A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle

A Papua New GXnea
Political Chronicle
1967-1991
A Papua New Guinea

Political Chronicle
1967-1991
Clive Moore with Mary Kooyman

Editors
CRAWFORD HOUSE PUBLISHING

BATHURST
C. HURST & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD

LONDON
A CHP Production
Produced and published in Australia by
Crawford House Publishing Pty Ltd
PO Box 1484
Bathurst NSW 2795
Published in the UK by
C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd
38 King Street, Covent Garden
London WC2E 8JZ
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
A Papua New Guinea political chronicle.
Includes index.
ISBN 1 86333 124 7.
1. Papua New Guinea- Politics and government- To
1975. 2. Papua New Guinea- Politics and government
- 1975- . I. Moore, Clive, 1951- . II. Kooyman,
Mary, 1928- . III. Title: Australian journal of politics
and history.
320.9953
C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd ISBN 1-85065-506-5
Copyright 1998 Clive Moore and Mary Kooyman and the
several authors in respect of the chapters contributed by them;
for the full list of such copyright owners, see the Table of
Contents of this volume.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying
or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers.
Printed in Australia
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Contributors and Editors

Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
viii
xii
XIll
CLIVE MOORE
Introduction
Papua and New Guinea's Political Development to 1967
XV
EDWARD P. WOLFERS
January-April 1967
May-August 1967
15
September-December 1967
23
January-April 1968
32
May-August 1968
42
58
ROBERT WADDELL
7
January-April 1969
74
May-August 1969
83
92
10
January-April 1970
99
11
May-August 1970
108
12
117
13
January-Aprill971
126
DAVID HEGARTY
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
May-August 1971
September-December
January-April 1972
May-August 1972
September-December
January-April 1973
May-August 1973
September-December
January-Aprill974
May-August 1974
September-December
1971
1972
1973
1974
134
143
151
160
170
181
191
204
214
220
227
JAMES GRIFFIN
25
26
January-June 1975
July-December 1975
233
247
DONALD DENOON
27
January-June 1976
271
28
29
30
31
32
DAVID HEGARTY
July-December 1976
January-June 1977
July-December 1977
January-June 1978
July-December 1978
286
294
308
316
321
33
STEPHEN POKAWIN
January-December 1979
330
34
DAVID HEGARTY
338
35
PETER KING
347
36
DAVID HEGARTY and PETER KING

January-June 1982
355
PETER KING
37
38
39
July-December 1982
January-June 1983
July-December 1983
362
367
373
YAWSAFFU
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
January-June 1984
July-December 1984
January-June 1985
July-December 1985
January-June 1988
378
385
397
405
416
429
447
47
MICHAEL OLIVER
July-December 1988
457
48
49
50
YAWSAFFU
467
482
497
NOTES
509
APPENDIX I
Papua New Guinea Colonial Chronology
550
APPENDIX II
Members Elected to the House of Assembly, 1964-1997
553
INDEX
561
CONTRIBUTORS AND EDITORS
Donald Denoon was Professor of History at the University of Papua New

Guinea when he wrote his chronicle. He arrived there in 1972 by the
scenic route from Uganda via Nigeria; but he departed more
conventionally in 1981 to Canberra. He is now Professor of Pacific
Islands History at the Australian National University. While at the
University of Papua New Guinea he edited (with Roderick Lacey) Oral
Tradition in Melanesia (1981) and (with Catherine Snowden) A History
of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea (1981). His most recent books are
Settler Capitalism (1983) and (with Kathleen Dugan and Leslie Marshall)
Public Health in Papua New Guinea (1989).
Emeritus Professor James Griffin was Senior Lecturer in History, University
of Papua New Guinea, when his chronicles were written. He was later Senior
Research Fellow in Pacific History, Australian National University;
Professor of Extension Studies (1981-84) and Professor of History (198890), University of Papua New Guinea. He has published widely on Papua
New Guinean and Australian History and politics. He has contributed
notably to the Australian Dictionary of Biography.
David Hegarty holds a BA, Dip Ed, from Melbourne University and an MA
from the University of London. He joined the University of Papua New
Guinea as a tutor in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies
in 1970. When he left in late 1982 he had been promoted to Senior Lecturer
and had served as Chairman of Department. He had previously lectured at
Monash Teachers' College in Victoria and had studied as a postgraduate
fellow at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica. His major research
and teaching interests have been in the politics, development and security
of the Asia-Pacific region with a special focus on Papua New Guinea and
the South Pacific. He has edited Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea:
studies of the 1977 National Election (1983), and authored numerous articles
and monographs on Papua New Guinea and South Pacific politics. Since
leaving Papua New Guinea he has worked in Canberra, Australia, as an
analyst in the Office of National Assessments, a Senior Research Fellow in
the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National
ix
University, a Senior Adviser in the Department of the Prime Minister and

Cabinet, and as an adviser to the Minister for Trade and Overseas
Development. He is currently employed in the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade.
Peter King holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the
University of Melbourne and a PhD in international relations from the
Australian National University. Since 1966 he has lectured off and
(mostly) on in Government at the University of Sydney. During 1981-83
he was Professor of Political and Administrative Studies at the University
of Papua New Guinea, and is currently Professor of Australian Studies at
the University of Tokyo, on leave from Sydney University. In 1988 he
became Foundation President of the Centre for Peace and Conflict
Studies at the University of Sydney, and was its Director from 1990 to
1992. His publications include From Rhetoric to Reality?, papers from the
15th Waigani Seminar (edited with Wendy Lee and Vincent Warakai,
1985), and Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New
Guinea (1987). He is a member of ex-President Jimmy Carter's
International Negotiation Network, and in recent times has lectured on
conflict resolution in Scandinavian universities and in Russia.
Mary Kooyman holds a BA from the University of Queensland where she
has worked as an editorial assistant for many years. She is co-author with
Martin Stuart-Fox of a Historical Dictionary of Laos (1991).
Clive Moore holds a BA and a PhD from James Cook University of North
Queensland, where he worked as a tutor in 1974-75. In 1981 he was
appointed to the Department of Extension Studies, University of Papua New
Guinea, as Lecturer in Social Sciences. During 1984 he was acting Director
of the Department, and from 1985 until1987 moved to the Department of
History as Senior Lecturer. In 1987 he was appointed as Lecturer in the
Department of History, University of Queensland, where he is now Senior
Lecturer. In 1979 he edited The Forgotten People and along with numerous
other works on the Queensland labour trade he is author of Kanaka: a history
of Melanesian Mackay (1985). More recently he co-edited Labour in the
South Pacific (1990) and compiled the Pacific History Journal Bibliography
( 1992). His current research interests are connected with Papua New Guinea,
the Solomon Islands and Queensland.
Michael Oliver holds a PhD from McGill University, Canada, where he
was a Professor of Political Science and Vice-Principal (Academic). He
later became President of Carleton University (Ottawa), then Director of
the International Development Office of the Association of Universities
and Colleges of Canada. He has published on the politics of pluri-cultural
states and was Director of Research for the Canadian Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism from 1964 to 1967. He has been a
Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex) and at
A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle
the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National

University. From 1984 to 1988, he was Professor of Political and
.Administrative Studies at the University of Papua New Guinea and edited
Eleksin: the 1987 National Election in Papua New Guinea (1989). He is
at present the National President of the United Nations Association of
Canada and Visiting Professor at Bishop's University, Quebec.
Stephen P. Pokawin is currently serving his third four year term as

Premier of Manus Province, Papua New Guinea. At the time of writing he
was Lecturer in Political and Administrative Studies with the University
of Papua New Guinea. He was seconded to the Manus Provincial
Government in 1981 to co-ordinate the establishment of Community
Governments in the Province. He contested the 1983 Provincial
Government Election and was elected as Member for Lelemasih
constituency. The Manus Provincial Government was suspended in 1984.
He was re-elected in 1985 after the lifting of the suspension and was
appointed by the Provincial Assembly as Premier of Manus. In the 1989
and 1992 Provincial Government Elections he was popularly elected as
Premier. He holds a BA (Hons) from University of Papua New Guinea
and an MA from McGill University in Montreal, Canada.
Yaw Saffu is Professor of Political and Administrative Studies at the
University of Papua New Guinea where he has taught since 1981. He
took a First at the University of Ghana and has a BPhil and a DPhil from
Oxford University. He taught at the University of Ghana, 1967-1980 and
at the University of Ibadan before coming to Papua New Guinea.
Born in India, Robert Waddell has worked in business in England, the
Netherlands and Indonesia. After becoming an academic he lectured in
politics in the University of Papua New Guinea from 1968 to 1974 and in
development studies at the University of New South Wales from 1974 to
1988. His doctoral thesis was on local government councils in Papua New
Guinea. He co-founded the appropriate technology organisation APACE
in 1976. Dr Waddell holds degrees and diplomas from Oxford,
Birmingham, the School of Oriental and African Studies (London) and
the University of Papua New Guinea. He is currently involved in the
fields of development education, development assistance policy and
practice, and appropriate technology. His publications include An
Introduction to Southeast Asian Politics (1972) and Replanting the
Banana Tree, a study in ecologically sustainable development (1993).
Edward P. Wolfers is Foundation Professor of Politics, University of

Wollongong. His contributions to this volume were written while he was a
Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs (New York). He has served
as consultant to the Papua New Guinea Constitutional Planning Committee,
1972-74; the Foreign Policy Review, 1979-81; the Security Review, 1991;
the United Nations Initiative on Opportunity and Participation, 1993; and
xi
intermittently for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as well as

the Ministry of Mining and Petroleum. Awarded a PhD by the University
of Papua New Guinea in 1976 for Race Relations and Colonial Rule in
Papua New Guinea (1975), he has published extensively on the history,
including race relations, politics and international relations of Papua New
Guinea and the wider region.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The fifty chapters in this volume are the Papua New Guinea Political
Chronicle published in the Australian Journal of Politics and History, 19671991, the flag-ship publication of the History Department ofthe University
of Queensland. Acknowledgement is due to all editors of the journal since
1967 and to its publisher Queensland University Press. Without them and
the labour of the chroniclers there would be no book.
Edward Wolfers, Robert Waddell, David Hegarty and James Griffin have
given their time to revising and re-proofreading their chapters in the
chronicle. They have also kindly agreed that all royalties from the book go
towards a fund to publish a monograph series based on postgraduate
students' theses from the History Department.
Geoffrey Bolton, now at Edith Cowan University, encouraged the project
from its inception. Eve Rannells, Law librarian at Michael Somare Library,
University of Papua New Guinea, helped provide details on politicians. Peter
Cahill and Edward Wolfers provided valuable comments on an earlier draft
of the Introduction. Thanks are due to Stewart Firth and Webb Books for
permission to use the map of colonial boundaries, and to the Geography
Department of the University of Papua New Guinea for the map of modern
Papua New Guinea.
Suzanne Lewis laboured for many months over the manuscript, and
survived a change from one word processing program to another, which
scattered parenthesis marks and introduced unknown hieroglyphics into the
text. She coped with remarkable aplomb amid the chaos and deserves great
thanks.
The book also owes much to the skills of Mary Kooyman, recently retired
editorial assistant of the Australian Journal of Politics and History, who
scanned the original political chronicles onto the word processor and
undertook the first part of the editing process, as well as casting a critical
and remarkably accurate eye over the final product.
Special thanks must go to the History Department, Research School of
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, for the financial
grant that made this publication possible.
ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations appear in the text and in the index.

ABC: Australian Broadcasting Commission/Corporation
ACTU: Australian Council of Trade Unions
AEC: Administrator's Executive Council
ALP: Australian Labor Party
Angau: Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit
ANU: Australian National University
Ass.: Assistant
Assoc.: Association
Aust.: Australia/n
BCL: Bougainville Copper Limited
BSIP: British Solomon Islands Protectorate
C'W: Commonwealth
CM: Chief Minister
Comm.: Commissioner
Comm.: Commission
CPC: Constitutional Planning Committee
CRA: Conzinc Rio Tinto (Australia) Exploration Pty Ltd
DAC: District Advisory Councils
DC: District Commissioner
DDA: Department of District Administration
Dep.: Department
DI: District Inspector
Dir.: Director
Ex. Mgr.: Executive Manager
GG: Governor-General
HA: House of Assembly
HR: House of Representatives
LGC: Local Government Council
MHA: Member, House of Assembly
MIF: Melanesian Independence Front
Min.: Minister
MLC: Member, Legislative Council
xiv
Napro: National Progress party

NGRU: New Guinea Research Unit
NSW: New South Wales
NZ: New Zealand
OPC: Office of Programming and Coordination
OPM: Organisasi Papua Merdeka
Pangu: Papua and New Guinea Union (party)
PC: Post-Courier
PM: Prime Minister
POM: Port Moresby
PPP: Peoples Progress party
Pres.: President
PSA: Public Service Association
PSB: Public Service Board
SC: Select Committee
SCCD: Select Committee on Constitutional Development
SPF: South Pacific Forum
SRC: Students' Representative Council
T&LC: Trades and Labour Council
UN: United Nations
Under-Sec.: Under-Secretary
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNTC: United Nations Trusteeship Council
UOT: Papua New Guinea University of Technology
UP: United party
UPNG: University of Papua New Guinea
INTRODUCTION
PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA'S POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT TO 1967
Clive Moore
I have come from 50,000 years ago

So they think
Others say I was born on 16th September 1975
Let my arrows fly another 50,000
Kumalau Tawali
"Niugini Panorama"
1984
This book contains a chronicle of politics in the Australian territories of
Papua' and New Guinea2 from 1967 until 1975 when the two colonies
became the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, and on through the first
sixteen years of Papua New Guinea's political history until the end of 1991.
The process of electing leaders to a national House of Assembly began in
1964; by 1967 when the chronicle begins the first House was in mid-term.
It was a unique time in the political life of Papua New Guinea. The first
political parties were being formed, and for the first time indigenous leaders
took their place in governing Papua New Guinea, growing with the task.
Two points need making before focusing the discussion on the pre-1967
years. First, political activity is not new to New Guinea. For tens of thousands
of years debates and political lobbying have been part of village life. People
joined together in gardening, fishing and hunting; and through trading reached
out to surrounding communities, dialect and language groups. Leadership was
generally acquired rather than inherited,3 and usually leaders could not order
compliance or make decisions on behalf of their people, relying on kinship
links, generosity and expected reciprocity to persuade. Leaders polished their
oratory, holding their followers through ability, hard work and eloquence.
Leadership could also be quite authoritarian, sometimes combining the roles of
statesman, warrior and priest in one man.4 Despite the existence of extensive
coastal and inland trade routes such as the Hiri, Kula or Te, which linked
leaders in exchange relationships over long distances, in many areas language
and dialect boundaries revealed little about political boundaries. Sometimes
alliances spanned language and dialect areas but deadly enmities also occurred
between close neighbours. Local disputes were settled by discussion,
often involving compromise. Village or clan gatherings were usual events,
xvi
Clive Moore
informal, lengthy and circumlocutory, arriving at decisions by consensus

not voting. Disputes between members of different communities often led
to war. Formal leaders are usually male, although there is no doubting the
influence of women, particularly older women, in discussions and
decision making. This pattern of male dominance is very evident in the
modern political process: only eight Papua New Guinean women are
mentioned by name in the entire 1967-91 political chronicle. 5
The second point is that the modern state is an artefact of nineteenth
century colonisation by the Netherlands, Germany and Britain, and by
Australia in the twentieth century. Just as they still do today, last century
the inhabitants of New Guinea and adjacent islands spoke hundreds of
languages, and lived in thousands of small societal units, each reasonably
autonomous but linked through inter-marriage, trade and warfare with
neighbouring peoples. There were never any overarching regional
governments; only small scale political units each governing hundreds, or
at most thousands, of villagers. Language and dialect groups indicate larger
cultural and sometimes political units but not in the sense of tribal "nations".
In many areas language and culture do not coincide. This lack of unity meant
that they could never combine against colonial intrusion, the final result of
which left three artificial political territories: the Indonesian province of
Irian Jaya, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.
Colonial Origins
The Maluku sultanates of Indonesia laid claim to areas of the Vogelkop
(Birdshead) Peninsula of east New Guinea over hundreds of years; Dutch
claims to the eastern half of New Guinea in 1828 were based partly on the
suzerainty of Maluku, which by then had been absorbed into their East Indies
colony. Formal Dutch annexation took place on 24 August 1828: all of
eastern New Guinea from the 14lst meridian on the south coast to the Cape
of Good Hope (Cape Yamarsba) on the north side of the Vogelkop; but still
not usurping the rights of the Sultan of Tidore to four areas of Geelvink
Bay and the Rajah Ampat Archipelago. Further expanded claims were
asserted in 1848, the claims made public in 1865 and again expanded in
1875 to the present boundary, except for a final change in 1893 when the
141st meridian border was altered to exclude land surrounded by a loop of
the Fly River which more logically belonged in British New Guinea. 6
German commercial interests in the Bismarck Archipelago were already
substantial when Germany took possession of northeast New Guinea on 3
November 1884 at Matupit Island in Simpson harbour on New Britain's
Gazelle Peninsula. The Protectorate of the New Guinea Company, with the
mainland known as Kaiserwilhelmsland, remained under company rule from
1884 until1899, when the failed enterprise was taken over by the German
state. The 1884 Protectorate did not include present-day North Solomons
province, Buka, Bougainville and the outlying Mortlock and Tasman atoll
groups. These were included as the border was expanded into the Solomon
Islands as far south as Santa Isabel Island between 1886 and 1889.
Introduction
XVll
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Introduction
XIX
Ten years later under the Anglo-German Treaty over Samoa the boundary
between the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (proclaimed in 1893) and
German New Guinea was moved north to its present position between
Bougainville and the Shortlands. At the same time most of eastern
Micronesia, the Mariana and the Caroline groups but excluding Guam, was
incorporated into German New Guinea as the "Island Territory". The
German Protectorate of the Marshall Islands, including Nauru, was added
to the German New Guinea territories in 1906.7
In September 1914 at the request of the Allies Australia and Japan
militarily occupied German New Guinea: Australia took over the "Old
Protectorate", leaving Japan controlling the "Island Territory" above the
equator. The southern section of the German colony was awarded to
Australia as a League of Nations Mandated Territory in 1921, remaining
under Australian administration until the interruption of the Pacific War,
1942-45. After the war the colony became a United Nations Trusteeship,
though governed as one unit with Papua until both became independent as
Papua New Guinea in 1975.
Papua is the twentieth century name of the British New Guinea
Protectorate, proclaimed on 6 November 1884 at Hanuabada, Port Moresby.
Australian colonists, particularly those in Queensland, were reluctant to
allow any other European power to colonise east New Guinea and expected
Britain to act on their behalf. Much of pre-Protectorate contact between
Papuans and outsiders was through the movement north of traders, labour
recruiters, missionaries, goldminers and officials from Queensland.
The chief executive of the British New Guinea Protectorate was a Special
Commissioner responsible to the Colonial Office, the title replaced by that
of Administrator in 1888 when the Protectorate became a British colony,
then altered to Lieutenant-Governor in 1895. Due to the untimely death of
the first Special Commissioner, from 1885 until1888 British New Guinea
was governed from Port Moresby and Thursday Island, Queensland's
northern-most administrative centre in Torres Strait. Even as a British colony
from 1888 New Guinea still fell primarily under the authority of Queensland.
All dispatches were liable to consideration by the Governor of Queensland,
acting on behalf of Britain and the Australian colonies which provided some
of the funds. Extraordinary matters could be referred to the Governor-inCouncil in any of the funding colonies but in reality there was little
communication or interference. British New Guinea was transferred to the
new Australian Commonwealth by Letters Patent in 1902, legislated for as
the Territory of Papua through the Papua Act 1905, and formally proclaimed
in Port Moresby on 1 September 1906. The chief executive's title was
changed from Lieutenant-Governor to Administrator after the death of the
long-serving incumbent Sir Hubert Murray in 1940. Temporary or acting
appointments, 1895-1940, were always termed Administrator.
The German chief executive of the company-colony from 1885 until 1899
was the Landeshauptmann, or Administrator. When German New Guinea
became a German colony, 1899-1914, the title changed to Governor. During
war-time Australian occupation of the colony there were Military
XX
Clive Moore
Administrators, but on the re-introduction of civil government in 1921 the

title reverted to Administrator, until war once again disrupted government
in the Mandated Territory in 1941.
The Second World War was a cataclysmic interruption to government
and everyday life in Papua and New Guinea. The Japanese attacked in
December 1941 and quickly occupied most of coastal New Guinea and parts
of Papua, though the Highlands were left largely unscathed. What
government remained was entirely military, although much of the
administration consisted of pre-war government officials in uniform. In the
early part of the war the Japanese set up quite elaborate systems of
administration in areas like the Gazelle Peninsula in New Britain and around
the Sepik.s The Australian army set up separate administrative units for
Papua and New Guinea. On 10 April19t12 the two units were combined as
the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (Angau), with headquarters
at Port Moresby, the first time that Papua and New Guinea were
administered as a single unit. Angau covered all areas not directly involved
in the war and was extended to cover the entire Territory between 1945-46.
Australia passed the Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act in
1945 to combine the two administrations but was unable to formalise this
until1949 because of the uncertain status of the League of Nations Mandated
Territory.
After the war even though two Australian Territories existed they were
governed as one by an Administrator based in Port Moresby. Thus the two
Territories became the Territory of Papua-New Guinea ( 1945-49) and then
the Territory of Papua and New Guinea onwards from 1949. When civil
government was restored during 1945-46 Angau disbanded. J.K. Murray
served as Administrator, 1945-52, followed by D.M. Cleland, 1953-67, D.O.
Hay, 1967-70 and finally L.W. Johnson, 1970-73. Michael Somare, with
majority support in the House of Assembly, was electe<l as Chief Minister,
1972-75, in preparation for independence. In December 1973 the office of
Administrator was merged with that of Australian High Commissioner:
Johnson served as the first High Commissioner, succeeded by Tom Critchley
in March 1974. Somare was the first Prime Minister, with Sir John Guise
as the first Governor-General, when the bird-of-paradise flag of the
Independent State of Papua New Guinea was raised on Independence Hill
in Waigani, Port Moresby, 16 September 1975.
Electing Politicians
Electing politicians to local, provincial and national government positions
is a relatively new concept in Papua New Guinea. Colonialism reduced the
autonomy of local political and social units. The colonial officials aimed at
"pacifying" local groups (meaning making them malleable to central
authority), and harnessed mainly male labour to maritime, plantation and
mining ventures, while leaving villages as autonomous as possible and not
a financial burden on the colonial state.9 Government was by European
officers on occasional patrols, backed up by part-time local 'officials", co-
Introduction
XXI
opted village leaders acting as interpreters, village headmen, medical orderlies and police. In Papua village constables were the counterparts of government headmen in New Guinea. The Germans called their indigenous officials
the luluais, headmen or local government representatives, and the tultuls
or interpreters. In some areas paramount luluais exercised authority over
lesser luluais. Australia never attempted to promulgate the position in Papua,
though there was provision made for Government Chiefs.IO
Government in Papua was initially divided into Divisions until1951, each
with its own Resident Magistrate, a pattern first laid down by Governor
William MacGregor in the late 1880s. Divisions were sub-divided into
smaller parts, under the control of Assistant Resident Magistrates, supported
by Patrol Officers. II In the New Guinea Territory the administrative units
were called Districts and the officials called District Officers, with Assistant
District Officers and Patrol Officers under them in Sub-Districts. After the
Pacific War the unified Territory was divided into eighteen administrative
Districts, each progressively subdivided into Sub-Districts (seventy-nine by
1969) as administration became more intense.
Various local church and a few informal government councils existed
before the Second World War. In New Guinea kiaps (patrol officers) sometimes called kivungs (large village meetings) to consult the people. In 1927
Motu-Koita villagers at Port Moresby elected the first local councillors, with
further elections in 1929 and 1935. These Papuan councils were remarkably successful, providing a forum for discussion of problems in these semiurban villages. Individual members acted as assessors for government courts
in matters concerning native custom and compensation, and provided a
conduit direct to Sir Hubert Murray.I2 But they lacked finances or statutory
authority until Australia's Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 and the Native
Local Government Councils Ordinance 1949-60 which passed to local government councils many of the powers held by village constables in Papua
and luluais in New Guinea. The first local councils were established on the
Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, at Hanuabada village, Port Moresby, and
on Baluan Island, Manus District.l3 In 1954 these "village councils" officially
became "local councils"; village constables were attached to council areas,
responsible for law and order, and became known as local constables. Local
councils were responsible for collecting all direct taxes on the indigenous
people, and were able to make and administer regulations on everything from
gambling and community work to controls on weapons, disease and plant
pests. These local councils were subJect to the Department of Native Affairs'
supervisors, later called advisors. I
Concerted policy to introduce universal local government dates from the
1960s. The council system was extended from 1960, a Local Government
Ordinance was passed in 1963, operating from 1965, and a Director of
District Administration was appointed in 1967. Although varying enormously
in the number of people they covered, the size of their areas and the level
of economic development in each, by 1967 there were 139 councils covering
eighty-two per cent of the population. The 1963 Ordinance also removed the
word "native", a significant change in policy, enabling non-native residents
xxii
Clive Moore
to stand for and vote in elections. Six years later 111 of the 142 councils
were multi-racial, with growing indigenous allegations that Australian
officials and councillors were dominating the local political process through
their English language competency and other means.l5 This came to a head
on the Gazelle Peninsula with concerted and violent opposition from the
Mataungan Association.l6
In the 1960s the largest councils, first Gazelle and Wewak-But, began to
delegate responsibility to Ward Committees, a move formalised by the
House of Assembly in 1967.17 Nominated District Advisory Councils
(DACs), made up from expatriates and chaired by District Commissioners
existed from the late 1940s. The Papua and New Guinea Act contained
provisions for nominated indigenous positions on Advisory Councils for
Native Matters, but none was ever established and in 1956 indigenous
members were added to the DACs. Ten years later the majority of DAC
members was indigenous. As local councils proliferated in the early 1960s
representatives of the councils became involved in regular District, Regional
and Territory-wide conferences. A Local Government Association was
formed in 1968, with annual conferences, followed in 1971 by the Local
Government (Authorities) Act which inaugurated a second level of local
government, overarching the limited geographic areas of the councils. Area
Authorities were established, District-level bodies set up to counter growing
regional sentiment, and made up primarily of local government council
representatives. Up to one-third of their members were appointed rather than
elected. With the advent of the House of Assembly in 1964 fundamental
questions arose concerning the roles of elected members and District
Commissioners, and central and local government. The intention in the 1971
Act was for DACs to be dissolved and District Commissioners and members
of the House whose electorates coincided with the local areas to have
speaking but not voting rights in all discussions. IS
_
Before the war the Lieutenant-Governor in Papua and the Administrator
in New Guinea received advice from European members of small Executive
and Legislative Councils. There were no elected members. Nominated public
servants held the majority of places (eight out of thirteen in Papua 192441, and eiht out of fifteen in New Guinea 1931-41) in the Legislative
Councils.l Non-official members were appointed by the Administration,
always representing plantation, mining, commercial and mission interests.
Each Territory also had an Executive Council composed of eight official
and one non-official members, the latter elected from among equivalent
members of the Legislative Councils.20 Papua New Guineans were not
represented, although officials and mission representatives were presumed
to protect their interests.
The post-war Australia Labor government introduced a new deal for
Papua and New Guinea, the terms of which continued under the LiberalCountry party government after 1949. Australia owed the people a
considerable debt of gratitude for helping to turn the war away from
Australia, and increased funding for education, health and welfare, but was
reluctant to transfer power from Canberra to J.K. Murray's Port Moresby
Introduction
xxiii
administration and was still not serious about training the indigenous people
to run their own country.
Australia's relationship with Papua and New Guinea in the 1950s and
1960s needs to be viewed against policy towards indigenous Australians and
the thinking behind the "White Australia Policy". Papuans were Australian
nationals with no right of entry into Australia. There are similarities between
the administration of Papua and New Guinea and remote Aboriginal
communities, particularly in the Northern Territory.21 From 1951 the
administration of Papua and New Guinea was combined with the Northern
Territory, with Paul Hasluck as minister,22 and Northern Territory patrol
officers were trained with Papua and New Guinea officers at the Australian
School of Pacific Administration in Sydney.
Within Australia, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (who were
Australians rather than Papuans only because of the territorial ambitions
of Queensland in the 1870s) lived in appalling conditions, deprived ofland
rights, largely confined to government reserves and missions, and controlled
by paternalistic laws. Not until a constitutional referendum in May 1967
were indigenous Australians counted in the national census and the
Commonwealth given power over the States in matters pertaining to them.
This was at a time when many Papuans and New Guineans had voted in local
council elections, and in two national elections, although the 1961 election
had been largely indirect. More than one million voters were on the electoral
roll for the 1964 elections.
The "White Australia Policy" remained current well into the 1960s,
though less firmly enunciated than in earlier decades. So at the same time
that Australia was giving way to international pressure to prepare Papua and
New Guinea for eventual independence, it was slowly changing conditions
for indigenous Australians and generally re-thinking racial attitudes. But it
would be much longer before indigenous Australians took control of their
own lives. Australian policy in Papua and New Guinea in the 1960s was well
in advance of that dealing with indigenous Australians.23
Australia established a "Staff Conference" in 1945, based in Port
Moresby, which continued until 1951. This was a committee of Heads of
departments and other co-opted officers of the government who advised the
Administrator on policy and legislation. Then in 1951 the "Staff Conference" was replaced by a re-constituted Legislative Council consisting of sixteen official and twelve non-official members, three of them elected by the
foreign population, which made laws subject to approval by the Administrator. There were three nominated positions for Papuans and New Guineans in the Legislative Council. The composition of the Council remained
stable throughout the 1950s but was amended in 1960, expanding the number
of members and allowing for more indigenous representation.
Just as the 1960s brought the beginnings of change for indigenous
Australians, the first years of the decade were crucial to shaping modern
Papua New Guinea. International changes stimulated constitutional changes
in Papua and New Guinea. The United Nations Trusteeship Council adopted
a resolution calling on Australia to set target dates for stages in political
xxiv
Clive Moore
advancement. Neighbouring west New Guinea was in turmoil as Indonesia

asserted its claims. Newly independent African and Asian nations were
looking harshly at Australia and its Territory. Then at the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers' Conference of 1960, African members took a hard line with
South Africa, which was forced to leave the Commonwealth in the following
year.24
Minister for Territories Paul Hasluck returned from the conference
converted to the view that the Territory needed a more representative
constitution. Amending legislation changed the composition of the
Legislative Council in 1961, which was expanded to thirty-seven places:
the Administrator and fourteen official members, twelve elected members
and ten appointed members. Six elected and six nominated members were
to be Papuans and New Guineans.
The Administrator was requested to nominate no less than two
members to represent undeveloped areas, and encouraged to include
missionaries and indigenous public servants as members. The Territory was
divided into six constituencies, each with one European representative
directly elected by Europeans, and one indigenous representative, chosen
via an indirect system, through local government councils and "electoral
groups" where there were no councils. People voted by lining up behind
the representative they favoured to take part in a regional conference to elect
a member. The old Executive Council was replaced by an Administrator's
Executive Council which consisted of the Administrator, three official
and three non-official members, at least two of them elected, and one
indigenous. The Administrator was obliged to seek the advice of his
Executive Council, and if he rejected such advice, to make a report to the
Legislative Councii.25
Further change came faster than the Australian government anticipated.
Several European members of the Legislative Council advocated introducing
a new constitution with an elected majority; a Select Committee to consider
this was established in March 1962, chaired by John Gunther.26 Then in
April a visiting mission from the United Nations, led by Sir Hugh Foot (later
Lord Caradon), put forward what has become known as the Foot Report,
which recommended the creation of a parliament of 100 members elected
by adult suffrage on a common roll, with no more than five official members.
Foot believed that this would transform political life in the Territory.27
The Legislative Council Select Committee did not go as far as the Foot
Report: there was to be adult suffrage and a common roll; the Australian
system of preferential voting was adopted but unlike in Australia voting was
not compulsory. The House of Assembly (the new name of the legislature)
was to have ten official and fifty-four elected members, and the non-official
membership of the Administrator's Council, all drawn from the elected
members of the House, was increased from three to seven, allowing a nonofficial majority. The Administrator was to nominate up to fifteen secretaries
from among them, and ten of the fifty-four elective seats were reserved for
non-indigenous candidates (the Special electorates). All others would be
Open electorates for indigenous and non-indigenous candidates alike.28
Introduction
XXV
The 1964 national election was the first large scale exercise of
democracy. In 1961 the elections operated on a nominal electoral role of
less than 500,000, which was doubled to 1,029,000 in 1964. Political
education campaigns preceded the elections with patrols reaching out
into remote villages, though as John Ryan notes many kiaps did not
bother to try to explain the intricacies of the Australian system of
preferential voting. Many voters used the "whisper" system in which
they were shown photos of candidates, whispered their choice and
watched the polling officer mark their ballot paper. Seventy-two per
cent of eligible voters actually took part. 298 hopeful candidates
contested the 1964 elections: 31 Europeans stood in the ten Special
electorates and 235 indigenous and 32 Europeans contested the forty-four
Open seats.29
Europeans won in six of the Open electorates, which the planners had
presumed would all go to indigenous candidates. The educational standards
and political abilities of the other thirty-eight members in Open electorates
varied: three (John Guise, Simogen Pita and Nicholas Brokam) had served
in the 1961 Legislative Council; nineteen had no schooling and only four
had been educated past Grade VI (all school teachers). Generally coastal
members were better educated than the Highlanders but only around half a
dozen members could hold their own in the House against Europeans, and
then only on topics of special interest. There were considerable language
difficulties in the parliament: only John Guise and Dirona Abe, both
Papuans, were fluent in English; twelve others spoke little English, and only
one Highlander spoke English; only two Papuans spoke fluent Tok Pisin.
Handabe Tiaba, member for Tari, knew only Huli, his mother tongue, and
could not communicate directly with any other member of the House. He
was provided with an interpreter between Huli and Tok Pisin.30 Debates
were in English, Tok Pisin or Hiri Motu with simultaneous translator services
provided. Five of the seven elected members appointed to the
Administrator's Council were indigenous: they and five others became
under-secretaries, understudies to the official members who were
departmental heads.
Establishing indigenous under-secretaries in a government in the
beginning stages of transition was not easy. The senior government officers
they understudied complained about their lack of training and ability, and
shared power to varying degrees. In turn the new under-secretaries felt that
they had not really been given any clear responsibilities, and that they were
not free agents, but expected to support the government. Lucy Mair quoted
one significant observation made by a journalist in relation to the 1968-72
House:
the votes of the members from the Highlands could at any time be carried
by an explanation of the question at issue in his fluent Pidgin by the district
commissioner for Western Highlands, who was one of the official
members.31
John Guise, member for Milne Bay and under-secretary for the Department
XXVl
Clive Moore
of Information, became leader of the Elected Members Group in the House,

with Matthias Toliman as his deputy and Barry Holloway and Zure
Zurecnuoc as two Whips; but there was never a unified voting bloc and the
Group dissolved in June 1966.32 It was also Guise who in 1964 called for
the setting up and became the chairman of a new Select Committee on
Constitutional Development. The 1962 Legislative Council Select
Committee had recommended the creation of the House of Assembly, but
many doubted the sincerity of the Australian government in bringing about
further constitutional change and political development. Guise's important
Select Committee, the report of which was presented to the House in June
and passed in final form in October 1967, is described in Edward P. Wolfers'
political chronicle for 1967. This report led to a major revision by Australia
of its Papua and New Guinea Act in 1968.
Political Parties
Papua New Guinea political parties fall into three categories: local branches
of extra-Territorial parties; indigenous-sponsored political parties formed
to mobilise votes in the House; and indigenous-sponsored movements and
associations aimed at mobilising electors on multiple levels. Wolfers
identifies the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist party) as the first foreign
party to have a branch established in Papua New Guinea, in Rabaul in the
1920s; though this was more of a social organisation than a political party.
Next came the Australian Labor party (ALP), with branches in Wau in 1938,
Rabaul and Port Moresby in 1941. Mainly on the basis "of evidence or
accusations supplied by their political opponents" Wolfers suggests that the
Italian Fascist and German Nazi parties had devotees in New Guinea before
the war, as did the Communist party of Australia and the Australian
Democratic Labor party in the 1950s. Certainly the_ United Australia
Movement and the Australian Country party made ventures into Papua New
Guinea in the 1960s. 33
The first home-grown party was the United Progress party, established
in 1960 by three members of the outgoing Legislative Council: Donald
Barret, RE Bunting, and Pita Simogen, the indigenous nominated nonofficial member for the New Guinea mainland, 1951-1960, later member
for Wewak-Aitape in East Sepik, 1964-68_34 The party went into self-imposed
suspended animation in September 1961. It lacked cohesion and finance,
but managed to stand four indigenous and five expatriate candidates in the
1961 Legislative Council elections: four of its candidates were elected; the
one successful indigenous candidate was Vin ToBaining from New Britain.
Indigenous-sponsored parties began to be formed just before this political
chronicle begins. Papua New Guinea's longest surviving and most famous
political party is the Papua New Guinea Union (PANGU) Pati, herein called
Pangu pati, founded on 13 June 1967_35 But Pangu was not the first. Oala
Oala-Rarua formed the first truly indigenous-sponsored party, the New
Guinea United National party, in September 1965. Oala-Rarua's party
negotiated with sixteen MHAs including five Europeans, but failed to secure
Introduction
xxvii
any support in the House and ceased functioning when Oala-Rarua

amalgamated both members and funds into Pangu pati in 1967 (from which
he was expelled the same year).36 Another, the Christian Democratic party,
was formed in June 1966 initially under the name of the United Democratic
party, endorsed by Peter Maut, president, and Otto Kovingre, vice-president
of the Wewak-But Local Government Council, along with Pita Simogen
(MHA Wewak-Aitape).
The last category of parties is indigenous-sponsored movements and
associations aimed at mobilising electors on multiple levels, which takes
us further away from normal European political parties towards less formal
more PNG-style parties. Local political movements of various types are
indigenous to New Guinea societies: charismatic individuals or warrior
leaders who could unite large numbers of followers for short periods,
perhaps just a number of years; religious cults, whether pagan or Christian;
and in the colonial era variations which were expressed as cooperative
movements and workers' associations, or what are generally known as
"cargo cults", in reality a vast array of micro-nationalist movements with
overtones of charismatic leadership and pre-Christian cults. Some "cargo
cults" managed to .get their leaders elected to parliament and many stood
candidates in local and national elections. Paliau Mal oat of Baluan Island,
part of the Admiralty Group, developed a political and religious organisation
which took control of the whole south Manus area. He was imprisoned in
1949-50 on spurious grounds, but later became president of the Baluan Local
Government Council and a member of the House of Assembly, 1964-72.
Koriam Michael Urekit, leader of a West New Britain cult movement, was
returned as MHA for the East New Britain Open electorate, 1964-78, and
his nominee Paul Manlel as MHA in West New Britain, 1964-68.37
Other political movements include parliamentary and popular wings
in the same organisation. Papua Besena was Josephine Abaijah's (MHA
1972-82) vehicle to advance her charismatic, rather quixotic Papuan
independence movement. But it was more than just a parliament-based
political party; perhaps Papua Besena is better described as a regional ethnic
movement or a charismatic movement, although it did have a political wing,
the Papuan Democratic Union, and involved Papuan leaders beyond just
Abaijah. 38 Another regional political movement, the Mautangan Association
of New Britain, is based among the Tolai, the dominant ethnic group on the
Gazelle Peninsula. John Kaputin, member for Rabaul since 1972, has always
been their main spokesman and was instrumental in setting up the
Mautangan Association's business arm, the New Guinea Development
Corporation. 39
Our list would not be complete without Napidakoe Navitu, formed on
Bougainville in August 1969 to act as intermediary between villagers and
Conzinc Rio Tin to Australia (CRA) in negotiations over its giant Panguna
copper mine. Because of the links between Napidakoe Navitu's president
Paul Lapun and Pangu, initially there was speculation of an amalgamation
but Napidakoe Navitu developed much broader economic and social aims,
canvassing for the future independence of the North Solomons. It also
xxviii
Clive Moore
supported three successful candidates in the 1972 elections.40

One limitation on the formation of political parties was the lack of a
strong trade union movement to foster worker-oriented candidates. The
situation was further retarded by the close hold ofthe Department of Labour
over workers' associations, and limits on their rights to fund political
parties.41 Left wing and labour parties were contemplated and even begun,
such as the Papua-New Guinea Workers' party in 1966 and the Social
Workers' party in 1973, but most left-leaning aspiring politicians soon joined
Pangu. However, workers' associations have been very successful vehicles
for national politicians, some of whom used them in fairly calculated ways
to further their own political ambitions.
There are several prominent examples of trade union and workers'
association leaders who became important politicians: Albert Maori
Kiki (MHA 1972-77), Gavea Rea (MHA 1972-77), Paulus Arek (MHA
1968-73) and Tony Ila (MHA 1972-92). Rise to political power through
leadership of a workers' association certainly applies to John Guise and
the Milne Bay Workers' Association. As Michael Hess says, although he
had been a waterside worker for many years on Samarai before the war,
Guise
was typical of the first generation of Papua New Guinea's political leaders,
in that he was a politician who stood outside the workforce he was attempting
to organise. 42
Revealingly, Sir John recalled to Hess that "if I didn't form a Workers'
Association ... I would have formed a political party". A consummate
politician and undoubtedly the most successful individual politician before
independence, though never party-oriented Guise's interest in trade
unionism was political rather than industriaJ.43
The 1967 and later political chronicles carry details on all political parties,
however short-lived, and the development of the long-stayers such as Pangu
and the People's Progress party.44
Early Politicians
Papua New Guinea's indigenous national political leaders honed their skills
in the 1960s and 1970s. Some of the earliest leaders served first in the
Legislative Council: Kondom Agaundo, Vin ToBaining and John Guise are
good examples of the diverse origins of these leaders during the political
transition.
Kondom, a tribal leader from Kundiawa, Chimbu (Simbu), served in the
Legislative Council, 1961-64, representing almost one million Highlanders.
Born in the late 1910s, the son of a war leader, but orphaned in early
childhood, Agaundo became one of the youngest luluais, involving his
people in coffee-growing and himself concerned in Waiye Local
Government Council, of which he became president in 1959. Agaundo had
numerous wives (estimates vary from seven to fourteen) and up to forty
natural and adopted children. Although he never learnt English and was not
Introduction
XXIX
fluent in Tok Pisin, he was a great Highlands orator. In the Legislative

Council he was constantly frustrated, a token Highlander, dignified and
progressive but bewildered by the foreign procedures. He expressed the
tribulations of a regional big man becoming a national political figure during
a speech in 1959:
My name is Kondom. I come from the bush. I have no English, I cannot read
or write. My tongue is thick, my head is stone. In my country I am a big man,
yet I stand before you as a child. I have been a leader with bow and arrow
and spear, but today I am a baby feeding at his mother's breast.45
Kondom lost his bid for the Chimbu Open electorate in 1964 and
tragically, was killed in a car accident in 1966.46
Vin ToBaining, born in 1915 at Latramat village on New Britain's
Gazelle Peninsula, schooled locally and trained as a pastor from
age seventeen to twenty-three, abandoned his studies and joined the staff
of the Raluana Methodist mission printery, rising to foreman. He moved to
Vunamami village in the Kokopo Sub-District and was appointed as
tultul after the war in 1946. The early establishment of local government in
the Gazelle enabled ToBaining to gain administrative and political
experience as vice-president of the new Vunamami Local Government
Council from 1951. Aged forty-six, he became a member of the Legislative
Council, 1961-64. A member of the Select Committee on Political
Development, he was also involved in negotiations with the Hahalis Welfare
Society on Bougainville in 1962 and represented the Territory at the
United Nations in 1963. After his term in the Legislative Council ToBaining
became president of the Gazelle Local Government Council. and was
involved in the land disputes and disagreements over the multiracial local
government system that led in August 1971 to the death of District
Commissioner Jack Emanuel. He was also a founding member of Pangu pati
and chairman of the Melanesian Independence Front formed in 1968.
ToBaining was forced into retirement by the emerging radical Mataungan
Association 1eaders.47
The last of our examples from the Legislative Council is the most
complex and arguably the real founder of the modern nation. John Guise
was born in Gedulalara village, near Dogura, Milne Bay District in
Papua in 1914, of mixed parentage. His grandfather, Reginald Guise, was
an adventurer who reached Papua in the early 1880s, and despite
being deported twice for unsettling the good order of the Protectorate,
returned to settle near Hula, became a trader and married locally.48 John
Guise grew up near the Anglican mission headquarters at Dogura, beginning
his four years of formal education in 1923. At fourteen Guise began work
on Samarai as a waterside worker for Burns Philp Pty Ltd and remained in
this job until war broke out, after which he served with Angau as a clerk in
Signals. In 1946 he joined the police force, rising over ten years to the rank
of sergeant-major, then spent five years in the Department of District
Services in Port Moresby, often coming into confrontation with the colonial
administration.
XXX
Clive Moore
Travel was part of the political awakening of John Guise. His first
overseas trip was to Australia in 1949, followed quickly by four trips to
Anglican Synods, and a visit to London in 1953 as part of the police
contmgent at the Coronation. Guise's first overt political activity was in the
Port Moresby Mixed Race Association, of which he became president in
1958. The association encouraged mixed-race Papuans to side with the
European elite, separating their development from other Papuans. He found
the elitism distasteful but was involved long enough to come to the attention
of the Administration which chose him to represent local opinion on the
Central District Advisory Council. They later regretted their choice because
of his opposition to all racial discrimination. Already "blooded" in politics
Guise entered the Legislative Council as member for East Papua in 1961,
becoming by far the most successful indigenous politician in terms of his
grasp of procedures and his progressive political philosophy. At this stage
Guise developed close connections with workers' organisations. Already
active in the cooperative movement he helped found the Milne Bay District
Workers Association.49
John Ryan compared Guise with other New Guinea political leaders of
the 1960s, suggesting that his only real equivalents were amongst the elite
of Netherlands New Guinea- men like Nicolaas Jouwe, Herman
Womsiwor, Johan Ariks, Eleizer Bonay, and Marcus Kaisiepo- most of
whom left before the Indonesians took over from the Dutch in 1963. The
Administration appreciated and fostered Guise's talents by sending him to
represent Papua and New Guinea at the 1962 South Pacific Commission
conference at Pago Pago, then later the same year and in 1965 sent him to
New York as special adviser to the Australian delegation at the United
Nations Trusteeship CounciJ.50
Ian Downs assessed Guise during his term in the Legislative Assembly
as "a cautious pioneer of nationalism at a time when h.e could expect less
support from his own people than from Australians".51 His statements on
the West Irian crisis and on the political future of Papua and New Guinea
were reasoned and moderate but strongly nationalist. His pre-independence
political career led him to be Chairman of the Select Committee on
Constitutional Development, Speaker of the House of Assembly, Deputy
Chief Minister, Minister for Lands and Minister for the Interior. He was the
first Papua New Guinean to be honoured with the degree of Doctor of Laws,
honoris causa, by the University of Papua and New Guinea in 1970,
followed by a knighthood in 1975 before he became Governor-General.
There is a degree of machiavellianism in the elevation of Guise out of the
political arena: he was so capable a politician that he was a threat to others
who desired the prime ministership. Yet there can be no doubt that Guise
was also the perfect choice for Governor-General: involved and dignified,
still at home with village people and equally fond of chewing buai (betel
nut). Ultimately frustrated by his vice-regal position he resigned in 1977
and returned to politics until 1982, dying in 1991. The cunning lone wolf
of politics in the 1960s and 1970s, Guise was an outstanding survivor.
Kondom, ToBaining and Guise are all politicians who date from before
Introduction
xxxi
the House of Assembly. Since the House first sat in 1964 Papua New
Guinea's voters have elected 440 national politicians. Only four have
become Prime Minister.
The Prime Ministers

Prime Ministers of Papua New Guinea, 1975-1997
Michael Somare*
August 1977 to March 1980
Julius Chan
Michael Somare
Paias Wingti
August 1987 to July 1988
Rabbie Namaliu
Paias Wingti
Julius Chan
September 1975 to August 1977

March 1980 to August 1982
August 1982 to November 1985
November 1985 to August 1987
July 1988 to July 1992
July 1992 to August 1994
August 1994-**
* Also Chief Mil!ister 1972-75

**Stood down March 1997
No description of Papua New Guinea would be complete without

detailing the career of the young Sepik journalist who became the most
important politician in Papua New Guinea's history, Sir Michael Thomas
Somare (MHA East Sepik). Born in 1936 in Rabaul where his father was
a sergeant of police from 1922 to 1945, Somare's home village was in the
Murik lakes district, west of the mouth of the Sepik. Educated in Wewak
and Finschhafen and a 1957 graduate of Sogeri Teachers' College,
Somare's first trip overseas was as a member of a School Teachers' group
which visited four Australian states in 1958. He visited Australia again in
1961. Somare taught in secondary schools in New Ireland, Wewak and
Madang before returning to Sogeri in 1962 to complete his Queensland
Junior certificate (grade 10). In 1964 he became an announcer on Radio
Wewak, but returned to Port Moresby the next year to attend the Administrative College to matriculate.52 Twenty-nine years old, he met a group
of students and staff through the Bully Beef Club at Administrative College. These men, and other public servants, later became important figures in national life. Albert Maori Kiki (MHA 1972-77), Niwa Ebia Olewale (MHA 1968-72), Reuben Taureka (MHA 1972-77) and Oala OalaRarua (MHA 1968-72) were all signatories to submissions to the Select
Committee on Constitutional Development and later became political
figures. Cecil Abel (MHA 1968-72) and Sinake Goava (MHA 1964-77)
joined in many of the discussions, as did Tony Voutas (MHA 1966-72),
John Guise (MHA 1964-75, 1977-82), Barry Holloway (MHA 1964-68,
1972-87), Paul Lapun (MHA 1964-77) and Pita Lus, the only member of
the present Parliament to have served continuously since 1964.
Somare was lucky to have been in Port Moresby at such a crucial time;
xxxii
Clive Moore
he returned to work at Radio Wewak late in 1966, but was back in Port
Moresby in mid-1967 to help found Pangu pati.53 Under its auspices
Somare contested the East Sepik Regional electorate in 1968, which he
has held ever since. A great negotiator and survivor, Somare has served
as Chief Minister (1972-75), Prime Minister (1975-80; 1982-85), Leader
of the Opposition (1980-82), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1988-92) in the
Namaliu government, and Minister without portfolio in the Chan
government. 54
Somare straddles the pre- and post-independence political modes. The
other three Prime Ministers have all been newer-style politicians. Sir
Julius Chan, born in 1939, of Chinese and New Ireland parentage,
educated to matriculation level in Queensland, like Somare has been a
constant force in politics for twenty-five years. A second generation
businessman of considerable wealth, Chan has been in parliament since
1968. One of the nation's most accomplished politicians, and credited
with introducing stable financial strategies, he has been Prime Minister
twice (1980-82; 1994-97), four times Deputy Prime Minister (1977-78;
1985-7; 1987-88; 1992-94), three times Minister for Finance (1973-77;
1985-87; 1992-94), and also Minister for Primary Industries (1978),
Trade and Industry (1986-87) and Foreign Affairs (1994). Knighted in
1980, Sir Julius created and remains the central power in and the
financial backer of the People's Progress party.
Rabbie Namaliu was born in 1948 at Kokopo, East New Britain.
Educated at Kerevat and Sogeri high schools Namaliu graduated from the
University of Papua New Guinea with a Bachelor of Arts in history and
English. Namaliu went on to complete a Masters degree in history and
politics at University of Victoria, British Colombia in 1972, returning to
the University of Papua New Guinea in 1973 as a Lecturer in the History
Department. For the next decade until he entered parliament in 1982
Namaliu moved through a series of administrative positions: principal
private secretary to Chief Minister Somare (1974-75); District Commissioner for East New Britain (1976); Chairman of the Public Service
Commission (1977); then principal research officer for Prime Minister
Somare and Pangu pati activist to 1980; and finally executive officer to
Somare as Leader of the Opposition in 1981. Member for Kokopo in East
New Britain, his education and administrative background prepared him
for cabinet positions as Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (1982-84)
and Minister for Primary Industry (1984-85), a period as Leader of the
Opposition and his final elevation to prime ministerial office, 1988-92. In
August 1994 he became Speaker of the House, and was knighted in 1996.
Paias Wingti, born in Moika, Western Highlands in 1951, was educated
at Mount Hagen community school and high school, studying economics
and political science at the University of Papua New Guinea until 1976.
Wingti never completed his degree, instead entering parliament in 1977
to represent the Western Highlands. He became Government Whip in the
same year, Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation (1979-80), Deputy
Prime Minister, (1982-85), Minister for National Planning and
Introduction
xxxiii
Development (1984-85), briefly Leader of the Opposition, then Prime

Minister (1985-87, re-elected 1987-88). Defeated by a vote of noconfidence in 1988 Wingti remained in the opposition until re-elected
Prime Minister in 1992. During his third term as Prime Minister Wingti
centralised the political system through a series of personal appointments
to key positions. and ~rovided parliamentarians with greater direct access
to government funds. 5
What seemed a clever but immoral parliamentary coup in September
1993 finally turned against Wingti in August 1994. Re-elected to
government in July 1992 Wingti took full advantage of the Namaliu
government's 1991 extension of the grace period before a motion of noconfidence could be introduced to parliament, from six to eighteen
months. On 23 September 1993, before the eighteen months expired,
Wingti resigned from office and the next day brought on a new election
for the position of Prime Minister. The opposition was caught off guard,
and, disgusted, walked out of the House in protest. Wingti thought
himself safe for another eighteen months and probably until the next
national election, but in August 1994 the Supreme court ruled that
Wingti 's re-election was invalid and declared him to have been only a
caretaker Prime Minister since September 1993, forcing another election
of the floor of the House. Wingti's popularity plummeted because of his
parliamentary tactics and personal life. Knowing that he did not have the
numbers to win, Wingti persuaded Bill Skate, the Speaker, to resign and
contest the prime ministership. On 30 September Chan in turn
successfully nominated Namaliu as Speaker, which assured his own return
to the prime ministership later the same day.
In March 1997 a scandal surrounding Sir Julius' contract with Sandline
International to bring foreign mercenaries into the country, to quell the
long-term rebellion in Bougainville, led to military and civil unrest. The
Commander of the Defence Forces, Brigadier General Gerry Singirok,
exposed details of the contract and demanded the resignation of Prime
Minister Chan, Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta and Defence
Minister Mathias Ijape. Two weeks of turmoil, the worst political
instability since Independence, led on Wednesday, 26 March, to the three
leaders agreeing to stand down while the circumstances of the contract
were investigated. John Gihenu, Member for Heganofi and an experienced
Cabinet Minister, was appointed acting Prime Minister.
Papua New Guinea goes to the polls in June 1997. Volatile but
reassuringly democratic, Papua New Guinea's parliamentary process has
continued to operate, though this time severely strained by military
rebellion just short of a coup d'etat. Let us hope that the vote of the
people at the elections marks out a clear path for the future.
The Political Chronicle

The Papua New Guinea political chronicle which follows was published
in the Australian Journal of Politics and History from 1967 until 1991. It
xxxiv
was then dropped from the journal as an anachronism, given that Papua
New Guinea became independent in 1975 and two other journals, Journal
of Pacific History and Contemporary Pacific carry quite satisfactory
Papua New Guinea poiitical chronicles, within a wider Pacific nation
context. The 1967-75 chroniclers were Edward Wolfers, Robert Waddell,
David Hegarty and James Griffin, followed by Donald Denoon, David
Hegarty, Peter King, Stephen Pokawin, Michael Oliver and Yaw Saffu,
1976-1991.
The original suggestion to include a Papua New Guinea chronicle with
the Australian State chronicles in the journal carne from Edward Wolfers,
who was about to take up a resident fellowship in Papua New Guinea. He
raised the possibility with Professor R.N. Spann of the Department of
Government and Public Administration, Sydney University, who in turn
wrote to Professor Gordon Greenwood of the History Department,
University of Queensland. Greenwood's response was positive, as Wolfers
says "at a time when politics in and concerning Papua New Guinea was
not a fashionable subject of academic interest in Australia".56 Thus began
the longest-running political chronicle of events in Papua New Guinea.
Initially it was necessary to be current with the media in Australia as
well as Papua and New Guinea, together with United Nations
publications. This was achieved through financial support from the
Institute of Current World Affairs for Wolfers' subscription to a
comprehensive Australian clipping-service. The United Nations
Information Centre in Sydney supplied relevant releases and publications,
particularly those relating to the Trusteeship council. After Wolfers' years
as chronicler Professor Charles Rowley of the Department of Political and
Administrative Studies, University of Papua and New Guinea (UPNG)
helped institutionalise the chronicle at UPNG, and Colin Freeman,
librarian in charge of the New Guinea Collection in .the UPNG library
agreed to subscribe to a clipping service to make the enterprise possible.
The authors have all been experts on Papua New Guinea affairs,
observing national politics from Port Moresby.
The chronicles have been edited slightly to standardise style, but all
retain a sense of immediacy; even the tenses used often indicate that they
are reports and analysis of recent events. Only a few cosmetic alterations
have been made to the chronicle, mainly to standardise spelling of names.
The "and" between Papua and New Guinea, correct from 1949 and 1971,
has been removed, and "Niugini" has been confined to Air Niugini,
although it was used interchangeably for Papua New Guinea in some
chapters of the political chronicle. "PNG" became a common term in the
1970s and is used in the later chapters of the chronicle.
The political chronicle is the most detailed account available of
national politics in Papua New Guinea, 1967 to 1991. The text is
augmented by two appendices. The first is an historical chronology of
Papua New Guinea to 1975, and the second contains a full list of
members of the House of Assembly, 1964-97. There is also a substantial
index.
1
JANUARY-APRIL 1967
Edward P. Wolfers
Australian policy in Papua and New Guinea since 1962 has had three
distinct, sometimes conflicting, elements. There has, firstly, been a
relentless insistence by the Minister for Territories, first Paul Hasluck, then
Charles Barnes, that "the people of the Territory have the right to choose
self-government or independence at any time". 1 Secondly, there has been
the hope that the movement towards self-determination "can proceed at a
pace [that the indigenes] ... want and in an atmosphere of calm". 2 The latter
hope has been based on the assumption that continued cooperation and real
harmony of interest between the Australian government and the territory's
leaders are not only proper, but likely. Lastly, the Australian government has
sought to establish certain minimum safeguards so that, should Australia's
hopes fail, the territory will soon be ready to follow whatever constitutional
path it chooses.
The first element has involved Australian resentment at outside criticism
of government policy for the territory, and fear that a radical elite might
attempt to force the pace, at a greater rate, and in a more independent
direction, than the indigenous majority presently desires. The second
element has led the Administration, albeit reluctantly at times, to increase
its consultation of local leaders, especially in the House of Assembly. The
increase in consultation has, however, often been granted less as part of a
consistent attempt to answer, or to foster local demands for a greater say in
Territory policy-making, than to demonstrate the Administration's faith that
"the real community of interest between the House and the Administration
can be used to the Territory's advantage". 3 Accompanying the last
assumption has been the vague hope, now increasingly acknowledged in
public, that the Territory's leaders will choose to remain closely associated
with Australia in the future, perhaps through some constitutional device
short of complete independence. The last element, based largely on fear, or
perhaps a realistic appraisal of the situation, depending upon one's
interpretation of official motives, has led to an Administration and Australian
government tendency to stress majority views in the Territory at the expense
of the views of the rapidly-growing educated elite. This stress has involved
attempts to discredit elite views as unrepresentative, and has led to quite
serious moves in the direction of preparing for the Territory's eventual
Edward P. Wolfers
independence of Australia, especially in the administrative sphere. The

resulting tension in policy between Australia's hopes and fears has tended
to breed indigenous frustrations far more likely to ensure the realisation of
the latter than of the former. Indeed, the first five months of 1967 have seen
the most vivid manifestations yet of the latent conflicts in Australian policy,
and, ironically, they have demonstrated very clearly the extent to which
administrative change is determining the rate and direction of political
change in the territory.
The New Administrator
Nineteen sixty-seven opened with the promise of a further liberalisation of

Australian policy in the territory. Just before the beginning of the new year,
the government indicated that Africans and Asians with specialised skills
would, for the first time, be allowed to work in the territory for periods of
up to two years. 4 In line with the recent relaxation of the domestic White
Australia policy which had for so long been extended to the territory's
immigration practice, the territory would be able to capitalise upon
experience from other underdeveloped countries, and especially from Japan.
On 8 January, Sir Donald Cleland retired after fourteen years as
Administrator of the territory. At his final press conference, therefore, he
spoke at length of his experience in, and hopes for, Papua and New Guinea.
The territory, Sir Donald felt, had now passed through the most critical
period of its development, and, although full self-government was still a
long way off, there should be no real worries on the road to nationhood.
His views depended for their validity, he pointed out, upon a strong
measure of control and wise policies on the part of the Australian
government. 5 He regretted only that the arbitration case over indigenous
public service salaries had not yet been settled, 6 and c.ast a glance at the
nature of constitutional change in the territory. His advocacy of a standing
committee of constitutional lawyers and independent members to replace
what he termed the present "voluntary committee" may even have indicated
a hankering after change, as his previous regret may have revealed a fear
for the future, that his strong denial of a recent deterioration in race
relations scarcely concealed. 7 Strong Australian control, the stress on the
long distance still remaining before self-determination, the assumption that
inter-racial cooperation was still a viable proposition, were the principal
points of Cleland's speech, as they had been the hallmarks of Hasluck's
career and policy.
There had been much speculation throughout 1966 as to Cleland's
successor. Mention had been made in the press of Messrs Falkinder and
Overall, respectively a former liberal backbencher from Tasmania, and
present chairman of the Australian National Capital Development
Commission, and of Sir John Crawford of the Australian National
University, especially once it had become clear that Dr J.T. Gunther,
formerly the Assistant Administrator (Services), now Vice-Chancellor of the
new University of Papua and New Guinea, was out of the running. The
January-Apri/1967
character, and comparative surprise of the appointment, of D.O. Hay, CBE,

DSO, a former Australian High Commissioner in Canada and representative
at the United Nations, gave rise to even more press speculation, when the
Minister for Territories, the Honourable C.E. Barnes, was dropped from
cabinet in late 1966. There was doubt whether this combination of events
strengthened the Department of External Affairs' influence over territory
policy-making in cabinet, or whether Barnes' new position isolated his
department even more than usual from cabinet interest. The long-term effect
of Hay's appointment, then, seemed crucial to most observers, if somewhat
difficult to predict.
The Sydney Morning Herald was not alone in greeting Hay as possibly
the territory's last Administrator. 8 This view was strengthened by the new
Administrator's UN experience, and the loss of a territories department
voice in federal cabinet, and its absence from the helm in Port Moresby.
The South Pacific Post looked to him as a man to "set a firm and precise
lead and avoid any unnecessary delays". 9 Only the Age dissented from the
common view, and feared that the appointment of a career public servant
could well strengthen Canberra's hand in Port Moresby, and even lead to a
complete takeover. 10 The fear of Canberra control, however, probably
reflects local territory fears rather than an awareness, observed in other
mainland papers, of the likely and existing irter-departmental tensions over
Australia's territorial policies.
Hay's first speech, on 9 January, immediately after his arrival in the
territory, set the tone at least for his first few weeks. He indicated a real
eagerness to get down to work and a personal desire for real involvement in
local policy-making. He promised increased consultation with the House of
Assembly and forecast much greater expenditure by Australia on the
territory's development in the next few years. His stress that he desired to
reduce the territory's dependence on outside economic and administrative
assistance hinted at a speeding-up of the territory's preparation which was
reinforced by the mild sense of urgency he imparted to an old article of
Australian faith in promising that Australia "will not be slow to make
constitutional changes if you, the people of the territory, want them". He
promised also to consider transitional steps towards a form of ministerial
government, and to increase local financial control to match the territory's
increasing contribution to the annual budget. 11
The promise of ministerial government was delivered anyway in the final
report of the House of Assembly's Select Committee on Constitutional
Development. Local budgetary control was later extended within the
framework of existing legislation, which allowed the six under-secretaries
not already members to be present at meetings of the Administrator's
Council, which he promised to consult rather more than in the past when
framing the 1967-8 budget.
Local participation was further supplemented later on with the
appointment of a second Highlander, Tei Abal (MHA Wabag) as
Under-Secretary for Labour. It is doubtful whether even this move
represented a recognition of conscientious labour or a further recognition of
Edward P. Wolfers
conservative leadership in the house.

Three Little Words
Expectations of an early definite shift in policy under Hay, and hopes for a
change in the minister's attitude towards the territory's political future did
not last long. The heated exchanges and mutual recriminations that occurred
in early March between the Australian press and Barnes ensured that.
The Australian of 4 March headlined a story that purported to be a report
of Barnes' speech to a small gathering at a public exhibition in
Melbourne. 12 Barnes claimed later that he had made his speech "off the
cuff', and had no record of it. His subsequent experience, however,
convinced him that the furore over his speech should "be taken as a
warning to any minister in future to have a written statement so that he has
some evidence of what he said" Y
The Australian reported Barnes as saying, "Independence for Papua-New
Guinea will not be achieved for very many years, if at all". 14 In substance
the statement probably did not represent any new departure in Australian
policy. It had long been said, and often reiterated, that it was up to the
people of the territory and the Australian government of the day to
negotiate over the future constitutional status of the territory after selfdetermination. The minister's unfortunate wording of the proposition,
however, led to a series of attacks on him, not the least of which implied
that he hoped for a direct constitutional link between the Commonwealth
and the territory on the lines of that governing New Zealand's relations with
the Cook Islands, or that between Puerto Rico and the United States.
The Speaker of the House of Assembly, H.L.R. Niall, flatly denied what
Barnes had said: "We will have independence much sooner than the
minister thinks and it will work." "It is not the first time_ that he has voiced
sentiments like this", wrote Peter Hastings, "although he has never before
been so frankly, brutally paternalistic"Y The reply to both charges was
swift. Both Barnes and the Prime Minister, Harold Holt, denied that the "if
at all" statement represented any change in policy, 16 and a cable was sent
from Canberra to Port Moresby to ensure the "correct" reporting and
explanation of the minister's remarks there.
Barnes, and Frank C. Henderson, 17 the most senior of the official
members of the House of Assembly, described the Australian's report as a
"distortion" of the truth, and suggested that the Age's rendition of the story
was the accurate one. Even the Age however, had quoted Barnes to have
"doubted whether Papua and New Guinea would ever be completely
independent of Australia" . 18 Barnes went one step further then, and
explained, "I said that the Territory's ties with Australia would continue
because it was isolated with us in the Pacific". 19 On economic and defence
grounds, the two countries' links would always be close.
Barnes' cable to the territory Administration was described by the
Australian as "a virtual direction to ventilate publicly throughout the
Territory the minister's spleen". 20 The Canberra Times described Barnes'
January-April 1967
statement as embarrassing, and the Age criticised him for it too. 21 The
Australian still continued unrepentant, and felt that "the words 'if at all' are
unwarrantably self-satisfied", 22 and there, but for some questions in the
House of Representatives,2 3 the matter rested - the real words used never
fully produced or denied, and their correct interpretation still in
considerable doubt.
The House of Assembly's Twelfth Meeting
The February-March meeting of the House of Assembly saw few matters
raised that had not been brought up before, but the proximity of the 1968
elections lent to their deliberation an urgency, and an explicitness about the
nature of some problems, that were both quite new to the House.
The first motion before the House began as "a discussion of a matter of
definite public importance, and rapidly developed, on both occasions as a
result of moves initiated by John Guise (MHA Milne Bay), into a debate on
the motion that "a Statutory Land Development Authority [on lines similar
to those of its Malaysian and Kenyan predecessors, be set up] to handle ...
every aspect of Land Resettlement ... with the object of centralizing and
coordinating all ... matters of Land Resettlement in the control of one
authority"Y The official members, with reservations as to the relevance of
overseas experience in this field, were soon forced to accept the elected
majority's support for the proposal. It seems likely, then, that one body may
soon replace the five departments, plus the relevant labours of the
Development Bank, the two Assistant Administrators and the Department of
Territories, Canberra, in this field. Guise's motion, in fact, represents the
second recent attempt by the House to alter present administrative
arrangements in the territory, though his motion was more definitely worded
than its predecessor, which only requested the Administrator last year to
consider the establishment of a Department of Local Government.
The continuing land and mining problem on Bougainville was again
raised during this meeting of the House, only to result in the usual confusion
and differences of opinion when debated. In November 1966, the House of
Assembly had finally supported Paul Lapun's (MHA Bougainville) attempt,
over the official members' opposition, to work a compromise between the
Administration and Conzinc Rio Tinto (Australia) Exploration Pty Ltd
(CRA) on the one hand, and the Panguna people of Bougainville on the
other. Lapun had sought to reconcile the Panguna people's opposition to
CRA's copper explorations through offering them five per cent of the
Administration's mining royalties from the project. Unfortunately the
Panguna people had again opposed the CRA application in February to
continue its activities, and the compromise appeared to have failed.
Don S. Grove, Director of Lands, Surveys and Mines, then made a
statement to the House to inform it of the current situation at Panguna.
Grove's statement indicated the nature of CRA's difficulties in Bougainville,
and showed the attempts CRA was making, through provision of high school
scholarships, etc., to win the local people's cooperation. The ensuing debate,
Edward P. Wolfers
however, developed into a series of attacks on the Panguna people for

retarding the territory's development, and for not being satisfied with the five
per cent of royalties offered them. 25 Even Paul Lapun, who had fought so hard
for the five per cent compromise, was attacked by some members, though it
seems clear that he had not foreseen in November that the Panguna people
were not amenable to any compromise at all and simply wanted to retain
complete control of their land. The debate swung around completely towards
the end, however, and the attack on Lapun and the Pangunas initiated by
Graham Gilmore (MHA South Markham) was answered by an impassioned
defence of Lapun by Pita Lus (MHA Dreikikir), and of the Panguna people,
at least against the sorts of attack made in the House, by Barry Holloway
(MHA Kainantu).
The Appropriation Bill (No 2) 1966-67, the end of the year adjustment to
the main annual budget, produced a minor surprise in the ease with which
the House approved of the restoration of the $50,000 it had cut from the
original budgetary allocation for overseas recruitment, and, indeed,
supplemented it by a further $10,000. The original $50,000 had been struck
from the budget as a gesture intended to show that the "House generally
viewed the continued recruitment of persons from Australia and elsewhere
as something to be avoided whenever possible",26 and in order to emphasise
the House's demand for greater participation by its members in the budgetmaking process. The restoration of the original $50,000, however,
represented a reluctant realisation of necessity by the House rather than an
Administration victory. It was still emphasised by many elected members
that the training and recruitment of local officers needed to be increased. In
addition, the justice of the members' second demand received a measure of
official recognition.
Between the Treasurer's (A.P.J. Newman) second reading speech on the
budget and its debate by the House, L.W. Johnson (Assistant Administrator
(Services)) made a statement to the House in which he expressed the
Administration's desire "to increase the degree of consultation in framing
the budget for the next financial year"Y In part, his statement was merely
the follow-up to Hay's remarks in his first speech in January, and in part,
the Administration's attempt to compromise with the House's demands
during the original budget debate. If anything, the Administration's
proposals simply robbed the final report of the Select Committee on
Constitutional Development of some of its thunder, while, in fact, intending
nothing not already provided for in existing legislation.
Johnson's statement promised increased consultation with all members
when preparing the budget, and with the Administrator's Council in
particular. The six under-secretaries not already in the council would be
consulted by it in relation to their departments' estimates. In all, the
promised changes were slight, and conceived within the framework of
current legislation. Their meaningfulness would depend as much on the
Administration's goodwill as upon the House's effectiveness in pressing its
demands.
John Guise and Lepani Watson (MHA Esa' ala Losuia) seemed to
January-Aprill967
emphasise the futility of those who hope for seventh statehood when,
separately, they pressed for Papuans and New Guineans to be trained
respectively as information officers and diplomats and posted overseas. The
Public Officers (Employment Security) Bill 1967, which gave legislative
form to the White Paper on the future security of permanent overseas
officers of the public service, only reinforced the apparent decolonising
tendency of Australian administrative policy in the territory.
The Public Officers Bill "gives machinery to give an assurance of job
security to permanent overseas officers of the public service by providing
for a compensation scheme for them in the event of the premature
termination of their services because of the requirements of localisation of
the public service or of political or constitutional change in the Territory". 28
Clearly, the Administration fears that, far from actually promoting stability
within the public service through providing security for its members, the
bill may actually foster fears and insecurity among those of the House's
members, probably still the majority, who fear desertion at, and even the
term, independence, though not a steady progression towards the same
result. In order to avoid too confused and disturbing a debate, therefore, and
possibly to forestall the criticism of members such as Ian Downs (MHA
Highlands) who felt that a contract service promotes insecurity and who,
therefore, desired the return of the old-style permanent service, 29 and of
those members possibly unsympathetic to any compensation for Europeans
who wanted, or needed, to leave as local participation in government
increased, W.W. Watkins (Secretary for Law) requested members to ask
their questions then for recording in Hansard, or to submit them to him
"before the bill is again debated, as the Government is anxious that the
scheme be fully explained and understood throughout the Territory". 30
Many members seemed to view the state of race relations in the territory
rather differently from Sir Donald Cleland. Indeed, one of the principal
preoccupations of the House seemed to be with the general theme of interracial and inter-regional relations, and there was widespread support for a
proposal to set up a three-member committee to recommend amendments to
the Discriminatory Practices Ordinance 1963. 3'
The many separate speeches as well as the general debate on the subject
of law and order in the territory seemed to focus very much on inter-racial
and inter-tribal relations too. The need for greater concentration on primarylevel education was repeatedly stressed, though its emphasis varied from
many indigenous members' purely parochial demands for more schools in
their own electorates, to the rather mild echo of the Highlands Farmers and
Settlers Bulletin 's 32 attack on the new university which appeared even in
O.I. Ashton's (MHA New Britain) attack on the "Hilton-like" facilities at
Vudal Agricultural College and Keravat High School, and on "the June
Valley dragon just about to devour its eight [sic] or ninth professor"Y
It was during the debate on the Native Employment (Amendment) Bill
(No. 2) 1966 that one of the more revealing exchanges took place, and one
with some relevance for the political groupings that were to emerge after the
thirteenth meeting of the House. The bill under debate proposed, against the
Edward P. Wolfers
wishes, but not against the vote, of Ian Downs, to provide rural workers
with one week's annual leave. John Stuntz (MHA East Papua) was able,
however, to amend the bill to allow casual workers and their employers to
terrninate their employment "at any time by eiiher pany wiihout notice", 34
and only six members were prepared to vote against him. John Guise's
amendment to increase the leave provision for plantation workers from six
to twelve days fared little better than Stuntz's opponents had done, and was
lost by fourteen votes to thirty-eight. Finally Stuntz was able to have the
leave due to agreement workers deferred until the end of their two years'
contract. The debate on Stuntz's initial amendment, however, provided the
occasion for an exchange between Downs and A.(Tony) C. Voutas (MHA
Kaindi) which highlighted the growing tensions between those who identify
themselves with the indigenous cause in a radical sense, and those with a
real economic stake in the country who assume (perhaps need to assume)
that race relations are good.
Downs had written a series of articles for the South Pacific Post, 35 and
spoken in the House, on the need to restrict the over-production of coffee.
Indigenous planting should be restricted, he felt, and the cash-cropping of
sweet potato and other locally-grown staples encouraged. Downs felt "unable
to weep with" the indigenous members over coffee prices, for they were
now even endangering European holdings. The Highlanders were beginning
to "substitute [coffee] for food in the cyclic food planting programme", and
even to buy food instead of planting coffee simply "as an extra agricultural
effort". 36 Downs seemed to feel then that Voutas' consistent support of the
losing side in the Native Employment Bill debate represented an attempt on
Voutas' part to gain the "reputation of being the only man who looks after
the people of Papua and New Guinea in this House ...". "Mr Voutas", he
said, "likes to call himself a brother of the people", but his irresponsible
attitudes were more likely to foment than to prevent inter_-racial troubleY
The Emergence of Parties
In the long-term, probably the most significant events of the first half of
1967 will prove to be the emergence of the territory's first two political
parties able to command support within the House of Assembly and outside.
The facade of unity which the caucus of all of the elected members of the
House of Assembly had provided had never commanded the ideological
unity or the organisational means for the emergence of a party, and even the
facade had crumbled by the middle of 1966. On paper, the territory had
only one political party.
The New Guinea United National party was formed in September 1965.
It gained the allegiance of no members of the House of Assembly, and its
total membership was never publicly revealed to consist of anyone apart
from its president, Oala Oala-Rarua. Once its formation was announced, it
had rapidly collapsed under pressure of the attack by certain MHAs,
especially Frank Martin (MHA Madang-Sepik), who disapproved of its
mildly socialistic platform, and the too-ready embrace of a few European
January-Apri/1967
radicals who sympathised with its platform rather than understood its
organisational problems. Party membership had offered no real advantage to
the present members of the House of Assembly, and the possible
disadvantage of association with a party whose aims were vague,
organisation nebulous, and leadership uncertain. An overly eager press corps
in search of significance where it hoped for it rather than found it, and the
failure of the party's appeal for non-European support, had ensured its
effective demise.
For at least eighteen months before its final formation, there had been
rumours of a potential political party in the Sepik district. There had been
signs in the press and elsewhere of a possible connection between the future
party and the leadership courses sponsored by the local Roman Catholic
mission both within the territory and in Melbourne, while its likely seventh
state bias was only too readily apparent. In March, however, the South Pacific
Post reported that the present United Christian Democratic party had been
formed already in June 1966, under the name of the United Democratic party, 38
although the party's first formal meeting was only held in May 1967.
The Christian Democratic party began with a circular from Otto
Kovingre, vice-president of the Wewak-But Local Government Council,
endorsed by Peter Maut, the council's president, and Pita Simogen (MHA
Wewak-Aitape). The party's original aims were: "(1) To unite the nation of
Papua-New Guinea as one country; (2) To unite all people of all
denominations; (3) To get people to follow the law of the Government
provided the law agreed with the law of God; (4) To unite all people of all
races in the country; and (5) To make people stop stealing, fighting and
murdering and to bring all together as brothers and sisters of one big family
within the party". 39 The explicit formulation of these aims seemed vague
when it was reported that the party opposed the early granting of selfgovernment, but that it would approach Oala Oala-Rarua's party to suggest
their amalgamation. The latter party had, of course, advocated the early
granting of self-government, originally by 1968, and Simogen's comment
that the two would never unite seemed rather more realistic than other
reports.
In May, the Christian Democrats finally announced a programme quite
at odds with that of Oala-Rarua's party, while its leaders seemed to be a
much less sophisticated group of European-guided pidgin-speakers. The
party's principal aims were: seventh statehood for the territory within the
Australian federation, and, simultaneously, to have pidgin as the territory's
national language; to endorse candidates in the House of Assembly and Local
Government elections, and to encourage primary education. 40 The party's
leaders later denied any association with the Roman Catholic church, 41
though its first meeting opened and closed with the Lord's Prayer and Ave
Maria, and its leadership included a mission catechist and two mission school
teachers. The two European members were a Roman Catholic priest and
Graham Gilmore, MHA. One of the party's leaders, Peter Maut, has already
been endorsed as the successor to its only other member in the present
House of Assembly, Pita Simogen. 42 At first centred exclusively in the
10
Edward P. Wolfers
Wewak area, the party soon claimed adherents at Madang, Kavieng and
Rabaul, and was recruiting in Lae, Port Moresby and Maprik to boost its
membership from the total of 3,000 at the end of MayY
Outside \Vewak, however, there was much discussion during the year as to
whether the territory was ready yet to have political parties, and, if so, how
many and of what type they should be. 44 Much of the debate centred around
the territory-wide hearings of the House of Assembly's Select Committee on
Constitutional Development. Various suggestions were made. One prominent
leader from the Finschhafen area suggested that two political parties be set
up, and even stated his preference as to what they both should seek to
represent. Tony Voutas, MHA, on the other hand, toured the New Guinea
district and regional local government conferences, and sent a letter to all
council presidents, suggesting that a local government party be formed. 45 The
Voutas proposal was potentially illegal in that it might involve direct council
donations for political purposes, and dangerous in that it could lead the
party's opponents to oppose local government as an institution. James
Meanggarum (MHA Ramu) wrote to the councillors and other people in his
area stating that "The time for 'yes sir, yes sir' is now finished, and I think it
is now time for 'no sir'. Things are not as they ought to be, because we have
not got a party, and we are in the habit of speaking one at a time and alone [in
the House of Assembly] about your conditions and the conditions of the
people of this country, "Meanggarum asked the councillors and people to
start a party, and not to heed" the cajoling of administration officers". The
platform should concern the necessity of roads and bridges for economic
development, improved wages for workers and mission teachers, and better
prices for producer cooperatives.~6 In short, there were some demands that
political parties be set up, but no attempt, outside the Wewak area, perhaps
because there was not the necessary knowledge, to start them.
The point at which many political demands received ~xplicit formulation,
and about which many organisational demands crystallised, occurred when
a group of thirteen Papuans and New Guineans presented their much
publicised demands for self-government to the Select Committee on
Constitutional Development in mid-March. The submission was actually the
third of a series which were presented in April 1966, by a group of ten
Papuans and New Guineans which included six of the final thirteen names
from January 1967, over the signatures of Cecil Abel and Albert Maori
Kiki, and then in March 1967. The final thirteen signatories were Dr
Reuben Taureka, the most senior indigenous public servant, Dr Ilimo
Batton, Albert Maori Kiki, Joseph Kaal Nombri, Gerai Asiba, Ebia Olewale,
Elliott Elijah, Cecil Abel, Sinaka Goava, Kamona Walo, Penuelli Anakapu,
Oala Oala-Rarua and Michael Somare. Cecil Abel was the only European
and Joseph Nombri the only Highlander among them, while only three were
from New Guinea. Three were government trainees, three patrol officers,
three concerned with education, two were doctors, plus a broadcaster and a
workers' association leader. All of them had acquired some prominence
outside their home areas, in the urban environment. 47
The demands of the thirteen were of a markedly different kind from
January-April 1967
11
those of most of the witnesses who had appeared before the Select
Committee, though no more radical, if nonetheless different in form, than
the suggestions circulated shortly thereafter by two MHAs, Messrs Voutas
and Holloway. 48 The thirteen claimed there was a "widespread feeling
amongst our thinking people that Federal Government [sic] is temporising
and foot-dragging". They pressed "for constitutional changes involving the
setting up of an Executive and the granting of nothing less than limited selfgovernment in 1968".'9 They wanted the under-secretary system to be
replaced by full ministerial government with at least eight ministers
including a chief minister, and the Administrator to be replaced by a high
commissioner with a Papuan or New Guinean deputy. They sought control
of the ministries of Home Affairs, to replace the present Department of
District Administration, Local Government, Lands, Surveys and Mines,
Labour, Information and Culture; with local Finance and Education to be in
local hands, their previous directors to become permanent secretaries of
their departments. They wanted the localisation of the public service to
proceed at a greater rate, under the guidance of a new Public Service Board
(PSB), to replace the present Commissioner. The "new framework after
1968 must be a 'caretaker administration'", or transition commission,50 they
felt, and their reasons for confidence in the success of the handover they
proposed were based on their conviction that there must be "a complete
face-about ... in policy and outlook on indigenous rule", their faith that "a
new type of politician will emerge in 1968 - younger, better educated and
with greater understanding of politics", and that the public service already
contained men quite capable of holding down its top positions. 51 The
group's combination of youth, education and organisational achievement
was impressive, and even the South Pacific Post welcomed the group's
submission with but few reservations, mainly concerning its fear that
overseas investors might be disturbed by such demands. 52
The response of Watkins, Secretary for Land, and Deputy Chairman of
the Select Committee, was as predictable as the reply to him was sharp.
Watkins felt that "all of these people could not possibly go along with some
of the statements here, which I think are impertinent, and also show an
absolute disregard for what has been done for the Territory ... and exhibits a
situation which shows no thanks for what has been done" .53 Other
correspondence in the press conveyed a similar charge of ingratitude on the
part of the "12 apostles", 54 but Watkins' remarks were quickly countered
with the charge that they almost bordered on contempt of the House of
Assembly. 55
It was, then, scarcely surprising when the "thirteen angry men" and nine
members of the House of Assembly announced on 13 June that they had
formed the PANGU Pati (the Papua New Guinea Union). The party
included Paul Lapun, Pita Lus, Barry Holloway, Nicholas Brokam, James
Meanggarum, Tony Voutas, Paliau Maloat, Wegra Kenu and Siwi Kurondo,
MHAs, all from the New Guinea side, and only the last-named from the
Highlands, and, later, John Guise and Eriko Rarupu, both Papuans. The
interim central executive of J.K. Nombri (Highlands), Oala Oala-Rarua
12
Edward P. Wolfers
(Papua), Michael Somare (New Guinea Mainland) and Vin ToBaining (New
Guinea Islands) represented all of the territory's major regions. It was also
announced by Oala-Rarua that the New Guinea United National party had
now ceased to exist.
The party desired home-rule, leading to ultimate independence, the
territory's unification, increased localisation of the public service, improved
educational and communication facilities, and increased economic
development through stepped-up overseas investment. Again pidgin was
advanced as the territory's nationallanguage. 56 As yet, however, the party's
final platform and constitution are not public. Recent allegations, both in
the press and on the radio, that at least two prominent MHAs openly
advocate the cause of the rebel Rhodesian government may provide the
party with some interesting opponents.
Local Public Servants' Pay
The decision of the public service arbitrator on salary rates for local officers
in the territory public service, L.G. Matthews, was finally handed down on
11 May. In sum, he awarded a $40 per annum rise to all officers in the
lowest adult male range of $440-560, and a $600 increase to those in the
top present salary levels, i.e. above $4,875. At the intermediate levels, he
simply set two benchmarks from which the complete structure could be
evolved. The present $950 paid to first class artisans, patrol officers, grade 1
education officers and grade 2 clerks was raised to $1,070, and the $1,700
paid to professional graduates, class 1, rose to $1,950. All pay-rises were to
apply only from the first pay period in July. 57
Local feeling over the small rises, granted after a hearing which began in
October 1965, ran high. Local Public Service Association (PSA) branches
expressed their dismay at the decision, a petition was circulated requesting
the Governor-General to disallow the decision, and Matthews' dismissal
was sought by the association. Despite Barnes' attempts to discredit the
protesters as an unrepresentative minority of dissidents, and his opinion that
"The umpire's decision is final and must be obeyed", 58 the decision was
followed, on 2 June, by probably the largest demonstration ever seen in Port
Moresby, when 1,500 people, not all of them public servants, marched
through the town to present a list of demands to the Administrator, David
Hay. 59 The PSA has now filed a memorandum with the Australian Prime
Minister requesting a review of the decision by the president of the
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and two of his
nominees. 60 The decision has not been disallowed, and will, therefore, be
enforced, but the memorandum is as yet unanswered. One form of
preparation for self-determination at least, the lowering of indigenous public
servants' pay-scales in accord with the territory's "capacity to pay", seems
to be exercising a very great influence on the form of the indigenes'
ultimate decision.
The scandals revealed by the House of Assembly's Public Accounts
Committee in regard to local public service housing, while nonetheless
January-April 1967
13
dismaying, can only have reinforced the feelings of disaffection aroused by

the pay decision. 61 Surprisingly, however, Barnes admitted the accuracy of
the committee's claims.62
The Final Report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development
The Select Committee's report was presented to the House of Assembly in

June, but as Hansard was not available at the time of writing, this report of
its contents and reception by the House are all that can be retailed of the
thirteenth meeting.
The report was unanimously adopted by the House, qualified only by the
comment by the Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs), F.C.
Henderson, that he felt the use of the word "minister" to be misleading.
Two other members at least were reported to have been surprised when the
report was debated, and had left the chamber for their notes when the
debate lapsed for want of further speakers. One member of the committee,
Tei Abal, claimed that he could not understand the report he had helped
make because it was not available in pidgin.6 '
Although "The Committee does not see its recommendations as committing
the country, or attempting to commit the country to any particular course"64
of constitutional development in regard to legislative-executive relations, its
report represented a cautious advance towards the territory's selfgovernment. The report recommended that the Administrator's Council be
replaced by an Administrator's Executive Council consisting of the
Administrator, three official members of the House of Assembly, seven
ministers and one additional MHA appointed at the Administrator's
discretion, all of whom, bar the Administrator, should be appointed by the
Minister for Territories on the Administrator's nomination. Subject to the
Administrator's responsibility to administer the territory on the Australian
government's behalf, the Council "should be the principal instrument of
policy of the Executive Government of the Territory, and should have the
final responsibility within the Territory for advising the Administrator on
budget policy and planning". 65 As "the members of the Council would not
publicly oppose the advice of the Council and the policies laid down by
it" ,66 it is, however, theoretically possible that the three official members
could be bound to support the Council's majority, or at least not to oppose
it, when the Council's advice is rejected by the Administrator- an
interesting source of potential embarrassment for the Administration, which
could, therefore, lose three votes in the House of Assembly, though these
three are probably more likely to abstain, than to vote against the
Administration policy in the House. The Administrator must report his
reasons for rejecting the Council's advice to the House as soon as possible.
The seven ministers, selected without racial qualification, will "share
responsibility with [their] Departmental Head[s]"Y The minister will
represent his department in the House, and, in cases of dispute between the
minister and the departmental head the Administrator will decide the issue.
It is suggested that the powers and duties of ministers should be reviewed
14
Edward P. Wolfers
by the House after a minimum of two years, as the "capability of a Minister

could develop to the extent that he is able to assume sole ministerial
responsibility for the department", or "the needs of, or situation within a
department could warrant an increase in the Minister's authority" .68
In departments without a minister, assistant ministers will be appointed
with powers spelt out, but not markedly different from those of the present
under-secretaries. Thus, all sixteen Administration departments will have a
measure of elected representation in the House, but the extension of the
obligation not to oppose the Council's decisions to the assistant ministers
probably only serves to add sixteen votes to the ten official votes in a
House of ninety-four when the two groups agree, and makes very little
difference when the elected members of the Council are in a majority and
opposed to the Administration. A great deal therefore depends on the calibre
of the Administration's nomillt:t:~ fur t:xecutive positions, especially as the
defeat of a minister's proposal in the House does not require his resignation
- shades perhaps of a future separation of powers?
The Council, though finally responsible for the annual budget, will be
assisted by a five-member, non-ministerial budget standing committee of the
House, to act as an additional link "between the house and the government
[sic] in budgetary matters". 69 The standing committee will lack executive
authority, "but could, in appropriate circumstances" 70 make
recommendations to the Executive Council, or to particular ministers and
assistant ministers.
The report finally recommends that a further committee be appointed by
the next House of Assembly to continue the previous select committee's
work, and to consider, among other matters, the desirability of drafting a
constitutional bill of rights, as well as to study more conventional
constitutional matters. In all, a modest advance, the success or failure of
which depends on the extent to which the next House of Assembly is
prepared to cooperate with the present Administration, or can be used by it.
2
MAYAUGUST 1967
Edward P. Wolfers
The Thirteenth Meeting of the House of Assembly 1

The thirteenth meeting of the House of Assembly (5-9 June) was one of the
shortest and least exciting to date. The debate on the report of the Select
Committee on Constitutional Development was, largely by accident, no
more than "a damp squib" .2 Where conflict was expected, the Administration
either conceded victory beforehand, as was the case with the Public
Accounts Committee's report on public service housing, or remained quiet
in the assurance that conflict was unnecessary in those cases in which the
Administrator had the power simply to reject the House's advice. Many of
the more controversial measures were simply held over for the longer budget
session.
In many ways, the economic bias of most of the debates reflected the
extent to which this meeting was no more than a legislative interlude before
the final preparation of the budget. The most exciting political developments
were now taking place outside the House.
The Public Accounts Committee's report on the Department of Health
was primarily concerned with internal administrative arrangements. It did,
however, reinforce the increasing tendency of Administration departments
to move away from the "give away" nature of many social services, and
towards charging the indigenous population for their use. While the
Education Department now levies a fee- against the committee's advicethe Public Health Department was urged to consider the introduction of
hospital fees too. It seems likely that the distinction between paying and
non-paying patients will disappear as soon as investigations into the
possibility of a medical benefits scheme suitable for territory conditions are
completed. 3
The debate on the committee's eighth report, on the housing division of
Treasury, was robbed of its expected excitement when the Minister for
Territories, Charles Barnes, simply admitted the accuracy of most of its
criticisms. 4 What could the Treasurer do, then, but acquiesce in the
committee's accusations as to the shortage and inadequate standards oflocal
officer accommodation? Thus, the report was accepted without demur,
despite the inclusion of such criticisms as that of the acting District Medical
Officer at Vanimo, who felt that "the indigenous married quarters in
16
Edward P. Wolfers
particular ... are under-sized, under-ventilated and underlit and there is no

provision for toilets ... I would say that if we wanted to design a house in
which we could cultivate the spread of tuberculosis we could probably come
up with something similar to this style of house". 5
On the more strictly economic side, Ian Downs moved that the House
request "the Government to introduce either legislation or the appropriate
administrative procedures for the establishment of a national development
planning authority or commission". 6 Such a body should coordinate planning
at the national level, advise the government and report to the House on all
aspects of economic planning and development. Finally, the motion required
an answer from the Administration by the August meeting of the House,
and implementation of the decision before the end of the year. A number of
European members for special electorates warmly supported the motion,
which was passed without any demur from the official members. There was
no need to fight the issue in the House, for at the August meeting, the
Administrator informed the House that, in his view, "the creation of a further
planning body of the type proposed by the resolution would, at this stage,
tend to complicate the process of reorganisation being undertaken within
the Administration and would also tend to duplicate activity". He requested
the House, therefore, "not to take the matter further at this stage". 7
The lengthy and long-awaited report on the territory's economic
development since the World Bank report was tabled on 9 June. 8
Unfortunately, it was "a statement on work in progress- on the forward
plan- rather than a settled programme ready for implementation". 9 Despite
the provision of a pidgin summary, and the recommendation of a number
of changes from the World Bank's programme, the report was not debated
at all, either inside or outside the House.
That "the Papuan's attitude to his pig has much of the emotional and
mystical quality of the Australian's attitude to his beer" 10 was surely
demonstrated by the debate on the Animal Disease and Control Billl967.
The bill simply provided stock inspectors with the power to impound
straying animals. The debate, however, developed into an impassioned, if
inconclusive, discussion of the rights of pigs. Only the debate on the Child
Welfare Bill1967, which sought to raise the age at which adolescents could
be committed to an institution rather than prison from sixteen to eighteen,
and to provide for multiple maintenance payments where a woman is
uncertain of her child's paternity, provided the same amount of
entertainment for all members. The bill was nonetheless defeated. The Local
Government Bill, to prevent non-taxpayers seeking election to foreign local
government councils while they were absent from home on labour-contracts,
and paying their tax at home, also aroused as much confusion as thought
before it was passed.
The report of the Select Committee on the conduct of the Administration
towards Andree Margaret Bellaard was as vigorously opposed by the
Administration as the committee's very constitution had been opposed in
February and March. The committee recommended that the Administration
pay compensation of $10,624 for the disruption of her restaurant business
May-August 1967
17
consequent upon the inequity and mutually contradictory nature of various

departments' rulings on her business. 11 The Select Committee's
recommendations were later rejected by the Administration, as it had been
expected they would be. It was, perhaps, this particular affair, then, that led
to the moving of the Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry Bill 1967, and
of Percy Chatterton's motion, in August, that the House set up a commission
of inquiry to investigate the possibility of appointing an Ombudsman or
parliamentary commissioner in the territory. 12
The Parliamentary Commissions oflnquiry Bill, which attempted to give
the House power to set up its own commissions of inquiry without first
requesting the Administrator so to do, was adjourned on the ground that "the
contents of the bill are very difficult for the indigenous members to
understand so ... that time is needed for members to consider it". 13 Despite
the Administration's prolonged attack on the bill on the grounds "that it does
in effect offend against the principles of the separation of powers, that it
results in an unnecessary duplication of existing machinery, that it is
ineffective, and that if effect were given to it, such legislation as would be
required may well be unconstitutional ..." the bill was finally passed at the
August meeting. 14 Despite the threatened consequences, the House, pending
the Administrator's approval and the Governor-General's assent, may well
be able to set up such commissions itself, and may appoint a three-member
standing committee of parliamentary commissions of inquiry to select their
members.
The Administration further asserted itself when the Administrator
informed the House that he did not favour the establishment of a separate
department of local government, as the House had earlier sought. The
Administration believes that, as the territory develops and direct
administration decreases, so the Department of District Administration will
gradually evolve into the sort of department the House had requested. The
early establishment of the new department would, therefore, only result in
"a less economic use of manpower" .15
The resumed debate on the Public Officers (Employment Security) Bill
1967 was again hurriedly adjourned when an unexpected line of attack was
brought forward by John Guise. While he supported the bill's general
principle of a compensation scheme for expatriate public servants who are
replaced by Papuans and New Guineans, or who must leave the territory in
the event of civil unrest at independence, Guise certainly did not favour
clause 40 of the bill. Clause 40 provides that all such compensation
payments should come from the territory's revenue, while, in Guise's view,
it is the Australian government that should set up such a scheme. Far from
the conservative members opposing the bill through fear of its implications
for the future, it seemed that the more radical members might oppose it for
the potential drain it represents on the territory's income.
The by-election for the Henganofi seat in the Eastern Highlands,
caused by the death of U gi Biritu, was held on 15 July, and was the
territory's first one-day poll. This time, the five Lufa candidates' preferences
did not go much beyond number three (it is optional how many preferences
18
Edward P. Wolfers
one indicates in Territory elections), so that Bono Azanifa from the

Henganofi sub-district was assured of the victory denied him in 1964 by
the tight exchange of preferences among the then four Lufa candidates. The
by-election had no legislative implications at aii.
The Minister and Political Parties

The formation of the Pangu pati immediately after the June meeting of the
House gained a favourable press. Such a favourable press, in fact, that the
Minister for Territories, Barnes, was moved to comment that "the amount
of publicity being given it is out of all proportion to how it is regarded by
the people of New Guinea. This is because the aims of the party fit in with
the ideas of many people outside the country". 16 In his view, the people of
the teHituiy did want self-government, but certainly not independence. The
Pangu pati was getting all the publicity, he felt, while the United Christian
Democratic party was being left out. The Australian, for one, agreed with
Barnes as to the undue publicity accorded Pangu, but warned that, when
talking of the party's support, the minister needed "to define in this context
just who the people of New Guinea are", the urban, educated elite or the
rural massesY
A few days later, while visiting Lae, the minister went one step further.
On this occasion, he "demolished the main plank of the conservative United
Christian Democratic Party, admitted to considerable ignorance ofthe Pangu
Pati ... and for good measure said that the Territory would be better off at
this stage without political parties" .18 Perhaps the first two points derived
directly from the last.
Certainly, the minister felt that "the Territory would be better off
without political parties. "Parties", he said, "should form naturally. They
should not be force-fed. However, it is a free country , ..".19 Then, as if to
deny his own dictum on force-feeding political development, Barnes
undermined the main plank of the United Christian Democratic party's
platform.
"I believe", he said, "a seventh State would not be contemplated by the
present Government ...". This policy had been decided upon by federal
cabinet, and he believed that "this will be the continuing policy of the present
Government". He cited legal difficulties, the possibility of a brain-drain from
the territory to Australia, and the cost of social services as reasons for the
policy, but denied that current Australian immigration policy was a factor
in the government's decision. He refused to commit himself, however, as
to what might be possible in fifty to one hundred years. 20
While the Australian criticised the minister for leaving any hopes about
a future form of close association between the territory and Australia, 21 the
Canberra Times simply denounced his reasons as "fatuous", his statement
as "unfortunate and ill-timed". 22
After some initial resistance, the Christian Democrats accepted the fait
accompli. Their platform now proposes "[T]he peaceful movement towards
Independence". The party therefore calls on the administration for
May-August 1967
19
"immediately increased efforts to educate the people in the meaning of

Independence and its responsibilities". 23 For the Christian Democrats the
hope of negotiating statehood after independence may still remain, but, at
least outwardly, the minister's announcement seems to have been accepted
with equanimity.
It is unclear, however, to what extent Barnes' later denial that seventh
statehood had been ruled out may still affect events, for his denial was still
qualified by his belief that it is "not ... a practical possibility for the time
being that the Territory should be absorbed into the Commonwealth as a
new State on the same terms as existing States". 24
Pangu, however, took umbrage at the minister's general attitude towards
political parties, especially as he admitted that he had not read the party's
platform. The party, therefore, accused the minister of being out of touch
with political realities in the territory, and of having a low opinion of the
intellectual and political understanding of many Papuans and New
Guineans. 25 Its earlier call for the territory to be placed under the care of
the Department of External Affairs, took on a more personal note, as Barnes
was warned not to go back on Hasluck's policy, and the government was
asked to put Papua and New Guinea under Hasluck again. 26
Pangu
Pangu, however, had problems of its own to contend with.
One ofPangu's most difficult problems, from the start, has been to explain
how its policy of home rule by 1968 differs from a demand for selfgovernment or independence. Very early, it therefore issued a statement
defining home rule as "one of the first steps towards full self-government.
The Home Rule we are asking for is only partial or limited self-government.
But it is NOT [sic] independence which most people think is still a long
way off." 27
Speaking in Sydney on 18 July, one ofPangu'sjoint chairmen, Oala OalaRarua, appeared to go one step beyond this policy, when he predicted that
independence could come by 1970. The prediction was made in part of a
speech, in which he also suggested that the developing Westminster system
of responsible government might be inappropriate for territory conditions. 28
Reaction in the territory to Oala-Rarua's widely publicised statement was
swift. Karo Ahi, president of the Huon local government council,
immediately qualified his support for Pangu pending clarification of the
implications of Oala-Rarua's statemenU9 In the Highlands, and at the first
meeting of the All Peoples' party, Pangu was accused of wanting (rather
than Oala-Rarua predicting), independence by 1970. Thus, in late August
Oala-Rarua was expelled from Pangu for making statements contrary to
party policy, failing to correct these statements, and failing to attend
executive meetings following his statement.
Oala-Rarua replied that the meeting which had expelled him was not
properly convened, that the executive had failed to convene to discuss the
matter with him when he returned from Sydney, and that he had already
Edward P. Wolfers
20
resigned from the party anyway. His final charge was that Pangu was
effectively controlled by the three European members of its executive,
Messrs Voutas, Holloway and Abel, a charge that the Pangu executive
denied. 30
Despite press fears that Oala-Rarua's expulsion represented a serious split
in Pangu, and would weaken the party, the party seemed only to gain from
its new, rather more conservative, image. Four additional members were
added to the parliamentary wing: Edric Eupu (MHA Popondetta, and UnderSecretary for Lands, Surveys and Mines), Stoi Umut (MHA Rai Coast),
Tambu Melo (MHA Kutubu), and Singin Pasom (MHA Lae). Several other
MHAs have made no secret of their sympathy for the party. To date, the
party has branches in Port Moresby, Lae, Rabaul, Kavieng and at several
places in the Morobe District. Albert Maori Kiki has been appointed the
party's full-time secretary, while the parliamentary wing now has an
established leadership of Paul Lapun and Edric Eupu, its leader and deputy
leader respectively, and Pita Lus, the parliamentary whip.
More Parties
Reactions to the emergence of political parties have varied from regret
that they have appeared at all on the part of some European settlers in the
Highlands, 31 to accusations that Pangu is predominantly a Papuan party, 12
to fears at the radicalism of Pangu, and even of the Christian Democrats.
The All Peoples' party, which was formed at Angoram on 2 July, falls
into this last category. Founded by a group of European Sepik and Ramu
river area traders, the All Peoples' party, which as yet lacks any real formal
organisation, has now endorsed at least nine candidates in the East Sepik,
Madang and Eastern Highlands districts. Clearly, as the invective heaped
upon Pangu at the party's first meeting showed, its founder, Jim McKinnon,
is motivated by the fear of rapid political change rather than by the desire
for political organisation.
The All Peoples' party stresses the importance of economic development,
the need to criticise the Administration only in a "constructive way", and
emphasises the territory's reliance upon Australian help and guidance. Most
importantly, it opposes self-government at this stage, but suggests that "a
target date should be set whereby everyone can work towards bringing the
economic, social and political development to a level where self government
would be a simple, painless, natural step", such a date being set by the
electors. 33 The party is also concerned with the protection of European
economic investments in the territory. It may be significant that one of the
party's two current members in the House of Assembly, Frank Martin (the
other is Suguman Matibri, (MHA Madang)) is an outspoken advocate of a
"Recognise Rhodesia" policy for Australia. 34
A proposal that the All Peoples' party and the United Christian
Democratic party should merge led to two attempts at initiating talks. 35 The
proposal was aborted partly because of personality clashes, and perhaps
because the Christian Democrats have now been obliged to alter their policy
May-August 1967
21
to accept the possibility of independence.

The territory's fourth party, the Agricultural Reform party, was founded
in Rabaul in mid-August, with a prominent Tolai leader, Nason Tokiala, as
its first president. 36 As yet, the party has made no public announcement as
to its policies, but it seems to stress the need to develop the territory
economically before independence, especially so that the islands will not
be forced to carry the mainland economically.
The Country party was formed in Madang on 3 September. It too lacks
legislative support. Its founder is J.D. McCarthy, a Madang-basedjournalist.
The Country party's policy rests principally upon the belief that "selfgovernment must come but the party insists that it must be established on a
firm economic foundation and preferably, by easy stages which can be
adapted to the existing economic and social conditions". Its policy-bias is
rural, but includes support for a public service with one set of pay rates and
one standard of conditions, according to ability. Its most novel policy is for
a representative committee of territory and Australian delegates, to advise
on, and protect, the territory's interests, to be set up within the Australian
Parliament. 37
The Country party's executive consists of Alphonse Kotas from
Kerowagi, a vice-chairman and treasurer from Manus, and its secretary,
McCarthy.
The United Nations Trusteeship Council38
The Trusteeship Council's debate on New Guinea for the year 1965-6
conformed very much to the usual pattern. The Soviet Union complained
of discriminatory electoral qualifications for the new regional electorates
(the candidates for which must have the territory intermediate certificate,
or its equivalent), and of discrimination in the economic, social, health and
educational fields. It also urged Australia to grant early independence to
the territory, and to refrain from using the area for military activities
incompatible with the UN charter. The Soviet representative also criticised
the administration's current practice in the alienation of land for mining,
and the activities of the police special branch.
The Liberian delegate, Nathaniel Eastman, also laid some stress on the
discriminatory nature of the qualifications required of candidates for the
regional electorates, and, despite its defence of the new electorates, the
Australian delegation was unable to estimate the number of indigenes who
might be eligible to stand for them. Eastman also criticised wage
discrimination in the territory, and educational discrimination in the form
of Primary A and inferior Primary T schools. He felt that the dual system
was difficult to justify in that children did not find it hard to learn English
quickly, as he knew from experience. He was also critical of the fact that
Papuan and New Guinean ex-servicemen received smaller loans to establish
their businesses than did their European counterparts, and commented
adversely on the smaller land-blocks granted to indigenous farmers.
The Liberian representative dwelt at some length on the problems and
22
Edward P. Wolfers
sufferings of the people of New Hanover, and asked who had introduced
the income tax bill into the House of Assembly. When told it was the
Treasurer, he expressed his disapproval of "a new tax being imposed on an
already helpless people". His disapprovai of the under-secretary system was
quite evident when he concluded that Zure Zurecnuoc's (Under-Secretary
for the Treasury) work was of an advisory nature only: "He picks up a little
information from the population and passes it along to the Treasurer".
Zurecnuoc therefore attempted, in answer, to stress his powers of decision
too. Eastman was also far from happy with labour conditions on plantations,
and cited examples in support of his case.
It was perhaps inevitable that with a female president and vice-president
Australia should have been asked to add a female adviser to next year's
delegation. The drafting committee which prepared the Council's report on
New Guinea was predictably mild in its strictures. Its members were the
New Zealand and Chinese representatives on the Council. The Soviet Union
voted against the final report, and proposed an alternative one of its own.
The first report was, however, adopted by five votes to one (the USSR), with
one abstention (Australia). Liberia raised many objections to the report, and
asked that a minority report be prepared. In consequence of the failure to
prepare such a report, Liberia refused even to be present in the chamber when
the report was finally adopted.
The Council concluded that the present political situation in the territory
is "unexceptionable in principal", but considered that experience suggested
that at these crucial stages before independence "there is a need for
stimulating more rapid advance in the political field", particularly by
increasing the financial powers of the House of Assembly and by
accelerating the indigenisation of policy-making posts and bodies. It
endorsed the report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development,
but urged that the regional electorates and the retention of the official
members in the House of Assembly be regarded "as a transitional phase
only". It also urged the progressive reduction of the number of fields in
which official power to disallow legislation might be exercised.
Curiously perhaps, in view of the minister's statement as to the
impossibility of seventh statehood, the Council insisted "that all options for
the future of the people of Papua and New Guinea continue to be kept open".
A number of critics of recent Australian policy in the territory had urged
that seventh statehood be ruled out in view of its inherent unacceptability
in the eyes of the United Nations. It is difficult to tell whether the report,
therefore, conveyed an element of criticism of Barnes' early statement and
was responsible for its later qualification, or whether the drafting committee
was pro-Australian, as one newspaper alleged, and was simply "caught on
the hop" by Barnes' unexpected pronouncement. 39
3
SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 1967
Edward P. Wolfers
The Fourteenth Meeting of the House of Assembly

The annual budget debates in the House of Assembly have so far provided
some of the few occasions, apart from the daily adjournment debates, when
the indigenous members can participate fully in the House's discussions.
In addition, they have, under the leadership of Ian Downs, tended to form a
series of increasingly dramatic confrontations between the elected members
and the Administration. In 1964, the official members were subjected to a
quite surprising volume and intensity of criticism from the fledgling
legislature; in 1965, they were forced to revise some of the Administration's
revenue-raising proposals under pressure from the elected members; and
in 1966, the elected members cut $50,000 from the proposed allocation for
overseas recruitment expenses, with the warning "that no future
Appropriation Bill should be introduced without adequate control by elected
members ... ". 1 In the light of history, then, the debate on the Appropriation
Bill 1967-68 seemed "distinctly anti-climactic". 2 Thirty of the House's
thirty-eight indigenous members spoke, and thirteen of the sixteen European
elected members. Six of the under-secretaries gained further experience by
delivering at least short summaries of their department's activities, though
in just what, overall, they were receiving experience seems doubtful in the
light of one under-secretary's promise, when unable to answer a question
himself, to "refer the question to my superior officers for a satisfactory
answer". 3 The budget debate itself was less exciting than its predecessors,
probably for two principal reasons: this time the budget itself did "not reflect
only the views of the Administration. In many important respects it has been
modified by (indeed some elements have risen from suggestions made in
the course of) widespread consultations about the economy of this country
and the best means of developing it ... ",4 especially with members of the
Administrator's Council, and with the under-secretaries; in any case, the
"secret thoughts of members" seemed often to have wandered from the
business at hand in the House, and were "probably one way and another
fastened on next year's imponderables, the enlarged House, the elections,
Ministerial Government and the new political parties". 5
The budget's overriding purpose, according to the Treasurer (A.P.J.
Newman) was "to intensify the impetus of economic development, with
Edward P. Wolfers
24
particular emphasis on the expansion of exports . . . on the basis of the

greatest possible participation by Papuans and New Guineans at every level,
including the level of entrepreneur and owner of productive resources". 6
These priorities accounted for the increased amounts, and proportions of
the total budget, allocated for economic infrastructure, extension staff for
"production departments", and for secondary and tertiary level educational
and training institutions. Total budgetary expenditure for 1967-8 is expected
to be $140.6 million, of which $77.6 million is covered by the Australian
grant (which has risen by almost eleven per cent over that for 1966-7). Other
Commonwealth departments are expected to spend a further $44 million
on defence, civil aviation and other activities during the year. The principal
functional allocations in the 1967-8 budget are (the 1966-7 figures are
included for comparison):
Commodity producing
sector
Economic overheads
Social services'"
General administration,
law and order"
1967-68'
$million
per cent
of total
1966-67
$million
per cent
of total
19.143
25.341
49.980
13.63
18.02
35.55
13.488
23.790
41.499
11.24
19.82
34.57
31.840
22.64
29.740
24.77
Among the more important increases in individual allocations were a rise

of almost 13.5 per cent for the Department of Education; an additional $2.5
million for the Development Bank (to bring its total capi~al to $3.5 million);
a rise of $740,000 to $1.1 million in the provision for the Institute of Higher
Technical Education; and a 63 per cent increase to $2.9 million in the
university's allocation. Rather ominously, in retrospect, the university was
later warned 12 that it was not necessarily going to get the amount of money
it forecast it would need over the next triennium.
In order to meet the $20.4 million (or 17 per cent) rise in expenditure
for 1967-8, the territory's loan target for the year was raised by $1 million
to $8 million, and new measures were proposed which were estimated to
return a further $1.17 million in revenue. Sewerage (already in July),
sanitation and water charges were raised, while the Public Hospitals
(Charges) Bill was introduced in order to levy charges on patients (largely
indigenous) who attended the formerly non-paying sections of the base
hospitals in Lae, Port Moresby and Rabaul. Only children under fourteen
were, by amendment, exempted from paying these new charges. Stamp duty
on cheques was raised from 3 to 5 cents, while import duty on spirits rose
by $1 per gallon, and the excise on locally manufactured beer by ten cents
per gallon. An additional $500,000 was expected from an amendment to the
income tax ordinance designed "to eliminate the present differential as
25
between private and public companies and to introduce one common

increased rate of tax of 22.5 per cent ... ". 13 The budget was attacked by
Downs as a "compromise, and a very bad compromise because the views
which have been put to the Administration have been largely discarded" .14
Most of his criticism, however, and that of Don Barrett and Barry Holloway,
was directed at the territory's administrative structure. The costs of the
administration were, in Down's view, "beyond the resources of our relatively
small population". Clearly, the Treasurer's promise of "a comprehensive
overall review of the organization of the Administration" 15 was not enough,
and this criticism of the Administration was given further edge by the critical
ninth report of the Public Accounts Committee on the stores and supply
branch, Department of the Treasury, and the Supply and Tenders Board.
Most of the indigenous members' budget speeches were essentially
parochial, though the frustration of many at the failure to do more for their
areas was readily apparent: "If I do not come back the person who takes
my place will say the things that I have always been mentioning in the
House" (Suguman Matibri). 16 There seemed to be some resentment too at
the members' political dependence upon a budgetary process over which
they have little individual control. As Wegra Kenu put it: "Nothing is being
done at present in my area and the people will not listen to what I say ... ". 17
The Income Tax and Income Tax (Rates) Bills 1967 interested most of
the European elected members rather more than the budget. Apart from
abolishing the differential tax rates for public and private companies, and
raising the tax to a flat rate of 22.5 per cent, the bill also abolished the special
concession to private companies that allowed them to pay only 12.5 per cent
on the first $10,000 earned, and 17.5 per cent thereafter. The new tax rate
was criticised by Downs on the ground that it would have a sectional impact
only, for, he felt, it "will not affect Papuans and New Guineans very much" .18
He was all for doubling the excise on beer instead, for although he had been
a member of the Administrator's Council when the increased tax was
discussed, he was opposed to the measure as signalling "the beginning of
the funeral march out of private investment in this country" .19 An amendment
to reduce the income tax on private companies to 17.5 per cent was, however,
defeated by 33 votes to 14, in which only 2 of the 3 were European elected
members (Voutas and Holloway), and only 3 of the 14 were Papuans and
New Guineans.
The most important "political" debate of the meeting was on Graham
Gilmore's resolution that "before there is further development towards
self-government or independence for the Territory of Papua a referendum
should be held in the Territory of Papua on the question of whether that
Territory wishes to form a full and permanent constitutional union with the
Trust Territory of New Guinea, its people accepting the ultimate citizenship
of that Territory, or retain its Australian identity and the people their
Australian citizenship". Gilmore had proposed a similar resolution late in
1965, which had resulted in a very confused and emotional debate on the
part of many indigenous members, and there had also been protracted
correspondence on a similar issue in the South Pacific Post earlier in the
26
Edward P. Wolfers
year. Liberty and light were certainly on Gilmore's side when he asked,
"Why should we stop these people from making their own decisions? It is
something for them to decide ... ", if the country is to be built on a firm
foundation of national unity. Clearly, however, many indigenous members
were simply frightened of the whole issue, and preferred to leave it to the
Australian government to handle: "We do not want to hear talk that may
divide the country and the people into two. Now we are one country and
one people. I do not want bad thoughts brought here" (Edric Eupu). 20
The Administration was opposed to the motion on the (for it) quite
traditional lines that "it would be most inadvisable at this stage if acts of
emotion were to precipitate any forms of cleavage or endeavour to affect
status before all peoples of the Territory have been given the opportunity
of examining the various futures available to them ... ". 21 Despite taunts that
they were denying the people their democratic right to be consulted on such
a major issue, and an amendment deferring the referendum until "any
irrevocable act towards the constitutional union of Papua and New Guinea
takes place", and extending the referendum's scope to New Guinea as well, 22
the official members and the Pangu pati remained resolutely opposed to the
motion. Indeed, John Pasquarelli's taunts at those "white men, who
seemingly all their time have tried to ingratiate themselves with the native
people by trying to not act as white men", 23 stirred up no hostility at all
towards Holloway and Voutas, but led Nicholas Brokam to point out that
the whole referendum issue had not been raised by Papuans and New
Guineans at all: "This does not come from the people of Papua and New
Guinea at all- from the black men -but I say this comes from the Europeans.
Some white men in this country want to divide us." 24 Clearly, very few
members were prepared to face the issue at this stage or in the proposed
form, and so the motion failed by thirty votes to nineteen. The only other
issue to raise a great deal of heat was the question of conditions at the Laloki
mental hospital near Port Moresby. Shocked by conditions there when they
paid a private visit, a group of members requested an organised tour of the
hospital. With the local press in support of their claims, Gilmore, Pasquarelli,
Chatterton, Stuntz, Martin and Downs made the Administration to agree that
conditions there were lamentable, though Gilmore was forced to withdraw
his charge that the patients had been drugged for the MHAs' visit. In
consequence of the unfavourable publicity, plans were later announced for
a special allocation to improve conditions at the hospital immediately,25 with
proposals for major extensions and improvements at a later date. 26
Some long-pending debates were also laid to rest, when the Mining
(Bougainville Copper Agreement) Bill 1967, was passed giving legislative
endorsement to the Administration's promises to Conzinc Rio Tinto in regard
to special taxation, and mining concessions for its activities at Panguna;
Gilmore's motion to allow the direct leasing of land from its indigenous
owners was lost. The latter motion was, however, implemented in effect,
and without demur, at the next meeting of the House with the passing of
the Land (Tenure Conversion) Bill 1967. This bill preserves the existing
restrictions on land dealings between natives and non-natives, although it
27
authorises the Administrator-in-Council to remove the restriction in all

dealings short of transfer of title in which he considers that "the dealing
would not adversely affect the interests of the owner" 27 or the local people.
The Public Officers (Employment Security) Bill 1967 was also finally
passed, though only after it had been amended in the light of Guise's earlier
criticism so that the "golden handshake" for displaced public servants no
longer simply constitutes a straightforward drain on the territory budget, and
does not, in fact, even come into force until such time as the Commonwealth
government has enacted a guarantee for the whole scheme. Guise was also
the mover of an amendment to the Native Employment Ordinance which
for the first time grants to indigenous non-agreement workers the right to
receive a week's notice before dismissal after a minimum of six months'
employment. Other important motions that were put and passed included a
resolution that the House should evolve machinery of its own to select or
assist in selecting the territory's delegates to the United Nations Trusteeship
Council, and another requesting the Administration to encourage smallholder rice-growing more actively than in the past. In addition, statutory
recognition was finally given to the widespread use of ward committees as
a liaison between local government councillors and the people outside their
own village whom they represent. The new electoral boundaries for the 1968
elections were also approved, although many members clearly felt that they
or their areas had been inequitably treated. Some of them indeed were
prepared to leave the territory without a legislature for from three to six
months in order to obtain a redistribution. It had been the fault of the Select
Committee on Constitutional Development that the Electoral Distribution
Committee had been allowed no flexibility, and had been tied to delineate
a firm sixty-nine open electorates. For some members, the concern for
electoral justice clearly took precedence over their evaluation of the need
for a legislature to be in existence at all times, although, in the end, the new
electoral boundaries were accepted without a division being called.
The Political Parties

Early in November, the territory's sixth political party, the National Progress
party (Napro) was formed in Port Moresby. Its leader is Bill Dihm, an
unsuccessful mixed-race candidate at the 1964 elections, and its membership
seems to be predominantly Papuan. The party's motto is "Toil to Reap", and
its policies are a curious meld of conservative dependence upon Australian
initiatives, satisfaction with the political status quo, and of proposals for
agricultural and economic development. The party claims to have the secret
support of four members of the first House of Assembly, and has sponsored
a number of candidates for Papuan seats in the general election. Both its
impact as a party, and its formal organisation, seem minimal.
Despite the disparaging comments of many members of the House of
Assembly, Pangu continued to grow, and branches were set up in Kavieng,
Wewak and Port Moresby. Lapun's deniaJ2 8 that the party was
Papuan-dominated was, therefore, largely superfluous. By the end of the
28
Edward P. Wolfers
year, the Territory Country party and the Agricultural Reform party seemed
to be moribund, and the various attempts at talks between the All Peoples'
party and the United Christian Democratic party, with a merger in view, had
failed. 29 The All Peoples' party also gained the adherence of an additional
MHA, Keith Tetley (MHA Gulf Open). 30
Extra-Parliamentary Politics
Outside the House of Assembly, most of the territory's politicians were too
preoccupied with purely local political problems, specifically those
connected with their desire for (re-)election, for there to be much activity
of national significance. Pressure continued from the Returned Servicemen's
League (RSL) and the New Guinea Graziers' Association for the government
to guarantee Australian investments in the territory, but to no availY The
annual federal subsidy to Burns Philp for the territory-Australia run will
be phased out between April and December 1968, and so the MV Bulolo
has already been withdrawnY There was some public discussion about the
role of the army in the territory's future, and the RSL lamented the heavily
stressed warnings in an Administration pamphlet against the perils of a
military takeover after independence. The Administrator, however, refused
to withdraw the booklet. 33 The Administration was also bitterly criticised
by many ex-servicemen for its failure to give financial support to a proposed
war museum. 34 Despite favourable press and much pressure, however, the
Public Service Association's demands for an increase in the pay-scales for
indigenous public servants finally failed, when the public service arbitrator,
L.G. Matthews, refused permission for an appeal against his earlier decision
to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. 35 In what
was the first public opinion poll ever held on the subject, Australians were
asked what they wanted the territory to be. The result was: under Australian
control, thirty-one per cent; a state of Australia, thirty per cent; independent,
twenty-seven per cent; undecided, twelve per cent. When analysed by party
affiliation and age group, the poll produced no significant differences from
the norm, except that the vote for independence was highest, at thirty per
cent, among the 21-29 age group.l6
The Fifteenth Meeting of the House of Assembly
The final meeting of the first House of Assembly was in many ways no more
than a postscript to the previous four years. Some unfinished business was
finally disposed of, while almost every debate was in some sense dominated
by the members' awareness of the imminence of the elections.
The Standing Committee on Public Accounts presented six reports, of
which one, the fourteenth, had later to be withdrawn because of the
unavailability of copies for all members of the House. The tenth report
concerned recruitment and training in the administration, and recommended
principally that use be made of outside consultants and organisation and
methods teams, and that a central authority be established to oversee and
29
direct localisation within the public service. In accordance with these

recommendations, therefore, the Administrator had already announced that
the comprehensive review of the organisation of the Administration that had
been forecast in the budget would be carried out by two committees: an
internal committee consisting of the two Assistant Administrators and the
Public Service Commissioner, followed by a committee containing one
representative each from the territorial Administration and the
Commonwealth government, together with "an overseas representative, who
has had extensive experience both in organization and in developing
countries" .37 There was, in consequence, little of a controversial nature in the
report to provoke debate, although Downs and Stuntz insisted on the deletion
of certain clauses which, they felt, stressed the need for localisation at the
cost of a certain dilution in personnel standards. The report was then passed
in its amended form, and the general question of administrative reform was
raised again in the form of a resolution requesting the use of further outside
experts in the upcoming public service review. Only Barrett, Holloway, Ron
Neville and Downs spoke on the resolution, together with Henderson for
the Administration, and of these the first three mentioned were members of
the Public Accounts Committee itself, while the first two and Downs had
been the initiators of the whole issue during the budget debate.
The Committee's eleventh report, on departmental expenditure for
1966-7, was accepted without debate. It recommended changes in the form
of the presentation of departmental expenditures in the House, an urgent
review of the works planning structure of the Administration, including the
strengthening of the role of the House of Assembly's Standing Committee on
Public Works, and a tightening up of overtime procedures, particularly in the
Department of Public Health. The twelfth report was chiefly concerned with
works planning, and the financial structure and operations of the Department
of Public Works, and harked back to recommendations made in the
Committee's fourth report, which was concerned with the same subject. The
thirteenth and fifteenth reports of the Committee concerned fairly technical
matters, and were, therefore, tabled and accepted without debate.
Public service reform was also the subject of two other important
measures before the House: a statement of those recommendations of the
Committee on the Public Service (set up by the minister in August, 1965)
which the minister had found acceptable and intended to implement; and a
series of Bills intended to carry out the Committee's previous
recommendation that a single line salary be established for the territory
public service. The report, which was not debated, certainly recommended
sweeping changes in the structure of the public service: the replacement of
the Public Service Commissioner by a Public Service Board consisting of
a chairman and three members, appointed by the minister after consultation
with the Administrator's Council for a term of three years fulltime
employment which would report annually to the Administrator's Council
as well as to the minister; the institution of a convention whereby the
Administrator's Council would, unless it be inexpedient so to do, be
consulted on decisions involving appointments to the first division, the
30
Edward P. Wolfers
functions and structure of departments, and overall changes in the salaries

and conditions of local officers; the establishment in the office of the
commissioner, and later the board, of a separate and strong unit to promote
and coordinate localisation at departmental level; and changes in entry
educational requirements in some cases, the revision of certain job
classifications, and improvement of English and induction training, as well
as a review of policy relating to acting appointments. The requisite
legislation was promised early in the life of the new House.
The Public Service (Papua and New Guinea) Bill (No. 2) 1967 was
introduced as a result of recommendations contained in the interim report
of the foregoing committee which the minister had accepted in September,
1966. Stuntz, the committee's chairman, expressed his reservations at the
Administration's delay in presenting the requisite bill to the House, and
lamented the haste in which it was, therefore, perforce considered. 38 The
bill sought no change in the level of expatriate public servants' salaries, but
simply provided that salaries for all positions will in future be expressed in
terms of local rates only, instead of the old two-rate (local and overseas)
system. Overseas public servants will, therefore, receive the same basic
salaries as local officers, plus a basic overseas allowance to restore the
officers' actual pay to the old level. During the debate, a surprise amendment
was moved by Voutas that the new salary scale also eliminate discrimination
on the basis of sex. Despite official opposition to the rapid passage of an
amendment with such wide monetary and policy-making implications, the
amendment was passed by twenty-eight votes to twenty-two. The revised
bill, however, still awaits assent. The cost of assent will be equal pay for
both sexes, while the cost of withholding assent may well be the singleline structure itself (which is, in essence, designed to remove at least the
external signs of racial discrimination from the public service wage
structure). When he discovered that, in fact, his amendment did not ensure
equal pay for men and women, but would allow the Administration to set
up a single-line wage structure in which a system of allowances could
preserve the old inequalities in actual pay, Voutas moved an amending bill
to ensure complete equality of pay, but later adjourned it for the new House
to consider more carefully.
The Appropriation Bill (No. 2) 1967-8 perhaps brought home to the
members more forcefully than any other measure the finality of this meeting
of the house before the elections. Because the new House could not meet
before June, and so no supplementary appropriations could, as is usual, be
voted during the early part of 1968, the House voted to increase the
Treasurer's advance from $2 to 7 million to cover variations from the
proposed expenditure for 1967-8. Many members were also very much
aware of their failure to provide pensions for those among them who retired
or were defeated, and so there was widespread support, particularly from the
indigenous members, for a resolution requesting the Administrator to "give
favourable consideration to requests from former members of the House who
are defeated at the elections, for loans, to either begin new business ventures
or rehabilitate existing business interests which they have been forced to
31
neglect in favour of the interests of their electorates" .39

The final indication of the widening gap between those few members,
most notably John Guise, who have managed to master the intricacies of
legislative procedure, and those who still seek to learn it, was provided by
Guise's insistence that, although he had signed Henderson's report under
pressure, although he had not had time even to read it, much less had he
been consulted in its preparation, he still wanted to table a report of his own
on the Malaysian land resettlement scheme. 40 Against the opinions of his
critics, he was prepared to assert that the territory could and should learn
from overseas experience, as his own minority report so amply
demonstrated. 41 On the other hand, Tei Abal probably spoke for many
members from the less sophisticated areas when he said: "This is our last
meeting. The official members have helped us and we have done good work
here, but we have not achieved very much for our country ... We native
members are not too clear on what is happening here."z And so to the
elections.
4
JANUARY-APRIL 1968
Edward P. Wolfers
In view uf Lhe laler controversy over the degree to which the Department ot
Territories should and does control the day-to-day administration of Papua
and New Guinea, the very first news story of the year had a certain ironic
touch to it: George H. Warwick Smith, Secretary of the Department of
Territories, was made a Commander of the British Empire.'
The Minister and His Critics

John Gorton's accession to the Australian prime ministership was widely
interpreted as a bad omen for Barnes' political future. Amid the plethora of
advice with which the prime minister was showered, most of the press
"tended to use the Territories portfolio as the starting point for their arguments".2 It was widely assumed, at least until February, that Barnes would
not retain his present portfolio, whether or not he remained in the ministry,
and that the Department of Territories would be reconstructed. Some
journalists, perhaps over-impressed by the Pangu pati's policies in this regard,
even predicted that Papua and New Guinea would in future be administered
by the Department of External Affairs. Such a change, it was felt, would
remove Territories' "inbuilt bias towards being a colonial, 'our' administration". 3
In the end, party-political rather than policy considerations dictated
Barnes' survival, although his department was renamed "External
Territories" (its title until1951), and its functions were allegedly "pared to
the bone" .4 The Northern Territory is now the responsibility of the
Department of the Interior. The new ministerial structure is intended to
emphasise the separate political destinies of Australia's two principal
territorial administrations. 5 Gorton's compromise was not popular with the
press. The editorial writer(s) of the Australian, probably Barnes' severest
critic(s), put it quite forcefully, when he (they) wrote that Barnes "is an
earnest, hard working and thoroughly conscientious minister and it is
distasteful to have to go on picking at him. However, the simple fact of the
matter is that he is not up to the job." 6 Taken together, the retention of
Barnes, and Gorton's failure to offer the territory the single option of
independence as its ultimate political destiny, seemed to demonstrate to the
Australian that the old "ministerial ambiguities" about the territory's future
January-April1968
33
still remained, although perhaps "the old ambiguities now exist elsewhere" .7
The second Australian Institute of Political Science summer school to
deal with Papua and New Guinea took place in January (the first was in
1958). At the summer school, Barnes was exposed probably more forcefully
than ever to the jostling of the experts. 8 The papers themselves occasioned
relatively little comment, except for H.L. Wootten, QC's demand that the
territory be offered only one choice for its long-term political future independence. Albert Maori Kiki (secretary of the Pangu pati) received wide
publicity for his remark in an otherwise restrained and carefully reasoned
speech that Papuans and New Guineans were forced to lick Australians'
boots. 9 Despite the encouragement of a number of his critics to change his
stance, Barnes did not deviate at all from his belief that "you do not close
off possibilities which in the light of later events may turn out to be wanted
by both countries and an advantage to them both". 10 K.E. Beazley, for the
Federal Opposition, spelled out for the first time the exact nature of the
ALP's commitment to Papua and New Guinea after independence; he
promised at least $50 million a year for thirty years. 11
Barnes' "policy of negation and evasion" was again attacked by the
Australian. Indeed, he was accused of espousing a policy of "risky seventh
statism" 12 in what was described as "one of the most extraordinary, kindly
and probably unconsciously paternalistic" 13 speeches he had given. He had
doubted, it was claimed, that Papua and New Guinea could ever be a separate
country, and insisted, that any demand by the House of Assembly for selfgovernment should, in his view, be confirmed by a popular referendum
before the Australian government should accede to it. Rather more
characteristic perhaps than the minister's critics of the Australian press and
public, neither of which have ever displayed any marked interest in Territory
affairs, the Brisbane Courier-Mail accused Maori Kiki and another
commentator who had criticised race relations in the territory at the seminar
of "having a chip on [their] ... shoulder". On the whole, the editorial said,
Australia has "not a bad record in New Guinea" .14
The Governor-General's opening address to Federal Parliament early in
March reiterated most of the principal themes of Barnes' earlier policies.
Australia intends to develop the territory for self-determination, Lord Casey
said, although he spelled out for the first time in formal terms what Barnes
had hinted at during 1967. The government continued specifically to hold
out the possibility of "a special relationship" between a self-governing Papua
and New Guinea and Australia, but the government now "believes that the
development of Papua and New Guinea as a seventh State of Australia is
fraught with difficulties, and that statehood, as against self-government, is
not likely to be the outcome of such development" 15 - scarcely a repudiation
of Barnes.
Gough Whittam and Kim Beazley for the ALP attacked the
government's tardiness in developing Papua and New Guinea for
independence, and the latter criticised again the inappropriateness of the
Westminster system of responsible government in the territory context. 16 The
strongest and most carefully reasoned attack on Barnes, however, came from
34
Edward P. Wolfers
a Liberal party backbencher, E.H. StJohn, QC, who urged the government
to commit itself to independence as the only goal for the territory, and
criticised the government's failure to provide more funds for the University
of Papua and New Guinea (see below).!' Barnes added a certain amount of
publicity to the force of StJohn's speech by walking out during it. The
minister did not bother with his critics during his address-in-reply speech.
"What is uppermost in the minds of many Papuans and New Guineans", he
insisted, "is development economic development ... [and] the task of nation
building in Papua and New Guinea is as much an economic problem as a
political problem" }8 The remainder of the speech, as well as his speech at
the opening of ANG house in Port Moresby on 18 April, 19 was concerned
with economic, especially agricultural and financial, problems. At a press
conference on 18 April, Barnes cast some light on his apparent lack of
concern with constitutional and political issues. Independence for Papua and
New Guinea, he estimated, was still twenty to thirty years off.2
The House of Assembly Elections

The second quadrennial House of Assembly election attracted as much
journalistic and academic attention as the first, though rather less interest
from the territory's voting population. Most commentators to date, however,
have confined themselves to sweeping generalisations about the prevalence
or decline of cargo thinking and racial feeling, and to general analyses of
the results. Few writers attempted to analyse the candidates or their
campaigns in any detail, although, generally, it seems likely that up to onequarter of the candidates (especially Europeans, and indigenes outside the
Highlands) distributed electoral leaflets. European candidates tended to
concern themselves with policy-issues rather more than the other candidates,
although relatively well-educated indigenous candidates tended to do
likewise. Indeed, where leaflets were distributed, more indigenous
candidates attempted to explain their policies than did Europeans, who often
just put "Vote 1" next to their photographs. Gimmickry such as polaroid
cameras, tape-recorders, and helicopters, and the dispensing of free shirts,
badges, beer and tobacco remained the preserve of European candidates.
Clearly, the elections were important, although most politicking took place
in languages, places and situations that were largely inaccessible to the
outside observer. Peter Hastings summed up the prevailing attitude of those
observers who were not just looking for "local colour", when he wrote:
In one sense it is difficult to take the New Guinea elections seriously. And
yet they ARE serious and extraordinarily dull. It is why they are serious that
is so hard to pin down.
Something in the way of political consciousness is stirring in the island,
something beyond the interminable parochial talk of bridges and roads and
hospitals. Something that indefinably stretches across the insular isolation
of electoral districts, tribes and languages.
January-Apri/1968
35
It is certainly there in the elites. It is certainly there in the electorates which

seem fairly determined, if one can be certain of anything in the island, to reject
most white candidates ... 21
The 484 candidates who contested the sixty-nine open and fifteen regional
electorates tended to be younger and relatively better educated than their
predecessors.22 Thirty to forty per cent of them had had some experience in local
government, while forty-six of the fifty-four elected members and one official
member (J.K. McCarthy) of the first House stood for re-election. Two sitting
members, R.T.D. Neville and Tei Abal, were re-elected unopposed for the
Southern Highlands Regional and Wabag Open electorates respectively, while
the new members for the Upper Sepik open and the West Sepik Regional also
had no opponents. Twenty-three European candidates stood for seventeen
Open and thirty-two for fourteen Regional electorates, while, for the first time,
two Asians contested the Kavieng Open electorate in the New Ireland district.
Two part-Asians stood for Namatanai, and a number of mixed-race candidates
stood elsewhere throughout the territory. Nineteen indigenous candidates
nominated for ten Regional electorates, for which the territory intermediate
certificate or its equivalent was required. Surprisingly four indigenes stood
in the Western Highlands Regional, and one in Chimbu, while in such
relatively sophisticated areas as Madang, New Britain and Morobe no
indigenous candidates contested the Regional electorates. Only one "foreign
native" stood for a Regional electorate (a Tolai in the Manus and New Ireland
Regional), although quite a number stood in Open electorates, including at
least four Papuans in the Madang-Morobe area. In five Regional and one
Open (Moresby) electorates, only Europeans stood, while in five electorates
two former elected members stood against each other, and in Moresby one
former elected and one former official member stood. In all, forty-eight
candidates resigned directly from the public service to contest the elections
(including sixteen interpreters, predominantly from the Highlands), although
relatively few of them were members of the so-called "urban elite". Other major
occupational groups among the candidates were (mission) teachers, farmers,
businessmen, etc. Only one woman stood (for Esa' ala). In general, Highlands
electorates attracted the greatest number of contestants; sixteen candidates
stood for each of the Chimbu, Gumine, Sinasina and Goroka Open electorates.
As regards the candidates' party affiliations: Pangu put up about thirty
formally announced candidates, and claimed a total of fifty-two Open
members and sympathisers. Tony Voutas hoped that the party would have
twenty members in the second House of Assembly. 23 The United Christian
Democratic party dropped the "Christian" from its title (and is, therefore,
now the UDP) and announced that it intended "to give second preferences
to genuine mainly indigenous political parties rather than to independents". 24
The UDP's leaders claim to have paid the $50 nomination fees of six
candidates in the Sepik (not all of whom will confirm the fact), and they
were its "endorsed" candidates. In addition, they seemed to have the
sympathy and ordinary membership of at least half of the indigenous
candidates in the Sepik, while the leaders also claimed the (unannounced)
36
Edward P. Wolfers
support of some candidates in New Britain, and the membership of H.L.R.

Niall, a candidate for the Morobe Regional. The All Peoples' party (APP)
had two public adherents in Papua (Keith Tetley and Gabriel Ehava Karava),
one announced candidate in the Highlands, and at least five adherents in
the Madang District, and another five in the east Sepik. It also claimed,
largely unspecified support in the New Guinea Islands. Seven Papuan candidates campaigned on a common platform for the National Progress
party (Napro), and with common leaflets on which only the names were
different. Napro claimed the sympathy of approximately another twentythree candidates throughout the territory. The Agricultural Reform party had
two major candidates in New Britain, though many other candidates in the
East New Britain district joined the party as a form of electoral insurance.
The Territory Country party was dead before the elections.
Parties probably had a real impact at the popular level only in the East
Sepik, Bougainville and Morobe districts, although the very notion of parties
was an issue in many other areas. Five prominent indigenous businessmen
in the Goroka area signed a document attacking all parties as premature, 25
and few candidates even mentioned their party affiliations, although many
of them derived their policies from their party's platform. The overall
significance of parties can perhaps best be gauged from two phenomena:
in the Milne Bay Regional two Pangu members stood against each other, as
did four UDP members at Maprik, and two APP candidates at Angoram;
and in the Morobe Regional electorate, while Voutas campaigned on an
openly Pangu platform, H.L.R. Niall attempted to demonstrate the
irrelevance of parties, by joining the UDP, asking the APP for help, attacking
Pangu specifically, while teaming up with one of its sympathisers in an Open
electorate and promising to set up a labour party with him after the election,
and circulating several thousand copies of the Goroka pamphlet attacking
all parties. Voutas won. Some candidates were members of up to four
separate parties.
Polling proceeded relatively smoothly under the scrutiny of the United
Nations' visiting mission and despite the embarrassment of two candidates
being arrested, on charges unconnected with the elections but likely, if the
candidates were found guilty, to require subsequent by-elections. Neither
won. A number of complaints about polling procedure were voiced in the
East Sepik, but none required action. The Chief Electoral Officer issued a
number of confident statements noting the voters' increased sophistication
and expecting at least as high a turnout as in 1964. When polling in the towns
ran at only twenty-five per cent, it was explained that the voters' increased
sophistication was a possible explanation -they realised now that they did
not have to vote. The final figure of only about a sixty-three per cent26 turnout
throughout the territory, however, was widely interpreted as signalling many
voters' disappointment that the first House of Assembly had not delivered
the cargo, and the apathy of European voters.
Most voters still cast their ballots on clan or language-group lines,
though these were sometimes given the guise of party or policy groups.
Nonetheless, Papuans won in two New Guinea electorates (Rai Coast and
January-Apri/1968
37
Huon Gulf), and a third did well at Bogia. The new member for Kikori was
also born outside his electorate, in the Kerema electorate, while one mixedrace candidate and a part-Asian were elected too. Although only about onequarter of the winners had an absolute majority of the votes on the first
count, in only eight electorates was the ultimate winner not the leader on
the primary count.
The new House of Assembly contains twenty-three members of the first
house, including, however, only four Europeans. All but three of the
indigenous incumbents in the Highlands were re-elected, and all of those
candidates of both races who stood again in the New Guinea Islands and
were not opposed by another incumbent. Only one candidate from each of
the Madang and Morobe districts and from both Sepik districts were reelected, and none of the coastal Papuans from west of Port Moresby.
Indigenous candidates were, contrary to many expectations, successful in
four regional electorates, while eight Europeans gained election in Open
electorates, including two, Angoram and Kainantu, that had been represented
by (different) Europeans before. Five of the eleven under-secretaries were
re-elected, which caused some surprise in that candidates in a number of
areas had found it electorally desirable to promise not to accept ministerial
office if elected, and to concentrate on their electoral duties. John Guise is
the only surviving elected member of the old Legislative Council.
The new indigenous members of the House of Assembly are, on average,
probably better educated, and more experienced politically than their
predecessors: 27 only twenty-six of them have no formal education at all,
while nineteen have some post-primary (i.e. post-standard VI) education to
their credit, including two who have completed a year's university, and one
Highlander (from Kompiam-Baiyer) with four years' post-primary
missionary training. All members speak at least one of the three territory
lingue franche, and thirty-one have some local government experience,
including fourteen council presidents, a number of vice-presidents, plus two
council clerks and a supervisor. Four members are workers' association
leaders, and many others have experience in other social and economic
organisations. Thirty-five of the indigenous members, including all ofthose
who were re-elected from the first House, have travelled outside the territory.
Only one of the indigenous members publicly acknowledges no mission
affiliation at all, while the largest known mission group consists of about
twenty-six Roman Catholics.
The European members are, on the whole, probably somewhat more
conservative than their predecessors. Four of them have university degrees,
and the length of their time in the territory varies from one who was born
in Papua and another who was brought up here, down to just under seven
years. Six of them were born outside Australia and her dependencies.
The state of the parties in the second House of Assembly seems unclear,
and their numbers seem to hinge very much on whether party members are
allowed to accept ministerial positions. Various Pangu leaders have
estimated the party's membership in the House at a number of different
figures, up to thirty. Presently, however, only the following members have
38
Edward P. Wolfers
at any stage publicly identified themselves with Pangu (although some of

these may withdraw, and other members have been identified with the party
by other people): Donatus Mola, Paul Lapun, Siwi Kurondo, Pita Lus,
Michael Tom Somare, Paliau ~.1aloat, James Meanggan1m, Cecil Abel, John
Guise, Tony Voutas, Mangobing Kakun, Michael Kaniniba, Niwia Ebia
Olewale. The party has expressed the hope that it can recruit further
members in the House, and two of the Tolai members, for example, have a
reputation for being even more radical than Pangu, at least on land matters,
as has Oala Oala-Rarua on constitutional issues. TheAll Peoples' party and
the United Democrats have at various times also claimed various members,
although, to date, only J.C. McKinnon and D. Buchanan have publicly
associated themselves with theAPP (although others may do so), while only
Yakob Talis and Beibi Yembanda have publicly proclaimed their membership
of the UDP. Epineri Titimur has announced that he is a member of lhe
Agricultural Reform party; Napro has no visible members in the legislature.
In retrospect, given the success of the first House's most conservative
indigenous members in gaining re-election, and the large number of other
probable conservatives, it seems curious that so much of the press has
interpreted the election as a Pangu victory. 28 Certainly, a number of public
members of Pangu were elected, but its total as well as its percentage
membership in the House is less than in 1967. The ministerial system may,
indeed, ravage Pangu' s numbers still more, although it does seem clear that
Pangu is the only viable party organisation ever to survive an election in
Papua and New Guinea.
International Aid
The Australian government has only recently begun to allow international
aid dispensing organisations into Papua and New Gui.nea. They are still,
therefore, largely assessing needs and tendering advice rather than giving
or lending money, although the situation is gradually changing.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World
Bank), which carried out an extensive survey of the territory's economy in
1964, has sent a number of teams to Papua and New Guinea. So far, it has
allocated $596,000 for a one-year survey of the territory's transport services
and needs, 29 and examined an application for a loan to improve the territory's
posts and telegraphs system. 30 In January, the Bank sent a further team of
five experts to examine the territory's agricultural development, specifically
to assess credit needs in the beef cattle industry, and in the coconut, rubber
and palm oil industries too. 31 In line with the Bank's earlier stress on the
need for expatriate investment to develop the territory, and on the desirability
of encouraging a local cattle industry, the mission seemed to be most
interested in the provision of credit facilities for European beef-breeders.
The World Bank mission was the subject of a minor controversy when its
leader, Dr C.P. McMeekan, denied having said that he was disappointed at
the Administration's failure to implement the Bank's 1964 report and to
apply earlier for a loan from the Bank. 32
January-Aprill968
39
The United Nations Children's Fund 33 and the UN Development

Programme34 also approved projects in Papua and New Guinea, and the
director of the development programme visited the territory in April.J 5
UNESCO sent its first science teaching expert to Goroka Teachers' College
in January, 36 and in April it promised aid totalling $1,196,200 to the college
over the next five years in experts, fellowships, equipment, supplies and
services. 37
The United Nations
Apart from its various aid-giving agencies, the UN does not have a good
image in Papua and New Guinea. The Australian government was reportedly
considering withdrawal from the Committee of Twenty-four (on
decolonisation) because of its adverse criticisms of Australia's efforts in the
territory. 38 The first female adviser to an Australian UN delegation, Rose
Kekedo, a Papuan, was also not impressed with the UN, which she found
to be overly concerned with the problem of racial discrimination, 39 although
the President of the Trusteeship Council, Angie Brooks, in turn, described
the territory's indigenous advisers to Australia's UN delegations as "sluggish
and lacking in initiative". 40 Brooks clearly hoped for a more rapid takeover
of the territory's Administration by indigenous leaders. 41
The seventh United Nations visiting mission to New Guinea was,
therefore, received with some apprehension in the territory. Clearly, many
indigenous leaders felt resentment that the UN was trying to push the
territory towards self-determination before they felt themselves to be ready.
In fact, the visiting mission could not have been more favourably composed:
its leader was a New Zealander, J.M. McEwen, secretary of his country's
Department of Island Territories and Maori Affairs, while the other members
were a Frenchman and an American, P. Gaschinard and Dr W. Allen, both
of whose countries also have a vested interest in stability in this part of the
Pacific, and a Liberian, A.F. Caine, whose country is probably one of the
more conservative members of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN.
The mission spent six weeks in New Guinea during the elections and
visited Papua too at the invitation of the Australian government. At very
few places indeed did indigenous speakers do other than plead for more time
till self-determination and ask for assistance to build more schools, etc. The
mission, in return, tended to stress that it was only looking, and that it was
not trying to hurry New Guinea towards self-determination. Despite several
relatively serious attacks on his honesty and his views, especially in Wewak
and on Karkar Island, Caine remained as conservative as the rest of the
mission in hoping that New Guinea would avoid some of Liberia's early
mistakes as a country. The only real variations from the standard theme
occurred when some cargo cultists near Madang asked the UN to make Yali
their king, and when candidates in the elections tried to use the UN's
meetings for political purposes at a few places. Indeed, the visiting mission
seemed critical only of the dual public service salary structure, and gave a
great deal of praise to the Australian effort in the territory. The mission
40
Edward P. Wolfers
seemed unanimous in finding no sense of unity yet among most Papuans

and New Guineans. 42 Perhaps, however, the visiting mission may have been
too good to be true, for, as a number of journalists belatedly began to point
out, maybe the mission had been so conservative that its report would be
completely discredited at the UN. 43
The University
As forecast earlier, the University of Papua and New Guinea seems unlikely
now to receive all of the money it requires to expand in accordance with its
earlier plans. Already, it has had to turn away thirty prospective students in
1968, and the government seems intent on sticking to the Currie Commission's projection of 575 students in 1970 as opposed to the 825 the university
claims tt could and should take. Editorials throughout the Australian press
were on the university's side, and criticised the minister's adherence to the
earlier plan as an "extension of bureaucratic bookkeeping into a field where
it simply does not work ... ". 44 Professor Inglis' and Dr Gunther's attacks
on the government's policy were given wide publicity in Australia, although
some of the university's critics in the territory carped at the expense
($28,000) ofthe Vice-Chancellor's new house, 45 and pointed to the need for
greater government expenditure on other types of education too.
Permits
The permit system, under which travellers between Australia and the
territory must obtain a travel document from the Department of External
Territories before entering or leaving Papua and New Guinea, received
further notoriety when a Port Moresby magistrate criticised the inefficiency
of a system that allows convicted criminals into the terdtory.46 On the other
hand, a number of other bodies had earlier expressed their grievance at the
system's efficiency in excluding a Russian journalist, Yuri Yasnev, a Pravda
correspondent, from the territory because he was both Russian and a
Communist (while two Polish journalists were already touring the
territory). 47 Yasnev was denied permission to tour the territory with a group
of journalists writing about the elections because there were, allegedly, no
further seats available, while James Anthony, a post-graduate student in
Pacific History at the Australian National University, was refused a permit
unless he signed a declaration promising not to take part in any political
activities while in the Territory. 48 The public disclosure of the conditions
placed upon Anthony so damaged the possibility that his research could be
carried out effectively that Anthony decided, in the end, not to come to the
Territory.
Other Matters
A report by two officers of the Department of District Administration on a
youth survey of Port Moresby and environs advocated a head tax on all
January-Apri/1968
41
urban dwellers to limit the drift to the towns, and the improvement of
accommodation and recreational facilities in the area. 49
The Public Service Association failed in its request to be consulted in
the appointment of a new Public Service Arbitrator, 50 and L.G. Matthews
was reappointed. The Associatio~ then petitioned the UN Trusteeship
Council to appoint a commission lD examine the existing public service
salary structure, the commission to consist of an independent chairman and
four other members, of whom two each should be acceptable to the Public
Service Association and the Administration respectively. 51 A tripartite
mission, consisting of the Chairman of the Australian Council of Trade
Unions (ACTU), A.E. Monk, the executive manager of the Employers'
Federation, George Polites, the secretary of the Department of Labour and
National Service and leader of the mission, Dr H. Cook, a former president
of the Chamber of Manufacturers, A.M. Simpson, and the secretary of the
New South Wales Trades and Labour Council, R.B. Marsh, visited the
territory in April (as a similar mission did in 1960) to report to the Minister
for External Territories on wages and labour conditions in the territory. The
only important public comment by a member of the mission to date has been
Monk's remark that the Australian trade union movement was disappointed
with the results so far of its efforts to help establish trade unions in the
terri tory. 52
5
MAY-AUGUST 1968
Edward P. Wolfers
Insofar as Papua and New Guinea has a constitution in the narrow sense of
a single document outlining the institutions of the territory's government,
and their functions, it is the Papua and New Guinea Act. Because the
territory is still an Australian dependency, however, a proper understanding
of its constitution in the broad sense, i.e. of the general principles underlying
the manner and method of its government, requires more than a knowledge
of the actual operation of internal territory politics. It requires such
knowledge, of course, but it requires, too, an understanding of the
assumptions of Australia's territorial policy-makers, as well as an
appreciation of just where, and to what degree, various bodies of the United
Nations play a part in Papua and New Guinea's political development.
The second third of 1968 was, therefore, of rather extraordinary significance in the constitutional development of Papua and New Guinea. Firstly,
the Papua and New Guinea Act itself was amended, and both the manner of
its amendment, and the reactions that the amendments aroused, provided
an interesting commentary upon the assumptions ofCanbe<rra's policy-makers.
Secondly, the seventh United Nations visiting mission's report was released,
and debated, in New York, and an opportunity thereby provided for an
assessment of the degree, and trend, of international interest in New Guinea.
Finally, the first meeting of the second House of Assembly, and preparations
for its second (budget) meeting, provided a useful insight into the changes
that had occurred in, and the actual operation of, one of the most important
formal instruments of political change in Papua and New Guinea.
The Papua and New Guinea Bill1968
The Honourable C.F. Barnes (the present Minister for External Territories)
announced the Australian government's acceptance of the House of
Assembly's revised version of the recommendations contained in the final
report of its own Select Committee on Constitutional Development in
October 1967. The requisite legislation, the Papua and New Guinea Bill
1968, was not, however, introduced into the Australian Parliament until May
1968, after the election (but before the first meeting) of the legislature it was
designed to reform. The minister kept his promise to legislate in accordance
May-August 1968
43
with the House's recommendations- but added some amendments of his

own. The subsequent outcry at these new amendments, and at the minister's
implementation of the recommended legislation, cast an interesting light
upon (a) the amendments to the Select Committee's report that Frank
Henderson (the senior official member of the House of Assembly) had
secured approval for in June 1967, and (b) the differing sets of assumptions
that underlay the minister's legislation, and his interpretation of it, and what
some of the Sele<>t Committee's members, and other elected members, had
thought that tbey had recommended.
It may b~ r-ecalled that Henderson originally objected to the use of the
terms "minister" and "assistant minister" to describe the proposed successors
to the old under-secretaries. "Ministerial member" and "assistant ministerial
member", he felt, "may more accurately describe the functions and
responsibilities of the position in the territorial context until the people of
the territory specifically decide on further steps towards self-government". 1
Barnes, too, went to some pains to insist in 1968, that the change in title
was "a matter of terminology not of substance" .2 In the light of the criticism
that followed his proposal of further amendments to the Papua and New
Guinea Act, howeyer, and in view of the attacks upon his implementation
of the revised act, it seems clear that the minister's interpretation of what
the House of Assembly really wanted was not identical with that of at least
some of its members. What was a question of terminology in the minister's
eyes revealed a quite significant gap between the assumptions of
officialdom, and those of some of the more radical politicians in the territory.
Barnes has always believed "that political development to the point of
self-government or independence or other status [to which, he alone
consistently makes reference] which the Territory may ultimately assume can
[not] have substance if it is not accompanied by progress towards self
reliance in economic matters ... ". 3 Furthermore, even though the minister's
insistence on the attainment of economic self-reliance before self-government
has weakened slightly to a claim that "substantial progress in this direction
is essential if political advance is to be real and genuine" ,4 Barnes' general
philosophy of political and administrative development does not allow for
undue baste, for he now believes that the "acquisition of experience is not
a process that lends itself to too much acceleration, but an experienced Public
Service and a fund of experience at the political level are essential for
efficient and stable government". 5 In short, even if Papua and New Guinea
is not likely to attain self-government before it is economically self-reliant,
the minister has purely political and administrative reasons for not hurrying
the process of political change along too much. Furthermore, he believes
that most Papuans and New Guineans agree with him, for when they speak
to him they talk about "the need for roads and bridges, not self-government".6
Indeed, in Barnes' view, the Australian government is still developing the
territory ahead of popular demand (and interest): "We could not be pushing
this thing quicker than we are doing to prepare these people for a situation
where they can say they want to take over". 7 The reaction of a number of
Papuan and New Guinean leaders to the minister's actions at this time,
44
Edward P. Wolfers
however, seemed to reflect a keener awareness on their part of the pushing

than of the speed.
The Papua and New Guinea Bill1968 represented "an important advance
on the side of the executive government distinct from the side of the
legislature", 8 in the minister's view, and so it did on his assumption that "the
final responsibility of administering the territory [should be left with] the
Administrator, acting on behalf of the Australian Government". 9
Nonetheless, the change in the title of part IV of the act, from
"Administration" to "The Executive Government" is of more than purely
symbolic significance.
The bill provided for the appointment of seven ministerial, and up to ten
assistant ministerial, members, through a process of consultation between
a standing nominations committee of five elected members of the House of
Assemhly and the Administrator, until a final list of elected members equal
to the number of ministerial offices was arrived at, and then approved by
the House as a whole. The Minister for External Territories was then
empowered to make the actual appointments to office himself, but "only
on the recommendation of the Administrator or after consultation with
him" .10 In short, Canberra retained control over who got what jobs, and was
also given the power, through the Governor-General, acting on the advice
of the minister, and after a report from the Administrator, to terminate the
individual appointments of all holders of ministerial and assistant ministerial
office, if it were in the public interest (whether policy differences could lead
to dismissals "in the public interest", especially ifthey broke the principles
of cabinet solidarity and secrecy which have been imposed upon the new
Administrator's Executive Council, the minister did not say). The minister
did, however, point out that "[t]hese arrangements for the appointment of
ministerial members and assistant ministerial members are designed on the
one hand to give the House of Assembly a full voice in these appointments
and on the other hand to recognise the essential responsibilities of the
Administrator and the Minister" .11 Final responsibility for the territory's
government, therefore, remains outside its own legislature. Indeed, the
"administrative functions exercised by a ministerial member" (as distinct
from the management and public service aspects of his department's
activities, over which he would have no control), "would be derived from
the Administrator". 12 Within this framework, then, the seven ministerial
members would "assume certain responsibilities in the administration of the
Territory both in day to day administrative activities and in the framing of
policies" .13
The new Administrator's Executive Council (which replaced the former
Administrator's Council) has an elected majority, of seven ministerial
members and another elected member nominated by the Administrator and
appointed by the minister, three officials and the Administrator himself. "In
matters of budget policy and planning, the Council would have the final
responsibility within the Territory for advising the Administrator", 14 and, if
he rejects the Council's advice, he must have his reasons for so doing tabled
in the House of Assembly. Nonetheless, "the proposed arrangements
May-August 1968
45
recognise the need, while so much of the Territory's revenue is provided

by the Australian Government, for that Government to determine the broad
strategy of the budget". 15
The tendency to view the ministerial members' role within a bureaucratic
framework was further emphasised in Barnes' insistence that the ministerial
members would not so much represent the Administrator's Executive
Council in the House of Assembly, but "would represent the Administration
in relation to those functions assigned to them, for example, regarding
questions and motions in the House". 16 The ministerial members' duties
would later "be set out in detail in arrangements approved by the Minister", 17
and they "may be adapted in the light of experience". 18 The subsequent
provision of ministerial cars (with special "MM" number plates) for four
of the official members of the House of Assembly, and the official
explanation that it had been done because these men "were in effect, official
ministerial members", 19 only stressed the dominance of bureaucratic norms
throughout the new system even more. The role of the new assistant
ministerial members remains as ambiguous as that of their predecessors,
the former under-secretaries: they hold, apparently, "a form of junior
ministerial offic.e designed to allow elected members to work with
departmental heads and to undertake work of a ministerial nature.
Responsibility however would remain with the departmental head." 20 Just
what form the relationship between the ministerial members for agriculture,
education, and trade and industry, and "their" assistant ministerial members
for rural development, technical education and training, and cooperatives,
would take remained unclear.
The proposed five-member Budget Standing Committee, to channel
private members' requests to the Administrator's Executive Council, was
not legally established by the bill, and, although its members were appointed
at the House's first meeting, it does not seem to have done much to date.
If the legislative implementation of the House of Assembly's
recommendations represented a cautious advance towards responsible
government, the minister's additional amendments to the Papua and New
Guinea Act only tended to strengthen Canberra's control over local affairs.
Firstly, the Governor-General was now empowered to withhold assent from
part of an ordinance reserved for his assent (by the Administrator, or by
law). Previously, he had been able to accept or reject an ordinance as a
whole, and this may, on occasion, have obliged the Australian government
to accept an unwelcome amendment rather than imperil the entire ordinance
if the official members tried to have it passed again (but without this
amendment) by the House. The old system had given the territory's
parliament a certain bargaining-power against officialdom. Now, although
the Governor-General must still tell the House why a particular clause has
not been assented to, he can just cut out those accretions-by-amendment to
a bill that the government does not like. Specifically the government used
the Governor-General's new power to threaten to delete an amendment to
the Public Service (Papua and New Guinea) Ordinance (No.2) 1967, unless
the House omitted the amendment itself. The amendment, which Voutas had
46
Edward P. Wolfers
hurriedly added to the bill, provided that male and female public servants
should, henceforth, receive equal pay. There were a number of technical
inadequacies to Voutas' general scheme (especially insofar as it dealt with
salary scales rat.lter than actual pay}, but the government was able to ensure
the survival of its single-line salary structure for indigenous and expatriate
public servants without risking a second full-scale debate on the general
principles of the bill. The House's refusal to omit the amendment could have
been met with the Governor-General's new partial veto. 21 A second
amendment to the Papua and New Guinea Act to provide "for priority to be
obtained for urgent administration business in the House of Assembly on a
message to the House by the Administrator", 22 further enhanced the
government's control, even over the House of Assembly's notice-paper.
The reaction to the minister's interpretation of the House of Assembly's
wishes, and to his own amendments to the Papua and New GuirteuAct, wa:.
both swift in coming, and generally unfavourable. A group offive members
of the new House, John Guise (chairman of the first House's Select
Committee on Constitutional Development), Tony Voutas (whose
amendment to the Public Service Bill was clearly the minister's immediate
target), Percy Chatterton (also a member of the first House) and Oala OalaRarua and Cecil Abel (both newly elected to the House) issued a joint
statement that they were "disturbed" at the proposed deviations from the
Select Committee's report. The Governor-General's new partial veto, the
failure to spell out more precisely the powers and duties of the ministerial
and assistant ministerial members, and the provision enabling the
Administration to claim priority for its business in the House, were all, they
felt, "a reflection on the dignity and authority of the first House of
Assembly". 23 They wanted the priority provision at least to be exercised only
on the advice of the Administrator's Executive Council. Even the Pacific
Islands Monthly concurred: to "some observers here", it commented, "the
recently enacted amendments to the Papua and New Guinea Act take a
hesitating step forward towards self-government followed by two smart
paces backward". 24
The minister answered his critics (especially those on the ALP side in
Federal parliament, for he never answered the five protesting legislators
directly) in a rather patiently paternalistic statement, in which he declared
it to be the government's ambition "to give as much administrative power
as possible to these ministerial and assistant ministerial members. Our
experience with under-secretaries has been that it is difficult to get people
into a situation to take the full responsibility of administering a department"
- hence the need for flexibility (i.e., the lack of a precise definition of the
ministerial members' powers) in the new House. His explanation of the
significance of the Governor-General's new partial veto was disingenuous
in the extreme. In Barnes' view the new provision "simplifies the situation.
In a sense ... [he somehow imagined] this provision limits the power of
assent of the Governor-General. Instead of withholding assent from the
whole of the Bill, he can withhold his assent from part of the Bill." 25
Barnes' failings on the constitutional issue were compounded, in some
May-August 1968
47
of his critics' eyes, by his subsequent announcement that the Departments of

Law, the Treasury, District Administration, and Lands, would continue to
be represented in the House by their permanent heads. Ministerial members
would be appointed to the Agriculture, Education, Public Health, Labour,
Public Works, Posts and Telegraphs, and Trade and Industry portfolios, and
eight assistant ministerial members would be made responsible, respectively,
for Forests, Lands, Local Government, Cooperatives, Rural Development,
Treasury, Technical Education and Training, and Information and Extension
Services. Simultaneously, the Administrator (D.O. Hay) announced that four
officers of the Department of District Administration (the District
Commissioners for the Chimbu, Central and Morobe districts, and a DDA
district inspector) would be appointed as official members of the new
legislature, to replace those departmental heads who had now been
supplanted by ministerial members.
John Guise criticised the allocation of portfolios as a denial of any real
positions of responsibility to members of the House, and the Pangu pati and
Oala-Rarua agreed. The new member for the East Sepik Regional electorate,
and a Pangu man, Michael Somare, was probably the most outspoken critic
of the kiaps' (pidgin for "patrol officer") appointment: "They have appointed
too many kiaps. They are not specialists. They only know how to boss
people about. They are there to influence the elected members from their
districts, where they are very big men." Further, Somare wanted "a man of
the people, not a Port Moresby European", to represent the Department of
Lands in the House, as well as a ministerial member for the Department of
District Administration. Oala-Rarua - significantly, in view of his
subsequent appointment as the relevant assistant ministerial member wanted an elected member to represent the Treasury in the House of
Assembly.
The Administrator replied to his critics with the claim that the new official
members had been chosen as individuals, on the basis of their ability and
experience, not as kiaps. 26 The Canberra Times felt that the allocation of
portfolios was not in this territory's best interests, while the kiaps in the
house would "need now to be doubly careful not to invite specific charges
[of attempting to coerce elected members]". 27 Only the South Pacific Post
seemed to find the official explanations of both actions satisfactory, although
it did find it "disappointing" that none of the official members came from
the New Guinea Islands. It felt that the Administration had missed "a chance
to foster a national spirit in the Territory by choosing the official members
on a representative basis". 28 The South Pacific Post did, however, publish
two articles, by Don Barrett (a former MHA) the very titles of which
indicated the vehement conviction of the writer that the first House's
recommendations had been betrayed. 29 The announcement on 29 May that
ordinary members' salaries would rise by $400 to $3,000 per annum, that
assistant ministerial members and the non-ministerial elected member of
the Administrator's Executive Council would receive $3,750, and that the
Speaker and all of the ministerial members would earn $5,000, may have
silenced some of the more aspiring of the Administration's critics on other
48
Edward P. Wolfers
counts. 30 In addition, all of the ministerial and assistant ministerial members

had earlier been promised Administration-provided housing in Port
Moresby. On 14 June a special Port Moresby allowance to cover the cost of
maintaining two households, and a special travelling allowance while
travelling on duty, over and above the normal electoral travelling allowances
paid to all members, were announced. 31
Barnes returned to the fray through an answer to a question without notice
in the Commonwealth Parliament. The Select Committee itself, he said, had
recommended "that final authority for government should rest with
Australia". Furthermore, several of the departments to which ministerial
members would be appointed were "responsible for a considerable number
of important policy decisions", although, as the Treasury portfolio "is
associated with a department involved in making many policy decisions, it
should remain with theAdministration". 32 Perhaps to reinforce his point that
money gives the power (and the right) to control, the minister refused some
weeks later to commit Australia, as the ALP's spokesman on territory affairs,
K.E. Beazley, had done in January, on the amount of its future aid to Papua
and New Guinea.J3
The minister's general unhappiness with the political aspects of Papua
and New Guinea's development was reflected in his comment, just after the
opening of the new House of Assembly, that any demand for self-government
by the legislature might well require confirmation by a popular referendum. 34
This implied attack on the House of Assembly's legitimacy is still the
minister's own view rather than government policy, and the Australian's
editorial writers quickly pointed to the difficulties it raised:
The dangers of the proposal are those of rigidity. At this stage, and for some
time to come, it is almost certain that the majority - and perhaps a vast
majority at that- of New Guineans will resist any moves towards all but the
most limited forms of self-government.
The notion of independence is anathema to most New Guineans at this

stage because it is equated with Australian desertion. The Government is well
aware of this and in saying that only a clearly expressed majority wish for
self-government, determined by referendum, will be acceptable, the
Government can sidestep any hasty moves for independence on the part of
the parliamentary elites ...
But there is a grave danger in frustrating the elites until such time as grass
roots political sophistication has caught up with the political thinking of New
Guinea's emerging native politicians. New Guinea will in the future be run
by native elites just as it is now being run by white elites. The notion of a
politically sophisticated mass electorate emerging in the near future is plain
nonsense. 35
The absence of any public reaction to his proposal by any Papuan and
New Guinean leaders lent additional credence to the minister's view that
"[p]ressure for early self-government ... was coming mainly from outside",
and especially from sections of the Australian press, although apathy
perhaps, rather than the "resistance" that the minister thought he perceived,
May-August 1968
49
seemed to be "coming from within". 36
The Speakership
The speakership of the Papua and New Guinea House of Assembly is a
disproportionately important office by the normal standards of a
Westminster-style Parliament. It is, in fact, the most powerful executive
office open to the territory's legislators, especially since the minister
delineated his conception of the ministerial members' roles. It is also the
most prestigious office to which Papuans and New Guineans may presently
aspire: in official protocol, it ranks only after the Administrator and Chief
Justice in precedence, and all of the members of the legislature, elected and
official, indigenous and expatriate, must show its incumbent due and public
deference at every sitting of the House.
Under the 1965 ordinance establishing the Department of the House of
Assembly, 37 the Speaker was given much the same powers over the
legislature's staff as his Australian counterpart, and was thereby given rather
greater authority than any other legislative office-bearer in the territory.
Specifically, the Speaker was empowered under this ordinance to report
directly to the Minister for External Territories (and it was assumed that
the minister would customarily act in accordance with the Speaker's reports)
on all matters affecting the appointment, promotion and transfer of officers
of the department. He is also able to recommend the creation and abolition
of offices, without the permission of (but customarily in consultation with)
the Public Service Commissioner; in short, to recommend any changes in
the organisation, and classification, of offices within his department; and
none of the officers affected by his decisions can appeal beyond the Speaker
against his regulations and determinations. Further, the Speaker alone can
determine his officers' periods of recreation leave. The speakership,
therefore, allows its incumbent a greater potential for actual experience in
the day-to-day administration of a department than is presently available
to anyone other than departmental directors within the Administration, and,
unlike them, and unlike the ministerial members, he has no really effective
superiors he must first consult. Moreover, because officialdom, and probably
a majority of the members, regard the House of Assembly as a training
institution, in which experience is gained in the forms and procedures of
government, rather than the exercise of power, the Speaker's office is
important because of its incumbent's role in preserving the decorum of the
House, and in showing the indigenous members how to do things "properly".
In a House of independents, the Speaker's right to decide who shall speak
when, may play an important role in determining the temper, if not the actual
trend, of a debate (for only on a very few occasions, such as the annual
appropriations debates, in which most members know beforehand that they
want to speak, is it possible to prepare a list of speakers, and to adhere to it,
before the debate begins).
The defeat of the former speaker, H.L.R. Niall, the chairman of
committees, J.K. McCarthy, and his successor at the first House's last
50
Edward P. Wolfers
meeting, Don Barrett, as well as the three other temporary chairmen, John
Stuntz, Dirona Abe and Zure Zurecnuoc, meant that none of the members
of the second House had ever had any experience in the Speaker's chair.
There was, therefore, considerable speculation in the press as to who would
get the job, most of it centred around the four expatriates who had been reelected (Ashton, Chatterton, Neville and Voutas), and Ron Slaughter while
he was leading on the first count, and seemed likely to win, in the central
regional electorate. (He finally lost on preferences to Oala-Rarua.) It was
widely assumed that very few of the indigenous members would be capable
of the job, and that most of those who were would probably prefer to seek
ministerial office- a point that was reinforced by John Guise's publicly
announced indecision whether he would accept nomination for the
speakership, and his definite willingness to become a ministerial member,
1f asked. 38 Gradually, however, the speculative field came to include Guise,
Matthias Toliman, Tei Abal and Paul Lapun, although there seemed to be
some support for Ian Downs' suggestion that an official member who was
close to retirement (W.W. Watkins?) be allowed to fill the position for, say,
the first two years, before handing over to his indigenous deputy whom he
would have trained for the position in the interim. 39
The problem of the speakership was finally resolved at the school for
members, which was held in Port Moresby before the new House met. The
school, as did its predecessor at Sogeri in 1964, provided an occasion for
teaching the new members parliamentary procedure, as well as helping them
to get to know one another, to discuss political matters, and, especially, to
resolve such questions as the speakership in private. The (unofficial) result
of all the speculation was the nomination of Roy Ashton (who was said to
be keener on a ministerial position), N.M. Casey (who did want to be
Speaker), and Percy Chatterton, who withdrew when his fellow member for
a Papuan electorate, John Guise, nominated. Guise won, because, as one
commentator unkindly put it, the "Highlands bloc ... [believed] that he
would be more useful as Speaker than in shaking things up on the benches",
while Pangu supported him in order "to avoid a public showdown over the
ministerial issue". 40 The result also enabled the new Speaker to resolve, at
minimum political cost to himself, the conflict that his ambition and his
commitment to the new ministerial system (as the former Chairman of the
Select Committee on Constitutional Development that had recommended its
establishment) presented with his membership of Pangu, which wanted to
boycott all executive office for the time being. W.W. Watkins was elected
as Guise's deputy, and Angmai Bilas, Percy Chatterton, Oala Oala-Rarua,
Paul Langro and Sinake Giregire became temporary chairmen of committees.
Despite Barnes' rather patronising comment that it was "good to see a
Papuan has the confidence of the House for such high office", 41 Guise's
election to office has already brought about an important change in the
atmosphere of the House. He takes great care to explain changes in
procedure, and the issue of each vote to the members, in pidgin, and has,
both in manner and in his dress within as well as outside the House, reduced
the formality, but none of the dignity, of his office. His acceptance speech
May-August 1968
51
and his ceremonial official dress have also stressed his desire to transcend
regional and party divisions in the national cause. His formal nomination
and seconding by two Highlands members, and his addition of a tapa cloth
(for Papua), birds of paradise feathers and (symbolically for a radical?) a
kina shell around his neck (to represent the Highlands) have underlined his
desire to use the speakership as "a symbol of Papua and New Guinea striving
for unity and nation building" .42 Even as Speaker, however, Guise has provided ample evidence of his political astuteness. As local member, he has
announced his desire to continue to look after his electorate's interests through
submitting a detailed report of their "needs and aspirations direct to the
Administration through the appropriate channels ... " and to back them up
through distributing copies of these reports throughout his electorate" .43 In
reply to the many questions he has been asked as to whether he remains a Pangu
member, Guise simply reiterates the relevant portions of his acceptance speech:
I shall maintain the impartial and the middle course of this office ... at all times.
No affiliation, no personal opinion, no likes, no dislikes will in any way affect
... the carrying out of my duties .... Every member of the House is a friend
and no one is above the other. The office of Speaker shall not be the subject
of any party pressure from any political party or group or individuals from
within the House, either from elected members or the official members.
The First Meeting of the Second House of Assembly
The new House did not discuss any really important or controversial issues
at its first meeting. The Administration seemed content to let the new
members find their feet first, and to choose the House's office-bearers. Thus,
it is difficult to estimate with any accuracy just how much more radical or
sophisticated (except in purely formal terms, i.e. education, extra-village
experience, etc.) the new House is than its predecessor. The re-election of
only nineteen indigenous and four expatriate members of the first House
has meant that, at least in terms of the members' mastery of parliamentary
procedure, the new House has had to start off very little further ahead of
where its predecessors had begun in 1964. In this light, then, Niwia Ebia
Olewale's complaint towards the end ofthe meeting that he had understood
very little of what had passed45 was an important indication of the likely
frustration of many members with the procedures of Westminster, especially
as the complainant is one of the half-dozen best educated indigenous
members. Tei Abal's question on the second morning as to why he had had
to change sides with Siwi Kurondo when they had nominated Guise as
Speaker, 46 was another sign that ignorance of some of Westminster's
ceremonial and substantively irrelevant trappings may embarrass even the
most conscientious of legislators.
The general tenor of the address-in-reply, and the daily adjournment
debates, as well as of the questions asked, revealed a House that was
probably even more concerned with parochial issues than its predecessor,
possibly because its members now have practical experience ofthe political
Edward P. Wolfers
52
necessity of keeping the home folks happy. Nonetheless, the internal

structure of the legislature has changed considerably, very broadly in the
way outlined by one elected member:
On one side of the House is the highly organised force of the Administration
with ten official members.
On the other side is the highly organised Pangu, also with ten members.
In between is the vast majority of the House and this majority has organised
itself to make sure neither the Government nor Pangu bulldozes it. 47
One of the first gestures towards leadership of the House, or at least

towards regional group cohesion, was that of Ron Neville (who sat in
Downs' old place, where the "leader of the opposition" would normally be
found, and where, uniquely with the senior official member, the seat's
incumbent need not share his desk with other members) and his six
"constituent" Southern Highlands Open members. Between them, they asked
twenty-two carefully prepared and detailed, if parochial, questions during
the House's first question-time, followed by a speech by Neville
explaining the significance of the gesture. In a sense, the rest of the
meeting was dominated by the questions and demands of members
from the less sophisticated areas, and those which are suffering most from
the Administration's policy of concentrating economic development
where the potential is greatest. The Southern Highlanders' performance,
however, seemed only to arouse a measure of resentment at their
flamboyant demonstration among the other members. Stuart Inder, for
one, later warned Neville in the Pacific Islands Monthly that he was
trying too hard to fill all of the gaps left by the departure of Downs, Stuntz
and Barrett from the House, and tended, instead, to sound "like a shorttempered kiap ... [whose actions] resulted only in him getting some backs
~~
The legislative session was officially opened by the Australian

Governor-General, and, for the first time, Papua and New Guinea's
politicians were told clearly and directly that the territory's "development
... as a seventh State of Australia is fraught with difficulties, and
that statehood, as against self-government, is not likely to be the outcome
of development". 49 Nonetheless, the Australian government continued to
hold out the prospect of a future, undefined "special relationship"
between a self-governing Papua and New Guinea, and Australia. Curiously,
in view of many commentators' expectations, the announcement seemed to
arouse no overt fears of desertion, indeed, very little reaction at all,
perhaps because of the possibility of the "special relationship". Even as
conservative a politician (on constitutional issues) as Tei Abal accepted
what was said without demur, although significantly, he did observe that
had Lord Casey been a man from the United Nations rather than the
Governor-General of Australia he would not necessarily have believed
him. 5
Otherwise, the House's proceedings seemed to be dominated by the very
presence of the Pangu pati, and the reactions it, in turn, aroused.
May-August 1968
53
Pangu now has ten members in the House: Michael Somare (East Sepik
Regional, and the party's parliamentary leader), Paul Lapun (South
Bougainville Open, and deputy leader), Pita Lus (Maprik Open, and party
whip), Niwia Ebia Olewale (South Fly Open), Mangobing Kakun (Munya
Open), James Meanggarum (Bogia Open), Paliau Maloat (Manus Open),
Tony Voutas (Morobe Regional), Cecil Abel (Milne Bay Regional), and
Michael Kaniniba (Huon Gulf Open), who at one point denied in the House
that he was (yet?) a party member at all. 51 Guise's elevation to the
speakership, and Siwi Kurondo's acceptance of ministerial office seemed
effectively to cut them off from the remainder of the party.
The Pangu members opened firmly, with an attempted demonstration of
unity and coordination, in which Somare, Lapun, Voutas and Abel
successively outlined the party's policies towards the new ministerial
system, local and self-government, home rule, and economic development
respectively. Somare announced, firstly, that no member of the party would
accept ministerial office (although Lapun was a member of the Ministerial
Nominations Committee). The party wanted to avoid any conflict between
party membership and a ministerial member's loyalty to the Administrator's
Executive Council. It sought to become, in effect, the House's "loyal
opposition". Thirdly, Pangu did not want to jeopardise its commitment to
its policies through loss of some of its members' votes to the Administration.
The party, therefore, committed itself to the fostering of a two-party system
in Papua and New Guinea. Somare concluded his outline of party policy
with an attack upon the appointment of so many kiaps to the House, as well
as the alleged concentration of these men's experience in the Highlands. In
Somare's view, the new official members had been appointed purposely "to
herd and shepherd the unsophisticated members ofthis House, thus exerting
a subtle form of direct rule ... [in order to encourage] controversial support
for the Administration ... from less sophisticated members. It would have
been better if other people, with special knowledge in certain fields had been
appointed to the house rather than the kiaps. " 52
The range of responses to Pangu's presence, cohesion and statements
of policy in the House was fairly wide. Several Highlands members
expressed their very real interest in discovering what parties were, and
specifically what Pangu stood for, although several of them added that they
feared the development of parties at this stage. Jim McKinnon, the leader
of the All Peoples' party, later sought to capitalise upon these fears (and
perhaps to take over the elected members' group that was formed during
the meeting), when he announced that Dennis Buchanan and himself, the
party's only announced legislative members, would henceforth call
themselves the "All Peoples' group", as "the majority of the people have
not the slightest idea of politics or party systems, and consequently have
little trust in parties". 53 The All Peoples' group (which one commentator
said had been renamed by some the "One Person's Party") 54 also announced
that its members would accept ministerial positions, if nominated - seven
hours after the list of potential office-holders had been accepted by the
House. At the other end of the political spectrum, Oala Oala-Rarua (a former
54
Edward P. Wolfers
co-chairman of Pangu, who had left the party after a dispute over his
prediction that independence could come by 1970) attacked Pangu, from
his own standpoint as "a straight out nationalist" for not allowing its
members to gain experience in the ministerial system it had advocated. 55
N.I. Uroe, from a more conservative position than Oala-Rarua, later added
that it was not just Pangu's prerogative, but "the role of all elected members
to act as the Loyal Opposition of this government" .56
Officialdom was clearly disconcerted, if not surprised, at Somare's
vehement attack upon the kiaps. L.W. Johnson, Assistant Administrator
(Services), rose very soon after Somare had spoken to point out that the
Administration had not wanted to appoint official members from within
departments which had ministerial representation in the House, as the
government wanted the ministerial members to have complete, unprumplt:u
responsibility for their departments in the House. The four new nominees
had, therefore, been "entirely on the basis of the personal qualities of the
individual man chosen for the job ... ".57 Curious, then, that these individual
official members (i.e., they are not representatives of their department) have
"District Commissioner" or "District Inspector" printed in brackets after
their names in Hansard each time they speak, in exactly the same position
as other members' constituencies or official titles are recorded. H.P. Seale
(District Commissioner (DC) at Lae, whose real role is probably that of
counterweight to Voutas among the seven Morobe Open members) then
explained that he had spent only eight of his thirty-four years in the Territory
in the Highlands, 58 while S.M. Foley later calculated that between the four
of them, they had spent only twenty-five of their one hundred territory years
in that area. Anyway, he insisted, he was not ashamed of being a kiap or a
government man. The kiaps' role in the House was "not an attempt to stand
between the member and the Government", but "both inside and outside the
House, to tell the people, what the Government is doing, and why it is doing
it". If Somare had meant by "simple" that the Highlanders were
unintelligent, then he should look again at the complexity of their traditional
culture, and agricultural system, and - an obvious appeal to Highlands
chauvinism - at the way their districts had been developed since contact
"in a manner unparalleled in this country". 59 Clearly, the official members
knew from experience (Foley, as DC for Chimbu, and then Ellis' successor
in the Western Highlands; Seale as former DC for the Eastern Highlands;
and Littler as District Inspector at Mount Hagen) just what makes the
Highlands tick.
A little later in the meeting, Neville (himself a former kiap, and from
an area where most of the members repeatedly ask for more, and more
regular, patrols) asked T.W. Ellis, Director of District Administration, a
question which enabled the latter to speak in detail and at length on the need
for more patrol officers to be recruited, and for those who are trained to be
retained. 60
The most important reaction to Pangu's presence and activities in the
House, however, came from about fifty of the uncommitted (i.e. non-Pangu,
non-official) members of the House who began to meet together as a group
May-August 1968
55
towards the end of the meeting. The group, variously labelled a "'power'
group" 61 or just an elected or independent members' group by the press, bore
a close resemblance to the elected members' group that emerged early in
the life of the first House. Although the group lacks any announced formal
organisation, its leaders are alleged to be expatriates, especially Casey and
Watts. 62 The reasons various members gave for their adherence to the group
varied widely: in some cases, simple resentment at the coherence and lucid
certainty of several Pangu members may have been the cause; in other cases,
it was a desire to frustrate, and put Pangu in its place (as evidenced in those
divisions where the official members supported a Pangu motion on its merits,
against the resolute opposition of nearly every other member); at least one
conservative expatriate supported the group because he feared that a few of
the other members would "join anyone who looks like becoming the strength
... "and he wanted to show that it was not Pangu. 63 In short, the group was
designed to give the vast majority of members a sense of belonging, as well
as to make sure that Pangu had an effective and organised opposition in the
House, apart from the Administration (on some issues).
To date, the elected members' group has displayed "almost party-like
coherence" 64 in the House, despite the absence of any real common interest
(except perhaps a desire to belong, and a fear ofPangu) among its members.
As early as its third meeting, however, an argument allegedly occurred, and
one European member is reported to have walked out in a huff. 65 The group's
apparent leadership by expatriates, its lack of a declared platform or even a
firm policy, and its informal methods of meeting and organisation, have
already given rise to widespread speculation as to its durability. The general
verdict of the press seems to be that the group will either go the way of the
caucus Guise once led (from 1964 until mid-1966), or eventually become,
as some of its members seem to hope, a party-like organisation in its own
right.
The rest of the first meeting tended to centre around two themes: the
experience, and lessons, of the last election; and the need to tidy up the
unfinished business of the first House (including a, perhaps unplanned,
reassertion of official control over the legislature).
Most speeches were concerned with relatively parochial matters
although some acknowledgement was also made of the country's brittle
unity, as displayed in the Papuans-versus-New Guineans' brawling in Port
Moresby which coincided with the meeting. In many cases, parochialism was
but the result of a member's analysis of why he had won, or a rival,
especially an incumbent, had lost. The members' experience with the
realities of electoral success, and loss, ensured widespread support for
Ashton's move to set up a select committee to investigate the possibility of
setting up a superannuation scheme for members. Somare's motion to set up
a commission of inquiry into the electoral system failed, however, initially
because of the mover's specification of what aspects of the system should be
investigated, and his advocacy of specific changes. Even when the original
wording of the motion, which almost presupposed the results of the
investigation, was changed to a more general form, which received official
56
Edward P. Wolfers
support, it was defeated. In large part, the debate simply provided the first
occasion for the uncommitted members' group to put Pangu down, although
it was also probably just not rational to expect the members to support a
move to change the system which had so recently allowed them to gain
election to the House. Voutas' motion for a select committee to examine
legislative procedures had to be amended too, for the same reasons as
Somare's motion, in order to gain official support. Although it was then
adjourned until the next meeting, it seemed likely to succeed, just because
it seemed less threatening, and very relevant, to most of the members.
Several bills, e.g. the National Fitness, and Gaming (Playing Cards)
Bills, were passed without debate, for they only tidied up some technical
shortcomings in their predecessors. Nonetheless, a lot of tidying up from
the first House still remains to be done- thirty-three of its ordinances had
still not come into force by June (plus part of one already in force, two about
which there were technical doubts, and two to which assent had been
refused) - an interesting set of indications of the care and urgency with
which officialdom prepares and considers legislation. 66 The Administration's
carelessness was further displayed in the way in which one bill was moved
and passed, without copies having been distributed to the members,67 and
one official member promised to answer a question on another bill after it
was passed. 68 Finally, the session provided an occasion for the (re-)assertion
of the government's power- one bill was refused assent/9 and another was
returned by the Governor-General for amendment. 70 In the latter case,
Voutas was at least promised that a committee would be established to
consider the principle of equal pay for equal work by men and women,
although his request that he be included on the committee was not
subsequently granted.
Other debates which aroused controversy concerned an announced
shortfall of $4 million in the Territory's internal revenue in 1967-8; the
question of an alleged decline in the discipline of the police force, especially
in the Sepik; and the desirability of sending a parliamentary mission abroad
to investigate the use to which long-term overseas volunteers were put
elsewhere in the Pacific (the motion was defeated because of the mission's
likely cost, rather than on the desirability of having volunteers). Legislation
was also passed to set up a four-man (including two indigenes, the
Administration promised) public service board; and legislation enabling the
negotiation of a $US 7,000,000 loan from the World Bank to improve the
Territory's telecommunications systems was quickly passed. The
Administration's Industrial Relations Bill 1968 was also passed, despite
some members' objection that the requirement that the parties concerned
report a threatened strike or lockout to the Labour Department could lead
to prosecutions in those cases where the threat was not perceived as being
real until too late. J.J. Garrett's amendment to require the report only if a
strike or lockout actually took place was defeated by thirty-one votes to fiftyfive. Throughout the meeting, the newly-elected ministerial and assistant
ministerial members still freely criticised, and even voted against, the
Administration.
May-August 1968
57
The new ministerial members are: Angmai Bilas (Trade and Industry);
O.I. Ashton (Public Works); Matthias Toliman (Education); Sinake Giregire
(Posts and Telegraphs); Tei Abal (Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries); Tore
Lokoloko (Health); Toua Kapena (Labour). The assistant ministerial
members are: Andagari Wabiria (Lands, Surveys and Mines); Joseph Lue
(Technical Education and Training); Kaibelt Diria (Local Government);
Lepani Watson (Cooperatives); Meek Singiliong (Rural Development); Oala
Oala-Rarua (Treasury); Paul Langro (Information and Extension Services);
Siwi Kurondo (Forests). Tom Leahy was nominated by the Administrator
as the non-ministerial, elected member of his Executive Council. Toua
Kapena, Paul Langro and Kaibelt Diria resigned from the Ministerial
Nominations Committee after Lapun, Neville and they themselves agreed
that they be nominated for office.
The Administrator seemed content with the appointments, despite the lack
of knowledge of English in seven cases, and the putative illiteracy of three,
although he was thought to have been unhappy with the inclusion of an
expatriate in the list of nominees. 71 Although the Administrator publicly
denied that there had been any major points of disagreement between the
Ministerial Nominations Committee and himself, he was reported as
regarding the ministerial positions as being mainly for training purposes,
and therefore not designed for expatriates. He was content to go slowly at
first, and claimed that their selection had not been over-ridingly based on
the need for geographical representation, but that their capacity (not literacy)
and age had been taken into account too. 72 The Administration tabled a code
of conduct for the new office-holders in the House immediately they had
been appointed, and the first "cabinet" meeting was held on 17 June.
There was some surprise among the press that Oala-Rarua had not made
full ministerial rank, and that Lepani Watson (alone of the four former undersecretaries who sought re-appointment) had not been "promoted" either;
indeed, he was now the assistant ministerial member for only a section of
the department for which he had once been the under-secretary. 73 In its usual
charming and tactful way, the South Pacific Post welcomed the new
ministerial members with a front-page comment from a Melbourne
journalist, who lamented the inability of some of them to read of the
activities of what the author amusingly called "the great advanced races".
"Boys", he concluded, choosing his words carefully, "if you want to keep
your illusions (and perhaps ours, too) you'd better stay illiterate". 74
The production by the Department of Information and Extension Services
of a roneoed weekly summary of the House's activities, This Week in the
House of Assembly, unfortunately only in English, and the Treasurer's
promise of a special budget seminar for members at the next meeting,
provided further evidence of the government's desire for the second House
to "work" internally, and "come across" at the popular level. Early in August,
the ministerial and assistant ministerial members also spent two days
practising the handling of government business in the House of Assembly
in preparation for the House's second meeting.
6
Edward P. Wolfers
The Second Meeting of the Second House of Assembly

The annual budget meeting of the House is always something of a
"talk-fest" .1 The very format of the debate on the annual appropriation
bill invites maximum participation from the full range of legislators in
that its provisions concern all of their electorates directly, and the
debate itself is, traditionally, relatively free-flowing (i.e., the members are
allowed to speak on almost any aspect of government policy they choose,
and at any level, from the purely parochial to that concerned solely with
matters of principle). The provision of a simplified summary of the
budget (replete with pictures of money-bags, drawn to scale) in Pidgin,
made participation easier for many members, as did the one-day
adjournment between the budget's presentation in the House and the debate,
when the official members "explained" the budget's provisions to the
members. The debate was even further stretched by the introduction of an
elementary form of ministerial responsibility that involved all but one of
the ministerial and assistant ministerial members in reporting formally to
the House on their respective departments' activities over the preceding year.
The Speakers' list- a device that only really works for the budget debatewas full: in all, only one assistant ministerial member, the four official
members who are kiaps, and five each of the expatriate and indigenous
elected members (and, of course, the Speaker) failed to take part in
the debate. The budget meeting as a whole was, in fact, a record: it
lasted through a total of thirteen sitting days plus the "day off' mentioned
above.
Total budgetary expenditure for 1968-9 is expected to be
$152,860,000, a rise of 14.5 per cent over the 1967-8 figure. The Australian
grant is $87 million, itself an increase of 12.1 per cent over the previous
year, while the Commonwealth government will contribute a further
$295,000 to meet the cost of pensions for officers of the two pre-war
administrations, and spend another $23 million (a drop of $21 million
from 1967-8) directly in the Territory on behalf of Commonwealth
departments (e.g. the army). Administration expenditure in 1968-9
(with the 1967-8 figures included for comparison) will take the following
form:
59
1968-92 1967-8
per cent
$million
$million
of total
Commodity producing
sectors'
Economic overheads'
Social services'
General administration,
law and order'
Grand total (including other

public works, misc.
and transfer items)'
per cent
of total
20.159
30.674
51.859
13.19
20.07
33.92
17.836
23.594
48.752
13.36
17.66
36.51
35.354
23.12
31.330
23.46
152.860
100.00
133.547
100.00
The budget itself was, in the Treasurer's (A.P.J. Newman) words, just
"more of the same thing as last year". 8 It was, however, perhaps a rather
more significant document in the long-term in that it represented the first
instalment ofthe Administration's five year economic development plan for
the Territory which was introduced later in the meeting. Indeed, the budget's
overall emphasis accorded closely with the plan: "to expend an increasing
proportion of our resources on the economic sector [basically on economic
overheads rather than in the commodity producing sector], with a decreasing
proportion on the social services and other sectors of the budget" .9 Similarly,
the budget's revenue-raising provisions accorded with the plan's, in that they
sought to increase internal receipts as much as practicable, and to attract
increasing Commonwealth grants, within an "overall trend ... towards
increasing internal and decreasing grant proportions of the total" .10 Thus
forty-three per cent of the Territory's receipts will be raised from internal
sources in 1968-9, while fifty-seven per cent represent the grant's percentage
contribution to revenue (as against figures of forty-two per cent and fiftyeight per cent respectively in 1967-8).
On the administrative front, the Treasurer promised that the
recruitment of public servants from overseas would henceforth be permitted
"only ... in those categories of employment for which there are insufficient
trained local officers" . 11 In practice, this would mean the cessation of
overseas recruitment of base-grade clerks (although replacements for
existing positions might still be sought overseas), and the recruitment of
training officers for all departments that still lacked them. In addition, a
special section would be established within the Public Service
Commissioner's Department to speed up the localisation of the Administration
bureaucracy.
Otherwise, the budget provided increases of 9.8 per cent and 8.9 per cent
respectively in the allocations for the Departments of Public Health and District
Administration, much of which will be absorbed in increased salaries
60
Edward P. Wolfers
and allowances, while the education grant rose by a modest $1,479,000. The
departments of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries, and Lands, Surveys and
Mines seemed to do best, with a rise of 20.8 per cent in the former's
allocation, mainly for salaries, and livestock subsidies, etc., and of 16.7 per
cent in the latter's, mainly for land purchases. As the Administration grows,
of course, so less and less becomes available for purely developmental
purposes each year, and more- $11,875,000 this year (a rise of 12.2 per
cent) is absorbed by general maintenance costs. The works programme
accordingly rose by only 5.8 per cent to $23.8 million, although this figure
does not include a further $6.1 million to be spent on capital works during
the year by the Electricity and Housing Commissions, the Ports and
Harbours Board, the University of Papua and New Guinea and the University
of Technology. Grants to these "Other Institutions" as they are called (i.e.,
the five institutions mentioned above plus the Development Bank) rose, in
all, by 36.1 per cent for 1968-9, without taking into account a special
promise by the Commonwealth government "to consider increasing the grant
to the Administration [by an unspecified amount], if the need of the
[Development] Bank for funds seems likely to exceed its resources and the
Government considers it necessary to assist the Administration to make an
additional contribution towards the Bank's capital"Y
Revenue-raising procedures differed only marginally from those that
pertained through 1967-8. The Administration believes that "development
is not just a matter for the Government", 13 and that the tax burden on private
and company incomes should, therefore, remain substantially lower than
in Australia. Nonetheless, the Territory's income tax was raised slightly by
the budget, the increases ranging from 1.1 per cent at the lower income levels
to 12.5 per cent at the top (average: 7.42 per cent). Overall, the tax rise will
yield a further $1 million during the financial year, offset as it is by
additional concessional deductions for superannuation_and life assurance
payments, and by a rise in the concessional deduction for a taxpayer's
children's educational expenses. The Territory's loan target for 1968-9 was
raised by $2 million to $10 million (as against the actual figure of $8.4
million achieved in 1967-8).
The budget debate tended to focus on parochial matters rather than
principles. Most of the members seemed, at least implicitly, to agree with
Neville, who opened the debate, that "the passage of this bill (which we
believe was largely prepared in Canberra, presumably by people who are not
conversant with the requirements of this Territory) is a fait accompli, and
that we are not really in any position whatsoever to make changes" . 14
Nevertheless, of course, a long series of minor, usually parochially-inspired
changes, were proposed. Voutas pressed on with Neville's allegation of
Canberra control by suggesting that the original budget approved by the
Administrator's Executive Council had been significantly changed at the last
minute by George Warwick Smith, Secretary ofthe Department of External
Territories. 15 Smith himself did not reply to Voutas until after the budget
had been passed, when he denied the suggestion, 16 while Ellis testified
immediately on his behalf that both the ministerial and assistant ministerial
61
members "have had a large hand, since they took up duty, in the compilation
of the budget" .17 Several of the ministerial and assistant ministerial members,
however, commented themselves on just how great a hand they felt they had
had. Their attitudes ranged from an answer to another member's question
by the Ministerial Member for Public Works (0.1. Ashton) that he had "had
no part in the Works Programme", 18 to an entertaining plea by Siwi Kurondo
that his Department of Forests be allocated more money. 19 Paul Langro was
nQt alone among the ministerial office-holders in pressing the demands of
his electorate against the present budget, 20 while Lepani Watson (Assistant
Ministerial Member for Cooperatives) made known his views on "his"
budget at the beginning of his speech:
Before I deal with the budget on behalf of my Department, I would like to
thank the Australian taxpayers for their contribution. My thanks come on
behalf of the Territory as a whole. My electors have not told me to express
their thanks because they do not seem to have received anything. 21
Most of the budget debate consisted of what the Pacific Islands Monthly
called "the usual run of 'I want speeches'", 22 climaxing in Koriam Urekit's
request for five fish freezers, a road, patrol and agricultural officers, a doctor,
a high school and a land demarcation committee for his electorate.23 On a
more general level, Neville was grateful for the Australian grant, but
concerned that the public service structure in the Territory might be
"somewhat too elaborate for us to sustain" .24 His only misgivings concerned
the public service's alleged inefficiency, and the effects of increasing
taxation on overseas investment. Michael Somare, who led for the Pangu
pati, congratulated the Treasurer for what he had managed to do within "the
limitations imposed by the Australian Government". He was, however,
critical of those limitations. In Somare's view, a true picture of Australian
spending in Papua and New Guinea could be obtained only by adding the
grant, direct Commonwealth departmental expenditure, and money spent
on "commercial activities" (e.g. the Australian Broadcasting Commission
and Trans-Australia Airlines) together. Then, total spending for 1968-9 could
be seen to have risen only slightly from the 1967-8 figure, by $1,400,000
to $119 million, and not by $10 million (the rise in the grant). Somare then
queried just why the Australian government is "levelling off its expenditure
in the Territory and not increasing it". "This Territory", he believed, "can
absorb a much larger grant - even double the present grant - without too
much pressure or wastage ofresources". 25 As the Pacific Islands Monthly's
local correspondent concluded: the Treasurer must have "listened happily
while Ron Neville and ... Michael Somare made, from opposite points of
view, criticisms which neatly cancelled each other out". 26
Other economic matters to come before the House at this meeting were
the five-year economic development programme, 27 which was tabled for
discussion at the following meeting of the House (see below), the
development capital guarantee declaration, which had been passed by the
first House of Assembly and was re-passed now without debate, and a
motion for a select committee to investigate "methods of increasing
62
Edward P. Wolfers
participation by indigenes in economic development through increased

share-holdings in Territory companies ... ". 28 Due to the costs involved in
setting up yet another House committee, the motion was finally amended
to become a request for an Administration investigation of the same problem,
but still involving a report back to the House. Meanggarum's request seemed
to gain in relevance after its passage, when criticisms were voiced in some
quarters of the apparent bias towards expatriate investment under the fiveyear plan, 29 and when for the first time, a Territory firm advertised a share
flotation, with a seventy-five per cent local holding, in Pidgin. Unfortunately,
only about three per cent of the total number of shares, however, seem to
be owned by indigenes. 30
The Public Service Arbitrator's decision of May 1967 in what was known
as "the local officers' pay case" did not end the Administration's difficulties
over its September 1964 decision to lower the rates of pay for indigenous
public servants to accord with the Territory's putative "capacity to pay".
Rather, it ushered in a new phase in which many local officers attempted to
press their claims politically rather than through arbitration. Percy
Chatterton's (MHA Moresby) Public Service Salaries Commission of
Inquiry Bill1968, which he prepared with the help and support of the Public
Service Association, 31 was but one of several manifestations of this change
in tactics. The aim of the bill was simple: in the absence of an established
system of appeals from arbitration, and in view of the Arbitrator's refusal
in November 1967 to refer his decision for review by a three-man tribunal,
Chatterton sought the appointment of a commission of inquiry into the rates
of pay for indigenous public servants. The bill proposed that the commission
report to the Minister for External Territories, who could accept or reject
its report. As the bill left the Territory's normal arbitration procedures
otherwise intact, it did not, in Chatterton's view, conflict at all with Lussick's
.
bill (see below).
The government chose to regard Chatterton's bill "as a direct attack on
the arbitration system ... : A small sector of the Territory's work force which
in the past has used arbitration extensively has now mounted a highlyorganised attack on the whole arbitration system ... because in one case the
Arbitrator has not given them all they have asked for." 32 A number of the
elected members, particularly the indigenes among rhem, were clearly
unhappy with the confrontation over the bill - generally because they
sympathised with the local officers' claims for a higher set of pay scales,
or at least did not want to be publicly aligned against them for political
reasons. As the Ministerial Member for Labour (Toua Kapena) put it: "In
opposing the bill I want to make it very clear that my opposition is in no
way directed towards a judgment or opinion on the adequacy or inadequacy
of local officers' salaries". 33 This sort of position enabled many members
to oppose Chatterton and Pangu without alienating the local officers among
their constituents. Oala Oala-Rarua (the Assistant Ministerial Member for
the Treasury) was, however, nicely caught: as an ex-public servant he could
not oppose a bill which could help to improve conditions for local public
servants, while "because of ... [his] background"- including his ministerial
63
position? - he could not support it. Instead, he accused the Public Service
Association of lying to local officers that the arbitration case would
automatically lead to rises in pay, a claim which the Association vigorously
denied, and he blamed the Administration for failing to consult local opinion
before altering the public service's salary structure in the first place. 34 In
the end, both Toua Kapena and Oala-Rarua abstained from voting on the
measure by walking from the chamber when a division was called, together
with three other Assistant Ministerial Members, Meek Singiliong, Lepani
Watson and Paul Langro, all of whom either supported the bill privately, or
just did not wish to be constrained into opposing it for the sake of preserving
the solidarity of the ministry. Although the Administration still won the vote
against the bill, by fifty-three votes to twenty-five, the abstention of five
members of the ministry presented a serious constitutional problem for the
government in that the ministry's collective responsibility to the House had
been openly breached. The whole matter was, therefore, referred to Canberra
for advice, although no action was ever publicly taken against any of the
five abstainers. 35 Curiously, however, in view of the publicity that surrounded
their action on this occasion, very little comment was ever made, at least
publicly, about an. earlier, more blatant breach of the ministry's solidarity
when three of the ministerial members, Ashton, Oala-Rarua and Paul
Langro, together with T.J. Leahy, a non-ministerial member of the
Administrator's Executive Council, had openly voted against the
government without reproof, albeit on a procedural aspect of a
comparatively minor, and unanimously approved, Lands Bill. 36 The
substantive issues raised by Chatterton's bill did not rest with its defeat
either, for shortly thereafter W.A. Lussick (MHA Manus and New Ireland
Regional) introduced the Public Service Arbitration Commission Bill 1968
which sought to establish a regular system of appeals from arbitration within
the public service rather than to canvass the merits of a particular decision.
The South Pacific.Post thought that Lussick's bill might well receive the
Administration's support at the next meeting of the House as a compromise
between the need for an orderly arbitration system and the political
desirability of reviewing the decision in the local officers' caseY
The debate on the Land Titles Commission (Jurisdiction and Appeals)
Bill1968 led to a rather similar confrontation to that which had taken place
on Chatterton's bill. Indeed, some members seemed to construe the two bills
in rather similar terms, despite the Administration's insistence that they were
not at all comparable. The bill proposed four important changes: (a) an
increase in the number of commissioners who would hear applications for
the restoration of land titles lost during the war, and also in land disputes
involving indigenes and non-indigenes, from one to three -land disputes
between indigenes would continue to be heard by a single commissioner; (b) a
widening of the present grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court to include
matters of fact as well as points oflaw; (c) the Supreme Court's powers to
adjourn, accept or reject appeals, and to return cases to the Commission were
clarified; (d) the power to appoint deputy land titles commissioners was
vested in the Administrator-in-Council. The debate on the bill became rather
64
Edward P. Wolfers
bitter. On the one hand, Chatterton construed it as an attempt to change "the

rules of the ... game ... during a particular match". 38 In his view, it did not
"merely enlarge ... the grounds of appeal to the advantage of appellants"
generaily, as the Administration claimed, 39 but was specifically intended to
enable the Administration to introduce new evidence into its pending appeal
against the Commission's decision in "the Newtown case" (in which a
relatively large, and well-developed area of Port Moresby had been returned
by the Commission to its original indigenous owners). Chatterton and Voutas
did not argue against the principles of the bill, but against application of
the amended legislation appeals provisions to cases in which legal action
had already been recommenced. Chatterton's unease, however, was not
confined to the bill itself. Why, he asked, had members not been provided
with a Pidgin translation of the bill's explanatory notes, as was usually the
case? Further, he commented, he was concerned to hear that an amendment
he had circulated to members only, on the previous day, had been commented
on that morning by the Administrator. "This is a lesson to me", he concluded,
"never again will I circulate an amendment before it comes up". 40 The bill
finally passed the House quite easily, but only after a division on a
procedural matter that split the Pangu pati six to three.
Other important matters that came before the House included a proposal
to establish a select committee to report on "all aspects of the position and
future of permanent overseas officers of the public service, including the
desirability and practicability of inducting some or all of them into the
Commonwealth public service so that they could continue to work in the
Territory Public Service on some form of secondment" ,41 which was
approved; a ministerial statement advising that the Education Department
was seriously considering the creation of a national system of education
which would include mission schools; and proposals, which the House
approved, to establish two more select committees - O!le to report "on all
aspects of parliamentary procedures ... whether within the Chamber or
outside it, so that the elected members will be able to have a greater
understanding of the work of the House and to take a greater part in it", 42
and one to investigate the need for a new and permanent House of Assembly
building. Three new deputy chairmen of committees were appointed to
replace those raised to the ministry: John Poe, Julius Chan and Traimya
Kambipi. The permanent staff of the House also achieved some prominence
when Ron Neville attacked the standard of interpretation provided for nonparty members in the House as unfair. Neville's criticism of the interpreters
was supported by Paulus Arek (MHA Ijivitari) who then went on to point
out that some of the European elected members tended in his view to
"dominate ... [and] suppress the wishes of we native elected members". 43
Clearly, some of the elected members' group were resentful not only of
Pangu's organisation in the House, but at the behaviour of their expatriate
leaders. Paul Lapun (MHA South Bougainville) denied that any of the
interpreters were actually members of Pangu, and attributed the good
translations Pangu received to the way its members spoke in the House and
to their preparation of speeches. 44 The matter closed with a stern reprimand
65
for Neville by the Speaker for making his charges through other than the
proper channels. 45 A final incident provided a valuable insight into the
problems Pangu faces in the House when Pita Lus (MHA Maprik) succeeded
in having his bill to change motor traffic signs from English words to
symbols approved by the House, against the opposition of the official
members. Koitaga Mano (MHA Kandep-Tambul) seemed to capture the
ambivalence many members feel towards Pangu when he spoke approvingly
of Lus' bill and of Somare's knowledge of the Administration: "I like this
bill of Mr Pita Lus", he concluded "but because some of the speeches from
Pangu members have made me ashamed, I cannot support it" .46
Secessionism
The Australian government has always regarded the fostering of a sense of

nationhood among Papuans and New Guineans as a prime policy-objective,
and as a prerequisite for self-determination. Put another way, the absence
of a sense of nationhood in the Territory has often been employed to explain
why Australia is reluctant to push the pace of constitutional development
more rapidly than i.t does. Australia's viewpoint in this regard can probably
best be summarised in Barnes' quotation from Professor Derham: "At the
present time, to speak of self-government is unreal. There is no self to govern
or to be governed."'7
Unfortunately, however, the government has generally conceptualised the
nation-building process as a simple and gradual expansion ofthe indigenes'
group-identities from the village, perhaps through a council area, to the
nation. Although the Administration and some settler groups have sometimes
been accused of short-sightedness in fostering (or exploiting) a sense of
regionalism among the Highlands members in the House of Assembly, there
has never been any explicit recognition by the Administration of the
possibility that various regionalist identities could crystallise out on the way
from village-oriented parochialism to nationalism. These regionalisms
would represent some advance from tradition, but could well prove quite
dysfunctional to the growth of nationalism. Thus, the events and publicity
surrounding the Bougainville and New Guinea islands' secession movements
during the latter months of 1968 are important, if not because of their present
support and power, then almost certainly as portents of the future, and as a
new and previously unconsidered set of challenges to Administration policy.
In recent years, considerable resentment at the Australian government
has been building up in Bougainville, partly at the general rate of
development in the area, and, perhaps most forcefully, over Conzinc Rio
Tinto's copper exploration and potential mining activities in southern
Bougainville. Even before CRA's arrival, however, many Bougainville
Islanders had become quite conscious of (a) the difference of their skincolour from that of most other Papuans and New Guineans, and (b) its
similarity to that of the people of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate
(BSIP). Together, the local people's resentments at Australian policy as well
as their emerging sense of identity as Bougainville people, explain the
66
Edward P. Wolfers
issuing in September of a set of demands about the island's future by a group

of twenty-five Bougainvilleans, comprising the island's two open electorate
members, several university students (who are members of the "Solomon
Islands Society" at the University of Papua and New Guinea) and other urban
workers in Port Moresby. Their sense of frustration at the political status
quo was clear, but their ultimate objective - whether to remain in the
Territory, perhaps in some special relationship with the centre, to establish
an independent country in Bougainville, or to join the BSIP - was not
specified. They simply wanted a popular referendum in Bougainville by
1970 to decide the issue, and asked their members of the House of Assembly
to legislate for the move in Parliament.48
Most press comment on the move expressed little surprise, except at
its timing, which one newspaper attributed to the presence of two BSIP
legislators m Port Moresby at the time 49 - a claim which one of the
document's signatories subsequently denied. The generalised frustrations
of the Bougainville people were aired in a debate at the University of Papua
and New Guinea, at which it was denied that the island's new-found source
of wealth, its copper deposits, had stimulated the move. 5 Reactions to the
move varied from one commentator's statement that it had no discernible
support in the BSIP at least,S 1 to the South Pacific Post's concern that a
referendum with three alternatives to choose from would be hard to hold,
as a simple "yes-or-no" vote would not suffice. 52 Many people clearly feared
that any concessions to the Bougainville demand would encourage other
groups to try the same tactic or at least to threaten secession unless their
areas were more rapidly developed. Both the Teop-Tinputz local government
council and a majority of the delegates to the Bougainville district combined
councils' conference, however, opposed any move to secede from the
Territory. 51 It became increasingly clear, in fact, that some of the original
signatories of the referendum request were more concern.ed to express their
frustration at the status quo, perhaps just wanted to be consulted about the
future, than with secessionism as such. Paul Lapun, for example, saw no
real conflict in moving a bill in the House of Assembly for a single name,
"Niugini", for the Territory, while simultaneously supporting the referendum
demand for his constituents, although the ambiguity of his position was too
much for James Meanggarum (MHA Bogia), who "seceded" from Pangu
because of its ambivalence in the matter. 54 Later on, Paul Lapun and
Donatus Mola began to outline a proposal that Bougainville be given
statehood within the Territory as a way out of the dilemma. 55 Bougainville
Islanders held meetings in Rabaul and Port Moresby (at the home of Joseph
Lue, the only one of their members who had not been present at the first
meeting) to discuss their future, and a group of thirteen university students
promised to explain the issue to the people at home during the vacation. 56
Towards the end of the year, what the South Pacific Post took to be disunity
among the secessionists was, in fact, an emerging consensus: they were
frustrated with the present status quo, and, with few exceptions, coming to
rest upon a compromise that statehood or some special status for the island,
possibly within the Territory, was probably the answer. 57
67
The next secessionist movement to emerge was better-organised and

probably more widely supported than its Bougainville predecessor. The
Melanesian Independence Front (MIF) was formed as a political party in
Rabaul in mid-October. It proposed that all four of the New Guinea islands
Districts (Manus, New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville) should secede
together, to form a single country, "Melanesia", with Rabaul as the national
capital. The party's chairman is Vin ToBaining, a former co-chairman of
the Pangu pati.
The MIF was clearly quite well-organised, and was generally taken very
seriously by the press as well as the Administration. After some rumours of
"a modified Rhodesia style organisation - with a 'black front'" ,58 and
considerable speculation as to its European backers, as well as a certain
amount of secrecy among its leaders about the party's policies and
membership, two of its founders finally stepped forward to explain its
policies, S.G. Simpson, a Rabaul businessman, and Melchior Tomot, the
party's joint secretary. So seriously was the MIF taken that on the very day
that its formation was announced, the Administrator's Executive Council
issued a strong plea for national unity if the Territory were to develop. 59 The
local press condemned "copra federations or even copra republics" 60 in the
islands, while sections of the Australian press urged the Commonwealth
government to condemn secessionism firmly and soon. 61 Finally, in midNovember, Barnes appeared to recognise the significance ofthe secessionist
moves with a statement in which he reaffirmed Australia's commitment to
the fostering of a sense of unity in the Territory, and a declaration that the
indigenous people's cooperation "is a condition of the heavy Australian
backing" for the Territory's development programmes. 62
The party has expanded quickly, although its activities to date have been
confined largely to the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain. By the end ofthe
year, it had drawn up its constitution, set up at least five branches in the
Rabaul area, and had possibly 1,000 members, including another former
Pangu official, Thomas ToBunbun, as one of its branch presidents. Although
the party still lacks any public adherents in the House, indeed some of the
Tolai members expressed surprise at its formation, several of them seem
ambivalent: they are publicly committed to a policy of national unity, but
the ambivalence of at least one of their number was rather finely captured
in his statement that the local people should not be blamed for the growth
of secessionist sentiment in the islands. It is, he feels, a natural consequence
of the Administration's neglect of the Tolai and Bougainville areas. 63
Other reactions to these moves have ranged from a public condemnation
by three Anglican bishops, and a vote against supporting the secessionists
by the Kavieng Club in Lae, to a pessimistic acceptance of fragmentation
after independence by the New Guinea Highlands Bulletin. "The proper
course", the Bulletin's editor commented, "would be for Australia to remain
until real unification by generations of inter-marriage is complete.
Otherwise, a decentralised form of government would seem to be the only
short-term hope." 64
Two new political parties were formed in late November to oppose the
68
Edward P. Wolfers
MIF. Both were led by failed candidates at the 1968 elections, the United
Islands Progress Society, at Kavieng, by a Chinese commercial artist, Perry
Kwan, and the United Niugini party, among villagers in the Paparatava area
near Rabaul, by a Tolai school teacher, Stanis Boramilat ToLiman. Both of
them are dedicated to the encouragement of a sense of national unity in the
Territory, and have small, highly localised memberships. They bear a close
resemblance to the "dwarf parties"65 with national aspirations, but localised,
ethnically-based support, that can be found in many parts of Africa and
India. 66
At least three of the six parties formed during 1967 continue to function
-the United Democratic party, the National Progress party (Napro) and
Pangu, while the MIF is reported to have emerged from among some
elements of the now-defunct Agricultural Reform party. 67 Late in September,
Pangu announced a new list uf uu:mbers of its interim central executive:
Keni Pythias, Cromwell Burau, Barry Holloway, Gerai Asiba, John
Yocklunn, J. Lee and Epel Tito, four of whom were unsuccessful candidates
at the 1968 general elections, while J.K. Nombri, Gavera Rea (also a failed
candidate) and Jacob Sabo constitute the membership of the new Bung of
co-chairmen. 68 Napro held its annual general meeting in November, and its
members re-elected one another to the executive: Bill Dihm (chairman), 0.
Dickson and Goodwill Tabua (deputy chairmen), Ephraim Karara (general
secretary), Sevese Morea (treasurer), Leo Saulep, and Mr and Mrs John
Jack. 69 In October, Pangu became involved in a minor controversy over an
allegation by Oala Oala-Rarua that one of its co-chairmen, Gavera Rea (who
had founded the Central District Waterside Workers' Association in July)
and Albert Maori Kiki, the party's secretary, were using trade unionism as
a "cover up ... to increase [Pangu's] mass support". Kiki and Rea thereupon
challenged Oala-Rarua, president of the Port Moresby Workers' Association,
to lodge an objection when the new Central District Building Workers'
Union, of which they are executives, sought official registration. There was
no public response from Oala-Rarua. 70
The Third Meeting of the Second House of Assembly

Probably the most important measure to come before the House during its
third meeting, at least in terms of its long-term implications for the
Territory's future, was the five-year economic development plan. It had
originally been adjourned to allow members time to examine it carefully,
but comparatively little public discussion took place on its provisions before
the House debate, which still contained several of the standard speeches of
concern with the document, accompanied by apologies that "unfortunately
I do not know what is written in this ... book dealing with the plan because
I do not read ... English"/ 1 or, evidently, Pidgin (for a Pidgin summary was
provided). The only important public criticisms of the plan had come from
the president of the Planters' Association of Papua, who feared the plan
would create "artificial prosperity ... for at least 25 years", 72 and from the
Public Service Association, which feared that a speech by the Administrator
69
on the five-year plan, in which he advocated that wages should not be

allowed to rise above their present levels without a matching increase in
productivity, was an attempt to turn the Territory's Parliament into a "rubber
stamp" for the Administration. David Hay, the Public Service Association's
president, J.G. Smith felt, seemed to be trying "to pressure members ofthe
House of Assembly by telling [them] that if they listen to the people in their
electorates this will ruin the five-year development plan and cast doubts on
the economic future of the country". The plan seemed fundamentally
defective, he added, in its failure to take account of the people's wishes and
probable wage and price increases. 73 The Administrator, surprised by the
furore his speech had aroused, particularly in the Australian press, 74
explained a little later that his speech did not foreshadow wage-freezing
legislation, but had been meant to emphasise the need for greater
productivity. 75 When the House met in November, the Administration clearly
felt that many members were still uncertain as to the full meaning and
importance of the plan, and so the House was adjourned for a day (as for
the budget) so that the economic adviser and other Administration officials
could "explain" the plan to members.
It is impossible to outline the plan's provisions here, although its overall
nature can perhaps be clarified. It is not an economic development plan in
the narrow sense, but a complete projection of all Administration spending
(including social services, etc.) over the next five years, including the 19689 financial year. Overall, it envisages that the Administration will spend
about $1,000 million "in harmony with the objectives proposed by the 1963
World Bank Mission", increasing over the period of the plan from $155.7
million in 1968-9 to $235 million in 1972-3. "The basic aim is to develop
the Territory for self-determination and to ensure that when this stage has
been reached the Territory will, to the greatest extent feasible, be able to
stand on its own feet economically." 76
The plan's principal priorities are for the development of the tree crops
(other than coffee), timber, cattle and manufacturing industries. According
to F.C. Henderson (Assistant Administrator Economic Affairs) -but with
too little emphasis on the first part according to some of his critics - the
plan is designed so as to "call for greatly increased indigenous participation
at all levels of the economy and at the same time it relies upon a continuing
flow of expatriate capital, 'know-how', and manpower". 77 The only major
item in the Territory's future that was not covered by the five-year plan was
the Bougainville copper project, the future of which was still uncertain.
Opinion in the House of Assembly, as in the press, was generally
favourable to the plan, although R. Neville and J.J. Garrett were disturbed
lest the Commonwealth's pledge "to assist in ... the achievement of the
programme if the House of Assembly indicates it is prepared progressively
to increase the Territory's financial self-reliance by raising the level of
Territory revenue and loan receipts as much as practicable over the period
of the programme" 78 be construed as a pledge to raise taxes during the next
few years. They feared the effect that such a pledge, and the actions it
implied, would have on expatriate investment. As is usual on such occasions,
70
Edward P. Wolfers
several members pleaded for such special local causes as the Madang-Mount
Hagen road, which was not mentioned in the plan, as the Administration
had not yet received the report of the United Nations Development
Programme's transport survey team. The plan's profoundest critics were
familiar companions - Percy Chatterton and several members of Pangu,
many of whose arguments bore a close resemblance to those employed by
academic critics of the 1965 World Bank report.
Chatterton argued that rapid economic development would require a
considerable amount of overseas investment. He preferred a slower rate of
development with increased indigenous participation. He deemed it less
likely then that Papua and New Guinea would become what he termed a
"banana republic" after independence, manipulated by overseas interests.
Specifically, Chatterton wanted companies that give indigenes positions of
genuine responsibility to receive a special tax concession, and "something
like a Black New Guinea Policy" in those aspects of economic development
where Papuans and New Guineans can already, or will soon be able to, go
it alone. By way of example, he suggested that the establishment of village
trade-stores be confined to indigenous entrepreneurs. 79
A.C. Voutas, who opened for the Pangu pati, followed Chatterton's line
of reasoning, emphasising that the plan tended to follow the Australian
Liberal-Country party's "philosophy of free enterprise capitalism" much too
closely. He wanted increased indigenous participation in business too. By
1974-5, he said, internal revenue was expected to exceed the Australian
grant, and the House might well decide to control the budget itself (i.e., to
undertake full internal self-government for the Territory), only to find that
economic power was not in the local people's hands at all. 80 Michael Somare,
Cecil Abel and Pita Lus followed Voutas' line, while Ebia Olewale (also a
Pangu member) confined himself principally to his own electorate's
problems. The final vote to take note of the plan was _agreed to by sixtyeight votes to twelve, in which division Ebia Olewale and Paliau Maloat
sided with the government against the rest of Pangu (which was now down
to nine acknowledged members after James Meanggarum's resignation).
The most dramatic debate of the meeting, in purely political terms, was
that on W.A. Lussick's Public Service Arbitration Commission Bill 1968.
Lussick's bill arose out of discussions surrounding Chatterton's bill at the
previous meeting, when many members expressed a desire for a system of
appeals from public service arbitration cases to be established in the
Territory without attacking the present arbitration system, as the
Administration felt that Chatterton's bill did. The new bill, therefore,
provided for a panel of three people (to replace the present single arbitrator),
who were to be appointed by the Chief Justice, to hear major public service
claims, and for an appeals system against decisions by a single arbitrator.
In November, just before the House met, the Administrator, apparently
acting on orders from Canberra, asked Lussick to defer his bill until the
government had had time to appoint, and then receive a report from, a group
of experts who would investigate the effectiveness of the present Public
Service Arbitration Ordinance. 81 Lussick, however, refused to commit
71
himself until he had consulted the other members of the independent

members' group, 82 while the South Pacific Post criticised the Department
of External Territories for attempting to delay the measure at the last moment
before the House met. 83 The independent members' group refused to adjourn
the bill, and Lussick concurred in its decision. 84 In the end, therefore, the
House met to discuss the bill under what the South Pacific Post described
as "an unhealthy air of confrontation", for which neither the Administration
nor the elected members, but the Minister for External Territories, should
take the blame. 85
Lussick was clearly annoyed at the government's tactics over a bill which
he had intended should assist the Administration. His bill would, he felt,
preserve the Territory's arbitration system intact, and still fulfil the members'
duty to the public servants in their electorates. He was, therefore,
embarrassed by the government's present opposition to the bill, 86 and
rejected the notion, attributed to Hay, that bills as important as this one
should be moved by the government. 87 In the end, however, the drama faded
with the bill's passage without a division being called, although, later, the
Public Service Association, fearing a veto, was moved to appeal to the
Governor-General. to bring the bill into effect as soon as possible. 88 The
government also went ahead with its plans, and subsequently announced
the appointment of two experts (E.A.C. Chambers, the Commonwealth
Public Service Arbitrator and Professor H.A. Turner of Cambridge
University) to investigate the Territory's public service arbitration
procedures and to report on them in time for legislation to be prepared for
the next meeting of the House. The Public Service Association, which had
backed the Lussick bill, condemned the terms of reference for the TurnerChambers committee as "too vague" .89
The longest debate ofthe meeting was on Brere Awol's (MHA West Sepik
Coastal, and an MBE since January) motion declaring "that national unity
is essential to the progress of Papua and New Guinea as a modern state with
enough resources and population to sustain a developing economy", and
pledging the members to work for unity among their constituents. 90 The
motion was clearly prompted by the talk of secession in the New Guinea
islands, but, except for James Meanggarum's personal "secession" from
Pangu, the debate was remarkable only for the impassioned pleas for unity
by the members from the landlocked and still comparatively underdeveloped
Highlands and the equivocations- that it was not the people's fault, but the
Administration's- of some New Guinea islands members, who felt their
areas were neglected, and others (e.g. Ebia Olewale) who felt that the Tolais'
comparative economic success had given rise to a feeling of superiority on
their part, and consequent support for their secession from the rest of the
Territory. 91 After this debate, P.G. Johnson (MHAAngoram) moved that the
House establish a select committee to seek the people's views, and then to
report back, on a single name, a national anthem and a symbol for Papua
and New Guinea. 92 The bill will be debated further at the next meeting of
the House.
An earlier bill to give Papua and New Guinea a single name, "Niugini",
72
Edward P. Wolfers
had, however, been defeated - by ten votes to seventy - at least partly

because some members seemed to find Paul Lapun, a spokesman for the
Bougainville secessionists, somewhat unconvincing as its mover. The
Administration was not opposed to calling the Territory "Niugini", but was
unable to support the bill which it felt to be unconstitutional on the ground
(which Pangu denied) that it would require an amendment to the Papua and
New Guinea Act to change the Territory's name. The official members,
therefore, suggested the bill be replaced by a resolution requesting the
Australian government to change the Territory's name, but Pangu refused
the compromise, and was defeated by seventy votes to ten. 93
A recent upsurge in the number of refugees crossing the border, and the
approach of the 1969 act of ascertainment, have increased Papuan and New
Guinean concern with West Irian generally, and with the refugees in
particular. A Pangu-sponsored motion to express the House's "sympathy
with the plight of the West Irianese refugees in the Territory and [urging]
the Administration to treat them with every consideration", therefore,
seemed assured of almost unanimous support in the House until the
resolution's mover, Michael Somare, accused the Administration of keeping
the refugees in "concentration camps", an accusation which many members
(by fifty-six votes to twenty-four) found repugnant. 94
Other important matters to come before the House included a bill for the
establishment of a separate local government section within the Department
of District Administration under the Commissioner for Local Government
so that, as the bill's mover put it, "experienced local government officers
... [could] hold permanent positions in the section, thus enabling them to
devote their services entirely to consolidating the work of councils" .95 The
bill's mover, Mangobing Kakun (MHA Munya) had earlier withdrawn his
bill for a separate local government department, as he now considered it to
be premature. The Supreme Court (Appeals) Bill1968,_which provided for
the establishment of a full court of appeal of at least three judges, was also
passed. The Select Committee on the role of permanent overseas public
servants asked that its terms of reference be enlarged so as to cover contract
officers, while Somare's Electoral Commission, so firmly rejected at the
first meeting of the House, was now approved. Finally, J.J. Garrett
engineered the passage of a motion recommending that the existing
allowances and subsidies for the overseas education of all expatriate children
be raised to the new levels awarded to public servants' children earlier in
the year, by also advocating the extension of these subsidies to cover
indigenous children being educated abroad too.
Probably the most notable political development of the November
meeting, however, was the general behaviour and cohesion of the
approximately fifty-seven-strong independent members' group. The Pacific
Islands Monthly already called it a "party without a platform", and felt that
most of its members seemed to regard it as but a matter of time until it
found a platform and became a party. 96 The South Pacific Post's political
reporter, Malcolm Beilby, agreed, and attributed much of the stimulus for
such a move to the government's "clumsy handling" of Lussick's bill.
73
Lussick, the group's present apparent leader, insofar as it has a single leader,
was quoted as thinking party organisation for the group to be about a year
off. Pangu, Beilby felt, had emerged from the session "milder, [and]
matured", trying to cast off its loser's image, although worried that some
more of its members (especially Paliau Mal oat) might resign from the party. 97
By the end of the meeting, some of the fascination of membership in a
new Parliament had worn off for at least a few indigenous members. Yauwe
Wauwe (MHA Chuave), for example, said he would never again ask
questions in the House because they never led to anything (but subsequently
asked several), while Kaibelt Diria (Assistant Ministerial Member for Local
Government) expressed his frustration at the government's failure to solve
his electorate's problems, and his own difficulties in explaining why to his
constituents. 98 Finally, James Meanggarum made a careful and sustained
criticism of most members' general demeanour in the House. He urged
greater moderation in the attitudes that the independent and Pangu members
showed towards one another. 99
7
JANUARY-APRIL 1969
Robert Waddell
Fourth Meeting of the Second House of Assembly (3-14 March 1969)

Debates in the House of Assembly may be divided into two categories: those
that deal with ideas, attitudes and principles and those that are concerned
with practicalities.
High in the first category were the debates of 4 March 1969 on motions
put forward by W.A. Lussick (Manus and New Ireland) and Ebia Olewale
(South Fly). Lussick's motion rejected "as an unwarranted insult to its
members, the Administration and the people of this Territory, the resolution
passed by the United Nations General Assembly calling for elections under
United Nations supervision ... ". Lussick said the implication was that the
1968 elections to the House of Assembly were not properly conducted. This
was clearly contrary to the visiting mission's report which was adopted by
the UN Trusteeship Council on 19 June 1968 and part of which reads" ...
is pleased to note that the elections of the Second House of Assembly were
well organised to ensure maximum possible participation, that they were
conducted on a basis of universal, adult franchise and a. common roll".'
Lussick's motion was supported by several members most of whom
stressed the point that they did not wish the United Nations, as Sabumei
Kofikai (Goroka) put it, "to force us into hasty self-government". 2 Nathaniel
I. Uroe, representing Rigo-Abau said that the mandate given him by ninety
per cent of his constituents was that he was not to push for immediate
independence: "when we are ready we will tell the Australian Government
we want to be independent". 3
The first rumbles of an impending storm over another issue came when
Michael Somare (East Sepik) of the Pangu pati said: "The forthcoming
plebiscite in West Irian - which is next door to us - is being held
under United Nations direction and I feel that we should tell the United
Nations to make sure that the West Irianese people are given the right of
free choice". 4
Later on the same day a long and complicated motion 5 was put forward
by Ebia Olewale (South Fly) a member of the Pangu pati. He also deplored
the General Assembly's resolution with its insinuations about the 1968 Papua
and New Guinea elections; he then drew attention to a resolution passed by
the House of Assembly on 2 June 1964 which stated that the elected
January-Aprill969
75
representatives of the people of Papua and New Guinea wished to "be

allowed to decide when the time is ripe for self-government ... and the
people's firm conviction that the road to self-government can best be
travelled with one guide - and that guide the Administering Authority".
Olewale also referred to the lack of a genuine plebiscite in West Irian. He
asserted that the Afro-Asian group were against white colonialism and "not
against their own colonialism". Somare (East Sepik) agreed that he did not
want other people to set target dates for self-government but he thought that
it was essential that the Australian government should do so. 6
Oscar Tammur (Kokopo) opposed that motion on the grounds that the
United Nations Organisation was responsible for many of the improvements
in Papua New Guinea. He did not wish to antagonise the United Nations.
Three or four other members supported this view and deprecated attempts
to "rubbish" the United Nations. 7
In all some twenty-three members spoke, nineteen Papuans and New
Guineans and four Europeans. The overwhelming majority supported the
motion but a fair number of those who spoke emphasised that they were in
favour of the setting of target dates, whether near or distant, for selfgovernment. They were anxious not to let it be thought that they were not
interested in planned political progress.
It was noticeable that, as always, the representatives from the Highlands
were the most cautious in their approach to the question of self-government.
They are eager to ensure the continued survival of the Australian goose which
lays the golden eggs. They also emphasise that they represent a goodly slice
of the population and that their views should certainly be taken into account.
Other important points were raised including:
Localisation of the Public Service: Pena Ou of Mount Hagen said "We must
give responsible jobs to our young people so that they can learn to run their
Public Service. The money the Australian Government is sending here
should not be going into the pockets of overseas people"; 8
Political Education: Paul Lapun, South Bougainville, said "The authorities
should be educating the people to work and educating them about political
independence. Tell us about different systems of government. Stop
condemning the people, saying they have no knowledge or resources"; 9
National Unity: This theme ran through many speeches and was perhaps
most succinctly put by Kaibelt Diria (Wahgi- Assistant Ministerial Member
for Local Government) in these words:
Pita Lus (Maprik) wants self-government immediately; Paul Lapun (S.
Bougainville) wants self-government for his own little island. If this happens
we are going to revert to the old ways where we have self-government in each
little tiny community as in the old days. We have been brought together by
Australia to form a nation ... the white man came and we no longer had selfgovernment but if we follow what these young blokes have to say then we
will end up as a whole batch of little independent islands of population each
with its own self-government.'
A great and heated debate was promised for the introduction of the Public
76
Robert Waddell
Services Conciliation and Arbitration Bill, 1969. It will be recalled that a

bill on the same theme had been introduced by Lussick in the November
1968 meeting of the House and had been passed by members. The bill still
awaited the Governor-General's signature.
Meanwhile the Minister for External Territories appointed Professor H.A.
Turner of Cambridge University and E.A.C. Chambers, a Commonwealth
Public Service Arbitrator, to "examine and advise on the efficacy of the
operation of the Public Service Arbitration Ordinance 1952-1965". 11 The
minister, Barnes, said the enquiry would be informal with no public
hearings; however, the experts would see a number of appropriate people
including representatives of several employee and employer organisations
in Port Moresby, the Highlands and the islands.
The bill was introduced on II March I969 by L.W. Johnson, Assistant
Administrator (Services). 12 Johnson was caretul m his introduction to give
credit to Chatterton and Lussick who had introduced bills on this topic in
the August and November (1968) meetings of the House. "Mr Lussick's
bill", he said, "in the November House was a valuable forerunner for this
particular bill". The debate which followed Johnson's outline of the proposed
arbitration procedure had all the spontaneity of a well-rehearsed professional
wrestling bout. Ebia Olewale was ready with an amendment 13 and Lussick
was allowed to move several well-drafted amendments as a consolation for
not having his own bill proceeded withY With slight alterations all Lussick's
amendments were agreed to. Voutas of the Pangu pati was not so fortunate.
He objected to the Administrator being given power to reject the names
submitted either by the Public Service Board or Public Service Association
for membership of the proposed tribunal and to require alternatives. 15 The
official members firmly denied that the Administrator had any intention of
"stacking" the tribunal. 16 Pita Lus (Maprik), a Pangu member, supported
Voutas but was accused by Andagari Wabiria (Assistant Ministerial Member
for Lands) of being one of"these men from Pangu [who] are really buttering
us up with sweet talk" . 17 Three elected members then confessed they were
"really confused" and the amendment was negatived.
In brief the bill as it finally emerged after amendments provided for a
tribunal in place of a single arbitrator. The tribunal was to consist of a
chairman appointed by the Governor-General and two other people to be
nominated by the Administrator, one from a list submitted by the Public
Service Board and one from a list submitted by public service organisations
jointly. In addition, in accordance with Lussick's suggestion, there should
be four "assistant members" -two each from lists submitted by the Public
Service Board and the public service organisations respectively. These
assistant members would have "deliberative but no voting power". It was
understood, though not specified, that they would be Papuans or New
Guineans.
In the event of a claim the chairman of the tribunal will require the two
parties to try to negotiate a settlement. If a party refuses to consult, the
chairman may call a compulsory conference. If this ends in deadlock the
tribunal takes over. The tribunal itself may decide whether it wishes the
January-April 1969
77
dispute to be heard before the full tribunal or the chairman only (flanked
by the assistant members in a deliberative, non-voting capacity). Where
"issues of general public importance are involved" the tribunal may "request
the Minister to refer the claim or any aspect of or matter arising out of the
proceedings to a Board of Inquiry", consisting of a chairman and not less
than three other members, appointed by the minister. The board does not
determine wages but investigates, collects data and reports. There is no
provision for appeal. As Henderson said, "Appeals in arbitration exist only
in Australia and they are for a specific reason, namely coordination between
awards of arbitration in different sectors. The bill follows the report (TurnerChambers) in taking the view that arbitration after attempted conciliation
is in itself an appeal." 18
A measure which aroused controversy was the Evidence by Affidavit Bill
1968. discussion on which was resumed from 29 November 1968. 19 On the
day of the debate John Griffin, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of
Papua New Guinea, wrote a letter to the South Pacific Post setting out his
objections to the bill. He said that it might be sensible to allow evidence to
be given by affidavit rather than in person in civil cases- at least if the power
were limited to Supreme Court judges and stipendiary magistrates. But in
criminal cases "where the liberty of the subject is involved it should not be
possible for a court to take evidence into account unless it is given to the
court by the witness personally" _20 A subsequent editorial branded the
measure as "Trial by Correspondence'". 21
Griffin's views were supported in the House by Chatterton and Voutas
who were able to get one amendment accepted - namely that the power to
accept evidence by affidavit be restricted to "the Supreme Court, a judge
or a District Court". 22 Otherwise the bill was passed intact by seventy-three
votes to ten.
Education was the subject of a great number of statements both in and
out of the House during this period. On 4 March, Matthias Toliman
(Ministerial Member for Education) referred to a statement made by Barnes
on 7 February, in which the latter announced the appointment of a committee
of three to study and make recommendations on the relationship between
mission and Administration education. The members were Dr C.E. Beeby,
a former Director of Education in New Zealand, and Gabriel Gris, a lecturer
at the Dental College, Port Moresby. The chairman was W. Weeden of the
Department of Education and Science, Canberra. The terms of reference
included such things as the salaries of mission teachers, and the possibility
of having "a single teaching service to employ all teachers, mission and
Administration". 23
On 10 March Toliman said that it would cost about $2 million per
annum over the period of the five-year plan to raise mission teachers' salaries
to the level currently paid to local education officers of the same
qualifications. He added that forty- five per cent of the Territory's secondary
and sixty-six per cent of its primary school children attended mission
schools. 24 In an earlier statement he had said there were 240,000 students
enrolled in the Territory's schools, of which according to a statement made
78
Robert Waddell
by Barnes in January, only 12,300 were in secondary schools in 1967. 25 It

was hoped to raise this figure to 24,000 in 1973 under the five-year
development programme.
In a speech in the House on 12 March T.J. Leahy (Markham) spoke
of the "disparity between the educated elite and the average villager"; he felt
the first priority was to "get the rural areas going" and that it might be
advisable to spend less on primary and tertiary education. 26 On 13 March
Dennis Buchanan (Eastern Highlands) proposed "that increased grants-in-aid
be paid to missions to enable them to pay their teachers salaries comparable
with those paid by the Administration and that provision should be made for
this in the 1969-1970 Budget"Y Although modified by Chatterton to read
"salaries at a significantly increased level" the motion was lost by thirtyfive votes to forty-four. Many elected members spoke feelingly of the good
work done by the missions. "We all know'', said Yauwe Wauwe (Chauve)
"that the missions were in some areas long before the Administration came
and we are grateful for the long service that they have given. I believe it is
time we compensated the missions." 28 Most of those who supported the
Administration referred to the $2 million and asked other members where
they supposed this was going to come from. Were they prepared to reduce
"the allocation for roads in the Highlands by the required amount?" asked
Warren Dutton. 29 The other argument was that the proper time to discuss
the matter was not now but after Weeden's committee had reported. One or
two spoke of the unified education system which might emerge and either
approved or strongly disliked the idea of the Administration's being able to
direct the activities of mission schools and teachers.
In a statement issued at the end of ApriP 0 the Roman Catholic bishops of
Papua and New Guinea said "In practice we will not rest or remain silent
on this matter until justice has been done to our mission teachers; until they
have been given their due: parity of salaries". The bishops also commented
on the pace of political progress:
It seems that the Federal Government is reluctant to hand over much real
authority to the officers on the spot, in New Guinea. The big decisions about
New Guinea are apparently still made outside New Guinea .... It is equally
regrettable that within New Guinea there is very little decentralisation of
decision making .... Opportunities for training local people in the democratic
processes are being lost. 31
One might comment that by all accounts it is not just the big decisions
that are made in Canberra.
"Localisation" of the public service is a very serious issue to which little
thought appears to have been given or perhaps much thought and little
action. One reason for inaction is, of course, that in 1966 there were only
14,500 Papuans and New Guineans with any secondary education. 32
However, Paulus Arek at a press conference in Canberra said Australia was
not doing enough about localisation. "A lot of Australian wives are in typing
positions and a lot of storemen's jobs are being done by Australians. These
jobs could be filled by Papuans and New Guineans." 33 Arek also criticised
January-Aprill969
79
the ministerial member system: "The present system of having politicians

as Under-Ministers is wasteful because they could lose their jobs in
elections". He said it would be much better if Papuan and New Guinean
public servants could understudy senior departmental officers. 34
The Administration's political education programme was attacked by
Somare in the House 35 and by Don Barrett in the South Pacific Post. 36 Barrett
said that such political education as the Administration gave was generally
very one-sided. Why were they so hostile to political parties? Why were
they afraid of giving both sides of a question and asking the people to make
up their own minds? He compared the Territory's policy unfavourably with
that of the Solomon Islands. After quoting Barnes' statement that the present
constitutional structure imposed on the Territory by Australia was modelled
on Westminster - "Why not? It has been found that it works well in other
parts of the world" 37 - Barrett said he preferred the BSIP's government's
approach. He then quoted the fO'l!l!owingpassage from a BSIP pamphlet: "In
the Westminster way of government we do not really meet the needs of the
Solomon Islands: what is good for Britain in this way is notS1 good for the
Solomon Islands". LW. Johnson, Assistant Administrator (Services)
defended the Administration's record. 38 He said that the political education
programme mounted before the 1968 elections and the present one were the
first planned ones. The Administration radio stations gave news of current
events and the activities of the House of Assembly and so on. The
Administration was "not trying to sell political education or political science
to people who were not interested". Pamphlets had, however, been
distributed throughout the country in 1967 on subjects like local and central
government, majority rule. rule of law, electing representatives, national
government and political parties.
C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories, visited Papua New Guinea
in April. His speeches were mainly on the theme of economic development
and the present dependence of the Territory on Australia for finance. At
Goroka at the opening of the $3 million base hospital he reminded the
audience that $2 million of the $3 million had "come from the pocket of
the Australian taxpayer". 39 He also complained of the difficulty of getting
land for development projects. "When I come to Goroka I am told it is
practically impossible for the Administration to obtain land for town
development. I am told this in Rabaul, in Madang, in Lae, in Mount Hagen
and in Port Moresby. If people who own land demand unreasonably high
prices they are demanding this from the people as a whole." As an example
of the benefits of development he pointed to the Bougainville copper project
which would require a total investment of $300 million and which would
provide "directly or indirectly 2,500 new jobs and support 10,000 people". 40
On 10 April Barnes held a press conference in Port Moresby at which he
made reference to the constitutional future of the Territory. Part of the
dialogue went as follows:
Questioner: "That suggests Sir that you don't anticipate the need for any
constitutional changes during the life of the present House?"
80
Robert Waddell
Barnes: "Well in major regard- I am expressing a personal view- I don't.
But I feel that [the] House of Assembly may have other views, but I think I
have always opposed too rapid progress in these things. I believe we have
made a tremendous step forward in the last constitutional changes. Why not
let it settle down for a term or two until they really know where they are
heading, really know what they want?"
Later the questioner returned to an earlier point:

Questioner: "But when you refer to a 'term or two', you mean terms as the
life of a House."
Barnes: "For the life of the House, for the life of two Houses. I don't see the
... I admit I haven't heard a good argument why this should be changed."41
This statement caused a furore in the press and among the more vociferous
politicians. References were made to "seven-year standstills" and "sevenyear freezes". Barnes was attacked by the South Pacific Post, the Australian
and in particular the Sydney Morning Herald which demanded that "Barnes
Must Go". The Speaker ofthe House of Assembly, John Guise, speaking as
a private member, said that the hundreds of students at high school and
university, let alone the politicians, would scarcely accept a ten-year freeze
in constitutional developmentY Pangu pati's secretary Maori Kiki said
Barnes was an ill-informed person who was incapable of doing his job.
"Self-government must come in 1972."43 Barnes later denied that he had
imposed a constitutional freeze, 44 but by this time the damage was done.
Barnes was also adversely criticised for his attitude to the forthcoming
"act of free choice" in Irian Barat. There is no doubt that this issue has
caused a good deal of concern to the Papuans and New Guineans. The main
complaints are about the handling of refugees and Australia's failure to
demand a more democratic method of testing West Iri~::tnese opinion about
the musjawarah or consultation process proposed by the Indonesian
government. The argument that one cannot expect a "one-man one-vote"
procedure in a "stone-age" country falls quite flat in this Territory where
two general elections on precisely these lines have been held in the past five
years. The Papuans and New Guineans appreciate that the Indonesians have
not the money or the expertise of the Australians but they feel that at least
the inhabitants of the coastal towns should be allowed a vote each. It is, of
course, abundantly clear that Australia does not wish to be saddled with any
responsibility for West Irian. As Dr Sudjarwo, the Indonesian Deputy
Foreign Minister said when asked whether Indonesia would allow an
independent state to be set up in West Irian: "That is not in our concept of
thinking ... I know that such a State would have no support from
Governments abroad; no support from the Australian Government for
example". 45
The major news on the economic front concerned Bougainville copper.
In February Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd announced in London that a
letter of intent had been signed by which it was agreed that the company
would supply Japanese smelters with 950,000 tons of copper in concentrate
January-Aprill969
81
over fifteen years. The planned capacity of the mine was 125,000 tons of
copper in concentrate a year, which was about twenty-five per cent more
than the entire Australian output. 46 Later it was announced that the output
might be as much as 160,000 tons. 47
In February Barnes said that the company had agreed that the
Administration would receive 1.25 per cent of gross revenue as a royalty.
The Administration would also have an option to take up twenty per cent
of the equity of the new company. Furthermore after an initial low-tax
"holiday" the company would pay fifty per cent of its taxable income to
the Administration. This could amount to $10 million or more a year. 48 The
tribal landowners would receive five per cent of the royalties paid to the
Administration. This could amount to $600,000 a year.
It is clear that the Administration is determined to let CRAgo ahead with
the project as expeditiously as possible. Trouble, however, has arisen over
the choice of a site for the new mining town which will be required to support
CRA's activities.
The Administration has chosen a site which takes in the highly productive
1,000 acre Arawa plantation owned by F.R. McKillop as well as some 3,200
acres of New Guinean-owned land. McKillop intends to fight the resumption
of his land. He and the Planters' Association of New Guinea allege that other,
undeveloped, land was available and had actually been chosen by CRA but
that the Administration was afraid of taking over a site entirely owned by
New Guineans even if it was undeveloped. 49 Once the Administration had
demonstrated its impartiality by taking over land belonging to an expatriate
it could then the more easily take over New Guinean-owned land later when
required. The Administrator, however, maintained that of the various sites
considered the Arawa one was chosen because it would involve the least
disruption to the least number of people. He emphasised that fair and just
compensation would be paid. 50
Meanwhile the encouragement of indigenous business enterprises
continues. Some think the Papua New Guinea Development Bank is much
too conservative in its policy. The bank's record may be judged by the
following figures, taken from its Annual Report for 1968:
Classification of appr&vals during the year according to the race
of the applicants shows the following:
Indigenes
No.
422
Amount
$678,304
Multi-racial partnerships etc & mixed

-race applicants
12
$1,865,451
Non-indigenes
66
$1,207,041
TOTAL
500
$3,750,796
82
Robert Waddell
The Report adds that "commercial applications from indigenes were

mainly for the purchase of trucks and the financing of small retail stores".
We should perhaps comment that $1,249,970 was accounted for by the
taking up of a fifty per cent shareholding in New Britain Palm Oil
Development Ltd. 51 This item presumably comes into the "multi-racial
partnership" category.
There is undoubtedly a shortage of indigenous management skills and
the House was pleased to hear Toua Kapena's announcement of an
"Indigenous Training Scheme" to encourage greater participation by the
private sector in the training of the indigenous labour forceY The main
points were: (1) assistance with part of the costs of apprenticeship such as
accommodation and tools; (2) proportionate reimbursement of tuition-fees,
board and lodging etc. for students attending full-time courses; (3) subsidies
for those attending approved short-term or "sandwich" courses; (4) subsidies
for other types of training including courses overseas. It was thought that
the cost of the scheme in the financial year 1969170 would be in the region
of$60,000.
8
MAY-AUGUST 1969
Robert Waddell
Bougainville
At the time of writing it looks as if the Bougainvi11e story is going to have
a satisfactory, it not entirely happy, ending. But this happy issue out of all
our afflictions reflects no great credit on the Administration which seems
to have been following rather than guiding the course of events.
The Administration has not had an easy time; it has been under fire
from both New Guinean and expatriate landowners. The New Guineans have
been fighting for either a better price or no sale at all; while the planters
have been contesting the right of the Administration to resume the
flourishing Arawa plantation which was owned by an Australian,
F.R. McKillop.
On 3 May Tony Newman, acting Assistant Administrator (Economic
Affairs), used the Administration's Radio Bougainville to reprimand Paul
Lapun (MHA Bougainville South) for whipping up anti-Administration
feeling "to suit his personal interest". Newman said that Joseph Lue, the
Regional member for Bougainville, and Assistant Ministerial Member for
Technical Education, had reported that almost 100 per cent of the Siwai
people (who live on the other side of the island from Arawa) and the local
government council approved the actions of the Administration. 1
A few days later it was announced that the Administration was arranging
for ten carefully selected Bougainville leaders to visit projects mthe Eastern
and Western Highlands, the object presumably being to open their eyes to
the benefits of economic development.
Meanwhile there was a fresh outburst of survey-peg removing- this time
at Guava not far from the actual site of the copper mine. Lapun, who had
previously been the target of the Administration's attack, was now asked to
use his influence to soothe the villagers and make the true state of affairs
clear to them. 2 This was not a task which he found congenial.
Later a high-powered delegation consisting of five ministerial and
assistant ministerial members was sent to Bougainville to discuss the copper
project with villagers. On this occasion Lue declared that it would be much
better if village leaders, rather than officers of the district administration,
accompanied the survey teams: they could "do much better jobs than kiaps". 3
On 23 June Tony Newman, as the Treasurer, gave the
84
Robert Waddell
Administration's reasons for choosing the Arawa site and announced that
the Administration had reached "a stage where the lands which the
Administration has proposed for the town site, that is Arawa Plantation and
the 660 acres adjacent to Arawa Plantation, is available to the Administration
on a sale basis, and not on a compulsory acquisition basis" .4
Tony Voutas (Morobe ), 5 a member of the Pangu pati, said he found it very
difficult to believe that the Arawa landowners had already agreed to hand
over their land. This doubt was implicit in the speeches of other members
who all talked as if the land problem was still to be solved. Subsequent
events proved that the doubters were right.
Roy Ashton (East and West New Britain- Ministerial Member for Public
Works) put the orthodox view with great force and clarity. He looked forward
to the day when the House of Assembly would be full of "strong m~n",
Papuans and New Guineans, who had "a national conscience", and would
not "worry about a minority". He warned members that if the international
finance houses "see you arguing and squabbling about a bit of ground for a
company, they might well fail to lend the company the money - $200
million". 6
On 2 July McKillop was reported to have agreed to sell Arawa plantation.
On 26 July Newman told New Guineans in Bougainville that the
Administration would not allow a few people to obstruct the development
of the whole of Papua New Guinea. He also told Rorovana villagers that
the Administration would grant Conzinc Rio Tin to a lease of 600 acres of
their land on 1 August for a construction camp and storage shed. Extra police
would be sent to prevent obstruction when the survey markers were put in. 7
On the day itself about twenty-five Rorovanan women succeeded in
removing the first marker. Having won this symbolic victory in the presence
of several dozen police and a helicopter they retired, apparently in good
.
humour.
On the same day the Administrator, D.O. Hay, was reported as rejecting
Lapun's suggestion that negotiations over the land should be reopened.
Joseph Lue warned that "this attitude of sell your land or else" was not
palatable to the Bougainvilleans. He added that he had made this clear at
the monthly meeting of the ministerial and assistant ministerial members
with the Administrator. 8
The turning point in the Bougainville Copper saga was 5 August. On that
day police used tear-gas and batons to shift sixty-five Rorovanan people who
were trying to prevent bulldozers clearing their land. 9
A few days later it was announced that the Napidakoe Association had
been formed with Paul Lapun as president, Raphael Bele as treasurer and
Barry Middlemiss, an Arawa plantation overseer, as secretary. The
Association, which claimed a membership of 4,734 from seventy-two
villages in the Kieta sub-district, aimed to handle all future law negotiations
with CRA on behalf of the villagers. 10
The Administration now seemed to start back-pedalling vigorously.
Tripartite conferences were held between villagers, senior Administration
officials and the CRA area manager. Flying in to attend the opening of the
May-August 1969
85
South Pacific Games, C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories, was
able to discuss Bougainville with Hay. Later Hay himself flew to
Bougainville to assess the situation and he held discussions with various
leading local citizens.
By this time a writ had been filed in the Supreme Court claiming the New
Guinea mining ordinances were invalid and void. The claim was taken
seriously by the Administrator who instructed the District Commissioner
in Bougainville to tell CRA to suspend operations until the legal position
was made clear.
On 20 August the sale of Arawa plantation was completed. The owners
were reported to be receiving something like $900 an acre, a sum which
immediately threw into stark relief the $100 an acre being offered to the
New Guinean owners ofthe neighbouring land.U Although a fair part of the
$900 consisted of compensation for improvements and loss of profits from
future harvests, the general public mostly chose to see the transaction as an
instance of Europeans getting better terms than New Guineans, and it
became obvious that organisations like theN apidakoe Association were not
likely to let the matter rest.
In this case Canberra saw the point very quickly. Very shortly after details
of the Arawa plantation's sale had been made public Barnes announced that
he and Prime Minister Gorton were prepared to negotiate a settlement. "We
indicated", he said, "that if the native landholders were prepared to negotiate
a settlement, similar procedures and principles would apply to the question
of compensation or payment to the native landholders as had applied in the
negotiations for the purchase of the Arawa plantation". 12
Albert Maori Kiki: An Alleged Breach of Privilege

On I May the New Guinea Times-Courier reported that Albert Maori
Kiki had told a student meeting at Sydney University that the
Australian government was deliberately encouraging a group called the
"Independent Members Group" which held a majority of seats in the House
of Assembly.
Kiki, who was on a fund-raising tour for the Pangu pati, was asked after
the meeting about party finances in the Territory. In his reply he said that
businessmen and planters had offered the Independent Members Group
$60,000 on condition that they accepted a specified political platform. The
Independent Members Group, said Kiki (though this was not reported in
the local papers) had refused both the platform and the money. On 2 May
Oala Oala-Rarua, current chairman of the Independent Members Group, said
he knew nothing about the $60,000.B
On 3 May Kiki appeared on the television programme "Four Corners"
in Sydney. During the course of an interview with Ian Downs, a former
member of the House of Assembly, Kiki said:
Pangu would like to see at this stage immediate self-govemment.lt is all right
for Barnes to say that New Guinea will get independence in twenty to thirty years
86
Robert Waddell
time. He is safe, because his views will be protected. He will be supported

by his stooges in Parliament- that is elected New Guineans made to accept
the ministerial portfolios with money, status, and cars and all sorts of things.
One and 'a half months later on 16 June J.J. Garrett (Madang) told tl1e
House about the "Four Corners" programme. No word was said about breach
of privilege, although someone suggested K.iki should be sued for slander.
Garrett's main concern was the possible effect on the Australian tax-payer
who was keeping the Territory afloat. 14
On 17 June a member asked, without prior notice and without reference
to K.iki, that a committee of privileges be set up. It was to have five members
whom he then named.
Immediately afterwards, another member drew the House's attention to
articles in the local papers and the Australian relating to statements alleged
to have been made by K.iki at Sydney University and on the "Four Corners"
programme. The member asked that the matter be referred to the newly
constituted Committee of Privileges. By a strange coincidence the
composition of the committee was such that it would have been hard put to
consider the Kiki case impartially. Every member of it was an interested
party. 1' There were two members of the Independent Members Group (the
chairman Warren Dutton, and Brere Awol), two ministerial members (Tore
Lokoloko and Sinake Giregire) and one member of the Pangu pati (Paul
Lapun). On 20 June the South Pacific Post said in an editorial:
The Secretary of the Pangu Party Mr. Albert Maori Kiki was intemperate and
extremist in interviews he gave during his recent visit to Australia. Members
are right in describing his statements as 'damaging and incorrect'. The editor
however advised the House to 'let the matter rest' in accordance with the
example of the Speaker John Guise who refused to bring the [now defunct]
local racist magazine 'Black & White' to book for its continued 'attempts to
bring this House into disrepute'.
On 26 August the Post-Courier (which now incorporates the South Pacific

Post and the New Guinea Times-Courier) published the Committee of
Privileges report in full. The report began by giving a brief history of
Parliamentary privilege in Westminster and elsewhere; it then made the point
that Section 15 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Ordinance
limited the powers of the House of Assembly to deal with contempt and that
contempt of the House could probably only be dealt with by a district court.
The committee found that the "stooges" allegation and the "$60,000"
allegation made by K.iki in Sydney and published in Papua and New Guinea
by the South Pacific Post, the New Guinea Times-Courier and the PostCourier and the ABC did in fact constitute serious breaches of the privileges
of the House of Assembly. The committee, however, said that it would be
beneath the House's dignity to initiate proceedings against K.iki; the House
should be "prepared to accept an apology" from him. A later paragraph
threw more light on the committee's reluctance to suggest further action
against Kiki: "As the Ordinance now stands a District Court has no
jurisdiction to try a person under Section 15 of the Parliamentary Powers
May-August 1969
87
and Privileges Ordinance for anything he has said or done outside the
Territory even if that person knows that what he says or does will be
republished in Papua and New Guinea".
Although Kiki had escaped, the committee could have suggested pursuing
the local newspapers, the republishers of Kiki's statements, but it refrained
from doing so. It merely said that the House should be prepared to accept
an apology from them.
Kiki understandably remained silent. The press were not so discreet. The
Post-Courier instructed its lawyers to send a statement to the Clerk of the
House in which it denied having committed contempt. The statement went
on to say that if the House thought otherwise it should allow the matter to
be taken to court.
This riposte of the Post-Courier was mentioned by Dutton when
introducing his report on 29 August. He said the statement by the
newspaper's lawyers was "irrelevant and verging on the impertinent. It
suggests that the South Pacific Post Pty. Ltd., is a body capable of
determining what is a contempt of the House."
The report was adopted by fifty-eight votes to twelve. During the debate
W.W. Watkins, S.ecretary for Law, and the only member with legal
qualifications, advised members to exercise caution. He reiterated that the
House and the courts had no jurisdiction over Kiki's extra-territorial remarks
and he further suggested that no action be taken against the ABC and the
newspapers, whose defence could be that they were "performing the
functions of publishing news for the public". 16
The House was not to be deprived of a victim. Oala Oala-Rarua moved
that the Post-Courier's reporters be banned from the House for the rest of
the current meeting. The motion was passed fifty-five votes to eleven. It was
perhaps significant that Watkins was not present when the House divided.
A number of people, including Tony Voutas and Dr J.T. Gunther, a former
Assistant Administrator and currently Vice-Chancellor of the University,
attacked the press ban. Dr Gunther said that the House had been unable to
deal with the real culprit Albert Maori Kiki. "Like a mad dog the House,
with official support, bit whoever or whatever it could." 17
The Gazelle Peninsula Multi-racial Local Government Council
In February 1969 a proclamation was issued by the Administrator-in-Council
announcing the extension of the Gazelle local government council's area
to cover several new villages and land which was occupied by Europeans
and Chinese. The main effect of the proclamation was to make the council
a "multi-racial" one- that is to say one which contained both New Guinean
and non-New Guinean taxpayers. This meant that non-New Guineans were
eligible for election to the council but it did not mean that there had to be
non-New Guineans on the council: this was entirely a matter for the
electorate which was overwhelmingly New Guinean.
Oscar Tammur (Kokopo, New Britain) who had been elected to the
House of Assembly partly on a promise that certain groups ofTolais would
88
Robert Waddell
not be included in any new local government council area, decided to lend
his organisational powers to the district villagers.
On 15 May the old local government council held its last meeting. In the
presence of Tammur the meeting, chaired by the vice-president - though
the president was also there - decided to reverse its earlier decision to
become "multi-racial" .18 The Administrator chose to disregard this resolution
"in view of evidence of haste and pressure" and decided that the election
should proceed as planned. 19 David Hay in person told the council that the
proclamation was now the law, "and even I haven't the power to cancel it". 20
On 16 May Tammur led a march of 5,000 or more Tolais through Rabaul
in protest. Tammur had various reasons for opposing the formation of the
new council. At the time of the Rabaul march he was reported as saying
that land was a major issue among the Tolais. The Administration, he alleged,
had bought up practically all arable land in New Britain. "When we attain
independence the indigenous people will 4ave no more sources of income
by which to obtain money to run their own country." Tammur's other main
objection was that the people had had the new arrangements thrust on them
without prior consultation.
The elections took place during the period 20 May to 12 June. Tammur
had said beforehand that his followers would boycott the elections. The
results showed that his instructions had probably been carried out. Of 33,688
voters on the roll only 6,720 people voted. The new council contained an
overwhelming majority of Tolais, there being only one Chinese and three
Europeans in a total council membership of thirty-eight.
After the elections Tom Ellis (Director of District Administration)
defended the official record. 21 He said that as early as 28 May 1967 it had
been resolved that members of the council should explain to their
constituents the proposal for the council to be reconstituted to include all
residents and for the council to consult by letter all non-indigenous residents.
So much for the allegation that the people had not been consulted.
Furthermore, said Ellis, in June 1968 Tammur had consulted the
Administrator and had agreed that the drawing of Raluana and other noncouncil villages into the council area would be a good thing and would
promote Tolai unity. With the election of the new council the uproar died
down for the moment but it was interesting to note that one of the first
resolutions passed by the council - on the motion of councillor George
Edwards, one of the three Europeans- was to drop the word "multi-racial"
from its title on the grounds that it "confused" a lot of villagers. The motion
was passed unanimously. 22
Administrative Reorganisation
A major administrative reorganisation was announced on 7 July. 23 The
Department of District Administration was to cease to exist as a separate
entity and was to become part of the department was to be Tom Ellis. The
new secretary of the enlarged Department of the Administrator was to be
Tom Ellis. The previous secretary of the Administrator's Department, David
May-August 1969
89
Fen bury, was designated head of a new Department of Social Development

and Home Affairs. The reorganisation came in for adverse criticism by the
press and by various prominent citizens.
The point upon which most adverse criticism centred was the failure of
Canberra to realise the importance oflocal government. The Post-Courier,
Don Barrett, and John Guise (Speaker of the House of Assembly), all agreed
that a separate department of local government should have been created.
Instead of doing this Canberra had decided to make it part of the division
of district administration within the Administrator's Department. "I feel it
most undesirable", said Guise in an address to the 1969 Local Government
Council Association on 8 August "that Local Government Councils which
are statutory bodies ... should be controlled by the Executive arm of the
Administration, the Government of this country ... they are supposed to be
independent statutory bodies" .24
It was also generally agreed that the placing of local government under
Tom Ellis represented a setback for Fenbury personally, and for his liberal
ideas about the role of local government councils as a training ground for
future national self-government. "No one would doubt Ellis's ability and
vast experience in. the field of district administration ... but few would
suggest that he is other than an outspoken opponent of a separate department
of local government". Fen bury, who had been associated with the local
government council movement ever since its beginnings in 1951 in the days
of Paul Hasluck, and who was a natural choice as head of a new department
of local government, was now to have no more to do with the councils:
instead he was to be fobbed off with what Barrett referred to as a "bits and
pieces" department with responsibility for such diverse activities as the
archives, the bureau of statistics, the electoral office, stores and supplies,
the government printing office and hostel management and catering. 25
The main effect of these changes, said an editorial in the Sydney Morning
Herald would be that "Canberra officials - notoriously out of touch with
development in the Territory and responsible for the major blunders of recent
years -will now have the means of reaching directly down to the most minor
details of field administration" .26
Constitutional Development
K.E. Beazley (ALP) accused the Administration of following a policy of

divide-and-rule. "They exploit the grievances of the highlanders to hold at
bay the requests of what might be called the coastal intellectuals." 27 A less
hostile critic might point out that the Highlanders and the coastal
intellectuals have very different material interests and operate on different
levels of sophistication. The Administration could well say that its task was
to strike a fair balance between the two groups.
There is no doubting the political conservatism of the Highlanders. Pena
Ou, chairman of the Western Highlands district advisory council, was
reported as asking for a referendum on self-government. "The people in the
Western Highlands District do not want self-government" he said. The other
90
Robert Waddell
councillors present who represented nine local government councils- agreed

to write to their MHAs asking them to press for a referendum. 28
These sentiments were echoed in the House of Assembly during the
debate on the setting up of a Select Committee on Constitutional
Development. Ninkama Bomai, member for Gumine in the Chimbu district,
said "If you people really want to ruin the Territory you can introduce selfgovernment, but we people in the Highlands do not want it in our area. I
feel the select committee should inquire into our thoughts on these
matters." 29
In the event the committee was duly set up, but its chairman, Paulus Arek,
made it clear that its duty was not "to try to achieve self-government or
independence" but rather to "find out the thoughts of all people in the
country". Nevertheless it was announced soon after that an overseas adviser
on constitutional development would be appointed to assist the committee.
It can therefore be assumed the Administration is in favour of some measure
of constitutional advance.
Further evidence of the unevenness of development was provided by Dr
Ralph Bulmer, Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of Papua
New Guinea. In his inaugural lecture he said that regional differences could
be one of the greatest threats to the viability of Papua New Guinea as an
independent nation. The university was helping to perpetuate discrepancies.
Thus Manus had one in 800 of its inhabitants at the university while the
corresponding figure for the combined Madang and Morobe districts was
one in 14,000.~0
Localisation of the Public Service
Gerald Unkles announced in July that he would set up a localisation section
within the recently constituted Public Service Board pf which he is the
chairman. The new section head was to be Dr David Chenoweth, principal
of the Administrative College, a man who was not only very familiar with
the local scene but who had made extensive studies of development
administration in West Africa and elsewhere. Appropriately in the
circumstances a New Guinean, W. Lawrence, a gifted undergraduate at the
local university and already the holder of a diploma in public administration,
was given one of the senior positions in the section. The subject of
localisation will be thrown into sharp relief over the next five years when
an estimated additional 1,450 overseas officers will be recruited into the
Territory's public service at professional and sub-professional gradesY The
service will expand rapidly but it is doubtful if many Papua New Guineans
will be able to look forward to promotion. It is much more likely that the
opportunities for Papua New Guineans will be mainly in the lower grades.
All this may lead to a growing demand both for a relaxation of academic
prerequisites and for a recognition of the political fact- unpalatable to the
efficient bureaucrat - that it may be better in the long run to have a large
number of under-qualified but experienced New Guinean public servants
than a select few possessing Australian-type academic qualifications.
May-August 1969
91
Evidence (Land Titles) Bill1969

The main intention of the Evidence (Land Titles) Bill 1969 which passed
through all its stages in June was to give the Administration a secure title
to the land it had acquired over the years. 32 Some members suspected the
Administration's motives and adversely criticised their proposal methods.
Tony Voutas of the Pangu pati prophesied that many of the decisions would
be upset after the Territory became independent. The majority of members,
however, appreciated that the Administration was merely trying to make a
future independent government's task easier. The Administration also sought
to encourage local and expatriate enterprise by giving entrepreneurs security
of tenure in the leases which had been granted them.
The long debate on the second reading resulted in the Administration's
making several concessions, of which two may be singled out for mention.
Firstly, it was agreed that the new legislation would not be retroactive in
that it would not apply to cases currently pending appeal to the Supreme
Court. Secondly, a further amendment moved by W.A. Lussick had the effect
of allowing hearsay evidence to be used on both sides "without loading the
scales against customary claimants to the extent that the Bill presently
does".' 3
9
Robert Waddell
Gazelle Peninsula
The Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain seems destined to occupy the centre
of the political stage in the territory for some time to come. After the
elections to the new "multi-racial" council had been held there was a
temporary lull in political activity but trouble broke out again at the
beginning of September. On 1 September a thousand Tolais attended a
protest meeting in Rabaul while a small band of their compatriots led by
Damien ToKereku, Daniel Rumet and Melchior Tomot - all prominent
members of the recently formed "Mataungan Association" - took the keys
of the local government council offices from the attendants, told the council
workers to go home and then locked up the premises. They were later
charged with obstructing the work of the council.
On 3 September four members of the House of Assembly from New
Britain, Oscar Tammur, Matthias Toliman, Epineri Titimur and Roy Ashton,
flew to Rabaul to hold a conference with the Mataungan Association's
leaders. Outside the building 4,000 or more Tolais gath~red in support of
the association. The Assistant Administrator, L.W. Johnson, said the
Mataungan Association was ready to use violence to achieve its ends; he
suggested that the House set up a committee to investigate the problems of
the Gazelle Peninsula. 1 In an editorial published on 8 September the PostCourier welcomed the suggestion but warned that care must be taken over
the membership of the committee: "Obviously the Mataungan Association
would not accept an enquiry by Europeans. They should not be asked to do
so. For the same reason the Tolais, whose interests are at stake, should not
expect representation. The Commission must be completely independent."
In the event the three-man commission of enquiry consisted of an
Australian and two Tolais. The chairman, P.D. Connolly, was president of
the Law Council of Australia and the Queensland Bar Association but had
no specialist knowledge of Tolai customs. Of the two Tolais appointed one
was a bishop of the United Church in Rabaul, Simon Gaius, and the other
was a teacher, Aisea Taviai. The bishop had been a member of the New
Britain district advisory council which in May 1967 discussed the question
of a multi-racial council and passed a motion requesting the Administration
to take certain steps with the aim of having the Gazelle and Bainings
93
councils converted. "The Acting District Commissioner passed the District

Advisory Council's motion on to the President of the Gazelle Council by
letter and requested the Gazelle Council to carry out a plebiscite among the
non-indigenous section of the community. It was as a direct result of this
letter that the Gazelle Council discussed the idea of a multi-racial council." 2
Aisea Taviai had been out of the Territory for a year, studying at the EastWest Centre in Hawaii, and could therefore be expected to bring an open
mind to the proceedings. The Administration also appointed Dr T.S. Epstein
as an adviser to the commissioner. Epstein had lived among the Tolais and
was the author of a book and several monographs on various aspects ofTolai
social and economic activities. Damien ToKereku, Chairman of the
Mataungan Association, said that the Association was "very pleased with
the Commission representation".
At this point a word should be said about the origins and aims of the
Mataungan Association. It would appear that this body was formed during
the first fortnight of May 1969 just before the elections to the new "multiracial" council. Its first official publication took the form of a number of
resolutions, written in English, which were handed to the District
Commissioner of East New Britain, Harry West, on 16 May 1969 by Oscar
Tammur, MHA for Kokopo. 1 The document opens as follows:
RESOLUTIONS conveying the convictions and feeling of five thousand
indigenous men and women who met at the Vunamami Community Centre
on Sunday, 4th May, 1969, at 2 p.m. and on the 11th May, 1969 at I p.m.
This group of ten thousand [sic] indigenous men and women representing
the people of seventy villages in the Gazelle Peninsula has been formed to
demand the revocation of the recent proclamation that changed the Gazelle
Peninsula Local Government Council into a Multi-Racial Council.
The main emphasis of the document is on self-help and self-rule. The
author of the piece, Melchior Tomot, secretary of the Mataungan Association,
acknowledges the need for expatriate assistance but demands that this be
given for the promotion of indigenous and not expatriate ends.
It soon becomes plain that the Association's members have two major
concerns: land and the fear of political and economic domination by
expatriates (which in the Rabaul context means Chinese as well as Australians).
On the question of land the Association has this to say:
But the members demand as their right the immediate settlement of the many
land cases that are still awaiting court hearing- and decision. The members
demand the immediate payment of compensation for all lands that were
alienated without proper negotiation with the original native owners and
without their approval. The amount of money for the compensation is to be
calculated on the improved capital value of the land. The people don't so much
need and want the government[ 's] or the expatriate's money as to have their
land and their rights returned to them.'
Concern about land leads to concern about expatriate domination in
general. Thus:
94
Robert Waddell
Members of the group are very much concerned to know that the Administration
has bought up practically all arable land in New Britain as well as all timber
forests. Their concern is aggravated by the additional fear that the Administration
besides taking up all our land, will so allow private companies to exploit all our
economic resources that when we attain Independence the indigenous people will
have no more sources of income where to obtain money to run their country. We
can clearly see that we indigenous [sic] will not run our own country but the white
men will, since they will always have superior economy. Money is power. Even
if we indigenes manage to govern our country we will govern it when it will have
been fully exploited and deprived of its economic resources.'
In a statement to the Commission of Enquiry Tomot had this to say: "The

Mataungan Association is pro-European and Asiatics, but it's anti-European
and Asiatic bullies, bullies which are put over the natives". 6
While denying that the Mataungans were racist Tomot wrote: "We submit
that the ultimate cause of any civil wars will rest with those white expatriates
like Donald Dunbar-Reid who believe that the native is good only for plantation
work and who carry on their ruthless exploitation ofthe country's economic
resources". 7 It is significant that Dunbar-Reid was in fact one of the three
Europeans elected to the new council, of which he later became vice-president.
As to the strength of the Mataungan Association's following, estimates
ranged widely from five to thirteen thousand. Paul Lapun (MHA South
Bougainville) who visited the Gazelle at the time of the troubles reckoned
that "the majority of the people are followers of the Mataungan
Association". 8 A number of other members of the House of Assembly,
however, were at pains to explain that the troubles were caused by only a
small group of people, some of whom according to J. McKinnon (Middle
Ramu) were "irresponsible, radical Europeans and Chinese". 9 Inevitably a
share of the blame was apportioned to the Pangu pati. _
The commission's report was published on 10 November and was the
subject of a prolonged debate in the House of Assembly. The debate was
disappointing in that speakers spent most of their time criticising the
composition of the commission and trying to decide who to blame for
stirring up troubles; intent on analysing the smoke they forgot to examine
the nature of the fire that lay at its heart The commission itself made three
main recommendations. It suggested that immediate action be taken on the
land problem. It recommended "the acquisition of alienated land adjacent
to the most critical concentrations of population to supplement existing
subsistence farming land". It also drew attention to the large number of
unresolved appeals to the Supreme Court of Papua and New Guinea and
suggested that extra legal personnel be appointed to clear the backlog.
On the other two burning issues the commission had nothing startling to
say. There was to be no referendum, such as had been demanded by
Mataungan supporters, and no fresh elections.
While asking for acceptance of the commission's report Assistant
Administrator L. W. Johnson was at pains to make clear that "the
Administration does not have a closed mind to the idea of a referendum",
95
though such a referendum "would have to be by secret ballot". Johnson then

said that these views "have been supported by a lady who I am sure has the
respect of Lapun and Somare (both members of the Pangu pati) who
mentioned her in their speeches, that is Dr Epstein" .10 This was an intriguing
allusion to the fact that Dr Epstein, who had been originally appointed as
adviser to the commission, but had later parted company with her colleagues,
was said to have wished to publish a "minority" report, which presumably
would have run counter to the orthodox line followed by Connolly. 11 In
mentioning Scarlett Epstein and suggesting not only that a referendum was
a possibility but that a meeting should be held with the very Mataungan
leaders whom the commission had so roundly condemned, 12 Johnson seemed
to imply that the report, except on the question of land, was out of touch
with political realities. 13
One of the most interesting features of the Mataungan affair was the
comment on it by Stipendiary Magistrate P.J. Quinlivan in the case of the
Gazelle Peninsula local government council against Tomot, Rumet and
ToKereku to which reference has already been made. In his judgement
Quinlivan said" ... it is my considered opinion that the multi-racial council
election of early 1969 should have been cancelled and that there should have
been no official opening of the multi-racial council in July for the Mataungan
Association to demonstrate at" . 14 Tomot and some of his Mataungan
associates had addressed the old council on 15 May at the invitation of its
members but after much discussion had left "firmly convinced that they had
lost and that unless their monster march next day could fire the
Administrator into reversing the Tolai Council's phoenix act, the multi-racial
council would come in ... ". 15 In these circumstances Tomot went through
with the march unaware that the council had in fact rescinded its earlier
decision to go "multi-racial". Quinlivan believed that the Administrator
would have paid heed to the old council's resolution but for the fact that it
would have looked like capitulation to a show of force by the Mataungans
in their march through Rabaul on 16 May. Quinlivan's explanation of the
Administration's decision to go through with the election may not convince
everyone but he certainly makes it clear that he believes that the old council's
final resolution was not made under duress. It was he says, "an
overwhelming reversal, which since the Councillors had sent Tomot and his
friends away, was obviously a free decision". 16 Quinlivan's view certainly
conflicts with that of Connolly who suggests that the decision of the council
on 15 May was the result of severe pressure from Tammur, Titimur and
Tomot. 17
During the last three weeks of November and the first week of December
talks were held between the various interested parties and efforts were made
to reach some compromise. Since an immediate referendum was out of the
question and since the Administration recognised the new council as
lawfully elected it was clear that any compromise would have meant a
backing down on the part of the Mataungan Association -which was most
unlikely. The talks were thus doomed to failure. Meanwhile tension built up
as the new council started to issue summonses against tax-defaulters, some
96
Robert Waddell
of whom had already paid their "tax" to the Mataungan Association which
they regarded as the "true" council.
On 1 December the Association refused to meet representatives of the
Gazelle local government council on "neutral grounds" in New Ireland. On
7 December, a Sunday, violence broke out as bands of Mataungan men
sought out and attacked various supporters of the new council. Two
prominent Tolai pro-council leaders, Vin ToBaining and Napitalai Toliron
ended up in hospital.
At this point Tom Ellis, secretary of the Department of the
Administrator, was reported as having taken over "the control of
Government forces in the area" .18 Many arrests were made and among
prominent Mataungans later jailed were Tomot, Matlaun, Lotu and Rumet.
Oscar Tammur faced a charge of non-payment of tax but his case was
adjourned.
Bougainville - The Copper Project
In the second week of September it was announced that Conzinc Rio Tinto
of Australia had made a new offer to the Rorovanan owners of land required
for the copper mining project. The offer was accepted and the lease was
eventually signed on 1 December. The owners were to get $7,000 a year,
plus $30,000 lump sum for damages to the land plus $7,000 worth in shares
in Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd at the issue price. 19 Although this particular
problem had now been solved the very generosity of the settlement was
certain to generate more difficulties in the Arawa area where a much lower
price per acre was being currently offered to New Guinean landowners.
Napidakoe Navitu
Much of the credit for the obtaining of such good terms for the Rorovanans
must go to Napidakoe Navitu, an organisation formed originally to assist
villagers in their negotiations with CRA and the Administration over terms
for the leasing of land. 20 On 2 October details were released of the
association's constitution. Napidakoe's prime aim was the encouragement
of unity among the people of Bougainville and the advancement of their
economic and social welfare. On the broader front the association intended
to put up candidates for the 1972 elections to the House of Assembly and
would press for "early domestic internal self-government for the Territory".
The president, Paul Lapun, was also a member of the Pangu pati and there
was some speculation as to whether Napidakoe and Pangu might eventually
amalgamate.
Constitutional
With the Select Committee on Constitutional Development pursuing its
enquiries under the chairmanship of Paulus Arek, there was a good deal of
comment on constitutional matters. One point on which there was a
97
considerable measure of agreement was that power needed to be devolved

from Canberra to Port Moresby.
Ebia Olewale (MHA South Fly) said in Sydney apropos Rabaul and
Bougainville, that the people of the territory were not against the police or
the Administration but rather against the Canberra government. "They
realise that the police and the Administration were only doing what Canberra
wants them to do." 21
In his inaugurallecture22 as Professor of Political Studies at the University
of Papua New Guinea, Professor C.D. Rowley said "The Niugini Public
Service is effectively though not formally an extension of fhe
Commonwealth Public Service, dominated by Australian values and
methods. The real executive is located in Australia, not Niugini." In
suggesting that a number of matters continue to be left to the decision of a
Papua New Guinea legislature and executive Professor Rowley asserted that
there would be two main advantages: not only would the decisions probably
be more realistic but they would meet with a greater degree of support simply
because they were seen to be made by an institution located within the
territory.
On 19 October four members of the Pangu pati and one independent
member of the House of Assembly, Percy Chatterton (Moresby), issued a
press statement on constitutional reform. 2' Their main recommendations
were that the Administrator be replaced by a high commissioner responsible
to the Department of External Affairs; that an overseas section of the
Commonwealth Public Service be set up from which officers would be
seconded to the Territory to do jobs which would not yet be done by
members of the Papua New Guinea public service; and that full executive
authority be given to the House of Assembly.
Towards the end of September it became an open secret that the Assistant
Ministerial Member for Information and Extension Services, Joe Paul
Langro, was about to resign mainly because of dissatisfaction with the
ministerial member system. The Administration went some way towards
meeting some of his complaints when they announced on 18 November that
"a ministerial member will exercise responsibility in respect of the functions
of his office jointly with the departmental head .... They may approve
requisitions for services, stores and supplies up to a limit of $20,000 ...
collectively, ministerial members will exercise greater financial authority
in relation to public works through the Administrator's Executive Council". 24
Education
Some disquieting statistics were released by Toliman, Ministerial Member
for Education. It appears that in 1969 only thirty-five per cent of those
children who completed standard II were able to enter form I the following
year, compared with eighty-four per cent in 1965. Furthermore the spread
of secondary education in the Territory was very uneven. In 1968, for
example, fifty-six per cent of children in East Sepik who sat for primary
final examinations were selected to go on to high school compared with only
98
Robert Waddell
twenty-seven per cent in Manus and West New Britain. There was a similar
inequality between urban and rural areas. Toliman seemed to be suggesting
these tendencies were politically undesirable and that entry into high school
should be by a territory-wide quota rather than by strict competition.
Proposals for improving the standard of education came from the
Advisory Committee on Education whose report was tabled in the House
on 11 November. 25 Its main recommendations were that there should be a
unified education system and a single employment authority for all teachers
and that teachers in approved mission schools should be paid the same
salaries as their Administration counterparts. Shortage of teachers and high
turnover of staff was thought to be the main reason for poor results in schools
-in which only thirty-two out of every one hundred entrants reach standard
VI - and it was hoped that higher salaries and better conditions might
improve matters.
Another remedy for lowering the turnover rate was to employ more Papua
New Guinean teachers and it was encouraging in this context to note that
the first twenty-seven Papua New Guinean secondary school teachers
graduated from Goroka Teachers' College on 27 November.
On the tertiary educational front a major clash occurred between the
Papuan Medical College and the University of Papua New Guinea on the
one hand and the Administrator and the Department of External Territories
on the other. According to Dr J.T. Gunther,26 the university's Vice-Chancellor,
the Administration had up to a very late stage been pressing the university
to give a degree course in medicine; why then should the minister suddenly
decide not to make the medical college a Faculty of Medicine at the
university? The medical college students, who at present get a diploma, not
a degree, at the end of their course, were highly incensed and sent a
deputation to Canberra in an attempt to have the decision rescinded. By the
end of the year there were signs that Canberra might after all relent.
10
JANUARY-APRIL 1970
Robert Waddell
Visit of Gough Whitlam

The visit of the Leader of the Opposition, Gough Whitlam QC, to the
Territory was undoubtedly the most significant event on the wider political
stage in Papua New Guinea during the period under review.
Whitlam's acts and words aroused strong reactions. Among the hostile
critics was a reader of the Post-Courier who took him to task for paying
too much attention to the "cries of the radicals, who go south and bask in
the limelight for a few weeks" -a clear reference to men like Albert Maori
Kiki of the Pangu pati, and John Kaputin of the Mataungan Association.
Another accused him of being detached from reality. "To suggest that Papua
New Guinea will be ready for independence by 1976 is like saying that the
moon will be ready for mass population in the same year." To these expatriate
critics were added the voice of the Papua New Guinean local government
councillors in the Western Highlands. According to one of the pressmen
accompanying Whitlam, "The councillors said they would reject any form
of home rule or independence. This was because they equated it with the
withdrawal of Australian participation in the Territory." 1 This idea that selfgovernment means the withdrawal of both Australian personnel and funds
is fairly widespread and the more radical politicians have a hard time
explaining that it is not a correct forecast of what is to come. Tony Voutas,
MHA for Morobe, and a leading member of the Pangu pati, said that
Whitlam "had given assurance that aid to a self-governing Papua New
Guinea would continue at a substantial level under an Australian Labor
Government". The leader of the Pangu pati, Michael So mare, accused
Administration officials of schooling "the people to think that selfgovernment and independence means the exodus of Australians". "Such
talk", he said, "has been used a great deal by many Administration officers
particularly to poison the Highlanders". 2
Whitlam's most controversial speech was made on 7 January at
Matupit Oval at Rabaul at a meeting of the supporters of the Mataungan
Association. 3 It must be remembered that at the time that Whitlam spoke the
Association was probably the persona least grata with the Administration in
the whole of the Territory: its leader, Oscar Tammur, had been slated by the
Connolly Commission and its other well known spokesman, John Kaputin,
100
Robert Waddell
was anathema not only to the Administration but also to the expatriate
business community and - it must be said - to many fellow Tolais of the
Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain; it was also the case that twenty-four
members oftheAssociation were serving jail sentences of up to six months
on charges of having struck members ofthe Gazelle Peninsula (multi-racial)
Council.
In his speech to an audience of more than 11,000 Whitlam promised his
listeners that if there was a change of government in Australia at the next
general election Labor would "let New Guineans govern themselves",
"appoint a New Guinean as Administrator of New Guinea" and "appoint
some New Guineans as District Commissioners". Whitlam labelled the land
arrangements in the Gazelle Peninsula as "old-fashioned" and "unfair" and
promised that in future New Guineans would be able to make their own laws
about matters of this kind. He warned Mataungans against violence. "We
do ask you particularly to be orderly and well behaved, not to make
disturbance or let people hit each other or bash each other." "You can only
make good laws in Parliament in the House of Assembly. You can't make
good laws by violence."
In a statement made in Port Moresby on 11 January, Whitlam said "I
deliberately avoided any expression of opinion whatsoever on the issues of
the multi racial council, taxes or jailings". The Post-Courier, however,
reported him as saying to the Mataungan members "I support you. I wish
you well in your fight ... ". He was also reported as telling a deputation from
the Gazelle Peninsula (multi-racial) Council he hoped the Administration
would reconsider and abolish their council. 4 On 9 January Whitlam added
fuel to the fire by visiting three leaders of the Mataungan Association who
were serving prison sentences for assault: these were Damien ToKereku,
president; Daniel Rumet, vice-president and Melchior Tomot.
On his return to Canberra, Whitlam asserted that the recent resignations
of the Police Commissioner, Ray Whitrod, and the Assistant Administrator
for Services, L.W. Johnson, 5 were the results of disagreements within the
Administration. In making this assertion Whitlam was merely giving public
expression to a widely held private suspicion that Whitrod had clashed with
the Secretary of the Department of the Administrator, Tom Ellis, over the
handling of the Rabaul incidents. Johnson also clearly did not see eye to
eye with the Administration over the handling of the Mataungan Association.
In addition it was widely supposed that neither man took kindly to
continuous interference from Canberra. 6
Select Committee on Constitutional Development

In February members of the Select Committee on Constitutional
Development went to Canberra to discuss matters with politicians and senior
members of the Department of External Territories. Paulus Arek, the
committee's chairman, said "We will find out from the Department of
Territories what powers they would be prepared to delegate to Port
Moresby". 7 Although such an approach no doubt displayed a firm grasp of
January-Aprill970
101
real-politik it seemed strange to some that the committee should have to

find out what Canberra was prepared to concede before they discovered what
the people of Papua New Guinea wanted. A former member of the House
of Assembly, Ian Downs, alleged that the committee's members had been
told that the Gorton government would not underwrite the fragmentation
of the country by offering a blank cheque to all and sundry seeking an
independent status. The Canberra cheque was clearly endorsed "For one
nation only". On 14 April at a meeting at Magarida in the Central District
Arek echoed these sentiments when he said that "Both Papua and New
Guinea could get individual independence; but we do not want that at all". 8
This was also in line with the administrator's speech over Radio
Bougainville on 20 February 1969 when he was said to have asked the people
whether they thought the Australian government would like to pay for
separate parliaments, development banks, armies and universities for every
group, if the territory were to split up into different countries. 9
As the Select Committee went on its way it became increasingly clear
that the people whom it visited were ill prepared to discuss the complex
questions posed to them. Less than 800 copies of the questionnaire were
available and these were duplicated a week before the committee set out on
its travels. Since the postal services have to battle against great odds to get
the mails through to remote and indeed not-so-remote places it is not
surprising that in many instances the committee arrived to find the
administration officer, the chairman of the local government council and
other opinion formers totally unprepared for the occasion. It also became
clear that very few people had any background knowledge of federal and
unitary, presidential and parliamentary systems of government; neither were
they competent to judge the rival merits of unicameral and bicameral
legislatures. It might, however, be argued that the committee's main function
was educational; that its purpose was to impart rather than gain information.
As Arek said in the House of Assembly "I come from a district where a lot
of people do not have the slightest knowledge of what constitutional changes
are or what a ministerial member is .... I feel it is all up to each of us as
elected members to go to them with this information, to discuss these matters
with them and then present their wishes to the House" .10 A factor which lent
an air of unreality to the committee's tour of the territory was the growing
suspicion that the Australian government was going to announce its plans
for the implementation of self-government well before the committee was
due to present its report in early 1971. It also seemed likely that the date
for self-government would be well in advance of that desired by the majority
of those Papua New Guineans whose opinions were sought by the
committee.
Political Parties and Pressure Groups
During this period the Mataungan Association of New Britain and the
Napidakoe Navitu of Bougainville continued to hit the headlines. A writer in
New Guinea 11 suggested that Bougainville secession was by no means dead
102
Robert Waddell
and deplored the fact that the conduct of a referendum was beyond the means
of the Navitu. In March, however, the secretary of Napidakoe Navitu, Barry
Middlemiss, announced that 16,000 voting slips had been distributed in
Bougainville and that the 11,000 which had been completed and returned
showed "overwhelming support for the complete break with Papua and New
Guinea". 12
New political parties that appeared or threatened to appear were the
Independent Members' party - or whatever its name may turn out to be and "Compass". The formation of the first-named had been on the agenda
for many months but nothing concrete had been achieved; however in
January in Singapore Tore Lokoloko and Sinake Giregire, both ministerial
members, announced that the party would be launched within three monthsY
Lokoloko said it would be modelled on the Australian Country party and
would represent the rural interest. It would include among its members
cultivators, planters and businessmen of all nationalities. In spite of
Lokoloko's confident words no such party did in fact emerge over the
succeeding four months.
"Compass" - standing for "combined political associations" - was the
brain-child of John Watts, MHA for the Western Highlands. 14 Its basic policy
was to work steadily towards the establishment of Westminster democracy
in the territory. In keeping with the supposed conservatism of the
Highlanders, "Compass" was in no hurry to attain self-government and
preferred to leave decisions in the hands of the Administrator aided by his
Executive Council and under the guidance of Canberra. It also proposed that
no decision about independence should be made without the prior approval
of the Highlanders whose wishes should be ascertained by means of a
referendum.
The Pangu pati made history by bringing out in April the first number of
what was hoped to be a regular monthly newspaper. PaiJgu Pati Nius is an
eight-page publication. Its aims are stated to be:
To provide news on important events in government, industrial relations and
business in Niugini.
To inform the public on the aims and policies of the Pangu Pati. To give an
independent view of political events in Niugini.
To serve as a means of political education.
The party hoped to circulate the paper to villages, local government

councils and other community organisations and to offer to people at the
village level a viewpoint different from that presented by the
Administration's radio stations and newspapers which were often the only
sources of information available.
For a paper which was published by an "extremist" political party 15 the
tone of the leading articles was very sober unless one rates as "extremist"
any mention of the rapid approach of self-government.
January-Apri/1970
103
The "Weeden Report" on Education

The report of the Advisory Committee on Education in Papua New Guinea,
known as the "Weeden Report" after the name of its chairman, W.J. Weeden,
was made public towards the end of 1969. On 16 February 1970 the Minister
for External Territories, C.E. Barnes, announced that the Australian
government had accepted all its main recommendations and that these would
take effect on 1 July 1970. This meant that the territory would have a unified
education system. higher standards of teaching and scholarship and eventual
near-parity in salaries between mission and government teachers in member
schools".
In the proposed system non-government schools could choose to
participate either as members, associate members or "affiliated" bodies.
Members would receive the full grant-in-aid but would not be free to control
the appointment and dismissal of their teachers.
Associate member schools could reserve up to a quarter of their teaching
positions for persons "within a specified category" but their teachers would
be paid "at two-thirds of the rate appropriate for local teachers with the same
qualifications in Administrative schools". 16 Affiliated schools could have
"complete control over the appointment and dismissal of their teachers" but
would "receive a Government grant-in-aid equivalent to one-third of the
salaries their certified teachers would earn if they were in member schools" .17
Although the authors of the Weeden Report and the Director of Education
were at pains to deny it, it seemed likely that many mission schools would
eventually lose their individuality under the new scheme.
Brian Harrison, a lecturer at the University of Papua New Guinea, pointed
out that the "individuality" of a mission school did not depend on the amount
of formal religious instruction given but upon the personality and religious
commitment of the staff. If the school could not afford to lose part of the
grant-in-aid it would be unable to control staffing and this would inevitably
lead to loss of "individuality" . 18 A more serious probable result of the
implementation of the recommendations of the Weeden Report will be the
withering away of less efficient schools in backward rural areas and a
blooming of schools in wealthier areas. This is because a school cannot
become a full or associate member unless all its teachers are persons who
have "satisfied the conditions for registration as a teacher and whose name
is inscribed on the register of teachers". Schools whose staffs are not up to
this standard are given two to three years to get their teachers certificated
and registered but it seems quite clear that a small but significant percentage
will not make the grade. They will then get a small subsidy or none at all
and will be forced out of business. One community which fully grasped the
significance of the report was the Roman Catholic church in Bougainville.
The church has had until recently a near-monopoly of education in
Bougainville and also a considerable degree of autonomy within the general
structure of the church in Papua New Guinea. The Roman Catholic mission
in Bougainville stated that the report meant that the Administration would
have complete control of their schools. 19 The hostility of the church in
104
Robert Waddell
Bougainville towards the report will undoubtedly add fuel to the flame of
secessionism in that island.
Status of Papuan Medical College

On 23 February 1970 the Minister for External Territories, C.E. Barnes,
announced that the Papuan Medical College would after all become a Faculty
of Medicine at the University of Papua New Guinea. Barnes has been under
considerable pressure for some time to change his original decision. The
pressure came from the students at the college who threatened strike action
and from the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor ofthe university, Dr J.T.
Gunther, a former Director of Public Health in the Territory. Barnes made
it clear that he had reversed his decision on condition that a certain measure
of control could be exercised by the Department of Public Health to ensure
both that expenditure was not excessive and that the curriculum was
"appropriate to the Papua New Guinea situation". 20
Status of Administrative College
On 2 February the Administrative College was renamed the Public Service
Training Centre. Gerald Unkles, chairman of the Public Service Board, said
that this was because the institution existed solely for the training of public
servants. Many of the staff and students, however, felt that the change meant
a loss in status. Under the former principal, David Chenoweth, the college
had acquired the status of a tertiary institution in which some of the senior
students were not only being taught bureaucratic and magisterial skills but
were being given some insight into the political difficulties of what has been
termed "development administration". Just after Chenoweth had been
shunted off to the Localisation Section of the Public S.ervice Board there
was a small demonstration by the students against conditions in the college.
The next day a dozen students were sacked. They were reinstated a day later
but from that moment on an edict went forth that the word "student" should
be replaced by "public servant under instruction". Many people deplored
the demise of the "liberal" tradition at the college but were not surprised
that the Administration should see fit to deflate somewhat an institution
which had numbered the begetters of the Pangu pati among its earlier staff
and students. 21
Labour
Two events of interest on the labour front were the revitalising of the Port
Moresby Workers' Association and the setting up of a board of inquiry into
rural wages. At an election held on 11 February, Albert Maori Kiki,
secretary of the Pangu pati, became interim chairman of the Port Moresby
Workers' Association. Other Pangu men elected to the interim committee
included an expatriate electrician, Uwe Lilje, who is also secretary of the
Pangu pati branch in the University of Papua New Guinea. The Pangu pati
January-April1970
105
now controlled three of the four main unions in the district, namely the Port
Moresby Workers' Association, the Building and Construction Industry
Workers' Union, and the Waterside Workers' Union; the fourth was the Staff
Association of the University of Papua New Guinea.
The setting up of a board of inquiry into rural wages was partly the result
of Whitlam's arguments with Gorton over the wages paid on plantations.
Whitlam asserted that the workers were paid $5 a month while Barnes
countered by saying that with other benefits such as food and lodging the
real wage could be assessed at about $20 a month. Subsequently it was
conceded by William McMahon on 5 May 1970 in the House of
Representatives in Canberra that wages in other Pacific territories were
substantially higher than current wages (however calculated) in Papua New
Guinea. 22
After an initial protest over its composition- it contained no workers'
representative- the board went about its work and will eventually produce
a report and recommendations.
Immigration Policy
The University of Papua New Guinea figured prominently in a controversy
over the granting of permits to two Indian academics, Mahommad Idris and
Dr I.H. Khan. The former, who was already a member of the staff, having
already obtained a new three-year contract with the university, then applied
for a renewal of his residency permit. There followed such an undue delay
that the Staff Association took up Idris' case and was told that the matter
had been referred to the Minister for External Territories. When eventually
Idris did get his permit it was not for the full period of his contract.
At about the same time serious trouble arose over the appointment of
Dr I.J. Khan to a post as Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political
Studies at the university. When selected for the post Dr Khan applied for a
residency permit on 17 December 1969 in good time to take up his
appointment on 1 February 1970. By mid-March 1970 Khan had received
no permit or any word from the Department of External Territories, nor
had Barnes given any explanation to the university. Under great pressure
from the university's Council and Staff Association, not to mention the
territory's Administrator, and the Australian Labor Party, Barnes said that
the Australian government had an obligation to see those appointed to
the staff of the University of Papua New Guinea were not "people who
promoted views and attitudes antagonistic to the peoples ofthe Territory".
Barnes was also reported as saying that he had a duty to see that Papua
New Guinea avoided the sort of racial problems now arising in other
countries. 23
In answer to this the Staff Association pointed out the absurdity of the
notion that two Indian academics would upset the "racial balance" in Papua
New Guinea. On 17 March the House of Assembly unanimously passed a
motion asking the Australian government to give the Administrator's
Executive Council more say in deciding immigration policy. 24
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Robert Waddell
Urban Local Government

The proposal to establish local government councils in Port Moresby, Lae,
Rabaui and Madang, by i July 1970 was made in August 1969. 25 Two months
later citizens' consultative committees were set up to decide upon boundaries
for both wards and councils, number of representatives and their terms of
office, and "any other matters which the Committee feels warrants special
consideration prior to the proclamation of the Council". "The main functions
of the councils are the provision of garbage and sanitation services, parks
and gardens, and the administration of cemeteries. Later on the council, if
it wishes and it if is competent, can take over other matters such as road
maintenance which the administration handles." 26
The consultative committees were to submit their reports by 19 December
1969 so that the councils could be established by July 1970. By the end of
April 1970 the reports were still not completed and there was every prospect
that the councils would not be in existence until January 1971 at the earliest.
The main obstruction was the Port Moresby Consultative Committee
which insisted on examining and questioning the whole structure of local
government. Port Moresby differs from the other three towns in that large
areas within the proposed boundaries were communally owned land held
by Papuans. There is also a growing immigrant and squatter problem which
has largely been ignored by the Administration. The committee's contention
was that a system of rating could not be applied equally to all land in the
area. It further proposed that problems such as the regulation of housing,
law and order and the provision of basic services, particularly to the
immigrant settlements, should be within the province of the proposed
council. For these purposes, the committee argued, the proposed local
government structure was clearly inadequate. The committee's stand was
backed by various local church and community organisations as well as by
Port Moresby's MHA, the Reverend Percy Chatterton. By the end of April
it looked as if the Administration would postpone the setting up of town
councils until 1971 and would also probably allow for a "hut-tax" in place
of a system of land rating. On the most important issue, however - the
powers of the councils - the Administration seemed likely to stand firm.
The chairman of the committee estimates that the population of Port
Moresby will be in the region of 250,000 by 1990; it is a safe bet that the
great majority of this population will be non-European; one can only hope
that they will not by that time be ill-housed, ill-serviced, unemployed urban
slum-dwellers.
The Public Service

The prospect of a quickening of the pace of localisation has disturbed many
public servants. The chairman of the Territory's Public Service Association
pointed out that the rate of resignation from the Service was alarmingly high
or a little over twice as high as anticipated by the Commonwealth Actuary.
Resignations were attributed to lack of confidence and the absence of official
January-April1970
107
provision for future employment. On the other hand the majority of officers
could not afford to resign and were likely to try to hold onto their jobs for
as long as they could: this, the president argued, could impede localisation
because there would "be no inducement for many overseas officers to put
themselves out of a job by training a local replacement".
Gerald Unkles, chairman of the Public Service Board, came under fire
for his handling of an important piece of "localisation". A vacancy arose
for the post of assistant secretary in the Department of Social Development
and Home Affairs. Out of the various applicants R.R. Bryant, then Chief
Electoral Officer, was selected. This move enabled Simon Kaumi, a Papua
New Guinean and at that time Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, to be
promoted one step to take Bryant's position. Eleven appeals were lodged
against Bryant's promotion and the Promotion Appeals Committee
unanimously agreed that there were three officers better qualified than
Bryant to fill the vacancy. But the Public Service Board eventually confirmed
both Bryant's and Kaumi's promotions.
In a statement the council of the Public Service Association said that it
had no objection to Kaumi's promotion- in fact it felt he should have been
promoted a year before: what it did object to was the "inadequate and
dilatory way in which the Public Service is being localised".
Unkles deplored the fact that the Association had chosen to attack him
personallyY This implied that his two Papua New Guinean colleagues took
no part in making the corporate decisions of the Board - which was quite
untrue. In any case the appeals committee did not make "recommendations";
it made reports. It was not for the committee to determine appeals, that was
the task of the Public Service Board, the statutory authority appointed to
manage the Public Service.
In the context of localisation one may note that sixty-one Public Service
cadets are undergoing tertiary education in the Territory: thirty at the
university, mostly taking Arts degrees, and thirty-one at the Institute of
Technology at Lae, studying mechanical and civil engineering, architecture,
surveying and business studies and accountancy. 28
11
MAY-AUGUST 1970
Robert Waddell
A New Administrator
The announcement on Tuesday, 5 May, that Warwick Smith, Secretary of
the Department of External Territories, was to be transferred to the
Department of the Interior and that he would be replaced by David Hay,
the current Administrator, and that Hay's place would be taken by the former
Assistant Administrator, L.W. Johnson, was received with widespread
satisfaction in the Territory. During Hay's incumbency the political climate
had changed with unbelievable rapidity and there was a general feeling that
the new situation required new men with new approaches; particularly was
this so in respect to the problems of the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain
which seemed incapable of solution except by someone who was not
committed to the course upon which the Administration had already
embarked; Johnson was such a man. In spite of all official denials it had
been widely supposed that he and the Commissioner of Police, Ray Whitrod,
had resigned over the handling of the Rabaul situation and Johnson could
certainly not deny that he had as good as repudiated the findings of the
Connolly Commission in a debate on the matter in the House of Assembly. 1
Johnson's assumption of the post of Administrator did not usher in the
millennium but it marked a radical change in style. The formality of the Hay
era was gone; it seemed unlikely that the Territory would see any more selfdesigned uniforms. With the informality of dress went an easier and more
relaxed approach to people and problems. The previous Administration had
frequently been too rigid in its handling of delicate situations: it had allowed
itself to be committed in advance to a particular line of action and then been
unable to change course when necessary. It had also ignored the advice of
people on the spot, as in the case of the holding of elections for the new
multi-racial council which became the centre of all the controversy in the
Gazelle: it is said that the majority of the field staff was against proceeding
with the elections but this advice was overridden by staff officers in Port
Moresby.
As a former Director of Education in the Territory, the new Administrator
was also expected to advance the cause of education and in particular to
adopt a less hostile and suspicious attitude to tertiary institutions such
as the university and the Administrative College than seemed to inform
May-August 1970
109
the previous regime. In his first interview as Administrator-designate 2

Johnson said that he proposed to appoint Papua New Guinean district
commissioners as soon as he could and this statement clearly implied that
the process of localisation of the public service was going to be speeded
up. If the inference was correct one could look forward to greater support
for the Administrative College and for the progressive ideas of its newlyrestored Principal, David Chenoweth, who seemed to be one of the few
people in the Territory to grasp the difference between "administration" and
"development administration".
Above all Johnson seemed to be ready to take the role of Trustee seriously
by placing as much responsibility for decision-making upon the Papua New
Guineans, where it rightly belonged. He placed the major responsibility for
solving the Gazelle Peninsula's problems upon the Tolais themselves 3 and
it certainly looked as if this policy might succeed. Again, in his first official
speech as Administrator on the occasion of the annual meeting of the Local
Government Association, Johnson outlined a plan for setting up area
authorities which would constitute a second tier between local government
councils and Port Moresby. 4 These new authorities would take over many
of the functions of the district advisory councils, which at present were
chaired by district commissioners and contained only appointed members.
Such a move, if approved by the House of Assembly, would lead to a further
increase in the area of Papua New Guinean decision-making.
Johnson's final asset was that he was a good "House of Commons man."
He had been a member of the second House of Assembly and had too much
experience of the institution to treat it with anything but the respect to which
it was entitled. He knew how basically well-intentioned and moderate the
"radicals" were and he would presumably attempt to harness their energies
to productive ends.
There were still, of course, a few reactionaries around in high places
("still two to go" said a distinguished retired public servant after the reshuffle) but it appeared that a way may have been found of diminishing their
influence. Under the new "open diplomacy" policy it seemed that the public
was going to be allowed to have details of impending controversial
legislation before it reached the House of Assembly. In this way a good deal
of informed discussion could take place in advance so that defects could be
put right and objectionable sections removed before the bill hit the floor of
the House. The Public Order Bill was a good example of this new technique.
So was the Administrator's general policy of inviting suggestions and
constructive criticism from the public on any topic.
The Gazelle Peninsula

On Thursday, 7 May, some prominent Tolais formed a group which they
called "Warmaram" - a word meaning "mediate" - whose object was to try
to heal the splits among the Tolai people which had arisen because of the
antagonism between the new multi-raciallocal government council and the
Mataungan Association. 5 The chairman of Warmaram was Sam Piniau, the
110
Robert Waddell
manager of Radio Bougainville; the vice-chairman, Robin Kumaina,

formerly a prominent member of Mataungan and currently deputy registrar
of the Savings and Loans Society in Lae; Paulius Matane of the Public
Service Board was appointed secretary. Among the other members of the
committee were two doctors and two priests. Piniau made it clear from the
outset that those of the committee who were public servants had been given
leave of absence from their normal duties in order to carry out these
mediatory functions; he also said that the group would ask for financial
assistance from the Administration. The whole project was expected to last
about three months. The formation ofWarmaram, fully reported in the PostCourier and in Australian papers, caused very little comment.
Towards the end of May a public servant handed New Guinea News
Service a copy of a letter alleged to have been written by the Director of
Information and Extension Services, L.R. Newby, to the manager of Radio
Rabaul. In the letter Newby said that Warmaram, not being a political party,
was to be allowed as much time on the air as it wanted; the same facilities
were not to be extended to Mataungan as it was "a group with political
ambitions". The most damaging part of the letter, however, was the following
paragraph: " ... it was mentioned during a conference [between Newby, one
of his senior officers, and the Administration] on 8 May that Warmaram
could be regarded as a scheme devised by Robin Kumaina to improve his
position if he should wish to stand for the next House of Assembly election
in 1972. The Administrator [D.O. Hay] said this was a risk to be taken. He
said a major concern of the Warmaram Group was to reduce and destroy
Kaputin's standing". 6
Although at the time it looked as ifWarmaram and its laudable intentions
had received a death blow, the wrath of the House of Assembly in an ensuing
debate was directed largely at the public servant who "leaked" the letter and
John Ryan who published it. Outside the House people were surprised, not
that the Administration played politics but that it did so with such lack of
finesse. In the long run it was the Administration which was damaged by
this incident and not Warmaram: the latter was seen as a body of men of
good and sincere intentions whom the Administration had tried to
manipulate for its own dubious purposes. Significantly Warmaram continued
to receive support from other Tolais, notably from university students among
whom Rabbie Namaliu - one of the first graduates - was prominent. It
should be noted that none of these students was noted for his admiration of
colonial rule. The Students' Representative Council of the university also
passed a resolution on Monday 8 June strongly supporting Warmaram. The
president of the Students' Representative Council, Maurice Thompson, a
New Hebridean, said that the Council was in favour of any move to
encourage unity in the Territory.
Towards the end of June the first rumours of an impending
confrontation between Mataungan and the Administration over land near
Keravat in the Gazelle Peninsula began to be heard. In September 1969 the
Administration had bought three plantations from Coconut Products Ltd for
over $150,000. The intention was to add these 9,500 acres to other
May-August 1970
111
government-owned forestry land to make about 14,000 acres in all which

would be made available for distribution to Papua New Guineans in blocks
of about twenty acres.
By the middle of July the Land Board was considering some 800
applications for the first 300 blocks. By this time, however, the leaders of
the Mataungan Association had encouraged its members to take over empty
blocks and "squat" on them. The Association's claim was that two of the
estates, Japlik and Vunapaladig, belonged to a Tolai named Tirupia and could
not therefore be bought and sold and parcelled out by the Administration.
On 17 July talks were held in Rabaul between the Administration and
Mantaungans but achieved no constructive result. The Association refused
to order its members off the Vunapaladig Estate. On Monday, 20 July, the
East New Britain District Commissioner, H.W. West, and John Kaputin faced
each other. West had some 500 policemen with him and Kaputin some 3,000
Mataungans lurking in the forests behind him. Part of the dialogue between
the two men went as follows:
West: Kaputin, I am telling you the Administration has clear title to this land
and should anyone dispute that, they have got recourse to the courts of law.
If you dispute ttiis there is no reason why you cannot take the matter and
contest it in the courts.
Kaputin: Yes, we will contest it by marching on to that road and you can
kill off as many as you want to. We will come here to resist and let the
Australian people know what you are doing to us.
West: The Australian people already know what we are doing in respect to
this land here. We are making available land to the Tolai people to help them
solve their land problems.
Kaputin: You are not giving the land to the Tolai people. What you want is
what you have theorised in your political ideology and you are shooting off,
killing off thousands in Vietnam because you won't support that and you are
doing the same thing right here. 7
In the end, after reports that Canberra had given the Administration
permission to use troops of the Pacific Islands Regiment if necessary and
after a group of prominent churchmen and politicians had implored the
government not to use force, 8 the problems were solved for the time being
when the police quietly evicted several hundred squatters. No force was
required. The employment of large numbers of police aroused the usual
adverse criticism but further ammunition was quite unnecessarily provided
for the critics when C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories, said that
it was the Administrator's Executive Council which had asked for police
reinforcements. This assertion was roundly repudiated by three members
of the Administrator's Executive Council and subsequently by Prime
Minister Gorton himself.9
As soon as Johnson arrived in the Territory to take over from Hay he
announced that, as foreshadowed in Gorton's policy statement of 6 July,
112
Robert Waddell
powers were going to be devolved to the districts. "We do not see why there
should be uniform development" he said in an evident reference to the
Gazelle Peninsula where some of the Tolai leaders, including Kaputin, had
been demanding a measure of self-government. 10 He warned, however, that
there could be no question of giving increased responsibility to the Tolais
in their present divided state. It was up to them to sort out their differences
and decide exactly what sort of council they wanted. This, it should be noted,
was the first time that any Administration official had suggested that the
status of the present multi-racial council might be negotiable; the previous
Administrator had always adopted a "What I have written, I have written"
stance.
Johnson visited Rabaul on 5 August and had talks with members of the
multi-racial council, Tolai "big men" and even some members of the
Mataungan Association. The Association's chairman, Damien ToKereku,
had said that there was no point in meeting Johnson, "just another
Administration official implementing the Australian Prime Minister's
policies"; 11 however, the vice-president, Daniel Rumet, did meet Johnson
and apparently was prepared to discuss the situation "with all parties" on
certain conditions. It was not, however, certain ifRumet was really speaking
for the entire Mataungan executive. Meanwhile another major land problem
was solved when village leaders, brought together by Johnson, came to an
agreement as to how plantation land bought by the Administration should
be divided and used. 12
By the end of August the multi-racial Gazelle local government council
was in dire financial straits. It had over $40,000 owing to it in taxes for the
1969-1970 financial year and as much again for the current year and was
quite unable to meet many of its commitments. In particular the allowance
for primary education in East New Britain was likely to be cut from $40,000
to $1 ,000- a reduction which would entail the closing down of some primary
schools. 13 The council had started to prosecute tax defaulters and in midAugust Oscar Tammur, MHA for Kokopo, and ToKereku, respectively
patron and chairman of Mataungan, had received summonses. Although a
decisive confrontation looked imminent it was thought the Association was
likely to put off the evil day yet again by challenging the validity of the
Gazelle council in the courts, a move which was certain to embarrass certain
senior members of the Administration who had wondered all along if the
council had been properly constituted. As for the council itself, any doubts
it may have had earlier about its own legal standing appeared now to have
vanished; under its new and vigorous president, Hosea ToWartovo, it was
clearly in no mood to truckle to the Mataungan Association.
The Fourth Waigani Seminar

Anyone who was unaware of the change in political climate and of the
strength and articulateness of political and economic nationalism in the
Territory had no excuse for continuing to be ignorant after the Waigani
seminar had run its course at the University of Papua New Guinea. This
May-August 1970
113
seminar which lasted from 9-15 May was labelled "The Politics of
Melanesia" 14 and could well have been a dull and highly academic affair.
In fact it was no such thing. The speakers had been brilliantly chosen by
Professor Rowley, Head of the Department of Political Studies, to include
representatives of the Mataungan Association, the Napidakoe Navitu and
millenarian movements as well as student leaders, members of the Pangu
pati and Trade Union organisers. To these practical politicians was added a
lively collection of professional economists, political scientists,
anthropologists and public servants. With unbelievable obtuseness the
Administration discouraged public servants from attending the seminar and
in one or two cases actively forbade them to do so. The one or two Papua
New Guinean public servants who were allowed to deliver papers had
obviously had their scripts censored to the point of inanity by Canberra and
their patent unease contrasted strongly with the apparent freedom of
expression accorded to delegates from neighbouring colonies. The seminar
ended with a paper delivered by George Warwick Smith, the departing
Secretary of the Department of External Territories. The lifeless content and
delivery of the paper itself and the low-keyed and soporific filibuster which
followed in the ens!ling question-and-answer session dramatically illustrated
the great gap between the lively potential of this country and the prosaic
but no doubt well-intentioned approach of Canberra and Konedobu.
The fourth Waigani Seminar did a number of important things: it revealed
the extent of Papua New Guinean disenchantment with the Administration
and the strength of anti-white feeling; it brought out into the open the aims
and motivations of the various radical political movements; it made many
of the audience (which sometimes numbered over 400) realise that
nationalism was nothing new or alarming but a phenomenon with which all
colonial powers have had to come to terms; above all it gave Papua New
Guineans confidence in their ability to cope with the problems of selfgovernment and independence. The Territory in some ways is a small place
where the influence of a small number of educated people is
disproportionately great; before the Waigani Seminar took place one doubts
whether many of this elite group had thought that self-government was
anything more than a rousing Whitlamite slogan. Now for the first time
responsible, sober- and often Melanesian -people were telling them that
self-government was not only feasible but should be acquired without
unnecessary delay. As far as the politically-minded Papua New Guineans
were concerned the last psychological barrier was down and it was no longer
possible for anyone to argue that Papua New Guineans were not ready to
make their own decisions.
What with the controversy raised by Whitlam's visit, and the speculation
aroused by Gorton's impending tour in July, constitutional development was
a much discussed theme in the Territory's political circles. To this discussion
was brought the expertise of the speakers at the Waigani Seminar and the
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Robert Waddell
subsequent seminar on constitutional development sponsored by the Council

for New Guinea Affairs.
On the subject of a federal versus a unitary constitution most
non-Papua New Guinean opinion seemed to be opposed to federalism. Thus
Hay on the eve of his departure said: "My experience has convinced me this
country is going to need strong central Government. Within that framework
there is ample room for the exercise of more authority by councils or groups
of councils in the districts." 15 Likewise Warwick Smith, then still Secretary
of the Department of External Territories, noted that the Papua and New
Guinea Act "as it stands seems to point towards development along two
lines, firstly a parliamentary system, secondly a unitary system". !kenna
Nwokolo, a Lecturer in Law at the local university, drew from the depths
of his Biafran backround to warn against the dangers of federalism; he gave
four reasons for reJecting a federal solution: that it would rouse "dormant
primordial attachments"; that it would be too expensive; that it would
"deprive the people of the territory of whatever experience they have
gathered in the art of government"; that it would "give fodder to secessionist
movements" .16
In favour of federalism was the Democratic Labor party (DLP) in
Australia which in a hopelessly confused article in the August issue of Focus
wrote "Surely a federal system of largely autonomous States is the antidote
against an African-type tragedy". The DLP seemed to think that the case of
the federation of Nigeria proved its point.
Rumours about the imminence of self-government were quickly dispelled
by the Prime Minister, John Gorton, when he gave his keynote speech in
Port Moresby on 6 July. 17 Gorton made several important points. He was
strongly anti-secessionist ("we would like to see [the Territory] advance as
a unit towards nationhood"); he was a gradualist ("I do not speak of selfgovernment in 1972 or in any calendar year that you ma,y care to mention,
because you are on a road towards self-government"); and he pledged
financial support for Papua New Guinea after self-government and
independence with the proviso that the Territory would eventually be
expected to "look after itself'.
Gorton also announced that ministerial and assistant ministerial
members would be given increased responsibility. Details of these changes
were given in a statement by the minister, C.E. Barnes on 6 July. 18 On certain
specified matters ministerial office holders would have power to make final
decisions, and legislation in these areas would not be blocked by the
Conmronwealth. There would also be a devolution of decision-making from
Canberra to Port Moresby, either to the ministerial members or to the
Administrator's Executive Council. Among the subjects affected would be
"education- primary, secondary, technical, but not tertiary- public health,
tourism, cooperatives, business advisory services, workers' compensation,
industrial training, posts and telegraphs, Territory revenue including
taxation, price control, coastal shipping, civil defence, corrective
institutions, registration of customary land, land use, leasing of land and
town planning and urban development". On the other hand the Australian
May-August 1970
115
government will continue to be fully responsible for "the judiciary, law and
order, internal security, ex .ernal affairs, international trade relations, defence
and some matters which Commonwealth Departments administer directly
in the Territory such as Civil Aviation". Significantly, the Australian
government "will also continue to carry special responsibility for projects
necessary to give effect to the Development Programme" or Five Year Plan. 19
Paulus Arek, chairman of the Select Committee on Constitutional
Development, welcomed the proposals and said that they had been the
subject of discussions between the committee and the Commonwealth
government for some time. "In fact the Committee regards the proposed
changes to have been part of its work ... ". Arek went on to say that the
committee would now be free to "examine the more fundamental
constitutional questions on which the future form of a government may be
based". In spite of Arek's belief that his committee was not superfluous it
looked increasingly as if Papua New Guinea was going to be treated like
Henry Ford's early customers and be offered any kind of constitution
provided it was parliamentary, unicameral and unitary.
Public Order Bill

On 12 August the Territory's Secretary of Law, L.J. Curtis, gave details of
a bill which would strengthen the Administration's hand in dealing with
riotous politicians, illegal squatters and vagrants.
The bill would enable police to prevent meetings and processions being
held where these were "likely to lead to disorder" and to prosecute
trespassers who "wrongfully remained on land or premises after being asked
to leave"; the bill would also enable magistrates to send back to their home
districts "vagrants or people whose words or actions are likely to lead to
disorder". As far as one could judge the bill was designed to deal on the
one hand with possible future activities of the Mataungan Association and
on the other with vagrancy and the squatter problem in the towns.
The proposed bill received an extremely hostile reception from some local
politicians and some of the staff and students of the university. 20 The head
of the Law Faculty, Professor A.B. Weston, produced a legal commentary
on the bill in which he pointed out that apart from anything else the bill
gave citizens in certain cases no chance of an appeal to the courts against
arbitrary acts of the police. Other critics saw the provisions for repatriating
vagrants as an unwarranted attack on freedom of movement or alternatively
as a futile, Canute-like attempt to stem the inexorable drift from the country
to the towns. On the other hand Basil Fairfax Ross, President of the Planters'
Association, seemed to think the measure might help to keep labourers on
the plantations. 21
During the next two weeks the bill received unprecedented publicity.
It was discussed unofficially by members attending a meeting of the
Australian University Law Schools Association in Brisbane; it was the
subject of close scrutiny by the International Commission of Jurists in Port
Moresby. A committee headed by Professor G. Sauer produced a report
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Robert Waddell
which was later handed to the Administrator; and it was discussed in a closed
meeting between Curtis and the staff and students of the University's Law
Faculty.
On 26 August the Administrator announced that his Executive Council
would consider amendments to the bill. "There has been widespread
discussion of the Bill and the administration is anxious that its provisions
should be fully understood and discussed by the community at large. That
is why we have taken the unusual step of releasing the Bill to the public
before it has been introduced in the House." 22 But it was not only enquiring
members of the public who obtained copies of the bill; copies were also
distributed by the Director of Education to high schools together with a
commentary specially written for the occasion by Professor Weston. 23
On 27 August a meeting was held in Hohola, a suburb of Port Moresby,
to protest against the bill. 24 The sponsors included several university
students who announced that they were members of a recently formed black
power movement. A great deal of militant talk came from speakers like John
Kasaipwalova and Leo Hannett but the chairman, Albert Maori Kiki, would
not commit either himself or his trade union followers specifically to antiwhite action. Although the general opinion on the university campus was
that black power was more appropriate to the Aboriginal situation than to
the situation of Papua New Guineans on the verge of self-government and
independence, there could be no mistaking the strength of the anti-white
sentiments expressed at Hohola and earlier at the fourth Waigani Seminar.
In such an atmosphere measures such as the proposed Public Order Bill
seemed to be almost purposely designed to create the very situations which
they were presumably intended to prevent. Fortunately by the end of August
it was clear that if the bill did reach the House of Assembly it would do so
in a heavily-amended form.
12
Robert Waddell
A Spokesman for the Administrator's Executive Council

The key to an explanation of many of the political happenings of the last
four months of 1970 was the appointment, in the last fortnight of
August, of Tom Leahy (MHA Markham) as spokesman for the
Administrator's Executive Council. According to an irate Tore Lokoloko,
in an interview on the local ABC programme "Contact" on 26 August, the
Administration (or Australian government) had intended simply to
nominate Leahy as spokesman. It was only under pressure from elected
members of the Administrator's Executive Council that the Administration
agreed that an election should be held. In the event Lokoloko stood
against Leahy and lost by five votes to three; the official members did not
vote. Lokoloko and others were angry that a Papua New Guinean
had not been chosen for the position, particularly as the spokesmanship
had been widely - but misleadingly - advertised as an embryonic
prime ministership. Very soon, however, the limitations of the position
became apparent. Firstly, the spokesman was the voice not of his own
but of the Administrator's Executive Council. Secondly, the council
was by no means united, consisting as it did of a heterogeneous, fortuitous,
collection of individuals, some of them officials with an allegiance to
Canberra, others elected members with a variety of divergent political
views. It was moreover afterwards said the Administrator, not the
spokesman, was the chairman of the counciL Most important of all, the
spokesman had no kind of coherent political party organisation linking him
either to his fellow council members or to the rank-and-file in the House
of Assembly.
In the event Lokoloko may have been glad that he was only elected
deputy spokesman. The position of spokesman turned out to
be both ambiguous and unenviable. Members of the House of Assembly,
moreover, were dissatisfied by the way the innovation had been made. The
House itself had not been consulted beforehand and neither had the Select
Committee on Constitutional Development as its chairman Paulus Arek
made quite clear in a speech in the House. 1
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Robert Waddell
Political Parties
If in one way Leahy's appointment as spokesman was something of a damp
squib, it certainly had important, possibly unintended, effects in other
directions.
For some time now the Administration had been trying to encourage the
growth of a conservative, middle-of-the-road political party or
intra-parliamentary faction with enough members and enough discipline to
form a majority in the House of Assembly. In January 1970 Messrs Lokoloko
and Giregire announced confidently, in Singapore, that the so-called
Independent Members' group in which they and W.A. Lussick were
prominent, would shortly form itself into a fully-fledged political party.
Hitherto the only intra-parliamentary group with any consistent record of
voting as a bloc had been the Pangu pati but there seemed no prospects of
its being able to command enough support in the House to form a majority.
When therefore it appeared that the loosely-knit, amorphous Independent
Members' group might become a cohesive party with a parliamentary
majority at its command the Administration did what it could to promote
this happy event. It is said that the Administration tried hard to persuade a
prominent Independent - it may have been Tei Abal - to assume the
responsibilities of leadership and to demonstrate that the new party had
enough cohesion to become the first indigenous government in a selfgoverning Papua New Guinea but no leader was forthcoming and the scheme
collapsed. Furthermore, by the end of 1970 the Independent Members' group
was moribund and its members had either become truly independent or
joined new factions.
Personalities and personal ambitions played a large part in the dissolution
of the Independent Members' group. In the centre of the complex web Leahy,
the newly appointed spokesman, was trying to create a.bridge to connect
himself and his supporters in the Executive Council to the rank-and-file
members of the House outside.
The obvious bridge, or so it seemed in August, was the Independent
Members' group, which contained not only Executive Council members like
Tei Abal, Sinake Giregire and Tore Lokoloko but also influential
"back-benchers" like Wally Luss1ck, Julius Chan and a number of
conservative Papua New Guineans. It had been expected that there might
have been some collusion between Independent members in the council and
those outside but if there was it came to an untimely end on 24 September
when Leahy, supported by the other members of the council, voted against
Lussick's bill to set up a select committee on air transport. Lussick had
apparently been counting on Leahy's support for the bill and felt badly let
down.
It was in the weeks following this incident that at least four parties, all
led by former "independents", were founded. The first and most significant
one was the Compass party which included Tom Leahy, Sinake Giregire,
Andagari Wabiria and Kaibelt Diria, all of whom were ministerial or
assistant ministerial members. The name "Compass" was borrowed from
119
an association which had been formed earlier in the year by John Watts,
MHA for the Western Highlands. The exact relationship between the two
Compasses was not entirely clear but both organisations had much the same
programmes, namely the expansion of economic and educational
opportunities allied to a slow and orderly political progress towards selfgovernment and independence.
The meeting at which the new Compass was formed was held at Minj in
the Highlands at the end of October and was said to have been attended by
three hundred leading Highlanders. It was afterwards said by newspaper
reporters and other witnesses that trucks belonging to the district
administration and a plane belonging to Dennis Buchanan, MHA, an airline
owner, were used to transport many of the participants to the meeting.
Prominent Independents who did not attend the Minj meeting included
Lussick, Neville, Lokoloko and Oala-Rarua. None of these had declared his
hand by the end of the year but it certainly seemed very unlikely that
Lussick, for one, would join Compass. After the 24 September incident
Lussick was apparently in no mood to join a party in which Leahy was a
leading figure.
The second political party which arose from the ashes of the Independent
Members' group was the People's Progress party. Led by Julius Chan (MHA
Namatani, New Ireland) and Warren Dutton (MHA North Fly), the party's
initial eleven parliamentary members contained ten former Independents.
Tei Abal said that he hoped the People's Progress party would cooperate
with Compass but there was no sign, by the end of 1970, of any formal
association between the two parties.
The third party to emerge was the Papua New Guinea National party
whose founder, Thomas Kavali (MHA for Jimi in the Western Highlands)
had once been a member of the Independent Members' group. Kavali and
Siwi Kurondo, an assistant ministerial member, were the only MHAs in the
party, but it was said to have quite an influential following outside the House
and there were several university students on its executive committee. An
interesting feature of the party was that its founding marked a genuine
attempt to bring Highlanders and coastal men together. It was evident that
leading student politicians were becoming conscious of the need to diminish
internecine rivalries and to work for a measure of political unity in the
Territory.
The net result of all this political activity was that by the end of 1970
Compass had a majority of the elected members of the Administrator's
Executive Council. The question still remained whether the party could
muster a majority in the House and if so whether it was willing and able to
establish effective liaison between the "cabinet" and "backbenchers". If it
could succeed in doing this the Territory would be able to take a good step
forward in its political development.
Public Order Bill

The widely-circulated draft Public Order Bill received further adverse
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Robert Waddell
criticism in September from such diverse individuals and organisations as a

joint committee of the Roman Catholic and the main Protestant churches, the
staff of the New Guinea Research Unit of the Australian National University,
the human rights sub-committee of the Council of Social Services, Port
Moresby trade union leaders, K.E. Beazley, the Australian Labor MHR, and
the editors of the Financial Review and the Papua New Guinea Post-Courier.
The bill was brought before the House of Assembly on 8 September by
L.J. Curtis, Secretary of the Department of Law, who announced that he
would propose twelve amendments. After an initial debate the bill was
referred to a committee of the House and then brought back to the House
for further debate on 11 and 18 September. After seven and a half hours of
debate the bill was passed by fifty votes to eighteen, but only after twentyseven amendments had heen macie to it. Opposition to the bill came from
Oscar Tammur, the Mataungan leader, the nine members of the Pangu pati
and eight other MHAs including Thomas Kavali, the young Highlander who
later founded the Papua New Guinea National party and Sabumei Kofikai,
a prominent Highlander of the older generation who had a son at the
University of Papua New Guinea. Having been amended to include
provisions for appeal to the courts against possible arbitrary acts by the
police, the bill in its final form, though not entirely satisfactory to its liberalminded legal and political critics, met with much readier acceptance than
did the original draft. It should be noted, however, that the vast majority of
the MHAs approved of the general intention and tenor of the bill and by no
means shared the qualms of the critics, many of the most articulate of whom
were expatriates.
Two important statements were made by Paulus Arek (MHA for Ijivitari),
chairman of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development. The first,
on 3 September, outlined some proposed constitutional changes; the second,
on 17 November, outlined "the sort of arrangements which might be likely
to exist during internal self-government". The Select Committee came in
for its fair share of adverse criticism during the period and the two statements
just referred to serve as good iliustrations of the dilemma in which it found
itself. The committee's role was not clear. To some it was just a fact-finding
committee charged with "seeking the true consensus of the opinion of the
people on vital issues"; to others it was a body whose duty it was to advance
constitutional development; to yet others it was seen to have a tutelary
function as an agent of political education. The members of the committee
became frustrated and angry men as time went by, largely as a result of this
lack of definition. Those who thought the committee should be the initiators
of constitutional changes became angry when Canberra or Konedobu
announced forthcoming changes ahead of the committee or made innovations
without even consulting the committee. The committee's proposals for a
middle tier of local government, for instance, were foreshadowed by the
Administrator before the committee's third interim report was tabled in the
121
House of Assembly on 3 September; 2 again the announcement that a

spokesman was to be appointed for the Administrator's Executive Council
was made without any prior consultation with the committee. On the other
hand those who thought the committee should be a mere passive receptacle
of public opinion became annoyed when it failed to report the public's views
accurately or else tried to alter them to suit the taste of the committee. An
example of the latter type of behaviour may be found in Arek's statement
of 17 November when he reported that the committee suggested that the
Territory be called "Pagini" in spite of the known fact that this particular
name was placed last but one in a public opinion poll sponsored by the
committee.
The committee for all its faults certainly provoked discussion of political
matters and perhaps this was after all its main function. In retrospect it will
probably be seen that the committee was more or less committed to a certain
line of constitutional advance- a middle-of-the-road progress towards selfgovernment - and was hoping to give its final recommendation legitimacy
by involving "the people" in its deliberations.
Arek's statement of 17 November was later incorporated in a widelydistributed pamphlet entitled "Tour by Select Committee on Constitutional
Development" which also contained a list of questions which the committee
would put to the public. The questions were couched in the form "The
Committee suggest that there should be ... : Do you agree with this? If not,
what do you suggest?" All but four of the questions were to do with the
composition of the House of Assembly and the Administrator's Executive
Council; the remaining four questions dealt with suggestions for a name
(Pagini) for the country, a national flag, a unitary constitution and a date
for internal self-government. No mention was made of the plans for the
extension of local government.
The proposals concerning the altered composition of the council and the
House were far from radical: official members were to be retained; the
Administrator was to remain in the council; regional electorates were not
only to be retained but their number increased. There was here no startling
change in the status quo and no hint of the "internal self-government by
1972" which so many observers had predicted. In taking this line of action
the committee was probably reflecting the views of most of its members as
well as public opinion, which was plainly not in favour of sudden change.
Public Service
The period under review was a black one for the public service and the
programme - if indeed it existed - for its localisation. In September S.M.
Foley, the District Commissioner for Mount Hagen and an official member
of the House of Assembly, announced that the number of qualified council
clerks produced by the local government staff college at Vunadidir in 1970
would not be sufficient to fill staff vacancies in councils and would not even
be sufficient to "meet losses from resignations and dismissals" let alone the
demands of an ever-expanding local government council system. Foley
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Robert Waddell
stated that no councils would be able to carry out a full range of functions
without trained staff. 3
On the credit side, six Papuans and New Guineans were appointed to
permanent posts as district officers in the Department of the Administrator.
These were the first such appointments. Two days later it was announced
that Pauli us Matane, a member of the Public Service Board, would be the
first Papuan or New Guinean to become a head of department on a permanent
basis. The department in this case was a new one, the Department of
Business Development.
A month later the Public Service Board came under heavy fire from the
Public Service Association (PSA) for twice rejecting the recommendation
of the Promotions Appeal Committee that a former PSA president, John
Greville Smith, be appointed Crown Solicitor. The Association removed its
representative from the appeal committee thus blockmg the consideration
of further appeals and demanded that Unkles, the Public Service Board's
chairman be replaced. The Board retaliated by saying that it was not obliged
to follow the recommendations of the appeal committee and that the latter
could function- albeit much more slowly- without the participation of the
Public Service Association. The situation, however, became much more
serious when it was announced that the Council of Commonwealth Public
Service Organizations had decided to declare a black ban on the Territory's
public service. In the same week the Public Service Board aroused more
controversy by decreeing that in future new contract officers and those who
had renewed their contracts after 18 November 1970 would not have the
right to appeal against promotions of other officers and that this right would
be confined to permanent and local officers only.
To the Board's assertion that this move would assist the progress of
localisation the Public Service Association retorted that the Territory could
ill afford to lose the services of repatriated officers who. might be panicked
into leaving Papua New Guinea prematurely.
Discontent reached its climax on 1 December when Unkles delivered a
paper at a seminar on management at the Public Service Training Centre
(formerly the Administrative College) in Port Moresby. In the paper Unkles
described the Territory's public service as "second class" and castigated
some of its members for unpunctuality, disloyalty and illegal and unethical
actions. The speech caused a great deal of resentment but the clamour was
stilled on 4 December when C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories,
announced that Unkles would not be renewing his contract and that his
position would be filled by Sere Pitoi, a Papuan member of the Board who
had previously served as acting Director of the Department of Posts and
Telegraphs. Sere Pitoi's appointment did not, however, alter the attitude of
the Public Service Association to the question of appeal rights and one of
the new chairman's first tasks would be to formulate a clear policy for
localisation, a policy which would make it plain whether promotion was
going in future to be based on merit regardless of nationality or on the
principle that preference should be given wherever possible to Papuans and
New Guineans.
123
The Gazelle Peninsula

The dispute in the Gazelle Peninsula of East New Britain remained
unresolved by the end of 1970 and there appeared to be no solution in sight
to the problem of the Tolais and their neighbours.
In September students at the university urged the Mataungan Association
to seek a compromise at the forthcoming talks between interested parties
to the Gazelle dispute. The talks were scheduled to take place on 16
September but as the day approached, first John Kaputin went to Australia
to attend Vietnam moratorium rallies, thus depriving the Mataungan side
of its most vocal leader, and then a council clerk was assaulted by a
Mataungan supporter and the council decided to call off the talks altogether.
A meeting was, however, held on 16 September between supporters of both
sides and a recommendation was made that the Administrator-in-Council
should revoke the multi-racial basis of the council. In response to this
recommendation the Gazelle Local Government Council voted
overwhelmingly in favour of revoking the original proclamation. The
president of the council, Hosea ToWartovo, then appealed to the people to
pay their council taxes now that the cause of the original quarrel was soon
to be removed. At this point Oscar Tammur announced that he disagreed
with the council's latest resolution and said that it was an Administrationinspired move. The council should be abolished, he said, and replaced by a
committee constituted by the Tolais themselves. ToKereku, the Mataungan's
chairman, said that there was only one solution: "the complete cancellation
of the council with a referendum among the Tolai and non-Tolai people here
on what type of organization they desire. We must be free from
Administration control and the Council is not."
When the council's resolution was put to the Administrator's Executive
Council the latter refused to make any quick decision. The matter was an
extremely delicate one and the council members were not prepared to
commit themselves at this stage. Meanwhile the Administrator continued
to hold private talks with representatives of the various parties. For its part
the Gazelle council was still short of revenue and had to appeal to the
Commonwealth Trading Bank for a secured loan of $10,000 to meet
maintenance and contract bills.
Towards the end of November the Administration's patience with the
Mataungan Association ran out and Ellis, head of the Administrator's
Department, attacked Tammur in the House and laid much of the
responsibility for the Gazelle Peninsula troubles at his door. He accused him
of wilfully holding up the resettlement of landless Tolais on land which the
Administration had purchased at Japlik, Vunapaladig and Matanatar. Ellis's
stand was backed by the Administrator who asserted that the solution of land
problems was being thwarted by "one or two individuals". 4
By this time Tammur himself was serving a thirty-day sentence in lieu
of a $30 fine for non-payment of council tax. Much to his dismay Tammur
served only half his sentence. An anonymous well-wisher in Canberra paid
the fine and Tammur was released. Tammur's indignation was shared by
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Robert Waddell
Kaputin who saw this move as an attempt by the Administration to "draw

the teeth from Tammur's protest". 5 Tammur then tried to return to prison
but was, in his words, "chased out ... like a dog". 6
The year ended with the Administrator appealing to the Mataungan
president to show "a spirit of unity and harmony" 7 and the East New Britain
District Commissioner H.W. West warning the Matuangan Association that
if it set up its own council on the Gazelle it would "not be a legally
constituted body, and as such would not be able to receive grants or
subsidies". 8
Economic Development
More progress was made in the endeavour to involve Papuans and New
Guineas in the commercial and industrial life of their country. On 24
September a Bill was introduced the aim of which was to set up an investment
corporation. The object of the corporation was "to provide for an equity
holding by eligible persons in major enterprises in the Territory financed or
largely financed by capital from outside the Territory or financed or largely
financed, or controlled or largely controlled, by persons other than eligible
persons ... ". In this context "eligible person" means "a native", the
Administration, the Development Bank, a local government council, a
society registered under the Cooperative Societies Ordinance, "or any other
group or body ... declared by the Administrator in council ... to be an eligible
person ... ". If passed the bill would have at least two important effects. It
would in the first place enable Papuans and New Guineans to have
representation on the board of foreign companies by virtue of the size of
the Investment Corporation's holding in those companies; secondly it would
enable Papuans and New Guineans of modest means to invest in foreign
companies through unit trusts, investment companies and other institutions
set up by the corporation.
There was no question, said Tony Newman, the Assistant Administrator
(Economic Affairs), of "compulsion on any company to sell shares to the
corporation" . 9 Even more desirable than the promotion of financial
participation by Papua New Guineans in foreign enterprises was the
promotion of business enterprise by Papua New Guineans themselves. In
this connection Ebia Olewale of Pangu (MHA for South Fly) had two
constructive suggestions. He advocated that the Administration should give
foreign businesses a timetable for the localisation of their enterprises and
that "a national development corporation should be established where the
principal function would be the promotion of Papuan and New Guinean
businesses". No move was made to implement Olewale's first suggestion but
presumably the Administration thought to satisfy him on the second point
by establishing a new Department of Business Development. According to
Johnson and Unkles the department would comprise the existing divisions
of cooperatives, extension and business training and management of the
Department of Trade and Industry. It was later announced the head of the
new department would be Paulius Matane, then a member of the Public
125
Service Board.
On 9 November the Administrator, L.W. Johnson, warned foreign
business men that they must "serve the needs of the country" and not be
"purely exploitive". If they did this there would be "no reason at all why
the normal political evolution of this country towards self-government and
independence should affect business enterprises in any way - unless to
stimulate them ... ". 10 On the very same day Lussick, in the House of
Assembly, attacked Pita Lus (the Pangu MHA for Maprik) for suggesting
that the Administration should protect rural areas from foreigners, ask local
government councils to cut down the number of business licenses to
expatriates in rural areas, and give priority to Papua New Guineans in
commercial and light industrial activities in the towns. Lussick condemned
the suggestions as being "clearly discriminatory and racist"; he was
supported by Tei Abal and Tom Leahy, leaders of the Compass party, who
both said they wished to see inter-racial harmony and cooperation in the
task of economic development.
Diametrically opposed to the views of the Compass party was John
Kaputin, one of the Mataungan Association's leaders, who regarded all "such
terms as partnership, multi-racialism, coalition and so on" with suspicion.
Quoting Kenneth Kaunda, Kaputin went on "all such terms ... mean one
thing and one thing only. And that is white supremacy." Such an a attitude
expressed very neatly the Mataungan rationale without any help from the
Administration or the Europeans or the Chinese. Kaputin put his theories
into practice by helping to establish the New Guinea Development
Corporation, a purely local enterprise, for which by the end of the year he
claimed to have raised almost $30,000. 11 The intention was that the
organisation should be registered as a public company early in 1971. Kaputin
was of the opinion that the stimulation of foreign enterprise and investment
could only serve one main purpose - namely to provide the country with
an alternative source of revenue to the Australian grant and thus enable the
Australian government to cut Papua New Guinea loose from the mother
country; it could "never attend to the basic social, political and economic
development of the people" .12 Both Kaputin and Lus made valid points and
it was sad to see how many intelligent people of all races failed to realise
that there was an urgent need for "discriminatory" practices in both the
political and economic fields.
13
JANUARYAPRIL 1971
Robert Waddell
The Tolai Cocoa Project

One of the stranger stories to come out of the Gazelle Peninsula of East New
Britain in recent times is that of the Tolai cocoa project. The story acquired
a few new twists during the period under review.
Briefly, the project was started in the early 1950s in order to give
guidance and shape to the rapidly-expanding indigenous cocoa-growing
industry. It became clear fairly soon that central fermentaries would be
required and that the finance needed for setting these up would be beyond
the resources of the New Guineans. Cooperatives were not going well in
the peninsula at the time and it was in those days impossible to give large
advances to individual New Guineans; it was therefore decided to channel
the required loans through the newly-formed native local government
councils which were statutory bodies to whom money could be lent. The
loans, one should note, were not repaid by the councils - the latter merely
acted as guarantors - but by the growers themselves; at no time was it
suggested that the councils actually owned the many fermentaries which
were subsequently built.
A board of management was formed to supervise the project and New
Guineans were trained to manage the fermentaries and to keep the accounts.
In essence the intention was that local growers should bring their wet beans
for processing to the nearest fermentary where they would receive an initial
payment of a penny or two per pound under the going market price. Later
on, when the beans had been processed and sold, the grower would receive
a second payment. This second payment represented the surplus left after a
fixed percentage had been deducted in respect of interest and capital
repayment charges on the bank loans. This was not an easy scheme to "sell"
to the Tolai growers but the latter soon grasped the essential details and
showed a remarkable anxiety to repay the loans as quickly as possible. The
banks were delighted and offered further loans at lower rates of interest. At
this stage there can be no doubt that the growers thought the fermentaries
would be their property as soon as the loans had been repaid. "The Project
manager ... [said] the then current loan repayment rate of 25 per ton was
equivalent to growers receiving 1.2d per pound of wet beans extra as equity
in the fermentaries" wrote an academic observer; he added "the Agricultural
January-Apri/1971
127
Officer said the Administration was studying the question of how to

determine the equity in the Project of individual growers and the form of
asset ownership when the loan was repaid". The writer then commented:
"This has never been done." 1 We can now add that it still remains undone.
In 1969 when the Gazelle Local Government Council became multi-racial
one of the points which the Mataungans seized on was the fact that the entire
assets of the Tolai cocoa project had been handed over to the new council
without any prior consultation with any of the interested parties. The
Mataungans had two main grievances: they objected to the presence of a
European councillor and plantation owner, John Dunbar-Reid, on the board
of a project which had been set up exclusively to help Tolai growers;
secondly, and more seriously, they argued that the new council had no more
right than its predecessor to dispose of the assets of the project; these, they
said, belonged to the growers. In the months that followed the Mataungans
started to boycott the fermentaries to such effect that the throughput in
October 1969, for example, was 218,608 lbs compared with 2,054,389lbs
in October 1968. 2
In late 1970, in an attempt to save the situation, the Administration
announced that it. was going to sever the connection between the project
and the council by setting up a new private company, the New Guinea Island
Produce company, to take over the affairs of the project. It was generally
assumed that the new company would be an all-Tolai affair but this turned
out to be the case only so far as its board of directors was concerned. In
mid-January 1971 Stanley ToMarita, the Tolai chairman of the company,
announced that 100,000 $5 shares would soon be on offer3 and could be
bought by any "native" (a term which seems to exclude Caucasian or Asian
persons born in the Territory) of Papua New Guinea; this meant, of course,
that it would be quite possible for the lion's share of the equity in the new
company to be in non-Tolai hands. Nor was this all. The president of the
Gazelle council, Hosea To Wartovo, was reported as saying that the only
money the council would get out of the cocoa industry would be a token
payment of $5 when the Tolai cocoa project's assets were transferred to the
new company. Earlier he had said that it was not for the Mataungans or
anyone else to try to take over the fermentaries. These belonged to the
growers through the Tolai cocoa project and now the newly-formed New
Guinea Islands Produce company. The sheer illogicality of the whole
transaction now stood revealed. Assets which admittedly belonged to the
Tolai growers were going to be sold by a council which did not own them
to an allegedly all-Tolai enterprise, shares in which were being offered to
Tolais and non-Tolais alike. Furthermore the $500,000 which was to be
raised was not going to be used to buy the assets of the project from the
growers but to build additional fermentaries: after all, the assets- which,
according to Quinlivan, the stipendiary magistrate in Rabaul, were worth
over $750,000- had already been bought for $5 and even this money had
presumably been paid to the council and not to the growers.
At about this time the Mataungans started to claim compensation of
$625,000 in respect of their members' equity in the assets of the cocoa
128
Robert Waddell
project. The claim was ridiculed and rejected by the Administration. On 5

March, in a letter to the Post-Courier John Kaputin, a prominent member
of the Mataungan Association, gave reasons for the Association's claim for
compensation. He quoted from Quinlivan's judgement in the case of Gazelle
Council vs Tomot and others: "With the exception of a minuscule
contribution from a European who was helped by the Project, the whole of
the Tolai Cocoa Project was paid for by the Tolais and while the Council
was exclusively Tolai it was convenient to have the ownership vested in the
Council. But it was not a part of the municipal assets or of the patrimony of
this area. There can be no doubt that the ownership is exclusively Tolai."
On 8 March the Administrator said the arguments raised by the Association
were completely groundless. His words were echoed in the House of
Assembly on 16 March by the deputy Administrator, Tony NP.wman, who
said it was patently absurd for Mataungans to call for negotiations: "There
can be no regard for the argument that first you claim what is not yours and
suggest negotiations about ownership". Two days later the Secretary for
Law, L.J. Curtis, said that what was called the Tolai Cocoa Project was "a
scheme under which beans purchased from Tolai cocoa growers are
processed in fermentaries owned and operated by the Gazelle Peninsula
Local Government Council". This statement contrasted interestingly with
the wording used to describe the objects of the New Guinea Islands Produce
company, namely: "To purchase the funds, assets of and to run, manage and
control an unincorporated organization operated by the Gazelle Local
Government Council and known as the Tolai Cocoa Project". 5 The word
"owned" does not appear here.
Towards the end of April, largely as a result of the activities of academics,
lawyers, anthropologists and members of the Mataungan Association, it
became evident that the Administration was beginning to realise that it had
committed, or was about to commit, a serious faux-pas. A sudden hush then
fell upon the scene and nothing more was heard for the time being of the
New Guinea Islands Produce company. There were, however, two
unresolved problems which were bound to return to plague the
Administration. The first concerned the ownership of the fermentaries; the
second concerned the fate of those who had reportedly bought shares, or
thought they had bought shares, in a company whose legal standing was very
much in doubt.
Gazelle Local Government Council
While the debate over the fermentaries was raging ToLiman, the Tolai
Ministerial Member for Education, had secret talks with the Administrator
and was subsequently able to persuade the Administrator's Executive Council
to agree to re-draw the boundaries of the Gazelle council in such a way that
the latter became once more mono-racial. On 18 January ToLiman himself
announced the good news on Radio Rabaul. There was no great enthusiastic
reaction. It seemed that the time had long since passed when such a gesture
might have led to a rapprochement between the council and the Mataungans.
January-Apri/1971
129
A whole new range of issues, including that of the disputed ownership of

the cocoa fermentaries, had now arisen to widen the rift. In the words of
the Post-Courier's political reporter, James Hall, "the Mataungans have
taken the dispute into a new phase- that of complete opposition to any form
of Administration-established local government". 6 This new attitude was
clearly manifested in the Mataungan's decision to hold elections for a new
council of their own, which was planned to start operating by the end of
May. Political battles of this kind are bound to have their victims. In this
case the victims were the ordinary citizens of the Gazelle, who, whether
they were pro- or anti-Mataungan or simply neutral, stood to lose
educational facilities, first aid posts, and rural development grants for want
of a properly-constituted, authoritative, rate-collecting council.
In March the Select Committee on Constitutional Development presented
its findings to the House of Assembly. The progressives, moderates and
conservatives in the committee had obviously found it very difficult to reach
a consensus and_ the report which eventually emerged from their
deliberations was a curious patchwork of a document, full of internal
inconsistencies. Having stated quite bluntly that "the majority of the people
of Papua New Guinea feel that internal self-government should come about
no sooner than during the life of the 1976-1980 House of Assembly", the
committee went on to recommend that "the development of the Territory
be geared to preparing the country for internal self-government during the
life of the next [1972-1976] House ... ".
On the subject of secession, however, the committee was quite resolute.
It firmly repudiated any suggestion that Bougainville or the Gazelle should
be allowed to secede or even to hold a referendum on the question.
As expected the committee plumped for a unicameral parliament on
existing lines. Against expectation regional electorates, in which candidates
had to possess certain minimum educational qualifications, were not only
retained but increased in number from 15 to 18. Again, in response to
widespread popular demand, the number of open electorates was increased
by 13 to 82. The committee also suggested that there should be provision for
having not more than three nominated members in the House but that these
should be chosen by a select committee of the House. If a public servant
was nominated he would have to resign his post in the public service before
taking his seat in the House. The committee decided to allow four official
members to sit in the House. The revised House would thus have 100 elected
members, up to three nominated members and four official members.
The committee further recommended that the Executive Council should
consist of the Administrator, three official members and ten ministers; that
the Territory be called Niugini and its inhabitants Niuginians; and that the
national flag be based on a design submitted by a young school-girl named
Susan Kanike.
All in all, apart from the hint that self-government might come in the
130
Robert Waddell
period 1972-76, there was nothing startling in the report, and certainly
nothing that suggested that the Papua New Guineans would get very much
more practice in self-government before they were overtaken by events.
Many of the better-educated Papua New Guineans had pressed for the
exclusion of expatriate public servants from the House so that political and
administrative roles could be clearly separated and so that indigenous
members could be allowed to make political decisions.
The Australian government's thoughts on the matter were clearly
expressed on 27 April by C.E. Barnes, Minister for External Territories,
when he said that the Australian government would prepare a programme
for movement to full Territory internal self-government in the period 197276. He added significantly that "a cohesive group of Ministers with the
support of the House of Assemhly after the 1972 elections could be
recognized as a government". 7 There was little doubt in the minds of most
observers that the Compass party (now the United party) was the group
which the government had in mind.
Political Parties
The first four months of 1971 saw the birth of one new party and the
renaming of another but otherwise nothing of great import. If some of the
parties were hoping for financial support from their opposite numbers in
Australia, they hoped in vain. Gough Whitlam, for instance, made it quite
plain that the ALP was not going to back any political party in the Territory.
He did not, however, omit to say where his own sympathies lay. "If I were
living in New Guinea", he said, "I would vote Pangu. It is not a stooge for
Australian companies. Pangu is a national party and finds all its money itself.
The only other party we know about is Compass and that gets its money
from Australian companies and planters." This jibe at the Administrationbacked Compass party did not cut much ice in the Highlands. Many New
Guineans there have interests in common with the expatriate planters and
do not greatly care where the financial support for their party comes from.
Compass in fact had more than financial support from expatriates; one of
the Australian Country party's organisers was sent over to give it advice on
how best to conduct its affairs both inside and outside the House. The June
sitting of the House would no doubt reveal how successful the organiser
had been.
In early February in Wewak a new party, the National Labour party, was
launched. Its organiser was William Hawarri, leader of the Sepik Youth
Movement. Hawarri explained that the party had no connection with the ALP
although it hoped for financial aid from Australian trade unions. The party's
platform was comprehensive and radical and included such things as the
setting of a national minimum wage, free education to high school level,
free hospital services and the return of certain alienated lands to their
original owners.
The National Labour party was only a small party and of all the parties
which had appeared on the scene by the end of April 1971 only the United
January-April1971
131
party (formerly Compass), Pangu and the People's Progress party looked
like playing any significant part in the next few sessions of the House of
Assembly. If, as was anticipated, the members of the leading parties were
going to be allowed to sit in blocs in the House, the United party, boasting
forty to fifty members, would clearly have a good chance of demonstrating
its discipline and unity and its fitness to provide the first ministry when selfgovernment came. If on the other hand the party failed to stay together it
could prove the salvation of the smaller but more compact Pangu pati, to
whose relatively better-disciplined ranks defectors from other looser-knit
parties with Establishment affiliations might well be attracted.
Town Councils
Urban local government has been introduced to the major towns of Port
Moresby, Lae and Madang (but not yet Rabaul) some twenty years after its
initial proposal. A variety of pressures together with hesitant Administration
policy has successfully stalled its introduction. In 1969, however, Citizen's
Consultative Committees were established and soon after recommended to
the Administration the area, composition and possible structure of these
councils. The committees for Lae and Madang recommended that only
alienated land be included in the council boundaries and thereby avoided
the problem of rating communally owned land. The Port Moresby committee
recommended the inclusion of all land, regardless of ownership, within a
wide radius of the town. In so doing the Port Moresby committee tackled
the wider social and economic problems of rapid urbanisation. It saw the
necessity of an administrative framework to meet the needs of both sectors
of the town; that is, the developed, serviced and predominantly expatriate
sector living on Administration or privately owned land, and the unserviced,
predominantly indigenous sector whose villages and settlements are situated
largely on communally owned land.
Multi-member wards were devised and the system of voting employed
was the familiar "modified preferential" system used in both national
elections. Candidates receiving lowest first preferences were excluded and
preferences distributed until the required number of councillors remained.
Such a method militates against party "ticket" voting.
On 3 April elections were held in the three towns. Large numbers of
candidates nominated (137 for 21 seats in Port Moresby), but the turnout
of voters varied. In Lae and Madang more than sixty per cent of those
eligible voted, while in Port Moresby just over twenty per cent voted. Part
of the explanation for this must be found in the intensity of the campaigns.
A rather curious statement by the Administrator early in February added
interest to the performance of political parties. Johnson said that it was his
belief that local government elections were not the proper place for political
parties "to struggle for supremacy". 8 His statement appeared some time after
parties had commenced organising. He was immediately attacked by Pangu
politician, A.C. Voutas MHA, for breaking the "revered principle of
political neutrality" 9 of the Public Service and later criticised by the
132
Robert Waddell
independent, Percy Chatterton MHA, for attempting to keep local

government "as innocuous as possible" .10 Perhaps the Administrator had in
mind the mythical non-party political "model" of Australian local
government, or, perhaps he was wary of Pangu politicians who see local
government councils as a means of party building.
Political parties did participate, and with considerable success. In Port
Moresby Pangu fielded both "declared" and "undeclared" candidates and
won 8 of the 21 seats. The campaigns of all candidates were decidedly "lowkey" and as usual issues were scarcely debated and played little or no part
in any councillor's election. Pangu's policy, which was outlined by one of
its successful candidates, Nigel Oram, a Fellow of the University of Papua
New Guinea, and former chairman of the Port Moresby Citizen's
Consultative Committee, included "the enlargement of the activities of the
council" for "the provision of basic services for the whole urban population
and not for a privileged minority", and the establishment of a "ward
committee" system as an important means of social control. 11
Of interest in the polling was the failure of the Ministerial Member for
Labour, Toua Kapena, to win a seat; the low vote for the Assistant Ministerial
Member for Treasury, Oala Oala-Rarua, who won the third seat in his ward;
the easy victory of Pangu's national secretary, Albert Maori Kiki; and the
virtual absence of participation in the election by members of the army. The
Port Moresby Town Council consists of eleven Papuans (six from local
villages, five migrants of long standing in the town); one New Guinean
(Chimbu primary school teacher); and nine expatriates (six of whom may
be described as businessmen and three as professionals). There appears, at
the time of writing, to be a "business" group, a Pangu group and a number
of"floaters"; however, when issues such as land rates, head taxes, provision
of services, and the "squatter" problem are raised, these groupings may alter.
The council will have a large range of problems to deal.with, not the least
of which will be the question of cooperation with the Administration over
matters of finance.
In Lae an intense campaign was fought between the Progressive Citizens'
Association (PCA) and Pangu. The PCA was formed late in 1969 largely
by Chinese and expatriate businessmen with the express purpose of opposing
Pangu. In the usual manner of conservative groups in the Territory it claimed
that it was not a political party but "an affiliation of progressive citizens
with similar ideals and principles" with a five-year programme for the
development of Lae. 12 The result of the election left an evenly divided
council of ten PCA and ten Pangu men, of whom eight were New Guineans,
three Papuans and eight Chinese and expatriates. One of the successful PCA
candidates, Police Sergeant John Fofoe, had stood without first seeking the
permission of the Police Commissioner. A ruling by the Commissioner gave
Fofoe the choice of positions and so he remained inside the police force
and outside the council. His resignation appeared to give Pangu a majority
with which to elect a council president. However at the council's first formal
meeting the Morobe District Commissioner, R.T. Galloway, took the chair,
in contrast to the procedure in Port Moresby where an interim chairman was
January-Aprill971
133
elected from amongst the councillors. Galloway immediately ruled that a

Pangu councillor, Brian Bogagu (whom he had sworn in a week earlier)
could not take part in the council, because as a public servant he had not
obtained permission from the Public Service Board. Both these actions of
exclusion were rather surprising. Police officers had previously been local
government councillors in rural areas. The Minister for External Territories,
C.E. Barnes, had announced that "in local government matters, officers of
the Public Service are free to express their views, or if they wish to do so,
to serve on local government councils"Y Besides, the Public Service
Ordinance refers only to restrictions on public servants' participation in
politics in House of Assembly elections. In the ballot for the president,
however, a Pangu councillor defected and the PCA nominee, Pama Anio,
was elected by ten votes to eight.
Campaigning for the Madang Town Council was comparatively quiet with
only a few candidates declaring party affiliations (all Pangu). As in Lae, all
villages were excluded from the new council, although there were a large
number of migrant settlements on Administration land within the
boundaries. Of the eighteen councillors eleven were New Guineans, one was
a Papuan and si)5. were expatriates, including an American Catholic
missionary and a Lutheran pastor. Five Pangu candidates were elected and
there were indications that the United party, which had successfully recruited
members from the nearby Ambenob council, would attempt to persuade Lae
town councillors to join its ranks. The introduction of town councils is a
significant step and is in line with the Administration's policy of bringing
all parts of the Territory under local government. It remains to be seen
whether the councils will be granted the power and autonomy to perform a
developmental rather than a purely perfunctory role.
14
MAY-AUGUST 1971
David Hegarty
National Unity?
The stresses and tensions which mark the transition to self-government and
independence were revealed in recent events. The question of unity or
disunity was raised early in the period under review. On 20 May the
Administrator, L.W. Johnson, issued a statement, authorised by the Minister
for External Territories, C.E. Barnes, "to re-affirm that it is the policy of
the Australian Government to advance Papua New Guinea to internal
self-government and independence as a united country". 1 The only alternative
to national unity, the Administrator forecast, was an inevitable breakdown
into "a collection of tiny, hostile fragments". He explained that in practice
there had been no difference in the legal status between Papuans and New
Guineans since the administrative union of the territories in 1947 and he
warned politicians not to seek political capital in pressing for separate
treatment. The timing of this statement was probably designed to dampen the
heated argument which marked the last days of the March session of the
House of Assembly, but it was probably also an attempt to deflate a growing
Papuan "movement". It did not prevent MHAs raising the question. On the
first day of the June session of the House on a discussion of a "matter of
public importance- political welfare of the Papuan people", Papuan
members, while expressing a desire for unity, criticised the Australian
government for a lack of consultation with the Papuan people on both their
legal status as individuals and their future union with New Guinea. Oala
Oala-Rarua (Central Regional), Assistant Ministerial Member for the
Treasury, was particularly critical of the United Nations' Visiting Mission,
which, he said, had urged unity without any real consultation with Papuans.
Papuans had not been specifically asked whether or not they wanted to unite
with New Guinea. Ebia Olewale expressed concern that the drift toward
unification had gone with Papuans largely unaware of it and without choice.
Bert Counsel, (MHA Western and Gulf Regional), told the House that a poll
which he had conducted showed that many Papuans were opposed to uniting
with New Guinea. They feared that they would lose their identity, receive
less development finance, and have decisions continually made for them by
others. In reply A.P.J. Newman, Deputy Administrator, an official member
and leader of government business in the House, suggested that there were
May-August 1971
135
hidden implications in Mr Counsel's speech.

Mr Newman: I repeat that it has as a background a suggestion that Papua
has suffered financially and in developmental terms by comparison with New
Guinea. If this is so, I do not make any apology. What I will say is this. His Honour
the Administrator emphasised that, in the interests of development of this
country, perhaps we have tended to concentrate on those potential developments
which will give the quickest possible return to this country. I do not disagree
with this and I defy any member of this Chamber to disagree with this principle.
Mr Chatterton: I disagree!
Mr Newman (continuing): Yes, Mr Chatterton, I would expect you to
disagree, because on more than one occasion you have very clearly expressed
yourself as a socialist. 2
The above exchange tells one little about Chatterton's real ideology but
it certainly reveals the dangers of giving allegedly apolitical public servants
unavoidably political roles. Two days later the Administrator admitted that
there was some basis for complaints about lack of development in Papua. 3
The following day the House passed a motion requesting the Australian
government to consult the Papuan people or their representatives before
altering their status in any way. The motion was carried by thirty votes to
twenty-five; official members did not vote but seventeen New Guineans
voted for the motion and four Papuan Southern Highlanders voted against
it. 4 Paul Lapun (South Bougainville) echoed the sentiments of many
members when he concluded that the motion would have been more
appreciated had it been introduced by a Papuan. Later in the session the
House asked that an all-party committee from the Commonwealth
Parliament should visit Papua to determine the wishes of the people. 5
These moves can hardly be described as separatist although there are a
number of historical factors which contribute to a Papuan regionalism. No
doubt politicians saw political advantage to be gained with national elections
only months away. The moves, however, placed the "nationalist" members
of the House in a difficult situation for a short time.
Violence on the Gazelle Peninsula

Events on the Gazelle Peninsula during the period were marked by several
violent incidents. Fighting between two groups of Highland labourers on a
plantation outside Kokopo resulted in two dead, nineteen injured and 162
gaoled. The removal of a 1,000-gallon tank on loan from the Shell Company
to a Tolai cocoa project fermentary at Rabuana village precipitated two days
of violent clashes between Mataungan Association villagers and police. In
the Kabaira Bay area on Thursday, 19 August, the District Commissioner
for East New Britain, E.J. Emanuel, was murdered. And in the midst of these
troubles a series of earthquakes and following tidal waves caused widespread
damage, flooding and landslides to the north coast of New Britain, resulting
in the temporary evacuation of Matupit Island.
The Rabuana incident is part of a continuing dispute over the
136
David Hegarty
ownership of the Tolai Cocoa Project. 6 On 28 July an estimated five hundred

Mataungans stoned and harassed a small group of Shell Company employees
and their police escort who were removing a cocoa fermentary tank. Police
reinforcements were called for but were cut off for some time by trees
deliberately felled across the road. On the following day a summons was
issued for the arrest of Peter Urami, a prominent Mataungan leader, who
was alleged to have hindered police during the incident. On Thursday, 1 July,
in a dawn raid on Matupit Island, to serve the summons, the 160-man police
contingent was attacked. They retaliated with tear gas and shotgun volleys.
Mataungan supporters then stormed on to Rabaul's airfield forcing it to close
down. Later in the day a measure of order was restored but Mataungan
leaders claimed that people had been hit by the shotgun fire. Oscar Tammur
angrily demanded that "if people want to fight us then let the Administration
issue us with guns so we can all bt:: atmt:c.l" .7 On Thursday night and Friday
morning police reinforcements were flown into Rabaul but by this time the
majority of the Matupi had gone elsewhere in their canoes. Subsequently
Peter Urami and another Mataungan, Joel Gita, were convicted under the
Territory's new Public Order Ordinance and sentenced to four months' gaol. 8
They are to appeal.
The murder of Jack Emanuel occurred as he attempted to mediate in a
land dispute on a plantation at Kabaira Bay, twenty-two miles from Rabaul.
In mid-June Rasimen villagers pulled up marker pegs, pulled down an office
and evicted workers from the construction site of a new PNG Electricity
Commission power station. The villagers claimed that the land was theirs
despite its sale by Plantation Holdings Ltd to the Commission. Later in June
the Commission indefinitely deferred further work on the power station. 9
The Administrator agreed with the Commission's decision but indicated his
willingness to provide police guards at the site. 10 On 11 August at the request
of the manager of Plantation Holdings, 120 police led by Police
Superintendent G.M. Feeney, and accompanied by Emanuel, moved on to
the plantation and asked a small group of "trespassers" to leave. According
to one report the villagers then left for a meeting while police and plantation
labourers removed crops and building materials. 11 On the morning of 19
August the plantation manager reported that thirty war-painted Tolais were
clearing a bush area and he again called for police assistance_ Emanuel,
Superintendent Feeney and 120 police arrived and, after speaking with a
group of men, Emanuel walked away down a track with one of them. His
body was discovered a short time after.
Police have alleged that several meetings of villagers in the area had been
held in August and that ceremonies were held late into the night of 18
August. It appears that groups of men had been deployed to attract or divert
attention and others to harass police searchers. Women and children had
apparently been evacuated to an offshore islandY
Subsequently twenty-one men were charged with murder; a further
twenty-one were sentenced to six months' gaol for riotous behaviour and a
number of men sentenced to gaol for practising sorcery. Emanuel had been
a member of the Territory's Public Service since 1946 and had served in
May-August 1971
137
district administration on the Gazelle for eleven years. Tributes emphasised

his calm and patient manner and his willingness to sit down and talk with
villagers. His death underlines the vulnerability of Administration officials
in the period of transition to independence when the legitimacy of colonial
rule is seriously challenged. The Administration responded with a general
toughening-up policy and insisted that no negotiations would be held until
respect for "law and order" was restored. Weapons of all types, including
bush knifes, were collected in police raids throughout the area. Reports
indicated an atmosphere of mutual fear throughout the Gazelle and that large
numbers of people were now paying taxes to the Gazelle Peninsula Local
Government Council.
Other political developments on the Gazelle included the formation of
the Mataungan Association's "private" Local Government Council.
Community representatives had been invited to attend the opening ceremony
on 29 May but most, including Administration officials, refused. Its first
president, Berriona Tolulupa, 62, a retired Methodist missionary, said that
the council would work with the European population. His own role,
however, was "to lead the Tolai people in the fight against the Australian
government so as. to get what we want with eventual self-government" .13
The council has forty-six elected councillors but remains under the control
of the Mataungan Association executive which approves or vetoes decisions
made. Divisions still remain, however, between supporters of the Gazelle
Peninsula Local Government Council and the Mataungan council. Matupit
Islanders evacuated during the earthquakes, for example, rejected substantial
aid offered by the Gazelle Council.
In an earnest attempt to obtain informed advice on Tolai problems the
Administration invited a Canadian anthropologist, Professor R.F. Salisbury
of McGill University, to spend a month with the people and to submit an
advisory report. Professor Salisbury is the author of two books on New
Guinea and recently corresponded with officials on the ownership of the
Tolai cocoa project. His report is expected to be made public later in the
year.
Report of the UN Visiting Mission
The Report of the United Nations' Visiting Mission to New Guinea broke
little new ground on political and constitutional development. The
Administration has responded to some of the recommendations made. The
UN Report endorsed the findings of the Select Committee on Constitutional
Development but advised that, on the question of target dates, "it would be
both prudent and realistic to assume for planning purposes that independence
will be achieved during the life of the Fourth House of Assembly" . 14
Separatist tendencies in Papua and New Guinea could best be answered,
the report suggested, by steady progress towards full self-government and
independence. The formation of proposed area authorities at the district level
to bridge the hiatus between local and central government was seen as a
means to widen political participation. Indications are, however, that the
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David Hegarty
Administration either does not share this optimism or that it is not really
prepared to decentralise authority. In noting the relative weakness of
political parties and the possibility that those in existence may solidify on
a regional basis, the report suggested that the Administration "encourage"
the development of at least two nationally organised parties. The
Administration's response has been to arrange for a booklet outlining the
purpose of parties and providing space for individual party statements. The
more rapid localisation of the judiciary was strongly recommended. In mid1971 the judiciary had no indigenous Supreme Court judges, no full-time
indigenous District Court magistrates, and only twenty-four indigenous local
court magistrates. An overall plan for the localisation of the public service
which ensured the selection of skilled expatriates and adequately
compensated those displaced was considered a necessity. A plan scheduled
for presentation to the June session ot the House was apparently rejected
by the Australian Cabinet and yet another committee was established to
report on localisation. 15 The report recommended that political education
should become the responsibility of all teachers, field officers and business
leaders. The report also recommended that the transfer of power to
ministerial members be continued so that a cabinet system could develop.
The armed forces should also be represented in the Administrator's
Executive Council to provide "a focus oflocalloyalty". The report did not
suggest what should be done if a cabinet lacked consistent majority support
in the legislature.
Developments have occurred, however, within the ministerial system
during the period under review, In May, during a visit by the Administrator's
Executive Council to the Morobe District, the Administrator announced that
the Territory no longer had a colonial administration but a Papua New
Guinea Government. The titles of Administration and Ministerial Members
were to become Government, and Ministers respectively. 16 Considerably
more legislation has been channelled through the Administrator's Executive
Council and committees of ministers have been set up to process it. 17
Responsibility for development planning is soon to come within the ambit
of the Administrator's Executive Council. Although the authority of
individual ministerial members has increased during the past months, these
moves have neither clarified their role as policy initiators nor have they
clarified the question of responsibility both collectively and to the
legislature.
The Trusteeship Council debate on New Guinea in June followed the
usual pattern. The Australian special representative was asked to provide
details of powers still retained by the Australian government and over which
it could exercise its veto. The representative listed twenty-nine main powers
which included the familiar controls over international relations, defence
and security, and the maintenance of law and order, down to such others as
the granting of pardons and the eradication of malaria. The Russian delegate
criticised the Australian government for its lack of a complete assurance to
the people of the Territory that a timetable for independence would be
followed. He pointed particularly to Barnes' statement regarding a "flexible
May-August 1971
139
position" after the 1972 elections and to the retention of the Administrator's
veto. He may have hit a responsive chord when he also criticised the political
education programme carried out by field officers of the colonial power and
the fact that local government has little real power. The delegate from the
United Kingdom generally praised the work of the Administration and
suggested that it might aid the development of parties by providing transport,
cheap printing facilities, cheap postage rates for party literature and the
allocation of radio time. Adnan Raouf, a member of the Visiting Mission,
thought it necessary to emphasise the need for localisation. It was sad, he
said during the debate, that there was not a single indigenous district
commissioner.
Consistent with its policy that the Council cannot make recommendations
to an administering authority, Australia abstained from voting on the
adoption of the reports. The Council later decided to send a mission to
observe the 1972 elections.
Public Service Decisions

On 20 July the Coociliation and Arbitration Tribunal of the Public Service
granted Papua New Guinean public servants leave fares to their home
districts at the end of every two instead of three years' service. The Public
Service Association argued that relatively frequent leave was essential if
indigenous public servants were to maintain kinship and cultural ties and
were to secure their land rights. The Public Service Board countered that
such a scheme would be too expensive and unlikely to be tolerated by an
independent government. In a written submission Professor Donald
Cochrane, Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Politics at Monash
University, who had in 1970 prepared a report on rural wages, warned that
if such leave was necessary then public servants were no different from other
workers outside their home districts. Home ties may be consolidated and
strengthened by such a scheme thus hindering the development of a national
outlook and contributing to political insecurity. The tribunal decided that
the new leave provisions should be subject to alteration by a future authority
and that public servants should meet part of the cost of their fares.
Interestingly these provisions apply only to members of the Public Service
Association.
In August the tribunal heard another case which attracted considerable
attention. The Public Service Association represented D.M. Fenbury,
Secretary of the Department of Social Development and Home Affairs, in
an application for a reclassification of his position from a level two to a level
four departmental head. A senior legal counsel from Sydney, V. Watson,
represented the Public Service Board. The case ostensibly concerned the
status of a departmental head: it revealed, however, something of the
extraordinary circumstances surrounding the recent restructuring of parts
of the Administration and of the personal infighting in the upper echelons
of the public service. 18 In the course of his evidence Fen bury claimed that
in mid-1969 advantage had been taken of his absence from the country to
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David Hegarty
remove him from his position as Secretary of the Administrator's

Department and to place him in his relatively junior present position. He
had told the then Administrator, D.O. Hay, and the former chairman of the
Public Service Board, G. Unkles, that the move had been clumsy and had
been made in considerable haste and without the knowledge or advice of
many senior officers concerned. Fenbury claimed that "[v]ariation of the
functions of a department does not normally entail abolishing the department
and the position of its permanent head" .19
During the hearing the Public Service Association called a large number
of witnesses who testified to the importance of a social development
department which had to deal with the problems consequent upon rapid
social and economic change. 20 It had become obvious, however, that
Fenbury's department had not been given control over the agencies
(especially local government) necessary to adopt an integrated approach to
these problems. The decision went against Fenbury but the tribunal chairman
recognised that the Department of Social Development and Home Affairs
might in the future become more important.
Yangoru Cargo Cult
An incipient cargo cult in the Yangoru area of the East Sepik District
attracted attention when rumours were reported of possible human sacrifices
to be offered on Mt Turu on the seventh day of July. 21 The cult attracted
further attention when the MHA for Wewak, Beibi Yembanda, announced
his membership and told of the moneymaking powers of the cult's deputy
leader Daniel Hawina. The rumours turned out to be false and the cult
appears to be of a fairly standard type involving the "cargo myth" and
expectations of a changed way of life. 22 Cult leaders believed that geodetic
survey markers placed on top of Mt Turu by United States and Australian
Air Force teams in 1962 had desecrated the home of an important creative
spirit known as a masalai. The removal of these markers, it was believed,
would bring about a vast improvement in garden crops, in the quantity of
game, and of fish in the rivers and streams. The cult leaders were Matthias
Yaliwan, a former policeman and missionary worker (who had worked both
in the mission's power station and aircraft hanger), and Daniel Hawina who
had lived outside his district for some years and who acted as spokesman.
A number of symbols including a large key, a four-sided "Instamatic" flash
bulb, an Agatha Christie noveP3 and a picture of Our Lady were used in
speeches and ceremonies. Early in July it was estimated that the cult had
about 7,000 followers and that it had raised over $20,000. The
Administration's strategy was one of non-interference although additional
police were sent to the area. On 7 July the markers were removed and
delivered to the Yangoru sub-district office and some days later another
marker was removed by a Papuan, John Koe, who claimed to be infusing
the idea of unity in the minds of the people.
Most cargo cults contain elements of potential political significance.
The Yangoru cult expressed a vague rejection of alien authority (and
May-August 1971
141
particularly that of the missions) and resentment at what was felt to be

European "trickery". The cult was also organised across language and tribal
divisions. Later in July, however, there were some indications that the cult
might be channelled into a more specific political direction. Some of its
leaders were members of the newly-formed "Peli [Hawk] Association"
whose "adviser" is William Hawarri, leader of the National Labour party,
and a probable candidate for the 1972 House of Assembly elections.
Land Tenure
The problem of finding a system of land tenure which will facilitate
agricultural and economic development continues to bedevil the
Administration. Mounting criticism from politicians, academics and church
leaders caused the Administration to postpone most of its proposed land
legislation (which had taken eighteen months' preparation) until after the
1972 election. The proposed land bills were designed to create a new system
of procedures for determining ownership of customary land; to give a series
of land control boards control over transactions in registered land; and to
strengthen the power of the Land Titles Commission - a statutory body
which hears and determines land disputes. 24 Considerable criticism came
from Dr Alan Ward, a visiting Senior Lecturer in History at the University
of Papua New Guinea, who argued that there were insufficient safeguards
against alienation ofland; that land registered in fully negotiable titles could
lead to loss of land rather than to the development of it by indigenous
owners; and that numerous social problems would result, including the
possible creation of a landless class. Anglican and Roman Catholic leaders
suggested that the bills be deferred at least until 1972, and possibly until
self-government, when Papua New Guineans could implement their own
land legislation. Before the bills were eventually withdrawn on 15 June the
Administrator said that the legislation would be reconsidered if passed by
only a small majority of the House; this provided an interesting sidelight
on the operation of the majority principle on such issues basic to Papua New
Guinean society.
Unions and Parties
There were several developments on the industrial scene. The Bougainville
copper project has now reached the end of its first phase and there were
reports of increasing unemployment among construction workers. There was
industrial unrest in Port Moresby in July when waterside workers went on
a week-long strike. One company threatened to evict its striking employees
but, after a compulsory conference between Department of Labour officials,
union representatives led by Gavera Rea and Albert Maori Kiki, and
employers' representatives, the workers agreed to return to work while
negotiations continued. As a result, casual labourers' rates were increased
by four cents to thirty cents an hour and the minimum urban wage for general
labourers was raised from $7 to $8 per week. In the course of the strike
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David Hegarty
members of the Miscellaneous Workers' and Clerks' Unions threatened to

strike in sympathy. On Monday, 12 July, when the waterside workers went
back, men at the South Pacific Brewery struck for higher wage claims. In
Lae there were indications that young Pangu pati organisers were attempting
to breathe new life into the Lae Workers' Association.
On the political front presidents were elected for the new town councils.
In Lae the Pangu pati ousted the initial president and installed their
candidate, Boyamo Sali, twenty-two, from the Morobe district. In Port
Moresby the Independent Group nominee, Oala Oala-Rarua defeated the
Pangu candidate, Nigel Oram, by twelve votes to nine, and in the
predominantly Pangu Madang Town Council an uncommitted candidate,
Veva Kopi, from Papua, was successful.
Late in August the United party released its platform anet a list of fortyfive MHAs which the party claimed as members of its parliamentary wing.
The platform reflects both the views of the Highlands members' on
economic development and education and some of the hobby-horses of the
party's influential European members. "The United Party believes the people
will be ready for self-government and independence when there is a strong
corps of educated leaders with experience in government, when the economy
is strong enough to support the country toward future developments, and
when the majority of Papuans and New Guineans understand the workings
of government." 25 It would seem most likely that political events will outstrip
this objective. The party platform also expresses the intention to retain field
officers of the Administrator's Department as advisers, to develop a strong
and well equipped police force, and to encourage the participation by women
in politics. But, above all, "The Party believes that self-government and
independence can only come through law and order". 26
15
David Hegarty
House of Assembly
At the election in 1968 for the second House of Assembly only twenty-three
of the forty-six MHAs who presented for re-election were successful. It is,
therefore, understandable that debates and proceedings in the final two
sessions of the House, in September and November 1971, rarely attained a
high level of exci~ement. Although elections for the third House were only
some months away, few individual members attempted to use the House for
private campaigning. There was, however, an interesting exchange between
supporters of the two major parties which indicated to some extent the level
of intra-parliamentary party politics.
On 8 November, Tim Ward (Esa'ala), read from a document purportedly
signed and distributed by the president of the Nawae Local Government
Council in the Morobe District. 1 The document told of how a Pangu pati
ship had arrived in Lae and its passengers - supporters of Tony Voutas had distributed money and cigarettes. When the Pangu pati gained
independence, the story ran, it would give people cars, houses, food, sealed
roads, and would only require forty cents tax! United party members then
attacked Pangu for fostering cultist activities. Their laughter was stilled,
however, three days later when Voutas revealed that the Nawae Council
president was a strong United party supporter. Later in the session, Pangu
leader, Michael Somare, produced a letter addressed to Highlands school
and college students and said to be written by Anton Parao, general secretary
of the United party and a man with some teachers' college training. The letter
warned students to beware the "smart coastal fellows" who are moving for
the top positions and who classify Highlanders only at the "grass cutting
level". Somare accused Parao's letter of deliberately promoting regionalism
while Thomas Kavali (MHA Jimi, New Guinea National party) attacked the
hypocrisy behind the title "United" party. On each of these occasions rather
sober speeches were delivered by Paul Lapun (South Bougainville) and Oala
Oala-Rarua (Central) who counselled an end to bitter party conflict. The
introduction of the budget for 1971-72 in the September sitting produced
little reaction from MHAs and public alike. 2 Total budgeting expenditure for
1971-72 is expected to be $208,062,000- an increase of nine per cent over
that of 1970-71. (This figure excludes an estimated $36 million for overseas
144
David Hegarty
officers' allowances and benefits paid for by the Commonwealth and which
is no longer part of the Papua New Guinea budget.)
The general pattern of previous budgets was repeated with increases in
allocation to individual departments largely absorbed by general salaries
and the increased cost of goods and services. As for revenue estimates the
Commonwealth grant-in-aid of $30 million and development grant of $40
million remain static; total loans are expected to raise $33 million; and an
internal revenue of $80 million. is expected. An additional $4 million is
expected to be raised by increased import and excise duties on beer, spirits,
and tobacco; an increase of 2.5 per cent to a rate of twenty-five per cent in
company tax; and a small lift in charges for motor vehicle registration. More
than fifty per cent of the total cost of government is now being borne by
Papua New Guinea.
The Chamber of Commerce grumbled at the increased rate of company
tax but more general criticism came from the young member for South Fly,
Ebia Olewale. Olewale accused the Administration of taking the easy way
out by leaving the first self-governing government the unenviable task of
increasing taxes. He described it as a status quo budget which determined
no priorities in economic and social development (a criticism which people
were to make of the revised Development Programme introduced on 31
August) and one which included "no effective effort ... for Papua New
Guineans to gain real economic power in their own country".' Pangu pati
criticism was directed at the "meagre increase" in allocations to the
Departments of Education and Social Development and Home Affairs. The
debate produced the usual parochial demands for roads, hospitals and
schools but the demands seemed to be less in number and persistence than
previously. The debate also produced one minor incident in which Somare
labelled United party leader Tei Abal (Wabag, Ministerial Member for
Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries) a "puppet", "stooge" and "bloody rockape".4
The House also witnessed an emotional debate over the death of Jack
Emanuel. 5 Many expatriate members took the opportunity to condemn the
activities of the Mataungan Association, whereas most Papua New Guinean
members expressed sorrow at this death. Implicit in many speeches was the
reluctant acceptance of the inevitable decline in authority of the kiap.
Matiabe Yuwi (Tari) rebuked Ron Neville (Southern Highlands) for the
preposterous suggestion that Southern Highlands' leaders wanted to charter
a plane to Rabaul to fight the Tolais. 6 This was one of a number of occasions
when Papua New Guineans publicly opposed expatriate members of their
own party.
Among other matters raised was an interesting motion proposed by OalaRarua for the establishment of a commission on constitutional and political
developmenU If there is no clear and cohesive majority in the third House
of Assembly, such a commission could be useful in negotiating the terms
of self-government. Briefly the proposal is for a committee of people with
expertise, experience and an understanding of the aspirations of Papua New
Guineans to investigate and report on constitutional forms and on
145
parliamentary and administrative procedures. This commission would be

better equipped and would have a different function from that of the previous
Select Committee on Constitutional Development which sought to test
public opinion before recommending changes. The motion has an interesting
postscript: two days later in the Post-Courier, the former Administrator, Sir
Donald Cleland, made public a letter he had written to Administrator D.O.
Hay, in January 1968, in which he modestly offered his services as chairman
of just such a commission. 8
A request by the House in June for an all-party Commonwealth
Parliamentary Committee to visit Papua and "determine the wishes" of
Papuans, was refused by the Minister for External Territories, C.E. Barnes.
Instead he offered to receive a delegation of Papuan ministerial members. 9
Oala-Rarua, who led the delegation, returned with the not altogether
exhilarating information that an airlink between Daru and northern
Queensland would soon be established, and that the Kennecott Copper
project in the Star Mountains might go ahead. 10 Barnes also promised an
economist to survey Papuan needs, but whether the government is
considering a change in its basic economic policy is doubtful.
In the final session of the House members accepted that their future ranks
were likely to contain self-interested and self-seeking men, and, to guard
against the dangers of corruption, they passed the Parliamentary Integrity
Bill. 11 The bill, better known as the anti-corruption legislation, is the product
of an eighteen-month effort by Tom Leahy (Markham- Spokesman for the
Administrator's Executive Council) and a University of Papua New Guinea
Senior Tutor in Anthropology, Jerry Leach, from Alabama. The first part of
the bill which covers MHAs, calls for a committee (to be established by
the Chief Justice) to investigate complaints and allegations of improper
practices laid against MHAs. This committee has the power to recommend
action to the Secretary for Law and eventually to the House of Assembly.
Majority party rule and political appointments to senior public service
positions were apparently not considered to be an obstacle to the operation
of the legislation. The bill also requires MHAs to provide the committee
with annual financial statements and business transactions. This section was
passed by forty votes to seven with the official members supporting the bill.
What was good for the politicians, however, was not so good for the public
servants. The second part of the bill (although dealt with separately by the
House) known as the Public Officers' Integrity Bill was defeated by thirty
votes to twenty-five with all but one official member abstaining. This section
of the bill which called for a Senior Public Officers' Tribunal was vigorously
opposed by the Public Service Association and by Officers of the
Department of External Territories. Their criticism was that existing Public
Service Regulations are sufficient to deal with misdemeanours in the upper
sections of the service- a point with which a quarter of the MHAs did not
agree.
Perhaps as a final act of defiance, but more certainly as a result of
intensive lobbying by the Public Service Association and the presence of
former kiaps amongst their ranks, the members of the House rejected a
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David Hegarty
government White Paper on alterations to the Employment Security Scheme

for overseas public servants, and, forced the government to withdraw six
bills which would have put the scheme into effect. 12 The Public Service
Association refused to accept the terms of the "golden handshake" (dubbed
in Port Moresby as the "bronze handshake") offered by the Administration.
Towards the end of the session the House agreed to legislation abolishing
the old public service appeals and promotion system and establishing a
mechanism for the more rapid advancement of local officers to senior levels
of the service.
In his opening address to the second House in June 1969, the Australian
Governor-General, Lord Casey, told the newly assembled members: "You
have a very considerable and growing responsibility to help guide your
country at this formative stage of its rlevelopment".n In a farewell address
in November 1971, the Administrator, L.W. Johnson, listed a number of
achievements of the House. He considered that members had grown to think
of Papua New Guinea as one country; that the House had acquired a large
measure of self-government; and that there was a growing realisation among
the people that their elected members "direct their own government".
Retiring members might well regard those statements with considerable
cynicism. Certainly there has been a transfer of legal power to the House
and to the Administrator's Executive Council, but the problem has been one
of the members' unwillingness or inability to use it. The Administrator's
Executive Council has been, in the words of Ted Wolfers, an "exercise in
role-playing" .14 Policy and policy initiatives have emanated from Canberra
or from within the Territory Administration but with Canberra's approval.
Few, if any, Ministerial Members have policies distinct from those of the
Administration. This is largely a result of the lack of developed political
parties. The Administrator's Executive Council, although said to be an
embryo cabinet, has no clear relationship to the Houseand its responsibilities are largely undefined. Members in the House have been able to
obstruct Administration business at times but have had little success in
directing the affairs of the country. On the performance of members,
Wolfers' remark is appropriate: "While many of the indigenous members
are better versed [than previous members] in the recondite technicalities of
parliamentary procedure, they seem politically more sophisticated only in
that they expect to achieve less through legislation" _IS
The attitudes of certain members have changed, albeit slightly. Highlands
conservatives are now prepared to accept the imminent arrival of selfgovernment.16 The more ideologically radical members - or rather, those
who are seeking more rapid decolonisation- have been content to wait and
"play the game". They (with few exceptions) have not been radicalised by
the slow process of withdrawal.
The House has provided a useful forum for some issues; for example,
the complaints of the Papuans, but it has not been a particularly useful
channel for the grievances of the people on the Gazelle Peninsula. As far as
the general public is concerned, the government is still regarded as an
Australian government. Despite the Administrator's claim that a growing
147
acceptance of government exists, the test of its legitimacy and of the

transplanted colonial institutions will be seen only when the colonial
authority is removed. An assessment therefore of the performance of the
House of Assembly must be made within the overall context of the colonial
political system.
The Salisbury Report and Gazelle Politics

In his report to the Administrator on the problems of the Gazelle Peninsula,
Professor R.F. Salisbury outlines several factors from the present
Administration which he considered had produced disaffection. 17 These
included the physical remoteness of Port Moresby and the centralisation of
decision-making there; the lack of an adequate local forum for the discussion
of "differential local impacts" of decisions taken at the national level;
declining confidence in Tolai leaders who had advocated the "new customs"
or the new methods of the Administration; confusion over the sudden change
in legal status of the Tolai cocoa project; and the continuing failure to resolve
the ownership of disputed land on the Gazelle. Salisbury proposed a number
of recommendatio_ns which he hoped might help the Tolais to solve their
own problems. His major recommendations were as follows:
1. The Administration should not prolong the life of the present Gazelle Local
Government Council; this would allow the Tolais themselves to decide the
most suitable form of local government.
2. The expatriate adviser to the Council should be replaced by a Tolai
executive officer.
3. 'That wherever possible Tolais be appointed to staff and to head
Administration Departments in Rabaul - with the possible exception of the
police, at least at first.' This move, Salisbury hoped, would alleviate the
feeling that the Administration was 'foreign' and not 'ours'.
4. Advance notice oflegislation should be given so that it could be discussed
at the local level.
5. To relieve the chronic land shortage, the purchase of under-utilised land
should be made easier and indigenous groupings should be encouraged to buy.
6. Shares in the newly formed New Guinea Islands Produce Company should
be distributed to all previously registered cocoa growers.
7. The Administration should encourage the New Guinea Development
Corporation (the scheme founded by John Kaputin and contributed to by
Mataungan supporters) and give it assistance through the Development Bank
and other agencies.
The report was tabled in the House of Assembly on 30 September in

summary form together with the reactions of the Administrator's Executive
Council to the recommendations. It was not debated until late in the
November sitting by which time most interest had evaporated. The
Administrator's Executive Council found little in the report which was not
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David Hegarty
already government policy. It considered that there was some merit in the
third recommendation, but a build-up ofTolai public servants in their home
region was likely to trigger similar requests from other regions which would
be harmful to national unity. Subsequently the Administration extended the
date for the Gazelle Council elections until June 1972. It appears that the
Administration has accepted the recommendations on land but has not taken
up the underlying philosophy of decentralisation in the report.
On the Gazelle Peninsula the basic conflict remained. The reaction to
Emanuel's death brought increased tax and licence payments to the council
but also brought accusations from Oscar Tammur (MHA Kokopo) that
people were being threatened by armed police. Tammur was jailed for fifty
days for again refusing to pay council tax but was released soon after an
anonymous donor paid his fine. Several attempts by Tammur and Matthias
Toliman (Ministerial Member for Education and MHA tor Gazelle) to bring
the three competing groups together to negotiate their differences apparently
failed. When Tammur moved in the September sittings of the House to
debate possible solutions to the dispute he was howled down. In the
November sittings he found his motion "buried" on the notice paper.
The Administration policy was to blame the Mataungan Association for
the disturbances on the Gazelle and to try to isolate the Association if not
to destroy it. In the House on 28 September, Tom Ellis, Secretary of the
Department of the Administrator, said: "Sir, I believe that the responsibility
for disruption and fear in the Gazelle lies with the Honourable Member
[Tammur] and his supporters" .18 In a series of radio broadcasts in Rabaul,
the new East New Britain District Commissioner, Arthur Carey, employed
a crude mixture of "fear" and "shame" in exhorting Tolais to obey the law.
In his broadcasts he emphasised that if law was not respected, prosperity
for the Tolai would be lost and there would be a "return to darkness"Y
"Begin working to make the Tolai name again a good name in Papua New
Guinea", Carey said. 20 Of the dissentients of the Gazelle he said, "They are
urging you to fight against your government. Disown these people. Cast
them out." 21 In electing men for the next House of Assembly " ... I think it
very important that whoever you choose will be people who will honestly
work for unity among the Tolai rather than someone who works for
division". 22 In his treatment of the problem as one of law and order rather
than of politics, Carey appears to ignore the existence of a genuine
nationalist movement and to be unaware that the acceptance of law and other
institutions is scarcely enhanced by exhortation and threats. 21
In October and November several Land Titles Commissioners began
hearing claims to disputed land and the Administration showed a willingness
to negotiate with "squatters" on Japlik plantation. In early December a Tolai
was appointed as adviser of the Gazelle council. The resolution of the
problems, however, appears no further advanced. As John Kaputin - the
Mataungan spokesman- recently put it: "Intimidation and oppression will
succeed in the short-term in slowing down the forces of nationalism - but
the will of the people will outlive colonial oppression" .24 As for a solution:
"we must challenge the present set-up for a structural change in our power
149
relationships ... simply changing a white council adviser for a black one is
no solution for anything". 25
Social Control
An increasing crime rate - particularly of crime related to drunkenness has caused concern throughout Papua New Guinea. In mid-1971 the
Administration established a Commission of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink
which is to report on possible action. A submission to the Commission
showed that of all cases heard by local and district courts in Port Moresby,
forty-five per cent involved charges of drunkenness. There has been doubt
cast on the adequacy of the police force to control the situation. A
particularly damaging criticism is a claim that villages and migrant
("squatter") settlements in the towns are rarely policed. The Administrator,
L.W. Johnson, denied that there has been a breakdown of law, but has
admitted that the police are below strength and has invited the South
Australian Commissioner for Police, Brigadier McKinna, to examine the
problems of the Territory police force. 26
Several prominept members of the United party, however, had no illusions
about the capabilities of the police. Following a series of riots, tribal fights,
and thefts from trucks along the Highlands Highway, the United party group
consisting of Messrs Giregire, Buchanan, Fielding and Hagon made
representations in Canberra to the Minister for External Territories, C.E.
Barnes, and the Minister for the Army, Andrew Peacock, for Australian army
assistance. They requested the secondment of forty troops to train and
reinforce the police. It was reported that the Ministers had agreed "in
principle" to the request, and the group expected the first of the army team
to arrive in January 1972.27
The United party request was criticised by the Pangu pati and by the
Police Association which claimed that it invited a "Congo situation" and
besides, if army personnel were needed, the Pacific Islands Regiment had
more local experience. 28 It would appear that more than just an increase in
the coercive power of the police is needed. New roles for the police must
be found to fit in with the changing role of district administration. In the
towns, coordinated planning for urbanisation and effective administrative
structures are needed to replace the traditional methods of social control
which are rapidly breaking down.
Election Preparations
The redistribution of electoral boundaries for the 1972 elections introduced
thirteen new Open electorates and three additional Regional electorates. The
Open electorates are based on a population of roughly 30,000 whereas the
Regionals, which require an educational qualification for candidates, are
based on the eighteen administrative districts regardless of population.29 This
follows the report of the Select Committee on Constitutional Development
which also recommended that four official members and up to three
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David Hegarty
nominated members be included in the House. The major anomaly in the

redistribution is the granting of one Open and one Regional seat to Manus
district which has a total population of just over 20,000 people. Highlands
members were particularly critical of this during the debate considering that
the Western Highlands district received one Regional seat for about 300,000
people. The Central and Morobe districts containing the two largest towns
are slightly under-represented but the proportion of seats for Papua and New
Guinea has remained almost identical.
In other amendments to the electoral ordinance, voting was extended to
18-year-olds and the nomination fee for candidates was raised from $50 to
$100.
Political parties commenced their election campaigns in the period under
review. The People's Progress party issued a one-page platform early in
September and indicated that the party would endorse thirty candidates. The
United party held its national convention in Lae on 5-7 November and the
Pangu pati held its first national convention on 27 and 28 November also in
Lae. The differing styles of the two parties were obvious. The United
convention was held in the Niall Community Centre and coincided with the
Morobe show. MHAs, local government councillors and council presidents
were flown in for the occasion. Considerable time was taken up with
argument over the proposed long and complex party constitution. Internal
differences were quickly revealed when Matthias Toliman proposed some
form of regional autonomy for New Britain- a proposal which was quickly
rejected by the expatriates, Walter Lussick and Ron Neville.
The Pangu convention met in the Young Christian centre and was
addressed by Pangu MHAs on aspects of party policy. Most delegates were
branch members or committee members and many were candidates already
pre-selected.
For this election the Administration's attitude to parties has changed
considerably. The three major parties were each granted one hour for
campaign speeches on the ABC and Administration radio stations and a
booklet containing party policies is being distributed. A political education
campaign to be put into effect after the election will lay emphasis on the
importance of parties.
16
JANUARY-APRIL 1972
David Hegarty
Bouse of Assembly Elections

The political scene in Papua New Guinea in the period under review was
dominated by the third general elections for the House of Assembly and by
the unexpected formation of a coalition government led by the Pangu pati.
These elections, held in February and March, marked a significant step in
the country's constitutional and political development. Whereas after the
previous elections in 1968 observers could only speculate on the likely
"political configuration" of the House, after the 1972 elections it was
possible to identify a "winner". A period of intense lobbying in March and
April for the support of the uncommitted elected members eventually
produced a coalition of the Pangu, People's Progress and New Guinea
National parties, the Mataungan Association and various Independents. The
National Coalition (as it became known) formed a ministry in the first
session of the House in April. After initial hesitancy over the timing of selfgovernment, the coalition expects to assume full control over the country's
internal affairs late in 1973.
At the grass-roots level, considerable change had also occurred. The
issues raised by candidates, the campaigning by political parties and the
quality of candidates elected pointed to an increasing sophistication on the
part of the electors.
For this election the number of Open electorates was increased from sixtynine to eighty-two and the Regional electorates from sixteen to eighteen;
the voting age was lowered from twenty-one to eighteen; voters were
required to vote in the electorate in which they had resided for the preceding
six months; and the nomination fee was raised from $50 to $100. A
redistribution carried out in 1971 reorganised electorates so that the
Highlands (including the Southern Highlands) had a total of thirty-six seats;
coastal Papua nineteen; New Guinea twenty-eight; and the New Guinea
Islands seventeen. The election for Middle Ramu (Madang District) was
postponed until June because of the death of a candidate.
Over six hundred candidates, of whom thirty-nine were Europeans,
contested the elections. In the Regional electorates indigenous candidates
reversed the result of the last House by winning fourteen seats to the
Europeans' four. In the Open electorates the results were seventy-six and
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David Hegarty
five respectively. The heaviest concentration of candidates occurred in the

Highlands which may still reflect the persistent solidarity of the traditional
clan-based political units in that region. It may also reflect, however, the
emergence of a new entrepreneurial type or group in the Highlands which
sees its economic success as being a basis for political support. On the whole
candidates were younger and better educated than their predecessors but
education was only one of the criteria for election. Two recent graduates of
the University of Papua New Guinea stood and were defeated.
Of the seventy-three MHAs who sought re-election two were unopposed,
a further thirty-nine were successful and only three out of twelve Europeans
were returned. This turnover rate was similar to that of 1968 when halfthe
incumbents were defeated. Europeans were rejected by voters for a number
of reasons which include a growing confidence in Papua New Guineans'
abilities to operate the legislature; a failure by European members to gain
substantial material rewards for their electorates; and a failure to be seen
by their constituents. The latter reason applies particularly to defeated
indigenous MHAs who failed to report to their electors. One of the six
Ministerial Members and five of the eight assistant Ministerial Members
who contested the election were defeated. The assistant Ministerial Members
had neither the power and status nor the financial support of their senior
colleagues and because of the time which they were required to spend in
Port Moresby, were consequently disadvantaged. There were eleven
members returned to the House for the third time (including John Guise who
had been elected to the Legislative Council in 1961, and awarded the degree
of Doctor of Laws, honoris causa by the University of Papua New Guinea
in 1970). Their leadership talents range from supernatural or charismatic
appeal to very skilful and careful use of existing groups and institutions
within their electorates.
Political parties had endorsed and given help to at least 150 candidates
but the campaign methods and the extent to which these candidates acted
as "party men" varied considerably. The Pangu pati was organised in the
East Sepik and Morobe districts and in the towns of Port Moresby, Lae and
Madang. It claimed a number of sympathisers throughout the country.
Pangu's pre-selected candidates were issued leaflets with photographs on
one side and major policy points on the reverse. These policies, the first of
which was a demand for immediate self-government ("Pangu i laikim selp
gavman nau tasol"), were discussed at branch and village meetings called
to hear the candidate's campaign talks as he moved through the electorate.
Pangu candidates generally had realised the advantage of walking through
the electorate, being seen by the people and utilising branches and campaign
organisers. The United party was best organised in Port Moresby and
throughout much of the Highlands- particularly in the Eastern Highlands.
United party (UP) candidates were often recruited after nominations had
closed and leaflets prepared for them. Party caps, T-shirts and newspapers
were distributed in thousands but their effect on voting intention was
minimal. The UP ran an expensive advertising campaign emphasising the
encouragement of overseas investment for development, the protection of life
January-Apri/1972
153
and property by a strengthened police force, and slow progress towards selfgovernment. The UP claimed that most Highlands candidates and many
throughout the country were sympathetic and would join the party if elected.
In mid-January UP member Bill Fielding confidently predicted in a radio
broadcast that his party would win sixty seats, form a government and have
Tei Abal as Chief Minister.
The People's Progress party nominated twenty-nine candidates, but, apart
from occasional assistance from a sitting member, they campaigned as
individuals. The New Guinea National party had two candidates- Thomas
Kavali (MHA Jimi) and Paul Pora, an economics graduate - who
campaigned openly as party members in the Highlands, but there were a
number of sympathisers who also stood. The Mataungan Association ran a
well organised campaign for the four Gazelle electorates and the Napidakoe
Navitu on Bougainville supported three winning candidates.
The impact of political parties on this election was substantial. Although
there were very few direct contests between the parties, their activities
throughout the country spread the concept of organisation as a criterion for
electoral success, they injected issues into the campaigns and they provided
a political orientation for candidates and members. During the campaign it
was reported that the UP had launched an appeal for $100,000 both to
finance their campaign and to establish a central organisation. About
$70,000 of that amount had been raised by April when the results became
known. Costs may well have been in excess of that figure if such things as
the loan of aeroplanes for party leaders to tour other electorates is taken
into account. The Pangu pati's expenses were estimated at just over $4,000
with candidates contributing additional amounts to their own campaign
funds. In December 1971, Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd, had offered Pangu,
UP and the PPP a campaign donation of $3,000 each. After the election in
the "Letters" page of the Post-Courier there was a short exchange as to the
source of funds between John Middleton, Michael Somare and Josephine
Abaijah - the first woman to be elected to the legislature.
Polling was held from 19 February to 11 March during the wet season
and was observed by a United Nations' mission. There were a few incidents
worth reporting. On the Gazelle Peninsula District Commissioner Carey was
apprehensive that voters would be intimidated and he urged Tolais to vote
without assistance from others. Somare protested that a patrol officer in the
East Sepik had "interfered" in the campaign and he successfully sought the
man's removal from the area. In late January the Chief Electoral Officer,
Simon Kaumi, flew to the Sepik to investigate reports that voters were
moving into the Yangoru-Saussia electorate hoping to vote for the cargo cult
leader Matthias Yaliwan. 1 Yaliwan was later elected. In the Morobe Regional
electorate a candidate who had failed in Pangu's pre-selection and then
accepted UP nomination tried to withdraw from the election. 2 In
Kairuku-Hiri in the Central District a ballot box containing sixty votes was
lost in a creek. The seat was later won by sixty votes and subsequently a
protest was made to the Court of Disputed Returns. And with exquisite
timing a political education booklet outlining the policies of the three main
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David Hegarty
political parties arrived in the electorates only days before polling began.
Voters elected younger and better educated members than were elected
in 1968. 3 The average age of MHAs has fallen from forty-one in 1968 to
thirty-five in 1972. The percentage of indigenous Open MHAs with no
formal education has fallen from forty-two per cent to thirty per cent. The
percentage of those with some primary education has risen from twentyfive per cent to thirty-six per cent, and there has been a small increase in
those Open members with a post-primary education of some type. When
the fourteen Papua New Guinean Regional members and the nine Europeans
are added the members of the House constitute an elite group.
In terms of occupation close to forty per cent of MHAs are classified as
businessmen (planters, traders, farmers, store-owners, etc.), about thirty per
cent as government officials (interpreters, clerks, senior officials), and about
seventeen per cent as school teachers. There were also eight managers and
supervisors, two party secretaries, one priest and one pastor, one politician
and one domestic servant elected to the House. Most of these MHAs had
varying degrees of political experience and, apart from those with previous
experience in the legislature, the seventeen or so who had had organisational
experience in trade unions, workers' associations, or political parties are
worth noting.
When the election results were known in March no party had a
majority, but the United party with about forty members was expected to
form the government. The Acting Administrator, A.P.J. Newman, rather
clumsily represented the idea which had been floated in 1971 by the
Administrator, L.W. Johnson, and the Administrator's Executive Council
spokesman, Tom Leahy, that all parties should join in a "grand coalition"
government. Pangu's national president, Gavera Rea, who had won the
Moresby Coastal seat quickly rejected a coalition with the UP. 4 The five
weeks which followed provided a fascinating scenario for students of the
strategy of lobbying. First the UP then Pangu claimed majorities in the
House. At one stage the numbers claimed by parties totalled fifteen more
than there were members. Defeated UP members and particularly the
Europeans Leahy, Lussick, Buchanan and Fielding lobbied uncommitted
MHAs and approached PPP leader Julius Chan for support. Somare also
visited Chan but most lobbying of other members was done by Pangu
supporters within the areas concerned. In the days before the first session
of the House on 20 April, Somare seized the initiative and announced that
Pangu together with like minded groups and individuals could form a
majority and if the PPP joined them they would have a certain majority.
Pangu's tactic had been to hold meetings entirely conducted by Papua New
Guineans with its only European member, Barry Holloway (Eastern
Highlands Regional) sitting quietly in the background. The UP took a block
booking at the Salvation Army hostel at Koki in an attempt to maintain
solidarity. The PPP was under pressure from both parties and its own
members were divided. Late on the night ofWednesday, 19 April, however,
Chan announced that all ten members of his party would join the National
Coalition.
January-April1972
155
First Session of the House

The National Coalition led by Somare, Guise, Chan and Kavali entered its
first session of the House uncertain that it could hold the members of these
disparate groups together. The seats within the legislature were arranged in
alphabetical order according to electorates. It was thought that this together
with new members' unfamiliarity with procedure might cause sufficient
confusion to deprive the coalition of its majority. In the ballot for the Speaker,
however, Perry Kwan, a mixed-race Chinese and member for Kavieng,
defeated the UP candidate Matthias Toliman by forty-nine votes to fortyeight. Toliman had been approached several times by coalition leaders to
stand for the Speakership but he had refused. The Governor-General's
opening address to the House provided only a brief and almost irrelevant
interlude to the intense politicking. Toliman stood for the position of
Chairman of Committees but was again defeated, fifty votes to forty-seven,
this time by Iambakey Okuk. Probably the most important division of the
day was that over the Ministerial Nominations Committee. This committee,
a relic of 1968 when only one small party existed, required seven members
to consult with the_ Administrator on the composition ofthe ministry. It was
thought that a representative committee might be necessary for the House
to agree to it. However, after some confusion over procedure, Coalition
leaders were elected in the ensuing ballot by fifty votes to forty-two.
Tension mounted throughout the next week and climaxed on the third
sitting day, Wednesday, 26 April. Somare moved the suspension of standing
orders so that he could name his ministry. Tei Abal objected on the grounds
that it would negate a motion by Paul Langro (who left Pangu late in 1971
and joined the UP in April) which called for members to consult their
constituents on the question of immediate self-government before the
appointment of ministers. The inexperienced Speaker overruled the
objection as well as a motion of dissent by Neville and called for the "yes"
vote neglecting to call for the "noes". The confused and angry scenes which
followed in which Langro protested that members might as well be given
their tickets so that they could return home, s were abated only by a hasty
adjournment of the House. On its resumption Somare withdrew his motion
and the debate on the Langro motion proceeded. UP speakers attacked the
coalition as a giaman (false) government, and claimed that it was
unrepresentative of the people's wishes; that it was hastily formed, that it
had persuaded some Highlands members to join it on the promise of power
and wealth and that it was potentially unstable. There was an air of
incredulity in many speeches that the "biggest" party was somehow no
longer part of the government. These attacks were answered by coalition
members John Kaputin and Paulus Arek who pointed out that members
should accept the majority rule principle and that if they didn't know the
opinions of their people so soon after an election they were wasting their
time. After seven speakers the motion was put and defeated by fifty-four
votes to forty-two. The UP had, however, made its point that business was
not to be rushed through the House without debate. John Maneke (PPP) then
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David Hegarty
moved that formal recognition and status be accorded the Leader of the
Opposition.
Ministries were allocated in the following manner:
Pangu
Michael Somare (Deputy Chairman of AEC)
Paul Lapun (Mines)
Ebia Olewale (Education)
Albert Maori Kiki (Lands)
Gavera Rea (Labour)
Reuben Taureka (Health)
Boyamo Sali (Local Government)
Coalition Members
John Guise (Interior)
Paulus Arek (Information & Extension Services)
New Guinea National party
Thomas Kavali (Works)
Iambakey Okuk (Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries)
Sasakila Moses (Forests)
Kaibelt Diria (Posts & Telegraphs)
People's Progress party
Julius Chan (Internal Finance)
Donatus Mola (Business Development)
John Poe (Trade & Industry)
Bruce Jephcott (Transport)
A regional breakdown of these ministries showed Papuan Coastal six,

New Guinea Coast four, New Guinea Islands three, and Highlands four.
The actual number of members belonging to the parties was a little uncertain.
A reasonable estimate showed Pangu twenty-four, PPP eleven, National Party
seven, Mataungan Association three, Coalition supporters twelve, and the UP
forty-two. The elections, therefore, had returned a new style of politician to the
House of Assembly. They had produced a group willing to accept the
responsibility of leading the country to self-government and independence. If
maiden speeches are any guide the mood and orientation of the House contrasts
quite sharply with that of its predecessor. Josephine Abaijah, Fr John Momis,
Tony Ila, Iambakey Okuk and many others showed clear recognition of the
problems of neo-colonialism, of disunity and instability, and of the stresses of
rapid economic and social change which confront the country. It was John
Kaputin who reminded his colleagues that there were more important tasks than
"playing around with political marbles in the ring which has been made for us".
New Minister
On 2 January the Australian Prime Minister, William McMahon, announced
the replacement of the Minister for External Territories, C.E. Barnes, by
the former Army Minister, Andrew Peacock. Most Australian editorialists
-some of whom had years previously called for Barnes' resignation- noted
January-Apri/1972
157
that a young and vigorous minister was required for such a sensitive position.
Peacock, warned by his colleagues about the potential embarrassment of a
difficult portfolio, immediately set about creating a favourable impression
in Papua New Guinea. In the first five weeks of office he visited the country
four times and held talks with administrators, politicians, business
representatives, and university students and staff. His approach to
decolonisation appeared to be more realistic and to embrace a wider
perspective than that of his predecessor. In terms of policy Peacock has
shown a willingness to take the initiative in advancing Papua New Guinea
to self-government. He was hopeful, as was the Administrator, that the
government would not be composed totally of conservatives. He insisted
that the new government and its ministers accept the responsibility for their
decisions. In a speech to a Liberal party conference in Brisbane he said "We
believe the best way for people in government to learn the skills of
government is actually to practise them" .6 (Albert Maori Kiki, Pangu's
secretary, had been preaching the same theme for years.) The Australian
government should not wait for self-government to happen, the Minister
said; rather it should actively encourage a desire for self-government; it
should prepare a programme of legislative and administrative actions; and
it should intensify public service training programmes. The new minister
also seemed prepared to recognise that the form of government adopted
would eventually be moulded by those Papua New Guineans with "a
fundamental understanding ofthe fabric of life in Papua New Guinea". 7 In
mid-February a position was created in the Administrator's Department (at
First Assistant Secretary level) to advise the Papua New Guinea government
on a programme of legislative and administrative actions relating to the
attainment of self-government and to the evolution of a constitution. The
officer- a former university Lecturer in Law- was given the enormous task
of liaising with the Commonwealth government, of implementing the
han dover programme, of continually assessing the situation and of advising
on further desirable action. He was to be responsible through the
Administrator to the Deputy Chairman of the Administrator's Executive
Council, but where conflicts of interest arose between the governments of
Australia and Papua New Guinea he was to side with the latter. In effect he
has become the National Coalition's adviser on the transfer of power. To
hasten the public service training programme the Australian School of
Pacific Administration in Sydney accepted ninety Papua New Guineans for
a special course in administration.
In other areas Peacock showed a welcome appreciation of some of the
anxieties and problems confronting the country. In speaking to both Papua
New Guinean and Australian audiences he has stressed that large-scale
Australian aid would be continued; advised that foreign relations other than
those with Australia should soon be developed; and warned that, in the light
of African experience, independence should be anticipated very soon after
self-government. Criticism of the minister, however, will likely revolve
around the apparent lack of a coherent economic development strategy for
the country. The only focus in this area so far has been on the need for
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David Hegarty
unimpeded importation of foreign capital; the establishment of a new

currency and banking arrangements; and an employment security scheme
for expatriate public servants.
Barnes, who had held the portfolio of Territories since December 1963,
was complimented by Country party leader, Doug Anthony, for his
"significant contribution" to the people of Papua New Guinea. Oscar
Tammur (MHA Kokopo) thought quite the opposite and accused Barnes of
having instituted policies without regard for the customs of the people, and
of now retreating from his "blunders". 8 In the Encyclopaedia of Papua and
New Guinea Barnes' biographical notes were recorded in six lines: no
mention was made of his policies. 9
Other Matters
Falling world prices in copra and over-production of coffee caused concern
among rural interest groups. The copra bounty paid to growers by the Copra
Industry Stabilisation Board was increased from $3 per ton in December
1971, to $30 per ton in February 1972 so that a minimum price of $125 per
ton was maintained. 10 The Coffee Marketing Board has decided to maintain
its relationship with Australia whereby, under the International Coffee
Agreement, it exports the amount which Australia imports from other
countries. Two university economists criticised the suggestion of coffee
production subsidies and urged a rationalisation of the industry. The
Marketing Board, they argued, should be representative of all sectors of the
industry and it should be the sole ratifier of all sales. If necessary the
Administration should introduce controls and compensate growers for
reducing production rather than encourage further growing. 11 An economist
also drew attention to the difficulty of assessing the general state of the
economy because of lack of information on the balance-of-payments
position and of public information on private and corporate capital flow
between Papua New Guinea and Australia. He suggested that a separate
currency was an immediate priority; that a form of profit control through a
declared list of goods should be enforced; and that the taxation system
needed simplification. 12 In the field of mining, Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd
reached agreement with Japanese importers on cutbacks in supply, and
Kennecott Pty Ltd presented proposals to the Administration for the
"possible future development" of the Ok Tedi area in western Papua. 13
Reforms of the legal system have recently been initiated. An officer in
the Department of Law has been engaged in updating terminology and
making the law more relevant to the particular needs of Papua New Guinea.
Work has proceeded on summary offences and on the reception of the
common law. Professor R.S. O'Regan in his inaugural lecture at the
University of Papua New Guinea proposed three reforms which would make
the law more relevant. He advocated the appointment oflocal assessors; the
abandonment of the current rules relating to the admissibility of confessions;
and the limitation of the accused's right to remain silent at his trial, all of
which are bound to create controversy. An interesting example of the clash
January-Apri/1972
159
between customary and introduced law occurred in Mount Hagen in

February when a European planter, Peter Howard, paid out $1,000 and four
bulls to a clan in compensation for the death of a clansman in a motor
accident. Howard had been earlier acquitted on a charge of manslaughter.
Finally, two items of historical interest; one a loss and one a gain to Papua
New Guinea. In January and February officers from the Commonwealth
archives removed files and records which were "essentially Australian" from
various government departments so that "Australia's record of its
stewardship" would be complete. On 27 March the Encyclopaedia of Papua
and New Guinea, "the first edition of the first fully compendius work of
reference on the world's second largest island" was launched in Port
Moresby.
17
MAY-AUGUST 1972
David Hegarty
In its first four months in office the National Coalition government led by
Chief Minister Michael Somare, set out to establish control over the machinery
of government and to bring some degree of popular acceptance. It was not
an easy task for the inheritors of the colonial political system. Bureaucratic
structures and personnel oriented towards the achievement of colonial
policies, subordination of politicians to administrators, a low level of integration,
and an externally dominated economy are legacies which make the task of
a nationalist government difficult indeed. The task is made even more
difficult when the metropole-colony relationships have been so close as to
inhibit policy decisions being made within the colonial administration; when
the incoming government is a coalition of parties with neither common cause
nor ideology; and when the government faces significant opposition from
one region of the country on such an emotional issue as self-government.
By the end of August, however, the Coalition was still intact and had
slightly increased its majority in the House of Assembly; most ministers
had established working relationships with their departments and appeared
more confident about their decision-making role; an Office of the Chief
Minister had been created; the complex process of transferring power from
Australia proceeded by a round of constitutional talks; and an all-party
Constitutional Planning Committee had been established to recommend a
constitution. Inevitably, as ideas for policy on economic development,
foreign investment and the structure of the public service were tloated,
tensions began to appear and pressure from interest groups mounted.
Opposition
The challenge to the credibility of the National Coalition launched in the

April session of the House of Assembly continued. Most Highlands MHAs
who had joined the government faced criticism within their electorates. Early
in May, Kaibelt Diria- the former Assistant Ministerial Member for Local
Government and United party member who had joined the Coalition after
the elections - defended his decision at a meeting of the Wahgi Local
Government Council. 1 Diria claimed that he was not bound to the United
party for it had supported other candidates in his electorate and, besides,
May-August 1972
161
there was more value in being "with" the government than against it. At
Kundiawa in the Chimbu District, a demonstration of 300 against the
Highlands members of the Coalition was led by United party leader Sinake
Giregire. Posters carried by the crowd proclaimed that self-government
should not be attained before 1978. The following day Somare announced
that "death threats" had been made against Highlands members. 2 A second
demonstration of 10,000 planned by the United party for Kundiawa on 20
May did not materialise. Instead Iambakey Okuk - Chimbu Regional and
Minister for Agriculture - who had returned to Kundiawa to answer his
critics held his own meeting of 2,000 people. Okuk, guarded by police and
a riot squad, warned expatriates and defeated United party candidates that
they would face charges if they continued to stir up opposition to the
Coalition.
In the June session of the House Highlands MHAs returned to the fray.
A matter of public importance- the "reaction of many highlands people to
the prospect of early self-government under the National Coalition
government and the consequent threat to the well-being of people from other
parts of Papua New Guinea working in the Highlands" 3 - was raised by Tei
Abal. Accusations of hypocrisy were made from both sides of the House
with United party speakers emphasising that the opinion of the people as
surveyed by the Select Committee on Constitutional Development should
be respected, and National party speakers urging members both to educate
and to lead their electors. The implications of the second part of the matter
were left unstated.
At the United Nations in early June, Anton Parao- Western Highlands
Regional, and United party secretary who had been invited to join the annual
delegation to the UN - again attacked the Coalition. He claimed that the
Coalition was improperly formed (because members had been persuaded
to join!), that it was non-representative of the country and that it was being
pushed too quickly towards self-government. There was, of course, a
considerable amount of post-election "sour grapes" in all this, but important
also is the "fear" of self-government whether it be a manifestation of
dependence or a regionalist political delaying tactic. If one wanted to know
what self-government actually meant to the people these debates, despite
their bitterness, were not particularly enlightening.
The Ministers
The Chief Minister's initial approach to his role as leader of an embryonic
nation was understandably one of caution. When interviewed on ABC
television in Australia on 8 May on the major problems and future policies
of his government his replies were either vague or guarded. Somare
reiterated his personal belief in immediate self-government but because of
coalition politics and his desire to win some consensus on the issue he
indicated that towards the end of 1973 would be a suitable target. On the
question of separatist movements Somare was quite optimistic: "I've found
that once you involve people in a system, when they feel that they're part of
162
David Hegarty
the system, it's very difficult for them to separate themselves" .4 He thought
that some degree of regional autonomy was also desirable. The
parliamentary system may need some modification, particularly because of
a lack of party solidarity, but in other respects it was working satisfactorily.
Government policy would be to encourage foreign investment but Papua
New Guineans must share in the ownership of industry and be employed
by these new industries. The familiar question of future relations with Japan
was asked and the usual answer given: that is, Japanese investment and trade
would be encouraged but that all investment would be carefully looked at.
Somare has enjoyed using Japan as a political lever in the past but now that
power is at stake there may be little political capital left in the tactic.
On his tour of the Highlands in the first week of July Somare continued
to play a soft-line on self-government. He emphasised that Papua New
Guinea must be prepared for self-government should the ALP win the 1972
Australian election. A second theme which he pushed at every meeting was
more positive: "You should not fear self-government. It will not bring a
wholesale exodus of the white man and his possessions nor will it plunge
us into chaos; it will bring the day when Papuans and New Guineans elected
by their people will make the decisions that are in the interests of their
people."5 Somare met opposition from councillors and leaders in the Western
Highlands at Laiagam and at Baiyer River but in Mount Hagen, the Wahgi
and Jimi valleys he received support. At meetings arranged with public
servants and school students he suggested that a one-party system of
government might be more appropriate than that of government and
opposition. European planters and businessmen were told that they must
involve more Papua New Guineans in their enterprises if they wanted to
avoid the chaos so many of them had predicted. Journalists travelling with
the Chief Minister reported that he "won respect with his proud demeanour,
willingness to listen and refusal to be overawed by the most bitter
denunciations of his policies", 6 and that his tour was a personal success.
There is no doubting Somare's skill as a leader but it is a mistaken view of
New Guinea politics to expect grand triumphant tours throughout the
country. It was certainly a new experience for the people to see a black
politician receive so much attention from the kiaps. Support and success,
however, do not depend on mass appeal, but on mutual trust and close ties
with local leaders and opinion makers and utilisation of their networks.
On 19 June it was announced that an Office of the Chief Minister had
been established. It includes the Secretariat of the Administrator's Executive
Council, a ministerial services branch, and a political development branch
which is responsible for planning and implementing constitutional
development policy and political education. 7 Eventually the office will
acquire most of the functions of the present Administrator's Department
including the division of District Administration. In speaking to the District
Commissioners' conference in July Somare indicated that the Department of
District Administration would come under his control in 1973. He expected
that field administration would continue to be a vital part of the government
but that cooperation was essential; attitudes would have to change, and
May-August 1972
163
officers would need to be "sensitive to the feelings and aspirations of the

political leaders representing both central and local government in the
field". 8 In the absence of political parties with substantial grass-roots
organisation, field administration could in future become much more
important than most people think.
The office is headed by Paul Ryan who was formerly a patrol officer and
secretary to the Administrator's Executive Council. His staff includes three
local graduates: Leo Morgan who is in charge of ministerial services, John
Noel in general administration, and Alexis Sarei who represents the Chief
Minister on interdepartmental committees and on the Gazelle negotiations.
Somare has a personal staff of four - a personal secretary, stenographer,
press secretary and research officer. The research officer is former MHA
and university tutor Tony Voutas. One of the major functions of the office
is to coordinate policy. Previously coordinating machinery had been
relatively weak- consisting of meetings of departmental heads and later of
meetings organised by the Administrator's Executive Council. The absence
of a colonial secretariat which could have been inherited and the relative
junior status of the office of the Chief Minister has tended to make its task
of coordination difficult.
The research section attempts to feed in alternatives and options on a
range of policies. Its role in this situation has been brought about largely as
a result of the general suspicion which many ministers and politicians have
of colonial departments and partly as an attempt to compensate for
inadequate policy-making machinery and personnel within individual
departments. It is a difficult role to play and one which invites the accusation
of "dualism", and of lack of faith in ministers. Some restructuring of the
public service may alleviate this particular problem. An important problem
which the office has begun to grapple with is that of involving more Papua
New Guineans in the policy-making process.
Other ministers used the first few months in office as a period of "settling
in" but they too faced a wide range of problems. Probably their key difficulty
was to prevent "absorption" by their departments. Some Pangu party
members have already expressed their dismay at how neatly some of the
ministers have fitted into the roles of their predecessors. Each minister was
entitled to a personal staff of two but most found difficulty in recruiting
committed and competent secretaries and had to rely on department
appointees. It was not easy for ministers to sort out just what power they
had and for them to decide how much control they should exercise. 9
Departmental heads themselves had to adjust from being the political,
administrative and policy head of a colonial department to one in which there
was now a political boss who required more than just consultation. Briefing
a minister and proposing policy options was a new experience for these
administrators and the adjustment appears not to have been entirely
satisfactory. There were, of course, the inevitable rumours of personality
clashes between minister and heads of departments. Rather indicative of the
changed political and constitutional situation is that no comparable "code
of ethics" as issued to ministerial members in the last House was issued to
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David Hegarty
these ministers.
Some ministers stepped quickly into their new roles. Albert Maori Kiki
(Lands), for example, insisted that a tourist development company return
half of the island of Wuvulu to the people if the company wanted to develop
the area as a luxury resort. Dr John Guise (Interior) made it clear that
bureaucratic slowness and non-cooperation would not be tolerated. Ebia
Olewale (Education) despite encountering in his own electorate, disbelief
that a black man could be an important man in the government, suggested
a post-primary vocational training programme to alleviate the problem of
so-called school drop-outs. Julius Chan (Internal Finance) quickly
established a working relationship with the Treasurer, Harry Ritchie, who
had recently been recruited from the Fijian civil service.
Towards Policy
For six years the Waigani Seminar held at the university has opened up
debate on such development problems as land, education, population,
agriculture, politics and administration. It was particularly appropriate that
the sixth Waigani Seminar held in the first week of May at the time the
National Coalition came to power had as its theme, "priorities in Melanesian
development". Speakers raised numerous policy questions which in the past
would have been considered "academic" but which now are the subject of
serious government attention. Topics discussed included types of
constitutions; the suitability of the Westminster system; educational
priorities and the nature of the educational system; local government,
political education and community development; foreign investment and the
role of multi-national corporations; and problems of national identity. The
three international speakers were Dr Ivan Illich, Lloyd Best (a West Indian
economist), and Professor Rene Dumont, all of whom challenged the
meaning of the term development and raised doubts in the minds of most
participants about the relevance of the "private car" civilisation for Papua
New Guinea. It was Professor Dumont who set the stage for an exciting
seminar by immediately attacking the view of economic development
proposed in the opening address by the Minister for External Territories,
Andrew Peacock. Professor Dumom criticised the government's policy for
deliberately attempting to create a class society and for neglecting research
into food crops and import replacement schemes. He reminded his audience
that in no country did the rich look after the poor and that a policy of selfreliance was the only sure way of a country retaining its pride. As the fourth
Waigani Seminar in 1970 had signified 'l break-through in the development
of nationalist politics, 10 the sixth Waigani Seminar threw down a challenge
to conventional notions of development as put forward by colonial
economists.
Perhaps the largest question facing the Coalition was that of the nature
of the second Economic Development Programme. The first programme to
cover the period 1968-69 to 1972-73 was designed to maximise, in the short
run, gross national income largely by importing foreign skill and capital.
May-August 1972
165
The programme aroused a small debate with critics emphasising that it was
more a series of projections than a plan and that indigenous participation
amounted only to "tokenism" .11 In 1971 the programme was revised largely
to take into account the impact of the Bougainville Copper Project, and, an
Office of Programming and Coordination (OPC) was established. 12 It was
hoped that one of the purposes of the Office would be to involve ministerial
members more closely in the planning process. The philosophy of the
programme bears fairly heavily the stamp of the Director of OPC, Bill
McCasker, who acts as chief economic adviser to the government. It became
obvious that the new ministry and members were not in sympathy with the
aims of the first programme. An OPC White Paper entitled "Programmes
for Development - Principles, Choices and Priorities" designed to elicit
some discussion and direction from MHAs met with a fairly hostile
reaction. 13 The chairman of the House of Assembly Economic Development
Committee, Dennis Young (Milne Bay Regional), was quite explicit in his
rejection of former policy in advocating a policy of self-sufficiency, of rural
development, and of indigenous control of the economy. He hoped that the
House would "Tell Mr McCasker that this is not part of Australia, it is not
part of England, it is not part of America- it is Papua New Guinea" in which
the economy should be based on the villages. 14
In August the draft version of the UNDP report on strategies for the
second Development Programme was leaked to the press. The "Faber
Report" as it became known, after its chairman Professor M.L.O. Faber,
recommended a marked change in emphasis from that of the first
programme. Localisation or indigenisation of the economy should be
stressed rather than growth defined in terms of the rate of increase of gross
monetary sector product. A rural vitalisation programme should be
undertaken; small-scale artisan and service activities should be encouraged;
major projects requiring foreign capital should be undertaken only if
appropriate terms were negotiated. The report was labelled "socialist" by
its Administration critics but its general philosophy of self-sufficiency,
reduction of social and economic inequalities and economic control in the
hands of nationalists captured the imagination of many Cabinet and private
members. Young's committee was later to endorse these proposals.
The government expects the final version of the report in November. If
adopted it may necessitate a recasting of the economic management
machinery and will require constant dialogue and good relations between
planners, senior politicians and administrators. Academic economists,
research institutes and administration departments have been invited to
submit ideas on future economic management for the country.
Another part of the economic infrastructure which the government has
inherited is the Papua New Guinea Investment Corporation. The Corporation
with a total capital of $6 million was established to hold equities in
"existing, substantial, viable operations in the Territory and those which are
significant employers of native or local labour", and at a later stage to sell
shares (unit trusts) to Papua New Guineans. So far investments of twenty
per cent or more have been made in the predominantly Australian oriented
166
David Hegarty
firms of Commonwealth and New Guinea Timbers, Burns Philp, Australia

and New Guinea Holdings and a million $1 shares have been taken up in
Bougainville Copper. An obvious line of criticism of the Corporation is that
it does little to increase the government's control of the economy; that it is
not a development corporation aiming at diversifying industry, and that it
facilitates the removal of capital from the country. The Corporation's
investments in colonial companies may be sound finance, but one would
have thought that they were poor politics.
Control over foreign affairs and defence is not likely to be transferred to
the government until independence. Small administration units have been
created, however, to facilitate that transfer. The international affairs branch
of the Administrator's Department which has previously been concerned
only with hospitality functions and with servicing the annual United Nations
delegatiOn has been recruiting university graduates and "suitable nongraduates" for diplomatic training. So far four graduates and three nongraduates have undergone the initial training period of six months in Port
Moresby and six months in Canberra with the Foreign Affairs section, and
are now spending six months attached to an overseas Australian embassy.
There may be some significance in the placement of these trainees: Jakarta,
Brussels, New York, Geneva, Nairobi, Bangkok and Tokyo.
A small defence section is to be established late in the year in the
Administrator's Department to liaise between the Joint Force Commander
(established early in 1972) and the spokesman for defence in the House of
Assembly. Despite the frequency of questions (particularly by visitors to
the country) about the role of the army, politicians appear to have put little
thought into defence policy. The Australian Minister for Defence, D.E.
Fairbairn, on a visit in mid-June called for a "continuing and growing
exchange of views between senior Australian Defence authorities and the
Papua New Guinea authorities on Papua New Guinea defence matters". 15
At the moment those responsible for Papua New Guinea defence matters
are Australian military personnel and the Australian Cabinet. 16
The problem of Papua New Guinea's relations with her neighbours,
however, has arisen prior to independence. The position of the Queensland
border only several hundred yards offshore from the Western District has
been a source of discontent, particularly for Ebia Olewale. Olewale (South
Fly) has demanded that the border be taken south to IO_latitude. This would
add several small Torres Strait islands and a number of fishing reefs to Papua
New Guinea's territorial waters. Olewale was supported by Australian
Opposition leader, Gough Whitlam, who said that the border problem should
be resolved before independence and before it becomes an international
issueY Queensland Premier, Job Bjelke-Peterson, however, in the middle
of a state election campaign, was adamant that the border would not be
negotiated. Torres Strait Islanders are Australian citizens and must continue
to enjoy the beneficence of the Australian and Queensland governments. A
writer in the Brisbane Courier-Mail supported the Premier's stand for, on a
visit to these islands, he found the people "friendly and hospitable; patriotic
to Queensland, Australia and the Crown" .18 The Commonwealth government
May-August 1972
167
which has been unable to resolve its own stance on offshore rights was hardly
in a position to take action.
Periodic clashes on the West Irian border between Indonesian troops and
West Irian "freedom fighters" 19 and a small stream of West Irianese
requesting permissive residence continue to pose problems for the
government. A minor controversy arose in mid-August when Somare
contradicted the grounds offered by the Administrator for the deportation
of eight West Irianese. Somare said that "criminals, spies or those using
Papua New Guinea as a base for operations against Indonesian authorities"
would not be granted permissive residency. 20 The Administrator had
previously said that the deportees were not connected with the Free Papua
Movement but were being deported because they could not satisfy the
conditions of permissive residency and that they would not face persecution
on their return to West Irian. In Jakarta, the Indonesian Foreign Minister,
Dr Malik, widened the perspective on the problem by suggesting that
relations would become difficult if Papua New Guinea were to progress
politically and economically far in advance of West Irian. 21
On the eastern front Papua New Guinea's membership of the South
Pacific Forum - .a conference of Pacific leaders to afford "top-level
consultation and cooperation on the politicallevel" 22 - was opposed by Fiji
on the grounds that Papua New Guinea was not yet self-governing or
independent and may not be able to speak for itself. Fiji's objection was
understandable considering the size of Papua New Guinea in relation to the
other Pacific nations, but So mare was not amused at the implication of being
a "stooge". At a seminar held at the university on 17 and 18 June, several
ministers, including the Chief Minister, presented short papers on aspects
of a future foreign policy for Papua New Guinea. The ideas presented could
only be described as "pushes" towards policy but it was obvious that a
separate identity was of prime importance. An editorialist described the
papers as rather "cheerful anti-Australianism". 23
Constitutional Talks
To facilitate the transfer of power to Papua New Guinea, a "programme of
legislative and administrative actions" had been undertaken early in 1972.
In July and August a series of talks was held which involved Peacock,
Somare, Toliman (as Leader of the Opposition), Fr Momis (later to become
deputy chairman of the Constitutional Planning Committee) and most other
ministers. Somare indicated his intention to obtain final powers over as many
areas as possible and Peacock played along with the very familiar theme of
"developing at your own pace". Matthias Toliman announced that the
Opposition was not bound by any decisions of the conference. At the end
of the talks a list of powers to be transferred was agreed upon. 24 Somare
was to become spokesman on both defence and police matters, and he had
the power to create new ministries. The powers which have yet to be
transferred- for example trade, internal security and most importantly, the
public service- indicate that the constitutional stage reached is still that of
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David Hegarty
pre-self-government.
Prior to these talks a series of study groups composed of officials from
Canberra and Konedobu had prepared the background to those powers
transferred. After the talks a plethora of committees or study groups was
set up to prepare reports for Papua New Guinea ministers for the next round
of constitutional talks to be held in October. The groups were composed of
members of the Chief Minister's Office, officers from relevant departments
and academics from the university and the New Guinea Research Unit. Their
task was to recommend appropriate policy and strategy for the Papua New
Guinea government to pursue in the October negotiations. The use of these
groups was an interesting attempt at policy formulation. There were the
obvious difficulties: colonial administrators trying to wear new hats,
academics trying to shape policy without access to recent files and
mtormatwn, and the uncertainty of the shape of the second development
programme. The growth of these groups appears to have arisen from a desire
on the part of the Chief Minister's advisers to utilise all advice possible, to
find alternative approaches other than those produced by departments, and
to circumvent the considerable influence of personalities in the upper
echelons of the public service. The use of these groups raises the problem
of the politics and quality of advice obtained, and of the possible resentment
of outsiders by public servants. This may be, however, the first small step
towards reorienting the colonial Administration towards one designed to deal
with development problems.
Other Developments
In the House of Assembly the Coalition consolidated its position with

comparative ease. It can now count on a majority of about twenty on almost
every division. The Leader of the Opposition was recognised "as the chief
spokesman for the members of the House who are not allied politically with
the Ministers", 25 but not before Tei Abal objected to the use of the word
"opposition". The United party named its shadow ministry on 19 June. The
Speaker, Perry Kwan, resigned and was replaced by Barry Holloway
(Eastern Highlands Regional). 26 On 23 June a Constitutional Planning
Committee with wide terms of reference was announced.
There was some unrest among backbenchers; party meetings were
infrequent and members felt that ministers were ignoring them. Outside the
legislature parties appeared almost moribund, causing some observers to
reflect that parties may, after all, be largely a colonial phenomenon.
On the Gazelle Peninsula the Gazelle Local Government Council was
suspended and, following visits by a team from the Chief Minister's Office,
some progress was made towards a settlement ofthe long-lived dispute. The
"Emanuel trial" in Rabaul which had lasted five months at an estimated cost
of between $260,000 and $500,000, concluded on 21 June when Chief
Justice Minogue jailed five Tolais for periods of eighteen months to fourteen
years for the murder of the District CommissionerY In sentencing the men
the Chief Justice said that the significance of land in Tolai society and the
May-August 1972
169
frustration at what the Kabaira villagers conceived to be injustice were

sufficient extenuating circumstances for him not to apply harsher penalties.
Despite the importance of national level politics the credibility of the
government will ultimately be determined by its effectiveness at the local
level. Moves such as a village court system- designed to have an impact at
that level are under consideration.
18
David Hegarty
The performance of the National Coalition government in the last months

of 1972 may be characterised as one of caution and compromise. It was probably
inevitable that, given the nature ofthe coalition, the slow process offormulating
policy and of restructuring colonial institutions, and the continuing regional
disparities in development, compromise and concession should be the case.
This approach to government led to disenchantment among some of the
radicals in the country who desire more positive action, particularly on grassroots development, and did little to ease the uncertainty -both of nationals
and expatriates -which prevails during the transition to independence. There
were, however, significant achievements in the period under review. A target
date for self-government, 1 December 1973, "or as soon as possible thereafter,
was adopted by the House of Assembly; a Cor:.stitutiona! Planning
Committee began work on recommendadons for a constitution for a selfgoverning and later independent Papua New Guinea; government policy on
the size and shape of the public service was introduced; backbenchers
pushed the government into adopting a policy on future mining agreements;
and government aims on economic development were announced.
In June the Chief Minister, Michael Somare, proposed the formation of an
all-party Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) which would "make
recommendations for a constitution for full internal self-government in a
united Papua New Guinea, with a view to eventual independence".' In
making its recommendations the CPC would consider such matters as the
system of government, central, regional and local relations, relations with
Australia, control of the public service, an ombudsman, a bill of rights,
protection of minorities, citizenship and constitutional review. By September
the composition of the CPC was finalised with Sornare as ex-officio chairman
and Fr John Momis as deputy chairman. The government nominated seven
other members: the chairmen of the two previous Select Committees on
Constitutional Development, Dr John Guise and Paulus Arek, and two Pangu
members, one Mataungan, one PPP member and one National party
member. The United party, which was originally allocated five places on
171
the CPC was conceded one more when the CPC was approved by the House.
The permanent consultants to the CPC are Professor J.W. Davidson,
Professor of Pacific History at the Australian National University, who has
acted as constitutional adviser to Western Samoa, Nauru, the Cook Islands
and Micronesia; Dr David Stone, a Research Fellow in politics at the New
Guinea Research Unit who has had constitutional experience in the Cook
Islands; and Edward Wolfers, Lecturer in Political Science at Macquarie
University, who is well known to many MHAs through his research in
Papua New Guinea over the past five years. John Ley, legal counsel to the
House of Assembly, was appointed legal officer, and Seaea Avosa, an arts
graduate from the University of Papua New Guinea was appointed executive
officer. In November a Papua New Guinea law graduate from the University
of Sydney, Bernard Narakobi, was appointed as a fourth permanent
consultant. Two overseas constitutional authorities, Professor Ali Mazrui
ofMakerere University, Uganda, and ProfessorY.P. Ghai of the International
Legal Centre at the United Nations, are expected to consult with the CPC
in 1973.
Previously constitutional development had occurred either at the initiative
of the Commonwe.alth government or on the recommendations of the House
of Assembly's Select Committees on Constitutional Development whose
reports were rarely out of step with Canberra. Although still subject to the
Australian government's final approval, the CPC has almost complete
freedom of action and for the first time decisions affecting the constitutional
future of the country are to be made in the country and by its politicians.
The broad terms of reference of the CPC, however, posed a problem for the
government in that, should the government require any constitutional or
structural change it must either consult with the CPC or await its
recommendations. Political and administrative tensions generated during
this transition period might require the government to act unilaterally on
such matters as, for example, regional autonomy. The Minister for Local
Government, Boyamo Sali, has already opened a number of Area Authorities
which may be the forerunner to some form of district government. In the
short-term, however, the CPC was useful to the government for it helped
slow down the transfer of power by insisting on critical examination of each
proposal. During the discussions preceding the planned October round of
Constitutional Talks between the Minister for External Territories, Andrew
Peacock, and the Administrator's Executive Council, several ministers
expressed alarm at the pace at which they were acquiring power and at the
confusion over exactly in which areas they had final responsibility. The CPC,
faced with the possibilities of being pre-empted by seeing power transferred
to structures which it had not yet analysed, also became involved in the
preliminary discussions. The upshot was that the Constitutional Talks were
cancelled and a system of detailed consultations replaced them.
After preliminary talks to decide on the "substantive matters" to be
included in the recommendations for a constitution, the CPC made
arrangements to use the Government Liaison Branch of the Chief Minister's
Office, "as a channel of communication between the Committee and the
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David Hegarty
people" .2 The government Liaison Branch- formerly the Political Education

Branch - has an establishment of about forty officers whose task is to
establish "discussion groups" throughout the districts to channel
communications from the central government to the village people and to
facilitate "feed-back". The role of the branch has changed from that of
"explaining" to people alternative systems of government to one of
engendering confidence about self-government, but opinions are divided on
its utility. In mid-December the CPC issued statements requesting people
to comment on what relationships they thought were desirable between
central, regional and local levels of government; on how respect may be
maintained for traditional leaders; and on the qualifications people thought
desirable for Papua New Guinea citizenship. On this latter question the CPC
suggested that "dual citizenship" should not be permitted. The Committee's
practice of issuing a comment or suggestion before asking people's opinion
is a welcome change from that of the previous Constitutional Committees
and one which will probably be used throughout its deliberations.
Perhaps the most important problem facing the CPC is that of the
reconciliation of regional demands. The composition of the Committee
should ensure that those demands are fully articulated. Given that
independence constitutions do not frequently stand the test of time, the CPC
may be able to provide a transitional framework which can accommodate
the many centrifugal forces operating in Papua New Guinea at this point.
The issue of self-government appeared finally settled, at least for the
House of Assembly, when on 19 September the National Coalition
successfully moved that the House take note of a paper introduced by the
Chief Minister in the June session, which set out the government's timetable. After a long debate the target date of "1 December, 1973, or as soon
as possible thereafter" for full internal self-government was agreed to by
fifty-two votes to thirty-four. 3 Somare had explained that the addition of the
words "or as soon as possible thereafter" was necessary in case proposed
changes in legislation could not be prepared by that time. He defined full
internal self-government as that which left only power over defence and
external affairs with the Australian government. In an earlier speech he had
also referred to Australia's right to revoke the power over internal security
which was to be handed over at self-government. 4 The Opposition argued
that the people had not voted in favour of early self-government and that
the country was unprepared in terms of educated manpower to become selfgoverning. Paul Langro and Anton Parao injected a new line by arguing that
the type of government should be determined before the date was set. Parao
told the government that: "If you wish to obtain political power at this stage
you should ensure that all the administrative processes are workable." 5 In
the same speech Parao observed that because so few people understood what
self-government was about, he did not want to see "a white colonial
government handed to a black colonial government". 6 Other interesting
speeches in the debate included those of Damien ToKereku (East New
Britain Regional), a Mataungan leader, who called for a state government
for the Gazelle if members didn't want self-government, and of Josephine
173
Abaijah (Central Regional) who again attacked the Australian government

for wanting to get rid of its "colonial embarrassment" and for leaving Papua
"a destitute colony of the Trust Territory of New Guinea". 7
In reply, government speakers emphasised that it was time for Papua New
Guinea to make decisions; that the Australian Labor party would insist on
self-government; and that in reality with most decisions being made in Port
Moresby, the country was almost self-governing already. Somare changed
his call for a seventy-six per cent majority of MHAs to approve the target
date to that of a "substantial majority".
Public Service
One of the most significant changes which occurred during the period under
review was that in government policy on the size and composition of the
PNG public service. Early in September in an Information Paper to the
House of Assembly, the Public Service Board reviewed the steps which had
been taken since August 1971 to advance the localisation of the public
service. The measures taken to hasten localisation included the
establishment oflqcalisation committees in each department to identify local
officers with potential and to set target dates; the implementation of a
promotion scheme designed to give preference to "efficient local officers";
the establishment of a "Senior Executive Programme" for training for senior
posts; and the expansion of training facilities. The Information Paper,
however, did not clarify where the final responsibility for localisation lay.
The Public Service Board estimated that, even with high targets for
localisation in all divisions of the service and with an expansion rate of only
half that of the previous five years, there would still be a need for over 7,000
overseas officers in 1976 (overseas officers would then constitute an
estimated twenty-three per cent of a total service of 30,000 compared with
thirty-one percent of a total service of 25,500 in 1971 ).
Publication of the Board's document provoked the government into
framing new guidelines. During the budget debate the Opposition criticised
public service expense and Somare answered this on 26 September by
announcing a drastic change in public service policy. 8 The service would
not grow at anything like the rate projected by the Public Service Board;
expatriate numbers in the service would be reduced from 7,000 to 3,000
over a period of three and a half years; and the number of departments and
statutory corporations would also be reduced. These reductions were
necessary, So mare said- for Papua New Guinea could not afford to maintain
a service based on Australian lines - and it was time that Papua New
Guineans had more responsibility in the running of the country.
Somare further clarified his new policy by explaining that it was not
intended as a "purge" of overseas officers 9 but reductions would be achieved
by non-renewal of contracts and non-replacement of officers whose contracts
had expired and by a natural retirement rate; by reducing the number of
temporary employees; and by a compulsory retirement scheme which would
be utilised once the Employment Security Scheme was finalised. The
174
David Hegarty
reverberations of the new policy were a dominant feature of the final months
of 1972. The Public Service Board's Information Paper implied that
localisation would continue at a leisurely pace within the framework of
existing structures and policies, and it made clear that there were no plans
or procedures for reducing the expatriate content of the public service. The
new policy required that plans be produced immediately and the response
was a mechanical application of the targets suggested by Somare;
department heads were asked to recommend programmes for reducing their
expatriate staff by sixteen per cent per annum. A Cabinet sub-committee,
co-opting the chairman of the Public Service Board, was appointed to
oversee the reduction effort, assisted by an "officials committee" composed
largely of Papua New Guinean public servants.
The new policy also made it evident that there could be no further delay in
settling arrangements for employment security for expatriate public servants.
Failure of the Australian government to provide details of compensation for
officers displaced or localised or compulsorily retired had hampered the
development of an effective localisation programme for several years. In
1971 the Public Service Association of Papua New Guinea and the
Department of External Territories agreed on compensation terms, but these
were rejected by the Australian Cabinet and counter-proposals were
withdrawn in the face of opposition from the House of Assembly, supporting
the Public Service Association. After a further rejection by the Australian
Cabinet of terms satisfactory to the Public Service Association, the then
Minister for External Territories, Andrew Peacock, appointed a South
Australian businessman, A.M. Simpson, to inquire into the issue and formulate
new proposals. The Simpson Report, largely favourable to the Public Service
Association position, had been submitted at the time Somare announced the
new public service policy, and the report was accepted in principle by the
Australian government late in October 1972. In brief the report recommends:
1. The Australian government be responsible for payment of compensation
for loss of career, superannuation and repatriation expenses;
2. Permanent officers and contract officers employed by the Minister for
External Territories (i.e, excluding temporary appointments and secondees)
be deemed Commonwealth employees;
3. At either 1 December 1973 (or at an earlier transfer of public service
control), or at 30 June 1976 (or earlier independence), permanent officers may
voluntarily terminate their careers and receive compensation of three times
superannuation contributions at the first date or 4.2 times compensation at
the second; and
4. That there will be no compulsion for permanent officers to accept alterative
employment.'"
Anxiety and uncertainty among expatriate public servants, which had
been focused on compensation terms, turned to the localisation/reduction
programme and the letters columns of the Post-Courier were filled with dire
forecasts of a drastic reduction in efficiency, as well as sharper critiques of
175
the sixteen per cent "across the board" exercise.

The actual progress of high-level localisation did not radically change
during the first months of the new policy. But it was clear that the Board's
localisation targets in its Information Paper which included two or three
Heads of Departments and two or three District Commissioners by the end
of 1972 would be superseded. The Senior Executive Programme, after
several months of hesitation, was revived in a week-long October seminar
of the forty senior Papua New Guinean public servants, who proposed new
arrangements for their own future training and posting. The problems which
might arise during the process of high-level localisation were brought to
the fore when it was reported that the government intended to appoint a
senior indigenous kiap, Joseph Nombri (a founding member of the Pangu
pati), as understudy to the Commissioner of Police. The local police
association, strongly supported by expatriate police, protested vigorously
to both the Australian and Papua New Guinean governments and Nombri
was posted elsewhere.
In November the Public Service Board and the Public Service
Association reached agreement on wage increases for local public servants.
Substantial increases were granted to lower range public servants as a
flow-on from a decision by the Minimum Wages Board to increase the
minimum urban wage from $8.00 per week to $13.80 per week. The Public
Service Association agreed not to make further claims for another three
years unless the cost of living rose by more than ten per cent after
September 1973. This agreement followed soon after the government
established an interdepartmental committee to investigate incomes, wages
and prices policy.
Economic Policy
On 29 August, in the House of Assembly, the Minister for Internal Finance,
Julius Chan, brought down the budget for 1972-73. 11 Although this was the
first budget to be introduced by an elected MHA, it was one which the
National Coalition had little hand in preparing. Total expenditure for 197273 was estimated at $225 million - an increase of $23 million on that of
1971-72.
Revenue sources included the Commonwealth grant-in-aid of $30
million; the Commonwealth Development Grant of $48.5 million; general
loan raising $27 million; and international loans of $14.9 million. Internal
revenue was expected to increase by $10 million from that of 1971-72 to
$95 million. Additional internal revenue raising measures included increased
import duty on cars, tobacco and wines; the abolition of the "Personal
Allowance" taxation deduction of $572; a dividend withholding tax of fifteen
per cent; and minor increases in fees and charges relating to Customs, Lands
and Companies Ordinances. Papua New Guinea Treasury officials have been
handicapped over the years in that they have not been permitted to budget
for a deficit or accumulate a surplus. Their borrowing programme has been
related more to balancing the budget than to the country's capacity to repay
176
David Hegarty
loans.
A further difficulty which officials experienced in framing the 1972-73
Budget was that they had no knowledge of the amount of assistance available
from the Australian government unti119 July. As usual there was little public
reaction to the budget. The United party's opposition in the House amounted
only to criticism of the internal revenue raising measures. John Kaputin
criticised the protection of foreign interests implicit in the budget. In
November, Julius Chan and the Treasurer, Harry Ritchie, visited financial
institutions in Australia to seek investor support for the $27 million loan
programme. Press reports indicated that the minister would have difficulty
in raising the sum required. 12
The first outward signs of tension in the coalition arose over the adoption
of investment policy relating to mining. On an ABC current affairs
programme the Minister for Mines, Paul Lapun (South Bouga.iuvilh::), haJ
proffered his personal view that the Bougainville Copper Agreement was
not sufficiently beneficial to the country and that it might need to be renegotiated. Challenged by Ron Neville (Southern Highlands Regional) in
the House of Assembly about his view, Lapun reiterated that he thought it
was "proper to discuss re-negotiation of the agreement" .13
More concern was aroused, however, when on 27 September Fr John
Momis (Bougainville Regional) tabled a long private-member's motion,
without notice, on future mining ventures. 14 The preamble of the motion
called on the government to recognise that economic control was essential
to "self-determination and real political independence" and that investment
principles relating to mining ventures should be adopted. The list of thirteen
"principles" included a majority of equity in the project to be held by the
government; maximum employment of Papua New Guineans; employee
participation and decision-making in management; maximum participation
by Papua New Guineans in ancillary economic activity; government
purchase of equity to be paid out of future earnings of the mine; tax holidays
to be balanced against the country's need for revenue; and for the
government to recruit a specialist team to engage in the negotiation and
supervision of mining ventures. The section of the motion which caused
most controversy, however, read as follows: "(i) An Agreement setting up a
mining venture should make provision for its re-negotiation in the light of
changing circumstances and the acquisition of new knowledge."
The motion was attacked in the House and in the press for implying that
no future agreements would be considered binding and that potential
investment would not be forthcoming. (It was reported that within twelve
hours of Lapun's interview the Investment Corporation had been contacted
by a London stockbroker asking for confirmation that the Minister for Mines
had advocated mining re-negotiations.) One direct result of the motion was
that Bougainville Copper shares fell sharply on Australian Stock Exchanges.
The difficulty Chan had found in attracting investment in the loan
programme was also attributed to the Bougainvilleans' move. BCP and other
mining lobbyists were active and observers thought that this was an issue
over which the PPP might break with the coalition. 15
177
There was obvious tension within the Administrator's Executive Council.

On 13 November, the Post-Courier reported that Chan (leader of the PPP)
and Kavali (leader of the National party) had given support to Fr Momis'
proposals. The next day Chan denied the report. On 15 November it was
announced that Somare would not open the Bougainville Copper Mine.
Somare denied accusations that he was under pressure from Bougainville
MHAs to cancel this engagement. The official members urged that to take
up majority equities would be unrealistic for at this stage of development
the country did not have sufficient skilled manpower to service such
arrangements. They were eventually overruled. Chan and his party remained
committed to the coalition. He quickly pointed out, however, that the PPP
proposed to announce its guidelines for overseas investment in the near
future. By the end of the year no statement had been made which was
perhaps an indication of further dealing within the coalition.
In the November session of the House Fr Momis moved three minor
amendments and Paul Lapun one major amendment to the motion. Lapun's
statement deleted all reference to the word "re-negotiation" by omitting
paragraph (i) and inserting, "An agreement setting up a mining venture
should include formulae agreed to by the parties which provide for changing
circumstances, such as price fluctuations, variations in profitability and
development of new techniques". 16 Although the United party criticised the
motion on the grounds that it damaged investor confidence, both the
amendments and the motion were passed on the voices with few dissenters.
It was almost inevitable that such a move on mining policy emanated from
the Bougainvilleans. The long-standing issue on Bougainville over the
presence of the mine has widened recently to a discussion of the tenure of
the agreement. 17 During the 1972 election campaign considerable mention
was made of re-negotiation. The Momis motion, which had very strong
support from government backbenchers in the House, did nothing to ensure
that existing contracts would not yet be re-negotiated.
The division within the government over investment policy was amplified
by a long internal debate over development objectives and a future planning
organisation. In mid-December Somare announced the economic aims of
his government and a new planning organisation for the next Economic
Development Programme. 18 The aims include a rapid increase in the
proportion of the economy under the control of Papua New Guineans;
decentralisation of economic activity with an emphasis on agricultural
development; the equalisation of services throughout the country; the
encouragement of small-scale artisan and business activity; a more selfreliant economy with less dependence on imported foods and services; and
government control and involvement in the economy where necessary to
assure the desired kind of development. It was obvious that the UNDP report
(the "Faber Report") - the draft of which had been circulated within the
Administration in August - had had a considerable impact on the
government. The programme, however, was to be known as the
"Improvement Programme" and it appeared that the second five-year plan
had been postponed for some time.
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David Hegarty
In line with the new objectives the large centralised Office of Programming
and Coordination is to be abolished and a small central planning secretariat
responsible to a Cabinet committee on planning is to be established. The
new secretariat will be physically located in the Department of Finance "for
administrative purposes". The Cabinet committee on planning is to be
comprised of the four coalition leaders, two senior local officer public
servants and one leading Papua New Guinean non-official. The new
machinery represents a compromise between the Office of the Chief Minister
and the Department of Finance- both of which sought to have the planning
secretariat attached to their departments. The reason given for the smallness
of the planning secretariat was that in future much of the planning process
will be decentralised, to departments and districts. In summary, government
activity highlighted problems of administ rative innovation and of the
inadequacy of structures. Policy formulation in such important areas as
localisation and economic planning was going without, or without regard
for appropriate consultative machinery. It appeared to some that the
administrative system was being "overloaded".
Regional Politics
Apart from handling basic questions of government policy and structure
and managing conflict within the House and within the coalition itself, the
government faced difficulties and pressures from various regions.
In October and November throughout many parts of the Highlands a
combination of drought and frost necessitated a large famine relief
operation. By mid-October an estimated 61,000 villagers, mainly from the
Southern and Western Highlands districts were dependent on government
food supplies of rice and tinned fish. The cost of the relief was estimated to
amount to $2 million.
Throughout the period, however, and even in parts of the famine areas,
tribal fighting and brawling occurred on an increasing scale. From
September to December there were numerous press reports of fights over
land, marriage and other clan disputes. Although very few deaths occur at
any one time, the system of "pay-back" ensures a continuation of the
disputes. On at least two occasions tribesmen turned on district
administration staff and forced them to retreat. Part of the cause of the
fighting appears to be an attempt to reassert group solidarity and to revive
the status of the older fight leaders in a period of rapid social change. Courts
were hastily convened and hundreds of warriors imprisoned, but it is obvious
that law enforcement measures are inadequate. District administration,
police and local government infrastructures are extremely fragile in the
Highlands.
Although the government convened a committee of senior Papua New
Guineans to investigate the law and order problem, the introduction of
village courts and the reduction in size of local government councils may
be the only viable method of administration other than more authoritarian
forms of rule.
179
The period under review also saw the emergence of the Highlands
Liberation Front which was formed by a group of university students with
the expressed intention of "liberating" Highlanders from the domination of
whites and coastal people. The front claimed that expatriate businessmen
had exploited Highlands resources and labour and that coastal Papua New
Guineans dominate senior public service positions. The aims of the front
include a controlling interest in all businesses in the Highlands for the
Highlanders themselves; decentralisation of the public service and army;
the appointment of Highlanders to senior administrative posts; and
"liberation" of the tourist-oriented Goroka and Mount Hagen shows. The
front appears to have little grass-roots support but it is the first Highlands
group to articulate regional demands for concessions from the government
other than demands for roads and bridges of the more conservative United
party MHAs. Many Highlands students active in political parties have
rejected the front because of its regionalism.
On the Gazelle Peninsula the political situation appeared more stable than
for some time. Although Europeans and Chinese continued to emigrate from
the area the Tolai factions appeared to have arrived at some compromise. In
September the government introduced a bill designed to give a special form
of "local self-government" to the Gazelle. The bill was considerably
amended in the November session and was then adjourned without debate
until 1973. The bill provides for the abolition of the Gazelle Peninsula Local
Government Council (which had been suspended in June), the establishment
of a trust to manage the property of the council, and for the recognition of
three "groups" on the Gazelle. These groups are the Warkurai Nigunan (the
Mataungan Association's form of local government), the Warbete Kivung,
which is a group of Tolais who have refused to participate in local
government since its inception, and the Greater Toma Council which consist
of groups loyal to the former Gazelle council and which in October held
their own informal elections. The groups still have power to tax their
registered members and will be less subject to central government
supervision over spending than previous councils.
No coordinating machinery is provided for but the idea of a likun or a
community approach has been suggested. The sentencing of Matthias
Toliman to two months' jail for his part in a scuffle at Toma at which the
Minister for Lands, Albert Maori Kiki, and several Mataungan leaders were
present, was another item of interest. 20 Toliman later successfully appealed
against his sentence. Of further interest was the announcement in November
of the considerable assets and plans for expansion of the New Guinea
Development Corporation - the business arm of the Mataungan
Association. 21
On Bougainville the secession movement continues. At a seminar
organised by the students' "Mungkas" (black skin) Association, many
speakers including Fr Momis and Leo Hannett were more cautious in their
approach to the question. It appeared that the students were more committed
to secession than their political leaders. The murder of two senior
Bougainvillean public servants in Goroka on 26 December after a car
180
David Hegarty
accident in which a young Gorokan girl was killed, sparked off demands
for Bougainvilleans to return home and for coastal public servants to refuse
postings in the Highlands. Early in the New Year, Somare, on a visit to
Bougainville, was confronted by angry villagers.
19
JANUARY-APRIL 1973
David Hegarty
Australian Policy
The end of 1972 saw the defeat of the McMahon Coalition government in
Australia. Early in 1973 the new Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam,
and the Minister for External Territories, Bill Morrison, laid down the Labor
government's policy on self-government and independence for Papua New
Guinea. The policy was essentially that which the ALP - and Whitlam in
particular- had advocated since 1970 and it differed only in emphasis from
that pursued by Peacock's administration in 1972. The first difference was
the emphasis which the Labor leaders placed on the target of 1974 for
independence. Both affirmed previous statements that Australia was "no
longer willing to be the ruler of a colony". 1 The second difference was on
the question of aid. Australian aid would continue into independence at least
at the present level and Papua New Guinea would have "first call" on
Australia's future foreign aid programme. Consideration would also be given
to grants over a three-year period rather than on the present year-to-year
basis. However, late in April, Bill Morrison indicated that contributions after
independence may take the form of "tied" or "project" aid. 2 The third
difference was the emphasis which the Prime Minister, in particular, laid
on national unity. In his February speech he made it clear that Australia
would deal only with the central government of Papua New Guinea. In a
clear warning to potential secessionists he said: "It is folly for anybody to
believe that any section of Papua New Guinea would serve its interests by
going it alone. For it would truly mean going it alone." 3
The Australian emphasis on 197 4 as the target for independence
immediately generated tension within political circles and between the
Minister for External Territories and the Chief Minister, Michael Somare.
Early in January, on his first visit, Morrison announced that his talks with
Somare would concern "terminal arrangements" for independence. 4 When
interviewed after the talks Morrison told journalists that Papua New Guinea
would be independent in 1974; that the change would be a natural "flow-on"
from self-government; and that there was no difference in attitude toward
independence between himself and the Papua New Guinea government. 5
Although Somare and members of his Cabinet may privately agree on the
desirability of early independence, Morrison's announcement was an obvious
182
David Hegarty
embarrassment. The Leader of the Opposition, Matthias Toliman, criticised

the setting of a target date as a threat to stability and unity, and he accused
the Chief Minister of making "private arrangements for independence". 6 In
a later statement Toliman charged that the government was ignoring the
people and that changes were being "dictated by a small self-appointed
elite". 7 He expressed sorrow that John Guise, the Deputy Chief Minister,
had had to support his Chief publicly on the issue. (His reference to Guise
was later interpreted as part of a move to split the National Coalition.)
During that week (8-15 January) Toliman toured the Highlands and it was
reported that at many meetings people spoke in opposition to the target date. 8
Another immediate, but less emotional, reaction came from the
Anglican bishop, David Hand, who suggested that a referendum should be
held in 1974 to test public opinion. 9 Guise, in characteristic language, told
Bishop Hand that he should "confine himself to the spintual care of his
church ... before pointing his episcopal finger of ill-formed criticism to
political matters" .10
In the face of criticism and the potential reaction to early independence,
Somare, who was in the middle of a politically difficult tour of Bougainville,
was forced to concede that independence could be delayed if necessary, and
that the people of Papua New Guinea would make the final decision.U In
Canberra in mid-January, Somare sought an assurance from Whitlam that
Australia would not act unilaterally on a target date. Whitlam affirmed that,
"Australia for her part, would work towards independence in 1974, but that
the timing for independence would be subject to consultation with the Papua
New Guinea government and to endorsement by the Papua New Guinea
House of Assembly as representing the wishes of the people" .12
Objections to early independence have been articulated in similar terms
to those opposed to self-government. Roman Catholic bishop, Louis
Vangeke, interviewed in Sydney said that the people, particularly the
Highlanders, were "not ready for it", and that "tribal fighting and warfare"
would ensue. 13 During Whitlam's visit to the Highlands in mid-February,
politicians and tribal leaders presented him with a petition which opposed the
setting of a target date for independence "because the Coalition government
has shown itself incapable of self-government, let alone independence ... " 14
The petition expressed doubts about the maturity and responsibility of the
government and about the quality of advice which the government was
receiving. The leaders urged Whitlam to encourage foreign investment and
to help create employment opportunities for the growing numbers of school
leavers. 15 During the February-March session of the House of Assembly the
Opposition moved to reject the target date and to ensure that the people
would have the right to decide on the attainment of independence. 16 Tei Abal
(Wabag) in moving the motion stressed that "outsiders" should not take part
in the independence decision; that more time was needed to encourage
investment, to retain Europeans and to train more Papua New Guineans; and
that Highlands MHAs would have serious difficulty explaining the decision
to their people. An amendment moved by Somare affirming that Papua New
Guinea should experience self-government before elected members decide on
January-April1973
183
independence was carried by forty-two votes to thirty-four, but only after

government and Opposition backbenchers insisted on continuing the debate. 17
Reaction at the local level to impending self-government and
independence has been much more complex. There is a wide gap in the
writing of social scientists about what people at the village level know of
central/national government activity and of their perception of current
events. Similarly little is known about the processes of communication at
the grass-roots level and about the reception and retention of political
"messages". A crisis of legitimacy is occurring, however, as the transfer of
power and the withdrawal of the colonial power proceeds. People are
uncertain that the authority and security experienced under colonial rule will
continue and consequently are reverting to traditional methods of security
and group solidarity. Much of the tribal fighting now occurring in the
Highlands is in part a reaction to contemporary political changes. 18
Transfer of Power
Australian policy was thus to continue the rapid transfer of power to the
Papua New Guinea government. Since 1972 the process of transfer has
occurred within the framework of a "gearing up programme". This
programme categorised the powers to be transferred essentially into three:
(a) those which would be transferred by 1 December 1973; 19 (b) those which
might not be transferred until after self-government; 20 and (c) those problems
and powers which would not be resolved until independence. 21 Alterations
would be made to the Papua New Guinea Act so that by 1 December only
provisions relating to the Trusteeship Agreement and reserved areas such
as defence and foreign affairs would remain in Australia's hands.
The method of transfer has involved a continuous series of discussions
between officials of the government and the Department of External
Territories, followed by consultations between the Chief Minister and the
Minister for External Territories. Once agreement is reached on a group of
powers to be transferred, Cabinet and House of Assembly approval is
obtained. The Territories Minister then signs the "approved arrangements"
(Section 25, Papua New Guinea Act) granting powers to the ministers
(Section 24). Initially the approved arrangements listed the powers which
ministers could exercise but recently the arrangements have described the
ministers' general power over their departments (and statutory bodies) and
have listed in an annex the powers for which the Australian government
remains responsible. On 30 April, Morrison signed instruments which laid
out in the most complete form for some time, the powers and responsibilities
of the Papua New Guinea ministry and the Australian "administration"
respectively. 22
These written arrangements, however, are not completely tidy for there
are powers "waiting" to be transferred but for which there has been no
appropriate minister (e.g. Justice), and many powers which remain, on paper,
an Australian responsibility but which are in fact being exercised by
ministers. For example, the Chief Minister controls the Improvement
184
David Hegarty
Programme; the Minister for Finance international loans; and the Minister
for Trade and Industry tariff policy. In many such areas the government
decides its policy and then informs Australia.
This gradual approach has the advantage of allowing the government to
"phase-in" self-government. The intention has been to avoid an "abrupt step"
which might aggravate the prevailing suspicions of the consequences of selfgovernment. The government has been able to proclaim for some time that
it is "almost self-governing". A further advantage has been to allow the
ministers to control the pace of the transfer and to ensure that the proposed
arrangements are acceptable.
The method of transfer, however, has on at least two occasions created
tensions between the government and the all-party Constitutional Planning
Committee (CPC) which has the task of framing a "home-grown"
constitutionY The first occasion involved a boycott of the CPC by United
party members from 29 March to 9 April. One of the reasons given for the
walk-out was that the CPC was merely an "academic exercise" and that
decisions on constitutional change were being made outside the
Committee. 24 Somare made it clear, however, that the Committee would
continue its work with the target for self-government at 1 December 1973.
There were other factors involved in the dispute including some politicking
by staff in the Opposition Leader's office, annoyance at the government's
handling of the independence date, the appointment of an "independent
adviser", and accusations of bias against the permanent consultants. The
boycott ended with only a minor concession to the United party - an
agreement to appoint an executive officer to assist Tei Abal. 25 So far that
position has not been filled.
The second occasion arose at the end of April when Somare and Morrison
issued a joint communique describing talks in which they had reviewed the
progress toward self-government and considered the nc:<xt group of powers
to be transferred. 26 The Deputy Chief Minister, Dr John Guise, and the acting
Minister for Finance, Gavera Rea, were the only other representatives at
the discussions. The communique said that no formal agreement had been
reached but such topics as the withdrawal of official members from the
House of Assembly, the future role of the Administrator, 27 the transfer of
control over the Improvement Programme, and those matters (including
electoral policy, currency, membership of international organisations) which
"for administrative or constitutional reasons might not be transferred until
after self-government" .28
Members of the CPC immediately viewed these moves as an attempt to
pre-empt their function and they issued an extraordinary denunciation of
the "Australian government" and "Papua New Guinea Officials". 29 In a
resolution released by the Deputy Chairman, Fr John Momis, the CPC
condemned "[t]he continuing colonialist attitude of the Australian government
towards the constitutional development of Papua New Guinea- in particular
its interference with the work of this committee ... [and] the willingness of
officials in the Office of the Chief Minister to actively collaborate in
advancing this Australian policy" .30 The resolution said that officials from
January-Apri/1973
185
both Canberra and Port Moresby determined to push ahead with the talks
despite the absence of the Chief Minister. The CPC singled out the Political
Development Division of the Chief Minister's Office for persistently seeing
problems (of constitutional change) "in purely bureaucratic, legalistic and
technical terms, and not as questions to which solutions must be found which
accord with the political realities of this country". 31
The CPC and its advisers were obviously annoyed at being left out of
the talks (although Fr Momis had been invited but decided not to go);
frustrated at the pace at which the government wanted to move; and more
than a little piqued at being pre-empted. Fr Momis personally felt that the
officials were intent on destroying the CommitteeY
In reply Somare, himself annoyed by the attack, said that the CPC had
over-reacted to the communique and he denied that officials were sabotaging
the Committee but he would take steps to ensure better communication
between them. It was, in a sense, a crisis situation which could have been
avoided. On the one hand the talks may not have been necessary as the CPC
pointed out. Morrison may have been seeking another announcement of
substance in addition to his Waigani Seminar paper on aid although, as the
communique pointed out, the talks were the first ministerial review of the
"gearing up" programme that Papua New Guinea had had with the new
Australian government. 33 On the other hand members of the CPC may have
been misreading the role of the Committee in the essential process of
constitution-making. The upshot has been that communications and relations
between the CPC and the government have improved, but the government
is "calling the shots".
Politics and Policy

The Papua New Guinea government's major concern during the period under
review was with maintaining coalition solidarity and with the formulation
of internal policy. Somare managed to keep his Cabinet intact, but the
ministry, due largely to the balance of interests within the ranks, appeared
reluctant to make firm decisions and propose action. Rumours of a split with
Chan and/or Guise aligning with the United party were quickly discounted. 34
Backbenchers, however, became openly critical of the performance of some
ministers, alleging that some were merely role playing and were concerned
only with the trappings of office. The lack of communication between the
ministry and the backbench, even during sessions in the House, resulted in
disquiet among MHAs and prompted Michael Pondros (Manus Open) to
announce the formation of a new party. Through a series of vitriolic press
releases the Opposition attacked the government's performance but this had
little effect and led only to the eventual dismissal of a member ofToliman's
staff. There were hints of a possible Cabinet reshuffle and the Pangu pati
executive - one of the few extra-parliamentary party organs to function
regularly since the elections- suggested substantial changes in the ministry.
Pangu ministers were unhappy over the allocation of the economic portfolios
to the PPP, but Somare would not risk a confrontation over their
186
David Hegarty
reallocation.
In their continuing attempts to control their departments, ministers
experienced further frustrations. Ebia Olewale (Education) formed an
advisory committee of local public servants with direct access to him. The
PNG Teachers' Association often found the Education Minister a willing
listener on subjects in which he was in conflict with his senior officers. John
Guise also announced plans to form a similar advisory committee. Other
ministers, particularly Kiki (Lands), Arek (Information), and Okuk
(Agriculture) have obtained much of their policy advice outside their
departments or from levels below that of departmental head. Okuk found it
necessary to rebuke officers of his department in the Eastern Highlands
District for their attitude to extension work and to cooperation within the
department.
In teuns of intetnal poli~.:y, those of economic development and the
structure of government received most attention. The objectives of the
"Improvement Programme" announced in December last year were
expanded by the Chief Minister in the House of Assembly when he moved
that the House take note of "A Report on Development Strategies for Papua
New Guinea" (the Faber Report) and endorse a list of eight aims "as the
basis for economic planning in the coming years". 35 The Faber Report
proposed policies and strategies aimed at producing a model of development
which emphasises such things as social harmony, relatively fair income
distribution and national self-reliance, as well as increased production,
employment, real income and consumption. The aims of the government
are coherent with many of the recommendations in the report. They include:
a rapid increase in the proportion of the economy under the control of Papua
New Guineans; more equal distribution of economic benefits;
decentralisation of economic activity; emphasis on small-scale artisan,
service and business activity; less dependence on imported goods; increase
in locally raised revenue; participation by women in economic and social
activity; and government control of sectors of the economy where
necessary. 36 In an address to the Economic Students' Association Somare
emphasised that rural development, self-reliance and an egalitarian society
were his government's major objectives. He spent time in his address
criticising the development of elites and elitismY
Administrative Change
As part of the continuing review of the administrative structure further

proposals were made by the government in an attempt to convert the rigid
colonial Administration into one more suited to the tasks of development.
In March the Office of the Chief Minister acquired the functions of district
administration, local government and intelligence, and became known as
the Department of the Chief Minister and Development Administration. The
Minister for Local Government, Boyamo Sali, became Minister for State
assisting the Chief Minister. At the District Commissioners' Conference in
April, Somare and Sali outlined the future powers and functions of district
January-Apri/1973
187
administration. 38 The District Commissioner (DC) who, in future, would be

selected by Cabinet from a panel of names submitted by the Public Service
Board, would reassert his coordinating power over other departments within
the district. The DC would be responsible for coordinating both central and
district policies and plans. He would have an emergency power over police
and services in the event of a crisis situation. Local government would be
re-integrated with district administration, 39 but this would require a change
of attitude on the part of field officers and a change of orientation from
centralist control to one of responsiveness to the local community. The
government's aim was to strike a balance between central government
control sufficient to secure national objectives, and local and district
participation in decision-making. These proposals, however, particularly on
the revision of local government, are extremely vague and it remains to be
seen what action will flow from them.
In December 1972 the Cabinet established a sub-committee to deal with
localisation and, by extension, with all public service matters. In a break
from Australian Cabinet traditions, the Chairman of the Public Service
Board was named to the sub-committee along with the four coalition
leaders. 40
The localisation programme and its complementary programme for

retaining expatriate officers proceeded in fits and starts. A stream of press
releases indicated that the Department of Social Development and Home
Affairs was localising its senior positions at a rapid rate. On 27 March it
was announced that sixty-four district administration officers were to be
compulsorily retired. At the DCs Conference two weeks later John Guise
apologised for the "cavalier" manner in which decisions had been made.
By April some expatriate public servants had received letters which indicated
how long a career they could expect and asked them their intentions.
More comprehensive administrative reforms were recommended in two
reports presented to the government. "A Report on Arrangements
Appropriate to a National Public Service for Papua New Guinea" (the Besley
Report) had been prepared during 1972 by three senior officials. It was
concerned with the need for replacing public service control and internal
arrangements, mainly contained in the Public Service Ordinance of 1963,
and it recommended relatively moderate adjustments in existing Australianmodel structures rather than considering the problems of public services in
new states elsewhere.
During February an inter-departmental committee chaired by N. Rolfe
of the Public Service Board, prepared a "Report on the Restructuring of the
Public Service", which was leaked in the press on 16 March. It was
concerned not with the public service but with the reorganisation of
government functions. It recommended that existing departments be reduced
in number from eighteen to fourteen and be regrouped into functional areas,
for example, human resources, natural resources, and "area improvement".
Because of the far-reaching changes proposed, the effect that a reduction
in departments might have on the number of ministers, and the fact that
Cabinet had not yet considered the report meant that it had little chance of
188
David Hegarty
adoption. In April a workshop of the Senior Executive Group, comprised

of over fifty senior national public servants, met for a fortnight to consider
the Besley and Rolfe reports and recommend to Cabinet the minimal changes
necessary for a national public service responsive to the priorities and
development objectives of the government.
Local Level Activity
At the local level the tempo of political activity was maintained. The death
of two Bougainvillean public servants in Goroka in December 1972 after
an accident in which a young girl was killed had wide repercussions. Three
professional associations representing local officers - the Public Service
Association, the Teachers' Association, and the National Medical Officers'
Union - protested to the government over the safety of coastal publk
servants in the Highlands. 41 The Chief Minister on his tour of Bougainville
in January 1973 heard angry demands for the punishment of those
responsible. The incident served to increase the hostility of the protests
which Somare faced. From all parts of Bougainville came demands for
secession although more strongly from the south than the north. 42 The
Bougainville Regional Local Government Conference in early February
resolved to establish a Special Political Development Committee to
articulate and channel people's demands on the future of Bougainville and
present them to the government. The committee is comprised of village
leaders, councillors and students and is chaired and coordinated by Leo
Hannett, a university graduate and author, who had been appointed Somare's
personal adviser on Bougainville. 43 The immediate attention of the
committee was to formulate proposals for a referendum on secession and
for the structure of district government.
In the Trobriand Islands in February and March a confrontation developed
between the supporters of the Kabisawali Movement led by former
university student John Kasaipwalova, and the supporters of the local
government council who have rallied behind ChiefVanoi. The basic aim of
the "Kabisawali People's Government" is to mobilise the people for selfreliance. Trade stores have been set up in about fifty villages as a political
device to make the people less dependent on the expatriate-owned outlets.
Voluntary labour has been used to build short roads and buildings. An
attempt is being made to control part of the artifact and tourist trade. Using
an approach similar to that employed by the Mataungan Association, the
focus of hostility became the already unpopular local government council
at Losuia. Kasaipwalova urged his supporters not to pay council taxes. A
number of incidents, one of which involved the burning of a council tractor,
prompted the authorities to commit a squad of riot police to the area. 44
Kasaipwalova was later charged on three counts under the Police Offenses
Act for abusing the acting DC, laying hold of a policeman, and insulting
behaviour towards a police officer. His subsequent acquittal on two of the
charges and suspended sentence on the third (in which the magistrate found
police provocation) has enhanced rather than weakened his prestige.
January-Aprill973
189
Inter-clan politics was also involved and the situation verged on violent
confrontation. The Chief Minister invited the opposing chiefs to Port
Moresby in an attempt at mediation. 45 The Chief Minister's representative
attended a 2,000 strong meeting called to work out priorities in the spending
of the monies collected by the Kabisawali Movement. Both sides in the
dispute are to contest the council elections in June. 46
One of the themes of local level political activity has been (with few
exceptions) the unpopularity of local government councils. The Nemea
Landowners Association in the Abau area of the Central District is one such
group which has refused to participate in the affairs of the introduced council
yet which operates its own "para-council". An anti-tax "movement" has
grown in many parts of the country and frustration has developed with the
size of the councils, their apparent inactivity, and their powerlessness to deal
with disputes. For the Gazelle Peninsula, however, legislation was passed,
which, it was hoped, might provide a model for local government
arrangements in other parts of the country. 47 The legislation provides for the
"recognised groups" on the Gazelle - the Warkurai Nigunan, the Greater
Toma Council and the Warbete Kivung to register and tax their members.
A trust has been established to take over the assets of the old Gazelle Local
Government Council, and the executive of the trust representatives from all
groups- will decide on economic and community projects. Initial opposition
from Toliman and his supporters from the Toma Council appears to have
subsided. Mataungan Association leaders hailed the legislation as a victory.
It also signalled the end of their opposition now that one of their "causes"
was legitimate.
As in previous months most of the news which comes from the Highlands
concerns reports of tribal or inter-clan fighting involving frequently
hundreds of warriors. The immediate causes usually concern disputes over
land boundaries, marriage, sorcery, compensation claims and even card
debts. The long-term causes, of course, are associated with the environment
of rapid social, political and economic change in which land shortages,
population pressure, competition to be involved in the cash economy and
the degrees of "marginality" associated with that venture, and political
uncertainty compound the problem.<8 The absence of effective, authoritative,
dispute-settling bodies and the deployment of the police riot-squad
enforcement agencies contribute to and actually increase tension.
As a reaction to impending self-government, groups (which in many parts
of the Highlands are concentrated in close proximity) are reviving traditional
practices49 and the status attached to fighting and land are being reasserted.
Group cohesion, universally strong in New Guinea societies through
"primordial sentiments", is consequently being strengthened.
The government has received a report on tribal fighting in the Highlands
which recommends local level courts and tribunals so as to maintain a
presence of government at the village or ward level; kin group liability in
compensation; improved police field tactics; punishment of lineage groups
involved; increased maximum sentences and other longer term
recommendations such as business advisory sessions and resettlement
190
David Hegarty
schemes. 50
Conclusion
Prevailing opinion among observers of the Papua New Guinea political
scene has for the twelve months of coalition rule oscillated between degrees
of pessimism and optimism. The pessimists point to the lack of a mobilising
and integrating ideology; to the lack of mass parties or indeed party
machinery; to the tiny elite and an inadequate education system; to a rigid,
mechanistic bureaucracy constructed for other ends; to an incredible lack
of coordination; to a lack of Cabinet leadership and decision; to the crisis
of authority in the rural areas; to the rising urban crime-rate and the
inadequacies of the police; to the dependence on the Australian grant and
the inahility to assess the worth of aid and investment. On the other hand
the optimists take heart that the coalition has survived its first twelve months,
that it has put in train far-reaching policy-changes, that it has tackled
questions of structure and policy which few, if any, new states tackled prior
to self-government, that the weakness of the Opposition will allow them
three more years of rule, that gradually relationships between local and
expatriate public servants are becoming more realistic, and that gradually
a "system" of operation is being evolved in Konedobu. 51 The most useful
concept for political scientists to employ in assessing the present and the
near future appears to be C.E. Lindblom's "muddling through". It may not
be sufficient, however, when at independence, that alien power which lends,
in Georges Balandier's terms, an "artificiality" to colonial politics, is
removed.
20
MAY-AUGUST 1973
David Hegarty
Unlike the first months of 1973 when government set the pace with transfer
of powers and the adoption of economic policy guidelines, the mid-months
were dominated by political activity. The event which provided a focus for
observers was the riot which occurred in Port Moresby on 22 and 23 July.
The search for causes highlighted existing economic and racial tensions
which had been inflamed over recent months by the activities of a Papuan
separatist movement. In so doing, questions were raised about the ability
of government- both urban and national- to resolve them. As it happened
urban administrators and government departments had neither planning nor
coordinating machinery to grapple effectively with the problems of the town,
while national leaders were absorbed in a crisis within their own coalition.
Port Moresby Riot
On Sunday, 22 July, a riot broke out in Port Moresby. The event which
triggered it off was the result of a Rugby League game in which a representative side from Papua defeated a side from New Guinea by forty-one points
to nineteen. As the crowd dispersed from the sports ground jeers and insults
hurled by New Guineans at Papuans quickly led to more violent outbursts. 1
Passengers in a bus were stoned and cars leaving the ground had windows
smashed. Taxi-truck and bus windows were smashed by flying bricks, stones
and bottles. As police reinforcements firing tear-gas moved in, the crowd
quickly moved on towards the Boroko shopping centre. A wedding being
celebrated in the backyard of an expatriate's house less than a hundred yards
from the ground was interrupted momentarily as police truncheoned a
suspected stone-thrower who had sought refuge in the driveway.
At Boroko more people- mostly Highlanders who frequent the betel nut
stalls, Chinese trade stores and hotel on Saturday and Sunday afternoonsjoined the fight. By this time most public transport had been withdrawn from
service and the crowd moved along Waigani Drive toward the suburbs of
Waigani and Tokarara four miles further out. Papuans walking home were
terrorised by New Guineans. Cars driven by Papuans or carrying Papuan
passengers were singled out for stoning and bashing. Europeans who drove
slowly were allowed to pass while others who drove quickly were stoned. As
192
David Hegarty
police sirens were heard behind the crowd a "chase" began. The police using
more tear-gas eventually dispersed the crowd at Waigani where the plateglass windows of three Chinese stores employing Papuan assistants were
smashed. On the route to the migrant settlements beyond both Waigani and
Tokarara chicken coops and gardens were raided by the mob as they fled
the police. Houses occupied by Papuans were stoned and their fly-wire
screens and glass louvres smashed. On the radio that evening the Chief
Minister, Michael Somare, said he was disappointed that such behaviour
should follow a game of football.
On Monday Papuans at Koki market retaliated. Police again used teargas to stop the fighting and two government ministers, Dr John Guise and
Dr Reuben Taureka, appealed to the people of the area to be peaceful. Many
coastal Papuans who had settled round Koki anchored their canoes some
distance off shore while others e~tablhh~::J lt:mporary settlements on the
nearby islands. Roadblocks restricted vehicular movements close to Port
Moresby and police prevented Highlanders and Papuans converging on the
town from nearby plantations and villages. Police appealed to residents to
stay indoors. Schools, whose numbers were depleted, closed early,
Konedobu public servants went home for the afternoon and Boroko shopping
centre was deserted. The garbage collectors (once the occupational preserve
of Goilalas but now increasingly dominated by Highlanders) continued their
rounds. In the afternoon several hundred university students, in an
impressive display of unity, marched to Koki market and to Konedobu. A
delegation then accompanied the Chief Minister to Hanuabada.
On Tuesday police with the help of Dr Taureka persuaded hundreds of
men in a convoy of trucks from the Rigo-Abau area to return to their
villages. The men were armed with sticks, spears, axes and bows and
arrows.
Overall the fighting had not been on a large scale. There had been no
deaths; the most serious injury reported was a broken jaw; houses, buses,
cars and trucks were quickly repaired. Nineteen people were subsequently
gaoled for their part in the riots and under a new police measure seventeen
of those were repatriated to their home areas (five Chimbu, three Eastern
Highlands, two Western Highlands, and seven from the Tapini and Bereina
areas of the Central District). The riot, however, was symptomatic of
tensions consequent upon both rapid urbanisation and the imminent change
in the political status of the country. Over the past few years the
demographic and social nature of the town has changed radically. In 1966
villagers numbered only sixteen per cent of the town's population, sixteen
per cent were expatriates and the remainder were migrants to the town
although many had been born in the Central District. The population of the
town is now estimated at 80,000- an increase of almost 40,000 since 1966.
The fastest flow of migrants has been from the Highlands and it is estimated
that 18,000 of the town's population originated there. These migrants are
mostly young, unskilled and poorly educated men, many of whom live in the
more recent squatter settlements on the fringes of the town. The ratio of men
to women in these settlements has been estimated at fifteen to one. Tension
May-August 1973
193
has existed for a considerable time between the relatively better off Papuans
(of the Central District in particular) and New Guineans (particularly
Highlanders) whose position in the town is relatively insecure. These
tensions had been exacerbated in recent months by demands from prominent
Papuans that unemployed Highlanders be sent home, but more particularly
by the political demands of Josephine Abaijah (Central Regional) and her
Papua Besena (Hands Off Papua) movement.
In many of her speeches demanding a separate political status for
Papua, Abaijah was openly contemptuous of Highlanders; she accused them
of taking over Papuan land and assaulting Papuan women. Rumours of a
fight at the football match had been brewing for weeks. At the base of the
rumours was Abaijah. In the course of the riots New Guineans shouted
derisively ofthe "meri Papua". 2 In a letter to the editor of the Post-Courier,
a university student wrote that workers in Port Moresby "hoped for some
incidents to occur ... Abaijah's ambitious call for Papuan separation was
well and truly on the nerves of many New Guineans. The ordinary New
Guinean workers, who do not feel secure in an unfriendly city, viewed the
Papua Besena Movement with contempt. It made them feel rejected and
snubbed." 3
Causes of the riot, however, run much deeper than that. Port Moresby
has witnessed over the past few years the very definite emergence of social
classes with different styles and conflicting interests. Another student, Kopii
Kepore, wrote of an interview he had conducted with a Highlander living
in a settlement.4 He asked: "Why did you want to fight?" The reply:
I left my home and came to Port Moresby about eight years ago. Moresby
was a dry, barren place with little building or development there. It is we New
Guineans who have come to work and develop Moresby to its present stage.
Papuans haven't worked hard and taken labouring jobs to develop Moresby.
We have heard many times ov-:r the radio that Papuans would get rid of us
and send us home. If that is so we must destroy what we have helped to
establish before they send us home.
Kepore also related an incident he had witnessed on Waigani Drive on

the Sunday of the riots: he heard one man say: "There's a car coming. Look
closely." A bystander said: "He's a fellow New Guinean - let him go." A
third person responded: "Forget the fellow New Guinean, he's driving a car
and he's a show-off (humbug). Let's fight him too!"
The government's response was initially fairly calm. In radio speeches
Somare appealed for people not to get excited over football matches
conducted between teams representing anachronistic divisions in the
country. He warned "louts" and "others seeking violence" they would be
strongly dealt with, but later admitted that social divisions within the country
were largely to blame. Cabinet refused Abaijah permission to hold a march
for "Papuan freedom" two days after the riot. The government immediately
convened an ad hoc committee with representatives from the police and a
variety of departments including Law, Social Development, Business
Development, and Local Government, to consider problems of urban
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David Hegarty
government and anti-social behaviour. The committee had considered some

important suggestions on urban administration and social control, by
university Fellow, Nigel Oram, 5 but was upstaged by a government proposal
to strengthen the Public Order Ordinance. The authoritarian proposals
included provisions for the removal of undesirable persons from certain
areas; a curfew in which people without reasonable excuse could be detained
and in which an assembly of three or more constituted prima facie evidence
of unlawful assembly; the control and repatriation of people not in regular
employment; and increased penalties for offences committed under the
Ordinance. 6 The proposed amendments had apparently been drawn up at the
request of two or three Papuan ministers and the Chief Minister's Office
only just succeeded in having them distributed as a "working paper" rather
than as concrete proposals. 7
Although both the government and the police came through this minor
crisis fairly well, the riots did serve to underline a number of potentially
disturbing features of the political system. Urban administration is weak,
particularly in relation to its actual contact with urban dwellers. A ward
committee system has been established but apart from one or two wards its
impact is symbolised by the new Ward Six committee room which is situated
in splendid isolation and framed by acres of bare, ploughed ground, between
the expatriate suburb of "Gordons", the largely indigenous suburb of
"Gordonia", and the fenced-in police barracks! As indication of their concern
for the town and its problems Port Moresby city councillors in August voted
themselves a 600 per cent increase in their monthly allowance. The lack of
government intelligence about what is happening in the town and the inability
to identify group leaders quickly underlines a potential security problem.
The absence of channels through which economic frustrations can be vented
and the lack of an integrating mechanism like a political party through which
people can gain a sense of involvement are serious deficic:<ncies. The absence
of any sense of community and of government and leaders' efforts to
promote it can only ensure that tensions will remain high. A series of tough
but repressive measures which strike only at the symptom and not the cause
may not be of much use either in the short- or long-term.
Papua Besena
One of the characteristics of the period of transition to independence is the
rapid formation of political groups and movements. As awareness of the
imminent withdrawal of the colonial power develops, movements - some
with formal organisation, some without - begin to make demands of
government on a wide range of issues. Communal groups with only vague
and unspecified economic objectives tend to proliferate. Minorities fearful of
their vulnerability at independence seek constitutional or political safeguards,
some threatening to secede or separate if their demands are not met. Little
is known about many of these inchoate groups and forces presently emerging
in Papua New Guinea. One movement, however, with broad objectives and
identifiable leadership but with unknown support, which has developed
May-August 1973
195
largely in the Central District is known as Papua Besena - or "Hands Off

Papua". The movement is led by JosephineAbaijah (MHA Central Regional)
who, during her election campaign, stressed the need for Papua to preserve
its own identity and for the government to sponsor economic development
projects in Papuan districts. At a series of meetings in Port Moresby and
villages close to the capital in June and July she expanded these views and
adopted a more separatist line in attempting to win support. The major
objectives and rationale of the movement may be summarised as follows: 8
1. Papua should have its own government and should not be forced into
political union with New Guinea.
2. Papuans should retain their Australian citizenship until such time as they
can govern themselves.
3. Papua should have an economic development plan and Australia should
continue to supply both development aid and 'compensation for past neglect'.
4. Papua has nothing to gain from political union because New Guineans would
dominate the economy; the Papuan lingua franca, Hiri Motu, would be ignored;
and Papuan culture and 'social institutions' submerged. (The naming of the
country's airline 'Air Niugini' was often cited as evidence of the government's
intentions.) Highlanders short of land and forced to move away from their
home areas without their wives, posed a threat to the lands and people of Papua.
Addressing a Rotary Club meeting in June, Miss Abaijah reserved special

vitriol for Australia which she accused of having "bashed, booted and bled"
Papua for thirty years and of now attempting to conceal the existence of its
colony by merging it with New Guinea. She had on previous occasions
accused Australia of "dumping" Papua and leaving it "a destitute colony of
New Guinea". In the House of Assembly on 21 JuneAbaijah was challenged
for attempting to subvert the government's aim of national unity. She replied
that Papua and New Guinea were legally separate entities; that Papuans were
identifiable as a people; that Papua was underdeveloped; and that New
Guineans, were taking over the indigenous business affairs of Port Moresby.
The riots in July seemed to support her barely concealed view that New
Guineans and Highlanders in particular, were "barbarians" about to swamp
Papua. Her calls for Papuan separation became more strident. In August
Abaijah and her adviser, Dr Eric Wright, (an Assistant Director of Health in
the public service) toured eastern Australia seeking public support for her
cause. Australian press and media gave her wide coverage and on a number
of occasions she was compared with Bernadette Devlin. Generally, however,
commentators were left more than a little bewildered about her motives.
The general strategy has been to organise rallies at her home in Hohola,
a suburb of Port Moresby, at which objectives of the movement are
explained: to collect ideas for development projects in other Papuan districts;
and to spread the movement's message to the rural areas. Village meetings
are organised at whichAbaijah usually makes an emotional appeal to Papuan
"sentiment" and Wright emphasises the size of Papua, its population in
relation to both New Guinea and the Pacific Islands, and its economic
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David Hegarty
potential. Wright's role is obviously central to the movement, but little is

known about him. On his return from Australia he was charged with breaches
of the Public Service Ordinance for political involvement.
Support for the movement is difficult to estimate. Support among many
long-term Papuan public servants appears strong. Tubusereia village was
reported to be strongly in favour of the movement as were many of the
western Motu villages. A meeting of United church pastors from the coastal
area agreed to support her. The great village of Hanuabada, however,
showed no sign of strong support. Two villages were exceptional in their
outright opposition to Miss Abaijah. At Boera village some twelve miles
from Port Moresby a young nationalist (and graduate of Queensland
University) Moi Avei, who has organised a village youth movement and
instigated a number of small-scale development projects for his village,
urged his people to oppose Abaijah. At the Koita village of Kila Kila, close
to Moresby, the people sided with a young fellow villager- Nora Vagi Brash,
a former House of Assembly interpreter - who challenged both the
movement's aims and the presence of Dr Wright. Some university students
formed a Papua Besena branch but most were concerned with the problem
of economic development for Papua. The Nemea Landowners Association
indicated its support. Letters to the Post-Courier were divided in support
and opposition. One possible indicator of the strength of the movement was
the attitude of the Papuan ministers in the House who initially ridiculed
Abaijah's approach but quickly became conciliatory and refrained from
outright opposition.
The government's attitude to Papua Besena changed considerably after
the riots. In the June House government speakers accused Abaijah of
attempting to destroy what they had worked for over the past eight years. 9
Immediately after the riots Somare accused her of political "opportunism"
and "irresponsibility" for attempting to hold a rally then. Later John Guise
urged the movement's supporters to wait for the budget which he said would
remedy the imbalance of development. 10 The government hoped that it could
ride out "the movement'" for compromise would mean a weaker bargaining
position vis-a-vis foreign investors such as Kennecott. Opposition also came
from Papuans working and living in New Guinea and from the synod of the
Anglican church. The Administrator, when receiving a petition from the
movement, read a statement on Australian policy to its leaders and hoped
that it would direct its demands to the CPC. 11 W.L. Morrison, Minister for
External Territories, in an interview with Josephine Abaijah, reaffirmed that
Australian policy in compliance with UN requests was to grant
independence only to a unified countryY
The separatist aim is of course (in the short-term) unrealisable and
there are serious doubts about the viability of Papua as a nation. What
constitutes Papua, for example? Papuan sentiment, however, which Abaijah
appears to have rejuvenated, has long historical roots. 13 If the themes which
she has played upon -of separate identity, of fear of New Guineans and of
economic neglect - become the rallying cry of a regional movement, a
further centrifugal force is added to the list with which the independent
May-August 1973
197
government must cope. However, the gradual shift in emphasis towards

economic development which appears to be occurring within the movement
may well stimulate grass-roots self-reliance movements and separatism may
fade as an issue. In terms of political theory, Papua Besena (if a short-term
judgement can be made) illustrates both the preservation and the working
out of an identity larger than the parochial unit. The analysis of it may well
make a contribution towards the reinterpretation of nationalism and its
development in new states.
Coalition Politics
The months of June and July were uncertain ones for the National Coalition.
Attention had already been focused on the performance and behaviour of
the ministry but in these months it became more direct. To some observers
the government appeared to be "marking time", content to play out the game
until independence. To others the government appeared to lose momentum,
even to lose the desire to change and to suffer an attack of the "jitters". The
government's apparent failure to take action on many reports which had been
presented to Cabinet; the ambivalence and uncertainty in handling the Papua
Besena challenge, together with the prevarication in deciding on such
questions as national day celebrations and a national language supported
the view that the government had lost its drive and initiative. The Coalition's
management of the June session of the House also came in for criticism.
The United party complained that bills had not been circulated in time and
that insufficient time was allowed for grievance or adjournment debates.
On a number of occasions the government came close to defeat on
amendments to its legislation. 14
The Chief Minister was aware of the criticisms levelled at his ministry.
He at least still desired change but the basic problem was that his hands
were tied. He had the power to allocate portfolios, but he had not the power
to dismiss ministers. A minister may be dismissed only in two ways: (a)
through the intervention of the Minister for External Territories on the
grounds of misconduct; or, (b) for the Ministerial Nomination Committee
- a seven-man committee of the House presently composed of the four
coalition leaders, Michael Somare, Paul Lapun, Obed Boas, and Kaibelt
Diria- to recommend (in conjunction with the Administrator) a new list of
ministers to the House for its approval. The first alternative was not possible
and given the tenuous nature of the coalition and the current volatility of
the backbench, neither was the second. The government was not prepared
to contemplate opening up a debate on the relative worth or performance
of ministers. The creation of three new ministries which had been approved
earlier by Canberra and a reshuffle of the ministry were the only courses
open to the Chief Minister for reform. Speculation over possible changes
led to an increase in tension on the government benches. 15 Backbenchers
saw a chance of improving their position; apprehensive ministers lobbied
their colleagues for support; and coalition leaders bargained intensely to
maintain or improve their power position.
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David Hegarty
Party Representation in the Ministry - June 1973

PANGU
AEC
PPP
NATIONAL
Somare (Chief Min.)
Chan (Finance)
Kavali (Works)
Kiki (Lands)
Lapun (Mines)
Olewale (Education)
Taureka (Health)
Mola (Bus. Dev.)
Okuk (Agric.)
Poe (Trade & Ind.)
Moses (Forests)
Diria (Posts &
Rea (Labour)
SaJi<> (State)
Jephcott (Trans.)
Arek(b' (Info.)
IND.
Guise (Interior)
Telegraphs)
(a) Minister for State assisting the Chief Minister on local government and district
administration.
(b) Arekjoined the PPP in March having previously been independent.
Pangu leaders had been concerned from the outset with both the number
of portfolios held by the PPP in relation to its voting strength (about ten)
and with the PPP's dominance of the economic portfolios. They were acutely
aware of the polished political performance of Julius Chan (the PPP leader),
who was usually prepared and persuasive in argument. It was rumoured that
the Chief Minister could often rely on the support of only two or three of
his colleagues in Cabinet. Pangu's major concern was to strengthen the Chief
Minister's hand and to counter Chan's conservative economic philosophyY
For this reason Pangu was anxious that John Kaputin (Rabaul), spokesman
for the Mataungan Association and chairman of the Tolai-owned New
Guinea Development Corporation, be appointed to Cabinet. The Pangu
executive had also been critical ofPPP ministers John Poe and Donatus Mola
and urged their party leaders to break the economic portfolio monopoly of
the PPP.
The National party remained firm in its support for Pangu and the
Coalition and it hoped to receive another "policy" ministry in the reshuffle.
In fact, late in June an unsuccessful attempt was made to merge the two
parties. The PPP for its part had little to gain from the proposed changes
and in mid-July, announced its opposition to the reshuffle. The possibility
of Chan becoming Deputy Chief Minister in place of John Guise (who would
become Minister for Justice) was not considered sufficient reward for losing
a portfolio. Throughout June backbenchers jockeyed for positions. Some
who could see themselves missing out threatened to form breakaway
groups. 17
Matters were brought to a head in the House of Assembly on Friday,
6 July- the last day of the three-week June-July session. Somare moved
that the House approve the ministerial appointment of Pita Lus, MHA for
Maprik since 1964, and the most senior Pangu member in line for a
portfolio; Yano Belo (Kagua-Erave) a Southern Highlander and National
party member; and John Kaputin. The United party in a brilliant tactical
May-August 1973
199
move amended the motion by adding the names of six Coalition

backbenchers for consideration. By stressing that ministers should be chosen
on the basis of education and competence the United party aroused the ire
of the more ambitious. Many who had not had a chance to speak were
threatening to abstain from voting. On Friday evening the session lapsed
for want of a quorum and the government was left without approval for its
new ministers and with unfinished business including transfer of control
over the public service.
In an angry broadcast the following Monday the Chief Minister appealed
to villagers and local government councillors to ensure that their MHAs
attended all sessions and worked harder. He said that he had instructed his
ministers to attend all Coalition meetings and to make themselves available
at all times to backbenchers.
By 1 August agreement had been reached between the coalition parties.
Albert Maori Kiki was to become Minister for Defence and Foreign Affairs;
Thomas Kavali would succeed him in the portfolio of Lands and the
Environment; John Poe would lose Foreign Relations and revert to Trade
and Industry; Paul Lapun became Minister for Mines and Energy, while
Bruce Jephcott added Civil Aviation to his Transport portfolio. When the
House met again late in August it was announced that John Kaputin would
be Minister for Justice; Yano Belo, Minister for Works, and Peta Lus,
Minister for State assisting the Chief Minister on police and cultural
activities. The Cabinet was subsequently enlarged to include the complete
ministry.
Kiki's appointment was seen as a wise move in view of his reportedly
good relations with senior army officers. Kaputin's inclusion would give
Somare added support but may in future exacerbate tensions over economic
policy. Government advisers hastily considered measures by which the
backbench revolt could be controlled and by the end of August moves were
under way to sponsor MHAs on fact-finding trips to Asia. Curiously enough,
despite or perhaps because of the troubles of the Coalition, a trend toward
consensual (if not one-party) rule emerged during the period under review.
This trend was to become more apparent in the latter months of 1973.
Economic Affairs
When confronted by groups and councillors over regional economic
problems the Chief Minister refers always to the government's Eight Point
Plan, the basic objectives of which are balanced development and rural
revitalisation. Many of the difficulties involved in implementing this plan
(noted in previous Chronicles) revolve around the restructuring and
reorienting of a colonial bureaucracy and the communication ofthe plan's
ideology to the people. During the period under review the government made
some moves towards achieving the plan's objectives. Legislation for General
Purpose Development Corporations was being drafted; restrictions on
expatriates were placed on wide categories of employment; 18 eight papers
were prepared in the Department of the Chief Minister on removing
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David Hegarty
restrictive legislation so that an "informal sector" might be encouraged; 19

Development Bank policy (which had been under attack for eighteen months
in the House) was in process of review; 20 and the One Year Improvement
Programme tabled in the House set out guidelines for district rural
development. 21
The objectives of the plan received support from students, some local
public servants and a few outside bodies but it was far from enthusiastic.
University students, impatient at the apparent lack of action by the
Administration, founded a "Melanesian Action Group" which held forums
on the Plan, and, together with the Melanesian Council of Churches and
the Port Moresby Community Development Group, organised a seminar on
self-reliance in July. A meeting of officers in the Department of Social
Development and Home Affairs at Goroka late in July discussed self-reliance
strategies for rural areas, while in August a meeting largely composed of
public service trainees heard speakers urge commitment to the government's
objectives. The response, if favourable, was not immediately apparent.
Despite the fact that the "eight points" are framed on the wall of Cabinet
and proposals are checked against them, at the end of August there was
evidence amongst people basically sympathetic to Somare, of a growing
disenchantment with the government's inability to move these obstaclesY
A "network" of committed students and young public servants, however,
was developing and the debate on the traditional neutrality of the public
service had begun.
One factor crucial for the plan is the government's attitude to foreign
investment and the role of foreign enterprise. Although the government had
clearly no intention of endorsing the "Development Capital Guarantee
Declaration" passed in 1966 and confirmed by the second House, it had not
agreed on policy. Attitudes on the question ranged from those held by Julius
Chan, whose stance had been to welcome investment and at the same time
to entreat businessmen to be "enterprising"/3 to those of John Kaputin who
would have the government in a position to control the economy and "where
necessary ... to expropriate or nationalise certain industries". 24 Not far
removed from Kaputin are the Bougainvilleans, Fr John Momis and Paul
Lapun (Minister for Mines). In November 1972 Momis had introduced a
resolution on mining policy which would ensure a greater return to Papua
New Guinea. On 24 June this year Lapun announced "principles" upon
which future mining agreements would be based. 25 These required that
companies pay tax and royalties totalling fifty per cent of profits; provide
all infrastructure or equity in its stead; effect localisation and training
schemes; process within the country wherever possible; employ modern
conservation methods, and that contracts be reviewed every few years.
Advisers in the Chief Minister's Department share similar views on
government control of foreign investment. 26
The confrontation expected to occur in Cabinet over investment policy
did not eventuate, however, for late in August, Chan was ordered to rest by
his doctors. When the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters is discussed it will be difficult to avoid a clash. During the review
May-August 1973
201
period agreement was reached on the ownership of Air Niugini but the
problems of dealing with an insensitive Australian Minister for Transport
in May were replaced by problems of dealing with Australian pilots,
engineers and radio operators unions. The decision to establish a central
bank was announced. The Investment Corporation issued its first shares to
the Anglican church. Export prices for copra and cocoa boomed, but
revaluation of the Australian dollar left the tea industry, particularly in the
Western Highlands, in a desperate plight. (The political implications of this
have yet to emerge.) Largely as a result of Australian inflation a massive
rise in the cost of living occurred. Motor car sales and savings bank deposits
fell as the exodus of expatriates proceeded. A mini-budget was introduced
in July to raise an additional $3 million.
Constitutional Planning
In May a joint statement released by the CPC, Morrison and Somare,

announced that self-government would be achieved in two stagesY By 1
December, the original date, all powers over domestic affairs will have been
transferred to Papua New Guinea and the Papua New Guinea Act amended
so that it "reflects in law the present situation of virtual self-government".
The second stage will be reached in April 1974 when the draft constitution
providing for all major aspects of the system of government and for
provisions for the change to independence is presented to a special session
of the House of Assembly. Self-government celebrations are to be held after
the House gives its approval. In May 1974 the House of Representatives is
expected to approve final alterations to the Papua New Guinea Act. The
staging process was necessary to allow the CPC time to prepare a draft of
the constitution. The process will probably also lessen the impact of selfgovernment on the polity. It will also give the government time to
consolidate its forces, for if considerable change in the system is
recommended, a stormy session of the House is assured.
Early in May the CPC issued its third discussion paper on "LegislativeExecutive" relations. In July and August it embarked on a tour of the country
visiting sub-districts and holding meetings in much the same manner as
previous Select Committees on Constitutional Development. In contrast to
their predecessors, however, members of the Committee and particularly
Fr Momis and John Kaputin spoke out strongly on such questions as
citizenship and district government. One journalist noted that often meetings
became a forum for political education. 28 As was expected, response to the
questions asked by the Committee varied from area to area. Where
government liaison officers had been active submissions were prepared and
speakers echoed the consensus of the gathering. In the major towns the
response was discouraging. Even at the universities in Port Moresby and
Lae despite provocation by Kaputin on citizenship, students showed little
enthusiasm for either the questions or the format. Flying visits at which
Committee members formally confront an audience with a set list of
questions are just not part of Papua New Guinean style politics. At some
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David Hegarty
meetings, for example in Kundiawa, there was conflict of opinion over the
move to self-government; at others such as that in Hanuabada, people were
more concerned with the behaviour of MHAs and ministers and the
government's power to sack recalcitrants than with questions on bicameral
legislatures.
One question which did attract strong support from most centres was that
of district government. In fact the Committee quite frequently appeared to
be "selling" the idea. Predictably the area which made the strongest demands
for regional autonomy was Bougainville. The Bougainville Special
Development Committee which had consolidated opinion on the political
future presented a list of negotiable demands and conditions to the CPC
through its chairman Leo Hannett.
Following the CPC crisis in April the style and approach of the
Committee appeared to change considerably. Committee members
appeared more relaxed, inter-party barriers were broken down and a
sense of loyalty to the CPC as much as to parties developed. A new spirit
of cooperation with the government also emerged as evidenced by
their willingness to consider interim arrangements for Bougainville. 29 A
number of factors may have been responsible for the change. The
proximity of members touring the country together and attempting to
agree on some of the most fundamental issues facing the nation may
have been partly responsible. The leadership of Momis and Kaputin
has also been important. The performance of Kaputin in a speech delivered
in Bougainville on responsibility to the nation was particularly
impressive. 30 A further factor in the change was the visit in March of
the consultant, Professor Yash Ghai of Kenya, an expert on constitutional
law and currently Professor of Law at Harvard University. In his
writings on East Africa Professor Ghai cast perspectives on the process
of constitution-making and on the durability of independence constitutions.
He argued that a revision in the analysis of new states' constitutions is
necessary. Constitutions agreed upon by the colonial power and national
leaders did not and could not provide a neutral framework or rules in
which politics could be played out. Rather they should be viewed as
devices for the attainment of independence. He argued further that, in
explaining the frequency of post-independence constitutional change,
the constitutiOn should be regarded "as a weapon in the political struggle
itself so that the constitution becomes, or more precisely, is made a
handmaiden of the party in power, as a means to the retention of
power". 31
The emphasis which both the CPC and the government have placed on
district government will no doubt enhance the prospects of the constitution
being approved. Once accepted the government will then be free to move
quickly to independence. The intervening period may not be sufficient to
allow for the establishment of appropriate district level structures and by
independence the government may find that a stronger central authority is
required.
May-August 1973
203
Public Service
In July, four months before self-government, five Papua New Guineans were
appointed directors of public service departments, thus bringing the number
of local officers in the first division to eightY Although regulations for a
national public service have yet to be finalised, they are expected to include
provisions whereby "stagnation" (i.e. the situation in which public servants
relatively young but less educated and trained than those junior to them,
remain at the top of the public service hierarchy for a considerable time after
independence) is avoided. Hence these five appointments have been made
for an initial period of only three years.
Statistics released in June revealed a significant increase in the number
of local officers in both second and third divisions since the White Paper
on "accelerated localisation" in August 1971. There had also been an
increase in the average level of positions held by local public servants. The
expatriate reduction target often per cent was achieved in the year June 1972
to June 1973. The biggest reductions were made in the temporary and third
division levels. At 30 June there remained almost 6,000 expatriates in the
public service compared with almost 20,000 local officers.
Parties and Unions
Late in May yet another political party was announced. The Social Workers'
party of PNG arose, according to its organisers, out of workers' frustration
with the government's performance. The objectives of the party are to
"advocate and fight for a strong and viable socialist Papua New Guinea.
The party is a coalition of urban and rural workers, villagers and students
representing a true grass roots democratic party." Its programme lists fortyone "immediate demands" encompassing industrial, rural, social and
political areas, and including nationalisation of all foreign industries; a basic
wage of $30 per week; workers' control and management of industries; rural
development schemes; political freedom for the villagers; support for the
Free Papua Movement and for the "liberation" struggles of the Mataungan
Association and the Kabisawali Peoples' Government. Also considered to
be an immediate demand, was "the defeat of capitalism, imperialism and
colonialism on all phases of the global universe". Further local government
should be abolished and the Melanesian form of "tribal chiefs [sic]"
recognised. On a "national" level, Papua New Guinea, the SWP says, "must
consist of a federation of republics and be a nation in its own right" .33
21
David Hegarty
Self-Government
Self-government day -Saturday, 1 December 1973 -passed quietly in Papua
New Guinea. In a short symbolic ceremony at Konedobu, the High
Commissioner (formerly Administrator) of Papua New Guinea, Les Johnson,
signed over responsibility for powers transferred to Ministers and swore in
members of the Executive Council. Only a small crowd gathered outside
for the event. Throughout the country all was quiet. The sale of liquor was
banned and hotels closed for three days from Friday, 30 November. On
Friday in a radio broadcast, the Police Commissioner warned that "the whole
of our greatly improved police resources will be used to ensure that selfgoverning Papua New Guinea gets away to a good start". On Saturday more
than 500 police were on duty in the major centres of the country. In Port
Moresby police squads in open trucks patrolled the almost deserted streets.
Koki and Waigani markets had closed and only a few stores remained open.
Early that afternoon a crowd of about 1,500 attended a rally at the suburb
of Kaugere where Papua Besena supporters called for "self-government for
an independent Papua". The leader of the Papua Besena movement,
Josephine Abaijah, spoke at a similar rally at Bereina some sixty miles along
the coast. Apart from an official reception at Government House the only
public celebration of self-government of which this chronicler is aware was
that held in the tiny Duke of York Islands to the north of New Britain. An
"end-of-year" primary school function had been organised to coincide with
self-government day and choral-singing, traditional dancing and speeches
lasted all day.
Self-government day was, in effect, a planned anti-climax. It had been
the intention of both the Australian and Papua New Guinean governments
that powers be transferred gradually and that self-government not mark an
abrupt change in status and responsibilities. 1 But that in itself was no
guarantee against possible trouble. In the preceding three months opposition
was still raised to self-government. The United party, although virtually
accepting the target date, did not give up its long campaign without a final
question concerning the method of transfer. 2 During the "National Day"
celebrations in September the Papua New Guinean flag was tom down and
burned in the Chimbu District. Further opposition was voiced during the
205
Cabinet's tour of the Highlands early in November. Tension generated

between Papuans and New Guineans by the July riots and the Papua Besena
separatist movement was still high. Rumours of the impending collapse of
law and order, of the exodus of whites and their "cargo", and of the calamity/
prosperity which would befall Papua New Guineans abounded and added
uncertainty to the period. On his Highlands tour Michael Somare had
criticised expatriates for spreading rumours of impending collapse. Prior
to I December many expatriates did in fact leave the country and a number
of Chinese departed both permanently and temporarily. 3
District Government
One of the most frequently asked questions in Papua New Guinea politics
concerns the potential viability of the new state. With its numerous small
often antipathetic tribes living for the most part in acephalous communities
and speaking more than 700 languages, Papua New Guinea would appear
to face an unenviable task in welding and maintaining national cohesion
by other than authoritarian means. It was a question to which the
Constitutional :Planning Committee (CPC) had addressed itself in its
endeavours to formulate a "home-grown" constitution. Throughout its midyear tour of the country the CPC heard calls for the introduction of some
form of district government, regional government or even state governments.
The solution recommended by the CPC in its Second Interim Report to the
House of Assembly involves the creation of "Provincial governments" based largely on existing district boundaries - and for conscious
decentralisation of power. 4 Provincial governments, it is argued, would
facilitate greater popular participation, encourage self-reliance, provide an
impetus for coordination, and help accommodate strong regional pressures
for autonomy. The CPC recommended that these governments should have:
(1) an assembly of at least fifteen elected members; (2) an executive body
called a provincial council; (3) a head of government known as "Premier";
and (4) be administered by public servants from the national public service
and by personnel employed directly by the provincial governments.
Pressure from Bougainville and the opinions of the CPC chairman, Fr
Momis, have obviously been influential in framing these recommendations
although there exists in most districts a general suspicion of centralised
colonial bureaucracy and a genuine desire for autonomy over certain social,
political and economic affairs. In October Cabinet agreed that interim
arrangements for a form of district government for Bougainville should be
prepared by the CPC and in November approved the establishment of district
government. An interdepartmental "task force" was established to report on
powers and functions which might be transferred to the district. Draft
legislation for interim arrangements was also in process. By the end of 1973
few practical steps toward district government in Bougainville had been
taken but political mobilisation toward that end had continued.
Both government and Opposition agreed in principle to the concept of
district government. The only public resistance to the proposals to surface
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David Hegarty
was that from the Speaker, Barry Holloway, who admitted that Bougainville
was an exceptional case. He argued that although the creation of district
governments may temporarily "take the heat off' the centre by focusing the
attention of dissident or ambitious politicians on district-level politics,
ultimately it could unleash the potential centrifugal forces in the country
and would almost certainly lead to the proliferation of bureaucracies with
consequent confusion and lack of coordination. He suggested a type of
"linkage" system by which the central government negotiated with groups
or districts as they became organised and voiced their demands for some
autonomy. If popular support was not on the side of the Speaker the one
thing in favour of his objections was the lack of administrators skilled in
decentralised government.
The Budget and Government Policy
The annual budget introduced by the Minister for Finance, Julius Chan, in
the August-September session of the House differed little from those of
previous years. 5 Estimated expenditure increased from $216 million in 197273 to $304 million although $63 million of this was for costs involved in
transferring certain Commonwealth assets such as DCA installations, in
creating the Bank of Papua New Guinea, the Papua New Guinea Banking
Corporation, and for the establishment of Air Niugini. These costs were to
be met by special grants and loans from Australia. Revenue for 1973-74 was
to come from the Australian Grant-in-Aid and Development Grant totalling
$77 million ($78 million in 1972-73); loans amounting to $33 million of
which $21 million would be drawn from International Aid Agencies; and
from internal revenue estimated at $105 million ($93 million in 1972-73).
Marginal rises in customs and excise duties on certain items, and the
abolition of some taxation concessions were designe.d to meet the gap
between estimated expenditure and receipts. A small increase in revenue
from dividend withholding taxes and investments, largely in Bougainville
Copper, was expected, but no alterations were made to company tax.
The dependence on Australian aid is made more obvious when it is
realised that $49.9 million for salaries and allowances for the Australian
Staffing Assistance Group is paid as part of normal Australian aid but is
not part of the budget. With the advent of self-government bargaining for
aid and attempts to show that such aid is in Australia's interests are likely
to increase.
The United party found little to dissent from in the budget although it
seized upon the lack of emphasis on any of the government's much vaunted
"Eight Points". Opposition speakers pointed to the government's anti-elitist
stance and its intended expenditure of $11 million on the two universities
compared with $3.3 million on the Rural Development Programme. The
most pungent criticism, however, came from the government's influential
backbencher, Fr John Momis. In his speech he stated that the budget had
"dismally failed to implement the philosophy of the New Improvement
Programme". 6 1t had, he said, neither reassured the people nor given them
207
direction. He called for real decentralisation; for a taxation system which

did not simply operate as an inducement to foreign investors; and warned
that "some of us ... certainly will not tolerate it [the budget] next year if it
follows the same lines". 7
The Improvement Plan for 1973-74 (sounding, in title, more nineteenth
century colonial than twentieth century pre-independent) was introduced
during the same session of the House. 8 The Plan was designed as a one-year
interim measure to fill the gap between the old Five Year Programme and
that proposed for 1974-79. It was drawn up while the government's
economic planning machinery was in a state of flux and before the arrival
of the new Director of Planning, David Beatty. It attempts to spell out the
strategies and policies by which the government's "Eight Points" may be
achieved and to map out a programme for "selective decentralisation" in
the districts.
In November the long awaited announcement of"Investment Guidelines"
proved to be an anti-climax. 9 The "guidelines" were little more than broadly
stated objectives concerning equity participation, employment creation,
decentralisation, etc. The coalition partners, however, had agreed to set up
a National Investment and Development Authority which would register all
existing and new foreign enterprises, advise the government on investment
promotion strategy including incentives, and advise on the establishment
of government industrial corporations. What authority NIDA had over other
economic policy institutions has yet to be decided.
Two of the more important government reports and proposals produced
in the period under review were the Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into Land Matters 10 and the Education Department's draft of a Proposed Five
Year Plan. 11 The Lands report is one of the most impressive of the flood of
reports to appear since the National Coalition took office. Dealing with
perhaps the most difficult of the development issues facing the new state, the
180-page report was completed in nine months. Some of the basic principles
adopted by the Commission in its inquiry included an evolutionary approach
to agrarian reform and an avoidance of collective and individualistic
extremes; the avoidance of inequality in the distribution of land rights; a
check on private landlordism; and encouragement to those who need land
and use it well. Chief among its recommendations were that, in areas of land
shortage, alienated land held by non-citizens should be compulsorily acquired
(with compensation); that non-citizens be entitled to a government lease for
a maximum of sixty years - that registration procedures be changed so that
group titles to customary land are possible; and that the dispute settlement
system should be part of the national judiciary decentralised to the district
level and should include local leaders for their knowledge of land matters.
An unsuccessful attempt has been made by the Minister for Lands to seek
Australian finance to compensate expatriate owners in the event of
compulsory acquisition. One of the problems which the framers of this report
now face (as with most others) is the difficulty of following up and
implementing the recommendations. Firstly the recommendations have to
be steered through Cabinet and secondly administrative staff and machinery
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David Hegarty
have to be available. Given the fairly radical departures from older

procedures there is an understandable antipathy amongst members of the
Department of Lands to the proposals. The "administrative lag" between
development aspirations and the ability of the machinery to implement, so
typical of this transition phase, is very much in evidence.
The substance of the Education Department's proposals is that the formal
education system should expand to the extent that universal primary
education would be provided by 1983 and that secondary education
expansion matches manpower requirements. Emphasis would be placed on
the involvement of the community in the school system and on the inclusion
of community values in the curriculum, but community education would
be the preserve oflocal government bodies. Major criticism of the proposals
to date has come from members of UPNG Education Research Unit who
argued that the problems of schoolleavers and "drop outs" and the current
dissatisfaction with the formal system of education would in no way be
overcome by an expansion of numbers within the very same framework.
They argued further that insufficient consideration had been given both to
projected manpower requirements and to teacher training and re-training.
Foreign Affairs and Defence
Although Papua New Guinea is not yet constitutionally responsible for the
conduct of its foreign affairs, it is in the process of developing relations with
its neighbours and policy orientations are gradually evolving. As with most
small, new states the direction of foreign policy is usually determined by
the state's relationship with the metropolitan power; by the treaties already
entered into on its behalf; by the source of trade and aid - and by the
interests of neighbouring states. Australia, which will remain the major actor
in Papua New Guinea's foreign policy for many years, .expects to have a
"special relationship" with its former colony. 12 Given the level of aid
supplied that is hardly surprising. Trade will also be a major link and on 20
December the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding,
to apply between self-government and independence, relating to trade
preferences and concessions in return for non-discrimination against
Australian goods. 13
Relations with Indonesia are bound to figure prominently in both
foreign and defence policies. In September an Indonesian Consul-General
(Brigadier General Roedjito) opened an office in Port Moresby and by the
end of the year had a staff of seven. 14 In mid-October Major-General Ali
Murtopo, personal assistant to President Suharto, toured Papua New Guinea
and urged some form of military cooperation particularly with respect to
border patrolsY Albert Maori Kiki, Minister for Defence and Foreign
Relations, agreed "in principle" on cooperation but was not prepared to
make specific commitments. Early in November Indonesia's Foreign
Minister, Adam Malik, arrived and signed an agreement concerning the
border which included articles on border crossings, land rights, settlement,
immigration controls, security, trade, health and pollution. 16 Malik attempted
209
to dispel the belief held in some parts of Papua New Guinea that Indonesia
had designs on "East Irian". Disparities in economic development between
the two parts of the island and sympathy from students and others for the
West Irianese are more likely causes of future tension. 17
Although no formal intergovernmental links have been established,
Japanese investment in PNG has been estimated at $20 million and a number
of leading firms have established offices in Port Moresby. 18 On two occasions
PNG has been represented at interministerial trade talks between Japan and
Australia: the latest at the insistence of the Minister for External Territories
and the shadow Minister, Andrew Peacock. 19
New Zealand has also shown considerable interest with an exchange of
visits by Michael Somare and the New Zealand Prime Minister, Norman
Kirk. New Zealand has offered aid worth $1.45 million over three years.
In regional affairs PNG appears to have approached its role in the South
Pacific Commission with some degree of enthusiasm. At the South Pacific
Commission Conference held in Guam in September, Albert Maori Kiki,
speaking in the debate on French nuclear testing in the Pacific said: "It is
time for all Pacific peoples to tell foreign powers that we will not tolerate
further manipulation of our own affairs. We call upon people in French
territories to liberate yourselves from such manipulation by a foreign power
". 20 In December PNG became a member of the Colombo Plan and, in all
probability, will apply for membership of the Commonwealth of Nations.
IfPNG has any current favourites among its neighbours they are the small
island nations of the Pacific. Commenting on a proposal put by both Malik
and Kirk for a sub-regional grouping (New Zealand, Australia, PNG and
Indonesia) Kiki was reported as saying that although PNG saw itself as a
"bridge" between Southeast Asia and the Pacific, it would continue to give
first priority to relations with the states and island peoples in the Pacific
with whom Papua New Guineans felt they had the greatest cultural affinity. 21
In the field of defence Somare indicated that after independence a
defence treaty with Australia was most likely but he was insistent that
Australia would not be called upon to handle internal security problemsY
During these months, however, an Australian Senate Committee inquiry into
the state of the Australian army was being told by military experts and others
that post-independent Papua New Guinea was potentially volatile and
"internal disorder of major proportions" could erupt. 23 In August an
Australian Army staff exercise - code-named "Cocoana" - had been
conducted at Duntroon. It involved problems of Australian military
involvement in aid of a post-independence government in a hypothetical
country which just happened to look like PNG. 24 In October a newspaper
report revealed that Australia had contingency plans for a military operation
and evacuation of civilians after independence and that "exercises" would
be held in February 1974. 25
Within the defence force itself the PNG Volunteer Rifles- a small force
of 340 men scattered throughout the country -was disbanded. 26 The
Australian Labor government's view that expatriate officers should not be
involved in any emergency situation resulted in the adoption of a rapid
210
David Hegarty
localisation policy for combat units.
Parties and Leaders

The death on 6 September of Matthias Toliman, leader of the Opposition,
and former Ministerial Member for Education, produced a leadership crisis
in the United party and added to the speculation that the government/
opposition dichotomy was in decline. The crisis was resolved when Tei Abal
somewhat reluctantly accepted leadership on 20 September with Joe Paul
Langro (West Sepik) as deputy leader. Toliman had been a staunch supporter
of the role of an opposition in parliament whereas Abal had said, on
occasions, that the concept of "a loyal Opposition" was alien in PNG. It is
one of Abal' s characteristics that whenever the Chief Minister or Ministers
visit his area he urges his people to support the Somare government. By
the end of the year the United party appeared to lose the support of some of
its members. This was due largely, however, not to any switching of
allegiances but to absenteeism. A solid core of UP members was maintained
but the public role of expatriates appeared to be diminishingY A review of
party policy in the light of self-government and other economic changes
was ordered by the party executive. It is expected that the essentially
negative, delaying stance of anti-independence will be less prominent in
future policy.
At the Pangu party national convention in November considerable change
occurred both in policy and extra-parliamentary leadership. 28 The party
adopted policy to politicise the public service by making direct political
appointments to the positions of departmental head and district
commissioner. It also called for a revision of the structure of the public
service. On development and investment, the party declared that all primary
agricultural production should be owned and controllep by nationals; the
government should aid nationals in buying foreign-owned enterprises; and
the government should set time-tables for phasing out foreign investment
in certain fields. The party also called for an education policy more relevant
to the community. A discussion group considered methods of countering
Papua Besena and recommended that more finance and more control over
its expenditure be granted to the districts. Moi Avei was elected national
president with Rabbie Namaliu and Tony Voutas, vice-presidents. By the
end of 1973 all three were members ofthe Chief Minister's advisory staff.
The national executive was drawn from ministers, MHAs and branch leaders
from most parts of the country. Representatives from the Mataungan
Association, the Kabisawali movement and the Nemea Landowners
Association participated in discussions.
Michael Somare remained undisputed leader of the party. His strength
lies both in his personality which enables him to get on well with people
and inspire confidence in those around him, and in his ability to mediate in
disputes between party or coalition members and to moderate excesses of
opinion. His politics, both in parliament and in the hustings, are not those
of confrontation but of consensus. He avoids potentially embarrassing
211
situations by stepping around them or, in Melanesian style, "meeting them

tangentially". 29 He has judged the pace of change of this difficult
constitutional and political transition remarkably well and has managed
(rather than controlled) a diverse coalition adroitly. His style and tactic of
co-opting the talented, the impatient and the frustrated either into his
department or into his employ as agents in the field has been successful to
date, but the patron relationship has its longer term dangers. At the same
time, however, his willingness to compromise and to delay decision has been
critically interpreted as a sign of political weakness and of lack of
commitment to the government's public goals, especially those relating to
Papua New Guinean control of the economy.
Within the House of Assembly the basic pattern of party allegiance has
been maintained since the formation of the Coalition, but there have been a
number of indications which suggest that the pattern is rather fragile and
the situation is more fluid than it appears. On a number of occasions in the
past government backbenchers have rebelled or threatened to rebel against
the government. As well a small number of informal cross-party allegiances
or cliques have developed- some CPC members forming for a time the most
obvious one. It was widely rumoured in the latter months of 1973 that
allegiance to the United party was flagging and that half the Opposition's
front-bench would be interested in accepting government portfolios if
offered.
Also indicative of this fluidity was the increasing criticism of the party
system and the calls for a "no-party" or for an "all-party" system. 30 No one
closely defined what was intended but those who objected were unanimous
in that the party system as it operated in the House was unsatisfactory.
(There has been little or no comment by politicians on the role and function
of extra-parliamentary parties.) In the debate on 24 September speakers
argued that party divisions contributed to disunity, hindered the effectiveness
of the representative system and were not "Melanesian style" politics.
Questions raised in this debate later on spilled over into some rather bitter
criticisms of the operations of the House itself. 31 Illiterate MHAs claimed
that they were not receiving fair treatment in debates, and, that Ministers
had refused to listen to them. All, therefore, was not well with the
transplanted "Westminster" system. A pay rise for ministers in November
made portfolio positions even more coveted for pragmatic Papua New
Guinean politicians.
Outside the House of Assembly other political leaders were operative.
The leader of Papua Besena, Josephine Abaijah, continued to win support for
her cause. In October the "Papuan Democratic Union" was formed as the
political wing of the separatist movement. Earlier that month a Papuan Black
Power group was formed with the objectives of developing an awareness of
Papuan identity, of resisting the black government's attempt to dominate
its black brothers, and of supporting Abaijah's efforts to create an independent
Papua. 32 On Bougainville the combined Councils' Conference rejected a call
by Leo Hannett for the resignation of the two Ministers, Lapun and Mola
but appointed him to be their district planner. 33 On the Gazelle Peninsula the
212
David Hegarty
three main Tolai groups agreed to establish a "Trust" as required by the

"Likun" legislation. A survey revealed that the Mataungan Association had
over 15,000 registered supporters. In December the Mataungan Association
sponsored a seminar on development issues at which representatives from
the three groups and students from other districts participated.
Disaffection
One of the features of the period under review was the strong current of
disaffection with the government among intellectuals and others. Some
university graduates, students and younger public servants, who had
previously given unqualified support to the Somare government, became
irritated at the apparent lack of action on government policy and
consequently focused their criticism on the national leadership. Many began
to question the commitment of politicians to the philosophy of the Eight
Point Improvement Plan and to doubt ministers' abilities to gain authority
over their departments so that the strategies for achieving the plan could be
implemented. Many doubted the government's sincerity in wanting to
change society and pointed to the lack of action on renegotiating the BCP
agreement; to the lack of investment policy; and to the tardiness and
inadequacies of localisation policy. Most were aghast at the statements by
Ministers Taureka and Poe that localisation was proceeding too quickly. 34
Many were disappointed at the growing authoritarian trend in public
statements made by ministers, but the basic factor in their misgivings
appeared to be the lack of attempts to build and communicate an ideology
of development which was implicit in many of the reports presented to and
accepted by the government.
Although there were prior symptoms this disenchantment surfaced
publicly at a university forum on 5 October at which Ll(o Hannett angrily,
yet trenchantly, attacked government leadership. Hannett had been
dismissed the day before from his position as special adviser to the Chief
Minister on Bougainville affairs for calling for the resignation of the two
Bougainville ministers, Lapun and Mola. His speech, however, was not
merely "sour grapes" for it struck a responsive chord amongst his audience.
In his speech he accused government leaders of hypocrisy in that they were
merely "mouthing platitudes about the needs and wishes of the people",
when in fact no change had emanated from the centralist colonially
orientated bureaucracy. No practical steps had been taken he said, to
implement the Eight Point Plan. Ministers were attempting to rule by "bluff'
and "ad hocery": "black actors had merely replaced white actors". Hannett
accused ministers of being the "stooges" of their white advisers and public
servants, and alleged that politicians had accepted "gifts" of watches and
transistor radios. He predicted that the result could easily be a "political
confrontation" in which the people's aspirations might have to be realised
by bloodshed. He pointed out that the Chief Minister and Cabinet were not
to blame for this state of affairs but there was a lack of machinery to link
up people's aspirations and convert them into manageable objectives.
213
Hannett believed that he was offered his position with the Chief Minister
only as "a palliative for the people of Bougainville", but he had become the
victim of empty promises. Through his efforts and those of the Special
Committee on Political Development, politics on Bougainville had moved
"half-way from the market place" and cries for secession had been translated
into negotiable demands. He claimed, however, that the government had not
trusted him, and officials, under central government direction, had reported
on his activities and harassed him.
Two months later further Papua New Guinean frustration at the slowness
of localisation and of the dominance of whites in the decision-making
structure was expressed by SeaeaAvosa, executive officer of the CPC. 35 He
alleged that it was a mockery of self-government if whites were to maintain
their key policy-making positions. Papua New Guineans, he said, could not
in these circumstances mould their own society according to their own
values.
Much of this criticism might well have been directed at the Australian
government for its inadequate preparation for the transfer of power. The
National Coalition came to power with basically reformist intentions and
the difficulties it has experienced have largely stemmed from the nature of
the coalition itself and from the economic and administrative systems it
inherited. However, young and inexperienced politicians have had difficulty
in asserting their authority. There has been an evident disparity between the
ideology implicit in for example the Faber Report and the Eight Points, and
the pragmatic economic "philosophy" expressed by many senior politicians.
Evident also is the "gap" in the decision-making apparatus between
ministers and the Administration. Two essential elements missing from the
political administrative structure have been, firstly, the adequate provision
for briefing ministers on policies and policy options and, secondly the ability
to translate adequately general policies into specific strategies. By the end
of the year, perhaps not surprisingly, some of the disenchanted had
succeeded in "taking over" the Pangu pati and were moving into government
advisory positions.
22
JANUARY-APRIL 1974
David Hegarty
The pre-independence political scene in Papua New Guinea presents a

complex web of political infighting, of jockeying for power, of shifting
alignments, of questioning of old assumptions, attitudes and institutions,
of pressure from old and new groups, of foreign penetration, and of crisis
and continuing tension which has yet to spin itself out. In the period under
review three interrelated events stand out from this web: the record profit
of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) and its political repercussions;
coalition politics and a Cabinet reshuffle; and the continuing clash between
Cabinet and the Constitutional Planning Committee over the future
constitutional framework of Papua New Guinea politics.
Bougainville Copper
The announcement by Bougainville Copper Ltd of a profit of $146 million
in its first full year of operation and the internal political repercussions which
followed, overshadowed most events in the period und~r review. The PNG
government which owns twenty per cent of BCL- the rest is owned by CRA
(forty-five per cent), NBHC Holdings (twenty-three per cent), and the public
(twelve per cent)- expects to receive $36 million in dividends, royalties
and withholding taxes as its share of the profit. Under the terms of the mining
agreement company taxes are not paid until 1978.
Radical politicians reacted immediately to the size of the profit and the
small percentage return to the government. The split which had been simmering
in government ranks over foreign investment and other issues for some months
burst into the open. On 4 February the Minister for Justice, John Kaputin, and
the Deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Fr John
Momis, issued a statement on behalf of what became known as a "ginger group"
of politicians, public servants, ministerial advisers and students. 1 The group
demanded ( 1) an immediate effective corporate tax rate of eighty per cent on the
operating company; (2) government acquisition of a controlling interest in
the company; (3) the creation of a government authority with funds and expertise
to manage the company and future mining ventures; and (4) the termination
of current prospecting licences in Bougainville and at Ok Tedi. The statement
was severely critical of the government's inaction on foreign investment policy
January-April1974
215
and on the implementation of the Eight Point Plan. It warned leaders that they
should step down in favour of those with "the necessary commitment" unless
they were prepared to "lead the country with far-sightedness and in the
long-term interests of all". The following day John Kaputin continued the
attack, alleging that PNG lacked "legitimate leaders" who could control the
country's affairs. This was immediately interpreted by press and radio as an
attack on Michael Somare's leadership to which the Chief Minister replied
that he was not an ambitious man and that he would be prepared to resign
if challenged seriously. 2
The government responded to the BCL announcement cautiously. The
Chief Minister called for "talks" with the company and established a
committee of officials to recruit a team of international experts and prepare
for the recognition of the agreement. His own view was that his government
should have "a little bit more" and should possibly own forty-nine per cent
of the company. No public political direction was given to the renegotiators.
The government did, however, show increasing sensitivity to the question
of foreign investment. Julius Chan, Minister for Finance, and leader of the
PPP, hastened to note that he had not urged restraint on the government in
its attempt to renegotiate. In an address in Sydney to the Australian Institute
of Directors, Somare said that his government would place emphasis on
partnership arrangements, resource taxation, and taxation of spectacular
profits.~ Soon after both Chan and the Commerce Minister, Ebia Olewale,
accused some foreign firms of having "cheated" and "tricked" the
government. Even the Australian Minister, Bill Morrison, felt obliged to
warn Japanese companies about fair dealings in PNG.
But the basic division in government ranks on this issue remained and it
came to be seen increasingly in terms of the "economic nationalists" intent
on gaining control over the economy on the one hand, versus the cautious
pragmatists intent on securing foreign investment on the other. In the wider
perspective, the magnitude of the profit (equal to one and a half times
estimated internal government revenue for 1972-73) underlines the problems
which new, small states have in dealing with multi-national corporations
and in maintaining political integrity.
Cabinet Reshuffle
On 27 February the Chief Minister in a move known to only one or two ministers
reshuffled his cabinet. Although the reason given was to "revitalise the
Ministry and produce new initiatives", and to place ministers where each could
utilise "his particular strength to achieve the Eight Point Improvement Plan",4
the move appeared designed to strengthen the hand of the Chief Minister
and his Pangu pati ministers at the expense of the smaller groups in the
Coalition and particularly the PPP. Those ministers most affected were:
Pangu: Michael Somare, Chief Minister, acquired the Department oflnformation
and the Social Development division from Interior. Gavera Rea, National
Development, in addition to his old Labour portfolio acquired the Investment
216
David Hegarty
Corporation, The National Investment and Development Authority, and Bureau

oflndustrial Organisations. Albert Maori Kiki, Defence and Foreign Relations
and Trade, acquired Trade. Reuben Taureka swapped Health for Education.
PPP: Julius Chan retained the Finance portfolio but lost the Investment
Corporation. Bruce Jephcott traded Transport for the new ministry of Fisheries
and Forests. John Poe lost Trade and Industry for the severely truncated
Interior ministry. Donatus Mol a picked up the senior portfolio of Health and
lost Business Development.
National party: Iambakey Okuk lost Agriculture for Transport. Sasakila Moses
lost Forests for Culture and Recreation. John Guise remained Deputy Chief
Minister and picked up the important portfolio of Agriculture in return for Interior.
The minister who experienced the most severe demotion was Ebia
Olewale who lost Education for the newly created Ministry of Commetct:.
It was rumoured that John Kaputin, Minister for Justice, was selected for
Commerce (and Olewale for Justice) but held his ground after discovering
the proposed reshuffle. The PPP reacted strongly to the move and bargained
their continuance in the Coalition for another ministry. Two days later
Stephen Tago was appointed Minister for State.
Although the timing of the reshuffle came as a surprise to most observers
some changes had been anticipated in preceding months. Dissatisfaction
with the performance of some ministers had been frequently voiced in the
House of Assembly. Public criticism had been made of the social behaviour
of a minister and in fact two ministers had appeared in court on charges
connected with drunken behaviour. Concern was also expressed at the lack
of movement towards the goals of the Eight Point Plan, and it was public
knowledge that in some departments an impasse had developed in relations
between ministers and departmental heads. Allegations of corruption and
abuses of the privileges of office were to be investig(lted by the Public
Accounts Committee of the House. The Chief Minister himself was being
posed as indecisive. He needed therefore to assert his authority. He received
support from his young Papua New Guinean advisers who had taken over
the Pangu executive and were determined to weaken the economic influence
of the PPP. Behind the scenes, sections of the United party offered support
to the Chief in any reshuffle if it meant the elimination of the radicals
(Kaputin and Okuk) and the weakening of the PPP.
Although the Coalition remained intact there was some anger at the
secretive manner in which the reshuffle was conducted. The Chief Minister
had strengthened his hand yet the possibility of having to rely on the United
party for support meant a perceptible shift to the right. The PPP's dominance
of the economic portfolios had been broken, but in so doing it left the party
less vulnerable to attack and may have even strengthened its position in the
government. The reshuffle, by itself, however, was no guarantee that the
changes it hoped to facilitate would eventuate. In fact the administrative
muddle left in its wake, the confused relationship of ministries to
departments, the unclear delineation of functions, and the lack of
responsibility for coordination and control are problems which still remain
January-April 1974
217
unsolved.
The Constitution and Independence

The running battle between the CPC and the Cabinet continued throughout
the review period. The conflict has stemmed basically from differing
approaches to decolonisation and from an emerging power struggle as
attitudes and ideological positions hardened. The CPC, charged with the
task of producing a "home-grown" constitution, has examined closely the
inherited structures of government and is in the process of recommending
adaptations and modifications to institutions so that they might fit more
adequately the Melanesian political culture. The CPC believes that a
psychological "break" must be made with the colonial past. It believes that
the present method of transferring powers allows both existing institutions
and the present ruling group to become entrenched. 5 As Australia has
continually forced the pace in the transfer, the Australian government is also
seen as a prime factor in attempting to pre-empt the work of the Committee.
During the life of the Committee a degree of solidarity has developed among
its members which has provided them with a base for criticism of
government performance.
On the other hand, the Chief Minister, officials in his department and the
bulk of Cabinet, believe that power should be transferred from Australia
quickly and with minimum upset to existing arrangements. A break with
precedent, they argue, would create too much confusion, and any
modifications should proceed gradually. A constitution was needed quickly
so that independence could be attained soon after thereby avoiding the
centrifugal tendencies which mount between self-government and
independence. They view the CPC, however, as having exceeded its charter
and of almost assuming the role of a "counter government". The Chief
Minister in a radio interview, admitted that the CPC had become an albatross
around the government's neck and that given the chance again he would not
have proposed such a Committee. 6
Early in February Bill Morrison, who had made Australia's policy on a
rapid transfer of powers clear, ran foul of the CPC. The Committee cancelled
a conference with him claiming that it had other "more important" matters
to attend to. 7 Three days later some of the CPC's controversial citizenship
proposals were leaked to the Sydney Morning Herald and sparked off bitter
infighting which was to last for several months.
Relations between Cabinet and the CPC steadily worsened, firstly as a
result of the delay in producing the report and, secondly as a result of a
deadlock in preliminary discussion. The original programme was for the
report to go to Cabinet in February, then to a special session of the House
in April, and then for a constitution to be adopted in mid-year. The delay in
the presentation of the report until June entirely threw the plan o1:1t of gear.
Early in March the Chief Minister called off the "two-stage self-government"
agreement with the Australian government but decided to press on with his
target for independence by the end of the year - without a constitution if
218
David Hegarty
necessary. On 12 March in the House of Assembly he proposed that Papua

New Guinea become independent on 1 December 1974. The Whitlam
government was in agreement and just a week earlier had promised $500
million in aid to PNG over the next three years. The target proposed was
greeted with applause from Cabinet benches but with uproar from the
Opposition. United party (UP) members demanded a referendum on the date
and heatedly argued that 1 December was too soon. Later the UP switched
its attack to threats of non-cooperation if the government proceeded to
independence without a constitution. This latter point was to become a
slogan for all political groups. Michael Somare set off on a tour of three
districts in April to promote his target date but found only lukewarm
response. He did find, however, reassuring support for his leadership.
The next clash occurred during preliminary discussions late in March and
early in April as to who should table the report: Cabinet or the CPC? Was
the CPC a committee of the House or was it empowered to report to Cabinet
only? The argument revolved around who would have control over the
drafting of the Constitution bill. That dispute was immediately
overshadowed, however, by the controversy surrounding the CPC's draft
proposals on citizenship some of which were leaked to the press. In these
discussions Cabinet members took exception to the proposals requiring
automatic citizens to have had three grandparents born in the country. They
also objected to the draft clauses which gave automatic citizenship to
children of a Papua New Guinean father and an expatriate mother but not
to the child of a Papua New Guinean mother and an expatriate father. Somare
reacted angrily and is reported to have made an impassioned speech in favour
of a multi-racial society. 8 The former proposal would have had the effect of
excluding both ministers Chan and Jephcott from holding executive
positions and consequently the PPP threatened to split the government if
satisfactory compromises were not reached. 9 Australian and local press were
highly critical of the proposals and a flood of letters to the editor alleged
"racism" on the part of the CPC. Both proposals were soon modified but
the talks had bogged down by ll April and little further discussion was
expected until the tabling of the report in the June session of the House.
Miscellaneous
Feeling over the Papuan separatist issue remained high. In March the House
moved and then rescinded a motion by Sinake Giregire that Australia pay
$1,000 million in compensation if the union of "uneconomic" Papua ""with
New Guinea was approved. In the meantime Papua Besena continued to
mobilise support. A joint meeting of Papua Besena, Social Workers' party
and Nemea Landowners Association members discussed common policy and
issued a joint statement critical of the behaviour and performance of
ministers. 10 Josephine Abaijah championed the cause of the hinterland Koiaris
in their claim for land compensation against the Electricity Commission. 11
Her campaigning in the Port Moresby Town Council elections in April was
critical to the victory of the "Papua Group" over the Pangu pati candidates.
January-Apri/1974
219
In the Highlands the politics of the coffee industry at present defy

comprehensive analysis. Recent legislation restricting roadside selling of
coffee to indigenous buyers was said to have gained approval although a
number of exceptions were granted to expatriates in response to local
pressure. 12 At Kainantu and Asaro in the Eastern Highlands, local
government councils were taking over expatriate-owned coffee mills while
in the Chimbu the coffee cooperative appeared headed for more management
trouble.
In the Trobriand Islands a rival organisation was established to that of
the Kabisawali People's Government. 13 On the Gazelle Peninsula the
Mataungan Association indicated that it would move soon for district
government without participation by the Toma Council if necessary. And
on matters social, the Rabaul Workers' Association ended a three month ban
on the supply of films to an expatriate-owned cinema for its refusal to admit
Papua New Guineans wearing thongs, while the House of Assembly debated
the motives and character of those expatriates who wore lap-laps!
23
MAYAUGUST 1974
David Hegarty
The politics of relative advantage and the sttugglt: fu1 puwt:r and influence
in the changing power structure continue to characterise Papua New Guinea
affairs. In this review period, both the government and the polity at large came
under increasing pressure from disagreement over such issues as economic
management and control; independence; nationalism and national unity; and
the future constitutional framework. As a result further divisions appeared
in the country's ruling elite which are likely to last well into independence.
Pressure and Response
A galloping inflation rate estimated at twenty per cent and rises in the cost
of living of six per cent in the first quarter and ten per cent in the second,
produced increasing unrest amongst the urban population. In mid-June a
crowd of Papuan women stormed and damaged the Chief Minister's offices
in Konedobu demanding higher wages for their husbands and a freeze on
prices. 1 The following day in a repeat demonstration the. women physically
attacked Michael Somare, Minister for Defence and Foreign Relations,
Albert Maori Kiki, and members of their staff as they tried to address a
crowd at the Sir Hubert Murray football stadium. Trade union leaders who
had earlier rejected the government's proposed policy of "wage restraint" 2
and who were currently appearing before both rural and urban boards of
inquiry into wages warned of a series of rolling strikes if their demands were
not met. The Public Service Association which had seen its agreement on a
wages freeze rendered obsolete by the spiralling cost of living demanded
an immediate increase in public service salaries.
The government responded by widening price control measures on such
staples as rice, flour and tinned fish and by reducing taxes on some food
items in the hope that prices would be reduced. A fresh vegetable supply
was instituted for the Port Moresby area as a government service to
supplement the city's markets. Efforts were made to locate cheaper overseas
supplies of sugar, and the Department of Agriculture disseminated portable
rice mills and investigated potential commercial sugar growing areas in the
country. Despite inflation the economy was reported to be sound by the
Secretary for Finance with good returns from primary export crops. 3
May-August 1974
221
In the first week in June the government was subjected to pressure from
striking students at both universities. The strikes initially were called over
food and allowances, but escalated into demands of national significance
when the government took a tough, anti-elitist line. The students demanded
a freeze on ministerial, MHA and senior public servant's salaries, an
immediate increase in the minimum wage, renegotiation of the Bougainville
copper agreement and controls on foreign investment, more strict control
over the behaviour and international trips of ministers, and the sale of a
ministerial retreat outside Port Moresby. One of the continuing themes of
student criticism of the government had been of its general economic
strategy: of the hiatus between rhetoric and action on the Eight Point Plan.
The students were pacified by a series of promises but by tying up cabinet
for at least two afternoons and by forcing the hand of some ministers they
had shown that they had some influence within the political system. Their
actions, in part, prompted a major speech by the Minister for Finance, Julius
Chan, on the difficulties of managing the economy and of implementing
the government's "equalisation" policies. Chan attempted to answer the
critics of his government's encouragement of foreign investment and he
spoke of the nect<ssity to increase internal revenue through large scale
resource projects.
Pressure from the PPP not to move to independence until satisfactory
citizenship provisions had been agreed to, and from sections of the United
party which had indicated support to the government in its confrontation
with the CPC, pushed the Chief Minister into amending his original 1
December 1974 target date for independence. 5 In the House on 25 June, the
Chief Minister proposed that independence be achieved "as soon as
practicable after a constitution had been enacted by this House". Opposition
leader, Tei Abal, further amended the motion so that the House of Assembly
itself would endorse any independence date. 6 The Australian government's
policy to treat Papua New Guinea as "an independent nation" both helped
the Chief Minister and, at the same time, created difficulties for him in
negotiating consensus in Port Moresby. 7
Perhaps the greatest shock to the government came when some of the
Papuan ministers questioned the desirability of Papuan union with New
Guinea at independence. The Minister for Commerce, Ebia Olewale, (South
Fly) in opening the Port Moresby show questioned whether unity and
independence in December were the only options open for Papuans. 8
Meetings of Papuan MHAs throughout that week however ended in
stalemate. No rapprochement occurred between Olewale and Josephine
Abaijah. Although they were seeking the same goals by different methods,
according to Olewale, Abaijah was "too emotional" for him to become
involved with her Papua Besena movement. 9 The Papuan MHAs, however,
did establish themselves as a bargaining faction which the Chief Minister
would have to take into account in the event of a cabinet reshuffle or further
constitutional change.
For eighteen months or more the government had underestimated the
strength of Papuan separatist feeling. By the end of August, at the instigation
222
David Hegarty
of the Chief Minister's research officer and Pangu president, Moi Avei, a
"Papuan Task Force" was established to recommend "on all types of
development opportunities in Papua", and in Avei's words, "to get some
action out of the bureaucracy" . 10 Ironically the Task Force occupied the
recently vacated CPC offices in Waigani and politicians were already
wondering what political threat these young Papuan organisers might pose.
These and other pressures therefore gave rise to a period of uncertainty
which in turn gave rise to the impression that things were "falling apart"
with the most crucial challenge - that of the constitution - yet to come. In
this situation it was obvious that the "numbers game" was well and truly in
operation.
Rt>port of the Constitutional Planning Committee

On 27 June the long awaited report of the CPC was tabled in the House in
draft form. The preceding months had been marked by acrimonious and
emotional argument over the question of citizenship which culminated in a
public dispute between the Minister for Natural Resources, Bruce Jephcott,
who alleged that the CPC provisions were racist, and the deputy chairman
of the CPC, John Momis, who defended the proposals and accused Jephcott
of breaching cabinet confidentiality. 11 The political storm really broke,
however, when Somare and his deputy, John Guise, simultaneously tabled
a minority report along with the CPC documents. The reports differed
substantially in such key areas as citizenship, head of state, power of
legislature, provincial government, leadership and investment codes, and
the overall size of the constitution. The Post-Courier on the next day carried
the headline: "Somare v CPC". In the weeks which followed group and
individual opinion began to polarise around the reports. Splits within some
of the parties emerged. Members of the Pangu executive-:- more radical than
the parliamentary wing- threatened to resign unless they were included in
party discussions on the report. Pangu president, Moi Avei, declared that
parliamentarians must listen to the "voice of the masses as expressed through
the party's grass-roots organisation" .12 The split was quickly healed. When
Pangu met, three CPC members (Momis, Kasau and Ila) were ordered from
the meeting after they had criticised "deals" between Somare and the PPP
and some members of the UP (Somare refuted this). When the United party
met to discuss the report angry Papua New Guinean members declared that
they would organise separate meetings for black members only to prevent
expatriates dominating the discussion.
On 3 July Kaputin and Momis (labelled the architects of the report, which
they refuted) challenged the "moral position" of the minority report, Kaputin
claiming that it was "an abuse of the trust of leadership", "an abuse of
political power for political ends", and "political expediency".n Somare
replied that he was entitled to submit a minority view and that he would
accept any challenge to his leadership on the floor of the House. He criticised
Kaputin for not attending cabinet meetings and said that he would consult
his colleagues about retaining Kaputin in the ministry. 14
May-August 1974
223
Fr Momis and Michael Somare also engaged in a slanging match: Momis

accused Somare of dependence on white advisers, of mediocre leadership,
of collaboration with other parties and of using his black staff merely as
"flower pots". Somare retaliated by reminding Momis of his own white
consultants and of treating the report as his "Bible" .15 When the final CPC
report and a "Government Paper on Constitutional Proposals" appeared soon
after, Momis referred to them respectively as the "black paper" and the
"white paper" . 16
Outside these circles discussion groups including Public Service
Association branches met to consider the proposals. Some CPC members
visited educational institutions throughout the country. At the University
of Papua New Guinea a "Teach-In" was held and showed student
support was solidly behind the CPC report identifying it as a nationalist
document.
The House of Assembly adjourned briefly to allow members to
examine the reports, but it was obvious that much more time for
consideration was needed. Equally obvious was that the government had
almost completely outmanoeuvred the CPC and had pushed it onto the
defensive. The CPC's strategy was virtually non-existent. When the
report first appeared in the House it was incomplete; in roneoed form
only, it amounted to a mass of individual chapters of "recommendations"
and "narrative". The committee had not met as a whole to give final
approval. Not all of the report was intended for inclusion in the constitution
but a separate schedule would indicate the appropriate sections. Little
lobbying had been done of other MHAs for their support and once party
discussions commenced the commitment of individual members to the total
report began to wane. The minority report, and the government paper
which followed it, on the other hand, had the advantage of brevity. The
complexity of the proposals and issues involved was beyond many of the
members. Any "radical" departure from present practice was to be suspect.
Differences between CPC members over specific issues were carefully
exploited. As well any incumbent government enjoys advantages in terms
of the resources it can bring to bear or the rewards it can offer over those
opposing it. Rumours of a reshuffle which might include UP members and
of a possible Pangu-UP coalition induced some to be wary of joining forces
with the CPC.
The report and the issues it raised did cause a shift in alignments in the
House. The strategic abandonment of the December independence date
ensured a majority for the government on most issues, but it was a majority
which relied on some United party support. The government was concerned
that the newly formed Country party 17 together with the CPC "group" and
the original Opposition might on occasions defeat the government. In the
face of a potential threat to their position the minority parties - PPP and
National - maintained their cohesion and solidarity. Pangu membership
remained firm while the UP appeared to be crumbling at the edges. The CPC
group retained its all-party stance and appeared as though it may in future
occupy the traditional role of an opposition.
224
David Hegarty
The Kaputin Affair

One of the significant events of the review period linked with the CPC
dispute and the struggle for power was the sacking of Justice Minister, John
Kaputin. In mid-July the Chief Minister requested Kaputin 's resignation on
the grounds that he had publicly challenged his leadership and that his
performance as a minister was unsatisfactory. 18 Somare said that his cabinet
must work as a "team" with mutual trust and cooperation so long as he was
"captain".
Kaputin who had been attending law conferences in Fiji and Australia,
and who heard of the resignation request over the radio, returned to Port
Moresby four days later on 23 July. At his press conference he made a long
statement in which he said that the present dispute, he believed, was not
between the Chief Minister and htmselt but was part of a wider struggle
between the nationalists fighting for the rights of Papua New Guineans and
the foreign establishment (together with those blacks who had been "sucked
into the system") who maintained economic and political control. He saw
no just cause for his resignation; his work on the CPC had taken priority
over his other activities and his departmental responsibilities were related
to policy rather than day-to-day matters. He pointed out that he had founded
the first black development corporation in PNG (the New Guinea
Development Corporation) and that, as minister he had proposed a number
of important new legal and economic measures. He had been frustrated in
some of his work and "overruled" on decisions he had made relating to the
appointment of acting judges. His duty lay in serving the people and not in
becoming a "good bureaucrat", signing "little pieces of paper" .19 He would
not resign but would let the MHAs decide his fate. Kaputin then returned
to the Gazelle Peninsula to discuss his position with his parliamentary
colleagues and the Tolai people.
.
Somare did not have the constitutional authority to dismiss Kaputin.
That authority Jay with the Australian minister responsible for PNG affairs
to recommend to the Governor-General the termination of a ministerial
appointment "in the public interest". 20 The alternative procedure was for
the seven-person Ministerial Nominations Committee of the House to meet
with the High Commissioner and then recommend to the House by motion
that a ministerial appointment be revoked. Somare refuted Kaputin's claims
on the initiatives he had taken and then stripped him of his Justice portfolio
and barred him from cabinet. Opposition leader, Tei Abal, supported the
Chief Minister's right to discipline ministers.
The support which rallied for Kaputin and the threat that the Mataungans
might break away from the coalition obviously concerned Somare and his
advisers. Leo Hannett, the Bougainville activist and architect of district
government for Bougainville met Kaputin at the airport on his return. Fr
Momis immediately defended Kaputin's work in the CPC and other
committee members later criticised his dismissal. Paul Langro, deputy
Leader of the Opposition criticised the Chief Minister and cabinet for having
"discarded their nationalism". University students speaking at a forum were
May-August 1974
225
almost unanimous in condemning Kaputin's dismissal and angrily attacked

the government's "white advisers". A meeting of senior Tolai public servants
in Port Moresby condemned the "cowardly manner" in which the sacking
was made. On 28 July a group of black public servants and trade union
officials calling themselves the "real nationalists" attacked the government
for its dictatorial approach, for its minority report, and for allowing the
"foreign establishment" to continue its domination. Early in August
dissidents in the Pangu executive declared themselves "fed up" with the
parliamentary wing for ignoring policy directives and with the coalition for
its continued compromise. On the Gazelle it became obvious that Kaputin
still commanded wide support. A series of meetings was held at which
village leaders were briefed on the issues and which culminated in a 2,000
strong meeting which demanded Kaputin's immediate reinstatement, district
government for the Gazelle, and no independence on the basis of the
minority report. 21
Efforts were made behind the scenes for a reconciliation between the two
leaders. An offer of another ministry for Kaputin appeared likely, but
Kaputin in drawing up a list of demands appeared in no mood to
compromise. By the end of the August session of the House the issue had
still not been resolved.
Throughout 1974 relations between Somare and Kaputin- friends of
fairly long standing - began to deteriorate and differences over basic
political issues emerged. In February Kaputin fired a broadside at the
national leadership for its lack of commitment to the national interestY Later
that month he was almost demoted in the cabinet reshuffle. The two leaders
began publicly sniping at each other: Somare ridiculing Kaputin for
preferring a Western-oriented, elitist education system; Kaputin replying
sarcastically that he could not help his fellow ministers "if they cannot see
beyond the pages of their written speeches"Y Kaputin had on many
occasions expressed his frustration both at the system of law which PNG
had inherited ("white man's law") and at the lack of support he received in
attempts to change it ("I'm just an office boy"). 24 His challenge to the Chief
Minister's minority report sealed the conflict between the two, for the time
being at least.
Deeper in the dispute, however, are differences in political style and in
approaches to political change and economic development. Kaputin has
always adopted an aggressive anti-colonialist stance, believing that the
dependence syndrome must be broken through social and political
mobilisation. He is a political rebel in the sense that he refuses to be tied to
or be identified with a particular system. He is an economic nationalist with
a firm resolve to gain national control over the economy (as far as is
possible) and to engage Papua New Guineans in the economy through
corporate capitalism. Nationalism, he believes, can only be generated
through political involvement and the working out of smaller group and
regional identities. His desire for rapid social and political change and his
unwillingness to compromise constituted a threat to the survival and stability
of the present government whose posture on decolonisation is essentially
226
David Hegarty
cautious and conservative. To the nationalists, however, he represented a

just cause.
As the review period ended a dispute broke out between the head of the
Department of the Interior, Simon Kaumi, and his minister, John Poe,
reflecting both the difficulties involved in grafting on a ministerial system
to a colonial bureaucracy and the problems of role adjustment as the
administration undergoes the trauma of becoming a national one. The stress
and strain observed in this period truly reflect the remark of the visiting
Fijian Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, that whoever invented "selfgovernment" obviously had never had to make it work. "Full steam ahead
for independence" was his advice.
24
David Hegarty
The Constitution Debate

The debate on the proposed constitution was the dominant political feature
in the last months of 197 4. After the draft report of the Constitutional
Planning Committee (CPC) had been tabled in the House in June, all parties
met to discuss the report and propose alternative recommendations. A small
team within the Chief Minister's Office worked quickly to produce a
"counter" document to the CPC report. The "Government Paper- Proposals
on Constitutional Principles and Explanatory Notes" was tabled in the House
in mid-August shortly after the CPC final report. The United party issued
its proposals on the constitution late in September. 1 The CPC report was an
intensely nationalist document. The ideology of change explicit in the
discussion of national goals, however, was not really matched by the
recommended institutional changes. The report also exhibited a suspicion
of power and a desire to limit executive authority (which some observers
thought unusual of "radicals"). The government paper was essentially a
response to the perceived challenge to government authority. Although the
paper accepted many of the CPC recommendations in principle, it was
largely concerned with the continuity of existing institutions and with
maintaining the political status quo.
The report and government paper differed on a number of significant
issues, the first being the size and scope of the constitution. The CPC
recommended a very comprehensive document which would include
statements on national goals, human rights, leadership, and investment as
well as detailed provisions on governmental structures and intergovernmental
relations. The government proposed a short document excluding much of
the detail in the interests of flexibility. It suggested that many CPC
recommendations be embodied either in organic or ordinary legislation.
The difference which generated most heat and which had repercussions
elsewhere in the polity was that over citizenship. The CPC argued for
stringent citizenship requirements whereby only people with two indigenous
grandparents and who were not "real" citizens of another country could
become automatic citizens ofPNG. Foreigners and people of mixed descent
who had acquired other citizenship (or who had enjoyed the privileges of a
foreigner in terms of salary and position) would be required to wait eight
228
David Hegarty
years before being eligible for naturalisation. The CPC argued that a
residential period prior to "Citizenship Day" should not be counted towards
this time as the life enjoyed during the colonial period had not "prepared"
foreigners for a life in independent PNG. The CPC argued that such
requirements would help create a national identity; would enhance
localisation of employment and business; would ensure that nationals were
in political control - and would help overcome "the present serious
imbalance in the distribution of benefits and opportunities" in society. 2 The
government's proposals differed in two respects. Firstly it provided for
"provisional citizenship" whereby people who had eight years' continuous
residence, who satisfied naturalisation criteria, and who applied, could retain
all rights of citizens including that of holding public office and of standing
for elections. 3 Secondly the government paper provided for a Citizenship
Advisory Committee, different from that of the CPC, which operated at a
national level and with only one community member coopted to advise on
the acceptability in the local area of the applicant. The government, however,
had given considerable ground since the original proposal in the minority
report of Michael Somare and John Guise.
A third area of difference arose over the power of parliament vis-a-vis
the executive. 4 The CPC recommended that the national parliament be
strengthened by the introduction of powerful permanent committees which
would have wide investigatory powers in all fields of governmental activity.
The CPC argued for the need to increase backbench participation and for a
more constructive role for parliament. The government paper proposed that
a committee system be allowed to evolve but such a "watch-dog" system as
proposed by the CPC could render parliament unworkable (particularly if
captured by an opposition party). The government also proposed the
retention of Regional electorates, which the CPC wanted abolished, and
elections every five years as against the CPC's four. 5 The CPC proposed that
in "Melanesian tradition" there would be no single head of state but that
legal executive power should be vested in a National Executive Council
comprising all ministers, and that most symbolic functions should be
performed by the Speaker. The government, however, provided for a head
of state to wield executive power on the advice of the National Executive
Council. Differences arose over the election of the prime minister: the CPC
arguing for a direct election immediately after that of the Speaker; the
government arguing for appointment by the head of state and the subsequent
endorsement by the House (probably in an attempt to avoid the confusion
in balloting which occurred when the coalition came to power in 1972). A
serious difference arose over transitional provisions involving the prime
minister and his ministry. The CPC recommended a "spill" of all ministerial
positions immediately the constitution was adopted- then the election of a
prime minister who would then select a new ministry. The United party
supported this proposal and came close to defeating the government on the
issue.
Chapter ten of the CPC report on provincial government began: "There
is a widespread discontent with the present distribution of power in our
229
country, and a deep yearning among our people for a greater say in the
conduct of their affairs" .6 Further on Professors Tordoff and Watts- two
political scientists commissioned to report on central-provincial relations
-are quoted as saying "in our experience of political systems in Asia, Africa
and the Caribbean, we have not come across an administrative system so
highly centralised and dominated by its bureaucracy". 7 The chapter then
argued the case for devolution of powers and proposed categories of powers
necessary for provincial autonomy to exist within a unitary system, and the
stages by which the scheme could be implemented. The government paper
agreed in principle but qualified its statement with warnings of the cost of
creating many small bureaucracies, of the need for flexibility and of the
necessity for ordinary legislation to provide it, of the difficulty of classifying
powers, and of the need for the centre to retain taxing and disbursement
powers. 8 Other differences arose over the method of appointing judges and
senior officials, and over the use of the defence force in times of civil
unrest.
The debates in the House of Assembly took place with the House meeting
in committee with the intention of sending drafting instructions to the
Legislative Council for the preparation of a draft constitution. The Chief
Minister moved that the CPC recommendations be approved subject to the
amendments and differences set out in the government paper. The debates
were not particularly illuminating. Only on rare occasions did the standard
rise above repetition of arguments used in the documents, or did the
"founding fathers" discuss constitutional principles or points of political
theory. In fact, from the start, the debate had become a matter of numbers
and negotiation. The CPC members formed a PNG Nationalist Pressure
Group in an attempt to muster a block of votes. The government, however,
maintained its majority on almost every occasion. It had reached agreement
with the United party Opposition on many issues and easily outvoted the
Nationalist Pressure Group and the Country party. On other occasions the
government allowed UP amendments. The NPG achieved maximum support
of twenty-eight but on a number of occasions its members were either absent
or voted with the government. On the citizenship issue the government
carried its amendment by fifty-one votes to twenty-one. The closest shave
for the government in this numbers game came on 27 November when the
UP supported the CPC recommendation that the ministry resign immediately
the constitution was adopted. Opposition leader Tei Abal's amendment was
defeated thirty-six votes to thirty-eight. It was unanimously agreed in private
at that time that Somare would win an election for prime minister, but the
opposing groups were hopeful that a "spill" would give them a chance to
select a new ministry from all sections of the House. The number of MHAs
voting on this issue was inexplicably smalJ.9 Tore Lokoloko, an Opposition
front bencher, voted with the government as did Tony Ila, a member of the
CPC. Fr Momis was absent on sick leave during that session.
The internal politicking of the period was understandably difficult to
follow. The government worked hard to maintain its majority by
"sounding-out" backbenchers from both sides for possible ministerial
230
David Hegarty
positions, and by watching closely the movements of MHAs out of Port

Moresby particularly towards the end of sessions. Efforts were made to
dampen criticism within the extra-parliamentary Pangu pati and a more
conciliatory line was taken towards unions and their leaders. The ministry
appeared to close ranks after the "Kaputin affair" and particularly under the
threat of a "spill". The shifting alignments in the House operated in the
government's favour. Albert Maori Kiki, Minister for Foreign Relations and
Trade, told university students that the Pangu and United parties were
moving closer together and that the opposing group was now the "young,
nationalist radicals". Whether or not a "deal" was made between government
and opposition was not possible to verify but Opposition leader Tei Abal
became one of Somare's most consistent supporters throughout this period.
At one stage Abal remarked that the United party would be happy to continue
in opposition while the government remained responsible. The NPG Itself
was not a particularly cohesive body and contained some strange political
bedfellows.
There is little doubt that 1974 represented a crisis period in Papua New
Guinea's modern political history. The constitution debate raised many
issues fundamental to the basic fabric of the state and on which there was
little real opinion or consensus. It was a year in which the government was
faced with a choice in its orientation. Pangu strategists had estimated the
support it would receive if, for example, its leaders moved to accommodate
the "radical nationalists". They also estimated the support and consequences
of some form of merger with sections of the UP at the expense of the PPP
and National party. They concluded that adopting a conservative stance and
maintaining the coalition was the safest posture. The issues raised during
the year tended to divide the elite almost into "two camps". The prevailing
atmosphere prompted political scientist Ralph Premdas to warn of the
possibility of a "more centralised coercive apparatus"_ usurping political
authority. 10
Other Issues
Many other issues either ran parallel to or cut across the debate on the
constitution. The one most immediately affected was the date of
independence. The delay in debating and adopting the constitution meant
that either June or September 1975 were likely targets. The Australian
government continued to show its impatience. Prime Minister Whitlam told
the UN General Assembly in November that he hoped a date would soon
be announced. It was reported later that month that Australia had suggested
unilateral decolonisation on its part if events were not speeded up. Australia
then resolved to treat PNG as though it were independent and on 3 December
legislation was passed in the House of Representatives clearing the way for
PNG to assume control over its own defence and foreign affairs. On 13
December the UN adopted a resolution to end the trusteeship agreement
when notified by PNG of its independence from Australia.
One of the continuing issues has been that of control over foreign
231
investment. The government temporarily silenced most of its critics by the

successful renegotiation of the Bougainville Copper agreement in October.
A series of conferences from April to October between the government and
BCL produced an arrangement apparently favourable to PNG, but only after
Somare had threatened to legislate amendments to the Act. BCL's profit in
its first full year of production was $158 million and its half-yearly profit
to June 1974 totalled $118 million. The major terms of the renegotiation
were the termination of the tax holiday from the end of 1973, three years
ahead of the original agreement; normal company taxation of thirty per cent
on profits up to $87 million (adjustable each year) and a super tax of seventy
per cent on profits in excess of that figure; and restrictions on further mining
development on Bougainville. 11 The PNG government retained its twenty
per cent equity in the company. The Chief Minister estimated that the new
agreement would earn the country $90 million in 1974 instead of $35
million, and that between $200 million and $500 million would be gleaned
over the next ten years depending on copper prices.
A series of incidents which became known as the "Kaumi affair"
illustrated the depth of public feeling over the nationalist issues (citizenship,
foreign control, localisation), and also illustrated the problems of adjustment
which the administrative machine was experiencing. In August Simon
Kaumi, Secretary of the Interior Department, had publicly criticised his
minister, John Poe, for being inept and dominated by his white adviser,
Warren Dutton (a former MHA). 12 He also accused white officers in the
Corrective Institution Service, for which he was administratively
responsible, of obstructionism. Kaumi was suspended briefly then reinstated
when the Chief Minister acted promptly to reconcile the minister and his
department head and to forestall a call for a public inquiry by the CPC
members in the House. Kaumi then chaired a public meeting organised by
an "action group" of public servants and students at which criticism of
government policies was made and at which he is alleged to have said "down
with the coalition government - up with the new government" .13 On 12
October the action group organised a demonstration march of about 500
people from Boroko via Koki market to the city. Speakers, including Kaumi
and John Kaputin, former Justice Minister, accused the government of
"selling out" the country. Kaumi was suspended on pay by the Public Service
Board and later, when found guilty by a tribunal of improper conduct,
suspended without pay. His criticisms brought a response from departmental
heads denying that they were lackeys, 14 while Somare stressed that public
servants could become involved in politics only "in an orderly manner and
through the right channels". 15
The government responded to the charge of permitting foreign economic
domination by pointing to the renegotiated Bougainville agreement, but it
was obviously concerned about structural and personnel problems within
the public service. 16 It maintained its argument that the bureaucratic
infrastructure and the nature of development problems were such as to
require a continuing expatriate presence, but it acknowledged the need for
greater cooperation and for higher levels of involvement in
232
David Hegarty
decision-makingY Meanwhile the newly appointed Papua New Guinean

members of the Public Service Board were preparing a report on structural
changes.
Regional pressures continued in Papua and on Bougainville. Papua
Besena leader, Josephine Abaijah, rejected provincial government as a
solution while a newly formed "Papua group" called for state governments
for all Papuan districts. In November the two groups joined forces and in
early December presented a petition to the High Commissioner, Tom
Critchley, demanding an Australia-wide tour so that separationists could put
their cause to the Australian public. The two groups want Papua to exist as
a nation in its own right and as a federation of states. ' 8 On Bougainville the
provincial government issued an ultimatum to the central government that
it would block the J aba River and deprive the copper mine of its water supply
unlc::~~ ruyaltic::~ from the:: mine were paid directly to Bougainville.
Negotiations between ministers and the government resulted in royalties
being granted to Bougainville and the cancellation of a special $2.4 million
grant. 19 In the Highlands continued tribal fighting stirred the government
into preparing controlling legislation but the task was complicated by
requests from some MHAs for active support against opposing tribes. 20
The sequel to the "Kaputin affair" (see Political Chronicle for MayAugust 1974) saw the former Justice Minister voted out of office by the
House fifty-two votes to twelve. Somare moved the motion of dismissal and
said that Kaputin had been offered another ministry but had continued to
make provocative anti-government statements. The government then gagged
the debate forty-eight votes to twenty-four. 21 Two days later in a statement
to the House, Kaputin replied to criticism of his performance and condemned
the behaviour and performance of cabinet and other ministers. He said that
in his proposals for change he had not received support from the Chief
Minister or cabinet. He concluded his statement: "I am interested in total
change for the people of Papua New Guinea and you can be sure, Mr
Speaker, that the next time around I will be knocking at the door". 22 The
sacking of John Kasaipwalova in December from the Village Development
Task Force brought to an end, temporarily at least, the foray into government
by the three most radical young politicians of the early seventies- Hannet,
Kaputin and Kasaipwalova.
25
JANUARY-JUNE 1975
James Griffin
Secession Movements
Superficially at least, the two most ominous events in a dramatic semester

were the unilateral declaration of independence by the Papua Besena
movement and the declaration of intent to secede by Bougainville. At dawn
on 16 March in the Port Moresby village of Baruni, Josephine Abaijah raised
the red, white and blue flag of the Papuan republic and then, in nearby
Tatana, lowered the Australian flag for emphasis. She also enacted a charade
of yielding up separately a hunting knife, a bolt of pink calico, two sticks
of tobacco, three ship's biscuits and an axe, symbolising the cargo with
which Australia occupied her land. "Take them back, Australia - we wish
you well", she said, "but we are free now and we claim our land for
ourselves". 1 In the afternoon an enthusiastic crowd estimated at 3,000 saw
her stage a satire against New Guinean "colonialism", Australian
"arrogance", Papuan politicians who supported unity and the "colonialist"
media2 (which, however, has almost indulged her). The overall gesture was
pathetic in both senses: moving and ineffectual. This was not because Papua
Besena lacks popular support, especially in the Central district, but because
its leaders are reluctant or unable to organise so as to offer the violence
which makes secessionism politically viable. Indeed Abaijah claims to
espouse non-violence. Michael Somare could therefore take the whole affair
coolly. He said he would take no action against separatists providing they
did not break the law and he "defended the right of the people to hold
political rallies if they so wished". "If six villages go and declare
independence", he said, "I don't take it as a mandate from the people". 3
In fact, even where the secondary groups affiliated with Papua Besena
made threatening gestures, Somare declined to act. In January, Simon Kaumi
-at one time designated "interim chief minister of an independent Papua" 4
-formed a Papuan republican fighters army of some 150 men and took over
an expatriate-owned plantation near Popondetta (Northern district). Late in
February some fifty of these "liberators" staged a symbolic "long march"
along the Kokoda Trail (four days for fifty-three miles) to the plateau behind
Port Moresby. The straggling band arrived to be greeted by some cautionary
but casual police but not by their leader who, although he flew into Port
Moresby, was (symbolically?) two and a half hours late. "I think he is
234
James Griffin
history", 5 said Somare of Kaumi and soon after dismissed him finally from
the public service. 6 Similarly groups with names such as the Papuan
Liberation movement and the Papuan Black Power movement seemed to
take up ominous postures but showed little capacity for mobilisation. The
only effective power base Papua Besena has lies in its majority in the Port
Moresby City Council which voted to support the Papuan republic but
seemed to take seriously enough the government's threat to disband it if it
openly abused its authority. Papuan politicians such as Dr (now Sir) John
Guise (from Milne Bay district) and Tom Koraea (Gulf) warned that
separatist feeling may be overwhelmingly strong during the next
elections, 7 perhaps in order to draw attention to the needs of their districts,
but they remain loyal to Somare and unity. Papuans seem too strongly
entrenched in cabinet, the public service, army, police, church, and
commerce, and their villages seem too dispersed for secessionism to be
more than a nagging problem, unless there is an utter breakdown of law and
order. 8
Bougainville posed a much more serious issue. A provisional provincial
government had been meeting since January 1974 and was functioning with
an elan unprecedented in PNG. (For example, by March seventy-five per
cent of its engineering programme for 1974-75 had been completed.) It had
won the copper royalties (approximately $2.5 million) from the government
in December and was investing in transport and commerce. The small fleet
of Bougainville Airways, acquired in freehold, was already flying under the
sub-national insignia of the traditional initiatory upi hat. The central
government, however, continued to put off the promised official provincial
elections. In February the Chief Electoral Officer maintained that the
administrative problems would be worked out by March. 9 In March it was
claimed that the rolls could not be drawn up until the constitutional
provisions on citizenship had been determined. There were grave doubts in
Bougainville as to the government's sincerity rather than about its ability
to decentralise power. The final impasse came when a central government
team met the provincial government representatives on 29 April at Arawa
to discuss the 1975-76 capital works programme. The provincial government
sought Kina (K)5.3 million* for a rolling programme. It was granted Kl.3
million (excluding royalties) which was insufficient to meet its contractual
agreements. From a reading of the minutes and discussion with observers
it is difficult not to deduce either utter misunderstanding or provocation on
the part of the central government and either intransigence and insensitivity
to the national interest or deeply-laid guile on the part of some Bougainville
leaders. In any case it seems not to have been appreciated by the central
government that the K5.3 million was for a rolling programme- the
provincial government simply lacks the capacity to spend that much- and
that some K3 million would have sufficed for 1975-76. Meanwhile Hannett
(perhaps deliberately) failed to clarify the issue. On 30 May "by an almost
* A national currency was introduced in April 197 5, kina and toea replacing
Australian dollars and cents (eds).
January-June 1975
235
unanimous vote" and with the support of "some 200 elected traditional
leaders" the assembly resolved to secede from PNG.A vote of no-confidence
was moved in Sir Paul Lapun (South Bougainville) and Donatus Mola (North
Bougainville), both ministers in the Somare government, and soon after
Raphael Bele (Central Bougainville) and Fr Momis (Bougainville Regional)
announced that they would resign from the House of Assembly in support
of secession. Secession was also somewhat ambivalently supported by Dr
Alexis Sarei, the District Commissioner but, in spite of pressure from the
Post-Courier, Somare did no more than place his position "under review" .10
On 12 June a fourteen-man delegation from Bougainville flew to Port
Moresby for talks with the central government which quickly broke down
because of the presence of Lapun and Mola. The Bougainvillean team
insisted that secession was non-negotiable and that it wanted K150 million
to set up its own government; in return it would negotiate PNG's twenty
per cent equity in the copper mine. Naturally the central government was
prepared merely to offer a little more for capital works.
From this point speculation raged as to how much support the
Bougainvilleans had. The Post-Courier and the National Broadcasting
Commission (NBC) slanted every index of support for the government, but
Dr Sarei, who headed a fact-finding team around Bougainville, was probably
justified in estimating support at some eighty-six per cent. At the end of
June an official government team under the Minister for Justice, Ebia
Olewale, was preparing to visit Bougainville to find its own facts and
encourage potential supporters. The government was said to be entertaining
various ploys such as "divide-and-conquer" by paying monies only to groups
supporting it, blocking off services, evacuating personnel and even sending
Bougainvillean students home from the mainland. However, any blockade
would affect mining efficiency and the workers' rampage in May made these
seem dubious tactics. The only bright spot was that Abaijah, instead of
applauding fragmentation, sent the Bougainville Provincial Assembly a bill
for K4, 100 million "payable to the Republic of Papua for damages caused
to Papua and Papuans by Bougainville projects and policies" .n The not so
silly side of this is that the Bougainvillean stance, by promoting antagonism,
seemed to be having not so much a "domino effect" as a consolidating effect
on other Papua New Guineans.
Setting the Date for Independence
On 6 March, in "a pre-independence day surprise move", Australia
transferred full sovereign rights over defence and foreign relations to Papua
New Guinea. This was a move "unprecedented in modern political history"
because, said the Post-Courier, "by definition no country can hold such
power until it is a sovereign state, because formal international status does
not exist before independence". 12 In his announcement to the House of
Assembly on 4 March, Sir Maori Kiki, Minister for Foreign Relations and
Trade, admitted that PNG was now "in a peculiar position" but that a special
relationship had been arrived at "to make the plan work in the short period
236
James Griffin
which still remains before independence". It meant, said the Post-Courier,

that there was "a cast-iron gentleman's agreement in which Australia
instructs the High Commissioner, Tom Critchley, to take his orders from
Port Moresby, instead of Canberra", although he remained the effective head
of state. PNG, in turn, would not enter into any foreign relationships which
would conflict with Australia's arrangements or her relationship with the
United Nations. Australia's military assets, worth $66 million, were handed
over in spite of her trusteeship of at least the old mandate's defence until
PNG Defence Force came into being under a new Defence Act; indigenous
personnel were "discharged" by Australia and "re-enlisted" by the Defence
Force; while Australians remained on secondment. Maori Kiki assured the
House "that Australia had undertaken to continue providing men and support
for as long as required" .13 Bill Morrison, Australian Minister for PNG affairs,
f~lt it n~c-~ssary to stress that the move was a response "to the wishes of
Papua New Guinea" and was "further evidence of Australia's belief that
Papua New Guinea was now fully able to manage its own affairs".
The Australian government was obviously exasperated that there was no
clear date for independence. Somare's government had agreed in July 1974,
in return for the withholding of some amendments by the United party, that
it would not announce an independence date until the final draft of the
constitution had been revised and passed, and until its main organic laws
had been agreed on. As these laws dealt with "human rights and emergency
powers, provincial government, the leadership code, ombudsman,
citizenship and parliament" it was unlikely that they would have a smooth
passage. Moreover, the government had been, with good reason, accused
of making unauthorised changes to the final draft of the constitution and
the Opposition groups were determined that these changes would be set
aside. Somare wanted Independence Day to be in June, but Abal, the
Opposition leader, declared this "totally impractical" and warned that "it
appeared that the Chief Minister was backing away from his promises". The
United party did not "favour any particular date for independence". It wanted
"a complete and meaningful document" whereas the government "clearly
wanted a short simple Bill of general principles" in which there would be
"too many loopholes"Y So no date was set in March, and, although the
government made new schedules during May for the announcement of
Independence Day (it was to be hoped on 5 June), the United party insisted
on seeing the organic laws, "the fine print of the Constitution", first.
There was especially strong opposition to the unauthorised change from
the two-thirds majority rule for altering the constitution to the majority rule
principle. The Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG) and the Country party,
which had formed a united front on the constitution demanded the
appointment of a new legislative draftsman to replace C.J. Lynch who had
"continually misunderstood clear drafting instructions, for whatever reasons".
They sought the adjournment of theN ational Constitutional Assembly until
the end of June and an agreement on which organic laws should be passed
before independence and they insisted that the government reaffirm that it
would be up to the House to decide on a date for independence. Somare's
January-June 1975
237
reply to the allegation of treating the House of Assembly's drafting

instructions "with contempt" was that "the final instructions on the fourth
draft constitution did not get to the draughtsman until five days before the
draft went to press". It was up to anyone now "to move to amend the
provision on the floor of the National Constituent Assembly. The final
decision ... is for all members of the House to decide." 15 Even the PostCourier, which had become so much Somare's ally, noted that this statement
did "nothing to allay the fears of opposition groups that the Government is
flaunting with the principle of democracy". (The alternative explanation is
gross incompetence.) John Kaputin (Rabaul Open) said that the subversion
of the constitution before it was even adopted "threatened the unity of the
country in a way which had not yet been realized by the people", and even
the Minister for Transport, Iambakey Okuk, agreed "as a member of the
Constituent Assembly" that the government "should be blamed" for the
changes.
Somare was rattled by the criticism and retaliated over the NBC with an
uncharacteristically ill-tempered attack on the (unnamed) Constitutional
Planning Committee's legal adviser, John Ley. He said the government was
prepared to move an amendment: "There was no deliberate change by the
Government of the two-thirds majority for entrenching the Constitution.
This happened through a misunderstanding, through manipulation by certain
advisers and in rushing to have the draft prepared by the press." He did not
concede the point of the leader of the Country party, Sinake Giregire, that
it was entirely inappropriate that changes in the draft should not be corrected
by amendments since they should not have been there at all. Instead he said
that "the NPG had resorted to a pack of lies to discredit the fourth draft which
was drawn up on regular instructions from the inter-party committee .... It
indicates a level of political irresponsibility and unscrupulous tactics that
precluded any possibility of serious collaboration with the NPG in the
future." 16 On 28 May, when he humiliatingly lost four divisions and it looked
as though the government was tottering at its first major challenge, Somare
bitterly attacked Momis, Kaputin and Ley. Eventually he apologised "for
becoming emotional". (However, it is believed that he approached the
Australian government to see if Ley could be deported.) When Fr John
Momis moved the adjournment "to allow party groups to consider the draft
and make changes", Somare seemed unaware that all members were equal
in the Constituent Assembly, and challenged the right of a backbencher to
move an adjournment. Momis's motion was, however, accepted and was
passed next day on Abal's amendment to take no vote on any issue until 2
June, with an adjournment set for 6 June. A government motion of dissent
saw ninety-two of the hundred MHAs in the Assembly reject it, forty-four
to forty-eight, with six government backbenchers and one minister voting
against and three Opposition members for the motion. Independence Day was
"again in the melting pot" though Somare was "still backing September".
Few others were. "The mere presence of Michael Somare makes September
independence a possibility but not a probability", wrote the Age
correspondent, which "must cause apoplexy in Canberra". 17 On 5 June the
238
James Griffin
House adjourned until17 June but a United party front-bencher, Yalob Talis
(Wapei-Nuku Open), "announced" that the government intended to set 15
September for Independence Day. 18
Talis proved to be almost right. The Bougainville crisis obviously decided
the issue. Talks with secessionists reached an impasse on Friday, 13 June.
On 17 June the Post-Courier announced that legislation would be introduced
the following day to ensure that Independence Day was a legal public
holiday but it still held that it was "not likely to be announced until the
Constitution had been passed". Next day (Wednesday) at 3.45 pm with only
sixty-six members in the House, Somare announced that he would later move
for Independence Day to be 16 September. The House rescinded the July
1974 motion that the constitution had to be passed first; "seven of our
organic laws are in your hands", said the Chief Minister. Kaputin lost his
move to adjourn the vote till the next day. The Umted party lost a vote to
continue discussion of their amendment to put the date back to 1 December
by fifteen votes to forty-five. The final vote came right on 5 pm, the time
specifically set the day before for ending the sitting. Kaputin and Abaijah
left before the final vote was taken. 19 Fr Momis had not attended the sitting
at all and the missing United party members also seemed unaware of what
had been going to happen. It is not clear why less than two-thirds of the
members were present at the "crunch". There have been unpublicised
allegations that an "outing" was conveniently arranged for some United
party members for that afternoon but simpler explanations (that the basic
constitutional fight had been won; that the government used the Bougainville
"crisis" to lobby effectively and at least keep some declared opponents of
"early" independence away; that the government simply counted on the
feckless absenteeism of many members) are available. It is an incident which
could throw light on future parliamentary processes.
The Constitution
The decision to make PNG into a monarchy seemed even more precipitate. At
the Governor-General's investiture in April, Somare repeated what he had
said during the Queen's visit early in 1974: PNG was "proud of its links
with the Queen". However, there was no intimation of a continuing role for
the Queen in PNG when, later in April, it was decided that the head of the
state was to be a citizen who was eligible for the House of Assembly and
that he would be chosen by secret ballot. The Post-Courier- of which it is
simply fair to say that it tries to endorse government policy with laboured
inanity,- editorialised: "Nothing can be fairer- that the people, through
their elected representatives, should choose their own head of State. In many
Commonwealth countries it is a straight-out political appointment, with
overtones of patronage. And in some the President elects himself by force
of arms .... It will be interesting, indeed, to see whether nominations are in
fact made from the general public as distinct from Members of the House." 20
It was, then, a great surprise when on 19 May it was announced that
the Queen was to be asked to be head of state. Obviously it was to be a
January-June 1975
239
popular move with the more conservative United party. The problem then
became: why this apparent change of mind? The cabinet statement said there
were "sound reasons .... The early years of our independence will be years
of adjustment and settling down. Continued ties with the Queen would give
a sense of security to a significant section of the community." 21 The position
is to be reviewed after three years. Responding to this pragmatism, the PostCourier did not become radiantly patriotic but simply spelt out the message
a little more clearly: "we will have a Governor-General as the Queen's
representative ... [who] would be appointed on the advice of the Government
and act in accordance with its wishes. There have been one or two notable
instances of Queen's representatives who, if they were not openly defiant
towards their governments, were at least a little difficult to get along with.
But anyone inclined not to comply with the democratic rules can be replaced
- and that has happened." 22
It is generally believed that the post of Governor-General will have to
go to Sir John Guise, who on the Queen's birthday was made a knight
commander of the British Empire not, like Sir Paul Lapun or Sir Albert
Maori Kiki, a knight bachelor. Sir John is a Papuan who, from time to time
gives studious warnings about secessionism. He has also, on occasion, been
thought to be too masterful when deputising for the Chief Minister.
Obviously a Queen's representative will be easier to remove than an
indigenous head of state. There were some protests at the Queen's
appointment, particularly by the students of the University of Papua New
Guinea, by Momis ("detrimental to the real emergence of Papua New Guinea
ideology, self-reliance and self-respect and commitment to our cultural
heritage") and by Abaijah ("should be chosen by the people and not by
politicians"). However, by and large, the decision was treated with respect
and people seemed to accept the Chief Minister's plea not "to bring shame
to us as a nation ... [by involving] the Sovereign in a political controversy".
So much for acculturation.
By the end of June the Constituent Assembly had approved nine parts of
the fourteen-part constitution, In the provisions members were not
unsolicitous of their own welfare. A fear of the educated can be detected in
the provision that candidates for the House of Assembly will have to be at
least twenty-five. An absolute majority of parliament is to be required to call a
fresh election before a government has served its full term. The House can
have up to three nominated members. MHAs are to be allowed to retain jobs
and businesses. An ombudsman commission was established. The judiciary
and senior public officials are guaranteed independence of government
interference. Rights to liberty, freedom of expression, conscience, thought
and religion and the right to privacy are set down although the only Tolai
United party member, Martin ToVadek, cautioned against "allowing too
many rights and freedoms", because "human rights was not a Papua New
Guinean tradition but something imported and could be very dangerous".
An independent tribunal is to be set up to hear misconduct cases against
politicians and senior public servants. While the tribunal will not have power
to dismiss leaders it can make recommendations to the head of state in the
240
James Griffin
case of elected leaders and to the appointing authority in the case of public
servants. The NPG added a new section to ensure "that village court
decisions were in line with natural justice". A government move excluded
non-citizens from "protection from unjust deprivation of property" because,
said Michael Somare, "the government needed the power to expropriate
foreign-owned property and would provide in legislation for adequate
compensation". The NPG failed in its attempt to require only a simple
majority vote for the disapproval of treaties and for the removal of a
provision that treaties could be kept secret "in the national interest". The
NPG also tried to require the Prime Minister and the Speaker to consult the
Leader of the Opposition before a treaty was deemed too urgent to be tabled
or to be kept secret.
The three controversial issues that were left were emergency powers,
provincial eovernment anci C'itiZf~nship Of these provincial government
promises to be the most difficult and no doubt policy will be affected by
developments in the Bougainville secession movement. Citizenship,
however, was vigorously and inconclusively aired in the last week of June
and caused divisions between and within parties. The draft before the
Constituent Assembly stated that only those with at least two PNG
grandparents and no substantive foreign citizenship should automatically
become citizens. Foreigners who were long-term residents could apply after
independence for provisional citizenship and become citizens after eight
years. As the People's Progress party, however, insisted that this would
create a group of"second-rate citizens", the government moved to eliminate
provisional citizenship and allow those who had lived in PNG for eight years
before independence to apply for citizenship. A United party amendment
allowing Papua New Guineans who hold foreign citizenship to become
citizens automatically was passed with government support, forty-five to
twenty-four. Another amendment provided that foreign ci_tizenship will have
to be renounced within two months of independence. How long other people
holding foreign citizenship will have to wait before naturalisation was not
decided. The issues were passionately discussed. The Chief Minister took
a moderate line. He said the government would not hand out citizenship to
the undeserving but by taking a tough line, "many of our own people who
are no different from ourselves" are hurt. "We must not confuse
vindictiveness with justice" because "'we are deciding the whole future of
our country for years and years to come". 23 The Country party leader, Sinake
Giregire, and United party member, Mackenzie Daugi, felt that the "present
power structure is weighted in favour of foreign citizens" and they wanted
to equalise opportunities between all peoples in PNG. John Kaputin, whose
children by two Australian wives live in Australia, said that he had "felt the
pain of being a person involved in two societies". He did not care if his
children had to wait eight years "to get this piece of paper" which in itself
did not mean the recipients would have the respect of Papua New Guineans.
"I want some assurances. I want some guarantees for my children", he said. 24
It is probably regrettable that such a difficult decision has been deferred
till the eve of independence.
January-June 1975
241
Cabinet and Parliament

The government came under suspicion for its projected life-style as well as
its mode of decision-making. The Eight-Point Plan was a constant source
of moral reference, particularly when Iambakey Okuk (Chimbu Regional)
announced in the New Year that he had taken steps to buy a fleet of twentyfive Mercedes-Benz. worth over $180,000. While they were to be used in
independence ceremonies and then as a government fleet, a number of
ministers were said to feel that unnecessary pretentiousness and expenditure
was not in line with the government's policy of "equalisation". There were
also objections that the order had contravened the policy of calling for capital
equipment by open tender rather than by private negotiation. Sir John Guise,
deputy Chief Minister, was reported as saying that if an expensive car was
thrust on him "he would have it driven to a public place where he would set
fire to it in protest", 25 but he was not present when a clear-cut cabinet
decision confirmed Okuk's initiative. However, as opposition built up among
politicians (including the United party) and trade unions, the government
cancelled the contract although undisclosed compensation had to be paid
to the dealers. Okuk felt that "the pressures against buying the cars had
largely been built up by a misleading, often inaccurate, and sometimes
dishonest press campaign which he believed to be largely sponsored by rival
motor trade interests". 26 No doubt the incident revealed something of the
elusive "Melanesian way" which is said to justify deviation from Western
standards.
However, the Post-Courier spared Okuk the full revelation of the bizarre
story behind the PNG naval rating who turned up at Australia House,
London, "thumped the counter and said 'Why aren't you paying me?"' He
was recognised as a sailor, absent without leave, for whom the military
police had been searching. He had been, in fact, sent to London by "highly
placed people" in October 1974, without the knowledge of the Defence
Force, to do "specialised study" for a position in the proposed PNG national
shipping line. He was, like Okuk and Okuk's departmental secretary, a
Chimbu. Presumably Chimbus were not to miss preferment in the new
enterprise. The rating was, understandably enough, let off with a reprimand.
Whether Okuk or Elias Vuvu were reprimanded has not been recorded.
Momis and Kaputin were both critical of the attitudes and conduct of
some ministers. They sought in February an open investigation because of
the possibility of "manipulation of leaders by outsiders- foreign investors,
politicians and ideologists" _27 In May they extended it to senior public
servants and wanted ministerial travel and business dealings scrutinised.
Okuk tried to outface Momis and Kaputin with their "cheap political
aspirations" by challenging them to investigate him first. The Post-Courier
supported an enquiry either through existing authorities or otherwise. "The
increasing tendency of government and semi-government bodies to tell
people what they think they should know, instead of what they are entitled
to know, is something to be alarmed about. Rumour and secrecy can only
harm the Government. It cannot afford to let people doubt its integrity with
242
James Griffin
independence so close." 28 Okuk showed no further temerity. He moved a

fortnight later for a ban on public access to the draft daily Hansard as "the
only way to stop members being misrepresented by the news media". All
sixteen government ministers present supported him and Somare plausibly
argued that pidgin-speakers could be misrepresented by the daily Hansard
and it should be edited. The Opposition valued "freedom of the press"
enough to defeat Okuk's motion forty-four to thirty-eight-2 9
Ministers were not the only ones clinging to office. It was a United party
man who moved that the next general election (scheduled for mid-1976) be
postponed for a year until 1977 "in the interest of stability after
independence", much to the annoyance of Abal who said MHAs were not
there "to be concerned about whether they were returned to office at the
next election". Yet the motion was carried on the voices only to be disallowed
as contrary to PNG powers.
External Affairs
The most interesting overseas visitor to PNG was probably Solomon
Mamaloni, Chief Minister of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate
(BSIP), who was so little known in Port Moresby that the Post-Courier
misspelt his name three times in its welcoming editorial.J0 There have long
been stirrings between the Buin-Siwai areas of South Bougainville and the
Shortland Island of BSIP, some five miles across the strait, for reunion. The
sentiment results from blood ties and petty trade but there is a diffused
feeling for realignment with Bougainville in the Western Solomons because
of the similarity of pigmentation, putative traditional relationships and
dissatisfaction with the "redskins" of the Eastern Solomons, especially the
numerically significant Malaitans. There is, however, a realisation even in
the Eastern Solomons that if Bougainville seceded from PNG and joined
with BSIP in a Solomons Republic it would make a viable geopolitical
entity. 31 Similarly the danger that the Western Solomons would want to join
an independent Bougainville is recognised. In a personal interview in
December 197 4, Mamaloni showed awareness of the problem and took the
statesmanlike view that the issue was, in the first instance, one that had to
be decided with PNG. Discussions obviously took place on this issue
between the two Chief Ministers and an "understanding" was said to have
been reached. On the border issue, Mamaloni said "his Government would
always keep in mind the human needs of people on both sides and felt sure
... a satisfactory agreement about the border would [eventually] be
reached". 32
Senator Willesee, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived on his
first official visit. He discussed with Sir Maori Kiki "matters affecting
the two countries after independence" including Australia's aid programme.
An unconditional guarantee of an $18-19 million loan from the United States
of America "for general developmental purposes" followed. The
Post-Courier inferred that "PNG is obviously a good bet for taking up
outside loans because of its vast export resources and because of its
January-June 1975
243
above-average political stability for an emerging nation", and was confident

that "even after independence Australia will continue to be prepared to put
its name to similar documents if the present PNG political climate
continues". 33 Two other Australian ministers, Bill Hayden and Frank Crean,
also arrived for talks on social services and formal trade agreements and it
was announced that free trade with Australia would continue after
independence. No marked progress was made on the question of the Torres
Strait border which no doubt will become an issue after independence. PNG
is to become the thirty-fifth member of the British Commonwealth as a result
of a unanimous welcome at the 1975 Jamaica Conference. At Nauru's
seventh anniversary celebrations Chan reaffirmed the priority which PNG
would set on relations with southwest Pacific countries. "We share many
common attitudes to life and many common problems", he said. While PNG
had little influence over decisions made by larger countries "it had control
in its relations within the southwest Pacific" .34
Sir Maori Kiki visited China with a small group on a trip arranged by
the Chinese Trade Mission. His aims were announced as the promotion of
"PNG with regional neighbours", to "study Chinese programs especially
in village development and small-scale industries, and to look for a market
for coffee and cocoa". 35 On his return Sir Maori said "his historic visit had
been successful and he looked forward to consolidating the friendship". PNG
"shared China's objective of being a self-reliant nation". However, "growing
links with Asian countries could not interfere with relations with Pacific
nations" among whom PNG "might become an economic force ... [but she]
would not seek political leadership of the region". Rather she wanted an
"island system of sharing responsibilities. Other Pacific islands could use
PNG as a storing pool from which they could draw their Asian imports."
But he added that Australia and New Zealand would continue to have a great
influence on the welfare and development of the South Pacific. Meanwhile
in Australia Gough Whitlam "has said Australia might one day seek a mutual
defence treaty with Papua New Guinea". 36 Torao Hashimoto arrived on
Australia Day to formalise Japan's relationship as resident Consul-General.
Not long after he advised the public that there were "occasional business
visitors ... from Japan ... [who} may not be reliable commercial partners,
and therefore, it is advisable for the local people to make contact with my
office before starting any business with them" .37
Overtures were made by France to PNG, particularly in the form of
providing postgraduate scholarships and soundings were taken as to the
opening of a consulate. Thus when a vehement paper under Sir Maori Kiki 's
signature to the Conference for a Nuclear-Free Pacific at Fiji in April was
withdrawn at the last minute, there was speculation as to whether PNG was
going to reach a rapprochement with France. 38 This decision also seemed
related to Australia's lack of warmth towards New Zealand's moves to have
the Pacific declared a nuclear-free zone. It appears, however, that the original
paper had not in fact been adequately cleared by Foreign Affairs and that
Somare will reaffirm PNG's opposition to nuclear testing at the South Pacific
Forum in July.
244
James Griffin
In view of PNG's determination to play a role in Oceania and France's

apparent determination to remain an imperial power it is possible that
relations will not become too amicable.
Towards Independence
A national currency was introduced in April. The publicity beforehand was
excellent: there seemed to be little hoarding of Australian money and no
cultic disruption. The "holey" kina coin (pierced to resemble traditional shell
money) was so popular on the Sepik that some artifact-sellers were trading
at three dollars value to the kina. 39 A dual currency will be in operation until
December. Chan gave an assurance that devaluation was not being planned
and that currency speculators would be wise to think in terms of
appredatiu11. Whik "nu government can ever give binding undertakings on
the future", he said, "PNG had every reason for establishing an international
reputation for the soundness of its currency" .40
Export prices for PNG's three main agricultural exports- coffee, copra,
cocoa- slumped, as did the price of copper. In 1974 total payments to the
government and the Investment Corporation from Bougainville Copper Ltd
(BCL) amounted to $93.5 million, a third of PNG's national revenue, but
this year there is a world copper surplus. It was revealed only in April that
CIPEC's 41 executive director, Sacha Gueronik, had visited PNG in February
to inform the government of CIPEC's activities, and to invite PNG to become
a full member. A government spokesman said that PNG would be unlikely
to cut production. "If it could be shown that a I 0% reduction ... could force
a 15% rise in revenue we would be interested. But so far CIPEC has given
no indication that it is capable of this." 42 At least this indicated that PNG
was not averse to cartels in principle and was capable oflearning the lessons
of OPEC. Sir Val Duncan, chairman of Rio Tin to Zinc, apnounced that BCL
would not respond to pressure to cut back production or agree to further
cutbacks to Japanese contracted buyers. "We have great respect for the PNG
government", he said, no doubt remembering his personal humiliation at
the renegotiation talks in 1974, "and I don't think it is boasting to say they
have some respect for us". 43
Both the slump and the 1974 Bougainville renegotiation would have
influenced the withdrawal of Kennecott Ltd from the politically important
Ok Tedi copper project in the remote Star Mountains area of the Western
District of Papua, near the Irian Jaya border. (Ok Tedi could reduce
dependence on Bougainville and, if the minerals were freighted south, it
would increase development in Papua.) Kennecott could not accept the
government's excess profits tax proposals. The company said that while it
had always accepted the principle that the government should take "the lion's
share" of windfall profits, it could not accept a rigorous application "in any
year when profits exceed the minimum level required for the project's
viability". Even apart from the excess profits tax, the effective tax provisions
were less favourable than those available to "all c.:nners" in developed
countries such as the USA. However, Somare was not dismayed. According
January-June 1975
245
to him "nine or ten overseas companies" were discussing the project with
the government in April. In May the government floated its own private
company, Ok Tedi Development Company Pty Ltd, with a staff of fifty, a
start-up capital of KlO,OOO and with the government as sole shareholder.
The government would consider a number of methods for developing Ok
Tedi: sub-contracting, independent private development, or partnership.
Meanwhile the National Investment and Development Authority (NIDA)
reaffirmed its determination to control foreign businesses under a national
investment priorities schedule. 44
These manifestations of political will and control were not matched in
the arena of daily law and order. The retiring Chief of Police, Inspector B.
Holloway, called the crime rate "a national disgrace". He was supported by
Sergeant Buka, president of the Police Association, who must have been
referring to the elitist endowments of his rivals in the army when he urged
leaders to examine the crime problem instead of wasting resources on "the
imaginary enemy outside our boundary" .45 The Teachers' Association
"recommended that in certain cases teachers should be withdrawn from rural
schools and the schools should be closed", while residents in the Port
Moresby suburb of Tokarara seemed to live in nocturnal siege. Pita Lus,
Minister for Police, who has been in the past fiercely critical of expatriates,
became flattering about the services of expatriate police officers and
virtually begged them to stay. Lus may have won some favour in advocating
tougher laws- he urges curfews and prohibitions without a blush at reverting
to colonial patterns - but he must have shaken even the old Africa hands
among his white officers when he urged that people who criticised
government leaders should be executed. "In the traditional structure of our
society", he said, "when the leader is speaking, the subjects have to listen
to him, but I do not see this happening now in this Parliament". His fellow
Sepik, Michael Somare, rejected such "final solutions" but said blandly that
he would retain Lus in the ministry because he "would lose his temper
regardless of whether he was a Minister or not". 46
While the police were inept in matters of routine, the riot squad
showed its effectiveness in quelling the rampage of workers at the
Bougainville copper mine on 12-13 May. They did this without using their
semi-automatic rifles and shotguns but with batons, tear-gas and, as the front
page of the Post-Courier showed, boots. 47 Company personnel managed to
escape from Panguna to Arawa (seventeen miles) with light casualties. Lus
was so incensed by the havoc (K250,000 damages and a week's production
missed) that he urged, "Shoot them, shoot them" .'8 Some 1,000 workers were
arrested and impounded in a makeshift prison, but after five days most were
released for fear of disease. Ultimately few prosecutions were successful.
The root causes of the riot were not made clear but, as with so much that
has happened on Bougainville, there was no lack of warning for those who
could read the signs. The riot was triggered by the sacking of the Workers'
Union president, G. Porn Porn, as a result of an off-duty brawl in the
company tavern.
This was in line with company policy but the action did not appear
246
James Griffin
consistent with the reinstatement of other brawlers three weeks earlier. The
strike itself, however, was led by skilled workers who were apparently
indignant at last year's minimum urban wage decision which raised wages
but narrowed differentials with unskilled workers. The fact that the decision
was binding on BCL does not seem to have been communicated effectively
between company and unionists. Judging by the inarticulateness of the union
leader in formulating grounds for dispute and negotiation, BCL's training
programmes in consultation and conciliation would not seem to have been
a success. The crowning irony came on 25 June when the workers met to
elect another president. In a secret ballot the position went to Henry Moses,
a vociferous Bougainvillean secessionist and a wealthy businessman in his
own right as a result of BCL patronage from its earliest days. Apparently
he won by a two to one majority. As Hamlet said, "it defies augury".
As independence approached the quest for autochthony seemed as
baffling as ever. Its superficial manifestation, localisation, proceeded apace
but in some areas with a worrying decline in efficiency. The Public Health
Department, once the pride of the Australian Administration, was seriously
run down; Air Niugini continued to draw severe criticism. The distinguished
historian, Professor K.S. Inglis, ended his term as Vice-Chancellor of the
university and handed over to Dr Gabriel Gris, a dentist and administrator
by training, but during the student strike Dr Gris failed to display any of
the resources of his authority. The strike itself was inchoate and there were
some disturbing signs of intellectual Luddism. In the end the students
seemed unaware that they had achieved one thing only, and that was a
constraint on civil liberty: the government declared its Waigani offices out
of bounds to demonstrators. The students had downed biros for over a week,
ostensibly to protest against the appointment of a foreigner as head of state,
but a fortnight later cheerfully accepted the Queen's birthday as a holiday.
At the opening of the colourful Creative Arts Centre, Sir Maori Kiki could
boast that "God made Papua New Guinea on a Saturday ... and gave his
richest culture to the last man he made". Papua New Guinean art "was not
primitive - it was advanced ... our culture is not written in any
encyclopaedia, it is written in the head". Those present were treated to a
performance of traditional music by Sepik flute players. Yet when the
national anthem competition was finalised, not one of the five selected
anthems, in either melody or verse, rose above the most banal Edwardianism.
Eventually the palm was to go Arise, all you [originally "ye"] sons of this
Land, which had flagrant fanfares from the Marseillaise. Perhaps this was
a fitting counterpart to the cultic gesture of the Catholic church which
proclaimed St Michael the patron saint of PNG because, said Bishop ToPaivu
"Michael the Archangel is a good spirit - and spirits have had a lot to do
with the kanakas of our country". 49 It seemed a rather naive parti pris.
Perhaps if Josephine Abaijah succeeds in her mission, Papua will be placed
under the protection of Joan of Arc.
26
JULY-DECEMBER 1975
James Griffin
Independence
"It is important", said the first Governor-General, Sir John Guise, "that the
people of the [sic] Papua New Guinea and the rest of the world realise the
spirit in which we are lowering the flag of our colonisers. We are lowering
it, not tearing it down.'" 1 Thus at 5.11 pm on 15 September Australian
colonialism was terminated. The combined PNG Defence Force, Police and
Royal Australian Navy bands played Auld Lang Syne and, after Prince
Charles, dressed as a full colonel of the Welsh Guards, had inspected the
troops with the PNG commander, Brigadier-General Edward Diro, the troops
gave afeu dejoie. The Australian Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, received
the folded flag and said that "both Papua New Guinea and Australia have
been fortunate in that during the long period of colonisation we managed
to avoid policies and relationships which have proved tragic elsewhere". 2
Gough Whitlam sat with Michael Somare in the grandstand and looked
satisfied- perhaps, inevitably, even a little smug. If Australian politics had
taken a more regular course, Whitlam would have achieved what he vowed
in late 1969: self-government and independence within the life of his first
government.
At 10.25 am on 16 September the triangulated black and red flag of PNG
with its white Southern Cross and golden bird of paradise was raised on
Independence Hill near the new Waigani administrative blocks which are
dominated by the Australian High Commission. The accompanying
ceremonies went with gratifying smoothness and decorum. Sales of alcohol
had been banned for a week before. Prime ministers came from Australia
and Oceania but the most conspicuous visitor was Immelda Marcos who
wore gorgeous dresses, brought an impossibly large entourage and invariably
arrived late. Independence for PNG was a minor but heartening event in
world history.
Celebrations in the provinces were cheerful enough, though many were
very doubtful about leaving their (imperial) mother's breast (to use their
own cliche of dependency). In Wabag (Western Highlands) in the heart of
the Enga, PNG's largest "tribe", a man cut off his finger in a traditional
expression of sorrow and a fellow tribesman, Tei Abal, Leader of the
Opposition, reported that his people wept. "My people were sad because they
James Griffin
248
are conscious of the great deal of help Australia has given to us so that we
can be independent". He went on to say that "his people wanted Papua New
Guinea and Australia to maintain ties of friendship and work closely
together" .3 In Bougainville, in spite of the secessionist boycott, an estimated
18,000 of non-locals and locals were curious enough to watch the flagraising.4 Many Papuans stayed away. The Papua Besena rainmaker, 0' ongu
Maughivu, tried to ruin the celebrations and, indeed, there were
unseasonable squalls around Port Moresby but, like Papua Besena, they
proved portentous rather than disruptive. Josephine Abaijah was in Sydney
with her vizier, Dr Eric Wright, who had been recently deported. She thought
Australia had groomed Somare "to play the role of dictator" .5
The independence spirit was surprisingly magnanimous in view of the
August bombshell when it was suddenly revealed that Australia would partly
renege on her commitment of 1974 to lJlOviJ~: $500 million in aiJ over lhree
years. This commitment was made because of the difficulties of an aid
relationship in which the donor has financed the annual budget to the tune
of some forty per cent in recent years. The high level of these funds has led
to the creation of a Public Service which is too costly for the current PNG
resources but, as the official book says, "it is difficult in the short-term to
achieve changes in expenditure patterns and the aspiration of people
receiving government services" .6 Therefore a relatively high level of aid is
needed until internal revenue is built up. As it takes several months for
government economists to negotiate the level of assistance needed, PNG
departments prepare their estimates in January and February but they do
not know what they will get until August. It was to remove this uncertainty
and facilitate long-term planning that the Australian government, in 197 4,
guaranteed $500 million over three years from 1974-75 to 1976-77.
The following table tells some of the story:
Australian Assistance
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
$A million
Papua New Guinea Budget

Development Grant and Grant-in Aid
77.1
79.0
89.6
0.7
1.0
1.5
53.9
51.6
53.0
Airport Construction
5.1
9.2
Education and Training
1.2
1.2
137.9
154.5
Cultural Development Grant
Australian Budget
Australian Salaries Assistance Grant
(ASAG)
Total Development Assistance
131.7
July-December 1975
249
While the table shows an increase of some twelve per cent in monetary
terms, in fact $60 million was budgeted for ASAG in 1974-75 and ASAG
expenditure will again be lower this year than expected. This means that
Australian aid has increased only by some five per cent in monetary terms,
and thus, making allowance for inflation (but not last year's devaluation),
there has been a decline in the real level of aid of about twelve per cent.
The official figure then over the first two years of the Australian commitment
is expected to be $292.4 million. It is hardly likely that the balance of the
$500 million can be made up in 1976-77 and it should be emphasised that
PNG government economists are genuinely trying to implement self-reliance
and did pare their requests to a minimum (Kl80 million), unlike the
Australian departments which anticipated cuts when drawing up
submissions and would have made some allowance for them. It was never
understood, however, by PNG that payments through the Employment
Security Scheme (ESS) to ex-public servants returning to Australia would
be part of this sum because PNG derives no benefit from ESS. The Whitlam
government thought otherwise and the private reports of the curt way in
which Messrs Whitlam and Hayden made and presented their decision were
far from reassuring from PNG's point of view, even allowing for the
problems of the Australian budget.
Michael Somare personally flew to Australia with Julius Chan
(Finance) and Sir Maori Kiki (Defence, Foreign Relations and Trade) and
had to be content with bargaining with Bill Hayden, Don Willesee and Frank
Stewart (Minister Assisting the Treasurer). They got nowhere. "Australia
has dumped us", Somare said bitterly on his return. "They have broken my
back, but not the back of my people. We have enough courage to go on."
Somare reported that, when he asked Whitlam for a commitment after
independence, Whitlam "did not give an answer". "That's a big question
mark", he was reported to have said. So mare placed the blame on
advisers rather than on Whitlam: "Because of their own mess they could
not see our point of view .... The minister who represented Bill H.1yden
did not know much about Papua New Guinea .... He was fighting here in
the jungle during the war and that was about all he knew." 8 He later pointed
out that "the Australian minister who was responsible for the introduction
of the scheme, Mr Andrew Peacock, has assured PNG that ESS payments
were never intended to be considered as aid by the Australian
Government". 9 Chan, for his part, preached against the "lavish standards"
introduced by Australia: "Unless we change those habits we will suffer
the fate of all spendthrifts ... the gutter" . 10 The then Deputy Chief
Minister, Sir John Guise, said that the Labor government would be
held responsible for all social, economic and political problems arising
from the cuts, "especially in the realm of district expenditure and in
the politically sensitive areas of Bougainville and the Southern
Highlands". When it had been in Opposition, the Labor party had promised
PNG "the world- even God himself'. Sir John thought that the move
towards self-reliance would now be slower and dependency on Australia
prolonged. 11
250
James Griffin
John Kaputin, one of the leaders of the Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG),
thought Whitlam, who professed to be a socialist but was no more than a
"good colonial imperialist", "might have unconsciously done PNG a favour
by reducing aid". He wanted "independent domestic and foreign policies"
which could be achieved by:
Sacking all remaining white senior public servants still involved in policy making;
Critically reviewing the present public service structure;
Accelerating the acquisition of all plantations;
Banning all non-nationals from carrying out business in rural areas;
Overhauling the House of Assembly;
Re-examining citizenship laws, which were now to the advantage of Australia
and Australians. '2
Jo:,t:phiut: Abaijah also Lhought the cuts were goodY
Andrew Peacock, shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, was
alarmed enough to fly to Port Moresby where he was photographed on arrival
with both arms studiously around the Minister for Commerce, Boyamo Sali. 14
On his return to Australia he said on television's "Federal File" that it was
"less than a fortnight since the Soviet Ambassador visited Papua New
Guinea and gave them undertaking [sic] that the Soviet Union would be
prepared to lend economic assistance. Furthermore, as Sir Maori Kiki
advised me, he himself visited Peking earlier this year." 15 There could also
be aid from Japan. He estimated aid had been slashed by twenty-nine per
cent. He gave "an undertaking in principle to enter into long-term planning"
with the PNG government when his party came to power. 16 Andrew Peacock
promised "continued and comprehensive aid" when his party returned to
power and his views were vigorously supported by the Australian press.
Senator Wille see, however, circulated a paper with Hayden's budget which
showed that PNG was receiving K21 0 million in aid, al! increase of K39 .3
million on 1974-75. He included all allowances to expatriates and
emphasised that PNG would continue to have first call on aid. 17 He also told
the Senate that Peacock had a "colonialist's" view of PNG and said that "he
had often tried to encourage other countries to contribute to the
development" of PNG. Peacock was "looking backwards to the bogeys of
the Cold War, rather than looking forward to the realities of the future" .18
In early October the former Administrator, Leslie Johnson, and a team from
the Australian Development Assistance Agency (including a former founder
of the Pangu pati, Tony Voutas) arrived in Moresby for talks over two days.
They would translate, said Chan, "Australia's commitment into a more
concrete understanding that would let the Government plan ahead and avoid
a repeat of this year's confusion over the Australian aid .... the national
interests of both Australia and Papua New Guinea would be explored" .19
The cutback was a disturbing gesture at the birth of a nation and it made
Australia's independence gift of a K2 million National Library buildingfor which there is no demand and little prospect of servicing - seem like
incongruous tokenism. There was no electoral demand in Australia for such
drastic retrenchment in PNG. A Gallup Poll taken before independence
July-December 1975
251
showed forty-one per cent of Australians thought the current level of aid
satisfactory, twenty-nine per cent wanted to give more and twenty per cent
less. 20
Torres Strait Border

Such opinions, however, could be affected by the tactics used to settle the
Queensland-PNG border dispute. Ebia Olewale, Minister for Justice, made
a statement for Independence Day saying that "Torres Strait is both
historically and ethnically part of Papua New Guinea .... It is very ironical
that we have marked our border with Indonesia already, documents have
been signed and agreements have been reached, whereas with Australia we
have not completed our border marking, or an agreement pertaining to the
southerly border. The border dispute should have been settled long ago if
the Australian Government had taken the matter seriously .... it is regrettable
that we are going into Independence without settling the border between
Australia and Papua New Guinea." 21
Olewale has not in the past been impressed by arguments that Bougainville,
geographically and ethnically, is at least as much a part of the Solomon
Islands as the Torres Strait Islands are of PNG, 22 a point which Whitlam has
publicly conceded. 2 ' Olewale (and Sir John Guise) 24 were incensed atJoh BjelkePetersen's intention to visit the Torres Strait Islands at this time and agreed
with Whitlam that the Queensland premier was a "humbug" who was trying:
to intimidate the people of the islands. It is the old colonial philosophy of
dominating the colonised by the colonisers. The Premier of Queensland does
not realize that from September 16 it will be the Independent Government of
Papua New Guinea which will deal directly with the Government of Australia
in settling this dispute. It is not good enough, it is not sufficient, it is not fitting
just to give people hand-outs as they have been doing in the Torres Straits
and thereby maintaining their control of the people. It is sad to see the
economy of the area dominated by the Australians. It is sad that the people
have not been helped in the past to involve themselves in real development
which they should be proud in saying they have achieved. 25
Olewale does not want to force those unhappy Islanders who do not
appreciate "real development", PNG-style, to take PNG status- and there
seem to be none who want to. He thinks they should move and their
economic interests should be taken over by his own Western District people.
He also disapproved of any unilateral restrictions being imposed on the area
by Australia as they would retard economic development. If restrictions were
not mutually agreed upon, the government would "effect economic
development in the area as we ourselves think fit" .26 In October the Western
Regional member, Napuri Maina, gave notice to parliament that he would
move for a commission to be set up, as provided under the constitution, to
investigate the border issue. The governments of Australia and Papua New
Guinea had failed to do so. The issue has interesting long-term implications
both internally as well as externally. For example, Papua Besena can
252
James Griffin
scarcely develop an attitude to the border issue without being either

pro-Australian or making common cause with New Guineans on the issue,
while Bougainvillean leaders are well aware of the inconsistencies that could
be involved in denouncing one "unnatural" border but preserving another.
In July the Queensland Minister for Justice, Bill Knox, had visited Port
Moresby where he said that the border could '"be negotiated amicably" but
that Queensland "would not be party to any agreement which prejudiced
the rights of Australian citizens in the area". Thus the border need not be
shifted any more than those between the United Kingdom and France,
Australia and Indonesia or PNG and the Solomon Islands need be. "A matter
of critical concern would be the international waterway through there, but
our principal concern is the Australians who live in the strait."
Queenslanders, said Knox, "supported the resolution passed by the State
Parliament last year calling for part of the att:a lu bt: u~t:tl a~ a marine park
and for joint harvesting rights of people of the area"Y The Queensland
Liberal party was not so sanguine. Its foreign affairs spokesman, M. White,
told the annual party convention that war could break out over the issue and
that PNG politicians might use it for their own purposes. The convention
resolved that a conference be sought between the governments of
Queensland, Australia and PNG on the issue. 28
However, the Queensland government remains intransigent. On his return
from his visit to Torres Strait which, he said, had "no political overtones"
presumably because "the border issue was not down for discussions at his
meetings with island leaders", Bjelke-Petersen revealed that there had been
"double dealing and blackmail by the Federal Government". On 20
September, he said, Dr H.C. Coombs, Whitlam's adviser on Aboriginal
affairs, had proposed to a meeting of Islanders, to which the Queensland
Department of Aboriginal and Islander Development was significantly not
invited, that the islands stay in Australia but the waters_ around them down
to the tenth parallel became part of PNG. 29 If they rejected this, PNG was
likely to get both land and waters. 30 "Dr. Coombs' threat was supposed to
cover the uninhabited islands, but when the Islanders made it clear they
would have no part of that either, it became a general one. If it had
succeeded, the Islanders would have needed a passport to go fishing off their
own islands ... Any so-called settlement without the consent of the Islanders
and the approval of Queensland is doomed constitutionally and politically.
I have no doubt at all of our neighbour's goodwill, but who can be certain
of the future?" 31 Peacock likewise accused Whit! am of "deceit",
"constitutional anarchy" and of "opposition to Australia's Federal System
within days of becoming Prime Minister". Whit! am had said "that he unilaterally - would move the border between Papua New Guinea and
Queensland". Referring to section 123, Peacock complained that "you cannot
come in here and rip up the Constitution" and gave his support to the
constitution, "the rights of Queenslanders and the rights of the Torres Strait
Islanders" .32 A decision in favour of the Commonwealth by the High Court
based on the Seas and Submerged Lands Act could quickly settle the issue,
however - at least for the time being. The Commonwealth would thus be
July-December 1975
253
allowed to negotiate a seabed boundary with PNG without Queensland's

consent. The islands would become Australian enclaves within a seabed
controlled by Papua New Guinea. This could be effected by both Australia
and PNG enacting matching legislation without consulting Queensland.
Both Somare and the Australian government "would prefer to negotiate
bilaterally an allocation of resources and a division of jurisdiction over the
sea and sea-bed" rather than have the issue submitted to the International
Court of Justice. 33
The Constitution
Although independence was in train by July the two most controversial
sections of the constitution remained to be settled: citizenship and provincial
government. The Minister for Transport and Civil Aviation, Iambakey Okuk
(National party), spearheaded a move to stop naturalised citizens from
serving in the next parliament because "in the past these outsiders dominated
the Papua New Guinean members and ruthlessly fought for their minority
interest to the detriment of the country as a whole". He said his plan "would
wipe out the 'wrongs' of the colonial past"Y The Minister for Lands and
National party leader, Thomas Kavali, wanted an amendment to the proposed
citizenship provisions which would restrict property rights of nationalised
citizens for five years after independence. He believed that "some foreign
citizens intended to apply for naturalisation only to protect their present
privileged position". Although the Lands Acquisition Act allowed compulsory
acquisition of foreign-owned plantations and although proposed legislation
would convert all foreign-owned freehold to leasehold without compensation,
"it would be some years before economic and social opportunities could be
said to be equal". A naturalised citizen would "gain all the protection
afforded under the Constitution to the property rights of citizens, thus
preventing any attempt by the Government to deal with his property so as
to bring him into line with the opportunities available to other citizens" .35
When the Constituent Assembly voted, the Nationalist Pressure Group-Country
party (NPG-CP) amendment to make long-term residents wait five years
after independence for naturalisation was lost fourteen to sixty-two in favour
of a government amendment to allow foreigners who have been in PNG for
eight years or more at independence to apply immediately for naturalisation.
Others will have to wait eight years regardless of whether this is before or
after independence. The Citizenship Advisory Committee would decide
whether a person was suitable for citizenship and criteria would include
whether a person has accepted pay or conditions greater than those offered
to Papua New Guineans; whether the majority of his business interests were
in PNG; whether he was married to a citizen; his services to or sacrifices
for PNG and its people; his knowledge of pidgin, Motu or a vernacular; and
whether his children are included in his application. While the concept of
provisional citizenship was dropped altogether, the economic opportunities
of naturalised citizens were to be restricted for ten years (e.g. in relation to
Development Bank loans, shares in the Investment Corporation, preferences
254
James Griffin
in government contracts, protection of small businesses). 36 Qualified

foreigners were given until16 November in which to decide if they wanted
PNG citizenship and a two-month deadline was set for all foreigners who
qualified in future. The minister responsible for citizenship retained power
to make exceptions.
Thomas Kavali's amendment on property rights was passed on the voices 37
but had to survive a further UP challenge. 38 Iambakey Okuk's amendment
on eligibility for the next parliament was lost twenty-two to forty-two. 39 John
Kaputin (Rabaul) attacked the government for adopting a "nonsense
attitude" to citizenship by naturalisation: it "had given citizenship rights to
foreigners but was now amending its proposals to take away those rights".
The Constitutional Planning Committee's (CPC) original proposals which
stringently restricted citizenship but gave all who were citizens equal rights
~huultl bt: It:in~lalt:ll. 40 Tht: Post-Courier thought the measures would "mollify
the bulk of the racists and satisfy most of the liberals" and "provide the
cornerstone for the multi-racial society envisaged by the ChiefMinister". Surely,
said the editor with delicious sanctimony, "one of the criteria for citizenship
should be the colour of a man's heart rather than the colour of his skin"Y
The Australian government expressed the hope that Australians who lived
permanently in PNG would give "positive consideration" to applying for
citizenship. Australian citizens or Australian protected people who did not
automatically become PNG citizens "would retain their status under
Australian law in the immediate post-independence period" but would lose
it if granted PNG citizenship. Amending legislation would be brought down
to prevent dual citizenship.
People who were eligible now to enter or re-enter Australia for residence
would continue to have their residence in PNG counted as residence in
Australia, for Australian citizenship purposes, for a transitional period of three
years after Independence ... this would apply only to people who came to
Australia as permanent residents. This met the wishes of the PNG government
which wanted to retain their skills in the immediate post-independence period.
People living in PNG who required prior authority to go to Australia after
Independence would be considered on the same basis as other people coming
from abroad. From January next year, all Australians going to PNG, would
need passports as well as entry permits. 2
At the closing date, 16 November, only 500 people had applied for
citizenship, the most notable of these being the Speaker, Barry Holloway,
and the Minister for Natural Resources, Bruce Jephcott. 43 The Australian
government was known to be concerned at the failure of mixed-race people
to take up citizenship. Of more than 3,200 counted at the last census, 1,000
had applied for Australian citizenship since 1971 and won the right to take
up residence in Australia. In fact, during October the PNG government had
begun a campaign to advise mixed-race people of their rights, if they had
two grandparents born in PNG. 44
Provincial government, the lynchpin of the CPC's attempt to create
participatory democracy in PNG, was thrown out of the Constitution in less
July-December 1975
255
than twenty minutes' debate, 45 although plans went ahead to set up a

Provincial Government Affairs Office and people were advised that they
should work towards provincial government. 46 This decision was made "on
the spur of the moment", said Olewale (who acted as "hatchet-man"). He
attributed the abrupt change in government attitude to the realisation that
provincial government would cost "more than K15 million over five years".
PN G did not have "this kind of money at this stage", a point supported by
So mare, who said that "the Australian grant was being cut each year and in
five years there would be no grant from Australia". However, the relevance
of the Bougainville situation was all too apparent when Olewale attacked
the CPC and its deputy chairman, Fr John Momis. He did not admire, he
said, the way the CPC "took their document to be correct, without mistake
in all its entirety". The CPC report was not "sacrosanct" and "the man who
conceived the idea of provincial government" was now a secessionist.
Provincial government "would cause massive problems with each province
taking up different powers at different times and public servants becoming
responsible to new bosses". We must look to local level leaders to build up
from the village level traditional government structures before we try to
bring in something new like provincial governmentY It was odd to recall
that Olewale had been the founder of Papua Action in 1971 and, as recently
as 1974, had publicly questioned at the Port Moresby Show "whether unity
and independence ... were the only options open to Papuans?" 48
On Friday, 17 August, the Constitution was formally adopted. Somare
and Abal were hortatory. Somare warned "of the dangers of having a
Constitution not attuned to people's thinking and too inflexible". Pondros
(Manus Island), standing in for the leader of the Country party, Giregire,
agreed, but expressed regret "that some members of the Constitutional
Assembly have brought changes into the Constitution through some personal
feelings of their own and I am afraid this may ruin the Constitution of this
country". Pondros was not allowed to finish. Olewale gagged the debate by
putting the question and won thirty-nine to twenty-one. "It was a politically
cynical move", said the Post-Courier correspondent, "and soured an historic
morning when members wanted to talk and clap and cheer". Perhaps the
following exchange is the most fitting epitaph to the Constituent Assembly
in its dying days:
Tom Koraea (Gult): Mr Chairman, there is no quorum.
Holloway [Speaker]: Go ahead, sir (to Olewale).
At the end there were nineteen members present.
The Post-Courier feature bore the headline, "AT LAST, BUT WHO'S
CHEERING?" 49
This attitude tied in with the vote by the Constitutional Assembly in July
to defer the next elections scheduled for 1976 until1977. It was passed fifty
to twenty-nine with seven ministers in favour. The proposer, Kobale Kale
(Sinasina), said it was not his personal idea but had been put to him by
members of the government and the House. It would ensure continuity and
256
James Griffin
stability in the House after independence. Ibne Kor (Nipa) wanted an

amendment to delay the election until 1978. It was lost twenty-six to fifty.
The subject was re-opened by the elder statesman of the Southern Highlands,
Matiabe Yuwi, in October. His motion to have the election restored to 1976
was lost twenty to forty-four with all government members except Somare
and Jephcott against. Olewale said it would set a precedent for changing
the constitution if the date were now brought forward. 50 Perhaps that
statement at least offers some reassurance that elections for the Fourth House
will eventually be held.
The Governor-General was elected by the House of Assembly and
predictably it was the government nominee, Sir John Guise. The first ballot
gave Sir John forty-five, Giregire twenty-five andAbal twenty-one. Giregire
was then defeated fifty-three to thirty-eight. If it was intended to eliminate
Sir John from political life, the government could not have taken comfort
from his subsequent remark that, as he was elected by the House and not
directly appointed by the Queen, he felt the Governor-General was
"therefore very much a political animal"Y He declared on radio that he
would not be "a rubber stamp". He thought the Australian Governor-General
was hampered by "a helluva lot" of red tape and protocol. "I'm John Guise,"
he said, "and it will take an earthquake or an atom bomb to change that ....
I'll look at legislation and safeguard the rights of the Constitution and the
people". He thought there was nothing to prevent a Governor-General
making submissions, say, in agriculture. He did not anticipate that the Queen
would remain as head of state for more than three years". 52 In spite of Sir
John's protestations of "humbleness" and altruism, one commentator could
not avoid remarking how Sir John had remained silent in the House when
the national elections were postponed because he knew the elections for
Governor-General were coming up soon after. Now, however, he was saying
that the MHAs had prolonged parliament "for selfish r~asons". 5 ' Sir John
was concerned to be seen only in a simple khaki jacket (although with a
stiff collar) without braid and without a hat. The man who had been gaoled
twice, once for riotous behaviour over a bowl of stolen rice and once for
illegal drinking, was setting aside a room in Government House just for
chewing betelnut. He was to be found there bare-chested after work with
friends or employees. On 29 December the Governor-General's secretary
revealed that there would be no New Year civil list because of procedural
difficulties following independence, because the list of nominations for the
Governor-General's recommendation had been late in arriving and because
the list had been "quite lengthy and some qualifications were in doubt". The
head of state, it was emphasised "had to scrutinize such matters before
passing them on to the Queen ... in future there would be seven candidates
awarded honours twice a year". Michael Somare was furious, denied there
was any problem of protocol or punctuality and accused Sir John's secretary
of "great impertinence". 54
If there were omens in Sir John's attitude, there was pathos in the
Leader of the Opposition's. Abal thought it would "be rather a good idea"
for the Queen to pay for the Governor-General and his office. "I do not
July-December 1975
257
think we have all that much money to create and maintain such an office
.... I understand England has got a lot of money and I am pretty certain that
they would very well meet the expenses of having the Governor-General."
But he appreciated the politics of the issue. Somare had warned him "that
the Papuan secessionist case could have been strengthened if the two top
government posts were held by New Guineans". 55
Foreign Affairs and Trade

In early October, Somare led a delegation to the United Nations where PNG
was admitted as its one hundred and forty-second member. (He also paid a
state visit to Washington en route.) Although he called himself "the leader
of a new Third World government", he commended Australia for not
inflicting "an authoritarian colonialist policy upon my country" so that
"today 90 per cent of the land still remains under traditional ownership".
Australia, after the second world war, had been "a generous and sympathetic
donor of aid" and "has guaranteed that this role will continue in our new
relationship as partners and neighbouring states in the Pacific". In foreign
affairs, PNG's "every action and attitude will be dominated by our realisation
that our first commitment is at home. We must consolidate our programs of
social and economic development." He re-affirmed the priority of the South
Pacific in PNG's external concerns and served notice that PNG would cosponsor with New Zealand and Fiji a resolution to make the South Pacific
a nuclear-free zone. A second concern would be Southeast Asia. Towards
other countries "our relationships ... will be best described as 'universalist'".
He quoted President Nyerere of Tanzania: "'We do not want our friends to
choose our enemies for us'. With very few exceptions -being those countries
with social or racial policies that are unacceptable to us- we will recognise
every government that wishes to recognize us", unless the price of mutual
recognition is that "we must take sides in regional, ideological or internal
conflict". PNG "supports the principles under which the United Nations
Committee on Trade and Development was established and would join
wholeheartedly in efforts to reform an inequitable world economic
system". 56 This moderation and "even-handedness" was reflected at home
when, on the UN's thirtieth birthday, the acting Prime Minister and Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Sir Maori Kiki, said: "We cannot accuse others of
inhuman policy, if our own actions at home are repressive ... We cannot
protest the racist actions of white-controlled African governments, if our
own attitudes are equally at fault." 57
Although the possibility of electrical power exchanges between PNG and
Irian Jaya were being canvassed,S8 apprehension over future relations with
Indonesia continued to grow. While in July it was said that "both sides of
the border are rich for potential development", 59 Deputy Leader of the
Opposition, Paul Langro (West Sepik Regional), revealed in early November
that there was plenty of sympathy for the Free West Papua Movement rebels
in the border provinces. He was especially perturbed by the activities and
political aims of the proposed Mupi Association in West Sepik. Certain
258
James Griffin
members, he said, were "greatly involved with the Western Papuan Freedom
Fighters living in border areas". Their involvement was being investigated
by national security officers in Vanimo, but evidence was not sufficient at
this stage "to warrant the Government to combat the proposed Association's
operations". Langro also found it "quite unpalatable that the association's
first move was to demand the removal of the West Sepik Provincial
Commissioner". 60 The implications of all this are not immediately clear but,
in the wake of the Indonesian onslaught on East Timor, the most hot-headed
of PNG's ministers, Pita Lus, who, like Somare, comes from the East Sepik
province, could contain himself no longer. "The Government could no longer
ignore the nightmare the West Irianese have been through", he claimed.
People on the border were living in constant fear of unidentified soldiers
who frequented the area. "Everybody knows", Lus said, "that the West
Trianese have heen <;uppres<;ecl anrl rlenierl fref':clnm to P-hoose their own futme
ever since the Dutch left the area. The Government, through the United
Nations, must fight hard by letting the world know what has been happening
on this side of the world." 61
Lus was not the only person to voice his concern at Indonesia's "imperialism"
in East Timor and to ask the government to "stop sitting on the fence". 62
Bernard Narakobi, chairman of the Law Reform Commission, and a prominent
nationalist, said "Papua New Guineans must in future be mobilised. Our
homes are no longer safe." He maintained that "pro-Indonesian forces caught
during the struggle on Timor had letters from generals telling them to watch
closely secessionist movements in Papua New Guinea". These letters allegedly
told the forces they could be "called upon". Indonesia, said Mr Narakobi:
justified its invasion by saying that instability on the island would not be good
for the region. If that logic follows to conclusion [sic] then instability in Papua
New Guinea would justify Indonesian intervention. Most of the people in East
Timor are Melanesian and belong to the Pacific. If they cannot be safe, how
can we be safe? Indonesia is proving itself to be a military imperialist,
contradicting its initial stand that it would support Third World countries for
the rights of small nations. Indonesia is suppressing the right of selfdetermination that it fought for against Western European powers.<'
Narakobi was supported by Langro and by the National Union of Students
and the Women's Action Group. The latter wanted PNG to participate in a
UN peace-keeping operation, take in Timorese refugees "through a United
Nations arrangement" and support an independent East Timor at the UN. 64
It organised a protest rally outside the government offices at Waigani. 65
Somare, however, said PNG would take "a non-partisan approach". He
"strongly supported ... United Nations moves for a ceasefire and
international supervision of the decolonisation process which would ensure
genuine self-determination for the people of East Timor". PNG had agreed
to co-sponsor a UN resolution to that effect. "Papua New Guinea is against
unilateral declarations either producing independence in the form of a fait
accompli or prematurely attaching the country to some other nation before
all inhabitants had the opportunity to participate in a proper act of
July-December 1975
259
self-determination."66 In a further statement Somare revealed, according to

some, his careful tutelage by Australian foreign affairs advisers (and also
his friend, Andrew Peacock):
I can understand the frustration in Indonesia that no action was being taken
to correct a progressively deteriorating situation on their doorsteps. I want
to make it absolutely clear that Indonesia had been prepared last week to
strongly support the motion in the United Nations for United Nations
intervention to supervise an orderly decolonisation in Portuguese Timor.
Indonesia took unilateral action after a United Nations decision on the matter
was postponed because of intervention from countries outside the region. 67
Somare denied that there was any need to fear Indonesia and claimed
friendly and "continuous contact on a wide range of matters" with Indonesia.
There was no parallel between the East Timor and PNG situations as
Australia had withdrawn only when a stable government had been set up.
"It is mischievous to stir up the ... fears." 68 Nevertheless, there were many
politicians and public servants who privately took a wry view not only of
Indonesian "aggression" but also of Australian "impotence". On the last day
of the year, the Pqst-Courier's magazine article was about the Southern
Moluccan independence movement. It was topically entitled: "A little known
problem that is so close to our doorstep". 69
Early in July Somare attended the sixth South Pacific Forum, in Tonga.
The Post-Courier thought the major issues were the cementing of personal
relations by the leaders; regional cooperation "to deal with the backwash
of international inflation"; plans for a shipping pool and cooperative bulk
buying to cut freight and fuel costs; and reassurance by PNG that it would
not try to dominate the area. 70 The forum decided "that all islands regardless
of size should have their own territorial sea zones", i.e., twelve miles offshore, together with an economic resources zone of 200 miles. The forum
also decided to set up a regional disaster fund from contributing members,
although Australia's Senator Willesee (the elected spokesperson for the
forum) said that neither Australia nor New Zealand would be involved in
contributing "because both nations already give large amounts of direct aid
for disaster relief'. 71 On his return Somare said PNG might try to drop some
of its trade links with Australia so as to expand those with the South Pacific,
e.g, by importing sugar from Fiji and exporting in return PNG's tea and
coffee. Somare was also critical of Australian and New Zealand seamen's
unions for demanding their award wages for South Pacific seamen without
regard to a country's capacity to pay.n
Peacock may have been alarmed (see above) by the announcement in
September that China would buy copper and cocoa valued at K3.3 million
and that other purchases of timber, palm oil, coffee and coconut oil were
being discussed. 73 Plans were announced for a Chinese trade display in PNG;
and a PNG delegation to China in November was allowed to sell two trial
shipments of timber (four million superfeet), "a major breakthrough" for
the industry. 74 More indicative still that PNG was now part of the adult world
was the statement by the Russian ambassador to Australia, Alexander Basor,
260
James Griffin
that his country would welcome the setting-up of a PNG office in Moscow
and that "Russia had much to offer PNG, particularly in the field of
technological equipment and industrial machinery" while Russia was
interested in some of PNG's "traditional primary goods" and especially in
helping to build up her fishing industry.75 There was also "the possibility
that financial aid could be extended by way of long-term loans and
favourable credit". Basor added that "reports of a Soviet Naval build-up in
the Indian Ocean were completely without foundation ... Russia was
concerned with developing friendly relations with all countries ... the
Pacific and Indian Oceans should not be used as areas of international
struggle" .76
PNG was not, however, about to venture far from the capitalist matrix.
Chan went to Hong Kong in October "to woo investors"n and in December
a trade mission from Taiwan and Hong Kong was "highly impressed"
by PNG's "investment potential", although it found the National
Investment and Development Agency (NIDA) "bureaucratic ... in the
processing of applications and approvals [which] may impede
investments from abroad". 78 In London in October, Somare had talks with
British shippers on aid to set up a South Pacific regional fleet and on his
return announced that a London office would be set up in 197 6. 79 Sir
Maori Kiki 's first major overseas visit after independence took him to
London, Brussels, Bonn and Malawi where he lodged a successful
application to join the Lome Convention. "We were lucky", said Sir
Maori. Because of "former colonial ties" with Britain and Germany,
PNG was probably among the last countries to be linked to the European
Economic Community which "took more than one-third" of PNGs
exports. A one-man office was to be set up in Brussels to deal with the
EEC. 80 The Commission of Enquiry into Standardisation of Imports
recommended that cars and trucks sold in the country should be limited to
five Japanese makes. 81 New Zealand businessmen were offered tax
concessions and rights to invest "in mineral resources and commercial
structure". The PNG High Commissioner, Leo Morgan, felt that New
Zealand was not fully aware of PNG's "vast resources" and of its coffee,
tea and cocoa products which New Zealand bought from "distant
countries". New Zealand aid would be worth $A5.5 million in the
current financial year, but as it was "highly project-oriented ... we find
we cannot take proper advantage of it". 82 New Zealand, however, later
stressed that it "could only expand its business if it increased its buying
from countries which bought from it". 83 Chan reaffirmed his policy of
pegging the kina to the Australian dollar, "a strong, single currency".
He could not "foresee circumstances in which it would be sensible to
devalue the kina in terms of world major currencies". 84
Mary Seymour Olmsted became the United States' first ambassador to
PNG. She had previously been serving as charge d'affaires. 85
July-December 1975
261
Government
Sir Maori Kiki, a Papuan, succeeded Sir John Guise as Deputy Chief (later
Prime) Minister. 86 Highlanders were perturbed that they did not occupy any
of the great offices of state and John Pokio (Okapa) warned that coastalHighlands rivalry was developing again in parliament. 87 The term "cabinet"
was abolished in favour of "National Executive Council" and all former
cabinet committees were abolished in favour of a new national planning
committee with slightly increased membership, viz. the Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister (both Pangu pati), Chan (People's Progress party),
Kavali (National party) and four public service heads. 88 A National Capital
Regional and an Enga Regional seat were created out of the Central and
Western Highlands Regional electorates respectively, with Josephine
Abaijah and Anton Parao as incumbents. The old seats were declared
vacant. 89
Even before the cuts in Australian aid were known, Julius Chan had
written to all ministers urging cuts in departmental expenditure and harder
work from public servants. 90 More rigorous methods of accounting were to
be adopted. 91 There can be no doubt from informal reports that there has
been great laxity in such matters as travel, telephone expenditure and the
purchase and use of equipment. The Auditor-General's report revealed
salaries for non-existent employees and unauthorised expenditure, for
example, on the ministerial aircraft, a Cessna 421 B, which had been
purchased in breach of the Government Contracts Act and Public Finance
Regulations. 92 To the Local Government Association, Chan affirmed that he
would "tighten" funds; he was determined to be "the Minister for SelfReliance, not the Minister for Handouts". 93 In mid-August a mini-budget
raised duties on beer, imported liquor and cigarettes by about forty-six per
cent. It was expected to add K6 million to the revenue. The maxi-budget
(30 September) saw radical changes in the income tax system, higher stamp
duty, and customs increases of up to forty-five per cent on luxury goods.
Concessional tax deductions were abolished, the general taxation rate increased
by an average of twelve percent but the minimum taxable income level was
raised from K12 to K18 per week. Low income earners with dependants
also profited: a person with four dependants will pay no tax unless he earns
K2, 112 per year. "It was not an Independence but a self-reliance Budget",
said Chan. 94 Drastic action had to be taken with the drop in copper and copra
prices, a suspicion that PNG was "uncreditworthy" with the World Bank, 95
and a gloomy general economic outlook at least until1977. 96 A mass public
service strike over the government's unilateral reduction of the wage
indexation base was narrowly averted in November by Somare's negotiating
skills and a general sense of the danger of economic disruption by union
leaders. However, with government housing rents being raised and
electricity charges going up thirty per cent, the urban dweller was feeling
the pinch. The only bright prospect was the likelihood that Broken Hill
Proprietary would conduct a two-year feasibility study of the copper
mine at Ok Tedi. 97 Informed reports from the whole Star Mountains area
262
James Griffin
revealed rich resources which might eventually reduce PNG's reliance on

Bougainville.
It was against this economic background and surreptitious charges of
ministerial corruption and incompetence that Somare suddenly reshuffled
his National Executive Council (NEC) in December. No ministers were
actually dropped from the NEC but the formerly separate Ministries of
Agriculture, Works, Minerals and Energy, Interior and Social Development,
Lands, Commerce and National Development were disbanded. This
rearrangement was to be a prelude to a restructuring of the public service.
Where previously the nineteen ministries had been divided between "senior"
and "junior", there were now to be thirteen "main" ministries with the other
six subordinate to them. Somare said that "he had considered reducing the
number of Ministers, but he felt this might affect the teamwork which had
been built up over the years ... teamwork was essential in the Ministry in
the light of the present economic situation" .98 "Teamwork", however, is a
euphemism for discipline. The new line-up is as follows:
Michael Somare
Prime minister
Deputy PM, defence minister and foreign affairs and overseas trade
Sir Maori Kiki
Justice minister and minister assisting the prime minister in provincial affairs
Ebia Olewale
Primary industry
Boyamo Sali
Sasakila Moses
Culture, recreation and youth development
Education
Iambakey Okuk
Environment and conservation
Stephen Tago
Finance
Julius Chan
Health
Sir Paul Lapun
Thomas Kavali
Natural resources
Gavera Rea
Labour, commerce and industry
Bruce Jephcott
Transport, works and supply
John Poe
Police
Posts and telegraphs
Ka1belt Duia
Housing and supply
Yano Belo
Donatus Mola
Public utilities
Corrective institutions and liquor licensing
Pita Lus
Dr Reuben Taureka
Information and broadcasting
The most significant changes concerned the two National party leaders,
Thomas Kavali and Iambakey Okuk, the two Bougainvillean
anti-secessionists, Sir Paul Lapun and Donatus Mola, the former Education
Minister, Dr Reuben Taureka, and the former Minister for Police, Pita Lus.
Sir Paul Lapun had been in Mines and Energy since 1972 but his current
lack of popularity in Bougainville made him no longer a politically necessary
choice. Similarly, Mola, who had presided over a rapid decline in Health
Services, no longer needed sensitive treatment. Dr Taureka had been
consistently at loggerheads with both teachers and bureaucrats in the
Education Department and had made no secret of his elitist tendencies. He
resigned from Pangu as a result of his relegation to a "minor" ministry. 99
Lus had given a deal of bloodthirsty advice during the year, urging the
shooting of Bougainvillean miners who rioted in May and the "execution" of
dissidents. 100 Perhaps to demonstrate his incorrigibility he urged from his
new Corrective Institutions portfolio that escaping prisoners should be "shot"
July-December 1975
263
on sight", 101 which elicited soon after from the Minister for Justice, Ebia
Olewale, the reassuring statement that prisoners in PNG had rights, that no
law authorised their ill-treatment and that anyone firing a weapon at them
could be liable to criminal prosecution. 102
The reaction of Kavali and Okuk to the reshuffle showed little evidence
of "teamwork". Both were believed to be under a cloud for irregularities in
their administration of the Department of Lands and the Department of
Transport and Civil Aviation respectively. The Post-Courier maintained that
neither had been demoted as Kavali had now both Lands and Minerals and
Energy in his National Resources portfolio and Okuk's Education post was
"an essential troubleshooter's job". 103 They did not see it that way, and
threatened to withdraw from the coalition. 104 At a meeting in Mount Hagen
on 16 December organised by students of the University of Technology,
about fifty representatives of the five Highlands provinces urged the National
party to withdraw and help to effect an election in 1976. Twelve MPs were
present, mostly from the United party (UP), including notables such as Tei
Abal and Anton Parao. Resolutions were passed calling on the government
to give senior posts in the ministry and public service to Highlanders.
Iambakey Okuk accused So mare of telling the People's Progress party (PPP)
leader, Julius Chan, of the proposed changes three months before but not
the National party, which had always been loyal and undemanding. When
the national coalition was formed he said, "we didn't ask [Somare] ... for
any Ministries like the People's Progress Party" .105 Never one for discretion,
Okuk claimed that the National party had been used to get rid of the former
Minister for Justice, John Kaputin, in 1974 and during the "debate on the
Constitution we were used to make things hard for the former chairman of
the Constitutional Planning Committee, Fr John Momis (Bougainville)". 106
Similarly with Sir John Guise, the government considered him "dangerous
and they lobbied to get him appointed Governor-General with only a
symbolic status" . 107 Somare had promised the National party the deputy
prime ministership if Sir John won the position of Governor-General, but
had given it to a Papuan instead. Belieing the name of his party, Okuk did
not hesitate next day in Goroka to emphasise that it was "a Highlands based
party" .108 Somare was "not afraid of making the Ministerial changes because
he knew he could replace any Minister with disgruntled United Party
members who defected from the Opposition" .109 He doubted if the United
party would move a no-confidence vote in the government "because there
was very little left of the party. You might find, one day ... Abal in a
ministerial position." 110 He had been given the Education ministry which is
"in a mess" although he "had no part in" but for which he would be blamed
as the next elections approached. "The Government has given me the rope
to hang myself', he said. 111 Moreover he was removed from Transport
because of moves by Ansett Airlines which wanted its nominee to be the
next head of Air Niugini and wanted "to continue netting K479,000 a week
for their planes" . 112 Interestingly, he does not seem to have reminded
listeners that his successor, Jephcott, was the only white man in the NECor, at least, the Post-Courier did not report it. In spite of such strong
264
James Griffin
criticism, the National party executive voted to remain with the government
rather than risk instability, 113 but it was hard to believe that a man of Okuk's
temperament could adjust himself to cabinet discipline again even if Somare
really wanted him to.
Chan denied that he knew about the changes and was reported to have
been "perturbed at not being consulted". He offered to return all PPP
portfolios for redistribution. He also revealed that he had not sought the
finance portfolio for PPP in 1972, only Transport, Trade and Industry,
Business Development and Information, and had accepted it only under
pressure from the former Administrator, L.W. Johnson. 114 The chairman of
the PPP, John Man eke, supported Chan, and said that PPP ministers were
above "petty personal interests or party pressures" and stressed that they
"have not caused undesirable publicity through their behaviour, either inside
or ont<:ici~ Papua New Guinea through drunkenness or court actions, but have
always maintained a good image for the nation". 115
Okuk was possibly right about the United party. Its troubles continued.
The shadow Minister for Education, Mackenzie Daugi (significantly, like
Anton Parao, a former member of the NPG) resigned because the UP was
not a constructive opposition and was dominated by "white elements", such
as the former member, Wally Lussick. 116 Abal defended his failure to "stir"
because "of the sensitive awareness that rivalry for power brings about
bloody events and civil unrests in newly independent countries" .117 However,
even Matiabe Yuwi thought Abal was obsessive about his problems with
Parao 118 and should either "clarify his position or hand over the leadership" .119
A six-man committee was set up to look into the leadership and into
Lussick's position and give Parao a chance to stay in the party.l2 In the
unlikely event of Abal losing the party leadership, his successor would
probably be Langro who, is, unlike his leader, fluent in English. Lussick's
influence would necessarily be reduced. Lussick denied he was trying to
influence the party. "Tei makes a statement and I put it into English", 121 he
said with extraordinary ingenuousness for a founder of the United party.
Thanks to the dominance of Somare, the Pangu pati nominally remained
the leading force in government but its branches had virtually gone out of
existence and few financial members remained. Moi Avei, the party
president, resigned from the ineffectual Village Task Force (and failed to
present his report) to devote himself to rebuilding Pangu. He asked
individual Pangu ministers to come down from their lofty heights and listen
to the 'rank and file' of Pangu. Ministers who refuse party discipline might
as well start organising their own future elections as Pangu will not be
supporting any political opportunists for the sake of numbers. It is better to
have half a dozen dedicated and committed party servants than to have a party
of a million individuals.
"Pangu", said Avei, "should work as a dedicated unit to fight with the
common people for an egalitarian society". 122 This criticism was believed to
be directed at all eight Pangu ministers with whom the party executive had
disagreed on some major issues including the citizenship provisions of the
July-December 1975
265
Constitution, the investigation of corruption and methods of party funding.

This last problem came to a head in August when it was revealed by Abal
that a registered company wholly owned by United party intended to take
over fifty per cent of the shares of Melanesian Investments Pty Ltd while
the Pangu pati would take up the rest. The self-reliance thus achieved would
be "a good step forward in the development of Papua New Guinea". The
United party would not interfere politically in the commercial operations
of any company in which it invested but would only control the dividends
it received. 123 Unfortunately for such sentiments Melanesian Investments
were alleged to be making an offer to take over PNG Associated Industries
Ltd. This company owned PNG Motors, a firm importing a brand of Japanese
car which the Commission of Enquiry into Standardisation of Selected
Imports had recommended to be among the few models to be allowed into
PNG. How, asked Kavali, could such a takeover be consistent with
"Parliamentary members' duty to act impartially in the national interest".
Avei said that he and other Pangu executive members were "in the dark"
about the proposed takeover but that some members of the executive had
"expressed personal opposition to the scheme". The chairman and managing
director of PNG Associated Industries, A. Morris, then revealed that
Melanesian Investments was made up of two companies, Damai Pty Ltd and
Tarangu Pty Ltd. The directors ofDamai were Somare, Maori Kiki, Boyamo
Sali and (ex-colonel) Patterson Low a, while the directors of Tarangu were
Tei Abal, Paul Langro, Angmai Bilas, Martin To Vadek and Andagai Wabiria
(all UP parliamentarians). More than seventy per cent of the shareholders
in PNG Associated Industries had agreed to sell their shares to Melanesian
Investments "and once ninety per cent of the shares were held by one group,
the rest could be compulsorily acquired by law". Morris anticipated his
company would be 100 per cent owned by nationals by the end of
November. 12
Andrew Maino, chairman of the Standardisation Commission, then
resigned because his report had recommended that the government should
take over practically all motor importing businesses. If Pangu ministers
voted in favour of the report, the party would stand to lose a large part of
its investment (a projected K500,000); if not, they would be accused of
jeopardising the national interest. The government was thus "in an
intolerable position". 125 It was also interesting that trucking associations saw
the Pangu-UP collusion as creating the feeling that the parties were looking
to a "one-party system" in future. 126 Maino was understandably "shocked
and disgusted" 127 but, as the Post-Courier pointed out, there was "no
suggestion of any improper dealing". 128 This was also the opinion of the
Pangu executive. 129 Pangu then moved to drop its association with the motor
industry and party thinking reverted to the idea of its foundation organiser,
Tony Voutas, who suggested before he finally left PNG that parties would
have to be subsidised by the state. 130
Parliamentary behaviour also continued to cause concern. Absenteeism
and drinking problems led to sittings being curtailed to the daytime ( 10 am5 pm). Lus, however, in spite of being Police Minister and a teetotaller, was
266
James Griffin
probably the worst offender. Somare, the Speaker and ministers had to be
called into the House to restrain him on one occasion, 131 and two days later,
he "head-butted and punched" Andagai Wabiria, an Opposition frontbencher,
for calling him a "pumpkin-head". Later at a reconciliation outside the
House he explained that he "had been sensitive about references to his head
since an expatriate member in an earlier House of Assembly had referred
to him as het kindam (prawn head)'' .132 The colonial scapegoat will continue
to have the oddest uses. Lus was also able to defend the ministers against
the criticism of sloth: "Did you know", he expostulated, "that we work until
7 p.m. at times" [author's italics]. 133 Is that attitude perhaps a legacy of the
expatriate public service? In spite of these functional difficulties, PNG
remained committed to the Westminster system. Sere Pitoi, chairman of the
Public Service Board, emphasised that senior public servants could not
belong to a political party or organisation. Local government councils. area
authorities and registered industrial organisations are not included in the
prohibition although senior officers still require Public Service Board
approval before nominating for office on these bodies. However, the Public
Service Board did, said Pitoi, "encourage discussion among public servants
on matters of national importance and submission of their views to the
Government through workshops and seminars ... The board was now
planning to extend these forums." 134
To support his homilies and cutbacks by personal example, Somare
slashed his own salary (Kl2,000) by Kl,OOO in December as a gesture
towards a general saving and to make unionists "more amenable to accepting
some restraint in their pay levels". He also said his Daimler Sovereign car
would be offered for sale; the ministerial chalet at Sapphire Creek and the
five contentious Mercedes purchased for the independence celebrations
would be sold; ministerial staff would be paid local salaries and a review
of ministerial staff salaries would be made; new methods of checking
expenditure would be introduced and there would be cuts in ministerial
travel expenses." 135 Although not an austere or a particularly forceful man,
Somare continued to show resourcefulness under pressure and stood
unchallenged as the most adroit politician in the country. In conversation
he likes to refer to "the art of the possible"; in fact, he continues to function
even with the often highly improbable (e.g. Lus). His personal balance was
shown when he declined to rejoice at the defeat of Gough Whitlam although
he must stand to gain from Malcolm Fraser's victory and Andrew Peacock's
accession to Foreign Affairs. "Quite apart from the results of the election",
he said, "the people of Papua New Guinea will always retain ... a warm
spot in their hearts for the Labor Party, and for the way they prepared and
helped us to win Self-Government and Independence. This is something we
will not forget." 136
Secession Movements
On the Bougainville issue it was left to the doyen of Pacific anthropologists,
Margaret Mead, to rush in where even unsubtle Marxists have been known
July-December 1975
267
to tread warily. Secessionism, she announced eagerly, had been stirred up

by foreign business interests, meaning, of course, Bougainville Copper
Limited. 137 No evidence was proffered and, to this writer's knowledge, Dr
Mead has never been in Bougainville. It was, however, an excellent instance
of the incredulity that seems to seize opinion-makers (even those who claim
to respect indigenous faculties) when they have to contemplate the stubborn
refusal of an allegedly unsophisticated minority to accept assimilation into
a new and uncertain polity. There has to be a reason more sinister than a
primordial drive for autonomy. Unfortunately for Mead and for other, less
ignorant and less outspoken observers, Bougainville Copper seems (to me)
to have been as bewildered and as obtuse as both the colonial and PNG
governments in its perception of secession and related issues. With the
renegotiation of the Copper Agreement in 1974, the awareness of its
vulnerability in any conflict, the workers' riots in May 1975, and the current
slump in copper prices, Bougainville has ceased to be a bonanza for investors
and it was believed by executives that rather than put lives at risk, the mine
would be shut down. Applying the criterion of crude self-interest to a
situation where the relative strengths and political will of both sides were
unknown, it stood to reason that the company would sit on its hands rather
than risk backing a loser. For this reason Somare failed to get any forceful
condemnations of secession from the company and the secessionists were
getting nothing more than official neutrality even when their spokesperson,
Leo Hannett, offered better terms for BCL from an independent
Bougainville. On the other hand, many whites in Bougainville were
becoming emotionally involved with the secessionist cause and the
cyclostyled Arawa Bulletin was patently a vehicle for the views of
secessionist leaders, especially Hannett's.
Incredulity was not confined to whites. At the beginning of July Ebia
Olewale led a "fact-finding" team of politicians and public servants on a
tour of Bougainville. Predictably he disagreed with the estimate of the prosecessionist District Commissioner, Dr Alexis Sarei, that some eighty-six
per cent of Bougainvilleans favoured secession. The north, at least was not
in favour, he maintained. ns Unfortunately, this was a hackneyed theme from
colonial days and one which occasionally served to divide and very
temporarily conquer the Bougainvilleans rather than aiding a more sensible
process: that which would unite and persuade. Soon afterwards the Nakar
Kas society was formed in Donatus Mola's village of Lemankoa (North
Buka Island) to combat secession. It seemed a significant announcement in
the pages of the Post-Courier139 until better information suggested that Nakar
Kas consisted of less than twenty of Mola's relatives and friends. Nakar
Kas was then heard no more. Olewale and his team were less self-assured
in the centre and south of the province and needed guarantees of security
before they faced an open call for secession at Arawa. Oscar Tammur MHA,
patron of the Mataungan Association on the Gazelle Peninsula, was allegedly
threatened with death in the south if he returned. Once a near-secessionist
himself, he is now a confirmed nationalist and he was obviously shocked at
how little "kinship" Boungainvilleans felt for him. In spite of everything,
268
James Griffin
Olewale (an ex-Papuan "separatist") was confident, on his return to Port

Moresby, that secession could be avoided. 140
The government then offered an increase of K500,000 in its contentious
allocation to Bougainville, 141 bringing the total to K4.2 million. The
Bougainvillean leaders, however, would talk only about the "generous"
financial compensation they would offer the PNG government for its loss
of control over the copper mine. Secession itself was non-negotiable and a
flag-raising had to take place before 16 September so that the world would
know that Bougainville had not given its consent to incorporation into PNG.
Moreover, any chance of compromise was ruled out when first, Dr Sarei, a
forceful but a fairly conciliatory man, left for the USA for holidays with
his American wife in July, and then Fr Momis, potentially a PNG patriot,
left for the UN in August to ask for a separate devolution. This effectively
left Leo Hunnett in charge of the movement. Ilis personal1datium. with
Somare, unlike those of Dr Sarei and Fr Momis, were far from amicable.
Hannett took the visionary standpoint that, even if violence was used against
them, Bougainvilleans would overcome the corrupt "neo-colonialist" regime
of PNG in the end. Occasionally, however, his pacificism alternated with
threats that he would not be able to control his people. Hannett published
an intransigent apologia in self-justification. 142
Hannett also led a group of leaders to Honiara in the Solomon Islands
(ex-British Solomon Islands Protectorate) in August to explain Bougainville's
position and discuss the possibility of union. They arrived in their own
(Bougainville Airways) Norman by Islander aeroplane with its sub-nationalist
insignia painted on the tailpiece. The Solomon Islands had just shed its
protectorate status and was heading for self-government towards the end
of the year 1" and independence by 1977. The sentiment for union is quite
intense and widespread in the Western Solomons where the people are also
jet black in colour but it has also become quite marked among politicians in
the central and eastern areas. There can be no doubt that Hannett and his
team made a profound impression on many Solomonese leaders not only
because of "affinities" but also because the Solomon Islands after
independence will be faced with indigence and dependency. Union with
Bougainville would alleviate this. Fr Momis consolidated the goodwill
already built up when he stayed on for several weeks in the Solomons on his
return from his futile UN visit. (He did not return through Port Moresby.)
Fr Momis explained his position at both public and private meetings. The
Chief Minister of the Solomons Islands, Solomon Mamaloni, was thus placed
under considerable pressure particularly as both Somare and Sir Maori Kiki
visited him as well. Fortunately an Australian Commission had been set up
in Honiara in February to watch the situation and it has continued to
represent PNG since independence. The Commissioner, Philip Jackson, has
undoubtedly exercised a moderating influence on some otherwise uninformed
and potentially brash leaders. Mamaloni has declined to condemn
Bougainvillean secession in spite of Somare's pressure and has adopted the
commonsense attitude that it is an internal issue for PNG. In any case his
own political base is tenuous. A motion of support for Bougainville,
July-December 1975
269
however, was due to be moved in the Solomon Islands Legislative Assembly

at its sitting in early January 1976.
On 1 September the Bougainvillean "rebels" raised the flag of the "North
Solomons Republic" with its traditional upi hat motif and, unlike Papua
Besena's UDI, accompanied it with a successful day of festivities. Hannett
made an eloquent speech, the peroration of which referred to Moses leading
his people into the Promised Land. Both Catholic and Methodist church
clergy were present. The following day the locally-born Catholic bishop,
the Most Reverend Gregory Simkai, officially declared his support for the
North Solomons Republic. 144 He also offered church land outside Arawa for
its officials when they were faced with eviction from their offices and
government-owned houses. This support was, after all, what his flock (some
seventy-five per cent of Bougainvilleans are baptised Catholics) wanted.
Again there was a shocked response outside Bougainville. It was tempered
only by the suspicion that secessionism was, as some would expect, a Popish
plot. After all Hannett, Dr (ex-Fr) Sarei, Fr Momis, Bishop Simkai and a
score oflesser leaders had all been in the seminary together. Unfortunately
for this theory Methodists (some fifteen per cent of Bougainvilleans) and
even some Seventh-day Adventists supported secession. Somare, himself a
Catholic, who knows better than to see events in such simplistic terms,
nevertheless responded angrily to Bishop Simkai's declaration by saying
that the government would have to review its attitude to the Catholic church
in PNG even though the Tolai auxiliary bishop of Port Moresby, the Most
Reverend Hermann ToPaivu, forcibly declared himself for unity. 145 No more
was heard of Somare's threats not only because the Catholic missions are
still necessary, influential, and generally "loyal" but also because someone
must have explained to Somare that Irish and English bishops did not
necessarily stand crozier to crozier over Home Rule nor did French and
German bishops agree over the rights and wrongs of various continental
wars. Bishop Simkai's declaration, however, did finally convince many
sceptics that secessionism was a pan-Bougainvillean movement which might
be defended with profound conviction.
In spite of those urging confrontation, Somare took a fabian course. He
was not prepared to make martyrs, particularly of Hannett or Momis. His
tactics were to abolish the Bougainville provincial government, freeze its
assets, isolate the "rebel" leaders, but meet any breach of the law firmly.
He believes (at least as a point of policy) that the relatively prosperous and
"business-minded" Bougainvilleans will eventually resent their lack of
continued development and tire of leaders who cannot supply purposive
action. (There is always the suspicion with Somare that every Melanesian
has his price.) Without arms, the only major weapon of the Bougainvilleans
is to sabotage the copper mine but this would harm their own people.
Moreover, they have not been driven to such desperation as to seek arms
(even if they knew how) in defiance of previously-stated lofty principles.
The upshot in the last months of the year was a series of contrived minor
"riots" which were met by controlled police action- more a testing of wills
than anything else. Meanwhile the Bougainvillean leaders set about
270
James Griffin
consolidating their hold on the village by pushing ahead with reforms in

local government by the Interim Provincial Assembly in early 1974 and
preparing for their own elections. In December life was still cheerful enough
in Bougainville; Momis and Sarei were exerting a moderating influence on
the "hotheads". Informal contacts had also been kept up with Port Moresby.
However, there could be no confidence that the exasperation of villagers
would lapse into torpor rather than explode in sporadic violence - and
Somare made no secret of not wanting to use the army so soon after
independence, unless he has to. 146
In Papua Dr Eric Wright, Josephine Abaijah's close friend and adviser,
earned the distinction of being the government's first deportee. 147 Only
twenty-five people turned up to a meeting to protest, 148 a reflection of the
distrust in which "white advisers" are held and of the barrier that Wright
personally created between Abaijah and many educated sympathisers. She
flew to Australia with Wright in August and together they attempted to
publicise the Papuan cause. 149 Abaijah's paper to the Australian Institute of
International Affairs seminar in Brisbane in September150 once again revealed
her excessive concern with political "morality" rather than knowledge and
organisation. This suggested that, unlike Bougainville secession, Papua
Besena could go out with a whimper rather than a bang. Abaijah and Wright
then left on a world tour. She returned to PNG in December. Unlike
Fr Momis, she had not resigned from parliament and seemed set to campaign
for a Papua Besena candidate in her old Central Regional electorate. While
there is no doubt that Papuan "sentiment" among villagers will remain
strong, educated Papuans must have been affected by the confident transition
to independence and the growing awareness that the outside world
(especially Indonesia) is potentially hostile. This should engender some
sense of Papua New Guinea nationalism.
27
JANUARY-JUNE 1976
Donald Denoon
The first half of 1976 has yielded a number of events which enable observers
to begin to see patterns in the political economy of the country. Questions
which were posed when Papua New Guinea became independent in
September 1975 still resist final answers- but tentative answers can now
be formulated.
A question posed by the formal independence of a new state, is the
nature and extent of its constitutionally asserted freedom. Will Papua New
Guinea be a successor state to the colonial administration set up by Australia
and modified by Australians and Papua New Guineans to achieve
independence? In late colonial times, Papua New Guinea was characterised
by dualism in the economy, social life, culture and even in politics: will
independent Papua New Guinea tolerate the continuance of such dualism?
And will the country's economy continue to be characterised by the massive
export of primary products, the unrestrained import of manufactured goods,
and a budget balanced by colossal infusions of Australian aid? Behind all
these very specific questions looms a rather amorphous one: what is the
meaning of "self-reliance", a term culled from the government's policy
statement (the "Eight Aims"), and bandied about in most economic
discussions? Since it now seems possible to propose an answer to the
overriding question, it is likely that the specific questions will answer
themselves in due course.
The converse of the first question needs to be posed. In colonial times
government was dependent upon Australia and to that extent independent
of the Papua New Guinean populace. Is the independent government of
Papua New Guinea, dependent upon the will of the people of the country?
Demonstrably, the most crucial question of internal affairs is to ask how
relations between the central government and various regional political
organisations developed. It is tempting to see this problem as a number of
unrelated, bilateral relationships; but in practice the central government's
handling of the Bougainville issue was clearly influenced by the fear of
provoking similar developments in other regions; and it may well be that
Bougainville's approach to the Papua New Guinea problem was influenced
by the leaders' estimate of the amount of enthusiasm for devolution in other
regions in Papua New Guinea. 1
Donald Denoon
272
Fourth, we should review the central government's relations with a

number of groups, as a way of understanding the development of intergroup
relations within the political system. Finally, Papua New Guinea became
independent without a foreign policy: that is to say, without an ideologically
articulate rationalisation of the various foreign relationships in which the
country was involved. It has often seemed that the government would like
to continue to conduct foreign relations without articulating a foreign policy
in this sense. Rather unfairly, however, foreign affairs forced themselves
upon the government in such a way as to force them to state their position
on some very unpleasant issues, in which it was extremely difficult to satisfy
considerations of equity and fair play. Not to put too fine a point on it,
honourable men were placed in dishonourable positions by the exigencies
of actual foreign relations.
***
Whatever else may be meant by "self-reliance" it implies a diminished
dependence upon Australian financial aid for ordinary budgetary purposes.
Over the past year, Papua New Guinea has been consuming Australian aid
at a rate of $A55.00 per capita per annum, and slightly more than half of
the budgeted receipts came from Australian aid. 2 These figures must, of
course, be treated with caution. They include military as well as civilian
aid (at least until1976); and the more than generous salaries and severance
allowances of Australian bureaucrats are also incorporated in these gross
figures. Nevertheless a country which depends so heavily upon a single
foreign benefactor has seriously restricted its freedom in international and
indeed internal affairs. Papua New Guinea and Australia have, in this respect,
created a new world record for direct financial dependency. The sheer size
of the annual subvention means, of course, that any modification of the aid
package in Canberra has direct and drastic consequences in Port Moresby.
The early weeks in 1976 were clouded by doubt as to the precise meaning
of existing aid agreements to the new Australian government of Malcolm
Fraser: even relatively minor reinterpretations by Fraser of commitments
by Gough Whitlam could create budgetary and political havoc; and it was a
matter of great importance that Fraser be publicly committed to a generous
interpretation.
Accordingly, the Prime Minister, Michael Somare, went to Australia
early in March. He came home with a revised agreement which was
widely praised. Over the following five years, Fraser committed Australia
to pay no less than K930,000,000 in aid to Papua New Guinea. 3 Ministers
congratulating themselves on this figure have shown a tendency to
emphasise that it is a minimum figure, and have sometimes been tempted
to round it up to the next hundred million. The Finance Minister, Julius
Chan, hailed the agreement as a means of securing long-term
self-reliance. This is a provocative definition: whatever self-reliance is, it
is reinforced by the guarantee of K930,000,000 of foreign aid over five
years. Self-reliance, thus described, would be destroyed if Australia
January-June 1976
273
declined to provide aid at all, or offered it only on a reduced basis. One

conclusion seems quite irresistible: the diminution of dependence upon
Australia for fiscal purposes is not the most urgent of the goals perceived
by the government of Papua New Guinea; maintenance of services at the
standard set by the Australian administration is evidently a matter of much
greater concern.
Another likely dimension of self-reliance is localisation of decision
makers in the public and private sectors of the political economy. In his
inaugural lecture, the Professor of Public Administration pointed out that
localisation of the public service had declined as a political issue since 1974.4
The only group of people who raised the standard of localisation during the
six months under review were undergraduates of the University of
Technology in Lae, protesting about the survival of an expatriate ViceChancellor and an expatriate university administration. They were not
endorsed by any other interest group; and no other group has attempted to
revive localisation as an emotional issue. Of much greater importance in
public discussion has been the question whether Papua New Guinea should
rely upon expatriates drawn solely from Australia, and paid at a single,
generous rate of remuneration; or else depend upon expatriates drawn
from a wide range of countries, remunerated at a wide range of different
rates of pay. The merits of these points of view are irrelevant to the
present discussion: what is notable is that this debate has replaced
localisation as a topic of public debate. A parallel change seems equally
interesting. Whereas the term "white adviser" was a potent term of
political abuse some months ago, it is no longer so effective. At the same
time the nature of "white advisers" seems to have changed. A minister is
now very likely to be advised by an Onusien of indeterminate nationality,
holding at least four degrees in different aspects of development studies.
The inevitable Australians of yesteryear have been replaced, at least in the
public image of government. A minister is still rather unlikely to depend
upon the advice of a national public servant, still less on the advice of
Parliament.
It is also clear, by mid-1976, that self-reliance does not imply
serious constraints on the inflow of investment capital from overseas. On
the contrary, the government and the press have expressed much
enthusiasm for foreign investment in general terms, and particularly in
relation to the Ok Tedi copper mining project near the borders of Papua
New Guinea and Irian J aya; and to the Purari project to extract large
quantities of electricity from hydro-electric installations along the lower
reaches of the Purari River. In this context, ministers have been advised
by experts, and appear to have been persuaded, that Japanese investors
are not as ruthless as they have been portrayed, that multi-national
companies are inevitable (even if not wholly desirable) and that no special
precautions are required in dealing with such companies. 5 The extremely
successful re-negotiation of the Bougainville copper agreement, and the
peaceful and amicable withdrawal of Kennecott from the Ok Tedi scheme,
lend credibility to the optimistic view of multi-national economic
274
Donald Denoon
procedures. It is also argued that dependence upon foreign private capital

investment is the only real means of diminishing dependence upon
Australian state capital investment. Since no political leader has
propounded a "solution" to underdevelopment without advocating large
infusions of someone else's money, this argument is quite correct in its
own terms. The terms of the debate rather than the debating points, would
repay closer scrutiny.
Dependence upon foreign capital has proceeded a step further than
the common Third World dependence upon foreign capital for public
sector purposes. The precedent, set initially by the Mataungan Association,
has now been emulated by almost every other political association in
Papua New Guinea: namely, to establish a business arm which is
independently able to raise money through investment, and which releases
the leaders of the political party or movement from direct financial
dependence upon its local supporters. At the end of 1975, the public was
surprised to learn that the business arms of Pangu pati (the leading party of
the national coalition) and of the United party (the only party on the
opposition side) were jointly proposing to enter the lucrative field of
motor car sales. The public was mollified by the assurance that political
leaders could readily distinguish between their financial interests (as
shareholders of the motor dealers) and their administrative interests (as
purchasers of motor cars for the government), but the episode nevertheless
startled a number of observers of the political scene. The particular
venture was abandoned, but the parties have evidently continued to
seek profitable investments. In March, for example, the Post-Courier
carried a report on the financial state of Pangu pati itself. Following
two disastrous election campaigns (described below), the party's
finances were at a low ebb. Apart from some KIO,OOO in bank
accounts, the party was reduced to K400,0006 6 in real assets. Pangu pati
itself would have us believe that most of its members and supporters
are relatively poor rural voters. Accordingly, it is necessary to look
elsewhere for the contributors to the party's admittedly depleted assets.
It seems inescapable, that party business activities involve foreign
investors, though not necessarily in a discreditable role. In popular
demonology, the "white political adviser'' has been replaced by the
"Southeast Asian economic adviser" - and the shift in popular opinion in
Port Moresby may well reflect reality. Since every political association
appears to depend for its finance upon involving foreign investors of one
kind or another, it is not very surprising that Parliament has no vocal
exponent of any development strategy which dispenses with foreign
investment tout court. To put the same point more crudely, in Parliament
there is no Left. In short, no significant political pressure group is serious
about self-reliance: the government does not wish to dispense with
Australian state capital; nor do the parties appear to oppose the intervention
of private investors in the economy of the country; nor does any vocal group
continue to press for the localisation of decision-making positions within
the public service.
January-June 1976
275
There seems no simple index to measure the dependence of political

leaders upon local public support. One aspect of the question may be isolated
by asking what has happened to political parties. Party control was never a
major factor in Papua New Guinea politics, but now it hardly seems to be a
factor at all. One instructive episode took place in January. In the cabinet
reshuffle towards the end of 1975, Iambakey Okuk (National party, Simbu
(Chimbu) Province) was appointed Minister for Education. He gave vent
to his irritation at losing the Transport portfolio, which he had evidently
enjoyed; and he publicly criticised the Prime Minister. After a few days of
ultimatums and rumours, Somare dismissed two National party ministers,
Thomas Kavali the parliamentary leader ofthe party, and Okuk himself. The
other members of the parliamentary National party felt absolutely no
solidarity with their leaders. Within three days a National party backbencher
(Kobale Kale) accepted the ministry vacated by Okuk, and within a week
the other National party ministers had publicly rejected Kavali 's instruction
to resign from the cabinet. 7 In the ensuing intra-party squabbling, Kavali
and Okuk were left in possession of the party apparatus and its titles; but
the other parliamentary members (who resigned from the party) clearly
regarded the party as a wooden spoon, suitable for people who had lost the
more tangible benefits of ministerial office. Even among parliamentarians,
the political party was not taken seriously.
The popularity of the government was tested early in the year, when byelections had to be held to fill two new regional seats: Central Regional
(created by dividing the old Central Regional seat into National Capital
Regional, held by Josephine Abaijah, and Central Regional itself) and
Western Highlands Regional (created by dividing the old seat of the same
name into Enga Regional, held by Anton Parao, and Western Highlands
Regional itself). The government failed both tests in a quite dramatic
manner. The Central Regional result was as follows:
Total
First preference votes
9,149
5,946
James Mopio
(Papua Besena)
6,504
(Independent)
5,I63
Dirona Abe
(People's Progress
Patrick Avi
party)
4,443
Moi Avei
(Pangu pati)
3,367
Hoidae Henao
(Papua Besena)
I ,523
Lahui Tau
(United party)
I ,396
The Pangu candidate, Moi Avei, was the party's national president, one
of the electorate's first graduates, a leading light in village development
associations within the electorate and the recipient of moral and transport
support from the central government. His failure even to challenge the
leading candidates was quite unexpected. The results of the Western
Highlands Regional seat were no more comforting to the governing
coalition. A total of 43,225 votes were cast. Of the twelve candidates, the
two who won most first preferences were both members of the opposition
United party -Raphael Doa with 14,821 was the eventual winner, and
276
Donald Denoon
the second placed candidate was James Kupul with 8,466 first preference
votes. 8
It would be a mistake to read too much national significance into
two regional by-elections, in which party lines were never very clearly
drawn. Nonetheless they suggested to Pangu 9 that something should be
done to arrest the decline of the party's appeal. At the bottom of the
problem was the question "what is Pangu?". It had a number of
policy-reviewing committees, but these evidently never met, and although
it had branches throughout the country, these were almost all moribund.
The party could point to absolutely no political programme and was
therefore reduced to describing as national party policy, whatever policy
its ministerial members had most recently adopted in cabinet discussions.
It was therefore quite impossible to portray Pangu as an independent force
in national affairs, even if it was becoming a significant force in the
national economy. When Pangu conducted its post mortem into the
by-election results, Moi Avei resigned from the party presidency, and the
party executive resolved to develop a party policy as a matter of urgency.
The value of these decisions will no doubt emerge in future. Since Avei
was the most prominent member of Pangu to protest at Pangu's entry
(with the United party) into the business of selling cars, his removal from
the national presidency is not, in itself, very reassuring. The policies
promised by the meeting may well emerge in time for national election
purposes; but at the time of writing (August 1976) there is still no
evidence that Pangu can develop policies significantly different from those
pursued by ministers from day to day. It is - to come to the point hard to believe that Pangu is anything more than a political fiction in
1976.
The political organisations which appear to have substantial strength
are those untainted by involvement in government: the regional
movements demanding autonomy or separation (Bougainville and Papua
Besena), and the United party. The regional movements will be
considered later. Meanwhile it is worth looking at the fortunes of the
United party opposition. The sheer survival of the United party is
somewhat surprising, considering the attractions of office and the few
rewards of loyal opposition. The party was also under severe internal
strains. The personal feud continued between Tei Abal, leader of the
United party, and Anton Parao the much younger member for Enga
Regional. After a number of verbal incidents in the Enga Province, Abal
sought damages from Parao in the Supreme court in Port Moresby 10 His
successes in these encounters seem to have consolidated his hold on the
party: his knighthood in the Queen's birthday honours list may also have
some marginal influence. The political consequences of Sir Tei's
continued ascendancy in the opposition include the entrenchment of his
view of how an opposition should behave in a newly independent country.
His strategy involves a quiet, thoughtful, cooperative posture in public
debate, and it is doubtful whether many of his colleagues would pursue so
quiet a policy if Sir Tei were not leader. The fact that the two leading
January-June 1976
277
candidates in the Western Highlands Regional by-election both claimed to

represent the United party is perhaps significant- though the preferential
voting system does encourage proliferation by all the major political
parties.
For some weeks, during March and April, it looked as if a general
election might be held later in 1976. The year opened with a number of
Somare's opponents and rivals demanding early elections: Kavali (8
January) was followed by Okuk and Abaijah (9 January) and by the
Leader of the Opposition himself (15 January). It was something of a
surprise, therefore, when Somare himself announced his intention to ask
Parliament to agree to an election in 1976 instead of 1977. The People's
Progress party and the United party agreed at once; the cabinet agreed
more hesitantly; and the Country party decided to oppose the proposal.U
In practice, there were a great many hesitations which could not be
avowed in public. A large number of members clearly feel that they have
no hope of re-election, and will be unemployed at the end of Parliament's
term. Equally, the United party, kept out of office by a very narrow and
unreliable majority for the governing coalition, expects to gain some
advantage from redistribution. Since early elections would take place
before redistribution, the United party expects some advantage from the
postponement of election. Thus, although almost every formal political
association was strongly committed to an early appeal to the electorate,
large numbers of individual politicians were alarmed at the prospect of
campaigning. The issue was fought on two grounds. First, Somare hoped
to pass a vote of no-confidence in the government, which would trigger
the dissolution of Parliament. But this prospect was dashed when the
Supreme court ruled that the constitution prohibited Parliament from
considering a no-confidence motion before the elections themselvesY
Failing that mechanism, Somare was obliged to hope for a two-thirds
majority of parliamentarians voting for a 1976 election. Not surprisingly,
that majority did not materialise. 13 Parliamentarians' commendable anxiety
to remain within the letter as well as the spirit of law, is evidently much
stronger than their desire to break a political logjam and appeal directly to
the people.
***
The half year opened with a by-election triumph for Papua Besena: it
closed under the shadow of disputed elections in, and for, Bougainville.
At no point in the six months could the government forget the vexed issue
of regional autonomy. During the half year, the central government
abandoned its earlier opinion that the country cannot afford provincial
government, and now appears to take the view that the country cannot
afford to dispense with provincial government. When the two National
party ministers were dismissed, Oscar Tammur became Minister for
Provincial Affairs, 14 a portfolio previously submerged in the Justice
portfolio held by Ebia Olewale. Tammur almost immediately set off with
278
Donald Denoon
two aides on a fifty-four day, ten-country, round the world tour; though under
protest he cut the tour by two days. 15 Nevertheless his appointment signalled
a revival of interest in provincial affairs, and the restoration of legal
provincial government to Bougainville in ApriP 6 was the first tangible result
of the changed policy.
The shape of provincial government is evidently a matter of considerable
concern. Most political leaders have assumed that the autonomous provinces
should be coterminous with the old districts. The only exception to this
statement is that supporters of Papua Besena, who tend to see provincial
government as a step towards Papuan independence, would like to see the
whole of Papua subsumed in a single province. Oro (Northern) Province
leaders, however, and possibly politicians in other areas outside the Central
Province, press for the former district boundaries rather than see Papua reemerge as a political expression.
There is also a great variation in enthusiasm for provincial
government from region to region. Bougainvilleans see it as the very least
that can be accepted, in the event of their abandoning their aspiration for
separatism. Highland leaders by and large seem willing to acquiesce in
provincial government, but only in the Eastern Highlands - possibly
encouraged by the Speaker, Barry Holloway - have local leaders
responded with any enthusiasm to the government's invitation to draft
constitutions for themselvesY The New Guinea Islands provinces seem
enthusiastic, and the East Sepik has also drafted a constitution. Other
districts either do not feel cheerful about achieving viability or - like
most of the Highlands - they expect to dominate the next national
government anyway.
Bougainville/central government relations set the pace throughout the
period under review. Violence broke out in Bougainville late in January,
involving the destruction of central government property and the digging
up of air strips. The police and riot squad personnel were evidently unable
to cope with the situation, and on 30 January police flew in by helicopter
to rescue a startled Sir Paul Lapun, who had not thought that his life was
endangered in his south Bougainville home. 18 Once again matters
simmered down and another round of talks was held in mid-February,
which led to the formal reinstatement of provincial government in
Bougainville and mutual reassurances of benevolent and cooperative
intentions. 19 When Parliament re-opened in the middle of March, Somare
seems to have expected that it would be possible to reseat Raphael Bele
and to see Fr John Momis once more in his parliamentary seat: but after the
first few days of the session, it became clear that neither of the
Bougainvilleans was going to sit in Parliament again. 20 It then became
desirable for the central government to hold by-elections in Bougainville,
to replace the two resigned members; but at once Momis warned that it
would seem like bad faith on Somare's part if he persisted in holding byelections for the national Parliament before the Bougainville provincial
elections had been held, after which the will of the people of the North
Solomons would be more discoverable. 21 Nominations were nevertheless
January-June 1976
279
invited. Three Bougainvilleans nominated for the Bougainville Regional

seat (one of them, John Banono, borrowing the deposit money from the
National party): but not one person nominated for Central Bougainville
Open. 22 This must be taken as somewhat ambiguous evidence of the
solidarity of Bougainvilleans, in response to the leadership's call for a
boycott.
Then at the end of May trouble broke out again in Buin. At a high
school social on Saturday night, 29 May, some young men disrupted
proceedings, attacked a teacher and threatened others. This would not
cause much stir - let alone political stir - anywhere else in the country.
However, the teachers were upset, and asked to be protected or removed,
riot police were sent in to maintain order, and the Post-Courier advised the
central government that its prestige was at stake. The Post-Courier
demanded that "the 'mad dogs' must be hunted down and brought to
justice immediately", to demonstrate that Papua New Guinea was not
merely a banana republic. 23 The Bougainville leaders requested the
withdrawal of the riot police, as they themselves could ensure the
maintenance of law and order. The half year ended with the dispute unresolved, and Waigani-Kieta relations once again bedeviled by
misunderstanding. There is no reason to suppose that this is the last occasion
when the relationship will be strained.
***
During the first half of 1976 a number of relationships have been
demonstrated which do not altogether amount to a single coherent pattern,
but which are extremely suggestive. First, a relationship which has been
unfolding throughout the year relates to education policy. The approach
adopted by the Ministry of Education last year, though rejected by
Parliament, remained the official line: namely to distinguish between
Papua New Guinea curriculum schools and multi-racial schools, and to
deny entry to multi-racial schools to most Papua New Guinean children.
The specific device for restricting entry to multi-racial schools was a
special fee of K400 per child per annum, over and above the much
smaller fees customarily charged by such schools to cover expenses of
libraries and extra services. Several challenges have been launched against
this policy. The parliamentary challenge, though formally successful, has
had no visible effect on departmental policy. The Papua New Guinea
Teachers' Association has objected to the existence of a loophole through
which the children of wealthy Papua New Guineans might obtain an
education thought to be better than that available to most national
children. Most effectively, the policy has been challenged by the courts,
in consequence of which the multi-racial schools will almost certainly
have to become private schools during the second half of 1976, in order
to continue as they are at present. At the heart of the problem lies the
small number of Papua New Guinean children currently enrolled in
multi-racial schools - no more than one-tenth of one per cent of the
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Donald Denoon
school-going population. Their parents are in a cleft stick. Government

policy is to equalise educational opportunities for all citizens: the interest
of urban parents, however is to ensure as good an education as possible for
their own children. Decision-makers have therefore been paralysed by the
conflicting pressure of national policy and family interest. 24
A number of very instructive circumstances is revealed by the
education debate. First, the commitment to egalitarian principals is in some
cases extremely inconvenient, but it cannot yet be disowned. Second,
personal commitment to Australian standards (of education, in this instance),
though indefensible in an independent country, cannot yet be discarded by
members of the national elite. Third, no rhetorical device has been
discovered which can express elitist interests in egalitarian terms. Fourth,
the verdict of the (expatriate) Supreme court carries rather more weight in
a determined department, than does the policy la1d down by the (mainly
indigenous) national Parliament. Finally, the interests of rural parents (in
establishing a really egalitarian education system) cannot be articulated
nearly as well as the interests of urban (and mainly expatriate) parents. The
latter can voice their views not only through school boards and the national
press, but also - and much more decisively - through access to policymakers. It seems fair to conclude that a small number of the national elite
are happy to benefit from the existence of unequal services made available
through the combined presence of an expatriate urban minority. Here,
perhaps, may be seen the development of an hereditary core to the national
middle class.
Next we may profitably look at the government's reactions to
demands from different quarters for higher pay. During April the Port
Moresby waterside workers struck, their claims were sent to arbitration,
and towards the end of May the arbitration awarded them nothing except a
derisory increase in long service leave. 25 There was also a review of
urban and rural minimum wages. On 30 June it was announced that there
would be no increase in the urban minimum wage until March 1977,
whereas rural wages would increase by 53t to K9.43 for the primary
industries, and by 63t to K11.38 for other rural employment. This must
be the first time since the national coalition came to power in 1972, that
urban workers have failed to make striking gains by arbitration. The
government's stance in the proceedings - arguing essentially for wage
restraint - must be seen as evidence that those ministers who owed their
initial election to trade union support have now put a fair social distance
between themselves and their constituents. 26 Urban workers made
astounding gains during the 1970s: their golden days are probably now
coming to an end.
Various sections of the public service have also - separately been in contention with the government. National officers have been
outraged by the proposal that the Housing Commission (which has taken
over responsibility for accommodating public servants) increase rents to a
more economic level. The proposal is intriguing. It has not been
suggested that the employer (the government) reimburse public servants
January-June 1976
281
for rent increases: consequently the proposal amounts to a concealed wage

cut, which is a most courageous notion in view of the political storm raised
late last year by overt wage restraint imposed upon the public service. British
and New Zealand government employees have also been agitating for parity
of treatment with Australian employees in similar occupations. Their appeal
runs directly counter to the government's policy of paying differential wages
determined by the economic circumstances of the country from which
expatriates are recruited. On the last day of the half year the arbitration gave
the New Zealand and British employees substantial wage increases, but left
them several thousand kina short of their Australian counterparts; 27 and for
the first time the cabinet has subsequently declined to accept the arbitration.
Meanwhile the Filipinos- undoubtedly the worst paid expatriate community
- have appealed to President Marcos to intervene on their behalf, to ensure
that somewhat better terms (though not parity with other expatriate groups)
be extended to those who renew their contracts. 28 These separate disputes
all suggest that the government is contriving to establish its dominance over
the strongest organised labour groups in the country: that its control over
the lowest paid is greatest; but that it feels increasingly confident of
managing even the most privileged sectors of the labour force. In view of
the public service background of many ministers, this is a significant
development.
Two other groups have been singled out for criticism from time to
time - university students and university teachers. On 27 February, the
graduation ceremony at the University of Papua New Guinea was
interrupted by some students seizing the public address system and making
it impossible for the Governor-General, Sir John Guise, to be heard. The
protest was aimed at Sir John as representative of the Queen, and echoed
the earlier demonstration of students against having the Queen as the head
of state. But as that particular issue no longer generates much political
enthusiasm, the most recent manifestation lost a great deal of sympathy
without even demonstrating that a large number of students attach
importance to the issue. Students at the University of Technology in Lae
made a much greater impact when they launched their demonstration in
late March. They complained about the slow pace of localisation in the
university, and especially at the slow rate of localising the ViceChancellor.29 The issues themselves are no doubt interesting, but there is
much disagreement about what the students actually demanded (or
alternatively requested). Equally interesting is the line-up of alliances
around the issue they raised. When one student pointed out that the
incumbent Vice-Chancellor, with all his merits, was a very expensive
functionary, he was defended passionately by a T.L. Leahy, 30 who upheld
the Vice-Chancellor as a model of university administration, and
dismissed opposition to him as merely a minority of students "encouraged
by a radical minority group of dissident staff members". A couple of
weeks later one Hector Clark defended the students from these criticisms31
arguing that students were generally concerned that they be given the best
possible preparation to help rural people, and that their protests against
282
Donald Denoon
the contemporary university structure made sense in these terms. Within a

fortnight, there was a response from Alkan Tololo, Secretary for
Education and Chancellor of both universities, denouncing Clark's point
of view, and implying that Clark had written merely as a parting shot
before leaving Papua New Guinea for ever. 32 The realities of the situation
are now irrecoverable, but the line-up of authorities against the students is
of some consequence: on one hand a planter, the Vice-Chancellor and the
Secretary for Education, and on the other a "dissident Staff member" and
the students themselves. When the students wrote to the press, they
complained bitterly of misrepresentation, 33 and during the student strike
itself they menaced various reporters who attempted to cover the event. 34
The role of the "free press" is a subject which deserves attention in a later
chronicle.
What seems to some academics to he an incipif\nt anti-academic
stance among representatives of the free press may perhaps be illustrated
by the "plantations" issue. During the annual Waigani Seminar (held this
year in Lae, and addressing itself to agriculture) an economist from
Waigani put forward the argument that plantations had not promoted
economic development, but had actually distorted it. The conclusion he
drew from this observation was that Papua New Guineans should not have
to pay to buy out the expatriate owners: on the contrary, they should be
compensated for taking over an unproductive enterprise. If Alec Gordon
had been seeking an emotive issue, he could hardly have done better than
this. The response in the press verged on the incoherent15 and cast
aspersions on his intentions, his integrity and his mentality. A week later,
however, Jacob Lemeki, secretary of the Public Service Association, came
to Gordon's defence; and four days later Dr Damena (president of the
Public Service Association) endorsed Lemeki. While Lemeki's response
could be buried in a centre page, Damena's endorsement called for fuller
treatment. The editorial on that day was one of the Post-Courier's
masterpieces: Alec Gordon was dismissed as insane, but the issue he raised
was admitted to be of some importance, and the editorial prayed that the
government would have the strength and wisdom to grapple with so complex
an issue.
From the foregoing account, one might suppose that the country is
drifting unconsciously from bad to worse. On the contrary, there is
demonstrably a great deal of purposeful political and economic activity.
Let us begin with the Public Service Association, the most powerful
labour organisation in the country, and one with a long and brilliant
record of commitment to the interests of Papua New Guinean employees
both in and out of the public service. The PSA, finding itself with some
funds to invests, determined to think big; and the result was a project to
build two office blocks, one in Waigani and one in Port Moresby. The
total cost of these buildings was to be K2,800,000. The PSA itself, in
association with the PSA Savings and Loans Society, was able to fund
K200,000: the balance was put up by a Chinese bank (Kl ,800,000) and
the Development Bank (K800,000). 36 It was later discovered that the
January-June 1976
283
business ann of the Pangu pati had acted as intermediary between the foreign
bank and the PSA, and had taken a commission for doing so. The Minister
of Finance was relieved to report that no conflict of interest or concealment
of interest had been involved but he did not specify how it happened that
Pangu's business arm had happened to be able to put the PSA in touch with
a foreign investor. 37 If we then remind ourselves that Pangu has suffered from
the reputation of being the "radical" wing of the governing coalition, then
we grasp something of what has happened to the tone of political life during
the past three or four years.
The purpose of this chronicle, however, is not to rake muck. Two
further developments may help us to see these events in some kind of
perspective. The Lae Miscellaneous Workers' Union - a very powerful
organisation, led by Tony Ila - announced its intention to acquire and
operate a taxi service in Lae. 38 Similar proposals have been rumoured for
other institutions, but never formally reported. What it does to a trade
union, simultaneously to represent under-privileged workers, and to
employ them, is not easy to comprehend, but we may assume that there
is some consequence in terms of working class militancy. Secondly, we
must consider a letter in the press from John Kaputin. Kaputin's mission
is to break new ground. He was the first indigenous football player, the
first to marry a white woman, and the first to commit himself full-time to
organising the business affairs of a political association. Once again, in
the period of this review, he declared himself in memorable and important
terms, which other Papua New Guineans will follow in future. The
occasion arose when the Post-Courier published a letter in effect
attacking Kaputin for elitism: for owning a fast sports car, for investing
Mataungan money in prestige urban investments, and for neglecting the
wishes and aspirations of the rural people. In his reply 39 Kaputin
identified the anonymous letter-writer as an expatriate, and answered the
implied criticisms one by one. He could, he pointed out, dissemble his
sports car by driving a beat-up jalopy around Port Moresby (a veiled
attack, we may suppose, on the Chief Minister whose Daimler remained
unsold, and whose colleagues' Mercedes had still not been disposed of), 40
but that would prove nothing. What - asked Kaputin - was there to be
ashamed of in being affluent? His antagonist accused him of choosing
urban prestige investments: on the contrary, he chose precisely those
investments which would yield the greatest dividend for the improvement
of rural life among subscribers to Mataungan funds (the New Guinea
Development Corporation). If these happened to be urban prestige
investments, should he, as responsible investor, eschew them? Who said
- he asked - that Papua New Guineans had a moral obligation to invest only
in trucks and rural trade stores, irrespective of profit? If responsible
investors, like Kaputin, steered clear of the most profitable investments, then
where would funds come from, for rural improvement? To these questions,
in these terms, there is no answer. Since the missions began operating in
Melanesia, by and large driving for self-sufficiency through plantation
investment, it is not very surprising that Papua New Guineans should
Donald Denoon
284
interpret self-reliance as astute investment in urban properties for the

ultimate good of the rural community. What is, perhaps, surprising, is that
it has taken until 1976 for an effective rationalisation to be presented.
The chronicler's mind does boggle, however, at the news that the
Bougainville provincial/provisional government performs in so similar a
manner. Early in the year, Leo Hannett, planning officer and a leading
figure in the Bougainville government, expressed his pride in the fact that
the Bougainville Development Corporation had the potential to grow into
a multi-million kina enterprise; and pointed out, with some satisfaction,
that it was controlled by the political leaders of the Bougainvilleans. 41 A
few weeks later it was revealed42 that the Bougainville Development
Corporation had acquired Arovo Island, a tourist resort complex within
the boundaries of the province. The other financial activities of the
corporation are not known to the chronicler, but it is curious that a
secessionist movement should see its economic and political functions in
much the same light as the political leaders of the central government
with which the province is at odds. What would happen, one is led to ask,
if the Pangu business arm invested in Bougainville Development
Corporation - and vice versa?
***
Finally foreign affairs have impinged slightly upon the Papua New
Guinea political scene. When the year opened, some Papua New
Guineans were drawing analogies between themselves and the East
Timorese, who also shared an island with the Indonesians. The closer the
analogy, the less comfortable for the analysts. It was clearly important for
the government to be seen to have a foreign policy, at least insofar as
concerned relations with Irian Jaya. Towards the end of February the
Prime Minister warned his citizens not to involve themselves with West
Irianese, who were seen to be rebels against legitimately constituted
authority.' 3 The Minister for Foreign Affairs then announced that he had
been involved in trying to bring together representatives of the Free
Papua Movement and the Indonesian government; and that the failure of
these endeavours could be blamed on the Irianese. 44 Within two days there
was a student demonstration against the Indonesian Embassy, over East
Timor. The students trampled the Indonesian flag; and although they
apologised the following day, the government was acutely embarrassed by
the public scene.'5
What made the issue embarrassing was that there was probably a great
deal of sympathy for the cause of the East Timor political groups who did
not wish to be incorporated into Indonesia, but that it was quite
impossible for Papua New Guinea to pursue a foreign policy at variance
with that of Australia. Dependence upon Australia continued to be the
cornerstone - if not the whole edifice - of the foreign policy of the
independent country. Early in March the government rejected the first two
reports of the Commission of Enquiry into the Standardisation of Selected
January-June 1976
285
Imports, on the grounds that these recommendations would damage Papua

New Guinea's "traditional trading partners" .46 It is no doubt a coincidence
that, three days later, the Prime Minister was able to announce the new
long-term aid deal with Australia: the government would probably have
reacted in much the same way at any time during the half year under
review.
Another formal foreign policy issue arose in June, when Japanese aid
donors threatened to cut off their aid if their advice was not followed in
the Bialla oil palm scheme in West New Britain. It was revealed on this
occasion that only Australian aid was given without "strings" or
constraints upon the government's freedom of action. 47 Finally, the
government continued to strive for admission to the Lome Convention,
and when financial constraints were tough, withdrew its diplomats from
New Zealand and Fiji rather than Jakarta, Sydney and Canberra. All of
which suggests that, whether freedom of manoeuvre was provided by
formal independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea's foreign policy
remains committed to the strengthening of links with "traditional"
partners.
In a period so soon after independence, perhaps the dominant question
to be asked is: what difference has independence made? In administrative
terms, it must be pointed out that the Papua New Guinean public servants
seem just as capable as their Australian predecessors; and politically, that
the ministers seem well able to make the political system work to good
effect. What is striking is not any difference in efficiency, but the goals
towards which politics and administration seem to be veering. The
country's foreign policy seems profoundly unaffected by independence,
either economically or politically. Internally, the country is seeing the
crystallisation of a middle class which is financially comfortable,
psychologically dependent upon the Australian connection, and politically
unabrasive. The idea of a single, highly centralised, state - an idea
inherited from Australia - seems to be being abandoned in favour of a
highly decentralised political system, wherein the central government
behaves like a trustee for those regions which have not yet chosen to opt
for provincial autonomy, and continues to look after those interests which
are inappropriate or unsought by the autonomous provinces. Internal
differences based upon "class" or occupation do not evidently bother the
government. The questions for the immediate future are concerned with
the developing relations between the central government and the
increasingly self-conscious and self-assured regions.
28
JULY-DECEMBER 1976
David Hegarty
In Papua New Guinea, a year after political independence, a number of

aspects of the neo-colonial condition are evident. The most obvious is
PNG's continued dependence on the "Australian connection" through aid,
trade and personnel. In 1975-76 Australian foreign aid amounted to
about $A214 million and for 1976-77 it is estimated at $A228 million
which currently represents above thirty-seven per cent of budget revenue. 1
Aid of this quantity gives the donor government tremendous leverage over
the recipient should the latter pursue radically different domestic or foreign
policies. It also provides a "cushion" effect against harsh and politically
difficult decisions and thus acts as a prop to the government in power. Further,
such an amount of aid tends to continue to raise expectations heightened by
colonial development policies of the sixties and which in turn require
further aid. Although most of Australia's aid is "untied", PNG's options
in using it are limited by the government's decision to perpetuate the
gargantuan bureaucracy and state infrastructure which it inherited from the
colonial period. The aid and trade relationship is also obvious. Almost fifty
per cent of PNG's imports come from Australia, 2 including goods which
in many cases could have been obtained more cheaply elsewhere, reflecting
in large part the historical and continuing dominance of Australian
commerce in PNG's economy. Papua New Guinea is currently the third
largest market for Australian manufactured goods. Of the foreign
investment in the country, seventy-five per cent is Australian. In November
a trade agreement was signed by the two governments formalising the
existing trade pattern. 3 In addition Australian personnel in the PNG public
service still number about 5,000, most of whom are in senior positions.
The Australian government supplies and equips PNG's defence forces.
After toying with Tanzanian-inspired concepts of "self-reliance" the
government settled on an economic development strategy based on what
it termed "fiscal self-reliance". In about 1974 the government appears to
have decided not to alter radically the economic policies devised in the
late colonial period but to maintain and extend the range of services
previously offered. This required continued long-term aid (which the
government sought and obtained from Australia) and a large inflow of
foreign capital. The government hopes that growth will be generated by
July-December 1976
287
two or three new resource projects within the next decade sufficient to
allow them to dispense with aid. Internally joint ventures (local
participation and foreign capital), individual and corporate
entrepreneurship, and the extension of cash cropping to increase earnings
of the local monetary sector are vigorously promoted with little regard for
the resultant loss of autonomy and social inequality. Recent government
policy statements indicate planners are aware that inequalities are
becoming entrenched and that dependence is long-term but see the only
alternative as a concentration on rural development and promotion of
resource projects "slowly" to reduce dependence on foreign aid. It is
sufficient to note that when World Bank and IMF missions visited late in
the year they endorsed the government's economic and fiscal policies.
A further aspect of the neo-colonial condition is found in the role
played by the political elite. Writing largely with respect to post colonial
East Africa, Colin Leys observed that neo-colonialism is not only a
particular mode of imperialist policy toward ex-colonies but it also
assumes a characteristic form of social, political and economic life within
ex-colonies particularly those in which the transition to independence
passed smoothly and left power in the hands of a regime "based on the
support of social classes linked very closely to the foreign interests which
were formally represented by the colonial state". 5
In PNG the class situation is complex. Embryonic classes have
emerged but for historical and other reasons the pattern varies from
region to region and such stratification as has occurred is cross-cut by
tribal and other loyalties. Class consciousness is minimal and it does not
yet make sense to describe PNG politics in class terms. The most obvious
developments have been the emergence of an educated, largely urban,
petty bourgeois strata whose aspirations and anxieties were described in
the previous political chronicle, and in rural PNG, where the
peasantisation process is well under way, a "big farmer" or "rich peasant"
class or group has emerged. It has also been reported that the extension
of cash cropping and animal husbandry in parts of the Highlands has
resulted in permanent landlessness and tenancy for a small but increasing
proportion of the population. 6 In the towns a small working class has
formed, but the union movement is not particular strong.
The orientation of the ruling political elite drawn from these various
strata is clear. By and large it favours the present development strategy,
the pro-Western direction of foreign policy and the continuation of a large
foreign presence. There is a clear convergence of interest among the elite
which is reflected both in the state of the political parties and in the
absence of any ideological opposition. The parties, with the exception of
a period of attempted mobilisation prior to the 1972 elections, have
remained as they began - parliamentary factions. Initially there were
differences between the two major parties - Pangu and United- over the
timing of independence and in their nationalist rhetoric, but their
approach to contemporary issues is virtually identical. All parties are
capitalist oriented and have engaged in business activities either through
288
David Hegarty
business "arm" or informal arrangements. Pangu has virtually dropped its

connections with the trade unions. Damai Pty Ltd, the business "arm" of
Pangu acts as a finance broker raising loans from foreign banks for
internal projects. All parties in the forthcoming elections are relying
heavily on patronage both to win votes and to recruit new members.
Politicians in pursuit of the spoils of office have no hesitation in
switching sides. Many have rapidly moved into business and are
maximising their opportunity to enhance their private wealth through
access to government services (e.g. the Development Bank) and through
their political positions some have found their way onto the boards of
foreign-based companies. Public servants also have access to such
services, and, having recently experienced the power of senior positions,
find it to their advantage to maintain the existing system. A quick check
of the Companies Register reveals a number of examvle& uf "fwnt"
companies and of "partnerships" designed to act as intermediaries
between foreign interests and the government.
To date there has been little opposition to this pattern of
development. The organised labour force is small and besides enjoys a
relatively privileged position in society. Economic nationalists - the
would-be national bourgeoisie- are too few in number to have an
effective voice. When John Kaputin, for example, protested at the PNGAustralia trade agreement he was rebuffed by government departments,
the Post-Courier, and by a selection of Post-Courier readers who
exhibited an extraordinary degree of dependence. 7 Since the report of the
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) only sporadic attempts have
been made to define an alternative nationalist position and these have
usually been side-tracked into a brand of Christian humanism. When
Bernard Narakobi, the current intellectual publicist, dared challenge the
basis of the imposed legal system and the direction of development by
arguing that in certain circumstances of injustice the poor were justified
in stealing from the rich, his views were immediately labelled
"Communist" by the expatriate Chief Magistrate, J. Pritchard, and
Narakobi received a drubbing in the columns of the Post-Courier. 8 Lest
the campaign antagonise too much the chairman of the Law Reform
Commission which Narakobi presently is, the Post-Courier invited him to
write a weekly column under the rubric "Melanesian Voice". Occasionally
outbursts against the general pattern of things occur from unexpected
quarters: a minister warns of the predatory nature of multinationals;
another gives vent to his anti-white feelings. The anti-white resentment
which the CPC tapped still lingers below the surface and the nationalist
issue of citizenship is not yet dead, but these resentments may stem more
from immediate interests (e.g. exposure of inefficiency, or blockages to
promotion or business) than from a desire to alter the system. Rural
unrest still takes the form of semi-perpetual tribal fighting which, while
reflecting in part the disruption in traditional societies caused by the
penetration of the capitalist mode, can hardly be construed as opposition.
No peasant organisations have emerged and those few grass-roots
July-December 1976
289
associations which emerged prior to independence appear to have lost

momentum.
This rather general and broad view of post-colonial society and politics
tends to obscure some of the more positive features of the new regime. In
the period under review the government took decisive action against two
foreign companies for failing to observe their responsibilities under their
investment agreements. In August the government dismissed the Japanese
company, Trans-Pacific Palm Oil (a subsidiary of Tokai Leveller) from
participation in the government-sponsored palm oil estate at Bialla in the
West New Britain Province. The government argued that the design of the
mill was not satisfactory to meet the needs of the smallholder estates to
be established around the company's nucleus estate. The government
hired an assessor from Malaysia to fix compensation after the company
demanded K6.6 million. 9 In November the government terminated an
agreement with a Singapore-owned timber company which had planned to
exploit 160,000 hectares of timbered land on the southeast coast of Papua
in Milne Bay and Central Provinces. The government argued that Sagarai
Lumber Pty Ltd had failed to submit a satisfactory financial plan and had
not helped people in the area build a sawmill, roads and other
infrastructure as undertaken in the agreement. 10 These actions indicate at
least the government's anxiety to preserve some control over foreign
investment and to prevent it from being "fleeced" . 11
The bloodless reconciliation with the Bougainville secessionists in
August was a considerable achievement for the government. The
Bougainville Agreement granted considerable regional autonomy to the
province but within a unitary state system. 12 During the course of
negotiations the government reversed its previous policy on
decentralisation and agreed to restore provincial government provisions to
the constitution. Whether it now envisaged regional autonomy as a
"necessary dialectical step" 13 towards integration as the CPC had done, or
whether it had weighed the cost of integration by coercion, or whether it
saw electoral advantage in the revised strategy is not yet clear. The
decision to proceed with provincial government, however, has provided
the opportunity for a restructuring of the bureaucratic apparatus. The
implications of this new thrust in government policy will be examined in
future chronicles.
The broader perspective also obscures the number of dedicated and
committed nationals within the public service desirous of change in other
directions. Some for example, speak of their wounded pride in pursuing
policies of dependence, but given the difficulties entailed in reversing
such policies injured pride may prove rather ephemeral. A further important
characteristic of the post-colonial regime is that it has eschewed coercion
and there is little evidence, to date at least, of the increasing oppression
characteristic of neo-colonial regimes elsewhere. But of course these are
early times- social mobility is still fluid, opposition can be readily
contained or coopted and the evolution of social class has not yet reached
friction point.
290
David Hegarty
Political tensions generated in the review period derive from two basic
sources: the forthcoming elections scheduled for May 1977; and the ongoing friction between politicians and bureaucrats characteristic of many
former colonies. The elections had originally been scheduled for this year
but the opposition and government backbenchers for scarcely concealed
reasons forced a postponement. As the final year of the third Parliament
wore on, the Prime Minister had increasing difficulty maintaining a
majority on the floor of the chamber. Members of Parliament competed
vigorously to speak in the hope that their constituents would hear their
names "called" on the radio and consequently government business
suffered. Party solidarity which had been strong only in the first eighteen
months of Parliament virtually collapsed. The United party, largely
through the efforts of a newly hired research officer, attacked the
government on a broad range of issues and had one notable success in
forcing the government to withdraw a "Public Order" Bill but this did not
prevent the Pangu and United parties drawing closer together. On the eve
of the Independence anniversary, Sir Tei Abal, United party and
opposition leader wrote that he would support Michael Somare for Prime
Minister after the next election. 14 The United party, in fact, is split into
two if not three factions and thus speculation about any range of
coalitions next year was feasible. The government was embarrassed by
the persistency of Paul Langro (West Sepik Regional) in seeking some
government action on behalf of the Irianese refugees, but the Prime
Minister was even more embarrassed at the exposure of the frequency and
cost of international trips which his ministers were making, 15 provoking
an uproar amongst his backbench when he persuaded Waitea Magnolias
(UP, Lagaip) to defect and join his ministry. 16 Iambakey Okuk and
Thomas Kavali who had previously been dismissed as coalition ministers
launched what journalists referred to as an "informal Highlands block"
designed to harass the government. Manoeuvring for possible coalitions
after the next election had begun in earnest and lists of potential partners
began to circulate. 17 One which gave considerable food for thought was
that which combined the leaders of the secession movements with the
remaining core of the CPC. The party political scene could almost be
described as that of the "outs" versus the "ins".
Tensions between bureaucrats and politicians arose for two reasons.
The first (and the one most common to new states) was that bureaucrats
felt they were entitled to more power on the basis of their experience and
qualifications than the generally poorly educated politicians. In addition
many senior public servants having recently arrived in their positions
began to look to politicians for policy directives and found them wanting.
The second and major bone of contention was the government's practice
of making both political and short-term appointments to senior positions.
The appointment to the chairmanship of the PSC of Rabbie Namaliu, a
Tolai graduate in history with a postgraduate degree from Canada who
had previously been private secretary to the Prime Minister and Provincial
Commissioner of East New Britain, sparked a hostile reaction from senior
July-December 1976
291
Papuan public servants. 18 A former education official spoke of a

government "master plan" to eliminate Papuans from senior positions;
Pious Kerepia, police commissioner and a career officer, had his term of
office extended by one year after strenuous lobbying. A key figure in both
these areas of tension - one who offered an understanding ear to
disgruntled public servants and one who appeared about to re-enter the
electoral arena- was the Governor-General, Sir John Guise. When the
government incorporated the "Westminster" style parliamentary system
into its constitution it was aware that the system in practice in the past
years rarely conformed to the ideal of representative and responsible
government. It should also have been aware that to elevate a person of Dr
Guise's skills to the vice-regal position and to expect him to remain
"above politics" was most unrealistic. Dr Guise had continued to keep
himself informed of political affairs; he gave advice to ministers freely,
and often commented on aspects of policy. A row which resulted in Sir
Maori Kiki's call for Guise's resignation, 19 had been precipitated by the
leaking of a letter which the Governor-General had written to the Prime
Minister protesting at the powers to be given to the Bougainville
Province. Guise came through the episode unscathed and with the public
and the government still guessing as to his electoral intentions.
As the administration was about to tackle its biggest test yet - the
preparation for provincial government - added testimony to the
inappropriateness of the inherited colonial public service and bureaucratic
structure was given by the Minister for Provincial Affairs, Oscar Tammur,
and the outgoing director of the Central Planning Office, David Beatty.
Tammur outlined the difficulties faced by the ministry in having policies
implemented if they ran in any way "counter to the wishes of the
majority of senior public servants" .20 He likened the political arm of
government to that of a driver in a car in which "the steering wheel had
been disconnected from the wheels". This, he said, "is almost entirely due
to the structure and internal mechanisms of the public service machine
that we have inherited from the Australian administration, and which ...
has hardly changed one little bit". 21 When even small changes are
proposed "the sacred doctrines of procedures, seniority, permanency and
security are held up as unalterable laws, under which a public service
must operate regardless of the cultural environment in which it exists". 22
Beatty, reflecting on his early experience in planning, found the
bureaucracy fragmented, uncoordinated, suspicious of ministerial control
and untrained to accept responsibility. 23 During the review period
accounting methods and financial control procedures came in for serious
criticism.
In the field of foreign affairs there were three main points of interest.
At the United Nations in September the Foreign Minister, Sir Maori Kiki,
outlined his policy of "universalism". "Universalism to Papua New
Guinea means taking the middle path without veering to either side on
questions relating to political ideologies, creeds or governmental
systems", and Sir Maori cited as an example PNG's recognition of both
292
David Hegarty
North and South Korea. 24 Universalism, Sir Maori added, resembled but
differed from non-alignment. The benefits of such a policy are not
immediately clear. It is perfectly understandable for a new state to want
to avoid international friction. Perhaps also understandable is the
reluctance of the present regime to commit itself to a Third World bloc
given its belief that the special Australian relationship provides it with a
counterweight in negotiation with foreign investors. But in that case
"universalism" scarcely conceals its real international orientation. As
well, "universalism" offers no guide to policy on such issues as the recent
Indonesian invasion of Timor, nor is it likely to offer inspiration in
dealing with an Indonesia perturbed by the operations of a guerilla force
along their common border.
The second point of interest was the negotiations over the relocation of
the Torres Strait border between Australia and Papua New Guinea. In
June the Foreign Ministers of both countries had reached agreement on
many points giving PNG a substantially satisfactory result-25 Agitation by
the Islanders, disagreement between the Australian Foreign Affairs
Department and Aboriginal Affairs Department, and a row within the
Liberal party over control of offshore minerals had by the end of the year
stalled the agreement.
The third point concerned Michael Somare's visit to China in
September. The Chinese accorded the Prime Minister a warm reception
and spoke courteously of PNG's "struggle" for liberation. Papua New
Guineans at home, however, were reassured by the Post-Courier
journalist, Angus Smales, travelling with Somare, that the Prime Minister
was not "dazzled" by the reception and that although Somare liked
China's small scale technology he had no time for its ideology. On his
return Somare stopped over in the Philippines where, it appears, he was
more impressed by the slogans of President Marcos than of Chairman
Mao. Not long after his return Somare announced that the "New Society"
would be Pangu's objective in the forthcoming elections. 26
One of the more obvious difficulties which beset a chronicler located
in Port Moresby at the centre of the political system is to assess
accurately and adequately what is happening at the periphei"y. In days of
"kiap rule" the task was relatively simple. Politics was usually cast in
terms of local confrontations with kiaps, of "law and order" problems
concerning fights over land, women and pigs, of experiments with local
government structures or of general acquiescence. Political and social
change has proceeded at such a rate, however, as to make even a quick
survey difficult. In the period under review there were two features which
will be of prime importance for some considerable time to come.
Provincial government was the pace-setter. East New Britain, Eastern
Highlands, East Sepik and Central Provinces in addition to North
Solomons (Bougainville) established provincial assemblies thus providing
a new arena for political competition and patronage and doubtless
complicating legal and administrative arrangements within the new state.
The Gazelle Peninsula appeared set for another round of strife as the
July-December 1976
293
Mataungan Association discovered that many of the leaders against whom

it fought over the Multi-Racial Council issue in 1969-70 were back in
power as appointed representatives of the province. In the North
Solomons a personality dispute led to the resignation from the provincial
government of Leo Hannett but he was soon reinstated.
The second feature concerns the rise in commodity prices and
particularly that of the price of coffee grown in the Highlands. Coffee
prices for 1976 have more than doubled those of the previous year. In
fact in the latter part of the year the value of coffee exported exceeded
that of copper. High prices caused by the failure of the Brazil crop
induced new plantings, in some cases on ground usually reserved for
gardening. Little of the new-found wealth has been reinvested or saved,
much of it being spent on traditional exchanges, new trucks, trade store
goods (cloth, etc.), but most on beer. The country's sole rice importer
complained that the Highlanders wanted to buy more rice than he could
supply. Missions and others complained at the incredible amounts of beer
being consumed. The Highlands for a time faced a petrol shortage when
it was more profitable for truckers to carry beer than fuel. The Speaker,
Barry Holloway (Eastern Highlands Regional), was rebuked by big
farmers and entrepreneurs when he proposed a coffee levy, the funds of
which he wanted directed toward provincial government development
corporations. The exercise of government control in many parts has
become inhibited by the erosion of traditional leaders' authority and by
the lack of success in settling inter-clan disputes by compensation and
other methods. 27 The consequences of a collapse in the price of coffee
within a few seasons were, to say the least, ominous. Indeed over the
Christmas period in the off-season with little coffee about these tended to
become apparent with renewed fighting, stoning of cars and trucks on the
Highlands highway, and a spate of robberies (especially of food) in the
townships. 28
29
JANUARY-JUNE 1977
David Hegarty
National Elections
The first national elections since independence dominated political affairs
in Papua New Guinea in the first half of 1977. The coalition government
composed of the Pangu and People's Progress parties led by Michael
Somare and Julius Chan respectively was returned to office with an
increased majority. The United party (UP) again assumed the role of
opposition although this time with depleted ranks and its organisation in
considerable disarray. Immediately counting of the poll was completed (9
July), a period of uncertainty (similar to that following the 1972
elections) prevailed in which it was not clear which parties and groups
would form the government. Despite the substantial impact parties had
made on this election, the absence of a nationwide, integrative party
system produced a post-election situation in which the loyalties and
affiliations of many winning candidates were not known with any
certainty thus precipitating an intense period of lobbying for the support
of independents.
To most observers it appeared that Pangu and the Peoples' Progress
party (PPP) would have the required number - at least fifty-five in a
Parliament of 109 - to form the government. The UP however, in a bid
to wrest power from the incumbents proposed that a "national alliance"
led by former Governor-General, Sir John Guise, with UP leader Sir Tei
Abal as his deputy and incorporating the members of the United, National
and Country parties, Papua Besena and other independents, had sufficient
numbers to govern". 1 A smaller and hastily formed group known as the
"Alliance for Progress and Regional Development" (APRD) led by John
Kaputin and Fr John Momis, which claimed the support of most New
Guinea Islands members of Parliament as well as the support of the
Bougainville and East New Britain provincial governments, attempted to
play a "balance-of-power" role between the two bigger blocs. When the
numbers were ultimately tested in the vote for Prime Minister in
Parliament on 9 August, Somare decisively defeated Sir John by sixtynine votes to thirty-six. 2 The "national alliance" had seriously
miscalculated its strength and neither the "balancing" role nor the
claimed numerical support materialised for the APRD.
January-June 1977
295
Prime Minister Somare, exerclSlng politician's license, exuber~ntly

claimed that voters had given his coalition a mandate to contmue
governing. But elections in Papua New Guinea are not about "mandates"
in the sense that they are tests of public opinion on government
performance and policy issues. Elections remain essentially electorate
level contests between competing clan candidates and personalities, with
the government being pulled together in the legislative arena. To say also
that the government had been "returned" is also in a sense, somewhat
misleading. The turnover of politicians was high- thirty-five of the
ninety-four who sought re-election being returned; with nine of the
eighteen ministers in the former government losing their seats.
Pre-Election Climate
The elections were held in the wake of PNG's independence, an

independence which in constitutional terms had been achieved rapidly but
smoothly. Independence had been attained without struggle, without mass
mobilisation against the colonial regime and without change in the basic
political institutions and policies laid down by the colonial power. The
structure of the economy characterised by dependence and foreign control
remained unaltered. Considerable social differentiation, however, had
become apparent during the transitional period. The small politicobureaucratic elite which had aspired to independence inherited command
of the colonial apparatus. In rural PNG a rich peasantry had emerged and
a class of middlemen (coffee buyers, traders, truckers) had rapidly moved
into business. The basic social cleavages in society were not, however,
class based. Loyalties remained essentially parochial although the
tendencies to regionalism noted throughout the transition period were
beginning to solidify. Regional inequalities generated in the colonial
period persisted after independence but no groups or movements had
appeared determined to rectify those inequalities. In fact the strongest
regional demands challenging the government were those emanating from
the regions where most economic activity was occurring.
The coalition government, itself drawn from these various elites, had
managed the transition period capably and in the first eighteen months or
so since independence the economic and political climate remained
generally favourable to it. The first six months of 1977 during which the
election campaigns were conducted were no exception. The economy had
been buoyed not only by the guarantee of continued Australian aid
($A200 million, in 1977), but by relatively high commodity prices
(especially those of coffee and cocoa) which maintained an upward trend
until midway through the year (see table 1). The return from the sale of
these commodities benefited planters, both expatriate and national, as
well as national middlemen; and much flowed back to small producers. 3
A number of development corporations involved in crop production and
processing declared substantial profits. The cost of living, based on what
many consider to be an outdated consumer price index (CPI), rose in the
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David Hegarty
December quarter of 1976, but in fact fell in the March quarter of 1977.
Price control on certain items, the maintenance of a hard currency
strategy, and a revaluation of the kina against the Australian dollar by
thirteen per cent in December 1976 accounted for the fall in the CPI. 4
The hard currency strategy, however, had not attracted foreign investment:
in fact, disinvestment had occurred. 5 There was a slight fall in the
enumerated labour force and a drop in real wages, but neither appeared
to have had short-term political repercussions. The International Monetary
Fund had commented favourably on the stability and management of the
economy and PNG's credit was obviously reasonably good with
international lending agencies.
In broad areas of public policy and bureaucratic and political
management the government had performed satisfactorily. Despite some
cleterioration, stanclarcls, particularly in the fielcl of puhlic health, puhlic
services and infrastructural development, were generally maintained at
pre-independence levels. Since the collapse of the CPC-inspired
nationalist pressure group in 1975 the government encountered little
opposition to its general strategy. 6 The major political crisis to have arisen
-the attempted secession by Bougainville- had been resolved apparently
satisfactorily in 1976. (The issue of secession, however, was of
paramount importance within the Bougainville electorate.) In April the
government defused a potential conflict with the powerful Public Service
Association when it negotiated a three-year "pay deal" in which public
service salaries would be fully adjusted each six months in line with rises
in the CPI (with a limit of twelve per cent per annum), and in which long
service leave credits were brought in line with the private sector. 7
Table 1. Export Commodity Prices in PNG Currency
Commodity
Cocoa
Copra
Coffee
Tea
Rubber
(Copper
(% Small-holder Production*)
35
40
75
25
3
March 1976
K9l 0 per tonne
K 130 per tonne
K 1.46 per kilo
K0.95 per kilo
K0.615 per kilo
Kl.6 per kilo
March 1977
K2,006 per tonne
K230 per tonne
K4.56 per kilo
K2.57 per kilo
K0.773 per kilo
Kl.2 per kilo)
* 1971-74 figures
Source: Bank of PNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin March 1977.
The policy area which aroused most consternation prior to the election
was that of foreign affairs and particularly that of PNG's relations with
Indonesia. Insofar as PNG has a foreign policy it is premised on a
reluctance to get involved with or offend other nations. The government
so far has consistently supported Indonesia's stance in relation to its
minority and territorial problems. 8 But their relationship is constrained by
a number of factors which include: the difficulties in administering the
500-mile PNG-Irian Jaya border; the existence of an 1,800 strong West
Irian liberation movement conducting guerilla operations into the province
January-June 1977
297
and around the border area; the attitude of the PNG elite to their
Melanesian "brothers"; and the particular perceptions of the Indonesians
of their status and role in the region. In January Somare visited Jakarta
and discussed with President Suharto the border issue, the movement of
villagers, the question of refugees, and the problem of guerrillas seeking
sanctuary on the PNG side of the border. On his return Somare stressed
that no agreement had been entered into regarding the repatriation of
"Irian J ayans hostile to Indonesia". 9
Late in April a statement attributed to the new leadership of the OPM
to the effect that PLO-type terrorist tactics might be employed throughout
the Pacific was reported in the press. 10 In May shortly after the
Indonesian elections, about three hundred Irianese were reported to have
crossed the border into the Western Province, and it was alleged that a
Sangaun (We_st Sepik) villager had been shot by Indonesian soldiers. 11
The government announced that it would send the refugees back and
disclaimed any knowledge of the situation across the border. This brought
angry reactions from journalists who were refused access to the border
and from Paul Langro, shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose
electorate was in Sandaun. Langro alleged that a deal had been made
permitting "hot pursuit" of guerillas. Somare appealed on the radio for
people not to "panic" over the border problems. Although the issue did
not translate into any electoral significance (Langro, however, lost his
seat) it is bound to be a continuing source of tension in the PNGlndonesia-Australia "triangle".
The Torres Strait border issue was raised during the early months of
1977. After appearing to take a firmer stand by passing "national seas"
legislation in Parliament 12 the government then dropped the issue and
omitted it from the agenda of discussions with the Australian Prime
Minister, Malcolm Fraser, when he visited Port Moresby a few days later.
The lack of substance and consistency in foreign policy was further
highlighted when the Prime Minister contradicted his Foreign Minister
over the admission of Ugandan President, Idi Amin, to the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, 13 and by criticisms
contained in an attack on the Department of Foreign Relations by PNG's
Ambassador in New York, Paulias Matane. 14
Government policy which had undoubted appeal and which had begun
to build up momentum was that of the introduction of provincial
government. A two-tier system of government was decided upon for a
variety of motives not least of which was a genuine desire to decentralise,
and an attempt to defuse political pressure on, the centre. By mid-year six
provincial governments were in operation. To assist with the many
problems of such a decentralised system the government hired at
considerable expense a firm of international consultants (McKinsey & Co
Inc) to report and devise strategies for implementation. Apart from the
structural, financial, functional and legal problems which will arise
between two tiers, all of which are in some way compounded by the first
provincial government agreement with Bougainville being seen as a
298
David Hegarty
"model", the problem which surfaced first was that of the position of
national public servants in relation to provincial governments. Electorally,
however, the establishment of provincial governments was an obvious
"plus" for the government, while candidates in the election were quick to
see the support base which association with their provincial government
could provide. The interplay between these two tiers of government will
provide much of the substance of domestic politics throughout the
foreseeable future.
The last session of the 197 5-77 national Parliament was held in
February-March but by then the attention of members was focused
elsewhere. Tore Lokoloko, the UP member for Kerema, was elected to
succeed Sir John Guise as Governor-General, Sir John having resigned in
February to re-enter the political arenaY In February the constitution was
amended to include the provision on provincial government. Relations
between parties and leaders were strained by the government's attempt to
rush through legislation. Former minister, Iambakey Okuk, leader of the
recently formed "Highlands bloc", provided much of the criticism of the
government. In February he temporarily frustrated the front bench by
refusing leave to introduce offshore resource legislation on the eve of
Fraser's visit. 16 Later he questioned the Minister for Justice, Ebia
Olewale, on why John Kasaipwalova was the "first political prisoner" in
Papua New Guinea. 17 The political party concept again came in for
criticism from a variety of viewpoints. 18
Public awareness of the impending election varied throughout the
country. In some parts people only realised that an election was being
held when the polling team arrived, but the overall turnout of voters (c.
sixty-five per cent) was consistent with previous elections. The progovernment Post-Courier gave the campaigning wide coverage and the
elections attracted considerable interest from foreign embassy staff with
the Australian High Commission being particularly interested in the
outcome. For a time early in the year it appeared that the UP had a
chance of winning power, an impression supported by a seeming
indifference to Pangu, of public criticism of ministerial performance, of
disillusionment among Port Moresby based public servants. with a "tired
government". On a short tour of parts of the country prior w polling it
appeared, to this chronicler at least, that the popularity of Somare was
widespread, the UP leadership was divided, no substantial criticism of the
government had crystallised, and that the advantages of incumbency in
terms of patronage would enable the governing parties to attract a larger
number of the uncommitted candidates (should they win) than would the
opposition.
Polling was delayed from May to June largely as a result of the
Electoral Commission's difficulties in compiling the rolls. Few census
patrols had been conducted in the intervening years and, as James Mileng,
the Electoral Commissioner, correctly pointed out, Parliament itself
contributed to the delay by rejecting the proposed boundary distribution
earlier in the year. Polling was conducted quite smoothly despite the
January-June 1977
299
omission of candidates' photographs from ballot papers in all but nineteen

electorates.
The Campaigns
A total of 879 candidates stood for the 109 seats (compared with 611 for
100 seats in 1972) and they included about eighty public servants, some
of whom had held top positions. The tenor of the campaigns varied
considerably but in many electorates there was an awareness among the
candidates at least that power, privilege and access to government
resources was at stake now that the colonial "referee" had departed. This
was the first national election to be conducted on a "first-past-the-post"
system and there was obviously a greater awareness of the "arithmetic"
of the electorate. Candidates and party organisers, particularly in the
Highlands, calculated clan voting strengths and in many instances votesplitting tactics were employed whereby a candidate would persuade
(often with financial incentives) other-clan candidates to run thus
reducing the chances of their opponents. There was also wider
recognition that a financial resource base and organisation was necessary
for success which led many actively to seek out party endorsement.
Provincial electorate candidates in some cases linked themselves with
open candidates and campaigned for each other, a method which proved
strikingly successful for Fr John Momis and his "ticket" on Bougainville.
Many ministers as would be expected sought maximum publicity for the
various activities (official openings, etc.) and some, like Boyamo Sali,
Minister for Primary Industry, were in a position regularly to announce
increases in commodity export prices and to propose small resource
projects (e.g. forests) in their electorates.
An analysis of the socio-political characteristic of candidates is
currently being prepared at the University of Papua New Guinea for a
forthcoming book on the elections, 19 but preliminary observations reveal
a number of characteristics different from previous elections. In part these
differences reflect the social differentiation occurring in Papua New
Guinea. These elections saw the demise of the older style big-men and
the rise of the "new men" drawn from the rural and urban elites. The bulk
of candidates tended to be "businessmen" of some sort or to have had a
corporation or a salaried income as a base. (Some had all three.)
General education levels were higher than in the past and the amounts of
money spent on campaigns increased dramatically. In the Simbu for
example the three leading provincial electorate candidates - Okuk, Kale
and Nilkare - each spent an estimated K20,000 or more. Expenditures
for all candidates are difficult to assess but most winners probably
spent in excess of K4,000 on their campaigns. In contrast, however, in
areas where early political mobilisation had occurred expenditure
appeared considerably lower. The successful Mataungans (although they
may be an exception) probably had individual expenditures of less than
K1,000.
300
David Hegarty
Political Parties
In the intervening years between elections party organisations had
generally atrophied. None had attempted to build a mass base and such
organisation as existed was dominated by a core of leaders and officials
in Port Moresby. The only significant development had been their entry
into business - usually real estate - with the aim of generating an ongoing source of funds. The lack of grass-roots organisation meant that
parties pre-selected candidates in an ad hoc manner with party officials
attempting to "spot" likely winners with large clan bases. Parties,
however, had a much more significant impact on these elections than in
the past. Pangu, PPP and UP endorsed 295 candidates and had reached
private "agreements" with many others should they win. Party "labels"
were more widely known throughout and although the concept of parties
had not penetrated to the villages many candidates were aware of their
significance both in terms of the financial support they could offer and
their linkage role at the national parliamentary level. There were more
direct contests between endorsed party candidates than occurred in 1972,
the "fear" of party attachment noted in previous elections having largely
dissipated. Disputants in local level conflicts on occasions adopted
national party labels - a feature not uncharacteristic of politics without a
developed party system.
In the months prior to the election all parties produced platforms
which reflected a clear convergence of ideology and policy. 20 They
were bland documents all emphasising rural development programmes,
foreign investment to stimulate industry and mineral resource projects,
extension of road and transport infrastructure, more education, law and
order, and the maintenance of stable government. Despite claims by
Pangu officials after the elections the policy differences with the PPP had
to be ironed out, the only discernible differences appeared to be Pangu's
slightly more cautious approach to foreign investment (viz. investment
"which truly benefits the people", compared with the PPP's "appropriate
incentives" and returns for investors and "reasonable royalties" for the
people). The PPP was also less emphatic about decentralisation and it urged
PNG's active cooperation with the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). The UP platform was little different in substance but was
critical of the government on a number of points urging changes in the
Electoral Act, a four-year parliamentary term, a royal commission into the
public service, abolition of political appointments to the public service,
a reorganisation of the Education Department, and lower cost embassies.
One novel suggestion, that is for the UP, was for the establishment of
state farms. Papua Besena's brief platform was interesting for the fact that
no mention was made of separation from New Guinea although it was
implicit in advertisements. Besena had three slogans: "Justice" the thrust
of which was connected with the return of alienated land; "Integrity", a
critique of governmental and ministerial extravagance; and "Development"
which tended to emphasise the problems of urban Port Moresby. The
January-June 1977
301
Country party produced a ten point plan which was actually a

regurgitation of the government's eight point plan of 1973.
Sanap Wantaim Somare ("Stand with or support Somare"). Pangu's
campaign was premised on the popularity of the Prime Minister. The
Prime Minister and his organisers toured the country rejuvenating
branches where they had once existed and endorsing candidates whose
chances looked good. Policy issues were rarely discussed although some
play was made of the symbolic achievements of the government: selfgovernment, independence, Air Niugini, and the new currency. Pangu
endorsed eighty-two candidates and made a determined push into the
Highlands. Advertisements in the Post-Courier urged those who desired
Somare to remain as Prime Minister to vote for Pangu candidates. In
complete contrast to Pangu's campaign expenditure in 1972, its 1977
campaign cost in excess of K200,000, financed largely by expatriate
business interests and by a mortgage on party-owned real estate. 21
Papa Bilong Kina na Toea 22 ("Father of PNG's currency"). Although
less explicitly based on the personality of its leader the PPP's image and
appeal nevertheless derived from Julius Chan's reputation as the most
able minister in the government. His ability to organise a tightly knit,
disciplined party and his power to dispense patronage was an obvious
factor in attracting candidates, particularly for the many public servants
who sought PPP endorsement. Chan toured extensively and candidates
were equipped with loud hailers, cassette recorders with messages from
the leader, and pamphlets. The estimated cost of the PPP campaign was
KIOO,OOO. The party maintained its slogan of "strong, stable, progressive
government" but again candidates concerned themselves with local issues.
The PPP endorsed sixty-eight candidates concentrating mainly on the
New Guinea Islands and mainland provinces and other select areas such
as the Southern Highlands and Milne Bay.
Taim nau - sensim gavman - makim United Party ("It's time - change
the government- vote United Party"). During the campaign period there
was some enthusiasm about the UP's chances. Despite the lack of overt
policy differences the UP appeared to acquire a "radical" wing in the
form of young educated candidates critical of government and who had
had no previous attachment to the planter-inspired UP. Sir Tei
campaigned extensively throughout the country in support of his
candidates. One ploy thought to be effective was to publicise the alleged
K43 million discrepancy in government spending. 23
The parliamentary wing of UP for some time had been seriously
divided into at least three camps. Members tended to group themselves
around either Sir Tei or his deputy Paul Langro with smaller support for,
Anton Parao. At the UP's convention at Lae in March, Parao and an
Engan, Karkarya, were expelled from the party. The divisions arose over
a dispute between Sir Tei and Parao (which resulted in a court decision
that Parao pay KIO,OOO in defamation costs) and over dissatisfaction with
Sir Tei's leadership. Party dissidents suggested that Sir Tei lacked the
ability and confidence to become Prime Minister and he was less
302
David Hegarty
interested m providing an alternative to the government than in

supporting it. Sir Tei's campaign was, in fact, rather curious. He often
publicly expressed satisfaction with Somare's leadership and declared
relatively unqualified support for the government. The power struggle
within the party was obvious for often immediately after Sir Tei had
spoken Iambakey Okuk would then roundly condemn the "Somare-Chan
regime". Party backbenchers had become discontented with their
opposition role. Mi les long askim kwestin (''I'm tired of [simply] asking
questions"), was a common complaint, which signified not necessarily a
desire for the UP to win but for the member to be in government led by
whichever party. In addition the UP had to cope with members like
Angmai Bilas (Madang) who declared his support for Somare as Prime
Minister but urged voters to vote for him as a UP man.
Once self-government and independence had become non-Issues there
was little left for the UP to oppose. The expatriate backers of the party
in 1972 had either withdrawn from overt politics or switched their
financial support to Pangu. The UP campaign cost an estimated K100,000
but unlike the other parties it had some difficulty in raising finance. It
endorsed 145 candidates permitting multiple endorsements in Highlands
seats, a strategy designed to net as many winners as possible.
Papua Dainai, Mauri Dainai, Tano Dainai ("For Papua, our way of
life, our country"). Papua Besena was hopeful of winning fourteen or
more seats in Papua. Its campaign was built around Josephine Abaijah's
appeal to a specifically Papuan sentiment but organisationally it was even
less viable than the other parties. An attempt by Besena candidates and
sympathizers to formalise the movement by adopting a constitution was
thwarted by Josephine Abaijah. She insists that Papua Besena is a
"movement" and her attitude to its leadership and organisation is
decidedly charismatic. In a Post-Courier article she wrote:
The basic organisational structure of Papua Besena is not based on that of
a foreign political party in a Westminster system of government. It is based
on an old and very efficient traditional Papuan social structure of 'fission
and fusion' or coming together and drawing apart as each circumstance arises.
If a person wants to establish some Papua Besena organisation or
conduct some Papua Besena activity he can call it any name he likes and
the leaders of Papua Besena will support it.
Papua Besena comes together. If the organisation happens to become a
power base of individual or for promoting interests or activities contrary to
the principles of Papua Besena then we draw apart. Nobody is injured,
nobody is hurt and nobody is disgraced ...
It is a strict policy of Papua Besena that leadership must arise where it
will throughout Papuan society and leaders must never be appointed.
Leadership may assert itself in any form in any situation. 24
In the event Besena ran a low-key campaign and fielded a "collection"

of candidates although some refused "endorsement".
The Mataungan Association, revived for the East New Britain
January-June 1977
303
provincial government elections in May, overcame a split in its leadership

and ran its three incumbent members of Parliament, John Kaputin,
Damien ToKereku and Oscar Tammur. Kaputin was not initially reendorsed but later regained his place on the ticket. Mataungan (and
particularly Kaputin's) chances were enhanced by the announcements of
K128,000 profit for its business arm, the New Guinea Development
Corporation, and a loss of K200,000 for its rival, the New Guinea Islands
Produce Company.2s
Country party candidates campaigned almost exclusively in the Eastern
Highlands, while the National party by the time of the elections had all
but dissolved.
Results aud Coalition Formation
The composition of the new Parliament is substantially different from that
of the old. A core of party stalwarts were returned but many incumbents
were dumped heavily. Of the ninety-four members of Parliament who
sought re-election only thirty-five were returned, reflecting in large part
members' loss of touch with their electorates and their inability to deliver
the goods and, in lesser part, the redistribution and the new voting
system. Education levels of members were generally higher, a majority
having had some secondary education while there were six graduates. The
number of expatriates (naturalised citizens) declined from nine to three
although some did not seek re-election.
There were some significant individual results. Michael Somare won
his East Sepik Provincial seat collecting a massive 87 per cent of the vote.
Julius Chan, thought at one stage to be in trouble, polled 56 per cent of
the vote in Namatanai. Sir Tei Abal, also considered to be under pressure
won with 49 per cent in Wabag. Two senior Pangu men, Barry Holloway
(Eastern Highland) and Boyamo Sali (Morobe), opposed by two of the
young 'new men' of the UP, Kim oro Vira and Utula Samana, won with
votes of 64 per cent and 69 per cent respectively. In Bougainville Fr John
Momis defeated Leo Hannett by 52 per cent of the vote to 33 per cent,
and his 'ticket' which had the tacit support of the provincial government won
the other three seats. Former Foreign Minister, Sir Maori Kiki, committed
political suicide by contesting against Josephine Abaijah who outpolled
him by two to one. John Middleton (Sumkar) an influential UP frontbencher managed only 24 per cent of the vote. Sinake Giregire, UP
leader, lost his seat with 19 per cent of the vote. A number of incumbents
met very heavy defeat. Ninkama Bomai (Gumine), for example, a
member of all previous Parliaments polled only 6 per cent in his
electorate. Three of the nine women candidates, Josephine Abaijah, Nahau
Rooney (Manus) and Waliyato Clowes (Middle Fly) were successful.
The post-election scene, however, belonged to the parties and their
leaders. In the lobbying for power which followed the counting Pangu and
PPP operated from a position of strength. Of the 109 winners, seventy-six
had been endorsed by parties or movements and forty-eight of them were
304
David Hegarty
aligned with the coalition. Somare and Chan reaffirmed their partnership
agreeing that Chan should become Deputy Prime Minister and that
portfolios would be distributed, six to PPP, nine to Pangu and three for
Pangu-independents. 26 The major problem as they saw it was to obtain
wide regional representation in the ministry. Pangu toyed with the idea of
a "grand coalition" and, in fact, offered Sir Tei two ministries provided
he deiivered fourteen members to the government. The UP rejected this
and when the "national alliance" was announced with Sir John Guise as
its leader the division hardened. Somare was particularly antagonistic to
Guise having campaigned against him in Milne Bay. Guise, however,
extracted a statement from Chan to the effect that he (Guise) was a great
national leader. The entry of the Alliance for Progress and Regional
Development (APRD) onto the scene posed two problems for Pangu: it
tended to reinforce regionalist sentiment, and it appeared to split Father
Momis, whom Pangu was anxious to have in the cabinet, from the
coalition. Momis, however, was wary of Guise's intention to hold the
provincial affairs portfolio himself, and when both he and Kaputin
realised the numbers were with the coalition, decided to support it.
The vote for the prime ministership on 9 August revealed the following
support for Somare and Guise:
Table 2.
Somare
Guise
38
19
12
69
Pangu
ppp
Independents
Total
United party
Independents
Papua Besena
Total
25
5
6
36
The independents voting for Somare included the four Bougainvilleans,

two Mataungans, two United party members who crossed the floor, and
four Western Highlands members who decided to join the coalition. The
independents voting for Guise included Guise himself, Okuk, Pondros,
Edimani and Clowes. The three non-voters were Dibela (Speaker),
Kaputin who abstained, and Urekit who was absent.
Party strengths in the new Parliament (adjusted figures to include all
109 seats) were calculated as follows:
Table 3.
Opposition
Government
ppp
38
20
Independents
Total
69
Pangu
II
United party
Independents
Papua Besena
Total
27
6
7
40
January-June 1977
305
The following table (Table 4) shows basic party strengths and

government-opposition support at three times over the past five years:
April 1972, when the national coalition was formed; March 1977, the last
session of Parliament; and August 1977, the first session of the new
Parliament. The table of course does not reveal the fluidity of voting
particularly in the pre-independence period when the government came
close to defeat, nor does it show the personalities who switched parties
during the life of the old Parliament.27 Party strength figures are based on
calculations by party and legislative officials. Members crossed the floor
in both directions on many issues.
Table 4. Government-Opposition Support by Parties, 1972-77
April 1972
(100 seats)
March 1977
(102 seats)
August 1977
(109 seats)
24
10
12
3
7
(54)
25
16
7
3
3
(54)
38
20
9
2'
42
32
10
3
1
(46)
2
(48)
Government
Pangu
ppp
Independent
MA
National'
(Total Government)
-'
(69)
Opposition
United
Country'
National
Independent
Papua Besena
(Total Opposition)
27
1'
I
4
7
(40)
Notes:
I. National party split early in 1976 with the expulsion of Okuk and Kavali from the
ministry.
2. Country party was formed in May 1974.
3. Kaputin, still MA, sits as independent opposition.
4. Kavali, once leader of National party, now describes himself as "pro-Pangu
independent".
5. Pondros.
6. Okuk.
The most obvious result of these elections has been the rise in strength
of the two major governing parties and the decline of the United party.
The explanation for this can be reduced to five factors: the favourable
political and economic climate which has prevailed since the government
took office in 1972; the notion among members that being "with the
government" is essential to gain access to goods, services and rewards;
the absence of a credible alternative; the popularity of Somare and Chan
306
David Hegarty
(i.e. the personality factor); and sound patronage politicking by those two
leaders.
The regional representation of the government is now quite wide - the
only provinces in which it has minimal support are Enga, National
Capital and Central. Pangu, in addition to its support bases in Morobe
and East Sepik, improved its membership in Sandaun, Madang, Simbu
and, quite strikingly in the Eastern Highlands. With the two Mataungans,
Tammur and ToKereku, and Kavali and three Western Highlands members
of Parliament joining Pangu as pro-Pangu independents its strength is
considerable. Pangu, however, lost ground in Papua, notably with the loss
of three ministers, Kiki, Rea and Taureka. The PPP improved its
membership in the Papuan provinces of Milne Bay and Western and
gained surprising support from the Southern Highlands where Chan had
assiduously cultivated area authority members.
The United party lost ground in Madang, Sandaun, Simbu and the
Eastern and Southern Highlands. It is now more obviously a Highlands
based party. Papua Besena won all but two of the eight seats in the
National Capital and Central Provinces, but, despite considerable support,
failed to make electoral ground in the rest of Papua.
Conclusion
Elections in a state undergoing rapid socio-economic and political

change provide an opportunity to focus at a particular historical moment
in that change process on aspects of the political system. To complete the
picture requires further investigation into the country's political economy
and into those parts of the political system not directly involved in
electoral competition. Election studies, however, do provide a number of
indicators about the general "state of the nation" and institutional
adaptation; about the power structure and the "style" of politics; about
basic political cleavages; and about the direction of political change.
Such a survey will not be attempted here but the campaigns and results
of the 1977 elections underscore a number of characteristics of PNG
politics. The high turnover of incumbents - a pattern repeated from
previous elections - might indicate a certain fickleness on the part of the
electorate, but it cannot be interpreted simply as a failure on the part of
members to "bring back development". In some areas where rapid
"development" was occurring the turnover was extremely high. A
complex of factors is obviously at work at the local level and it indicates
that people's concerns are still very much parochially oriented and that
the politicking of the national legislative arena remains largely irrelevant
to them.
The relative affluence of the winning candidates compared with the
rest of the population indicates a further consolidation of the political
elite. Politicians have come to power not from a distinct class base but in
search of economic power. The linkages or relationship between
politicians and constituents is based not on mass mobilisation but on
January-June 1977
307
patronage and clientelism. 28 Politicians gather their support and attempt to

maintain it first within their clan then outside it through the attempted
manipulation of material rewards. In essence their strategy is an extension
or permutation of traditional patterns of leadership in PNG society This
strategy also finds expression at the national level in the manner by which
parties operate.
The basic cleavages in PNG politics are not ideological or class based
but regional. Classes have emerged, the two most visible elements of
which are the rich peasantry and the educated petty bourgeoisie whose
representatives predominate (in a form of loose alliance) in the
Parliament and other state institutions. 29 Class action and class
consciousness is growing but remains as yet relatively underdeveloped,
mitigated by a variety of forces. Regionalism represents perhaps the most
basic cleavage and the one which has the most political leverage. Fuelled
by a long-standing antipathy of those on the periphery to the centre and
by colonial policies of unbalanced development it is a potentially
destabilising force. Demands emanating both from the advanced
provinces (whose sons are already well entrenched in the state
bureaucracy) and from the less developed provinces for more resources
could jeopardise the credibility of the allocators of those resources. The
political elite, therefore, is not homogeneous and the jockeying and
"scuffling" over power by the groups within it will continue to
characterise PNG politics for some time to come.
The immediate problems for the new government will be short-term
ones of political and economic management. The coalition is larger in
number than before and includes a number of educated economic
nationalists already critical of the announcement that government policies
will continue. The number of executive positions has already been
expanded to thirty-one - twenty-two ministers and nine parliamentary
secretaries - in part to placate regional and other demands. The success
of regional groups within the coalition in obtaining favourable allocations
could stimulate further the buying of political support. The opposition,
although divided, may not prove to be as "lame" as before and can be
expected to attack on such issues. The state of the economy will also be
of concern. Falling commodity prices, slow or negligible rates of foreign
investment and the threat of an unemployed, educated workforce will
create social tensions and constrain the government's proposed rural
development strategy. The apparent continuity in PNG politics suggested
by the return of the Somare-Chan government tends to disguise the
potential instability of the system.
30
JULY-DECEMBER 1977
David Hegarty
Politics from July through December 1977 revolved largely around the
settling in of the re-elected government, the sharing out of the spoils of
office. the dispute between the government and the heads of the defence
and police forces. and the affirmation or adaptation of government policy.
Government
The election of Michael Somare as Prime Minister over his opponent, Sir
John Guise. by sixty-nine votes to thirty-six provided a clear indication
of government and opposition support in the new Parliament. In the
governing coalition Pangu and pro-Pangu independents numbered fifty
(including the Speaker) while the PPP mustered twenty MPs. (Pangu later
increased its ranks by defections from the opposition.) Initially there were
to be eighteen ministries - a number supported by the Public Service
Commission and the Ombudsman - of which Pangu would have nine,
pro-Pangu two, and PPP six. 1 Four days after this allocation Somare
unilaterally increased the ministry by four and announced the creation of
eight Parliamentary Secretary positions. 2 This move, which gave each of
the twenty provinces representation, was designed to give the cabinet a
"national" appearance and to stifle criticism both from provinces where
government support was high and from previously unrepresented regions.
This brought the total number of executive positions to thirty and when
to that is added the speakership, the deputy speakership and the
chairmanships of the various parliamentary committees which carry
privileges above that of an ordinary MP, the proportion of those involved
in some form of government activity in a Parliament of 109 is quite high.
In the new ministry Pangu has eleven portfolios and four
parliamentary secretaryships, PPP has seven and four, while pro-Pangu
MPs hold four portfolios. The PPP did well in the allocation with eleven
executive positions for a parliamentary party of twenty and, although it
does not dominate the "economic" portfolios as it did in 1972, the
ministries which it has all have large budgets and most have extension
activities and/or functions which can be utilised for patronage purposes.
The basis for Pangu's allocation amongst its own members appears to
have been firstly seniority within the party (no minister was dropped),
July-December 1977
309
and, secondly, appointment according to the regional formula.

The introduction of parliamentary secretaries was attacked by the
opposition on the grounds that they merely provided "jobs for the boys",
but an appeal to the Supreme court to have them declared unconstitutional
was disallowed. Some government MPs were unhappy about these
positions on the grounds either that they were not appointed or, as in the
case of Tony Ila (Lae), that it was an insult to be offered a "junior"
position. Ila declined a parliamentary secretaryship in Labour and
Industry, stating that he was not prepared to be a minister's "tea-boy". 3
Opposition
The opposition in the new Parliament consisted of the United party,
Papua Besena, and a few independents. Sir Tei Abal was re-elected
opposition leader and in August selected his shadow ministry. 4
Dissatisfaction within United party ranks precipitated an attempted "spill"
of offices and moves were made for Sir John Guise to replace Sir Tei as
leader. The basic causes of this dissatisfaction were that Sir Tei has
played a largely supportive role for the government in the past: that his
leadership lacked dynamism and he was under the influence of white
officials in the United party (notably Wally Lussick, a former MHA and
a founding member of the party) and that the composition of the United
party had changed significantly with the election of younger and more
ambitious men to its ranks. Moves for the "spill" were made after a
budget reply speech by John Jaminan (shadow finance) was denied by
Martin To Vadek (UP deputy leader) as not representing UP policy.
Jaminan countered by saying that he would not take orders from any
white man, and a petition was circulated to remove Sir Tei.
The attempted takeover, however, was stalled largely because of the
tight hold exercised over the United party executive by Sir Tei and his
officials and by the lack of a clear procedure for succession within the
United party. However, with a depleted and divided formal opposition,
effective criticism of government passed to an informal "ginger group" of
MPs drawn from all sections of the chamber. The ideological position of
this "ginger group" which includes Tony Bais (Pangu), Noel Levi (PPP),
John Jaminan (UP), Iambakey Okuk (NP), Michael Pondros (Country
party), John Kaputin (Mataungan), is essentially one of economic
nationalism. The group's concerns were evident in its move in the
September session of Parliament to establish a select committee on
foreign business interests (and those of naturalised citizens), and in
various statements made by its members. PPP parliamentary secretaries
John Noel and Noel Levi vented their concern by attacking the GovernorGeneral's address to Parliament on general government policyP Jaminan
criticised the government budget for its continuing dependence on foreign
aid. Kaputin queried the position of four naturalised citizens in the
ministry 6 and ridiculed the Minister of Commerce, Pita Lus, for his
naivete on the motivation of foreign investors. 7
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David Hegarty
Papua Besena has aligned with the opposition for obvious reasons. The
movement does not regard the government (which it claims is dominated
by New Guineans) as legitimate but there is some division between its
two most prominent spokesmen- Josephine Abaijah and James Mopioover what parliamentary role it should play. 8
Coup d'etat?
The most serious threat to the authority of the government since

independence revolved around a series of events which became known as
the "Diro affair". In late September and early October rumours circulated
in Port Moresby of a possible coup d'etat. These rumours arose from
cabinet's decision to "carpet" Brigadier-General Ted Diro, commander of
Papua New Uumea's detence torces, for what cabmet bebeved to be an
unauthorised meeting between Diro and Seth Rumkorem, a minority
leader in the West Irianese free Papua movement (OPM) at Wewak in
August. The government believed that Diro's meeting may have had
repercussions in its relations with Indonesia. The government, to date, has
regarded the rebel movement as an Indonesian domestic problem and has
studiously avoided any hint of encouragement to the guerrillas. Diro
believed that his reprimand was unjust for he saw his meeting with
Rumkorem as an opportunity to gain first-hand information on the border
situation, and, besides his minister had been briefed on the purpose of the
meeting. In the time between the announcement that Diro was to be
reprimanded (30 September) and the actual reprimand (5 October), Diro
sought and obtained from his senior officers a commitment of loyalty to
himself as defence commander. Adding further fuel to the rumours were
reports that the homes of three senior public servants had been placed
under armed police guard and that Australian defence personnel seconded
to the PNG Defence Force were reminded that they were not to be
involved in internal disputes. 9
In accepting cabinet's reprimand Diro issued an unambiguously
provocative statement which read in part:
In accepting your punishment, I want to take the opportunity of thanking
the Ministers who supported me on the issue. I also want to thank those
who created the situation for me, because I have now been able to assess
who my friends are and who aren't ... Mr Prime Minister, I want you to
know that the force is becoming sick to death of being made a political
football by certain politicians and ex-politicians. 10
Clearly the government had bungled the affair both by allowing it to

become a public issue thus creating speculation that elements were out to
"get" Diro, and by not placing more blame on the Defence Minister.
Although the border is undoubtedly a sensitive issue and in some way
contributed to the dispute, relations between government and defence
leaders had been strained for some time. Tensions had existed between the
former Minister for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Sir Maori Kiki, and the
July-December 1977
311
army over the latter's involvement in a community development project

- the "Mirigeda association" - whose patron was Sir John Guise. 11
Although the coup did not materialise and earnest stories were written in
the Australian press ridiculing its possibility on the grounds that the army
was too small, 12 the Diro affair did damage relations between the civilian
and military authorities, the permanence of which has yet to be assessed.
Police Row
An unrelated series of events and one with somewhat less serious
repercussions involved the dispute between the government and its police
Commissioner, Pious Kerepia. Cabinet decided in November not to renew
Kerepia's term of office for "professional reasons".B The decision had
been preceded by conflict within the top ranks of the force and more
notable the demotion of Senior Inspector Leo Debessa, commander of the
Highlands unit, for insubordination and for failure to obey the
Commissioner's orders. Police Minister Lowa was known to have had
close connections with the echelons of the police force immediately below
the Commissioner. Kerepia did not go quietly. He alleged political
interference in the force and announced that he would pass to the
Ombudsman information that he had been under pressure to declare his
political loyalties. Meetings of the police association and senior officers
to consider the situation decided that they were "loyal to the government
of the day" and took no further action. Ironically, on the same day as
Kerepia's non-renewal was made public Police Minister Lowa's election
to the seat of Moresby North-East was declared void by the National court
on the grounds that he had failed to satisfy residential qualifications.
Policy
(I) Although there was to be no substantial change in overall policy, new

portfolio allocations produced statements from some ministers on the
direction of their departments. Julius Chan, formerly Finance and now
Primary Industry, attracted publicly for his ideas on agricultural
development. Chan recognised the inherent unequal trading relationships
for a small country trading largely in agricultural commodities and
announced that increased domestic food production would be a prime
target of his department. 14 He hoped that new production methods for
market gardening by individual and group enterprise would be devised to
offset the heavy reliance by urban centres on imported vegetables. The
implementation of these schemes was the obvious problem. Most land is
still held in customary tenure, indeed it had been government policy to
ensure that. No marketing or infrastructural arrangements had been
worked out nor had the government arrived at an appropriate urban
strategy. The Department of Agriculture was geared more toward cashcropping and plantations rather than to smaller-scale food production.
Despite this orientation the department was slow to respond to warnings
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David Hegarty
that plantings and production in coffee and cocoa were declining. 15

(2) In late August, Finance Minister Barry Holloway introduced in
Parliament a budget to cover the period July-December. Future PNG
budgets are to coincide with the calendar year. The budget contained no
new initiatives or policies. Revenue was estimated at K235.5 million and
expenditure at K241.5 million. Holloway indicated that a tight rein would
be held over government spending which was expected to grow by only
three per cent over the next few years. Departmental spending was
trimmed to fifty-three per cent of budget expenditure. The minister saw
the need to diversify sources of foreign aid and late in the year the Prime
Minister successfully negotiated an untied grant of $US15 million from
Japan. 16
(3) The Minister for Commerce, Pita Lus, announced a "vigorous and
responsible crusade" to ensure that nationals received u bigger share of
the economic cake. Lus attacked foreign businessmen for not localising
the private sector more rapidly. His speech, however, was illustrative of
the attitude of much of the elite toward foreign business for his
concluding remark compromised his earlier position when he said, in
effect, that if you can't beat foreign businessmen, join them.
(4) Equally instructive as to the elite's position was the hardening of
the government's attitude toward the trade unions. In November a
waterside workers strike in Port Moresby was condemned by the Prime
Minister and other MPs including Sir John Guise. It later transpired that
cabinet had been briefed on the strike by the representative of the
employers federation, but had not heard the views of either the
Department of Labour or the trade unions. 17 In the past the government
has been successful in co-opting and neutralising trade union leadership
through Pangu linkages. In the case of the waterside strike former
Foreign Minister, Sir Maori Kiki, was invited to mediate. Sir Maori who
is president of the Port Moresby council of trade unions and a successful
businessman-farmer, is chairman of the national shipping corporation and
holds directorships on the boards of New Guinea Motors and the ANZ
Bank! The Public Service Association and other white-collar unions have,
by contrast, received favourable wage deals from the government. These
deals came under fire for the first time from the chairman of the
minimum wages board. 18
(5) Oscar Tammur, Minister for Education, outlined his philosophy for
a "self-reliant" education system. 19 The system, he argued, should not
produce people "who regard success as paid office employment in a
mechanised urban situation" nor to promote "dreams of a non-industrial
society composed of subsistence farming philosophers", but to train
manpower in a broad range of technologies. There was an urgent need for
training in professional, managerial and executive level skills for at
present forty-eight per cent of manpower in those levels was foreign.
Among the steps towards this strategy the minister envisaged the
establishment of small "co-operatives" or "brigades" of educated youth,
the fostering of more purposeful and committed leadership in the
July-December 1977
313
universities, and the possible reintroduction of corporal punishment in

schools! One of the basic problems not addressed by the minister,
however, was the declining enrolment in primary schools and the shortfall
in applications for admission to tertiary institutions.
(6) In the field of public administration, the government indicated
concern in two areas - control over statutory organisations, and the
operation of the public service. The Prime Minister's attack in Parliament
on the power of statutory bodies appeared to be directed largely at the
National Broadcasting Commission which had attempted to preserve its
autonomy and maintain a critical line in its news and current affairs
programmes. Other targets appeared to be the National Airlines
Commission which controls Air Niugini and the Harbours Board.
Public service staffing and structure had been under almost constant
review since the government took office in 1972 but it was not until
August (1977) that the Public Service Commission declared that it was
now "able to start real manpower planning". 20 Staff ceilings had been set
through to 1981 and plans to rationalise the multiplicity of job
classifications and to set a redundancy scheme for national officers were
almost complete. Localisation of the public service stood at eighty-nine
per cent compared with seventy-nine per cent in 1972. Expatriates
numbered 4,316 or eleven per cent (at 31 March 1977) but the low
percentage further disguises the senior positions which most expatriates
hold. The Public Service Commission chairman, Rabbie Namaliu,
expressed concern at bureaucratic inefficiency but scant attention appears
to have been paid to upgrading training. The situation can only worsen
with increased demands for skilled manpower as decentralisation
proceeds. The politicisation of the public service was a much heard
complaint in the review period. In addition to the Kerepia affair questions
were raised in Parliament about the involvement of senior public servants,
and particularly of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Tony
Siaguru, in the post-election coalition negotiations. Siaguru, a Pangu
executive member and a man with a reputation for tough negotiation, had
assisted Somare in forming the government. A Public Service
Commission inquiry into Siaguru's activities subsequently found that the
independence constitution guaranteed all citizens' rights to political
involvement and that earlier Public Service Commission directives
forbidding public servants to hold party office were invalid. 21
The government did not deny that public servants were involved in
politics, but Chan, as acting Prime Minister, denied that the government
desired to implement a general patronage system. 22 It was an issue,
however, which attracted considerable criticism, not least from Josephine
Abaijah who accused the government of establishing a "pecking order of
power" in the interest of "political survival". 23
Foreign Policy
Papua New Guinea persists with its policy of "universalism", that is a
314
David Hegarty
policy which aims at pursuing a "middle path" in international relations,

offending as few states as possible and criticising only racist regimes and
those which "deny fundamental human rights". Prime Minister Somare at
the United Nations in October reiterated this theme and in the course of
his address named Uganda as a state repugnant to his values. This
brought a sharp rejoinder from the Ugandan representative at the UN and
provoked criticism at home from Somare's Pangu colleague, Tony Bais,
who suggested that Somare might focus on Indonesian "colonialism" in
West Irian. 24
The border with Indonesia remains the basic foreign policy problem
and is beginning to pose a dilemma for the government. The United
Nations representative on refugees cleared the government over its
handling of the Irianese who fled into PNG in May and June, but support
for the West Irianese cause became increasingly vocal. Michael PouJru~
(Manus) requested the government to negotiate in the dispute between
Indonesia and the rebels and later moved in Parliament that PNG
recognise the OPM. 25 Karla Swokim, Parliamentary Secretary for Primary
Industry, called on the government to support the Irianese liberation
struggle. 26 At the South Pacific Forum in October students presented a
petition to Pacific leaders urging them to consider the West Irianese
cause.
In August PNG was host to the South Pacific Forum. The major issues
considered were the establishment of a Pacific fisheries agency, the major
stumbling blocks to which are resources and manpower to run it and the
question of American membership. Pacific leaders all supported the 200
mile economic zone, but there was less than unanimity on PNG's
proposal for a dialogue with the ASEAN states. Although PNG constantly
emphasises that its first priority in foreign policy is a commitment to the
Pacific, its very presence as a major state in the region is in some ways
a hindrance to the further development of regionalism.
Provincial Government
Progress towards the establishment of provincial government throughout
the country was accelerated by the appointment to the Ministry of
Decentralisation of Fr John Momis. Momis had been de facto chairman
of the Constitutional Planning Committee from 1973 to 1975 and had
consistently pushed for decentralisation as a strategy for "nation building".
At Momis' insistence "provincial affairs" was renamed the Ministry of
Decentralisation. He established an office of implementation headed by
the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Papua New Guinea, Dr
Gabriel Gris, in part to override bureaucratic obstructionism, and
announced that all provinces would have certain government functions
transferred to them by January 1978. The central government departments
most affected by the transfer of functions were Primary Industry, Health,
Education and Business Development. Those provinces which have not
yet an operating provincial government could choose to exercise their
July-December 1977
315
functions but responsibility for their exercise remained with Momis.

The law-making functions of provincial assemblies are set out in the
Organic Law of Provincial Government (passed in Parliament, February
1977) which divides powers into provincial, concurrent and national.
Public servants working in provinces remain national public servants in
terms of salary, promotion, conditions, etc., but are responsible to the
provincial government in the exercise of provincial powers. These
national public servants, "on loan" to the provinces, are grouped into one
"department" headed by an administrative secretary appointed by the
centre in consultation with the provincial governments.
The result of this decentralisation has been to create a tier of semiautonomous governments within the unitary state of Papua New Guinea.
The national government, however, retains the power to intervene,
suspend or abolish provincial governments. The political consequences of
decentralisation are numerous. From the national viewpoint provincial
government has complicated legal, administrative and staffing
arrangements, it has instituted a process of bargaining and of potential
conflict between the periphery and the centre, and it has weakened the
ability of the centre to plan, coordinate and control an integrated
development strategy. These problems were highlighted during the
Premiers' Conference (Simbu) in November when the Premiers demanded
more power, including controls over public service salaries, foreign
investment, citizenship, police and internal migration.
Within the provinces a new arena of political conflict and patronage
has been opened. A new stage has been set for traditional rivalries, for
defeated national level aspirants, and for rivalry between provincial and
national MPs seeking either to build or safeguard their support bases.
Provincial government has opened up a new power and patronage base
for both politicians and bureaucrats. In both Simbu and New Ireland
provinces national MPs have been critical of the operation of their
provincial governments and have begun to fear the weakening of their
own influence. 27 In Bougainville a dispute arose over the representation of
certain groups in the provincial government and the demarcation of
boundaries for community (i.e. local) governments. In East New Britain
dissonance between the various Tolai factions flared again.
The latter months of 1977 saw the first public reaction to provincial
government. Politicians complained about their declining prestige and
influence over provincial affairs and it will not be long before those from
the less-developed provinces recognise that the present structure of
provincial governments tends to entrench regional inequalities. A case
study of the establishment of the Simbu provincial government by ANU
scholar, Bill Standish, warned of "extravagance, waste, corruption and
nepotism, and the 'provincialisation' of the public service" as well as of
a "rip-off' by provincial politicians. 28
31
JANUARY-JUNE 1978
David Hegarty
The leadership code, designed to prevent corruption among national leaders

by denying them private business interests, threatened to split the governing
coalition. At the same time as this schism was emerging, the opposition was
undergoing something of a revival under the leadership of the member for
Simbu, Iambakey Okuk.
Leadership Code
In national Parliament on 3 March, Prime Minister Somare surprised
politicians, administrators and observers alike by proposing a more stringent
code of leadership. 1 In his statement to Parliament the Prime Minister said:
For some time now ... I have been increasingly disturbed by some ofthe trends
I see in our country. I have become convinced that there are dangerous
tendencies at work in our society and that if allowed to continue these
tendencies will corrupt our policies, subvert our efforts at national
development, and set us on the wrong road.
The tendency which worried the Prime Minister most was that national
leaders, both politicians and bureaucrats were becoming too closely involved
with foreign business interests "for the good of our people". Leaders, he
said, were putting themselves in a position where they were bound to be
tempted to place personal gain above the national interest. Michael Somare
reminded MPs that their duty and responsibility was to the people from
whom their power derived. He called for a "decisive change in outlook" to
prevent the graft, corruption and domination of decision-making by foreign
interests, characteristic of other Third World countries, developing in Papua
New Guinea. How, the Prime Minister asked, "can the minister or senior
official who has urban business or large property interests really make
decisions which will promote the rural areas? And how can the leader who
accepts a share in a foreign company deal honestly with that company when
it seeks licences or other favours from the government?".
The option proposed by the Prime Minister was either politics or
business. The revised code envisaged that "national leaders" - defined as
ministers, departmental heads, heads of statutory bodies, the Leader of the
January-June 1978
317
Opposition, and possibly provincial Premiers and secretaries -would divest

themselves of their business interests and no longer engage in business
activity while in public office. These leaders could sell their interests
privately (but not to their immediate families) or to a public trust
administered by the state. Compensation for loss of private income would
take the form of increased salaries and a retirement pension scheme.
In addition to the code the Prime Minister gave notice that an
organic law governing the activities of political parties, particularly in
relation to their financial support, would be introduced. Parties, he
suggested, should be independent of pressures arising from their own
business activities or their dependence on donations from private, foreign
commercial interests.
Prime Minister Somare's own position was interesting. Despite the
fairly widespread criticism of elitist and extravagant behaviour of leaders,
he had made little attempt to discipline them nor had he established the
precedent of replacing ministers except in times of crisis. He admitted in
his statement that he had fairly substantial business interests and that the
introduction of the code would severely affect his personal financial
situation. It appears that he had accepted the code partly on philosophical
and partly on pragmatic grounds. His stress on the responsibility,
commitment and obligation of leaders to the welfare of the people and his
objection to elitism indicated a return to the egalitarian, redistributive and
populist philosophy inherent in the Pangu pati platform. In addition he
possibly realised that some new initiatives were necessary in order to
maintain his government's credibility and to prevent the tarnishing of his
international reputation. As he said in his statement:
If we do not take these steps, history will record that I was a Prime Minister
of a government of empty words- a government which entrenched the interest

of a small elite and let the national goals of a fair, honest and equal society
sink into the W aigani swamps. 2
It appears also that the Prime Minister saw in the code an opportunity to
overcome the impression that he was tired, uninterested and had lost his
grip on the government, and thus to regain his status and authority. A
point not missed by observers, however, was that after his statement to
Parliament he and his supporters retired to his office for a champagne
toast. 3
Strong opposition to the code mounted quickly, both privately and
publicly. Behind the scenes the Australian High Commissioner in
particular lobbied the Prime Minister to change his mind on the grounds
that the code had socialist implications and that it would produce
instability in the coalition. Some Pangu ministers and aspiring ministers
had reservations about it. The leader of the People's United Front,
Iambakey Okuk, opposed it and successfully passed a motion in
Parliament to establish a tribunal to investigate ministers' business
interests. 4
The major thrust of opposition to the code came predictably from
318
David Hegarty
the junior partner in the governing coalition, the People's Progress party.
Although the PPP initially approved the code "in principle", its leader Julius
Chan, was clearly annoyed at the lack of consultation on the code and
suggested that if the Prime Minister had evidence of corruption among
leaders it should have been exposed. Various members and spokesmen for
the party raised objections to the proposal, namely: that the Prime Minister
had been insufficiently explicit in defining a "conflict of interest"; that there
was no distinction between assets acquired before leaders took office and
those acquired since; and that the administration of the government trust
would be difficult and costly, particularly if unprofitable businesses were
to be taken over. Chan emphasised the point that the code would stop
experienced and talented men entering politics. In effect, the code was a
threat to the survival of the PPP.Its leaders had substantial business interests
(although Chan explaineci that he was only a "dormant shareholder" in his
family's business) and party loyalty was built around a form of patronage
whereby members became shareholders and directors of party and other
businesses.
By May it was clear that no compromise could be reached and that
a split in the coalition was imminent. PPP backbencher, Warren Dutton
(North Fly) said that the code could destroy the coalition and that mutual
trust could never be re-established. 5 Dutton and other backbenchers
announced that they would vote against the code. On 25 May, Prime
Minister Somare decided to shelve the code, giving as his reasons the
"volatility" of Parliament and the desire to avoid instability. Apart from the
PPP dissent, the struggle for the leadership of the opposition (see below)
in which some government backbenchers participated raised doubts about
the government's ability to muster a majority on the issue. A week later,
however, under backbench and ministerial pressure, the Prime Minister
announced that he could re-present the leadership code at the August session
of Parliament.
Budget and Planning
In February the Finance Minister brought down the budget for 1978.
Estimated government expenditure was set at kina 486 million which
anticipated a three per cent growth in government expenditure for the year
and a reduction of two per cent in the real value of Australian aid.
Measures to increase internal revenue included increased duties on selected
luxury and semi-luxury imports; a restructured personal income tax system
which increased tax rates for higher income earners; the abolition of the
tax-holiday scheme except for businesses totally owned by nationals; and
a broadening of the fifteen per cent dividend withholding tax to cover all
dividends paid. 6
Simultaneously the Prime Minister introduced the first National Public
Expenditure Plan designed as a first attempt to control and redirect
government expenditure. The introduction to the NPEP admitted that
the "eight aims" promulgated in December 1972 and by which the
January-June 1978
319
government had intended to make a "radical departure" from colonial

development strategies had not been "a fully effective tool for redirecting
the activities and resources of the Government". 7 The "eight aims" were
reviewed in the national development strategy of October 19768 and it was
decided that the guidelines for development set down in that strategy should
be translated into detailed policies and definite commitments of expenditure.
The NPEP is the first in a series of annual, four-year rolling plans, and
envisages an expenditure of K78.4 million over the next four years. In effect
the NPEP determines the allocation of all new government expenditure on
the basis of development priorities set out in the national development
strategy. Doubts, however, have already been raised as to the effectiveness
of the NPEP as an instrument for promoting rural development and for
reducing inequalities particularly in view of the fact that "existing"
government expenditure is not subject to similar evaluation.
Foreign Affairs
The government appeared to take a much tougher line on the OPM guerrilla
movement operating along the PNG-lrian Jaya border. In June, as the
Indonesians mounted their largest offensive yet against the guerrillas, the
PNG government sent an army and police detachment to the border to
prevent OPM members seeking sanctuary on the PNG side. 9 Indonesian
troops were believed to have crossed into PNG territory and to have razed
at least one village.
Relations between PNG and Indonesia reached a particularly low ebb
during the review period. Indonesia expressed concern that two Australian
journalists had visited the border area and had accompanied OPM leader
Jacob Prai on a short "patrol". When the OPM announced a West Papuan
"provisional government", which included Irianese who were naturalised
citizens of PNG, the Indonesians questioned the "loyalty" of these citizens.
In a radio interview an embassy official spoke rather undiplomatically of
the conditions under which Indonesia might have invaded Papua New
Guinea. Predictably this provoked the sternest response to date from Foreign
Minister Ebia Olewale, who demanded the reposting of the official. A few
weeks later, however, Olewale visited Jakarta and earned the distinction of
being the first Foreign Minister to visit East Timor. Within PNG sympathy
for the OPM and criticism of the government's policy toward Indonesia
continued to mount.
The continuing ambivalence in PNG's relations with other Third
World countries was evidenced by some of the Prime Minister's
statements at the Commonwealth Heads of Government regional
conference in Sydney in February. The Prime Minister deplored other
states' attempts to gain special consideration from the developed states
until they put "their own house in order". Conveniently forgetting that
almost forty per cent of the PNG budget is funded by Australian aid, the
Prime Minister suggested that other states might look to PNG as a model
of financial and administrative management. One area in which an
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David Hegarty
obviously troubled Department of Foreign Affairs had some success was in

its nearly completed negotiations with Australia over the Torres Strait
border. 10
32
JULY-DECEMBER 1978
David Hegarty
The climax to a tense political year arrived in November when the ruling
Pangu-People's Progress party coalition government broke up after more
than six years in office. The PPP withdrew from the coalition after a
cabinet reshuffle had effectively demoted its ministers. Prime Minister
and Pangu leader, Michael Somare, retained power however when his
party was joined on the government benches by its long-standing opponent,
the United party. Although the reshuffle precipitated the split, its catalyst
was undoubtedly the leadership code dispute which had raged since early
March. Pangu and PPP had been at loggerheads since then over the Prime
Minister's proposed code designed to prevent corruption in government
by excluding national leaders from private business. Opposition leader,
Iambakey Okuk, sensing a tired and divided government, joined issue and
the ensuing power struggle produced perhaps the most turbulent period in
Papua New Guinea politics since the constitutional debates of 1974.
Leadership Code Dispute
In the Political Chronicle for January-June 1978, it was noted that
compromise between Pangu and PPP over the code was unlikely. In fact
four different versions of the code were prepared but no common position
could be reached. Fr John Momis, Minister for Decentralisation,
assuming the role of Pangu's spokesman, based his arguments for the
code on the need to change the country's economic and political structure
currently characterised by foreign monopoly and influence. 1 He later
extended his critique to encompass "the beginnings of a comprador class
which provides a convenient bridgehead for the continued onslaught of
foreign capita1". 2 If the "basic principles of equal and collective
development" were to be achieved, he argued, the code was necessary to
demonstrate to the people that the government identified with them, was
responsive to them, was restrained in advancing its own interests, was not
satiated with power, and was not subject to foreign influence. He
criticised those who argued that business and politics went hand-in-hand
in Papua New Guinea society, and that business experience was a
prerequisite for successful political leadership. On the contrary he
declared that traditional leadership in Papua New Guinea was not basically
322
David Hegarty
acquisitive but distributive and that the "big man" usually acted as the
custodian of community wealth. 1 (Prime Minister Somare was later to
argue that "big men" are directly accountable to village society.)4 Momis
also warned that Pangu had made too many concessions to the PPP in the
past and that the Nationalist Pressure Group might be reconstituted in an
attempt to provide nationalist leadership.
The PPP which had had its compromise proposals of a strengthened
Ombudsman and a parliamentary register of business interests rejected by
Pangu, argued, in summary, that the code was unworkable, that it did not
reflect societal values, that it would be a drain on the public purse, and
that it would deprive the individual of the right to accumulate wealth. Its
spokesman, Sergius Arek, said in part: "The proposed Code is foreign in
concept. It is an exercise in ideologies and its practicality is most
Juublful" .5 In TanJ:auia wht:rt: a 1>imilar c.;uJt: haJ bt:t:n inlruJuc.;t:J il haJ
failed to check corruption in the middle and lower ranks of government.
Arek said the PPP did not want to split the coalition, but it demanded
consultation by its coalition partner on such important issues.
Iambakey Okuk was more explicit in his rejection of the code on the
grounds that it was socialist in inspiration. "We believe in a private
enterprise system. The present government, despite all its fancy talk, does
not. The proposed Leadership Code shows just how much the present
government is under the influence of people who don't want business and
industry to expand, but who want all the power to be kept by Government
and their public service bureaucrats."" Early in August Okuk declared his
own assets which included a coffee factory and urban real estate. 7 Papua
Besena leader, Josephine Abaijah, said the code would have no effect for
"corruption and patronage" has been built into the system and the
compensation scheme was hypocritical. She argued that: "The only way
to remove corruption is to change the system, not to monkey with it.
There should be no Ministers, no privileges, no luxuries and few overseas
jaunts. All politicians should be on the same level and have the same
authority". 8
Opposition Challenge and No-confidence Motion I
With the government divided and personal enmity between its members
quite apparent, Okuk and his advisers orchestrated an attempt to topple
the government. Their strategy had essentially four elements: firstly, to
consolidate opposition numbers; secondly, to create further division in
government ranks; thirdly, to seize the initiative and dominate the media
through criticism of government performance; and fourthly, to expound
an alternative policy.
Having captured the opposition leadership in May and formed a
provisional party, the Peoples' United Front (PUF), Iambakey Okuk then
reached agreement with UP leaders, Raphael Doa and Roy Evara, and
Papua Besena MPs, to form a coalition in opposition. Meetings and
manoeuvring with dissident and potentially dissident government members
July-December 1978
323
went on throughout June, July and August. Reports that talks had taken
place with the PPP in July were denied, but it was later revealed that
considerable discussions had been held over the possible formation of a
new government. The PPP was obviously split with a substantial group
urging Chan to join with Okuk. Okuk also sought to strengthen his
Highland base by gaining the support of Highland provincial
governments. Using the media effectively the opposition criticised
ministers' expensive overseas trips, ministers' failure to exercise authority
over their departments, and the government's scheme to standardise
expatriate public service contracts which it said would result in an exodus
of skilled personnel. The opposition called on the Prime Minister to
resign and in Parliament in August moved a motion of no-confidence in
the PPP Minister for Transport, Bruce Jephcott, over allegedly misleading
the House, in the hope of attracting wide support from MPs. In the
August session Okuk spelled out his investment policy, the first in a
series of statements which if he came to power his group would
implement. It argued that the National Investment and Development
Authority (NIDA) was too restrictive in dealing with investment and that
a greater inflow of foreign investment was necessary to end dependence
on aid." (NIDA had also been a target of Chan's criticism). The
opposition, he said, would reverse the government's "socialism" for the
opposition believed that "profit was not a dirty word".
The scene was thus set for an intriguing week in Parliament. On 17
August, Roy Evara, deputy leader of the UP, moved the first ever motion
of no-confidence in an elected government, claiming that it was divided
and unfit to govern. 10 Under the constitution one week must elapse before
a no-confidence motion debate takes place, and another MP must be
nominated as the alternative Prime Minister. In this case Okuk was
nominated.
On 21 August Prime Minister Somare sought leave of Parliament to
introduce legislation governing the leadership code. With Parliament in
uproar PPP voted solidly with the opposition to deny the Prime Minister
leave, and the leadership code legislation was later struck from the notice
paper.
On 24 August the no-confidence motion was debated and defeated by
the government, sixty-eight votes to thirty-five, as the coalition held firm.
Evara, speaking to the motion accused Chan of breaking an undertaking
that if the leadership code was blocked his party would support the
motion of no-confidence. Okuk described Chan as "deceitful" and
deserving of a knighthood. Chan replied that he had no apology to make
for holding discussions with the opposition in the interests of stable
government and said that those who had speculated on the divisions in
the PPP were wrong. Other speakers denigrated the "power politics" of
the session, for which Okuk himself made no apology reminding MPs
that: "If you are not hungry for power then you should be working for the
missions and reading the Bible all the day". The Prime Minister said that
the code would return when he could be certain of a fifty-five-vote
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David Hegarty
majority. At least five MPs thought to be opposition supporters voted with

the government.
Cabinet Reshuffle: Coalition Split No-confidence Motion II

During September and October Okuk continued his criticism of the
government, labelling it "socialist" and "Marxist". He outlined further his
economic policy, including state assistance to national capitalists, joint
ventures between foreign capital and the state; and the establishment of
a manufacturing base.
On 1 November the long anticipated cabinet reshuffle was announced
(see Appendix A). Pangu and pro-Pangu ministries were increased from
thirteen to nineteen and PPPs rose from seven to eight. The system of
parliamentary secretaryships which had proven unpopular and unwotkabk
was dropped altogether. The reshuffle obviously demoted the PPP in the
ministry and a point of particular concern to Chan was that the division
of forests had been excised from his portfolio.
Chan, in an emotional speech to Parliament on 7 November,
announced the PPP's withdrawal from the coalition, giving as his basic
reason the lack of consultation with his party on major issues, including
the reshuffle itself, and the absence of trust and mutual respect. 11 The
principles of the partnership agreement signed after the 1977 elections, he
said, had been ignored. The PPP had been wrongly blamed for "Pangu's
compromises". No PPP minister had ever publicly criticised a government
decision. He then spoke of a "disturbing trend" in government. "We are
moving away from an open and democratic form of government ... into a
dangerously personalised form of government ... [in which] a very small
group of non-elected persons" had undue influence. The latter part of the
statement was clearly directed at the "gang of four" and other senior
public servants close to the Prime Minister.
Okuk immediately invited the PPP to join forces with him against the
"socialist faction in the Pangu Pati"Y The Prime Minister adjourned
Parliament. The following day the PPP stood by its decision and withdrew
from a last-ditch cabinet meeting and proceeded to the Parliament
building expecting to join up with PUF, the UP, and Papua Besena which
would have placed those forces in a majority. The UP, however, had been
standing by and immediately joined Pangu in coalition. According to
some reports, when that was discovered the PPP attempted to rejoin the
government. It was later revealed that, earlier in the week, Okuk had
approached the Prime Minister to join him in coalition.
Parliament resumed the following day (9 November) and a Pangu-UP
ministry was announced which gave five portfolios to the new partner
(see Appendix B). UP leader, Raphael Doa, explained that his party had
joined the coalition in the interests of "strong, stable and fairly
representative government". Okuk accused the UP of being cajoled into
government by stories of a military takeover - an accusation which the
Prime Minister ridiculed. Chan speculated that the PPP withdrawal may
July-December 1978
325
have been an "error of judgement" and in a radio interview he made his

reluctance to withdraw quite obvious. It would appear that PPP members
decided by a slim majority on their course of action and its leader was
stuck with the decision.
On Thursday 9 November, PPP's Noel Levi moved the second noconfidence motion in the government to test its stability and majority.
Uncertainty prevailed as to how solid the UP was in support, but the
government, seemingly unperturbed, tabled the 1979 budget and the
second National Public Expenditure Plan. Both Jephcott and Okuk
attacked the government's "left-wing" orientation, and Noel Levi,
speaking to his motion, said that the "grass-roots Pangu" of earlier days
had gone and its many advisers were creating new policies to "suit
certain individuals". 11 National Planning and Development minister, John
Kaputin, tried to retrieve the initiative for the government by reiterating
its development strategy while the Prime Minister defended his own and
his government's record. When the vote came on 16 November the noconfidence motion was defeated, sixty-three votes to forty-five. The
Speaker, surprisingly, voted with the government and Sir John Guise,
until then Deputy Leader of the Opposition, abstained.
Outcome
The outcome of this power struggle was that a change in the composition
of the government occurred but it did not signal any immediate change in
policy. The economic nationalist group has been strengthened in the
ministry and in time we might expect some attempts at tackling the
question of foreign control of the economy. If those attempts merely
reflect the current demands from national entrepreneurs to reserve areas
such as real estate, transport and plantations for nationals then little
fundamental restructuring is likely to take place. The withdrawal of the
PPP meant the loss of some experience in cabinet but, given the limited
extent to which ministers have provided direction in the past, this may
not pose too great a problem. Fairly even regional representation was
maintained both in government and opposition. The result also reemphasised the centrality of Michael Somare in the formation of any
government in the current context of Papua New Guinea politics.
Australian media comment on the split tended to stress the instability
of Papua New Guinea's political situation. In a parliamentary system in
which the parties are essentially factions and in which party
identifications are loose and loyalties built largely around personalities,
shifting alliances and coalitions are bound to occur. On this occasion the
parliamentary dispute became particularly heated, and the Prime Minister
was heard to question whether the parliamentary system was really
appropriate, but the opposition challenge and change of government was
conducted entirely within the constitutional framework. The ructions in
Parliament were not a reflection of popular disaffection or bureaucratic
breakdown.
326
David Hegarty
Other Issues
Other issues and events which arose during the July-December period and
which at various points in time related to the power struggle concerned
criticisms of the process of decentralisation; questions of foreign policy;
and problems of maintaining "law and order". These issues will only be
noted in this review and taken up in future chronicles.
Conference papers delivered at the University of Papua New Guinea's
Waigani Seminar revealed mounting criticism of the decentralisation
process and demonstrated considerable divergence of views on the
desirability of provincial government. All indications were, however, that
the concept was popularly accepted and that the process would be very
difficult to reverse. 14
In July th~:: Imlunesian guvermnenl launched a month-long offensive
against the Irianese liberation movement, the OPM, following the
abduction of Indonesian officials by the OPM in May. The offensive
brought a flood of refugees (as many as 1,000) across the border, and it
was reported that Indonesian soldiers had crossed into Papua New Guinea
territory. Prime Minister Somare, obviously concerned, raised the matter
with Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew apparently in the hope
that the ASEAN states might exert some pressure on Indonesia. The
Australian government reportedly protested to the Indonesian government
about the scale of the operation. Concern and anger was expressed by a
number of Papua New Guinea politicians and student protesters but the
government's course of a tougher line against the OPM was not altered.
In October, Jakob Prai, military leader of the OPM and his "defence
minister", Otto Ondawame, were captured by police in the west Sepik
town of Vanimo where they had arrived in the hope of seeing Prime
Minister Somare. They were subsequently jailed for two months for
"illegal entry" into Papua New Guinea. The government resisted
Indonesian demands for their deportation and requested the UN
Commissioner for Refugees to find a third country for their asylum.
In December Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja, arrived in Port Moresby for talks and announced that
Indonesia had agreed upon a "new policy" for Irian Jaya, that it would
not demand the return of Prai nor an extradition treaty with Papua New
Guinea, and that it desired a revision of the "rudimentary" border
agreement. 15 Papua New Guinea's Foreign Minister, Ebia Olewale, said
that the border issue had become an emotional domestic issue and
reiterated that his government was based on humanitarian principles and
was thus placed in an awkward situation.
The Torres Strait border agreement between Papua New Guinea and
Australia was successfully concluded in November with a rather unique
bilateral arrangement for a resource-sharing zone.
At the South Pacific Forum in Niue in September division occurred
between member states over proposed American membership of the
Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency. Papua New Guinea along with Fiji
July-December 1978
327
took the lead in opposing America's entry, signalling the country's first
major independent step in its foreign policy.
Problems of controlling increasing rural and urban crime rates were
highlighted by a series of attacks on defendants held in police custody. A
cabinet sub-committee was later established to investigate possible longterm solutions.
Conclusion
If there was an underlying theme to the politics of 1978 it was one of
concern for the country's post-colonial direction. Competing views
emerged on both the nature of the problem and on possible solutions.
There was a concern amongst some over the pattern of neo-colonial
politics, and the leadership code itself with its explicit criticism of elitism
and of the emerging comprador class was the most obvious manifestation
of this. For others neo-colonialism was not an issue. The clear
implication of the opposition's revised policy and criticism of the
government's alleged "leftist" orientation was that the creation of a stateassisted bourgeoisie had been restrained by the government's emphasis on
"redistribution", and that the capitalist road to "development" had been
obstructed by a restrictive investment policy.
Two points should be noted about these views. Firstly, neither would
necessarily achieve the objective of reducing dependency. The leadership
code, although a "progressive" step, by itself, without a sustained
ideological programme and the development of political machinery to
support it, would probably not succeed in containing acquisitiveness or in
inducing greater responsibility. Okuk's policy would almost certainly lead
to the entrenchment of dependency. Secondly, while superficially there
would appear to be considerable ideological distance between these
views, pragmatism won out.
The pattern of post-colonial politics is thus firmly established. The
"shake-out" which appeared imminent in June 1978 occurred but its
consequences at this point in time do not appear to be particularly farreaching. The economy remains aid and trade dependent. State power is
in the hands of a political and administrative elite, or in class terms,
shared by a loose alliance of an educated petty bourgeoisie and a rich
peasantry. The rhetoric of redistribution is still current but the essentially
accommodative political and governmental style ultimately works in the
interests of those with the most economic and political clout. Internal
crises are managed in ad hoc fashion, the key to their resolution being
political expediency and the dispensation of patronage. Despite the
emergence of tentative and often confused ideological positions the
"pole" of political attraction remains the centre.
328
David Hegarty
APPENDIX A
PNG Ministry at 1/llnS (former position in brackets)
Pangu:
Michael Somare- Prime Minister

Ebia Olewale- Foreign Affairs & Trade
Oscar Tammur- Education
John Momis- Decentralisation
Ba..-ry Holloway- Finance
Ms Nahau Rooney- Justice (Corrective Institutions)
Delba Biri- Corrective Institutions (Justice)
Stephen Tago- Home Affairs (Conservation & Environment)
Pita Lus- Commerce
Karl Kitchens [Stack]- Minerals & Energy
Pato Kakarya- Conservation & Environment (Home Affairs)
Tom Koraea- Media
Boyamo Sali- Lands
Thomas Kavali- Housing
* John Kaputin- Minister of State, assisting Prime Minister
* Tony Ila- Forests
* Kare Maor- Higher Education
* Paias Wingti- Transport
* Lukas Waka- Police
PPP:
Julius Chan- Deputy PM, Primary Industry (excl. Forestry)

Bruce Jephcott- Works (Transport)
Yano Belo- Minister of State, assisting Decentralisation (Works)
Louis Mona- Administrative Services (Defence)
Jacob Lemeki- Labour
Wiwa Korowi- Health
Gabriel Bakani- Public Utilities
* John Noel- Defence.
Indicates new minister.
APPENDIXB
PNG Ministry at 8/IIns. (former position in brackets)
PANGU:
Michael Somare- Prime Minister

Ebia Olewale- Deputy PM - Foreign Affairs & Trade
Barry Holloway- Finance
John Momis- Decentralisation
Oscar Tammur- Education
Kare Maor- Higher Education
Boyamo Sali- Lands
Stephen Tago- Home affairs
** Thomas Kavali- Housing
John Kaputin- National Planning & Development (assisting PM)
Tony Ila- Labour (Forests)
Tom Koraea- Works & Supply (Media)
Gai Duwabane- Defence
Pita Lus- Commerce
Lukas Waka- Police
Paias Wingti- Transport
Ms Nahau Rooney- Justice
Delba Biri- Corrective Institutions
Karl Kitchens [Stack]- Minerals & Energy
Pato Kakarya- Environment & Conservation
July-December 1978
UNITED PARTY:
**
329
Raphael Doa- Health

Roy Evara- Primary Industry
Sir Tei Abal- Public Utilities
Wesley Embane- Media
Pundia Kange- Forestry
On the eve of the second motion of no-confidence Kavali left the government. His ministry
was later taken by John Noel who left the PPP during the coalition split.
33
JANUARY-DECEMBER 1979
Stephen Pokawin
Government
Having been in power since 1972, the government under Michael Somare
has moved away from an earlier attempt to adopt ideological guidelines
under the rhetoric of the Eight Point Aims, 1 and later National Goals and
Directive Principles/ to the day-to-day upkeep of government. In 1979
the government concentrated its efforts on responding to crisis situations.
Even though the government was not seriously threatened, it was faced
with conditions of instability which raised doubts about its ability to
provide effective leadership and government. Nineteen-seventy-nine was
the most tumultuous year of the decade. The government was faced with
industrial strikes, threats of strikes, moves by the opposition political
parties to topple the government, widespread rural complaints about
neglect on the part of governments, accusations of mal-administration and
mistreatment of villagers by government officers, apparent lack of
solidarity within the National Executive Council, claims of near anarchy
due to alleged breakdown in law and order, alleged constitutional
violation by the executive arm of government, and ineffectiveness of the
public service. 3
The government frequently employed delay tactics and committees to
counter confrontations and demands from its many constituencies. Instead
of acting to resolve the issues, it has displayed initial interest to appease
the people, and has then either set up a committee or referred the
decision to a committee. In the meantime it has expected that people may
cool down and forget about it. Among the committees in 1979 were:
committee of inquiry into the Waigani fire; committee of inquiry into the
disturbances at Hanuabada; committee of inquiry into alleged
mistreatment of villagers at Menyamya; committee of inquiry into the
prison unrests; committee of review into local level government; constitutional review committee; committee of review into information services;
ToRobert committee investigating the public services; and the emergency
committee. When deadlock was reached between the unions and the
employers, the conflicts were referred to the Arbitration and Conciliation
Tribunal for decision. This approach to government was indicative of the
indecision and half-hearted policies of the Somare government in 1979.
331
On 6 September the government successfully defeated the third attempt

by the opposition in thirteen months to topple the government by a vote
of no-confidence, with a vote of 63 to 34. 4 Doubts as to the ability and
integrity of the government to govern effectively increased, with a
number of ministers appearing before the courts on charges ranging from
drunken driving to violations of constitutional provisions. And the
principle of collective decision of the cabinet received major setbacks,
with ministers defying instructions from the Prime Minister and publicly
expressing contrary opinions to cabinet decisions. 5
Opposition
The theme of instability found manifestation in the operation of the
opposition political parties. The opposition did not live up to
expectations. Since Okuk successfully overthrew Sir Tei Abal and
assumed the leadership of the then United party in 1978, the opposition
had made several unsuccessful attempts to get into power through the
vote of no-confidence. The opposition's goal to "expose, oppose and
depose" the government failed to be realised in 1979. Instead it
contributed to the creation of an unstable situation within the
opposition.
This unstable situation was inherent primarily in the composition of
the opposition. The partnership between the People's Progress party,
Papua Besena and the National party 6 was a matter of political
convenience rather than a practical long-term partnership. They
represented different views and interests which made a true partnership
impossible. In addition, the PPP was not committed to the leadership of
Iambakey Okuk and the strategies employed to take over power. 7
Within Papua Besena there were differences between the parliamentary
members regarding their association with the opposition and the cause of
the party. The leader, Josephine Abaijah, accused some members of
Papua Besena, including the parliamentary leader and Deputy Leader
of the Opposition, Galeva Kwarara, of political opportunism resulting
in the neglect of the cause for which the movement had originally
emerged. During the vote of no-confidence six members of the movement
were absent from the Parliament. 8 Successive failure of the opposition to
master the majority in the Parliament to defeat the government led
eventually to Okuk's announcement on 3 October that he would not
accept nomination in the future as alternative Prime Minister in moves to
topple the government. He also challenged the PPP to contest openly the
leadership of the opposition to resolve any doubts as to who the
leader was or should be. Ultimately, the failure of the opposition to gain
support in its bid for the seat of power could be attributed to an impatient
and blind push for political power. The goal of political power
overshadowed the assessment of the political, social and economic
conditions and development of suitable strategies to equip members for
the task.
332
Stephen Pokawin
Provincial governments in 1979 proved to be an important level of
government to deal with. This was due to the leadership and commitment
of the Minister for Decentralisation, Fr John Momis, and the enthusiasm
and determination of the provincial governments to establish themselves
effectively in their respective provinces. By the end of the year thirteen
provinces had elected provincial governments, while six (Sandaun (West
Sepik), Simbu, Western Highlands, Southern Highlands, Enga and
Morobe Provinces) continued to operate under the Interim Arrangement
Act. With the establishment of provincial governments the responsibility
and process of allocating scarce resources came under the watchful eyes
of the villagers. Decisions and actions of the leaders became subject to
close scrutiny. Consequently, the villagers have become politically
mobilised. 9
On 8 November the East New Britain provincial government
successfully engineered a move which caused the national Parliament
promptly to enact legislation empowering the provinces to run lotteries.
Similarly, soon after the National Executive Council decided for a multimillion kina Ramu Sugar Project, Oro and East Sepik Provinces
spearheaded a coup in favour of small-scale sugar projects. The Minister
for Primary Industries a few days later announced his flexibility in
accommodating small-scale projects. 10
The provincial governments also faced numerous problems. Antipolitical party feeling was widespread. In the New Ireland Province the
election of Robert Seeto as Premier led to accusations of PPP's
involvement in provincial government politics. This resulted in a series of
resignations from members of the secretariat. The anti-party feeling
repeated itself throughout the country. 11 Furthermore, it was alleged that
provincial governments were misusing public monies. Members of the
national Parliament were particularly critical over this issue. They
attempted to acquire control over this aspect of provincial government by
suggesting the powers of the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee
extend to the provincial governments. 12 And in April, the interim Premier
of East New Britain, Koniel Alar, and his Deputy Speaker, Hosea Biu.
were jailed for organising an illegal police force. 13
Foreign policy
In 1979 Papua New Guinea came out unreservedly against a continuing
"colonial" presence of metropolitan powers in the Pacific. At the South
Pacific Forum meeting in Honiara, Solomon Islands, the Foreign Minister,
Ebia Olewale, championed the cause for self-determination for the French
Pacific territories. 14 He repeated the stand at Papeete during the 19th
South Pacific Conference when he waived protocol to address a public
rally organised by pro-independence parties. 15
From 4 to 6 June, Papua New Guinea played host to President
333
Soeharto of Indonesia amidst the tightest security ever experienced in the

country. This reflected the sensitivity of the West Irian cause for
independence and the widespread support among the populace. 16 The
official policy regarding West Irian however, is one of hands-off
Indonesia's internal affairs. On 3 March Jacob Prai, the leader of OPM,
and Otto Ondawame flew out of Papua New Guinea to Sweden. It is
ironical then for Papua New Guinea to deny France's similar claim over
its Pacific territories. On the question of decolonisation in the Pacific the
West Irian issue betrays Papua New Guinea's position as the champion of
self-determination. The relationship between Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea was further strengthened with the signing of a new border treaty
in December.
For the first time in the history of an independent Papua New Guinea,
a high-ranking United States government official visited the country. The
visit of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew
Young, in May, however, was low-key and did not produce any
substantial result. The visit was nevertheless indicative of the increasingly
influential role of Papua New Guinea in the affairs of the Pacific Island
states which own a substantial amount of sea resources.
Student politics
The 1979 April-May strike spearheaded by the book and pocket
allowances for the national scholarship holders was a major incident in
student politics. It was marked with violence unequalled in the history of
student action in Papua New Guinea. This was accentuated by widespread
fear among the student population, suspension of classes at the University
of Papua New Guinea and the University of Technology, brutal
intervention by the police force on the Waigani campus, and the eviction
of the student leaders by the National court. 17
It was suspected that the strike had been manipulated by politically
motivated student leaders to facilitate the downfall of the government. 18
Evidence during the strike pointed to the genuineness of the need for
increased book and pocket allowances, but similarly, there were
extraneous factors implying wider political motives underlying the strike.
Ultimately, the strike demonstrated the mechanism of conflict resolution
of the Papua New Guinea government which tends to respond more
readily to a situation of confrontation rather than through an ongoing
system of resolving conflicts before they get out of hand.
Strikes
In 1979 there was an increasing number of industrial strikes or threats of
strikes and protest marches. Throughout the years it has become a norm
that the authorities in Papua New Guinea would respond more effectively
to industrial action than through negotiation. Among these were the
national doctors, the Electricity Commission employees at Rouna and
334
Stephen Pokawin
Yonki hydro-electric complexes, the Port Moresby bus drivers, the Port
Moresby waterside and seamen's union, the national air pilots employed
with Air Niugini, the Papua New Guinea Teachers Association, the Public
Services Association, the national nurses employed with the Department
of Public Health and the Bougainville mine workers union. 19 In all these
cases the issues revolved around improved and better working conditions
and government or company decisions which were considered detrimental
to the interests of the workers.
Strikes and demonstrations extended to the villagers and the student
population. In addition to the tertiary students' strike of May, students at
the national high schools at Aiyura and Kerevat staged a boycott of
classes. The villagers employed protest marches to government offices to
demonstrate their dissatisfaction at decisions made by the government on
matters attectmg them.
State of Emergency
The government on 23 June declared a State of Emergency in the five

Highlands provinces (Eastern, Southern, and Western Highlands, Enga
and Simbu). The declaration resulted from an increase in conflict between
different tribes in parts of the provinces. People were killed and
thousands of kina worth of property in the form of houses, garden crops
and coffee trees was destroyed. The government and the business sector
were concerned at the detrimental effects the conflicts may have on the
economy and businesses. 20 The coffee industry is a major contributor to
the national revenue.
The situation should raise fundamental questions relating to the
concept of law and order. Should tribal conflicts be equated with the
issue of law and order? What are the causes of tribal conflicts and how
do they relate to the administration of laws in the country today? Do they
show defiance of law and order or are the current law and its
administration inadequate for the tribal conflict situation?21
The State of Emergency is related to the situation in the police force.
The force has been accused of widespread indiscipline and ineffective
performance of its duties with regard to the maintenance of law and
order. In April 1979, the government appointed one of its major
functionaries to the position of Police Commissioner on the retirement of
William Tiden - Philip Bouraga, who at that time was the Secretary to
the Prime Minister's Department. 22
With the declaration of the State of Emergency, in retrospect, the
appointment of a strong government Police Commissioner was a farsighted one. Reactions varied, ranging from those who saw it as
victimisation of the Highlands people to those spearheaded by the women
of Western Highlands Province who supported the move and initiated
steps under the emergency to establish peace between conflicting tribes.
For the national parliamentarians, the declaration of the State of
Emergency led to a session of shadow boxing in the August session. The
335
emergency was declared without prior endorsement by the national

Parliament as outlined in the constitution. During the August session the
government presented and the Parliament subsequently enacted three Bills
- the Emergency Bill, the Custody of Members Bill, and the Emergency
Committee Bill - to legitimatise and operationalise the State of
Emergency. 2 ' An emergency committee was appointed headed by Sir John
Guise, to review the operation of the emergency. From its report, the
Parliament on 4 September approved the immediate lifting of the State of
Emergency in Southern Highlands, most of Eastern Highlands and Simbu
except for four troubled areas. The emergency in Western Highlands was
lifted after the initial sixty days period, while Enga was extended for an
extra four months. In accepting the report, the Parliament stated
emphatically that the State of Emergency should only be invoked in times
of natural and national disaster.
Premdas/Rooney Affair
The single most serious crisis to be faced by the government was what
has become known as the "Rooney affair". 24 It began with the
government's deportation order to Dr Ralph Premdas, an academic with
the University of Papua New Guinea. Dr Premdas unsuccessfully
appealed to the ministerial appeals committee. Premdas then sought and
was granted a staying order from the National court to enable him to
appeal further against the decision. In response the then Minister for
Justice, Nahau Rooney, communicated in writing with the Chief Justice,
Mr Justice Prentice, outlining her views on the role of the judiciary in the
Premdas case. The communication was treated by the Chief Justice as an
attempt by the Minister for Justice to interfere with the operation of the
judiciary which he claimed under the constitution was not permissible.
The situation led to the involvement of the public prosecutor who later
disclosed another communication from the Minister for Justice regarding
the case of another minister, John Kaputin. The Minister for Justice was
tried by the Supreme court, whose members were party to the conflict,
and sentenced to eight months' imprisonment. The government responded
by invoking the power of licence vested in the Minister for Justice which by then had been assumed by the Prime Minister - to release the
imprisoned former Justice Minister. The Act led to massive unrest in the
prison and among the university students. More than 200 prisoners
escaped from major prisons in the country. The students staged
demonstrations and public campaigns to remove the government from
power. It was accused of acting unconstitutionally and creating the
situation whereby it was seen that the laws of the country were not
applicable to all people alike. Dr Premdas was deported from the country
well before the Rooney affair erupted.
Before the situation had a chance to calm down, the Supreme court
sentenced another minister, John Kaputin, Minister for National Planning
and Development, to ten weeks' imprisonment after finding him guilty of
336
Stephen Pokawin
not complying with a court order to file the 1977 report of the New
Guinea Development Corporation with the Registrar. The decision
shocked the government but no action was taken to remedy what was
regarded as blatant mal-administration of justice. The situation culminated
in an obvious conflict between the judiciary and the executive arm of
government. The Rooney affair led to resignations of five judges of the
National and Supreme court, including the Chief Justice. Soon after the
government appointed Mr Justice Wotten from New South Wales as Chief
Justice and the government took an historic step in appointing the first
Papua New Guinean judge, Murray Kapi, who was then the state
solicitor. 25
Political Mobilisation
Nineteen seventy-nine ended a decade of broad political mobilisation
among the people of Papua New Guinea. All decisions made by the
national and provincial governments as well as private enterprises became
subject to political action from groups who were affected one way or
another. Decisions regarding development of projects, roads, expansion of
towns, establishment of major projects, became issues of contention
between the authorities and the people who opposed the decisions. The
increasing tendency for the people to demand high compensation
for work done on their land was seen to increase towards the end of
1979. Similarly the loss of lives through accidents or tribal fighting
was followed by concerted moves from relatives for high
compensation. Compensation has become a matter of political concern.
Instances are abundant. The building of the highway through the Central
Province has led to demands by the people whose land the road
passes for K400,000 compensation. The government responded by setting
up a committee to look into the issue. The cannery which was to be
built in Manus Province was, as a result of concerted opposition from
the villagers and the defence force, moved out to New Ireland, even
though the Manus provincial and national governments had approved the
project.
Similarly the women were politically active in influencing
decisions. The women's groups in Western Highlands spearheaded
support for the government in its attempt to restore peace among
conflicting groups in the Highlands. The women in other provinces were
also very active in the affairs of the nation as well as the affairs of the
provinces. 26
The country was provoked by the publication of a naked Papua New
Guinea female advertising the perfume Eve. The flow of protest from all
quarters eventually forced the agency to modify the form of
advertisement of the product.
These instances were indicative of massive involvement of the people
in the process of influence in the country. The political nature of 1979
ended a decade which was politically sensitive and volatile.
337
1980 Budget
On 6 November the Minister for Finance, Barry Holloway, handed down
the 1980 budget. Of the total of K573.8 million, departmental
expenditures topped the appropriations with Kl87.7 million to be
followed by Kll7 .9 million grants to the nineteen provinces. The
breakdown of revenue sources showed internal sources fifty-four per cent,
Australian grant-in-aid thirty-two per cent, and borrowing fourteen per
cent.
End of a Decade
1979 ended a decade which shall go down in the history of Papua New
Guinea as a landmark. In one decade PNG saw an end to direct
colonialism, the rise of the national elites to power, a vigorous attempt at
establishing international status, and an intense questioning of the status
quo. A late starter among the colonised, Papua New Guinea in her quest
for human dignity, independence and equality had before her the
experiences of many Third World countries. However, the odds were
against her. On the national and international scenes, the effects of
colonial rule overshadowed the initial stages of the country's postcolonial period. The paternalistic concern of Australia, the former
colonial power, and the dependent attitude of the national elites and the
populace dominated the affairs of the decade under the ideology of good
government, political and economic stability and creditable international
reputation along the capitalist line coated with socialist rhetoric.
The chronicle for 1979 is a culmination of a decade indicative of a late
starter.
34
David Hegarty
Papua New Guinea: 1980

Nineteen seventy-nine had been a particularly turbulent year in Papua
New Guinean politics. 1 The Somare government had experienced a
dramatic fall in its credibility largely over its mishandling of a number of
domestic crises, and particularly over its dispute with the judiciary, a
dispute known popularly as the "Rooney Affair" .2 Late in that year a view
was current, largely expressed by Rooney's adversaries, that PNG's
political system was on the point of collapse. 3 The political events of
1980, however, confounded that view. In March a peaceful, orderly and
constitutional change of government occurred on the floor of Parliament.
Michael Somare lost power in a motion of no-confidence and was
replaced as Prime Minister by Sir Julius Chan who became leader of a
five-party coalition government. The dispute with the judiciary was
resolved and the "constitutional crisis" of 1979 faded from memory.
Despite the encroaching economic recession, the Chan government faced
up to a range of policy issues indicating that it was intent not on reform
but on restoring proper political management. Tension continued,
nevertheless, within the political elite, and particularly between the new
coalition partners. By the end of 1980 a degree of uncertainty about the
cohesion of the new government and the direction of policy prevailed.
That uncertainty, however, was not of sufficient magnitude to give rise to
catastrophe theories about the future PNG such as had surfaced a year
earlier.
Change of Government
On 11 March, in Parliament, the Leader of the Opposition, Iambakey
Okuk, moved the motion: "That this Parliament has no confidence in the
Prime Minister [Michael Somare] and nominates Sir Julius Chan to be the
next Prime Minister". After a brief debate the motion was passed by a
vote of fifty-seven to forty-nine, thus ending Somare's eight-year reign as
leader of Papua New Guinea. Sir Julius Chan was sworn in as Prime
Minister by the Governor-General and shortly afterwards announced his
new ministry. 4
339
The background to the change of government and to Somare's loss of

credibility has been described elsewhere, 5 but the factor which
precipitated the collapse of the Pangu-United party coalition was
Somare's reshuffle of his ministry in mid-January. In the reshuffle two
ministers were dropped (Roy Evara - United party - Minister for Primary
Industry; Stephen Tago- Independent- Minister for Science and Culture)
for, in Somare's words, not maintaining "the requirements of cabinet
solidarity". Fifteen of the twenty-three ministers were moved to different
portfolios, the most important of which were the move unwanted unwanted by Fr Momis - of the Decentralisation minister to Minerals and
Energy, and John Kaputin's demotion to higher education (Kaputin had
not been returned to his ministry of National Planning after his release
from prison in December). The reshuffle had a profound effect on party
alignments. The United party split into two factions with about seven of
its fifteen members quitting the government over Evara's dismissal and
the party's failure to gain increased representation in cabinet. Fr Momis
and John Kaputin also left the government ranks, formed a new political
party, the Melanesian Alliance, and negotiated with the opposition parties
to form a new government. Momis and Kaputin had been, in late 1979,
the instigators of a letter to the Prime Minister, signed by eight ministers
and a number of government back-benchers, which complained about the
complacency of leadership and lack of direction of government policy.
Somare's reshuffle hardened their resolve to withdraw and they eventually
took four other MPs with them.
In the weeks preceding the February-March session of Parliament both
government and opposition lobbied furiously for the support of MPs. In
his bid to stave off defeat, Somare appointed three new ministers, Opai
Kunangel and Martin ToVadek from the United party, and Matiabe Yuwi,
an independent MP. All of the Village Economic Development Funds for
the year (K750,000) were distributed to MPs. 6 The opposition parties
were divided, for a time, over their nominees for the prime ministership.
National party leader, Iambakey Okuk, who had made most of the
running in the opposition, was the logical choice, but he had lost in three
previous no-confidence motions/ and eventually deferred to People's
Progress party leader, Sir Julius Chan, who had a wider basis of support
amongst parliamentarians.
Speaking to his motion on 11 March, Okuk presented a catalogue of
alleged faults in the Somare government. These included: a loss of public
confidence in the government; the cynical misuse of government funds to
buy voting support; the lack of consultation and cooperation within the
ministry; the alienation over the years of fourteen former ministers; the
development of a personalised form of government; the lowering of
morale in the public service; the precipitation of the constitutional crisis in
1979, the lack of an employment-creation policy; an ill-conceived quota
on rice imports; and the lack of government response to rural problems.
Okuk then outlined his aspirations for the new government which included
the provision of Christian leadership; cooperation with the public service;
340
David Hegarty
posttlve measures to end law and order problems; more regional

cooperation in the decentralisation process; improved status and
conditions for national MPs and, in particular, more power for national
MPs over provincial affairs. In reply Michael Somare pointed out that his
government's record in economic development had been creditable and
warned that the opposition parties enjoyed no mandate from the people.
He predicted that the new coalition would not survive its own internal
contradictions.
When the numbers were ultimately tested the new National Alliance
coalition held a majority of eight. Despite Okuk's later statements that it
was he who had defeated Somare and had put Sir Julius in the Prime
Minister's position, it was in fact the desertion from Somare of the
Melanesian Alliance which tipped the balance.
The National Alliance consisted of five panies: People's Progress party
(led by Chan), National party (Okuk), Papua Besena (Kwarara), Melanesian
Alliance (Momis) and a faction of the United party (Evara).
Party strengths and the allocation of ministries were as follows:
Party
People's Progress party

National party
Papua Besena
Melanesian Alliance
United party
Independent
Numbers
20
18
8
6
7
1
Ministries
7
5
3
3
6
1
Total
60
25
As the year progressed more members of the United party and a small
number of pro-Pangu MPs switched to the new government while a small
number of coalition MPs drifted to the opposition.
The constituent elements of the coalition appeared to have little in
common other than a discontent with the previous government. Indeed on
many major issues such as decentralisation, foreign investment, separate
status for Papua, the leadership code, and citizenship, the coalition
partners had previously been on opposite sides of the political fence. This
was in part reflected in the initial coalition agreement, in which the
parties bargained both for the number of ministries per party and for the
right to allocate portfolios among their own members - thus, from the
outset, reducing the Prime Minister's control over his ministry.
Policy
The Prime Minister, in his "State of the Nation" speech to Parliament on
24 June, addressed a number of policy themes and issues. 8 On the
economy he suggested that his government was primarily interested in
restraining the inflation rate which had risen to 11.6 per cent - a rise of
five per cent over the previous months; creating a favourable investment
341
climate; encouraging commercial investment in agriculture - a field in

which productivity had declined; and encouraging the development of joint
venture projects between national and foreign capital. Little emphasis was
placed on a domestic manufacturing or industrial base. The Prime
Minister expressed his opposition to the expansion of state enterprise,
using the line that bureaucrats don't make good businessmen. The
initiatives taken by the government throughout the year, however, were
relatively minor. The Prime Minister suspended the plantations acquisition
scheme which he saw as a cause of declining agricultural export
production, and in August the Finance Minister John Kaputin, introduced
an interim budget of K36.25 million to cover costs of projects already
under way. In the face of declining revenue from the minerals stabilisation
fund and a decline in the real value of Australian aid the Prime Minister
had to backtrack on an earlier promise to boost government spending by
five per cent (compared with the Somare government's projection of three
per cent). 9 The Prime Minister was critical of the Somare government's
decision to accept a five per cent annual decline in the real value of
Australian aid, arguing that continuing high levels of aid were essential to
allow the government to explore new avenues of domestic revenue raising.
Australian aid adviser, Sir John Crawford, however, foreshadowed that
the rate of decline in real aid might be greater in the forthcoming (1981)
aid agreement. In the 1981 budget introduced to Parliament in November,
there was little change to the previous government's policies of a hard
kina strategy, wage restraint, and a steady growth in public spending. The
budget estimated a total revenue of K694.3 million, twenty-four per cent
more than in 1980. The only initiatives announced were a reduction in the
size of the public service by one per cent, increased expenditure on the
police, and increased duties and excises on petroleum, alcohol, cigarettes
and soft drink. The National Public Expenditure Plan for 1981-84, which
accompanied the budget, foreshadowed increased expenditure to boost
agricultural production. However, the Finance Minister, John Kaputin, did
express the government's determination to be tough on departments with
poor records in financial discipline, and he appeared determined to reduce
the autonomy of several statutory bodies.
On the public services generally the government expressed its intention
to reduce the crime rate and to stabilise the law and order situation; to
improve urban infrastructure, particularly housing; and to improve the
efficiency of the public service. The latter point had become a pet theme
of the Prime Minister - he often used it as a springboard to attack the
myth of the "Melanesian Way" in both public administration and
business. Many senior public servants were reshuffled in June but the
consequences were merely to create a furore over political appointments
and to increase the insecurity of the senior echelons of the public service.
Deputy Prime Minister Okuk frequently criticised the performance of the
public service and showed his determination to override obstructionist
bureaucrats (among other things) by launching a sustained attack on the
management of Air Niugini. 10 Okuk dismissed the expatriate general
342
David Hegarty
manager of the airline as well as two senior national executives who had
publicly opposed the minister and had supported a strike by airline
employees, and replaced the members of the National Airlines
Commission with his own nominees. Okuk's intervention was vindicated,
in part, by the release in late June of the Ombudsman Commission's
Interim report on Air Niugini which analysed the financial decline of the
company and suggested that, "up on the penthouse level where
management lives we have discovered a den of iniquity".
On the law and order front, the government detailed recent increases in
crime11 and announced more funds and improved conditions for the police
force, and a new Department of Community and Family Services which
it hoped would provide coordinated youth development policies. Police
Commissioner Philip Bouraga established a "special squad" of plainclothes police to tackle the problem of urban "rascal" gangs, a move
which was later to bring him into conflict with his minister, Warren
Dutton.
The government (or at least part of it) continued to support the process
of decentralisation. In Parliament in July, Decentralisation Minister, Fr
Momis, reviewed the progress of devolution. In the period of three and a
half years all but one of the nineteen provinces had held democratic
elections, but only four provincial governments (North Solomons, East
New Britain, New Ireland, and Eastern Highlands) had attained complete
financial autonomy. The administration of provinces had been reorganised
so that all public servants in the field came under the umbrella of a
provincial department headed by a Secretary with the same status as a
head of department in Port Moresby. The central Department of
Decentralization was also trimmed and reorganised so as to provide better
budgeting, planning and management support to provinces. Fr Momis also
pointed to the problems of decentralisation which included an excessive
interest in the "perks" of office by provincial members, lack of liaison
between national and provincial members, administrative overlap between
the two tiers of government, financial mismanagement by provinces, and
the reluctance of provinces to devolve powers to the local-level
community governments. Late in the year the government had to bail out
four provinces in debt, but took steps to impose tighter financial controls
by requiring forward budget estimates and monthly reports from all
provinces. It also prepared a constitutional amendment giving cabinet
power to suspend poorly managed provincial governments.
Criticism of the decentralisation process continued to be heard from
academics, journalists and national politicians. 12 The most ardent critic
was Deputy Prime Minister Okuk who seized the chance of undermining
provincial governments by deciding in cabinet (with Chan, Momis and
Kaputin absent) to allocate sectoral transport programme funds, which
would normally have gone from the central government to the provinces,
directly to national parliamentarians. 13 Okuk's explanation was that these
allocations would significantly increase the power and status of national
MPs vis-a-vis provincial governments, but with the Agriculture and Health
343
Ministers following suit with their sectoral funds, it opened the way to
the abuse of government expenditure for blatantly political and personal
purposes. Cabinet was clearly divided on this issue, but Momis did not
have the numbers to rescind the decision.
In foreign affairs the government did make a number of shifts in
policy, and scored considerable political kudos through the intervention of
defence force troops in the Santo rebellion in Vanuatu. A series of
statements in Parliament by Foreign Minister Noel Levi - based largely
on a preliminary report by Australian academic consultant, Ted Wolfers
- indicated the abandonment of the previous "universalism" policy and
the adoption of a policy of "selective engagement". In July Noel Levi
said that PNG's areas of primary concern "obviously include our
immediate neighbours, Australia, Indonesia and Solomon Islands and our
major economic partners" . 14 Levi was critical of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan (and subsequently PNG stopped a Soviet tourist cruise ship
from embarking in Madang); expressed concern at the plight of refugees
from Kampuchea and Vietnam; and was pointedly critical of both colonial
and racist regimes. This was not a significant departure from the policy
of the Somare government, but in late November Levi informed
Parliament of the government's new approach:
We intend to engage our energies and resources with those countries,
international organisations and issues, which are of greatest concern to us.
Our approach will be one of selective engagement in accordance with
Papua New Guinea's national interests, and our human, financial and other
resources. 15(my emphasis)
Levi's statement cited the strengthening of South Pacific regional

organisations, a closer relationship with the member states of ASEAN,
cooperation with Indonesia on the Irian Jaya border development
program, continued opposition to colonial powers and racist regimes, the
possibility of observing the next meeting of the non-aligned movement,
the possibility of diversifying trade relations with China and South Korea,
and the maintenance of strong bonds with Australia, as the broad
objectives of an on-going foreign policy process.
The 20th South Pacific Conference held in Port Moresby in October
revealed Papua New Guinea's intention of playing a leading role in South
Pacific regionalism. In a direct challenge to the leaders of the small South
Pacific states, Prime Minister Chan said that there was no room for
romanticism (by which he meant the "Pacific Way") in confronting
development problems. Both he and Foreign Minister Levi urged the
delegates to confront issues and not shelve them. Levi called for a new
political alliance in the South Pacific along the lines of the Organization
of African Unity which would give the Pacific a greater voice in
international affairs. Naturally, other Pacific delegates were more than a
little wary of Papua New Guinea's intentions and referred the suggestion
for further discussion.
In July Prime Minister Chan responded to a request from the New
344
David Hegarty
Hebridean Prime Minister, Fr Walter Lini, for PNG troops to be sent to

the New Hebrides for peace-keeping purposes. Brigadier-General Ted
Diro flew to the then New Hebrides to assess the situation. A special
session of Parliament met in August to consider a "defence agreement"
with the now Vanuatu government. The government initially had difficulty
in mustering a majority, but later that month a 350-man contingent of
troops left for Port Vila. Sir Julius was criticised by the Fijian Prime
Minister, Ratu Mara, for being "quick on the draw" and by PNG's
Opposition Leader, Michael Somare, for practising "DC3 diplomacy" - a
reference to the fact that the air arm of the defence force consists of four
DC3 aircraft and a number of smaller planes. (The opposition was later
to challenge the constitutionality of the decision in the Supreme court.)
The troops took over on Santo from a combined British and French
commando unil, arrested numerous rebels, captured the Nagriamel leader,
Jimmy Stevens, and eventually took the last outpost of French colons at
Port Olry. 16 On their return home in late September the troops were
greeted enthusiastically. The episode showed that the small force had
been well disciplined and well led, and the result of their successful
intervention was to cement ties between the two countries. As it turned
out this episode was one of the few notable successes of the Chan
government in 1980.
Style
The style of the Chan government was somewhat different from that of
its predecessor. This was largely due to the relentless drive and ambition
of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Transport Iambakey Okuk. On
numerous occasions Okuk made it clear that he was the "power behind
the throne", and that he would brook no interference from or obstruction
by the bureaucracy. The image that he and his adviser, Geoff Wall,
consciously promoted was that of an action-oriented, no-holds-barred
politician, determined (destined?) to become the first Highlands Prime
Minister of Papua New Guinea. In the context of Melanesian politics this
was in some ways a hard image to promote. Aggression and
self-conscious assertiveness are often seen as a form of "maverick"
behaviour which doesn't fit too well (except perhaps in parts of the
Highlands) with the consensual nature of PNG's political culture. The
best example of Okuk's style was his controversial purchase of three De
Havilland Dash-7 aircraft while on a trip to Canada (at the invitation of
De Havilland) in September. 17 Acting without cabinet approval, without
the advice of the Finance Department, and apparently against the advice
of the Air Niugini management, Okuk negotiated the purchase and a
covering loan from a Canadian bank for the three aircraft! Okuk said that
it was the best deal ever for the airline and that it would "not cost PNG a
penny". On his return he freely admitted that he had broken all the rules
and procedures - "Forget the bloody procedures", he said, "I've got a
good deal for Papua New Guinea. The procedures are no good anyway". 18
345
The Finance Department estimated the cost of the aircraft at K29 million
over the next few years, excluding the cost of upgrading airstrips in
provinces where the aircraft would be used. (Naturally one of those
airstrips was in Okuk's electorate.) Prime Minister Chan declined to
discipline his deputy, and cabinet, after long and heated debate, agreed to
the Dash-7 deal on the basis that it was time for Air Niugini to refleet.
Throughout this and other disputes (which included the Air Niugini
affair, a motion of no-confidence - partly inspired by Okuk - against the
PPP's Police Minister, Warren Dutton, and Okuk's proposal for a "minibudget") Prime Minister Chan maintained a low-profile approach. He
appeared content to be a mediator and conciliator. Commentators could
not agree on the effectiveness of this style. In the early months of the
new government some saw the combination of the "manager" (Chan) and
the "hit-man" Okuk as a dynamic duo. Later, it was held that Chan was
astutely allowing Okuk sufficient rope to hang himself prior to the 1982
elections. By year's end, however, there was agreement that the coalition
partners were completely out of step and that Chan had lost all semblance
of control. Chan's proposal in his State of the Nation address for a code
of ethics for ministers was nowhere to be seen, and allegations of petty
corruption against national politicians were as frequent as they had been
in the last months of the Somare government. As for the other coalition
partners, only the Melanesian Alliance (which adopted a manifesto calling
for social justice in December)1 9 appeared intent on "holding the line"
against irresponsible government spending.
While the approach to government of the new regime may have
differed in some respects from that of its predecessor, the Ombudsman
had no illusions that the style of leadership had changed significantly. In
his annual report for 1980 the Ombudsman said:
Many leaders have got themselves involved in private businesses by instigating
business groups or family businesses. Some Leaders obtained loans from
the Banks which were guaranteed to be repaid from funds to be made
available from the Village Economic Development Fund (VEDF). Some
people jokingly stated that the name Village Economic Development Fund
is a misnomer, it should be called "Leader's Economic Development Fund". 20
The Ombudsman also complained that the total amount of bad debts
and dishonoured cheques on the part of leaders had continued to increase.
Conclusion
Nineteen eighty ended with speculation about the stability and longevity
of the Chan government. It was reported that Okuk had approached
Somare with a view to a coalition between the National and Pangu parties
with Okuk as Prime Minister. Somare's response was that he and Okuk
were "good friends", but he later indicated that he would not serve in the
"number two" position. 21 The Bank of PNG also warned the government
that its economic policy direction was now suspect. The bank's Quarterly
346
David Hegarty
Economic Bulletin reported that the hard kina strategy was damaging the
export sector; that the profitability of importers stood in marked contrast
to the plight of exporters; that no discipline had occurred in levels of
government spending; and that the trend of financing increased
government expenditure through international borrowing was dangerous.
The Governor of the bank, Sir Henry ToRobert, suggested that fiscal
policies were undermining economic stability; his diagnosis: "We are
currently living beyond our means". 22
35
Peter King
The new governing coalition of March 1980 led by Sir Julius Chan
continued its sway throughout 1981 against many expectations and
perhaps against the odds, but it was a different coalition by year's end.
Several ministers had been pressed into resigning for indictable
misbehaviour, and the leader of the United party, Roy Evara, who had
been sacked as Primary Industry Minister by Michael Somare in the
declining months of the first post-independence government, was sacked
once more in September 1981 - and from the same portfolio. (A racial
gibe against the Prime Minister's part-Chinese ancestry came on top of
clear evidence of disloyalty.) 1
A perennial question was posed. Would the leader of the United party
lead his party out of the coalition? In the event, ministerial office proved
to have special charms in a pre-election year, and a United party substitute
was found in deputy leader Paul Torato, who moved over from Justice to
Primary Industry. The cabinet team - Julius Chan's People's Progress
party; Iambakey Okuk's National party; Evara's United party; Galeva
Kwarara's (after April, when Kwarara came under a cloud, Gerega Pepena's
Papua Besena); and Fr John Momis' Melanesian Alliance - played on,
and the United party itself was scarcely disturbed. Roy Evara stayed
leader, despite Paul Torato's claims as a member of the government.
As for Michael Somare's opposition Pangu pati, it soldiered on rather
dimly and alone, gathering inspiration only as campaigning for the 1982
elections got under way towards year's end.
Government Disunity
The PNG party system has shown great vitality of a kind in the years
since independence. The parties, having little ideological distinctiveness,
or discipline, or grass roots support, are not very cohesive, even in
government. But what the governing parties have lacked in coherence
they have made up for in openness. Rows are frequent and usually public.
In the first six months of 1981 the chief opposition leaders de facto were
actually inside the coalition. The leading Melanesian Alliance ministers,
the 'two Johns', Kaputin and Momis, stood up frequently to the
348
Peter King
pacemaker of the government, Deputy Prime Minister Iambakey Okuk.

There was a great gladiatorial contest between the fiscally responsible
Finance Minister, Kaputin, and the expansive, development-at-any cost
Transport and Civil Aviation Minister about a mini-budget early in the
year. 2 But it petered out in mid-year with undeclared defeat for Okuk as
the economic weather signs (copper and coffee prices in particular)
showed that fiscal stringency was inevitable. There was thus an
unexpected and unlikely reconciliation between Messrs Okuk and Kaputin
at budget time towards November, but the top level of the government
machine as a whole was in frequent, chronic disarray for most of 1981.
The Prime Minister attacked the public service and its commission for
paralysing the government. Several ministers attacked their permanent
heads, and the permanent heads invariably dug in and fought back. Police
Minister Warren Dutton accused Chief Commissioner Phillip Bouraga of
insubordination and failing to brief him, and Primary Industry Minister
Roy Evara felt sabotaged by DPI Secretary William Lawrence - these two
pairs were barely on speaking terms. Minister of State for the Public
Service Lennie Aparima criticised the chairman of the PSC, Israel Edoni,
for emasculating the minister's department. These conflicts were partly
personal, partly partisan political, and partly a result of constitutional
ambiguities about the operational responsibilities of ministers and the
location of the right to sack. These ambiguities were partly resolved by
the Supreme court early in 1982. 3 The discretion and double talk of
Australian coalition government has notably failed to inspire politicians
in PNG, and the doctrine of the apolitical department Secretary likewise
doesn't appeal to public servants.
Ministerial poaching was another trend of 1981, and the chief
practitioner was the Deputy Prime Minister who used it at Transport to
extend his already formidable political base. Okuk made well publicised
sorties into law and order operations, education policy, energy planning
(he proposed to solve Port Moresby's chronic electricity shortage with an
off-the-shelf coal-fired power station imported from Queensland),' and
even National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) programming. (He
stormed the NBC studios in Port Moresby to take an interview featuring
himself off air.)S Often he seemed to be Prime Minister in all but name.
It was he who had dealt provincial government and the decentralisation
process its heaviest blow to date by persuading the National Executive
Council (in July 1980) to authorise the minister to allot transport sectoral
program money to national MPs rather than provincial works
departments. The then Minister for Primary Industry, Roy Evara, and the
Health Minister, John Jaminan, followed suit early in 1981 with identical
schemes for agricultural and health sectoral funds respectively.
The 1982 National Elections

The national elections due in June 1982 were already casting a long
shadow in mid-1981, and the misuse and manipulation of the sectoral
349
funds for personal and political purposes was a constant complaint of the
Pangu opposition, the Melanesian Alliance ministers, most provincial
governments, and almost all commentators. Okuk and Evara argued that
provincial government had made national MPs redundant and that the
sectoral funds could serve to restore their authority and usefulness. Critics
argued that the sectoral funds made a mockery of provincial planning and
were cynically designed to secure the re-election of favoured sitting
members and thus consolidate support for the ministers managing the
overall patronage flow.
Other election run-up moves included the Deputy Prime Minister's
freewheeling deal to lease/purchase Canadian Dash-7 aircraft for Air
Niugini at a cost of K27 million. (The deal, although not authorised in
advance, was endorsed by the National Executive Council in April.) The
Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister argued that refleeting was
timely and that the Dash with its short take-off could bring quality
service to additional airports. The Finance Minister and most
commentators argued that refleeting was unduly expensive and quite
unnecessary, and that the deal was election-motivated - and also ethically
questionable. 6 (The Ombudsman Commission is known to have looked
into the Dash deal, but dropped its enquiries following NEC
endorsement.) The 1982 election was by year's end the bigger issue of
1981. What were the others?
The heroic post-independence experiment of setting up nineteen extra
parliaments for three million people held its popularity in 1981, but
performance was still very patchy. A great debate about decentralisation
and the state of the nation erupted several times between Deputy Prime
Minister Okuk and Decentralisation Minister Momis during the year. In
a speech during a fund-raising visit to Australia in July, and in an epic
exchange of letters with Okuk in November, Fr Momis contended that
PNG was a neo-colony undergoing moral, economic and political decline;
that Okuk's activities were a large part of the problem; and that the
decentralisation process was essential to keep leaders under popular
control, tap latent energies and nationalist consciousness, and share
equitably the growing burdens of recession. Okuk wished for Fr John's
early return to the church, and declared that he was sabotaging the
government. Okuk condemned the expense, mediocrity, and incoherence
allegedly inherent in provincial government and called for four regional
governments. Fr Momis spoke for responsive grass-roots democracy and
defended the provinces (his own, North Solomons, in particular) and his
department against the ravages of the sectoral programmesJ
East New Britain, North Solomons and Morobe clearly were going
well, but the list of problem provinces was long, and local people kept up
a barrage of letters to the press about them. Nevertheless high hopes still
rested on decentralisation. Despite the overseas trips, collapsing business
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Peter King
arms and conspicuous consumption associated with provincial politics,

provincial government was still on trial.
Resources Development
"Gearing up" in Western Province and elsewhere for Ok Tedi gold and
copper to come on stream was all the rage in 1981, but the start-up date
for mining kept slipping - which could pose a serious threat to national
finances after 1986 when the latest five-year Australian aid agreement
runs out. And as the authors of the Jackson Report on the overall impact
of Ok Tedi had feared in 1980, the national government was doing
precious little to ensure economic spin-off and local benefit in the North
Fly region from the biggest resource project in the country's history. 8 The
aspiring province of North Fly, seeking to defect from Western Province
for Ok Tedi's sake, was seemingly stopped in its tracks in September by
a timely handout, but forward planning remained exigious. 9 Towards
year's end Bougainville Copper Ltd was sporadically under siege as the
people of the North Solomons, the most prosperous province in the
country, geared up to get extra millions in BCL royalties and also
substantial equity in the mine. 10 It began to appear that prosperity was
being near a copper mine. Certainly the country will not escape its
extreme dependence on copper and gold sales before century's end.
Copper and gold were at least manageable revenue earners for the
national government. Transfer pricing by foreign companies seeking to
hold down local earnings and thus tax payments is not a great problem
with these commodities. But on other fronts questionable resource deals
were gathering momentum in 1981. Fish and timber exploitation and
exports were definitely not under control. Primary Industry Minister
Evara was under fire for much of the year from Sir John Guise and the
three Papuan coast Premiers for issuing fishing licences to the Utama
Company in which his brother had an interest, and which was using joint
venture Taiwanese boats. 11 His United party successor in the DPI
portfolio, Paul Torato, promised reform, but by year's end the Taiwanese
boats, detained for poaching, had escaped custody and fled to Singapore. 12
In forestry the big deal was with the Filipinos. The Hetura Meja
company won a tender to develop the huge Vanimo timber resource in
partnership with East Sepik Province and the national government. The
rumours of pay-offs on this KlOO million deal seemed to be well
confirmed by release of correspondence implicating the previous
government, by the strange on-again, off-again tendering process which
cut out several reputable non-Filipino logging companies, and by the
startling revelation that Hetura Meja had no timber-getting experience in
its own right, but would rely exclusively on sub-contractors for logging.U
If the Vanimo deal is the wave of the future, and it may be, Hetura's
offer to prop up Wesdeco, the terminally ailing Sandaun provincial
government business arm, was a wavelet. The offer was finally rejected
and Wesdeco allowed to collapse gracelessly in November; 14 but with
351
forest exploiters making direct approaches to revenue-hungry provincial

governments a prospect of company provinces began to emerge.
Law and order
Public disorder is tidal in Papua New Guinea. The Port Moresby crime
wave of May 1980 receded under duress from the police "21 Squad". The
new alarms of November-December 1981 brought the 21 Squad back to
the capital from North Solomons, but they also brought a climax to the
bickering over operational policy between a dovish Police Minister and
his hawkish commissionerY At K29 million in the 1982 budget, the
police were going to cost nearly ten millions more than the defence force,
and the differential seemed likely to widen.
In a year of shrinking revenues and opportunities the government
seemed unable to accept the connection between crime and urban social
problems - school dropouts, unemployment, squatting, lack of youth
services, etc. Preventive social and economic policies were in the toohard basket, and law and order was on its way to being the leading
national industry, propped up also by the pandemic baby civil wars of the
Highlands, otherwise known as tribal fighting. Debate raged all year
about a solution. Some Highlands premiers opted for a State of
Emergency; non-military spokesmen wanted to deploy the defence force;
deliberate police mayhem, kiap-style, was suggested as a deterrent (and
partly practised); and in one highly significant intervention the Prime
Minister (who did an admirable amount of leg work at the grass-roots
during the year) suggested that the tribesmen might be left to fight it out
if they didn't desist.
The 1982 Budget
Sir Julius Chan's exasperated remark on tribal fighting brought out in the
open what may be a growing inclination of Port Moresby governments to
abandon the traditional sector to its own devices. As Richard Jackson of
the University of Papua New Guinea pointed out in December, the
government derives virtually no revenue from the traditional sector and
does little for it in return.' 6 Finance Minister Kaputin's "adjustment"
budget and the National Public Expenditure Plan projections mark a
retreat from commitment to across-the-board "rural development" and
welfare programmes, and new project funding is mostly economic in a
strict sense, and is highly localised.
The K750 million budget- a three per cent reduction over 1981 in real
terms - chopped much else besides such rural services as malaria control,
family planning programmes, aid posts, and provincial hospitals.
Environmental and wild life conservation programmes, the University of
Papua New Guinea, the defence force, DPI - all suffered cuts; the office
of tourism was abolished; and there was more to come in 1982. On top of a
claimed four per cent shrinkage in public service manpower in 1981, the
352
Peter King
budget promised six per cent more in 1982. 17

One gainer was non-tertiary education; but "free" primary education as decreed in a successful, vote-catching private members' bill during the
budget session 18 - will still only reach half the primary school age
population. (Should there not be an equivalent cash grant to the parents
of the educationally lost children?) Minerals and Energy (Ok Tedi
expenditures) and the Prime Minister's Department were the big budget
gainers.
The government's executive aircraft, including the notorious Kumul I,
will cost no less than K19 million in the next five years - almost one
defence budget - and Kumul I had few supporters outside the magic
circle of senior ministers who insist on keeping up with the Joneses of
1970. (The Kumul I Lear Jet is not new, and its operation and
mainl~nance are an alarmingly high proportion of fly-away cost.)
The other prime ministerial growth area was security - the new
National Intelligence Organisation has absorbed the PNG Security
Intelligence Organization and become the government's chief intelligence
gathering and evaluation enterprise. It was licensed to recruit twenty-five
new staff in 1982. The government may be gearing up for more effective
foreign policy making, but it may also be dreaming of counter-revolution.
Foreign Policy
After the triumphs of 1980, when PNG came to the aid of the
independent Vanuatu, 1981 was a quieter year in foreign affairs. The
government edged closer to the ASEAN countries, and the Philippines
especially. Friendship and border cooperation with Indonesia remained a
high government priority, as the Foreign Affairs and Trade Department's
new quarterly journal stressed in its second issue. 19 But strong popular
discontent with the government's policy on Irian Jaya underlay the setting
up of a self-appointed but very distinguished South Pacific Human Rights
Tribunal which held hearings at the University of Papua New Guinea in
May. The tribunal, chaired by ex-Justice Bernard Narokobi, provisionally
indicted the Indonesian government for human rights abuses on the basis
of evidence from West Papuan refugees, much to the displeasure of
Foreign Affairs Minister Noel Levi. 20 The government decided to deport
three of the non-citizen participants in the tribunal, and later nearly
succeeded in jailing the protector of one of them, Gabriel Ramoi, the
president of the University of Papua New Guinea's Students
Representative Council. (Permissive resident John Hamadi escaped back
to Irian Jaya.)21 There were other deportations later in the year, including
one to Jayapura- another blot on PNG's human rights record. There were
government stories about OPM requests for Soviet aid and much stimulus
to domestic anti-Communism in Papua New Guinea. Yet neither the
government nor anyone else could provide a clear picture of what was
actually going on in the Irian Jaya province. How many official
Indonesian transmigrants are there? How many unofficial? How many
353
soldiers? How many OPM factions? Is there a serious prospect of the

OPM winning a form of autonomy or independence?
The Foreign Affairs and Trade Department sent a "visitor" (not yet a
full observer) to the non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting in Delhi in
February. Foreign Affairs Minister Levi attended an ASEAN foreign
ministers' meeting as special observer in Manila in June (but full
membership seemed not to be on). Sir Julius was in Melbourne at
CHOGM in September (and refused to speak up in support of Australian
Aborigines). The Deputy Prime Minister was in Peking in May and in
Taipei toward year's end. (The latter visit dampened the chances of
technical aid from the hosts of the former visit.) On 9 November the
long-awaited White Paper on foreign policy was tabled in Parliament. 22
Much of its language and content had been anticipated in statements by
Chan ministers, and the consultant, Ted Wolfers of Macquarie University,
Sydney, had been working closely with two governments since 1979.
"Universalism" officially died once more, and "selective engagement" (or,
when it came to West Papua, selective enragement) was the order of the
day. Identified enemies were still scarce - a definite plus; and there were
also signs of hesitation about plunging into ASEAN; but Foreign Affairs'
attempt to put foreign policy on the domestic political map, and stake out
a claim to coordinate and oversee all the foreign activities of the
government, seemed unlikely to get far. There was virtually no debate on
the White Paper. 23
Main Trends of 1981
Apart from the post-independence deterioration of many services being
accelerated by economic hard times, the savage program cuts in the
budget, the worsening (on the whole) of the law and order problem, the
growing unemployment, the mediocre to bad performance of statutory
bodies (Posts and Telegraphs and Harbours were exceptions), and the
continuous decline of education standards (an enquiry was opened), there
was much else to lament in 1981.
Land, the only valuable resource of most of the 90 per cent of the
population in the traditional sector, was becoming an ever more acute
problem and issue. Where the people felt their claims had gone unheard
they did not hesitate to blockade towns and companies. Apart from
Bougainville Copper's shut-down for a few days at a cost of millions in
October, the Motu Koitabu people of Central Province and the National
Capital District, who wanted a new province, won for themselves a sort
of sub-provincial autonomy with a blockade of Port Moresby itself in
August.
Was this the wave of the future - decaying infrastructure and declining
economic performance plus selective ransom by strategically situated
grievance groups morally or factually in control of land?
Political leadership was another strongly felt problem. In 1981, as
for many a year, the political parties refused to get properly organised, or
354
Peter King
to develop grass-roots support, or cohere, or offer serious policy

alternatives. And the Chan coalition was said to be floundering constantly unbalanced by inter-party bickering, and also by the activity of
the powerful demiurge who was the Deputy Prime Minister. The
government as a whole was also alleged to be drifting apart from society
- the executive jet issue symbolised the complaint all too well.
Was Papua New Guinea becoming two congealed nations? Well, not
quite yet. The tug of the village, the clan, the tribe, the province, the
region was still strong, far stronger than the tug of class; and
"development" remained a euphemism for the upward mobility which
nearly all aspired to and which those with higher education could still be
sure of. But opportunities for development and upward mobility were
nevertheless fast drying up in 1981, at the same time that the standards
and probity of the political elite seemed to u~; ll~;dining.
Politicians' self-interest was seen to be rampant in the notorious 1,000
kina electoral nomination fee which Parliament approved for the 1982
elections at its November sitting. (It was disallowed by the National court
early in 1982.) And then there was the mounting evidence that Asianstyle corruption had arrived in PNG through the Filipino connection.
Would Port Moresby become a suburb of Manila?
On all sides the cry went up for more or better leadership to overcome
the gathering problems, and the Westminster system came under sharp
attack. The Constitutional Review Commission was urged by Minister of
State Lennie Aparima in December to overcome the law and order
problem. Decentralisation of power to provincial governments was said to
be breaking up as well as bankrupting the country. The Deputy Prime
Minister was frequently defended or upheld as the only strong man on the
horizon (and a sworn enemy of provincial government) and almost
everyone, including the Deputy Prime Minister and National party leader,
Okuk, himself, denounced the party system and its ragged coalitions. In
short, no one said things were getting better, and the argument was often
about more or less desirable modes of decline. And yet ...
There were still powerful alternative visions of the country's
development circulating in 1981. Apart from the prophesy of Fr Momis,
there was the complementary program of the impressive Premier of
Morobe, Utula Samana - partisan of urban squatters, village-based
community government, intermediate technology, and small-scale national
enterprise. And that well-known visionary of the Melanesian Way,
Bernard Narokobi, was creating great interest and expectations by running
for Parliament. 1982 would perhaps tell.
36
JANUARY-JUNE 1982
David Hegarty and Peter King
The Economy
The perception that the world economic recession and highly depressed
commodity markets were likely to last for years rather than months
gradually came to dominate Port Moresby political debate in the run-up
to the national elections of June 1982. After its first quarterly review for
1982, the Chan government made cuts of K9 million in the budget which
it had brought down in November 1981. This figure represented the exact
reduction in payments to revenue from the Mineral Stabilisation Fund which will continue to be fed almost exclusively by levies on Bougainville
Copper Ltd until the Ok Tedi gold and copper project comes on stream in
1984. 1 Bougainville, the most profitable copper mine in the world, began
to make losses in 1982 with the copper price at 75 cents US a pound.
Mineral revenues had thus become a collapsing contribution to general
revenue, joining copra, cocoa, and coffee; and Australian aid, although
itself declining, now represented a rising proportion of the budget for the
first time since independence in 1975. K9 million was also the sum which
the government in effect decided to seek as relief from Australia in May
when it sent a team to Canberra to ask for immediate remission of the
five per cent per annum aid cuts being made under the current five-year
aid agreement which runs to 1986. Total aid receipts as given in the 1982
budget figures were K198.6 million - K197 million of them Australian. 2
The gold price had been sufficiently low for sufficiently long to justify or
"trigger" the making of the relief request under the five-year agreement.
The failure of economic recovery - which was still expected late in
1981 -to appear early in 1982 led to marked anxiety on two scores- the
government's poor administrative and economic performance in
consuming no less than forty per cent of a Kl.5 billion GNP, which was
shrinking in real terms; and social polarisation between those tied in to
the modern sector of the economy - especially to government services
and perks - and the ninety per cent of people beyond government safety
nets in the rural subsistence sector. A Canadian researcher, Professor Michael
Trebilcock, released a devastating report on the profit and employment
creating performance of statutory bodies in April; 3 and Port Moresby
hospital - to name but one - seemed on the point of collapse several
356
times early in the year. 4 Sectoral funds for transport, agriculture and
health continued to be allocated at the discretion of national MPs rather
than through provincial governments as originally intended; and the
National Fiscal Commission strongly condemned the system in February,
recommending that a fiscal agreement be drawn up between ministers,
national MPs and provincial governments before allocation of the funds. 5
Decentralisation Minister John ~v1omis summarised the NFC's finding
thus:
The Fiscal Commission left no doubt that two ministers of the national
government, one of them Deputy Prime Minister [Okuk], had quite
recklessly taken over public money intended for the poor of this country
and allowed it to be squandered .... Years of precious work to build up
vital standards of objectivity and accountability were steadily wiped out by
these ministers .... The Agriculture Minister of the day [Evara] lacked any
finesse at all. He handed money sometimes only to his political supporters
among the MPs and his opponents got no money for their areas.
As noted in the last chronicle, the allocation of sectoral funds to

national MPs was widely interpreted as the first shot fired in the national
elections; but some other critics apart from John Momis also interpreted
it as government self-destruction, while yet others saw it as a further step
in the self-creation of a politician-businessman ruling class in Papua New
Guinea.
Several other moves were interpreted in this way. The raising of the
electoral nomination fee from KlOO to K1,000 in the last Parliament of
1981 was seen as a change bound to advantage sitting members with five
years of chances to get rich behind them. The Supreme court disallowed
the new fee in March as improperly legislated in Parliament. Later the
court ruled further that the K1 ,000 deposit "denies at this time to a majority
of eligible citizens their [right?] of reasonable opportunity to stand for
Parliament in terms of section 50(i)". 7 The new fee would undoubtedly
have reduced the number of candidates running for the elections.
In April the K100 million Vanimo timber deal came under renewed
attack as an exercise in ministerial self-aggrandizement. As the
government concluded a final agreement with the Hetura Meja company,
fresh details on the tortuous and suspicious history of the deal were
brought to light by solid investigative reporting in the Times of Papua
New Guinea - greatly aided by judicious leaks from the Waigani
bureaucratic complex. The final terms agreed to by the National Executive
Council on Wednesday 22 April were based on a submission by Forests
Minister Joseph Aoae which by-passed the government's own negotiating
team of senior public servants, and was drawn up by the minister's
personal lawyer- who happened to be a director of the Hetura Meja
company! Terms of the deal objected to by the government team included
the rapid logging rate (guaranteed to devastate the 287,240 hectare
resource), and the projected profit rate (24 per cent- unusually high). 8 In
the same month the director of the National Investment Development
January-June 1982
357
Authority criticised the failure of the Hetura company to inject its own
capital into the project, while also condemning a flood of half-baked
business proposals and backdoor dealings traceable to carpet-bagging
Filipino businessmen. 9
The national government had also come under heavy fire for its role in
another, inadvertent resources deal in March following the seizure of the
American tuna boat Danica in PNG waters. In the wake of a court order
for the confiscation of the Danica, the Prime Minister found himself
under pressure from the US owners and the American Embassy on the
one hand, and from economic nationalists - including the Department of
Primary Industry - on the other. The result of a rather chaotic negotiation
was interpreted as a sell-out by the Times and a triumph by the Prime
Minister- who claimed that the US had at last recognised PNG's 200mile economic zone. The buy-back price of the Danica was K200,000,
three per cent of its estimated value and equal to the owners' first asking
price. The agreement on licence fees for future American tuna fishing
rights will yield only one-third of the amount paid by Japanese vessels of
comparable size. 10
Apart from resource deals, two other moves scandalised observers
concerned with either the political weakness or the propensity to selfenrichment of PNG's governing class. One was the cut-price release of a
large parcel of enormously scarce and valuable Port Moresby residential
land to a whos who of bureaucratic, political and business notables in
June. 11 The other was government support for NBC Chairman Leo
Morgan's fresh initiatives to introduce commercial television. 12 This latter
episode, which involved hired-gun international consultants, was the
stimulus for a transparent hoax by a cabal of expatriate journalists in Port
Moresby, who got under the guard of the credulous Post-Courier and the
NBC itself. 13 Critics attacked the spending of money on television while
radio is still poorly developed and half the country's children are unable
to find primary school places.
The National Election
From April onwards the national election campaign began to dominate the
political scene almost exclusively. Campaigning had begun in earnest
during late 1981 as the various parties held national conventions, adopted
party platforms, and pre-selected party candidates. The eight significant
parties (Pangu, People's Progress, National, United, Melanesian Alliance,
Papua Besena, Papua Action and the PNG Independent Group) endorsed
about sixty per cent of the 1,125 candidates who contested the 109 seats.
The term "endorsement" has a variety of meanings in Papua New Guinea.
In some cases candidates were committed party supporters; in others,
candidates were only sympathetic to the party or its leaders; and in others
again candidates approached parties in the hope of receiving financial
support. Some candidates were endorsed by two or even more parties.
Party platforms were quite similar in substance, calling for more rural
358
development, better transport, health and education services and more

natural resource projects, and welcoming foreign capital as a means to
economic growth. However, the parties' organisational and financial
strengths varied considerably. 14
Of the major parties Pangu was best organised and best funded, with
a campaign chest in excess of K700,000. Pangu's platform proposed an
integrated development bank pooling resources and staff from the
Finance, Agriculture and Lands Departments as a means of stimulating
the economy and boosting employment. It endorsed candidates in all but
one of the seats and had additional "pro-Pangu" candidates in most of the
electorates. Through radio jingles, posters, T-shirts and party stickers its
message was that Pangu "knows the way". As in 1977 Pangu's campaign
revolved around the popular figure of Michael Somare, and he
consciously promoted the party's image with a view to obtaining a
parliamentary majority in his own right.
The National party's platform focused on the need to reform the public
service, to establish regional (as distinct from provincial) governments, to
relax regulations governing foreign investment, and to facilitate economic
growth through joint ventures between state and foreign capital. Its
campaign was squarely based on the personality of Iambakey Okuk as an
action-oriented, entrepreneurial leader. Okuk also attempted to inject
foreign policy issues into the campaign. In a bold move widely believed
to have originated with his well-known "white adviser", Jeff Wall,
formerly of the Queensland Liberal party, Okuk condemned Indonesia's
transmigration program in the Irian Jaya province, and proposed a form
of political recognition of the OPM, the West Papua liberation
movement. 15 Earlier he had criticised Asian - specifically Filipino immigration into PNG, and called for a return to traditional- that is,
white- sources of skilled and professional manpower. 16
While party leaders refused to engage the formidable Okuk in debate
on these sensitive nationalist issues, the Indonesia Embassy rose to the
bait: "the indigenous people of Irian Jaya do not consider themselves as
a Melanesian ethnic group", it announced; and - in a pointed reference to
Okuk - "One has to understand the nature of international politics if one
would become a leader of a certain nation" Y The border crossings by
Indonesian soldiers and helicopters in search of hostages taken by the
OPM late in 1981- which coincided with the final stages of the election
campaign - were construed in some quarters as a "spoiling" response to
the Okuk initiative. The border violation on the first day of polling
created a security panic on the scale of the troubles of 1977-78 in
Waigani; but the border issue seems unlikely to have affected the election
outcome, notwithstanding Okuk's defeat.
National party expenses in the election campaign were probably well
in excess of K400,000, and Okuk admitted to personal expenditure of
K200,000 in his Simbu electorate alone. Candidates were endorsed
mostly in the Highlands region apart from those sponsored by the
National party's subsidiary, the Papua Action party, in the Papuan region.
January-June 1982
359
The People's Progress party ran a low-key campaign, failing to hold a

national convention and reissuing its 1977 election manifesto (which
emphasised its responsible approach to financial management), but adding
the word "honest" to its old slogan of "strong, stable and progressive
government". Sir Julius Chan and his organisers judiciously selected
about 100 candidates in most parts of the country with the intention of
patching together a small but cohesive minority party. Campaign expenses
for the PPP were over K200,000.
Of the smaller parties the Melanesian Alliance (MA), led by Fr Momis,
offered the only significantly different party platform. The MA proposed
an all economic strategy of redistribution with growth, and emphasised
principles of decentralisation and social justice. 18 The MA perhaps
represents the only ideologically left-wing party in PNG, although its
radicalism is tempered by its Christian support base. It was handicapped
by a late start and a chronic shortage of campaign funds (less than
K20,000), but it managed to attract sixty candidates in many parts of the
country. The United party, once the strongest of all parties, faced the
electorate poorly organised and without a reputable, nationally prominent
leader. Despite substantial party assets and a potential support-base in the
Highlands region, the UP gained little publicity and its manifesto failed
to appear. Papua Besena, the separatist movement founded in the early
1970s by the charismatic Josephine Abaijah, split into two factions prior
to the poll. Abaijah retained the leadership of Papua Besena, but her six
parliamentary colleagues formed a Papua party. The support for these two
factions was substantially undercut by the formation of a PNG
Independent Group led by former defence force commander, Ted Diro, a
Papuan. Diro's electoral message consisted simply of an appeal for "new
blood" in the country's leadership and for the "modernisation" of Papua
New Guinea. His strategy was to endorse a selected number of
candidates, and to collect uncommitted MPs into his Group after the
counting. The final minor party was the hastily formed Papuan Action
party - the National party's ally - comprising a number of former MPs
and retired public servants.
Candidates, both endorsed and independent, employed a variety of
styles, strategies and techniques in their bid for electionY The usual
method for a candidate was to consolidate his clan or wantok vote, extend
his network through traditional alliances (for example, marriage and
exchange) with other clans, and then attempt to capture votes through
secondary associations of various kinds (for example, church, local
council, work-place). A candidate usually attempts to demonstrate his
prowess in various fields, provide evidence that he is a man of some
status and ability, and he must tour his electorate "showing his face" to
the voters. Most candidates employed field agents (komiti in pidgin) who
attempt to consolidate group support. Patronage in the form of gifts, beer,
petrol, trucks, cash and pigs, became an important factor in
electioneering, with incumbent MPs, because of their access to
government resources, enjoying a considerable advantage. Vote-splitting
360
tactics were also employed whereby a candidate would encourage another

to run so as to split the clan vote of a leading opponent.
Results
Election polling was carried out between 5 and 26 June. In terms of voter
support for party endorsed candidates, Pangu clearly outpolled every
other party and, at the close of counting, had won fifty of the 108 seats.
(One seat was to be contested late due to the death of a candidate before
the poll.) Table I reveals the extent of support for each of the parties.
Candidates of Pangu won more votes than other parties in three of the
four regions. In the northern region it won twenty-four of the twentyeight seats, consolidating its traditional support bases, and it later won the
support of two other MPs in that tegiun. Tl11:: Mdam:~ian Alliam;~
outpolled Pangu in the Islands region and won eight seats overall, but lost
two MPs to Pangu in the post-election lobbying. The PPP's votes were
evenly spread throughout the country but it lost support in the northern
region. The National party, surprisingly, polled quite weakly, particularly
in the Highlands. Diro's PNG Independent Group polled well in Papua
and made inroads in other regions. The United party retained a small vote
in all regions, winning nine seats, but losing three of these to Pangu after
the count. The secessionist wing of Papua Besena disappeared, while its
non-secessionist wing, the Papua party, managed to retain three seats. The
Papuan Action party did not win a seat.
Table 1. Candidates percentage: Vote percentage: Seats Won
Percentage
Candidates
Endorsed
PANGU
PPP NP
DIRO*
PAP
MA
UP
PBt
IND.
TOTAL
17
13
1.2
6.4
1.2
41.2
100 per cent
Percentage of
Total Vote
Obtained
34
10
10
6.0
0.8
8.6
7.2
1.6
20.9
100 per cent
Number of
Seats Won
14
13
108
50
* PNG Independent Group

t Includes both Papua Besena and Papua party
The next chronicle will discuss the results of the ballot for Prime
Minister on 2 August and the party composition of the new Parliament
compared with that of the former Parliament.
Voter turnout for the 1982 elections was approximately sixty per cent
of the eligible voting population (18 years and over) which continued the
pattern of previous elections. Of the 103 incumbent MPs who contested,
only fifty retained their seats, again continuing the pattern of a high
turnover of incumbents. 20 Twelve of the twenty-seven ministers in the
January-June 1982
361
outgoing government were defeated. The first-past-the-post voting system

together with the unusually large number of candidates, meant that many
seats were won by candidates who captured only a small percentage of
the total vote. In all, 62 seats were won by candidates who received less
than 30 per cent of the votes cast in their electorates. As shown in
previous chronicles, the Chan coalition was seriously and often publicly
divided throughout its two-year innings; but by far the most important
influence on the election outcome was the state of PNG's economy which
worked heavily against the coalition and in favour of Pangu. In the period
from late 1979 to mid-1982 the price of PNG's four major exports,
copper, coffee, cocoa, and copra had fallen by up to fifty per cent.
Stabilisation fund reserves for agricultural exports were all but exhausted.
Foreign exchange reserves had fallen to a figure equivalent to the value
of 3.5 months' imports. Despite the austerity budget of 1981, government
expenditure continued to exceed revenue by as much as ten per cent.
Employment in the private sector had fallen during 1981 and early
1982 by over seven per cent. Investment spending fell in the first six
months of 1982, and over the previous two years there had been virtually
no new investment with the exception of the Ok Tedi gold and copper
mine in the Western Province. The quantity of retail goods sold in the
country fell, for the first time, by five per cent reflecting the reduction in
purchasing power consequent upon the fall in agricultural commodity
prices. The Chan coalition could scarcely be held accountable for this
economic recession, but there were few economic levers available to
minimise its impact. A devaluation of the currency may have helped rural
producers, but such a move would have posed inflationary problems in
urban areas and would have increased an already large import bill. 21
As for other factors in the election result, the determinants of voting
choice for the vast majority still seem to have been the clan or kin
affiliation of the candidate and his status, wealth, generosity and
reputation as perceived by those in close proximity to him. The
candidate's level of education is often also taken into account, and the
new Parliament will be better educated than the old. Although the party
affiliation or the party label which the candidate may have expediently
adopted still seems to have been of minor significance in the 1982
elections, parties have increased their impact on the electorate. There was
for the first time, a semblance of a party vote (captured largely by Pangu)
as voters in many parts of the country responded to increased party
organisational activity, and consciously made comparisons between the
"good" years of the Somare reign and the "lean" years of Chan.
37
JULY-DECEMBER 1982
Peter King
On Monday, 2 August 1982, over a month after the end of polling for the
national elections, the national Parliament elevated Michael Somare to be
Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea for the third time. Somare's margin
over the outgoing coalition's last-minute nominee, Fr John Momis, was
sixty-six votes to forty, ending weeks of confused and largely futile
factional manoeuvre for control of the new government. The process was
begun on the morrow of the election result by the defeated National party
leader, Iambakey Okuk, who sensationally nominated General Ted Diro retired commander of the Defence Force, newly elected MP for Central
Province, and leader of his own Independent Group - to lead the National
party in the new Parliament. The merger of the two parties which
followed effectively blocked a Diro-Somare coalition because the new
alignment was too large for Somare's purposes. On the other hand, the
constituent elements of the old Chan coalition could not agree on a new
governing formula despite considerable but misplaced confidence in their
ability to stop the Pangu party in Parliament.
In the event Somare once again chose the lacklustre United party, under
Roy Evara's still disputed leadership, as governing partner, and the parliamentary vote of August gave him eleven more supporters than a bare
majority in the 109 seat Parliament. The new ruling coalition consisted of:
fifty Pangu MPs; eleven MPs who were either independent or who switched
to Pangu from other parties immediately after the poll or just before the
parliamentary ballot; and six United party MPs. The new National party
leader, Diro, defeated the Melanesian Alliance leader, Fr Momis, for the
position of Opposition Leader by eighteen votes to seventeen and the opposition line-up was then: nineteen National party (i.e., fourteen "old" NP and
five Diro supporters); six Melanesian Alliance; three Papua Besena, and
thirteen People's Progress party. Sir Julius Chan chose to take minority party
status for his PP rather than throw in his lot with the official opposition.
Despite an election promise to trim the size of the ministry in a time
of severe recession, and despite Pangu's unprecedentedly strong
parliamentary position, Somare announced a cabinet of 26 on 4 August only one short of the constitutional maximum of twenty-seven allowed
under section 144(i). The pressures to maximise patronage, and appease
July-December 1982
363
coalition partners and potentially wavering independents and partyswappers, were evidently too great for "the Chief'; but it was an
uninspiring start.
The full cabinet consisted of:
Michael Somare (East Sepik) Prime Minister
Paias Wingti (Western
Highlands)- Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister for National
Planning & Development, and
Minister for Primary Industry)*
Mathew Bendumb (Bulolo)Transport & Civil Aviation
Rabbie Namaliu (Kokopo)Foreign Affairs & Trade
John Nilkare (Simbu) - Decentralisation
Casper Angua (Bogia) - Labour
& Employment
Barry Holloway (Eastern
Highlands)- Education
Pato Kakaraya (Wapenamanda)
- Works & Supply
Pundia Kange (lalibu-Pangia) Corrective Institutions and
Liquor Licensing
Martin Tovadek (Gazelle)Health
Philip Bouraga (National
Capital) - Finance
Bebes Korowara (Goroka) Lands
*
**
Lukas Waka (West New

Britain) - Forests
John Giheno (Henganofi) Police
Kala Swokin (Western) - Urban
Development
Tony Bais (Wewak)- Justice
Epel Tito (Kavieng) - Defence
Boyamo Sali (Morobe) - Media
Roy Evara (Kikori) - Home
Affairs
Tom Awasa (Huon Gulf) Religion, Youth & Recreation
Mackenzie Javopa (Sohe)Culture & Tourism
Sir Pita Lus (Maprik) - State
(Parliamentary Services)
Michael Pondros (Manus)Public Utilities**
Karl Kitchens Stack (Sandaun)
- Commerce & Industry
Halau Mai (Tari) Environment & Conservation
Tony Siaguru (Moresby SouthEast) - State (Public Service)
Francis Didiman Pusal
(Southern Highlands) Minerals & Energy.
Primary Industry passed later in the year to Dennis Young (Milne Bay),
So mare's first choice for Speaker.
Pondros was suspended on a corruption charge in November and his portfolio
was taken over by Media Minister Boyamo Sali.
By this allocation Pangu reserved twenty-one ministries for itself,

but also greatly favoured the Islands and Southern (Papuan) regions over
the more populous - and more Pangu - Highlands and Northern
(Momase) regions. There were bitter complaints from Madang and
Morobe in particular - and two Pangu stalwarts, the former Planning
Minister, Tony Ila (Lae Open), and former Justice Minister, Nahau
Rooney (Manus), 1 had good cause to be aggrieved by a cabinet of which
eleven of twenty-seven ministers were novice MPs. Nevertheless the new
364
Peter King
men included such talents as the former Police Commissioner, Philip

Bouraga, the former head of Foreign Affairs, Tony Siaguru; and former
chairman of the Public Services Commission, Rabbie Namaliu.
Finance Minister Bouraga's budget, brought down on 9 November,
made good on Pangu's election promise of economic belt-tightening,
although revenue expectations still seemed high to many, and the budget
assumed that the Chan govennment's request for a deferral of Australian
aid cuts, discussed in the last chronicle, would be granted. Bouraga
mentioned but did not identify forty-five projects which would be affected
by failure to heed the government's plea for an extra $A12 million from
Canberra in 1982-83. The government's overall expenditure target was
K788 million ($A1 ,000 million), a cut of five per cent in real terms
(rather more if a more realistic measure of inflation than the official one,
which is biased towards "traditional" consumption items, is used). The
Finance Minister announced a deep cut of 3,000, including 300 expatriate
officers, in the public service- about ten per cent of the total. 2
However, despite his election promise and a fresh undertaking given on
4 August to trim cabinet numbers after a couple of months, Michael
Somare had failed to shed anybody by year's end. (The government's
attempt to rationalise the department structure was not completed until
January 1983 and will be reported in the next chronicle.)
In other post-election developments both the Ombudsman Commission
and the Law Reform Commission attacked corruption in government. 3
The Ombudsman commissioners criticised the previous Chan government
for tolerating corrupt dealings with a Singapore businessman over
unsaleable executive diaries inside the Prime Minister's Department itself.
They detected a tendency to runaway corruption in accordance with a
trickle-down model proposed by Professor Syed Hussein Alatas of
Singapore. 4 Nevertheless there was a singular victory for honest civil
servants and that persistent muck-raker, the Times, when the Vanimo
timber deal came to nought in November. (Its tortuous genesis was
recounted in the previous chronicle.) In October Somare reinstated
Andrew Yauieb- who had clashed sharply with the previous government
- as director of the office of forests. The Filipino Hetura Meja Company,
having failed to secure a government guarantee for its proposed offshore
money raising, also failed to sell off its negotiating rights over the
Vanimo tract to another company. 5 When Hetura finally withdrew, the
government promptly called for new tenders.
Corruption was also several times on the agenda at the University of
Papua New Guinea's 1982 Waigani Seminar in September, where the
theme was national performance during ten years of self-government as
measured against the first Pangu government's "Eight Aims". Speakers
were neither complimentary nor optimistic on the whole, and there was
hard-hitting partisanship from both sides of politics which led to
disturbances in the University. Highlight of the seminar was the women's
section which marked a watershed in the development of Melanesian
feminism. 6
July-December 1982
365
Curiously enough, the most frequently posed question in the wake of

Pangu's parliamentary victory was: after Somare what? Michael Somare
hinted several times that this would be his last term as Prime Minister,
although he was only forty-seven. In the wings were several possible
Pangu Prime Ministers, but attention in late 1982 focused first on the
acknowledged Pangu Highlands leader and Deputy Prime Minister, Paias
Wingti, who made strong running in the early weeks of the new
government, and ex-"Gang of Four" Public Service Minister, Tony
Siaguru, who had become the principal energiser of the new government
by budget time. In speculating about Wingti's future some contended that
a Highlands leader would always (like former Deputy Prime Minister
Okuk) stimulate a non-Highlands blocking movement - while others held
that the country was becoming ungovernable except by a Highlander.
Unfortunately these views were in the last analysis compatible. The two
men clashed over the future of the Institute for Applied Social and
Economic Research towards the end of the year. lASER came formally
under the National Planning Minister, Wingti, but was in reality quite
autonomous. Siaguru wished to make it over as a kind of think-tank for
the Prime Minister's office. 7 Unresolved trench warfare developed over
the issue, and Prime Minister Somare was driven to the brink of personal
breakdown by the feud among his first lieutenants. While Siaguru's vigour
succeeded in damping speculation that his motives were personal, the
lASER director, seconded UPNG Professor Richard Jackson, whose job
was undoubtedly at stake, resorted to writing political crossword puzzles. 8
Another possible future Pangu leader, Foreign Affairs and Trade
Minister Rabbie Namaliu, was meanwhile contributing indefatigable
travel and considerable poise to his new portfolio. Local Indonesian
sources had made it clear during the elections that they preferred a Pangu
victory. Pangu leaders made it equally clear that they believed strongly in
their own superior ability to get along with Djakarta. In the event the new
foreign minister perhaps went too far. He and his permanent head, Paulias
Matane, visited East Timor in September, where he declared himself
content with Indonesian administration of the unhappy province. Matane
trumped this later with a eulogy of the Indonesian military intervention
and occupation. But an anonymous critic promptly berated Matane, for
making a travesty of the Fretilin struggle to regain Timorese
independence. 9
While relations with Indonesia were at least temporarily reverting to
their old simplicity after the border alarms of the election period, relations
with Britain were unexpectedly complicated on the eve of the Queen's
visit in October. The Times leaked a portion of the General Constitutional
Commission's forthcoming report to Parliament which came out strongly
for a republican presidency to replace the Governor-General. The new
chairman of the GCC was embarrassed by the misleading headline:
"Rarua wants Queen out" 10 (he didn't, personally). The rapturous welcome
accorded the royal party five days later seemed to ma"ke the issue
academic for the moment; but the Times' publisher was shortly able to
366
Peter King
benefit from the burgeoning controversy aroused by the Queen's visit. An

expatriate journalist at Niugini Nius sneaked a scurrilous piece on the
royals past editor-proprietor Ray Thurecht for the issue of 19 October.
The irate Thurecht promptly pulped the entire printing, and, ere sunset on
the twentieth, Word Publishing, the ecumenical owners of the Times, had
agreed to buy out the Nius and set about developing a strong challenge to
PNG's only other daily, the Melbourne Herald group's Post-Courier. 11
As a pre-Christmas present for the Times, one of its principal targets,
the National Broadcasting Commission's long-serving chairman and
director, Leo Morgan, was sacked by cabinet on 14 December for defying
a directive against the introduction of television broadcasting. The Times
had campaigned long and hard on the issue, but cabinet was seriously
split - even Somare wavered. The Media Minister, Boyamo Sali,
subsequently lost his job as acting Public Utilities Minister, a job he had
used to issue a television licence to the NBC. 12 The Times once again as in the Vanimo deal- may have made the crucial difference. It
remained to be seen whether the Word empire, whose staff was under
severe strain from the demands of its new acquisitions, could handle a
daily and a twice-weekly (Times) without a collapse of standards.
38
JANUARY-JUNE 1983
Peter King
Papua New Guinea's relationship with Australia moved to the centre of

political debate in the first six months of 1983. Two episodes were
symptomatic of the overall trend in the relationship: the new Labor
government in Canberra finally put the aid relationship back on a clear,
agreed basis after more than a year's uncertainty, and a flurry over
alleged bugging of PNG telecommunications from the Australian High
Commission building in Waigani was resolved amicably during the Hawke
visit to Papua New Guinea in June. These episodes underlined two
weaknesses: the failure of the PNG government in a time of economic
recession to advance towards fiscal and monetary self-reliance, and a gaping
deficiency and dependence in security and intelligence arrangements.
They suggested, however, that the increasingly hothouse relationship with
Canberra remains popular and acceptable in Papua New Guinea by and
large, especially with the governing and property-owing elite.
On his visit to Port Moresby in April, less than a month after taking
office, the Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Hayden made good on
a pre-election undertaking as Opposition Leader by announcing a K7 .5
million ($A10 million) increase in aid for 1982-83, 1 the first modification
under the Crawford "trigger" formula (see Political Chronicle, JulyDecember 1982) to the 1981-85 aid agreement which required a five per
cent per annum reduction of aid in real terms (see Political Chronicle,
January-June 1982). But this was still ad hocery. The new basis for aid
was not finally announced until the Australian Prime Minister's visit in
June. Under the new formula, the rate of aid decline is set at one per cent
in 1982-83 (the PNG government's KlO million request represented zero
decline), one per cent also in 1983-84, two per cent in 1984-85, and three
per cent in 1985-86. Under a new trigger mechanism replacing the
Crawford formula but pointing in the opposite direction, an increase in
the rate of aid decline to 2.5 per cent will be triggered by revenues from
Bougainville Copper Ltd exceeding K60 million in June 1983 prices in
any one financial year. For revenue flow over Kl 00 million the decline is
3.75 per cent, and for flows over K140 million the original five per cent
decline is restored. If the trigger is activated for two consecutive years the
base figure of $A263 million will also be reduced. 2
368
Peter King
Thus by Australian generosity was Finance Minister Philip Bouraga

reprieved from axing all or part of forty-five unidentified projects put on
the danger list in the 1983 budget. The PNG budget will be boosted by
no less than Kl5.4 million in 1983-84; 3 and the PNG government has
been able to stave off for one more year a serious effort at retrenchment
of the inflated public service. (Appropriately enough, the laughable but
appropriately named "retrenchment exercise" which was launched in
1982, and whose results will be documented in the next chronicle, was
budgeted at a similar sum, K12.5 million, most of which went as "golden
handshakes" of up to K40,000 for senior public servants, many of whom
found immediate re-employment in the public service.)4 The Australian
government retains extraordinary and increasing potential leverage over
the PNG budget but it is not being used to induce economic performance.
The general review of aid policy announc~:J by tin: Hawkt: guvt:Inmt:nl
may change this, but the PNG government seems to have found a trump
card in the deteriorating law and order situation. During the Hayden visit
Australian officials were saying that governmental collapse might lie at
the end of the secular trend towards uncontrolled tribal fighting in the
Highlands and escalating rascal gang activity in the main urban centres;
and that fresh budgetary support to Port Moresby was therefore vital.
Serious Papua New Guinea observers would point out that existing law
and order resources - not to mention budgetary resources - are being
poorly exploited.
The PNG-Australia intelligence relationship was a vexed issue through
the chronicle period. During the visit of the Fraser government's Defence
Minister, Ian Sinclair, in February there were fresh defence force
complaints- which date back to 1977 at least- that Australia had denied
PNG necessary intelligence information on Indonesia and West Irian.
Then in May an Australian citizen working under contract and
occasionally under cover for the eighty-five strong K700,000 National
Intelligence Organisation clashed with a delegation of provincial Premiers
from the Momase region (Morobe, Madang and East and West Sepik)
when he clandestinely accompanied them on an official visit to Jayapura.
The delegation leader, Utula Samana of Morobe Province, is a well
known friend of the West Papuan independence struggle and persona non
grata at the NIO. He accused the undercover Australian, Bob Welsh, of
spying on the Premiers' delegation, and editorialists queried the use of
Australian citizens in clandestine work, NIO's connections with the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, and the strange fact that
Welsh made himself known first of all to Indonesian officials in
Jayapura. 5
Finally on 6 May, during the run up to the Australian Prime
Minister's visit, the National Times carried a story that the Australian
High Commission in Port Moresby was tapping telephone calls in PNG
with "Reprieve" equipment. The Somare government was, surprisingly,
moved to lodge a diplomatic protest, 6 but other reactions were more
predictable, although perhaps more startling to outsiders. Former PNG
January-June 1983
369
Defence Force Commander and then Opposition Leader, Ted Diro,

criticised the diplomatic protest and warned that Australia might cut off
aid to PNG if debate on the phone tapping allegation was not restrained.
"We rely on Australia and we must not bite the hand that feeds us
because it may break loose", he said. 7 This in turn triggered a chorus of
disbelieving, mocking editorials. 8
Meanwhile the Australian High Commissioner, Robert Birch, had
denied the bugging allegation in the following text: "The Australian High
Commission has no electronic eavesdropping facilities in Port Moresby
operating against Papua New Guinea". 9 But Australian journalist Laurie
Oakes reported before the month was out that bugging equipment had
been removed from the High Commission when Canberra got wind of the
National Times story. 10 Thus while some commentators found great
significance in the use of the present tense by the High Commissioner,
others found greater significance in the phrase, "operating against Papua
New Guinea". Was the bugging being directed exclusively against the
Indonesians, the OPM and perhaps some Australians in the PNG
government and elsewhere whose ideological orientation on West Papua
was not to the High Commission's liking? Some old hands were
outspokenly sceptical about the value of a sophisticated bugging
operation in a political milieu where cabinet "secrets" are often freely
available for the price of a drink - which is in fact one of the great
charms and blessings of government in Papua New Guinea.
In the event the Australian Prime Minister got off the hook lightly
when he arrived on 2 June. At his joint press conference with Bob Hawke
late that day, Michael Somare declared himself satisfied with Hawke's
explanations, and it was then openly suggested in the Times that the PNG
government knew of the alleged bugging beforehand and had access to its
productY
A new issue in the perennially troubled border relationship with
Indonesia had already found the government playing an aggressive defence
in April. Niugini Nius broke the story that a section of the so-called
Trans-Irian Highway being built in stages from Merauke to Jayapura had
crossed twice (later the number of crossings was put at three) into PNG
territory for a total six kilometres trespass into Western Province. 12 Again
protests were lodged, and again the issue triggered a great debate, this
time about the long-term strategic relationship with Indonesia. While the
Indonesians fairly promptly acknowledged the error of their way 13 - a
Japanese contractor or an old Dutch road may have been at fault in the
first instance - and agreed to close the offending sections of road, heated
controversy erupted in the poorly air-conditioned offices of Waigani about
the strategic meaning of the Trans-Irian Highway itself, which runs very
close to the border in the southern sector. For the National Intelligence
Organisation, located in the Prime Minister's Department, the offending
road section is chiefly intended to serve the transmigratioa settlements
spreading inland from Merauke on the Arafura Sea. (Merauke is about
seventy kilometres from the border.) But border specialists in the Foreign
370
Peter King
Affairs Department argue that the trespassing border road has poor acces~
to present and planned transmigration blocks, and that its purpose is
purely military - to cope with the OPM and perhaps the PNG Defence
Force in the border area. The outspoken ex-kiap and MP for the North
Fly electorate in Western Province, Warren Dutton, agrees (North Fly
borders the Merauke kabupaten.) In one popular scenario, the area of
Western Province south of the so-cailed "Fly bulge'' between the Fly
River, the Gulf of Papua and the border is "taken out" by the Indonesian
army in double quick time to constitute a buffer against OPM interference
in the progressive Javanisation of the Merauke area. 14
If Papua New Guinea was suffering various forms of neo-colonial
pressure chiefly from its two big neighbours in early 1983, there was yet
a third putative friend to beware of. The new Japanese Ambassador to
PNG, Makato Taniguchi, stated frankly in April that Japan was frustrated
by PNG's strict planning guidelines and other bureaucratic obstacles
standing in the way of tied aid. Japanese aid to independent PNG leaving aside long-term low interest credits to finance hydro schemes has totalled a mere K2.2 million - for a Fisheries College in Kavieng,
New Ireland. Japan, taking forty per cent of PNG's 1981 (K220 million)
-mostly copper, coffee, fish and timber exports and producing 16.7 per
cent of her imports (K125 million), would like to undertake new forestry
and fisheries projects, but insists on Japanese consultants and
contractors. 15 Enthusiastic senior ministers in PNG have been unable to
help the Japanese get around the National Planning Office, and perhaps
some of them felt relieved that they had failed after an episode of heavyhanded resource diplomacy in April. Sohbu Trading Corporation operates
a large timber lease at Open Bay in West New Britain, and also owns a
fishing venture, Pacific Seafoods, which the tax office has assessed for
Kl.84 million in back taxes owing as a result of transfer pricing practices.
The notorious distaste of Japanese companies in PNG for "downstream"
processing of primary products seemed to be well illustrated by the
mysterious burning down and non-replacement of a sawmill provided for
in the original Open Bay lease agreement. Despite Open Bay's supposed
failure ever to turn a profit in nine years of operation (average loss was
put at Kl million a year), the company and the embassy fought long and
hard for lease renewal when the PNG government announced in April not for the first time - that the lease would be terminated in June. Hints
were dropped in Tokyo that financial aid to PNG could be affected. 16
Although there must be a strong suspicion that Sohbu practises transfer
pricing in log as well as fish exports, the PNG government backed down
for another six months. It would surely be even more vulnerable to~
yennish pressure if Japan were allowed to develop a strong presence
through project aid.
On the domestic front, destabilising developments for the Pangu
government stood out in the first half of 1983. Iambakey Okuk, despite
being Deputy Prime Minister and throwing perhaps the largest beer party
in .history - at Kundiawa, Simbu - lost his seat in his own province, at
January-June 1983
371
the June 1982 national elections. But from April to July 1983 he made a
remarkably easy come-back in his wife's district through a hotly contested
by-election. The new member for Unggai-Bena, Eastern Highlands, who
had nominated General Diro as his successor at the helm of the National
party after his 1982 defeat, then rapidly returned to the leadership of both
the National party and the opposition by a constitutionally curious
process of acclamation. An embarrassed and diminished General Diro was
left in limbo with his surviving, mainly Papuan following. 17
The Somare leadership was extremely nervous at first as the
uncrowned king of the Highlands resumed his flamboyant parliamentary
- and extra-parliamentary - ways. 18 But without his shrewd and
sometimes inspired white handler from his days in government, Jeff Wall,
Okuk's manoeuvres seemed to have lost their touch, and Highland
defections from the Pangu pati in Parliament were quickly contained. It
was at this time that Gabriel Ramoi, the apparently underage Pangu
backbencher, self-professed socialist and immediate past president of the
University of Papua New Guinea Students' Representative Council, made
the unforgettable remark that the opposition consisted of all MPs without
a ministry.
The other issue threatening to unhinge the numerically sound Pangu
government early in the year was industrial action against the so-called
dual salary structure. Expatriate salaries are two to three times as large as
national ones for the same work in the public sector, and are fleshed out
with free travel, free schooling and free housing. The system is very
unpopular among citizens, but, when the Public Employees' Association
(PEA) called a twenty-four hour stop-work in February, the government
played tough. The Public Service Minister, Tony Siaguru, and the
chairman of the Public Services Commission, Renagi Lohia, threatened to
sack all striking public servants - ineffectually as it turned out. 19 The
government was groping for a cosmetic solution which would abolish the
dual salary structure in principle and on paper without destroying
incentives for skilled foreigners to take employment, or blowing out the
government wages budget to an extent that would cripple development
spending. This was to come in the second half of the year.
Meanwhile University of Papua New Guinea students, already aroused
by the recent "de-localisation" of their vice-chancellorship, alleged
corruption at the university, 20 and descended on Parliament in support of
the PEA. Student placards denounced elected leaders as stooges for
foreigners and called for a tough new leadership code which would end
land dealing and insist on the sale of leaders' business interests to the
state. The students were met with dogs, tear gas and vocal support from
the opposition, who scented massacre and dictatorship in the air. 21 It
seemed possible that the linked issues of foreign privilege, foreign
interests and foreign influence had arrived at the top of the political
agenda a decade after self-government. But the uncomfortable fact was
that the government still needed to go cap in hand to Australia in order to
find the money to begin rolling back the dual salary structure. Moreover,
372
Peter King
with productivity among the national salariat about half or less that of
expatriates - at least in the private sector22 - and with salaries absorbing
well over bplf of government budget in a time of still deepening
recession, equal pay was potentially a formula for disaster.
39
JULY-DECEMBER 1983
Peter King
The Okuk Challenge and the Pangu Leadership

Iambakey Okuk, victorious in a by-election and restored to the leadership
of his National party, resumed the leadership of the opposition at the
beginning of the August sitting of Parliament. Despite an unpromising
numbers situation, he immediately set about the overthrow of the second
Somare government, having been instrumental but not a full beneficiary
in the overthrow of the first such government back in March 1980. Once
again he found himself not entirely in control of putative allies, but his
achievement was considerable: a tremendous, excited media coverage;
some Highland defections from the ranks of the Pangu pati; an apparent
mutiny in Pangu's United party partner based on that hardest of PNG
political currencies, ministry offers; a trans-party coalition of Papuan MPs
in a Papuan Solidarity Bloc under the opposition member for Moresby
North-West, Mahuru Rarua Rarua; the nominal support of all the
opposition parties; and some unsteadiness on the government front bench.
Okuk's tactic here was to condemn Somare's style of leadership from
behind, and announce that he was prepared to serve under one or other of
a short list of Somare's chief lieutenants, preferably his Highland deputy,
Paias Wingti. 1 However, despite this highly imaginative if not bizarre
offer, Okuk failed to spell out the policies which would justify
overturning Pangu with its solid parliamentary majority, and the press
remained overwhelmingly hostile editorially to his bid. When it came to
a vote in the November sitting of Parliament, Pangu was overwhelmingly
steady; the United party remained uncharacteristically united with
Somare;2 the Papuan Solidarity Bloc fell -or had fallen- apart on party
lines; 3 and in anticipation of defeat Rarua's motion of no-confidence was
actually withdrawn. Pangu then routed the opposition when a vote of
confidence was passed 70-0, an improvement of four on the result of
August 1982 which installed Michael Somare as Prime Minister. The
previous Opposition Leader, Ted Diro, and four other opposition MPs
crossed the floor; the rest of the opposition walked out of the chamber. 4
Despite this rather clumsy debacle, however, Okuk's probing for
support from the government front bench did have some logic. Rumours
had been surfacing in the press and the Waigani gossip circuits from time
374
Peter King
to time of rivalry among Somare's senior colleagues- particularly Deputy

Prime Minister Wingti, Foreign Minister Rabbie Namaliu, and Public
Service Minister Tony Siaguru. Michael Somare was thus moved to
affirm, despite previous suggestions to the contrary, that he would be
leading Pangu into the 1987 national elections. Nevertheless a sharp
insight into those rivalries - and into the high politics of business in PNG
- was vouchsafed to the public in October. When Primary Industry
Minister Dennis Young proposed a restructuring of the coffee industry
based on reducing the number of small exporting firms and introducing
a new large company to manage exports from Mount Hagen in the
Western Highlands Province, there was vehement opposition from two
ministers with strong coffee interests, who happened also to represent key
provincial electorates in Parliament. They were the Minister for
Provincial Affairs John Nilkare (Simbu), and the Minister for Education,
Barry Holloway (Eastern Highlands). 5 But Young was powerfully
seconded by the Deputy Prime Minister and provincial member for
Western Highlands, Wingti, who denounced the foreign interests allegedly
represented by his colleagues and argued that coffee exporters were
ripping off growers. 6 It was noteworthy in this affair that John Nilkare,
who defeated Okuk in the 1982 elections, has leadership ambitions
himself, and that Barry Holloway is politically very close to Siaguru. It
is also noteworthy that Rabbie Namaliu, whose reputation rests on a
statesmanlike approach and an unbesmirched personal record, and whose
tenure at Foreign Affairs has done much to reinforce his standing, stayed
aloof from the inner cabinet wrangling. In the event Michael Somare and
the National Executive Council handed down a typical Pangu compromise
on the coffee export issue which nevertheless favoured Young and Wingti
on balance. A new company is to be launched with about five per cent
(i.e., 45,000 bags in 1984) of the country's overall quota, to be deducted
pro rata from the existing companies. 7
Defence and West Papua
A long awaited review of defence policy by a ministerial committee
under Deputy Prime Minister Wingti was finally released in September.
Cabinet adopted its recommendations in full. There will be a ceiling of
3,050 on the defence force, which may involve a cut of up to 1,000 men;
a new forward company base will be opened at Kiunga in the Western
Province, which is the river port for the Ok Tedi mine; the patrol boat
base at Manus is to be relocated to Port Moresby for economy reasons;
and the company outstations opposite Irian Jaya at both Vanimo and
Kiunga are to be beefed up with engineer platoons from Port Moresby. 8
The defence allocation for 1984-1985 was set at K24 million. ($A32
million), and a long term re-equipment programme was announced.
These decisions testified to rising concern in the government about the
security implications of Indonesia's transmigration programme, which is
supposed to bring 700,000 new settlers to -Irian Jaya under the Repelita
July-December 1983
375
IV five-year plan by 1989. But the government still preferred to speak

softly while trying to sharpen its very small stick. When Defence
Minister Epel Tito, who strongly favours boosting defence, declared on an
Australian radio program in September that Indonesia has historically had
designs on PNG; that transmigration is a threat; and that Indonesia could
invade the country within the next ten to twenty years, he was cautioned
by the Prime Minister, found unrepentant, and transferred from defence
- to the media ministry !9
The government was relieved in November when "General" Seth
Rumkorem, leader of one of the two main OPM factions and an irritant
for the government while he remained a free man in Rabaul, at last found
a temporary home in Greece, thanks to rather controversial efforts by the
local Liaison Officer of the UN High Commission for Refugees, Michael
Shergold. However, the evidence at Rumkorem's departure from Port
Moresby that the OPM factions were uniting after their twelve-year split
was perhaps ominous for the government. 10
Nevertheless, on the bureaucratic front, at least, the government was
having its way on West Papuan issues. A few expert (but expatriate)
voices which had been raised against Indonesia in the border section of
the Foreign Affairs Department were being stilled. The resolutely
non-alarmist National Intelligence Organisation (Prime Minister's
Department) was being given exclusive control of intelligence coordination for the border area, amidst charges that the responsible (but
also expatriate) officials in NIO were more beholden to Australian - or
even Indonesian - than PNG interests, while administrative responsibility
for the border was being transferred from Foreign Affairs to Provincial
Affairs. 11
The issue of dual loyalties on the West Papua issue was aired in an
ABC radio program on 21 August, which set out to throw new light on
"the coup that never was"- the curious episode of 1977 in which senior
defence force officers worked out a contingency plan to intimidate the
Pangu government of the day and actually rehearsed a sort of coup d'etat
in defence of their commander (General Ted Diro), who was under threat
of discipline for making an independent political approach to the
leadership of the OPM. 12 Although the government may have discovered
a formula for the bureaucratic smothering of the West Papua issue,
Indonesia's transmigration program seemed bound to keep it alive. In
November/December the Times ran a series of articles on it, and
published for the first time the so-called transmigration map, Proyek
Transmigrasi-Propinsi Irian Jaya. Dated April 1982 and passed to
Foreign Mfairs officials by the OPM in the northern border area, it shows
30,000 square kilometres of land earmarked for transmigration in the
Merauke area alone - about one-third of the total for the whole province.
Allowing for the use of only half of the ostensibly earmarked land in Irian
Jaya as a whole, and working on a figure of two hectares per transmigrant
family of five, Foreign Affairs officials estimate that a total transmigrant
population of over ten million is envisaged - more than ten times the
376
Peter King
number required to outnumber Irian Jaya's ex1stmg Melanesian

population! 13 Meanwhile the NIO, having initially accepted the map at
face value, decided in September that it was an (unexplained) fake, and
that the disruption likely to be caused by transmigration was acceptable
and containable, especially because Indonesia was unlikely to meet its
transmigration targetsY (On this last point NIO is almost certainly right.)
The NIO paper predictably provoked an outraged response at Foreign
Affairs.
Although the General Constitutional Commission tabled its final report in
March 1983, 15 calling for many and quite radical changes in the
Independence constitution of 1975, including replacement of the Queen
as Head of State, the government seemed to be keenly interested in only one
change. In November it had its way. Increasingly irritated by corruption,
malpractice and financial incompetence among most of the nineteen
provincial governments set up soon after Independence - especially by its
inability to remove the Premier of the Southern Highlands who had lost
his majority in the Provincial Assembly - the government persuaded
Parliament to give it an easier procedure for suspending provincial
governments. The previous procedure, never invoked, depended on a
parliamentary vote: as amended, the National Executive Council (cabinet)
now has a right of provisional suspension. The change received
overwhelming support in the national Parliament, despite strong
opposition by the provincial governments themselves, by the Melanesian
Alliance party under ex-secessionist leader John Momis, and by at least
one minister closely identified with the origins of the decentralisation
process in East New Britain (Rabbie Namaliu). The vote showed rising
animosity among national politicians towards provincial politicians, who
have acquired extensive power if not much authority in recent years; and
Provincial Affairs Minister John Nilkare served notice that at least five
(unnamed) provincial governments already "qualified" for suspension. 16
The Budget, Dual Salaries, Corruption, and the Economy
Minister for Finance Philip Bouraga's second budget, brought down at the
beginning of November, reflected the good news of the Australian aid
increase and a turnaround to profit by Bougainville Copper Ltd, both
noted in the previous chronicle. Thus goods and services expenditure was
set so as to bring about a two per cent spending decline in real terms, as
opposed to the three per cent decline forecast in the 1983 budget.
However gross outlays were off five per cent in real terms at K825.4
million and compensatory borrowing was up at K14.0 million, 7.3 per
cent of a projected GDP of Kl.92 billionY
The opposition inveighed rather incoherently against the lack of
expansiveness in this latest of a long line of fiscally responsible PNG
July-December 1983
377
budgets, but they were right in the sense that the country has not found
a formula for reliable and durable economic expansion, and is faced with
acute long-term problems which threaten the modest economic
achievements of self-government and Independence - a slow but steady
rise in external debt; a debilitating dependence on high levels of
Australian aid and high world gold and copper prices in combination with
the early success of the Ok Tedi project; the great expense of provincial
government; the threat of expenditure blowout arising from the campaign
by national civil servants against the so-called dual salary structure and
expatriate privilege; and, finally, the rising tide of corruption in
government.
Two developments in the second half of 1983 were particularly
disturbing from this perspective. Firstly, Public Service Minister Siaguru
announced the abolition of the dual salary structure as a "colonial relic"
in August, at an immediate cost of K14.5 million. This "abolition" was
largely symbolic, but was likely to stimulate powerfully the trade union
appetites of all the government's white collar employees when lawyers,
academics and doctors had already made significant recent gains. 18
Secondly, it became clear in November that the Public Prosecutor would
not act against apparently corrupt leaders implicated in the Ombudsman
Commission's massive and philosophically concerned report on the socalled Executive Diaries Affair, Corruption in Government. 19 (See
Political Chronicle July-December 1982). The Ombudsman's report was
intended as the thin end of the wedge for a crack-down on political
corruption, which is clearly distorting the pattern of economic
development and exacerbating class inequality in the country. The Chief
Ombudsman was privately outraged at what was seen as the pusillanimity
of the Public Prosecutor; and revelations in early 1984 of extensive
institutionalised corruption in the Works and Supply Department
suggested that the outrage would need to be maintained.
40
JANUARY-JUNE 1984
YawSatTu
Papua New Guinea politics during the first half of 1984 have been
dominated by four of her hardy political perennials: provincial
government matters, OPM activities and their ramifications, efforts by
politicians to secure a firmer grip over the bureaucratic machinery, and
law and order problems.
Provincial Government: Elections and Worries About Non-Performance
With nineteen elected provincial legislatures of varying originating dates
and life-spans, hardly a year passes in PNG without flurries of elections.
In May/June, there were provincial elections in Simbu, Morobe, North
Solomons, Western Highlands and West New Britain.
If the outcomes of these elections are seen in terms of party popularity,
as political leaders and the press somewhat misleadingly urge us to see
them, 1 Pangu pati, the party in control at the National Centre,2 was
reconfirmed as the governing party in West New Britain but was
dislodged by the Melanesian Alliance of Fr John Momis in the North
Solomons. In Simbu and Western Highlands politicians claiming
allegiance to Pangu secured the premiership while in Morobe a proMelanesian Alliance group of populist politicians, the Morobe
Independent Group led by the incumbent Premier, Utula Samana, beat off
a strong Pangu bid for provincial government power.
The elections in Morobe and North Solomons generated the most
interest nationally. Morobe, the largest province, is regarded as a Pangu
territory, thanks to the yeoman services of the ex-kiap, Tony Voutas, and
others, back in the sixties. Indeed, at the 1982 general elections, as in
previous ones, Pangu-sponsored candidates had swept the polls there. But
the provincial government there since 1979 had been dominated by a
Premier who has dedicated himself, as he once told me, "to burying
Pangu in Morobe".
Samana, who describes himself as "a Melanesian Christian
Socialist", is clearly contemptuous of the party leaders at the national
level, with the exception of Fr John Momis, because they follow what he
considers to be a disastrous, unnationalistic, un-Melanesian, pro-foreign
January-June 1984
379
domination and capitalistic path. But, in Papua New Guinea where the
ancient Chinese saying "Your enemy's enemy ..." is a cardinal guide to
political behaviour, Iambakey Okuk, Leader of the Opposition, a bornagain capitalist, between whom and Samana there has clearly been no
love lost in the past, came proffering campaign support, which was
gratefully received. In the end, Samana's re-confirmation as Premier
depended on his going into alliance with members of Sir Julius Chan's
People's Progress party, a party that is constant only in its adherence to
Friedmanite economics and the harsh, remorseless capitalism that flows
from it.
North Solomons, politically the most advanced province in PNG,
whose bid for secession in the mid-seventies precipitated the
establishment of the provincial government system, had a government
that was dominated by Leo Hannett, a Pangu stalwart. This was
incongruous because North Solomons is the citadel of John Momis'
Melanesian Alliance. Against Pangu's colourful verbaliser and reputedly
capable administrator, Leo Hannett, Melanesian Alliance fielded a former
Premier of the province, Dr Alexis Sarei, who had resigned his plum job
as PNG's Ambassador to the court of StJames to make himself available,
in the presidential-type election by which the North Solomons chooses its
Premier.
As in the general election two years before, party leaders and,
especially, the media sought to create the impression that the provincial
election campaigns were being waged on issues: restoration of business
confidence in Lae (Morobe); provincial-national government relations,
particularly over the share of benefits from the Panguna mine (North
Solomons); the revival of local government councils (Western Highlands
Province); and so on. But, as anybody who has attempted to discover the
determinants of electoral choice in PNG would readily testify, it is the
influences of the electors' personal knowledge of the candidate, their
kinship or community-based relationship with the candidate and, above
all, their perceptions and calculations regarding the candidate's ability to
perform in the distribution of tangible material benefits to persons and
communities, that are dominant.
With the exception of North Solomons, where the presidential-style
election of the Premier produced a decisive winner, all the other
provinces experienced the usual post-election cliff-hanging drama of
juggling with figures, lobbying intensely, bargaining, and auctioning and
buying support in order to come up with the winning number in the
Assembly. But it was in Simbu where the neatest solution was found to
this most persistent of all PNG's political leaders' nightmares; how to
obtain and retain a winning coalition in the absence of deeply felt
loyalties and in the face of obviously limited ministerial positions which,
as Peter King pointed out in the last chronicle, is PNG's hardest currency
in trading among politicians. The shrewd Mathew Siune, pc!rhaps taking
a leaf out of the book of the new Oro provincial government's illegal
expansion of the cabinet from eight to ten in order to survive, produced a
380
YawSaffu
cabinet of twelve in a twenty-four-member chamber! With the Speaker

drawn from the Chamber and every member of the cabinet naturally
voting to protect their position, Siune was truly home and dry. 3
Such brazen pursuit of power, evidently without qualms about financial
implications or public opinion, is symptomatic of the indiscipline and
insensitivity that have come to characterise the generally unsatisfactory
performance by virtually all provincial governments. In January, on the
basis of a condemnatory report by the auditor-general, the Enga
provincial government was suspended by the National Executive Council,
acting under the new powers it had obtained from Parliament in
November 1983. In the subsequent debate that culminated in Parliament's
endorsing the suspension, a long catalogue of misuse of funds, lack of
accountability, politicians' insensitivity and bureaucrats' incompetence
was paraded before the attentive public.
Although Enga was the only provincial government to be suspended in
the period, there was, quite clearly, a simmering disenchantment with
provincial governments which threatened to boil over. National MPs,
themselves no paragons of virtue, discipline or diligence, took up cudgels
against the provincial governments, proclaiming loudly their duty to
safeguard the welfare of the people by insisting on creditable
performance. In all likelihood, however, rivalry with provincial politicians
for power and status is what really actuated them. 4
OPM Activities and Repercussions on PNG Politics
Beginning in February, some desperate operations primarily to publicise
the cause of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, also known as the
West Papua or Irian Jayan freedom fighters) provided occasions for a
continuous testing of PNG diplomacy to the hilt.
First, an attempt to seize the provincial parliament building in Jayapura
and raise the OPM flag on it drew the fire of the Indonesian army
detachment there. The flight of OPM fighters across the border into PNG
and the hot pursuit by the Indonesians, manifested among other things by
the violation of PNG air-space by Indonesian Air-Force planes, created
panic among some Irian Jayan border communities. The result was an
influx of border-crossers (as the PNG government called them) or
refugees (as most of PNG opposition spokesmen preferred to call them).
From about 200 at the end of February, the number had swollen to about
7,000 by the end of June, stretching the resources of the PNG
government, while presenting it with unwanted security problems.
Then, at the end of March, a Swiss pilot working for Associated
Mission Aviation was abducted by the OPM to the PNG side of the
border and held there while demands for a huge ransom were made. The
PNG government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. In the end,
after the intervention of the local Catholic clergy and the Swiss
Ambassador in Canberra, the pilot was released unharmed, and apparently
without conditions.
January-June 1984
381
Finally, there was the Nyaro interview. In April, an ABC television

crew came to PNG and obtained a secret interview with the President of
OPM, James Nyaro, on PNG soil. Despite requests by the PNG
government that the interview not be screened and ABC Management's
assurances that it would not be screened, the interview was later telecast
in a "Four Corners" program by the ABC, after the ABC Board had overruled Management. 5
The PNG government, obviously very sensitive to any Indonesian
misconstruction of the interview granted on PNG soil as evidence of
PNG aid and comfort to OPM, or as contravening the 1979
border agreement between Indonesia and PNG, 6 charged that the
ABC crew had not respected undertakings given, and had connived
with Nyaro to break PNG's immigration laws. The government
retaliated by refusing to renew the work permit of the resident ABC
correspondent when it expired, and by imposing new, stringent conditions
for visiting journalists. These measures then drew forth a further reaction
in Australia in the form of uncomplimentary remarks about PNG
democracy. The remarks, in turn, rankled not a little in Papua New
Guinea.
The fracas with the ABC had the potential of souring
PNG-Australian relations. But given that Australia's own defence interests
were seen as best served by a tough, "no-nonsense" PNG policy towards
OPM "rebel" activities, 7 and given all the other ties in Australia-PNG
relations, the Nyaro interview and its repercussions were no more than
the proverbial storm in the tea-cup. Repercussions of OPM activities on
PNG-lndonesian relations, however, were of a completely different order
of magnitude.
Numerous ministerial and bureaucratic meetings between Indonesia
and PNG were hurriedly convened to defuse tension. Exasperated
diplomatic notes flew backwards and forwards, with Indonesia
denying charges of violation of PNG air-space and hot pursuit,
while PNG reiterated its scrupulous observance of the terms of the
1979 treaty denying aid and the use of territory to a "rebel" cause. Papua
New Guinea forced Indonesia to recall its defence attache in Port
Moresby at the end of April, while the National Intelligence
Organisation showed a visiting Indonesian journalist the rough side of
PNG hospitality, balancing out somewhat Indonesia's barely disguised
arrogance and insensitivities regarding PNG's sovereignty, dignity and
pride.
In the end, PNG and Indonesia agreed to review and update the 1979
border agreement later in the year. The PNG government decided to
repatriate border-crossers, Indonesia agreeing in advance to guarantee
their safety and security, but unwilling to have UNHCR become involved.
Refugee status was envisaged for only a small minority of the bordercrossers, despite calls by some opposition politicians and at least one
government minister, by some religious groups and university students, to
treat all crossers as refugees.
382
YawSaffu
Pangu Proposals for Administrative Reforms

The appointment of Tony Siaguru, one of the principal authors of Pangu's
collective intentions as the Public Service Minister in 1982 fuelled
expectations of imminent reforms of the bureaucratic machinery of the
state. Until the February/March 1984 session of Parliament, however,
attempts at reform had been confined to a costly, necessary but poorly
executed retrenchment exercise and to the equally expensive abolition of
the dual salary structure in the public service. 8
In the February/March session of Parliament, the Public Service
Minister introduced two bills, the Constitutional Amendment (Public
Services Commission) Law 1984 and the Organic Law on the Public
Services Commission (Repeal) Law 1984. The basic objectives of these
bills were to (a) emasculate the existing Public Services Commission and
(b) to increase the government's political leverage over the public service.
The first objective was to be achieved by transferring the executive
powers of appointing, promoting, disciplining and making decisions about
terms and conditions in the public service from the PSC, leaving it with
only an advisory and quasi-judicial function of determining, on request,
whether or not established rules have been followed or breached in
dealings between authorities and public servants. The second objective
was to be achieved by vesting those transferred executive powers in a
new Department of Personnel Management and thus abolishing the
constitutional independence and insulation from direct political pressures
from the government of the day which the existing PSC enjoys.
Debate and comments on the proposals took the thoroughly familiar
form of pairing of opposites: democracy (government spokesmen) vs
dictatorship (opponents); authority of popular mandate, clear
accountability and efficient control to obviate frustration (government) vs
politicisation, "wantokism" and the death of professionalism (the
opposition). What is clear is that the checks and balances inherent in the
autonomy and independence of the existing PSC are under attack in these
reforms. But as for the hopes of the government, and the fears of the
opposition, only time will tell.
Given the endemic rivalry between politicians and public servants in
parliamentary systems of the Westminster type, which is particularly
virulent in PNG on account of "fear of power", anti-politician, probureaucrat biases which crept into the Independence constitution, and
given also that a fair number of opposition parliamentarians evidently had
personal memories of frustration from their stint as ministers in past
governments, both bills were passed in the May/June session by the
required two-thirds majority in the 109-member Parliament. The voting
was seventy-four to nine and seventy-six to eleven, respectively. As
required by the constitution a period of at least two months has to elapse
before a final vote can be taken on them.
Taking these two bills together with the National Intelligence
Organisation Bill, 1984, which was passed very easily and very quickly in
January-June 1984
383
the June session, with the intention revealed in the June session to move
away from annual, project-based or shopping-list planning to a
medium-term (five-year) and sectoral planning from 1986, and with the
White Paper on Industrial Policy which was tabled in the earlier
February/March session, a new period of government activism is perhaps
heralded.
Law and Order Problems

At the beginning of the year, the oppositiOn sought to make political
mileage out of separate sex scandals involving two Pangu stalwarts and
ministers in Somare's government. The alleged crimes dated back to 1975
and 1978, respectively. At the end of 1983, in the Assembly of the
Morobe provincial government, a member who was once the Deputy
Police Commissioner claimed that political pressure had been exerted to
prevent prosecution of the offenders.
At first, Prime Minister Somare hoped to scotch the opposition calls
for a commission of enquiry by bluff and bluster, taking a tough, "no
probe" stand. Then, in spite of the Ombudsman's comforting opinion that
he would refuse to conduct an enquiry even if the commission were asked
to do so, because he did not expect that any light would be shed on the
allegations after so long, the Prime Minister budged amidst the crescendo
of opposition and media demands, and after Iambakey Okuk had entered
the fray with a bogus public opinion poll which, naturally, demanded an
enquiry by overwhelming majorities.
The sole commissioner, Deputy Chief Justice Kapi appointed in
January, reported in June. 9 He found that the allegation that political
pressures were exerted on the police not to lay charges were "prompted
by political considerations" 10 and that the provincial member "abused his
privilege in making allegation in the Morobe provincial government
without any basis" .11
A cynic might have recorded the above paragraphs under the section
on provincial elections as one of the opening salvos in the Morobe
election campaign. But the opposition spokesmen who demanded a
commission of enquiry often sought to link their argument with the
burgeoning law and order problem in the country, sanctimoniously
deploring what they saw as one law for the powerful and another for the
common rascal (as even the armed gangster is inappropriately called in
Papua New Guinea).
Although tribal fighting in the Highlands region of PNG has by no
means become a thing of the past, as the designation of Enga as a fighting
zone from 15 May to 15 August clearly underlined, it is urban crime that
is now synonymous with the law and order problem. Break and enter, car
theft, stop and deliver in isolated areas, daring snatches even in crowded
city centres, rapes, all of these increasingly at knife-, axe-, or gun-point,
have become so rampant that the legislators, obviously believing that
heavier penalties are the answer, or at any rate a significant part of the
384
YawSaffu
answer, have amended the criminal code accordingly.

Following an abortive effort in 1983 by the government to pass what
was viewed by them as Peace and Good Order Bill, but by most of the
attentive public outside of government as possibly Strife and Bad Order
Bill, a Minimum Penalties Act was passed. It prescribed minimum jail
sentences for a wide range of urban crimes. In the February/March
session of Parliament, a ten-year minimum jail sentence for rapists was
passed, with a ten to one support in the debates.
Judges have been unusually outspoken against the Minimum Penalties
Act, while the police have, expectedly, been for it. But it is the Corrective
Institution Service that has borne the brunt of the effect, with
overcrowded prisons with which the service evidently cannot cope,
resulting in prisoners breaking out of jail apparently at will.
A committee appointed in 1983 to review policy and administration on
crime, law and order, the Morgan Committee, reported in May. It held out
chilly prospects for early improvement in the law and order situation. It
concluded that the crime situation will deteriorate, that existing law and
order resources will not be able to cope. It declared that only "positive
government action in favour of youths" and an overhaul of the education
system will, in the long run, provide a solution.
41
JULY-DECEMBER 1984
YawSaffu
Introduction
Faction fights within the ruling Pangu pati cabinet, and relentless efforts
by the opposition parties to capitalise on these, to woo the losing faction
out of Pangu, and to threaten to bring down the government through a
motion of no-confidence, eclipsed in interest and intensity all other items
on the political agenda of PNG during the second half of 1984. A partial
consequence of all this was that the Prime Minister shuffled his cabinet
at the end of the year. On the opposition side, the combative, "no-holdsbarred" leader. Iambakey Okuk, lost his parliamentary seat after a court
decision, causing changes in the leadership positions of the parliamentary
opposition. Apart from a spirited confrontation between the government
and its international partners in the giant Ok Tedi gold and copper mining
venture, all the other items that occupied centre stage of the political
arena during the six-month period were essentially a continuation of
trends that had been visible in the earlier half of the year. On the
provincial government front, there were more elections, further changes
of provincial governments through votes of no-confidence, and further
dissatisfaction within the performance of provincial governments. Law
and order problems scaled new heights, provoking massive
demonstrations and forcing the government to come up with forty-nine
specific proposals to combat the appalling crime situation. The Irian Jaya
problem refused to go away. But the government's clearer efforts to bring
the issues involved to the attention of the international community
appeared eventually to soften attitudes in Jakarta.
Some Political Consequences of Mr Wingti's Discomfort within Pangu
After the 1982 elections, having conceded that in deference to the dictates
of PNG's political arithmetic the Deputy Prime Minister should be a
Highlander, the Prime Minister astutely threw to the Highlands Bloc in
the parliamentary wing of his party the question which of its members
should have that position. Paias Wingti, a convert from United party to
Pangu during the usual after-election scramble for members and
ministerial positions in 1977, was the choice of the majority of the
386
YawSaffu
Highlands Bloc over John Nilkare, the vanquisher of the seemingly

impregnable lambakey Okuk in the Simbu Regional in the 1982 elections.
Paias Wingti also sought and obtained the National Planning portfolio at
the expense of Karl Stack, who apparently believed it was already in the
bag for him.
From around the August 1984 session of Parliament, Wingti began to
urge Prime Minister Somare to reshuffle his cabinet and to replace those
ministers whom he termed "the innocent and the dangerous". 1 The
identities of the "innocent" ministers, by which it was assumed he meant
the incompetent ministers, did not seem to excite much curiosity. Not so
the identities of the "dangerous", those who were said to be doing
irreparable damage to the image of Pangu as the caring, little man's party
by their alleged business deals and their not exactly puritanical life-styles,
and who were allegedly manipulating cabinet, using it to rubber-stamp
decisions taken by them over legendary "long lunches and dinners",
splitting cabinet by their methods and tactics, and thus undermining
collective responsibility and governmental effectiveness. The press
quickly revealed that Tony Siaguru, Public Service Minister, Sir Barry
Holloway, Education Minister, and John Nilkare, Decentralisation
Minister, were the "dangerous" gang in Wingti's book. Sometimes Karl
Stack, the Industrial Development Minister, was also mentioned. Tony
Siaguru and Barry Holloway are among Somare's earliest and most loyal
political colleagues. With Karl Stack they are certainly leaders among
Pangu's ideas men. With Rabbie Namaliu, the Foreign Minister, they are
the most articulate. In terms of having power bases of their own,
Holloway, Nilkare and Stack are definitely among Pangu's "heavies",
each representing a provincial seat and each partially responsible for the
success of a fair number of Pangu candidates in the Open seats within
their provinces. Even Harold Macmillan at his most savage as a butcher
of cabinets to advance party popularity and dominance in the country
might have baulked at what Wingti was urging Somare to do. In any case,
if the claim that the "dangerous" men were using the cabinet to rubberstamp their unilateral decisions was valid, then it follows that their
faction was in the majority, or at least enjoyed majority support in
cabinet. Having failed to obtain satisfaction in private, Wingti went public
towards the end of October with his demands for a reshuffle.
Nahau Rooney, an on and off Pangu MP for Manus, a minister in an
earlier Somare cabinet who thought she should have been a minister
again this time, one of Wingti's staunchest followers and his chief
negotiator with the opposition parties, expectedly tried to explain Wingti's
challenge in terms of ideology and principles. 2 One of PNG's most
experienced journalists also slipped the terms "left" (Wingti's faction) and
"right" (the opposing faction) into his analysis of the split in Pangu. 3
Otherwise there has been virtual consensus among observers and
commentators that what is involved here is pure power play. Having come
so far in such a short time within Pangu, Wingti wanted to clinch the
post-Somare succession in advance by clipping the wings of Siaguru, by
July-December 1984
387
securing the promotion of backbenchers whose allegiance to himself he

was assiduously cultivating (e.g., Thomas Negints, Tony Ila, Jack Genia),
by enticing suitable opposition members to defect to Pangu (e.g., Peter
Kuman, the opposition chief Whip himself) and, above all, by seeking to
wrest control of Damai Pty Ltd, Pangu's business arm, and hence control
over party funds, from his rivals. 4 Somare had hinted on a few occasions
that he was looking to an early retirement from politics, possibly even
before the 1987 elections. Therefore, Wingti, having just completed the
consolidation of his electoral base by the establishment of Kumul Kopi
Export Co, 5 Launched his campaign to remove the basis of his discomfort
within Pangu and, simultaneously, to advance himself several steps
towards the succession.
The opposition parties, ever ready to try a motion of no-confidence,
quickly established contacts with Wingti's faction just as soon as they
learnt of the challenge and Somare's refusal to sack the named senior
ministers. 6 Government backbenchers, all of them prone to delusions of
ministerial grandeur, began to add their voices to the calls for a reshuffle.
At the end of October Martin ToVadek, one of the three United party
ministers, resigned his Health portfolio for family reasons (according to
the Post-Courier) or possibly because of frustrations in cabinet (according
to the Niugini Nius). The opposition naturally saw the resignation as
another hopeful sign that the disintegration of Somare's ministry was at
hand. With the November budget session only a week away, and aware
that ministers dropped in a reshuffle in PNG tend to "payback" by voting
with the opposition in motions of no-confidence, Somare announced that
he would reshuffle his cabinet after the impending session of Parliament.
The next day, Wingti expressed his opposition to the delay. Contacts
between the Wingti faction and the opposition intensified. Somare too,
amidst encouragement from a section of the press and probably the
business world, was in touch with Sir Julius Chan who led thirteen
People's Progress party MPs. Sir Julius had retained for his party a
privileged status as a minority party in Parliament, outside of the
opposition groups, thereby preserving his freedom of action as a maker of
winning coalitions in the parliamentary numbers game. Thus, once more,
on the eve of a parliamentary session, the ferocious sport of poaching the
opponents' members was in place. It is a game whose only valid rule
appears to be: "get the numbers".
Tom Awasa, a United party-sponsored candidate in 1982 (or only
partially sponsored half of the way, according to him) who switched to
Pangu after he won and was rewarded with a ministry, evidently spoke
for each player: "When I won the elections, I told my electorate that I did
not win the elections because I wanted to be in the opposition. I wanted
to be in the government". 7 Paul Torato, the parliamentary leader of the
United party, emphasised the confined, parliamentary character of the
game. He declaimed: "I will not go out in the street or by the road sides
to recruit members to build up the party. This has to be done in
Parliament". 8 Sir Julius Chan for his part gave an insight into the specific
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YawSaffu
techniques utilised by parties to win when he accused his opponents of

"snatching members from other parties and greasing independents by
detaining them at hotels, and doubtless with the assistance of liquor
accounts and feminine liaisons". 9 The MPs so obviously love their
freedom to shop around for ministerial positions that in the August
session of Parliament they forced the government to shelve a bill intended
to curb this very propensity. 10 In the debate on the issue in Parliament one
MP actually opined that "party stability is one of the dangerous policies
we are trying to establish in this country".U
On 5 November, the same day that Parliament convened for its fourth
and last session for the year, Tony Siaguru, the real target of Wingti's
venom, resigned from cabinet to be free to lunge into Wingti. He detailed
Wingti's land deals and exposed Wingti's business relationship with the
top brass of the United party. It is ironic that Wingti, whose contribution
to the barrage of hints and innuendos about corruption and sharp deals
was so important, was also the only one whose deals received detailed
documentation. Two days after Siaguru's resignation, the opposition
issued a statement which said: "The leaders of groups in the opposition
have confirmed with the Deputy Prime Minister that they are prepared to
form a new government with him and his group" .12 However, at the same
time that this statement was being read to the press, the Pangu
parliamentary caucus was papering over the rift, voting on the one hand
to reject Wingti's resignation, and on the other to reinstate Siaguru. On
the surface, Somare's Melanesian-style, "tangential approach" to problemsolving appeared to have worked. Somare and Wingti addressed a press
conference together on 9 November. Later, in Parliament, Wingti claimed
that "the current conflict within Pangu had led to an even stronger Pangu
government". 13 But the opposition clearly did not believe that Pangu was
now so united or that Wingti was now so solid with his Prime Minister
that a motion of no-confidence in Somare was not worth a try. The
caballing definitely did not stop. On 13 November, Fr John Momis, the
Deputy Leader of the Opposition, gave the required seven-day notice of
a motion of no-confidence and named Iambakey Okuk as the alternative
Prime Minister. However, with Wingti failing to move over to join forces
with the opposition, primarily because the question of who becomes
Prime Minister was not resolved to his satisfaction, and with the very
numerate Sir Julius Chan keeping his PPP members' votes to himself
because he had done his sums and had concluded that Somare had the
numbers to defeat the opposition bid for power, because a move either
way appeared to be fraught with danger for his party's unity, and most
probably because Chan does not really think much of Okuk, the motion
was withdrawn on 19 November.
A cabinet reshuffle had quite clearly been induced by the faction fight
and by the opposition challenge. The resignation of Sir Pita Lus, the
intensely loyal veteran MP of 1964 vintage, one of a handful or so of a
remarkable but clearly endangered species, created one more vacancy at
the top in addition to the one created by Martin ToVadek's earlier
July-December 1984
389
resignation. On 21 December, Somare reshuffled his cabinet. It became

clear that Wingti had been demoted in the reshuffle. He was moved from
National Planning to Education, exchanging positions with Barry
Holloway. Education is clearly an important ministry. It consumes the
largest portion of the budget. But, compared with National Planning,
Education is like a tributary ministry pouring into mainstream National
Planning. Further, although Wingti remained Deputy Prime Minister,
Philip Bouraga, who remained at Finance, was now designated as State
Minister assisting the Prime Minister. So, as observers asked, what did
Wingti's deputy prime ministership amount to?
Although Tony Siaguru was given only a fraction of the portfolio
which the more junior Tom Awasa had before (Siaguru was given the
Youth Ministry where Tom Awasa had, in addition to Youth, Women,
Religion and Recreation) nobody suggested that Siaguru had been
demoted because, looking at the realities of the situation rather than the
nomenclature, it would have been incorrect to think so. With an estimated
population of 650,000 youth, out of the PNG total population of about
3.3 million, with the renewed attention to youth training schemes and
youth problems on account of the deteriorating law and order scene, Tony
Siaguru had been handed a challenging ministry, but also one with very
obvious rewards for anybody wanting to establish a personal power base
that would span the whole country. Of the other members of the
"dangerous gang", Nilkare went from Decentralisation to Lands - and
wagging tongues were quick to say: "to pull the wrap on Wingti". Stack
remained at Industrial Development. Some of the promoted new men,
Jack Genia and Tony Ila, for instance, were among those that Wingti was
known to have cultivated. But not nearly enough of his proteges and
allies got in: the Negints, the Rooneys and the Ramois. In summary, a
third of the twenty-seven-member cabinet was dropped; a third of the old
cabinet retained their portfolios; two-thirds of the new cabinet were new
to their jobs. 14 Wingti's reaction to all these changes was, "They have
played their game, now I'll play mine" .15
Changes in the Opposition Leadership
On 6 December, the National court upheld a losing candidate's petition
and declared that Iambakey Okuk was not residentially qualified when he
contested the Unggai-Bena by-election, an opportunity deliberately
created for Okuk to get back into Parliament by the resignation of a National
party stalwart, Akepa Miakwe. Okuk handed over the National party
leadership in Parliament to Stephen Tago, the only Papuan MP in that
party. His deputy was Gai Duwabane, a Highlands MP. The leadership of
the parliamentary opposition was not settled as amicably. It appears that
some National party MPs and the Melanesian Alliance MPs got together
and elected Fr Momis, Deputy Leader of the Opposition under Okuk, as
the new Leader of the Opposition, with Stephen Tago as the new deputy
leader. Mahuru Rarua Rarua, MP for Moresby North-West and the leader
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of the Papuan Solidarity Group in Parliament, allegedly a trans-party

grouping of all Papuan MPs but in fact a rump of the now virtually
defunct Papua Besena party, objected strongly to the way Momis had
acceded to the leadership. Berating the padre for failing to uphold
principles of democracy, he threatened that his group would not be part
of what he termed "an opposition of convenience". 16 But the truth of the
matter is that his group has nowhere to go. It is too small, only three
members really, and too disunited to be of interest to Somare, having to
contend as he does with the only slightly bigger but even more disunited
United party. Paul Torato, parliamentary leader of the United party, also
challenged Momis' and Tago's leadership of the opposition, objecting to
what he described as "this murky business of passing the leadership from
one person to another" .17
Provincial Government Matters
Parliament voted on 17 August to extend the suspension of the Enga
provincial government by another six months. The following month
Manus provincial government became the second one to be suspended,
again for financial mismanagement and lack of accountability which were
detailed in an Auditor-General's report. The suspension of the Simbu
provincial government in December on identical grounds was a further
testimony to the growing indiscipline and lawlessness surrounding the
affairs of most provincial governments. The sheer number of motions of
no-confidence that are generated in the provincial government system,
successful and unsuccessful, is an aspect of this "lawlessness", this
"revenge politics" or "payback politics", as Alfred Sasako has aptly
dubbed it. 18 In the period, there were motions of no-confidence in East
Sepik, Gulf, only six months after the installation of the government, in
Milne Bay and in Central, where Dr Reuben Taureka's government was
ousted on 20 September and the former Premier, Kone Vanuawaru,
returned to power. The indiscipline was particularly evident in the bizarre
behaviour of defeated or about to be defeated provincial politicians. Thus
in the Central Province, after the overthrow of the Taureka government,
there were two Speakers: a new Speaker was voted in, but the old one
refused to vacate the office. In Enga, the suspended Premier publicly
vowed to obstruct the new provincial Secretary because he opposed the
removal of the previous Secretary. In Milne Bay, the Assembly's attempt
to remove the Speaker, which it had the right to do, resulted simply in the
Speaker locking up the premises and taking off. In the Western Highlands
Province, apparently to make their electoral bases more secure, the
government came up with a scheme to appoint councillors, instead of
being elected by the voters as before. Even Utula Samana, evidently, is
not averse to deriving some political advantage from the general
atmosphere of relaxed indiscipline. He was defeated in his efforts to
increase the number of ministers in his cabinet from 10 to 12. There was
nothing illegal in his attempt to amend the provincial constitution, only
July-December 1984
391
that as Samana would be the first to acknowledge, if he were not

benefiting politically, twelve ministers for a province, even the largest in
the country, is a little extravagant.
If the suspensions of the provincial government showed the national
government's determination to impose certain minimum standards of
performance and accountability, the Prime Minister's announcement of 27
September that he would throw the whole question of the future of the
provincial government system to the voters to decide in a referendum
showed the extent of its exasperation. The reaction of the provincial
governments of the Islands region to the announcement was sharp and
totally negative. They threatened to secede from PNG if the referendum
went ahead. The Premier of East New Britain, Roland ToVue, convened
a meeting of the Islands leaders in Rabaul where the threat to secede was
apparently endorsed - "but as a last resort".
Unlike the provincial government elections in Simbu in the earlier half
of the year which had been attended by considerable violence, the
provincial elections in Sandaun in November/December and in Madang in
December gave only a partial and weak indication of the gathering crisis
in the system. In Sandaun, eighteen out of twenty-five members of the
Provincial Assembly were returned by their electorates. The Melanesian
Alliance claimed victory even before all the results were in. Momis
declared: "The people have rejected Pangu and PPP. People are rejecting
bribes as a mode of operation in the political area. People are more
informed, critical and responsible". 19 Pangu, on the other hand, claimed
only a modest win of six seats and announced that it was supporting the
former Premier, Andrew Komboni, for the premiership. 20 In the end Paul
Langro, who is vice-chairman of the United party at the national level,
but at the provincial level is probably a member of the Sandaun
Independent Group, emerged as Premier at the head of a coalition of
Pangu, some MA members and the Sandaun Independent group, much to
the disappointment of Fr Momis, the leader of the Melanesian Alliance.
He accused Pangu of poaching. "Politics in PNG", he now said, "is
getting more nasty and dirty". 21 The election in Madang was a more
extravagant affair. There were 202 candidates for the twenty-four seats,
with Yomba (15) Usino (16) and Bundi (17) at the top end of the
candidate subscription scale.
Samana, who had attempted earlier in the year to influence the
outcome of the provincial elections in the Western Highlands Province,
again intervened in Madang to urge Morobeans there to support
candidates he approved ofY Nine out of the twenty-four sitting members
were returned. It appears that younger, better educated men had been
voted in to replace the older members. Once more, even before all the
seats had been declared, the Melanesian Alliance was claiming victory.
But it appears that only some very smart footwork in the Provincial
Assembly secured to Max Moeder the premiership. At 9 a.m. sharp on the
first day of the Assembly, while the Pangu faction was no doubt still
trying to keep its acquired numbers together in some hotel, with thirteen
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out of twenty-four members of the Assembly present, the election of the

Premier and the Deputy Premier proceeded. By the time the Pangu
faction came it was all over. Moeder's tactics were challenged in court.
A National court judge ruled that the election of the Premier was legal.
Half of the members constitute a quorum. 23
Budgetary Matters, Resource Exploitation and Environmental Issues
Both Hetura Meja of the Philippines and Halla Resources of South Korea
once won and lost the contract to develop the vast Vanimo timber project,
a 290,000 hectare tract of virgin forest resources in Sandaun Province. In
October, Bunning Brothers of Western Australia, which had tendered all
along with others right from the word go several years back, was now
awarded the contract. The Times must be satisfied with the credentials of
Bunning Brothers and/or with the terms of the contract, since its spirited
campaigns against the two earlier abortive contracts has not been evident
in this instance.
Nineteen eighty-four was a year of good prices for PNG's agricultural
exports. Coffee fetched K112 million. (x 1.3 to get the $A equivalent);
copra K76 million; palm oil K74 million; and cocoa K56 million. The
International Coffee Organisation granted an increase of 38,000 bags to
PNG's quota. The high earnings prompted two large new investments in
agricultural projects. In West New Britain, Harrison and Crossfield,
already involved in palm oil plantations in West New Britain, announced
a new palm oil project worth K37 million in the same province. In Milne
Bay Province, the Commonwealth Development Corporation announced
an investment of K60. 7 million in a cocoa project. The good earnings and
the burgeoning size of the stabilisation funds also prompted a politician
to suggest that the accumulated funds be used to finance development
projects. 24 To its eternal credit, the government thundered a loud "No".
Papua New Guinea's impressive fisheries potential was also highlighted
in a Bank of PNG Economic Bulletin. With a coastline of 8,300
kilometres, over 600 islands and the 200-mile fishing rights zone, PNG
has fishing grounds of over two million square kilometres, two large river
systems, the Fly and the Sepik, and 1,600 fish species suitable for
consumption.
Although metal prices were low in 1984 and were expected to remain
low in 1985, receipts from Bougainville Copper were estimated to
account for a fifth of the estimated internal revenue of K517. 7 million in
the 1985 budget brought down in the November session of Parliament.
With total expenditure set at K930 million, and an estimated internal
revenue of K517. 7 million, it is quite clear that the hefty K24 7. 7 million
Australian budgetary subsidy is still a key factor in PNG politics. The
low metal prices were at the base of some of the problems which the
government had with its international partners in the Ok Tedi mining
venture in the period. Twice, in July and in August, the government
ordered Ok Tedi to shut down because of environmental hazards from its
July-December 1984
393
operations. The company had not constructed a permanent tailings dam to

deal with the poisonous waste effluent.
There had been plain bad luck, or perhaps incompetence, when the site
chosen for the permanent tailings dam simply collapsed in an avalanche
of rocks and mud during a massive landslide at the beginning of the year.
Then in June 2,500 drums of cyanide for the gold processing operations
were lost in rough weather at the mouth of the Fly River in the Gulf of
Papua. Only 125 drums from a split container were recovered. Whether
through bad luck or through incompetence, there had been very serious
cost overruns. $US910 million had been spent on Stage I of the project.
Yet no permanent tailings dam had been constructed and no hydroelectric project had been initiated. Another $US250-300 million was
required to complete Stage 1, the mining and the processing of the gold
cap. The first export of gold had already begun in June. The permanent
tailings dam and the hydro project were supposed to be completed by
August 1986 when Stage II, mining and processing of copper, would
begin. But the general manager of the Ok Tedi Company (Shareholders:
Amoco (US) thirty per cent; Broken Hill Pty (Australia) thirty per cent;
a West German consortium twenty per cent; PNG government twenty per
cent) was now saying that copper processing would be postponed for
more than two years to 1989. The private shareholders were clearly
reluctant to commit further funds to complete Stage I, blaming low metal
prices. The government began to have doubts about the intentions of its
partners. Might they not just decide to cut their losses by removing the
gold cap, which they were now doing, and leaving the copper unmined
and unprocessed? On 21 November, the government, declaring its
dissatisfaction with the company's tardiness and non-adherence to the
agreements, decided to exercise its option and limit its Stage I
commitment to $US45 million. This meant that there would be no more
cash from the government, as its contribution had reached that level
already. Thus began the very high stakes game of poker between the
government and its international partners. The company began laying off
workers, spelt out the community projects it would axe, and accused the
government of failing to fulfil its obligations to the company and of
wanting the private shareholders "to carry the can". The government for
its part, on 27 November, gave the company up to 31 January 1985 to
submit firm plans about its intentions or face a closure.
The Irian Jaya Problem
The border-crossers or refugees who numbered a few hundred in
February were over 11,000 by October. At the end of July, the
Department of Foreign Affairs announced that border-crossers would be
escorted back within a few weeks "without UN supervision". Internally,
students and others like the Red Cross who were against the repatriation
were becoming vocal. University of Technology students at Lae, for
instance, pledged to boycott classes and take to the streets to demonstrate
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their opposition. Externally, Indonesian troops did not make things any
easier for the government. There were allegations that they burnt down
houses and gardens on the PNG side, no doubt to force the villagers not
to aid and comfort the OPM rebels/freedom fighters. OPM activities were
also tending to harass the government. At the beginning of July the
government gave the OPM a deadline, 3 pm on 3 July, to release a
community school teacher whom they had abducted as a protest against
government measures to repatriate the border-crossers/refugees. He was
released before the deadline. Troops were moved up to Sandaun Province
in the middle of July to check OPM activities inside PNG, while around
the same time the Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, raised the question
of Indonesian incursion at the seventeenth meeting of ASEAN in Jakarta.
The Indonesians pledged to give PNG advance warning on future military
exercises. Namaliu again raised the Irian Jaya issue at the UN in
September.
For several reasons, the Irian Jaya issue took a fair amount of
Parliament's time during the November session. First, there had been
several deaths in the refugee camps, beginning in August, no doubt
because of the insanitary conditions in the camps. Secondly, Fr John
Momis had met the OPM leader, James Nyaro, on PNG soil. Thirdly, a
joint verification team had been attacked by the refugees at the
Blackwater Camp, and some Indonesian members on the team had been
critically injured, provoking demonstrations in Jakarta against the PNG
mission. Fourthly, there were renewed clashes between the OPM and
Indonesian forces in October. Therefore, the Prime Minister had
authorised the use of troops on the border at the beginning of November.
Finally a new border agreement had been initialled in October and this
had to be ratified by Parliament.
Relations with Indonesia were getting warmer meanwhile, in spite of
all these developments and in spite of the Jakarta demonstrations. Jakarta
was mellowing. Indonesia now agreed, in December, to allow UNHCR to
participate in the repatriation exercise. Indonesia also agreed to let PNG
officials travel with border crossers to their home villages and to make
checks at later times. By the end of the year, Foreign Minister Namaliu
assessed the situation in the following way: about 500 Irian Jayans,
mostly academics, government officials, and army deserters who did not
want to return would qualify for political refugee status. More than 1,000
had hitched back to their villages, leaving about 9,300 in the various
camps on the border. These would be repatriated but it would not be done
in a hurry. Some moneys were now coming from UNHCR, Indonesia,
Australia and PNG itself to clothe and feed them until March 1985 at
least.
Law and Order Problems
Law and order, or more to the point, lawlessness and lack of order, are
fast becoming the Achilles' heel of PNG, the outstanding threat to the
July-December 1984
395
practice of humane government that has characterised the first ten years
of her independent existence. Of course, some commentators would see
crime as a mere symptom of more basic sicknesses in the society. But
whatever the cause of crime, and whether it is capable of affecting the
course of national development, the cost of the evidently uncontrollable
urban crime to the victims, to the government and to society at large is
daily in evidence. A siege mentality has been fostered. Like the weather
to the English, crime has become an obsession. The difference though is
that crime in PNG is not a mere opening conversation gambit. It is a real
worry. The situation has been building up over several years now. But the
anti-crime emotions released by a gang rape of two expatriate women and
an eleven-year old girl at the Port Moresby suburb of Badili in October
were spectacular.
A virtually spontaneous protest demonstration was under way the next
day. A week later, a more organised, and a truly mammoth demonstration
by an impassioned and angry crowd of about 25,000 finally ended up at
the government offices at Waigani, where a petition for more serious and
effective measures to combat the law and order problem was presented to
the Prime Minister. Other urban centres organised similar demonstrations,
the one in Madang timed to coincide with the National Executive Council
meeting there. On 17 October, the NEC meeting in Madang adopted
forty-nine specific measures. 25 A task force headed by an excommissioner of police was appointed to oversee the implementation of
those measures.
There has been no shortage of suggestions from all sorts of quarters on
how the crime situation can be improved. Roland To Vue, the East New
Britain Premier, advocates the reinstatement of the colonial Vagrancy Act,
to allow police to send unemployed squatters back to their villages.
Indeed, the Madang provincial government has been trying to implement
its own undeclared "Vagrancy Act", trying to evict Sepik settlers and
repatriate them. Sir Barry Holloway, after a visit to Israel, was much
taken with the kibbutz idea. With the support of some of his cabinet
colleagues, he proposed a scheme to settle each of the various ethnic
groups presently living in squatter settlements on a 50 hectare kibbutz in
the Moitaka area of Port Moresby. No doubt if it worked it would be
extended to other urban centres. For Utula Samana, who obviously does
not share the national parliamentarians' faith in minimum penalties, as he
unsuccessfully challenged the legality of the Minimum Penalties Act in
the Supreme court, the formula for success in crime control in Morobe is
for the provincial government to be given control of the police, land and
investment! A consultants' report, the so-called Clifford Report,
sponsored by the Institute of National Affairs and issued in September,
saw community responsibility, integration of the police in neighbourhood
communities, and the expansion and strengthening of village courts as the
major prongs of attack on crime. 26
The report managed to miss the obvious point that village courts in
urban settings are a complete nonstarter. Whose traditions and customs
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YawSaffu
would the village courts uphold? Parliament voted on 19 November to

bring back the PNG Volunteer Rifles, school cadets and the reserve
police. But the most pertinent suggestions came from the gangsters
themselves.
The Post-Courier of 28 December carried a report which speaks
volumes about the openness, tolerance and respect for constitutionalism
in the emerging political culture of the country. About 300 gang members
and leaders of eleven powerful gangs with fanciful names met at one of
the squatter settlements in Port Moresby and pledged to go straight and
pledged further to help the government fight crime. But in return they
wanted from the government "youth programmes, cleaning contracts and
small business ventures, trade stores, fishing, poultry, farming". They
promised that "1985 would not be trouble free for the citizens" unless the
government did something about theh demands. Thh. wa:, a chilling,
threatening rather than a promising close to a year that had seen
spontaneous gaiety when the Pope visited in May, pomp and pageantry
when Prince Charles came to open the ultra-beautiful but equally ultraextravagant national Parliament in August, and that had witnessed a
costly, prestigious, perhaps unnecessary CHOGRM meeting.
42
JANUARYJUNE 1985
YawSaffu
The Unpredictability of PNG Politics
On the basis of the events of the first six months of 1985, the only
prediction that a wise man should be prepared to put his money on is that
PNG politics will continue to be characterised by a conspicuous
formlessness, well beyond the next national elections scheduled for 1987.
Nothing else is predictable.
The Political Chronicle for July-December 1984 gave the reasons
behind the cabinet reshuffle on 21 December. It also showed how the
disqualification of lambakey Okuk as an MP on 6 December led to John
Momis and Stephen Tago becoming the Leader and Deputy Leader,
respectively, of the opposition. In February, an extraordinary letter written
by Okuk to Somare was leaked to the press. Machiavelli himself would
have been hard put to it to match the cynical amoralism that suffused
Okuk's proposals in the letter.
Reminding Somare of the continuing danger which Wingti, in
collaboration with the opposition, represented to the Pangu government,
Okuk proposed a coalition between his National party and Somare's
Pangu as the way to stop Wingti. Further, and here was the punchline,
Somare should order the Electoral Commissioner to issue the writs for
the Unggai-Bena by-election immediately, to ensure that Okuk would be
back in Parliament for the March session. The letter contained very
specific instructions on how Somare should go about this clearly
unconstitutional, and potentially politically damaging, chore.
Somare should summon the Electoral Commissioner and present him
with an ultimatum: to issue writs immediately or be replaced. Somare
should "ensure that only two of you are in the room and that you advise
him that the conversation is being contained within the four walls and
that if he discussed it outside the room, you will deny that the
conversation ever took place. Of course, you will have to replace him if
he goes to the media". 1
While this amazing plan was simply Okuk's super-speed boat to get
him back to Parliament, Okuk sought to justify it, ironically, in terms of
an alleged danger to constitutional democracy. "It is fine for us to have
a constitution of an ultra-democratic Society", he said, "but the type of
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government that would be provided by Mr Wingti would make a mockery

of that democracy". 2
Okuk has a largely favourable popular reputation as an "action man".
The corollary from that, as shown by this episode, is Okuk's evident
devotion to cutting awkward constitutional and procedural corners. Yet, in
an emerging political culture in which constitutionalism appears to have
a strong hold on political actors, not only does Okuk invariably get away
without strong censure, but also quite a number of people have resigned
and offered their office, when necessary, so that Okuk's political career
could progress. 1 This is a truly remarkable phenomenon, given that
political behaviour in PNG is heavily characterised by an assertive
individualism and pronounced pragmatism, both of which sit rather
incongruously with such deference. Okuk evidently possesses a non-stick
teflon coating, of about the same quality as Ronald Reagan's. He could
even joke publicly about his remarkable letter: "From my experience,
however, I would warn anyone wishing to write to the Prime Minister to
take extra precautions. Perhaps the best advice is not to write". 4
Okuk's scenario about what would happen in the March session of
Parliament, if he was not back there to lead his pack, proved uncannily
accurate. On 18 March, the first day of the March session, Wingti
announced his resignation, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Education, from Somare's cabinet. Within one hour or so of his
announcement, Sir Julius Chan had given the mandatory one week's
notice of a motion of no-confidence in Somare, and had named Wingti as
the alternative Prime Minister. Chan, who had refused to go along with
the November 1984 attempt to unseat the Pangu government, obviously
reckoned without either the pervasive payback syndrome in PNG political
culture, or the impressive ability of most PNG politicians to make 180
degree turns, or square circles, when either is required for selfadvancement.
On 20 March, the Pangu caucus expelled Wingti, along with Nahau
Rooney, MP for Manus Open, Pato Kakarya, who was dropped in the
December 1984 cabinet reshuffle, and Bai Waibe, the Pangu Whip.
Eventually, fifteen Pangu MPs migrated with Wingti to the opposition
benches where they formed a new party, the People's Democratic
Movement, on 28 March. Tom Awasa (dropped in the December 1984
reshuffle) was deputy chairman, with Nahau Rooney as acting general
secretary, Bai Waibe as treasurer, and Legu Vagi (Moresby South) and
Thomas Negints (Tambul-Nebilyer, Western Highlands) as executive
members. In anticipation of the defections, Somare had approached both
Okuk and Fr Momis with invitations to become Pangu's coalition
partners. That Okuk would accept Somare's invitation was widely
expected. It was also expected that Okuk would be able to prevail on his
party's executive and MPs to go along, given that the National party has
not been known to articulate any coherent set of policy differences from
Pangu.
But what most people would have discounted, until it happened, was
January-June 1985
399
that Momis would lead his Melanesian Alliance into the coalition and
save the Pangu government from being thrown out. So venomous had
been Momis's attacks on alleged Pangu government corruption, especially
since assuming the leadership of the opposition in December, and so
wide, relatively speaking, did the policy gap between Pangu and the
Melanesian Alliance appear over practically every issue, that Momis's
decision took people by surprise.
On 25 March, after losing by sixty-five to forty on a procedural but
tell-tale vote, Wingti led a walk-out by a section of the opposition so that
when the National party and the Melanesian Alliance voted with Pangu, 5
the motion of no-confidence was easily defeated, by sixty-eight votes to
nineteen.
In the wake of the easy defeat came the difficult reshuffle, the second
in less than four months, this time to accommodate new coalition
partners. Boyamo Sali, Minister for Defence and a senior, steadfast Pangu
stalwart, had resigned on 13 March. Apparently, his personal conduct had
invited pressures on him to resign. 6 Together with the Education Ministry
vacated by Wingti, there were thus two vacancies. But these were not
enough. Barry Holloway and Tony Siaguru had to resign to free two more
ministries. While the Melanesian Alliance obtained the deputy prime
ministership (Momis) and two ministries, Public Service (Momis) and
Education (Sam Tulo), in return for bringing the support of only five
MPs, the National party, with twelve members, obtained only two
portfolios, Defence (Stephen Tago) and Civil Aviation (William Wi),
when it had wanted one ministry for every four MPs. Thus the National
party was taunted by the new opposition Whip, Mahuru Rarua Rarua, for
having accepted a cheap bride-price.
Perhaps a more graphic illustration cannot be offered of the
formlessness of PNG politics than the spectacle of Wingti, now Leader of
the Opposition, spouting vintage Momis expressions of righteous
indignation, in his relentless attacks on alleged Pangu government
corruption, with Fr Momis now having to deflect waspish opposition
probes, and having to defend the Pangu government and Pangu policies
against erstwhile anti-Pangu comrades-in-arms. Without a hint of what the
difference was, between his November 1984 motion of no-confidence and
the March move by Chang-Wingti, Momis condemned the latter as a
"self-interested bid for power". 7 Perhaps nemesis is Fr Momis, with his
image of one who works hard at personifying moral rectitude, having to
convince his followers about the rightness of teaming up with a
government he had so trenchantly berated for moral laxitude.
In May, Okuk won the Unggai-Bena by-election and was back in
Parliament for the May-June session. He regained the parliamentary
leadership of the National party while Stephen Tago reverted to the
position of deputy, Gai Dawubane having resigned to make this possible.
Okuk, naturally, expected to be given a ministry. But Somare had a real
problem. There just were not enough ministries to go round. Somare even
considered creating a second Deputy Prime Minister. But he had to
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abandon the idea in the face of a barrage of opposition and media

criticism. The failure of the no-confidence motion in March meant that
the government was safe until the August-September session of Parliament,
after the mandatory six month interval between motions of no-confidence.
So, instead, Karl Stack, the Commerce and Industry Minister, was picked
on in the June session, ostensibly on account of his non-compliance with
customs regulations. But he survived the motion of no-confidence.
Ok Tedi and Aid Negotiations

The last chronicle detailed the bases of the government's dissatisfaction
with its Ok Tedi partners and the ultimatum it gave to the Ok Tedi
Company to submit firm plans about its intentions by 31 January 1985 or
face u shut-down. The firm plans were not submitted. Instead, the PostCourier reported that BHP, which has thirty per cent shares in the Ok
Tedi Company, was threatening to withdraw and redirect its funds to
Chile if the government took a tough line. 8 On 31 January, the
government ordered the Ok Tedi mine to be shut within thirty days "in a
gradual and orderly fashion". The company was ordered to submit its
plan for an orderly shut-down by 8 February, to stop mining ore by 10
February, and to stop processing ore by 28 February. Property at mine
site and maintenance after closure would, however, remain the company's
responsibility.
The government's last proposals to the shareholders had made several
concessions to them. For instance, the completion of Stage Two was now
postponed by three years, to March 1989. 9 The government was also
prepared to put K38 million into the Hydro Plant and bring forward a
$US30 million loan guarantee. But it insisted that the tailings dam must
be built out of gold revenue and that the shareholders will not receive
dividends until the completion of Stage Two, or unless the government
agreed.
The government and its partners disagreed most about the injection of
more money by the shareholders and about whether the Additional
Projects Tax's twenty per cent allowance would continue beyond the
construction period, as the company wanted.
Although the closure of the mine would mean revenue losses to the
government and to the Western provincial government, and the loss of
jobs would also be worrying, it was international capital's expected
reaction to its stance that appeared most worrisome to the government.
The government had, wisely, neither borrowed in anticipation of revenue
from the mine, nor had it planned to receive budgetary help from the
mine until 1990. But it believed its credit rating to be under threat unless
it could appear to international capital to be flexible and responsible (i.e.,
accommodating).
On 20 March, an agreement was signed to reopen the mine. 10 The
agreement committed the Ok Tedi Company to build a permanent tailings
dam, a plant and ancillary infrastructure to process 20,000 tonnes of
January-June 1985
401
copper per day, an investment of $US250-300 million. If copper and gold

prices increased sufficiently (and a test for this was incorporated in the
agreement) the company would have to expand copper processing
facilities, involving a further investment of about $US400 million.
The government was also involved in negotiations with Australia over
the next quinquennial Australian aid agreement, for the period 1986-91. 11
Following the publication in 1984 of the report of the Jackson Committee
on Australian Aid Program, and the stated wish of the Joint Australian
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, that the recommended
Jackson rates of decline in Australian aid to PNG be "gradually
accelerated", the PNG government geared itself for diplomatic battle to
ensure minimal cuts. The government also sought to prevent the aid from
becoming either procurement-tied, as Australia's manufacturers' lobby
was said to favour, or project-tied, as some PNG opposition politicians
(such as Fr Momis before he became a member of Somare's cabinet)
were urging. 12 The Deputy Leader of the Melanesian Alliance, Bernard
Narokobi, even wanted, incredibly, a twenty per cent cut, while even the
Australians were talking of cuts of less than five per cent. MA's dialectal
reasoning, which made "untied aid a neocolonialist concept", but tied aid
presumably not, was a shade too subtle for this chronicler. Bipartisanship,
even on issues such as this, is evidently unknown in the PNG political
lexicon.
By the end of June, the only unequivocal outcome to the negotiations
was that Australia had rejected PNG's plea to cut aid by only one per
cent. Somare, uncharacteristically, declared an end to further negotiation.
But both sides are so much aware of their special relationship, and of the
place of this remarkably generous untied aid in the relationship, that
further negotiations are clearly on the cards.
Elections to provincial assemblies were held in East New Britain and
Southern Highlands in March and June, respectively. In East New Britain,
the incumbent Premier, Roland ToVue, regained the premiership with the
support of ten members of the so-called To Vue group of re-elected
assemblymen and five Melanesian Alliance members. The results of the
Southern Highlands Province could be read as indicating a relatively high
popular satisfaction with the performance of the members of the previous
assembly. Twenty-five out of twenty-nine (or thirty-two, if the three
nominated members are included) were returned (the percentage turn-over
rate of less than twenty per cent being very low by PNG standards).
Yaungtine Koromba, a 36-year old, former Lutheran pastor was elected
Premier. He was supported by sixteen assembly members who called
themselves the Southern Highlands Independent Group. Despite its name,
however, members of the group were all affiliated to political parties.
Four belonged to the People's Democratic Movement. PPP and National
party had three members each. And there were two each for MA and
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Yaw Saffu
Papua Besena. n Although president of the PPP in the Southern Highlands

since 1980, Koromba declared his resignation from the PPP just as soon
as he was elected Premier. The need to keep his motley supporters united,
and also the belief that the party affiliation of a provincial government
can prejudice relations with the national government, the provider of
development projects and services, dictated Koromba's disaffiliation.
In two other provinces, changes of government were effected by
successful motions of no-confidence. In the Oro (Northern) Province, the
government of Conway Ihove was replaced in January by one led by
Denis Kagere, the former Speaker. In the Western Highlands, Premier
Kagul Koroka's government was toppled in April. The new Premier,
Philip Kapal, was backed by a Pangu-National coalition. Observers
related developments in the Western Highlands to the well known rivalry
between Wingti and Kindi Lawi (Western Highlands Regional, and since
December 1984, Minister for Home Affairs). The new Premier is said to
be Kindi Lawi's protege, while the former Premier was Wingti's man.
Thus their fortunes coincided with the changing fortunes of their patrons
at the national level. The change of government in the Western Highlands
resulted in the appointment of a five-man review committee, headed by
the veteran politician, Sir Thomas Kavali, to investigate the wishes of the
people in the province regarding the form of local government they
wished to have.
The Enga, Simbu and Manus provincial governments remained
suspended. But the pace of their return to elected rule varied. In Simbu,
the Administrator and his deputy constantly received death threats
(resulting in a round-the-clock police protection for them) and the exPremier, Matthew Siune, threatened to burn down the provincial capital,
Kundiawa, on account of the suspension and the pressing of
embezzlement charges against him.
In Manus, after the jailing of the ex-Premier, Joel Maiah, along with
a few bureaucrats, for embezzlement, preparations got under way for
elections in the second half of the year. Gaol, for embezzlement, has
become the next office for several ex-Premiers: Maiah in Manus; Mara in
the Western Highlands; Tindiwi in Enga.
Law and Order

In line with the forty-nine anti-crime measures adopted by the government
towards the end of 1984, the 1985 budget contained increased allocations
for law enforcement agencies (up from K59.5 million to K67 million) and
for youth programs. Some of the forty-nine measures were being
implemented. For instance ninety soldiers were regularly out on patrol
with the police during the first four months of the year, and the Police
Reserve Force was reactivated. But, as the Times pointed out, at the end
of May, only eight out of the forty-nine measures had been
implemented. 14 It was thus not surprising that, going by newspaper
reports, police statistics and the mushrooming of security companies, the
January-June 1985
403
law enforcement agencies were losing the fight against the criminals. In
the Highlands, banks shut up shop for one day in February to dramatise
and protest their insecurity. A coffee strike by buyers in the Western and
Eastern Highlands was initiated in June because of armed hold-ups and
shootings. The executive officer of the Coffee Industry Association
warned that the coffee industry was "in grave danger of collapsing unless
the law and order problem was brought under control". 15 Horrific stories
of pack rapes, of armed robberies, of break and enters accompanied by
violence and terrorism, hogged prime space in newspapers, day after day.
Meanwhile, in April, Pious Kerepia (in charge of the Law and Order
Task Force) decided to try a different tack. He organised a five-day
retreat at the army training camp, Goldie River, with the leaders of the
criminal gangs operating in Port Moresby. 16
The intention was to initiate a dialogue between representatives of
State and Society and those of gangsterdom to enable the former to learn
directly from the gangsters why they had turned to crime, and what could
be done to turn them from a life of crime. There was also an attempt to
appeal to the gang leaders on rational, patriotic, emotional, moral and
religious grounds to reform. YIPs, including the Governor-General,
participated in the dialogue. At the end of the retreat, the gang leaders
presented to the organisers a memorandum entitled "A Call to the
Nation". This was essentially a restatement of the December 1984 pledge
by the gangsters. 17 They will give up their criminal activities if the
government makes it possible for them to earn income from legitimate
sources, such as cleaning contracts, small business ventures, trade stores,
fishing, farming.
This Christian approach to the crime problem was, however, fraught
with serious dangers, not the least of which was that its success in
weaning the gangsters would almost certainly backfire. To the extent that
unemployment (and its attendant boredom and frustration) was a root
cause of the problem, success could, paradoxically, lead to the spawning
of more and more gangsters. Joining a criminal gang could come to be
seen as perhaps the path towards securing employment, in an environment
of depressingly high unemployment.
The rapidly escalating incidence of violent criminal activity forced the
Prime Minister to revise his opinion, no doubt uttered in a fit of recurrent
complacency, that the crime situation was under control and that the
streets were becoming safer to walk at night. The public ridicule of the
Prime Minister on account of this misjudgment was reflected in a
dismissive Post-Courier editorial: "We do not wish to comment further on
the foolishness of that statement". 18 Jolted by the public reaction to his
misassessment, Somare now moved, in June, to propose the death penalty,
castration, flogging, etc, to deal with the "uncontrollable law and order
situation" . 19 The government introduced a bill to counter rape with
castration and death.
But the bill was shelved when it evoked very strong criticism from
the opposition, church leaders, and the Melanesian Alliance coalition
404
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partner. Instead, Parliament voted on 14 June to declare a State of

Emergency in Port Moresby, initially for twenty-one days, with a two
month extension from 4 July. A 10.30 pm to 4 am curfew came into
effect in the National Capital District from 17 June.
The Commissioner of Police was appointed the controller for the State
of Emergency. But a Parliamentary Committee, under the chairmanship of
Ted Diro, a former Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force,
was appointed to monitor the implementation of the emergency
provisions. In particular, it set itself the task of ensuring that the police
would not misuse the emergency powers, as it was said to have done in
a previous State of Emergency declared in the Highlands in 1979.
43
JULY-DECEMBER 1985
Yaw Saffu
Wingti's Short Road to the Prime Minister's Office

In his maiden speech as Leader of the Opposition on 28 March 1985,
Paias Wingti had promised: "We are here to change the government if not
within this term of Parliament's session ... definitely ... in 1987" .1 Less
than eight months later, on 21 November, Paias Wingti was sworn in as
the new Prime Minister, after a successful motion of no-confidence in
Somare. This chronicle will trace Wingti's short road to the Prime
Minister's office and examine the promise of a new direction in PNG
politics suggested by the first steps taken by the new government in the
dying weeks of the year.
In the August session of Parliament, Wingti continued with renewed
vigour the systematic chipping away at the integrity of the Somare
government. Supported by Chan and Okuk (who announced at the
beginning of the session the withdrawal of his support from the Somare
government, on account of Somare's failure to give him a ministry),
Wingti accused the government of corruption in the sale of the Grumman
jet (which Chan had bought for his use when he was Prime Minister) and
in the purchase of the Defence Force's Arava aircraft, bought from the
Israelis with the proceeds of the sale of the Grumman jet.
Somare and Stack, the Industrial Development Minister, were
further accused of associating with crooks. It was alleged that friends of
Stack (owners of the Australian air firm, Pelair, also known earlier as
Wings of Australia and as Peldale) associated with drug smugglers and
elements of the Australian criminal world. Somare was accused of having
interfered with a customs and police search of the Pelair aircraft for drugs
at the Port Moresby airport on 6 March 1985. Pelair was allegedly
involved in all sorts of deals with the Somare government. As Chan
quipped in Parliament: "Sell the Grumman at a loss? Call in Pelair. Buy
the Arava? Call in Pelair. Joint venture with Air Niugini? Call in Pelair.
Charter a jet for the Prime Minister? Call in Pelair. Carry free veges for
Minister? Call in Pelair. Give a free trip to a minister's wife? Call in
Pel air". 2
With the help of aggrieved businessmen who had failed to secure the
middlemen's commission in the sale and purchase of the aircraft, Wingti
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YawSaffu
spoke in the August session with the authority bestowed by the

possession of confidential documents, some of which he tendered in
Parliament. 3 Mischievously or not, Wingti managed to misinterpret the
documents and, on that basis, charged that Somare had persistently lied
to Parliament and demanded his resignation.
Besides this barrage of attacks on personal integrity, Somare faced the
frightening prospects of Okuk's revenge. Okuk had withdrawn his support
at the beginning of the August session because, as he put it, he did not
like "sitting behind these jerks". 4 It was not clear what had happened to
Okuk's patriotism since March, when he claimed that he had joined
Somare "in the interest of preserving unity and stability of the country". 5
In July, with the August session on the horizon, there had been calls from
several National party spokesmen to pull out of the coalition. Okuk
htmselt had Issued an ultimatum: more m1mstnes to the National party by
12 August, the first day of the August session, or the party pulls out. He
claimed that the party had entered the coalition on the basis of one
ministry for every four members in Parliament. Somare, perhaps not
appreciating sufficiently Okuk's genius, 6 his uncanny ability to make
himself central, time after time, to the determination of political
outcomes, failed to find him the ministerial position he so desperately
sought. Okuk withdrew from the coalition and, with the Executive of his
National party, began to pressure on the party's two nominees in cabinet,
Stephen Tago (Defence) and William Wi (Civil Aviation) to leave too.
Okuk's dissatisfaction was a signal for the opposition to attempt
another vote of no-confidence. On 22 August, Chan gave notice of a
motion of no-confidence in Somare and named Wingti as the alternative
Prime Minister. His seconder was none other than Iambakey Okuk. But
the next day the government caught the opposition temporarily napping,
and sprang a surprise motion to adjourn the session a week early, before
the no-confidence motion could be put to the vote. That motion was
carried by the slimmest of majorities, the Speaker's casting vote.
Conceding that they had been bested, the opposition withdrew its noconfidence motion, and Parliament rose on 26 August with hardly any of
its numerous pending bills addressed in the session. The only
achievement of that session, from the point of view of good governance,
was the opposition's success in extracting from Somare the appointment
of a commission of enquiry into its allegations of corruption.
To reassure the public that no white-washing exercise was intended,
Somare gave Fr Momis the responsibility for setting the terms of
reference and for appointing the Commission. Mr Justice Bredemeyer and
two senior Port Moresby magistrates were appointed. The Commission,
which began sitting on 3 December, was instructed by its terms of
reference to uncover any impropriety on the part of any member of the
government and in the sale of the Kumul (Grumman) jet, in the purchase
of the Arava aircraft in the search by police and customs officials of the
Pelair (Peldale) aircraft at Jacksons airport on 6 March 1985. An Interim
report was required by 30 September and the final report by December.
July-December 1985
407
Wingti criticised the terms of reference as too narrow and predicted a

cover-up. He proposed twelve additional terms of reference but he was
ridiculed by Bernard Narokobi, the deputy chairman of Melanesian
Alliance, as an "untrained and untried soldier in the war against
corruption", while Momis called upon the public to reject "Mr Wingti's
toilet politics". 7 The daily reporting by the mass media of allegations of
corruption at the Commission constituted a daily assault on the image of
the Somare government.
On 2 October Parliament reconvened, thanks to the opposition's sharp
parliamentary strategist, Warren Dutton, who had got the Speaker to agree
that, since a State of Emergency had been declared in a part of the
country, Parliament was obliged to meet at least once in two months.
While the opposition had its eyes on another attempt at a no-confidence
motion the government again managed to adjourn the session on the third
day. Meanwhile there was talk everywhere of an inevitable vote of noconfidence during the impending November budget session because there
would be no way to curtail a budget session in order to deny the
opposition the required time to see its motion through.
As if in anticipation of that event, the government's own Whip, the
member for Lufa, had resigned and defected to the opposition. On the eve
of the November session another Pangu backbencher, the member for
Kompian-Ambun, defected to the opposition side, claiming there was "no
authoritative government any more", alleging "corruption and abuse of
power" and predicting that "change is inevitable". 8
The 1986 budget handed down on 12 November was not spectacularly
different from previous budgets but it ran into unexpected opposition. In
real terms, the total projected expenditure of K958 million (roughly
$US958 million) was two per cent less than the previous year's budget
but the expenditure on goods and services, at K757.9 or seventy-five per
cent of the total expenditure, was in real terms four per cent less than in
the 1985 budget. Neither the ratio of recurrent to development
expenditure (3.5:1) nor the fact that some two-thirds of the expenditure
on goods and services went to education (twenty-five per cent) economic
services (twelve per cent) health (eleven per cent) transport and
communications (ten per cent) and to public order and safety (ten per
cent) was unusual. It was the revenue-raising measures that the opposition
politicians and, strangely, the Deputy Prime Minister, Fr John Momis,
seized upon to chastise the government.
The revenue-raising measures were largely indirect taxes. The general
import levy went up from four per cent to five per cent, and from 0 per
cent to 2.5 per cent on basic foods such as tinned fish and rice, and from
five per cent to fifteen per cent on aviation fuel. These were to raise the
relatively small amount of Kl5.3 million. Trade Union spokesmen,
women's groups, and ordinary people, through the correspondence
columns of the Post-Courier, made their opposition to the new 2.5 per
cent levy on basic food known. Indeed, on the very day of the vote of noconfidence in Somare, a women's group, organised and led by Ms Fide
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YawSaffu
Bale, who stood as a PPP candidate for a Port Moresby seat in the 1977
election, went on demonstration against the levy.
To explain the motion of no-confidence that was moved on 14
November by Chan, again seconded by Okuk, and again naming Wingti
as the alternative Prime Minister, one has to say it was a continuation of
the favourite game of the opposition in Parliament for which Chan now
sought to provide a refurbished rationalisation. The people elect MPs. but
they do not mandate any particular party or parties to rule. It is MPs who
determine which coalition forms the government. They determine this
after elections, and they have the right to change their mind any time, in
between elections, about which coalition of parties should rule. Stability
should not necessarily take precedence over effectiveness, competence
and honesty of government. 9 But, as the Post-Courier editorial of the day
intoned, in that case the people hec:ome mere "bystanders of
democracy". 10
But while conceding that the motion was part of the ongoing
opposition game, it must also be said that the impending 1987 elections
raised the stakes of the game and fuelled passions. It was primarily about
obtaining and denying access to state resources and opportunities on the
eve of an election. To move a vote of no-confidence so close to the
scheduled elections meant that either the opposition believed that
resources available to an incumbent government are so decisive in
elections that they more than compensate for all the possible liabilities in
office, or it did not believe its own propaganda about the sunken image
of the government, or how unpopular its budget proposals presented to
Parliament on 12 November were.
A significant boost for this interpretation of the motion of noconfidence was Chan's PPP national convention in Lae at the end of
October. The organisers and party executive were obviously buoyed up by
the attendance of provincial "heavies". There were three Premiers, from
New Ireland, Gulf and Southern Highlands, seven Deputy Premiers,
including one from the Pangu heartland of East Sepik, who was
accompanied by a well-known Angoram businessman, Mr Schulze, and
thirteen provincial ministers. As the reported public speeches made clear,
the convention was about winning the 1987 elections. There was evident
satisfaction with all aspects of preparation except for funding."
In accordance with PNG rules in the numbers game, the opposition
guaranteed steadfastness of support by cloistering at the Kokoda Trail
Motel outside Port Moresby MPs who had pledged to vote for the
motion. On the morning of 21 November, they came down from the
mountain retreat straight to Parliament to vote, 58 to 51, to oust Somare
and to install Wingti. Voting for the motion were members of Wingti's
Democratic Movement (17), Chan's PPP (13), Okuk's National party,
except William Wi, the Aviation Minister in Somare's government (13),
a section of the United party under Paul Torato (5), the Papua party (3),
and a group of independent members, disgruntled Pangu backbenchers
and a rebel Melanesian Alliance member (7).
July-December 1985
409
In a public clash with his co-conspirator and a cabinet colleague

several months later, Chan provided some very revealing details about
aspects of the pre-vote manoeuvrings within the opposition camp: "Okuk
desperately wanted the Finance Ministry and to stop Wingti from
becoming the first Highlands Prime Minister"Y For both reasons Okuk
offered to nominate Chan for the prime ministership. Chan claims he
declined the offer because it entailed making Okuk Finance Minister. But
it could not have escaped the ever alert Chan that Wingti's followers
would not have gone along unless Wingti was named the alternative
Prime Minister. Wingti was not likely to spurn a Deputy Prime Minister's
position under Somare and accept the same position under Chan.
The New Government
Wingti's government had only eighteen months to market itself before the
1987 elections. It was thus under some pressure to attempt to display
distinctively different wares. At least, the packaging had to look new.
A caretaker cabinet, comprising the leaders of PDM's coalition
partners, Chan, Okuk, Torato, Kwarara (Papua party) plus Ted Diro
(Independent) and Nahau Rooney (PDM), was appointed on 21
November. Four days later the full cabinet of twenty-five, three fewer
than Somare's, was announced. The coalition share out of cabinet posts
was as follows: PDM got seven, including the prime ministership; PPP
obtained five, including the deputy prime ministership for Chan; National
party secured four, with Okuk as Primary Industries Minister; Torato got
the Lands Ministry as one of the three UP portfolios, instead of the
Minerals and Energy he reportedly wanted, and which went to John
Kaputin, the sacked MA rebel and Finance Minister in the 1980-82 ChanOkuk government. Papua party was given one ministry, Trade and
Industry, which went to Kwarara, while four Independents, including Diro
(Forestry) and Bourne (Transport), were given ministries. With only six
of the twenty-five having previous cabinet experience, there was a
preponderance of "new blood" politicians.
In terms of regional representation in cabinet, eleven were from the
Highlands, six from Papua, five from the New Guinea littoral and three
from the Islands. Although the number of Highlanders caused the raising
of some eyebrows, in terms of ministries per seats in Parliament, the
Highlands representation was not excessive.
In his acceptance speech, Wingti had pledged to cut spending by,
among other measures, reducing the number of departments and
ministries. Finance and Planning ministries were merged and the Planning
Office was abolished. Home Affairs and Youth ministries were merged, as
was Civil Aviation with Culture and Tourism. The rationalisation and
streamlining also involved Trade being excised from Foreign Affairs and
merging with Industry, while the activities of the now abolished Physical
Planning Department were split between Housing and Lands. The NEC
Secretariat and the Prime Minister's Department also merged. Unlike
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YawSaffu
trimming the cabinet and pruning the departments, only time will tell
whether Wingti's promise to cut down overseas travel by ministers and
bureaucrats to save money will be fulfilled or not.
Before Parliament adjourned on 25 November, it voted to reject the
budget handed down by the deposed government. A Supply Bill, to allow
the new government to use up to a third of the 1985 appropriation, as the
constitution allowed under section 212, was passed to enable the
government to prepare its own budget, according to its priorities, for
submission in the March 1986 session. Tax reduction and cuts in
government spending, redirection of government expenditure away from
service and welfare activities and the bureaucracy to the economic
departments, such as DPI, Forests, Trade and Industry, privatisation and
deregulation or, at any rate, relaxation of controls and cutting red tape,
and a heavier reliance on the private sector to bring about the growth that
the government now put forward as a top priority (the same as the
Somare government too had opted for in its last year) were the guidelines
that both Wingti and Chan emphasised for the future budget.
On the political front, it was all change on the parliamentary
committees. A Parliamentary Select Committee investigating the
provincial government system (the Siaguru committee) was abolished,
perhaps myopically, to cut Siaguru down to size and/or to save the
K300,000 or so which the year-long examination of the system was going
to cost. The terms of the Pelair investigation were widened to include the
proposal for a joint air-freight between Air Niugini and Wings Australia,
the alleged drug ring operating between PNG and Australia and the role
played by PNG Aviation in the sale and purchase of the aircraft. The
Commission was expected to be extra thorough as it was now given a
longer period, 30 September 1986, to complete its work.
The government initiated extensive changes of personnel at the top of
the bureaucracy, thus contributing to a growing tradition which is more
consistent with the American notion of the political bureaucrat who
comes and goes with the changing political executive than it is with the
British notion of the neutral civil servant, there to serve equally
whichever party or coalition comes to power. Close to one half of the
bureaucrats at the departmental Secretary level were replaced. The
government said the changes were in aid of efficiency. Wingti said he had
no time for "incompetent people". His refrain was that the bureaucracy
was "inefficient beyond belief'. But it is also clear that political
calculations entered into the exercise. The appointment of Tony Huai as
Commander of the PNG Defence Force, perhaps the most controversial
and most ill advised of the changes, illustrates this.
Tony Huai, apparently a very capable solider, had resigned earlier on
in the year as Chief of Operations in the Defence Force and had made
very public criticisms of various aspects of the Somare government's
handling of defence matters which, he claimed, had led to an exodus of
officers. He went to work for Chan in the PPP office soon after he left
and announced his intention to stand in the next elections on a PPP ticket.
July-December 1985
411
At the time of the political changeover, he was in charge of security at

Air Niugini. The man Tony Huai was appointed to replace, Brigadier Ken
Noga, had stood for election in 1977 (and lost) as a pro-Pangu candidate.
It could thus be argued that the new government was not initiating a new
(unwise) tradition. But the difference was that for the first time an
appointment of the commander had been made from outside the current
crop of the most senior officers, indeed from outside the force, and this
was apparently resented by some officers.
A newspaper report claimed that "army politics" was holding up
Huai's return to assume the command. It went on to indicate some officer
resistance to his appointment: "In the past, representatives from all
Defence Force establishments have taken part in the 'takeover' ceremony.
This will not be the case with today's ceremony". 13 If there is one lesson
that Third World politicians can learn from the literature on military
intervention in politics, it is that civilian attempts to lay aside cherished
military traditions and re-order internal organisational matters for partisan
reasons often prove short-sighted.
The rapidity with which cabinet members announced their policy
objectives and actually proceeded to act on them, beginning in most cases
with overhauling boards of directors, or at any rate trying to,
suggested a decisiveness in decision-making and in government affairs
which had appeared to be lacking lately. For instance, one of the "Young
Turks", Gabriel Ramoi, put in charge of Communications, was
announcing, a day after he was appointed, a review of the introduction
of TV broadcast (a reference to the television contracts hurriedly signed
by the previous government), and a shake up of the board of PTC and
NBC.
An impression of dynamism was created in the first few weeks of the
new government. This matched Wingti's emphasis on hard work,
efficiency, honesty and "no handouts", in speech after speech. Wingti also
promised new standards of probity with his pledge to declare his assets
to Parliament and to insist that his ministers make a declaration of their
assets to him.
But there were also early indications of extreme inexperience.
For instance, after his familiarisation tour of his department, the new
Police Minister, Tom Muliap, a former constable, was so obviously
carried away by his new sense of power that he evidently believed he
could double the size of the service, modernise the barracks, give
the police more money than the rejected Bouraga budget did. And
that budget had been clearly generous to the police, on account of the
law and order problem. Evidently, even the department Secretary,
the Police Commissioner, could not refrain from urging him to be
realistic. 14
412
Yaw Saffu
Provincial Government Affairs

Reflecting on ten years of PNG independence on the eve of the tenth
anniversary, Somare put decentralisation at the top of his list of mistakes
he believed the country had made. 15 A select Parliamentary Committee
was set up in August under the chairmanship of Tony Siaguru to review
the provincial government system. The evidence which the committee
began to collect on its travels round the country was overwhelmingly
unfavourable. It is not particularly difficult to explain the general
disenchantment. Practically every other week, some provincial
government somewhere, or some minister or Speaker, is under threat of
removal through a vote of no-confidence. And, as at the national level, all
normal functions of the legislature seem to come to a halt as the
politicians bicker and denounce and abuse one another.
At the end of June, Robert Seeto's government in New Ireland
survived a motion of no-confidence. In the next session of the Assembly,
it showed its commitment to political leaders' freedom of enterprise by
rejecting a leadership code bill. In July, Paul Langro's government in
Sandaun survived a vote no-confidence, as did Max Moeder's government
in Madang, in August and again in October.
In the Central Province, where the government was in perpetual
turmoil, tenure of ministerial office became a game of musical chairs. In
August, threatened yet again with a motion of no-confidence in the
impending Assembly meeting, the Premier, Kone Vanuawaru, postponed
the scheduled 19 August sitting to September, allegedly because of the
government's "awkward financial situation". But the danger had not
disappeared by September. So the Premier threatened to petition the
Minister for Provincial Affairs to suspend the provincial government. He
survived the vote on 24 September, only the second vote of no-confidence
since the beginning of the year, but the umpteenth threatened motion,
each of them accompanied by a bewildering rapidity of resignations,
replacements, and changes in alliances and coalitions. Tony Farapo, the
Minister for Provincial Affairs, duly showed the yellow card and warned
that any more restlessness and the whole team would be suspended.
In December, in the same week that a motion of no-confidence in
Dennis Kageri's government in Oro was withdrawn, the Gulf Premier
resigned rather than be kicked out, and the opposition candidate, Francis
Malaisa, succeeded him. The stated grounds for the oppositions' attempts
in all the above cases, whether genuine or not, did nothing to endear the
system to the people, but everything to engender cynicism and alienation.
Corruption was usually alleged. Charges of incompetence, wastefulness
and selfishness were rampant. It goes without saying that the spectacle of
constant bickering and crisis politics does not inspire popular confidence.
Parliament extended the suspension of the Simbu and Enga
provincial governments by six months, to March and May 1986,
respectively. In August, the Western provincial government was also
suspended, on the now familiar grounds of financial irresponsibility and
July-December 1985
413
poor performance. In the same month however, in Manus, elections

marked the end of the suspension of the provincial government. Stephen
Pokawin emerged at the head of a group of Independents and MA-leaning
members to capture the premiership.
If the Wingti government had a policy on the provincial government
system, whether to help the system improve itself, change it, or perhaps
just let it drift, it did not reveal its hand except to curtail the investigation
by the Siaguru Committee.
Irian Jaya
By July 1985, the position of the Somare government on the 10,000 or so
Irian Jayan refugees encamped on the PNG side of the border since the
beginning of 1984 had crystallised to this: there will be repatriation, but
genuine refugees will be allowed to stay. However, the necessary
screening process and the logistics of repatriation had yet to be worked
out.
The solution of problems associated with the border was seen in
essentially bilateral terms, although a few hesitant steps to
internationalise it, by mentioning the problems at ASEAN and UN
meetings, had been taken to put a modicum of pressure on Indonesia to
be more humane and sensitive in its handling of the Irian Jaya issue. But
as much as possible, and consistent with dignity and pride in sovereignty
and independence, cordial relations with Indonesia, founded on mutual
respect, were the context within which PNG sought to resolve the border
and refugee problems associated with OPM activities.
Meetings at various levels between the two countries, like one at
Rabaul in September between officials to review the border agreement,
were a necessary concomitant of this approach. So were the various pacts
and agreements, such as one signed in July, to complete the demarcation
of the border with pillars by 1987.
However, this approach was, from time to time, liable to severe
criticism, particularly after government actions which appeared to be
callous or grovelling to Indonesia. Thus, when the government repatriated
twelve "trouble making" Irian Jayans, and some of those remaining at the
Blackwater Camp went on the rampage in Vanimo in protest against the
repatriation, political leaders queued to condemn the forced repatriation
but not the rampage.
It would appear that a section of the OPM sought to provoke the
government deliberately because they reckoned that any publicity was
better than no publicity. One Moses Wessor, described by a seasoned
PNG journalist as "a staunch supporter of OPM" admitted that OPM
"used refugees for world recognition" 16 a tactic which is neither new nor
unique to OPM. OPM's provocative acts included issuing threats of
reprisals against border villagers. In August, the OPM Defence Minister
wrote to a village school head teacher at Scotchian in Sandaun warning
that the village would be wiped out if the people continued to report OPM
414
YawSaffu
activities to the government.

In opposition, leaders of Melanesian Alliance had been very critical of
the Somare government's handling of the refugee problem. At the end of
October, when Somare was attending the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting in the Bahamas, the National Executive Council,
under the acting Prime Minister, Fr Momis, adopted a new policy on the
refugees. According to a report in the Times, cabinet decided to resettle
refugees away from the border area (Utula Samana, the Morobe Premier
for one, had offered land for resettlement) and internationalise the issue
so as to get third countries to take some of them.
When Somare returned at the beginning of November, he was
obviously not keen on internationalising the problem. He said that PNG
and Indonesia were capable of handling the problem. The immensely
relieved Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, was qmck to latch on
to Somare's words because only the previous month fifteen Irian Jayans
seeking refugee status had revealed Australia's unwillingness to entertain
any such requests.
The Wingti government gave a firm undertaking that there would be no
more compulsory repatriation and hinted at other changes in PNG policy
towards the refugees. Wingti's assumption of office coincided with
cataclysmic changes within OPM leadership, which presaged possible
changes in OPM policies and strategies. James Nyaro, the OPM
President, and four other leaders were forced to give themselves up to the
PNG authorities. Geradus Thommy, the commander of the OPM's
southern region, and his two associates surrendered to the authorities in
Kiunga, a week before Nyaro and his Defence Minister, Alex Donal
Derey, gave themselves up to authorities near Vanimo. Stronger factions
had taken over OPM leadership in circumstances that appeared to recall
the flight and eventual exile in Europe of earlier leaders in 1979, 1981
and 1982. 17
Law and Order

On the law and order front, it appeared that improvements in one area
were always balanced by a deterioration in other areas. The State of
Emergency imposed on the national capital in June was not lifted until 4
November, although from 19 August the night curfew was from 11.30 pm
(instead of 10.30 pm) to 4 am. The emergency was hugely successful in
lowering the incidence of crime, in the recapture of several scores of
hardened prison escapees (thanks largely to the institution of a reward
system which forked out up to K1,000 for "tip offs"), and in raising the
morale of the police. It was immensely popular, as polls conducted by
newspapers showed. However, at the cost of K3 million, the emergency
was held by critics to have been money down the drain, in as much as the
underlying causes of crime had not been addressed. Also, the sweeping
powers given to the police by the emergency orders were criticised as
eroding liberty, leading one critic to daub 1985 "The Year of the Police".
July-December 1985
415
The Human Rights Association of PNG and cntlcs like Bernard

Narokobi and Dutton Warren had a point. Some of the emergency decrees
issued by the Controller had very little to do with the maintenance of law
and order but clearly encroached on liberty. For instance, Emergency
Order No. 2 banned demonstrations and protest marches. No. 14 banned
the conveyance of liquor in the National Capital District. No. 15 banned
street vendors from operating after 6 pm. No. 18, which authorised police
to enter and search any premises, was perhaps necessary in an emergency.
But it was liable to abuse. Another, No. 24, ordered a Leader of the
Opposition, Paul Torato, to give information to the police. Hiding behind
parliamentary immunity and abusing it, as unfortunately an increasing
number of PNG MPs are wont to do, Torato claimed knowledge of the
activities of a Joe Davis, charged with receiving stolen properties, and
especially of his high-society mates. Warren Dutton argued in Parliament
that an order of that sort on an MP was unconstitutional. 18
A proposal which emerged in the emergency period was for a top
security prison to be built on a remote island. However, apart from the
cost of building and servicing such an isolated prison, no province
appeared prepared to accept such a "development" project. Meanwhile, in
Parliament, after a critical Special Judges' Report on the Application of
the Minimum Penalties Legislation had been presented, Sir Barry
Holloway, a member of the cabinet which recommended the legislation to
Parliament, now took the lead in getting sixteen changes to the Summary
Offenses Act approved quickly on 21 August, to the applause of bodies
like the Melanesian Institute in Goroka, which had blamed the Act for
many broken homes in the Highlands.
The Highlands increasingly presented a far more serious law and order
problem than urban crime did. The recrudescence of tribal fighting in the
Highlands during the period under review was possibly more costly in
terms of lives and property. The underlying causes of tribal fighting tradition, absence of trusted and effective state institutions, pressures of
the modern economy on land and on customary relations, alcohol, and so
on - make it endemic and, as such, tribal fighting is apt to flare up
without warning anywhere any time. Enga, Eastern Highlands and
Western Highlands were particularly vulnerable during the period.
44
YawSaffu
Nineteen eighty-six was pre-eminently a year of efforts by the govermng

coalition leaders to exploit opportunities of office to mobilise their political
resources. The impending June 1987 national elections evidently made
that imperative. The efforts tended to have a destabilising impact on coalition
solidarity. They also tended to move Wingti in directions which were not
exactly congruent with his rhetoric of disciplined leadership, tight control
of public funds, and elimination of the so-called "handouts mentality".
A key player in the political game, Sir Iambakey Okuk, died from
cancer in November. His death emphasised that a transition from the era
of pre-independence leaders was under way. Wingti's accession to the
prime ministership in November 1985 had initiated the transition.
For Pangu, the largest political party, in opposition since the
November 1985 parliamentary coup, 1986 was a year of further political
haemorrhage. The break-away of the Siaguru faction in April could be
seen as yet another example of the challenge to the leadership of the preindependence cohort by members of the younger political generation. The
rise of the younger generation became more and more evident in the
provincial government elections held in the year.
The Evolution of Intra-Coalition Disagreements

In December 1985, soon after he was appointed Minister for Primary
Industry, Okuk instructed members of the agricultural marketing boards
under him - cocoa, copra and coffee - to resign by 1 January 1986, to
allow him to make new appointments. To a man, the members refused to
resign, accusing Okuk of wanting to get his hands on the Stabilisation
Funds, through the appointment of pliable new board members. The funds
at that time stood at K170 million. 1 Wingti stepped in, forcing Okuk to
withdraw his demands.
Okuk was by no means the only minister seeking to reconstitute boards
of statutory corporations to consolidate their positions and/or elicit
performance. At the NBC, at the PTC, at the Harbours Board, at the
various statutory banks, and elsewhere, the politics of board membership
consumed a great deal of time and energy. The adversarial nature of the
417
Westminster system, which is specially highlighted when governments

change, was reflected in wholesale changes (or at least attempts at such
changes) of personnel and policies throughout the year. 2
Towards the end of January, when Okuk was in Taiwan attending a
meeting of the World Anti-Communist League, the acting Minister for
Primary Industry, Neville Bourne, with Wingti's backing, cleared up a
backlog of fishing licence renewals. Okuk had delayed approval of the
renewals. On his return he was furious at what he considered to be
meddling. As we shall see, Okuk's plans to restructure the fishing
industry were to become one of the core reasons for a sustained public
clash between himself and Chan, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
for Finance and Planning.
The next bone of contention, the control of the Agriculture Bank, was
between Okuk and Chan. According to Chan's public statement, Okuk
had "desperately wanted the Finance Ministry" during the pre-November
1985 conspiratorial manoeuvres among the then opposition leaders. 3
When he failed to secure the Finance Ministry, he was offered Primary
Industry, apparently with the transfer of control of the Agriculture Bank
from Finance to Primary Industry thrown in at Okuk's insistence. Once in
government, however, Chan resisted the transfer of control and Wingti
backed him. So embittered was Okuk about the loss of a veritable source
of electoral gravy that he publicly attacked Chan's appointments to the
bank's board as an exercise in cronyism and political patronage, and halfplotted with the opposition, with the intention of blocking the
government's budget in March.
Disagreements between Chan and Okuk were fuelled further by the
failure of Finance Department to find or release an amount of K360,000
to fund a Fisheries Development Authority (FDA). Apparently Okuk did
not even consult the bureaucrats in DPI about the FDA. He relied on his
unofficial adviser, an Australian businessman. The FDA was expected to
take over the activities of the Fish Marketing Corporation and to be
responsible for approving applications for licence to fish in PNG waters.
Cabinet approved the establishment of the FDA "in principle" in June and
appointed a national to head it. But Okuk wanted his expatriate adviser
to be retained as a consultant. When the money required to set up FDA
was not forthcoming from Finance, Okuk accused Chan of sabotage,
whereupon Chan unleashed a classic political vituperation, of such venom
and brutality, as, I am sure, will not be equalled for a long time in PNG. 4
Okuk really was central, or vocal, in all the disagreements that racked
the cabinet. There was, for instance, the case of the Speaker. In PNG, the
speakership is a brazenly partisan office, the Westminster convention of
not opposing the re-nomination of an incumbent Speaker having evidently
been lost in transit in Australia. So, after the successful Wingti-ChanOkuk motion of no-confidence, the new coalition installed its own
Speaker, a member of Okuk's National party. In the May session of
Parliament, the opposition demanded his resignation on account of a well
publicised incident, an uncontrollable consequence of a drunken stupor in
418
YawSaffu
the well appointed bar in Parliament.

But this proved to be one of the occasions when Wingti's clear efforts
to inculcate discipline, during the first months of his prime ministership,
dashed hopelessly and ineffectually against the harsh realities of PNG
coalition politics. Okuk insisted the Speaker would not resign. In spite of
his crusade at the time, on behalf of disciplined leadership, Wingti
appeared to have no choice but to let him stay on. Indeed, he had to go
one step further and protect the Speaker from an opposition censure vote
by mobilising his coalition partners and backbench.
Okuk's penchant for disregarding procedures was notorious. It was the
basis of another clash between him and Wingti. A cabinet proposal by
him early in the year to grant a coffee export licence to one Wally
Pedarcher, a Mount Hagen coffee planter and businessman, was knocked
ba~o;k. He was askeu Lu !>ubmil a poli~.;y paper lo guiue Lhe licensing of all
agricultural exports. Instead of a policy paper, Okuk urged the Coffee
Industry Board to grant the licence, 5 a calculated defiance of Wingti, and
an attack on his political base.
The granting of the licence to Pedarcher in March spelt the beginning
of a major crisis for Kumul Kopi, the grassroots coffee marketing
organisation in the Mount Hagen area which Wingti had put together
three years earlier, to consolidate his electoral base. Pedarcher had
supplied up to fifty per cent of the coffee marketed by Kumul Kopi.
Moreover, the factory which processed Kumul Kopi 's purchases was
leased from Pedarcher. With his own licence to export, Pedarcher
withdrew the sale of his coffee to Kumul Kopi. The continued use of his
coffee factory by Kumul Kopi also became uncertain.
The directors of Kumul Kopi publicly expressed alarm at the imminent
prospect of liquidation. This elicited a public pledge by Wingti to bail out
Kumul Kopi. Wingti's determination to be the de facto Primary Industry
Minister, 6 long before Okuk's illness in September, must be traced not
only to the dictates of the 1987 elections, but also to the clash with Okuk
over the licence for Pedarcher.
Okuk's illness, and eventual death on 14 November, removed one
fertile source of instability in the coalition government. The extensive
rioting and civil commotion that attended his funeral in November was an
appropriate reflection of the turbulence of the man's political career.
Okuk's last year in politics, as the Primary Industry Minister, is not likely
to enhance his reputation with future historians. The blatant conflict of
interest situations he placed himself in, such as the attempts to give
himself a licence to process and export coffee, and the appointment of his
business partner to the National Plantation Management Agency (NPMA),
had editorials in two newspapers in the same week urging Wingti to
dismiss him.
Okuk was by no means the only minister who placed himself in
conflict of interest situations. Paul Torato's extensive dealings in land
while Lands Minister (plus an earlier attempted fraudulent dealing in
mineral prospecting, which surfaced in the year) brought a swift
419
suspension as minister. Chan's role in the floating of Placer Pacific shares

in PNG was also widely criticised as an instance of conflict of interest.
The Placer Affair

As Minister for Finance, Chan had put pressure on Placer Pacific, a
mining company with interests in PNG, to increase the shares it set aside
for the country from 2.8 to 11.5 million shares. He also got the company
to extend its offer date by one week, and relaxed foreign exchange
controls to allow the shares to be taken up. When details of who acquired
shares were published in the newspapers in October, Chan's companies
and his party had obtained over 800,000 shares (amounting to 7.5 per
cent of the entire PNG Placer shares) at the offer price of $Al.OO per
share. On the first day on the stock exchange, the shares traded for
$A2.30, ensuring a tidy profit for all who bought shares.
Largely because of the magnitude of the shares which Chan's
companies obtained, and the fact that three of his companies had each
been allocated the maximum number of shares of 150,000, when virtually
every other applicant had done no better than a half of what they applied
for, there was a huge outcry from the opposition for Chan to be sacked.
Even ministerial colleagues joined in the attack. Chan was virtually
accused of insider trading and of greed. Envy mingled with sanctimony
as Chan was berated for profiting so hugely from decisions made, and
pressures exerted, as the Finance Minister.
Although Chan's purchases of the Placer shares were the most
spectacular, virtually all members of the PNG elite, not just politicians,
had bought shares in Placer. As they had not first sought permission from
the Ombudsman before they bought shares in a foreign company, most of
them were in breach of the Leadership Code. The opposition sought to
exploit the issue to embarrass the government, in spite of the fact that
several members of the opposition had also bought shares.
On 27 November Parliament voted by forty-five to thirty-three not to
institute any official probe into the Placer shares affair. By forty-one
votes to thirty-one, government supporters voted to gag debate on a
motion of no-confidence in Chan. In reaction to calls for a probe, Wingti
announced that the Leadership Code would be reviewed, evidently to
relax its stringency in such matters and bring it into line with realism.
Parliament's decisions regarding the Placer Affair and its ramifications,
and Wingti's stand, calling the Leadership Code obsolete, triggered a
massive student demonstration on 2 December, the same day the vote of
no-confidence in Chan was taken. The students were joined by
unemployed urban youth, church groups, and other members of the
public. They petitioned for an enquiry into how Chan acquired shares in
Placer Pacific for his family companies and for his party. They wanted
Wingti to act on the massive infringement of the Leadership Code. They
also wanted Parliament to be dissolved immediately.
Julius Chan survived the vote of no-confidence by fifty-two to forty-
420
YawSajfu
five, thanks to the eleventh-hour decision by five National party MPs

(including the three National party ministers) to vote with the
government. 7 Two members of the League for National Advancement,
John Nilkare and Karl Stack, also voted with the government.
Wingti's leadership, however, had suffered badly. It had become clear
that he had no answer to what should be done to reconcile the
understandable setzure of a profitable opportunity by the elite with the
demands of the Leadership Code. Several times he promised, then
postponed, a statement to indicate what he thought should be done. The
image which Wingti had sought to cultivate, of a straight, decisive leader,
was seriously dented by the handling of the Placer Pacific affair. In the
circumstances, a reshuffle of his cabinet had a distinct appeal.
The Cabinet is Reshuffled
Wingti reshuffled his cabinet in December. Apart from Gai Duwabane, a
National party MP who stepped into Okuk's portfolio at Agriculture and
Livestock, there was no new face in cabinet. And nobody was dropped
from it. Perhaps one should say that nobody could be dropped: such was
the tightrope Wingti walked.
About a third of the cabinet was moved around. The most significant
changes were at Foreign Affairs and at Finance and Planning. Ted Diro,
the former Commander of PNG Defence Force and the Forests Minister,
became Foreign Minister, while Chan and the Trade and Industry
Minister, Kwarara, did a straight swap. The rest of the changes were as
follows: Legu Vagi went from Foreign Affairs to Transport, while Neville
Bourne moved to the newly created Fisheries and Marine Resources. Paul
Torato's suspension was lifted and he was given the Forests Ministry,
while the Police Minister, Avusi Tanao, went to Lands and Micah Wes
moved from Health to Police. Albert Kipalan, whose Administrative
Services Ministry was abolished, moved to Health.
From any long term perspective, the further rationalisation of the
machinery of government inherent in the split of the DPI and the
abolition of the Administrative Services Ministry was probably more
significant than any shift of particular ministers. Like the earlier
rationalisation measures at the beginning of the Wingti administration in
December 1985,8 the reforms carried out in Finance by Chan, 9 and the
passing in March of the Public Service bills, initiated in 1984 by Tony
Siaguru, 10 the structural reforms accompanying the reshuffle were a part
of the on-going search for appropriate formulae to make public
administration efficient and economical.
Pangu Pati's Second Haemorrhage

In April, just slightly over one year after the defection of Wingti and
fourteen backbenchers to form the People's Democratic Movement
(PDM), Pangu experienced a second break-away. The group that had been
421
calling itself the Pangu Independent Group (PIG), led by Pangu's ideas
men and experienced organisers, Tony Siaguru, Barry Holloway and John
Nilkare, broke away, after failing to be allowed to operate virtually as a
party within the Pangu pati. Their mate, Karl Stack, the former Industrial
Development Minister, had resigned five weeks earlier, largely because of
attempts by Somare to sack him the previous year because of the Pelair
allegations, and to give his ministry to Gai Duwabane, the National party
MP, in an effort to appease the National party which was threatening to
leave the coalition. In May, the four of them and the Telefomin MP,
Felix Tapimeng, launched a new party, the League for National
Advancement.
The break-away of the Siaguru faction, like the emergence of several
new parties in November and December, was spurred on by the
impending national elections. The origins of the break-away, however, lay
in earlier intra-Pangu politics pre-dating the defection of Wingti's faction
and his accession to the prime ministership. 11
In opposition, Pangu began to ponder how it might revitalise itself for
1987. The effectiveness of Somare's leadership style came into question.
But it was also clear that dislodging him was not going to be easy. So,
PIG proposed that it be allowed to operate as a party within Pangu. PIG
wanted to be accorded a right to develop its own policies, raise funds
independently, sponsor its own candidates, promote its own posters and
publish its advertisements and differentiate these by the words "Affiliate
Member of Pangu". Caucus expectedly rejected the proposal. The group
quit at the end of April and in May launched the League for National
Advancement.
With the approach of elections, new parties sprang up. Some of them,
like the National Settlement party of Louis Vagi, announced in December,
and Roy Evara's Wantok party, a month earlier, were derided as one-man
parties. But the People's Action party, launched in December, appeared to
be more substantial, and somewhat more broadly based than on one
person's political ambition. However, the Papuan core of the party, and
the preponderance of ex-Defence Force/Defence Department personnel in
its leadership suggested that it was probably Ted Diro's refurbished
vehicle for the elections, seeing that his 1982 model, the PNG
Independent Group, had lost all power of acceleration after a few months
into the new Parliament.
The Economy
By the standards of Third World non-oil producing economies, the
economy in 1986 appeared healthy. Foreign reserves were adequate for a
six-month import cover. Inflation was low, around five per cent. And
there was promise of a considerable future minerals boom. But not only
were the usual problems associated with Third World primary producing
economies evident, a coffee rust disease discovered in April posed a threat
to the coffee industry. There were also strong indications of serious social
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YawSaffu
dislocations and of increasing incidence of preventable diseases which

took some of the shine off the creditable performance statistics. Although
in line with thinking in government circles, that all-out growth through
the private sector was now the preferred strategy, rather than the earlier
emphasis on distribution, the two budgets of 1986 also, naturally, took
electoral appeal into serious account.
In March the 1986 budget was brought down to replace the previous
government's, which had been jettisoned by the new government in
November 1985. Although the Bank of Papua New Guinea Quarterly
Economic Bulletin regretted the government's "failure to place the 1986
budget proposals within the framework of medium term economic
prospects", especially as it was difficult to know "whether the
government itself regards its overall fiscal strategy as sustainable", 12 it did
al:knuwledge, nevertheless, that the budget "effectively addressed some of
the major fiscal problems of immediate concern". 13 The budget sought to
slow down overseas commercial bank borrowing, bring recurrent
expenditure under greater scrutiny, and elicit an increase in internal
revenue.
The total estimated internal revenue of K565 million was K54.3
million higher than the previous year's estimate. General import levy
went up from four per cent to 7.5 per cent, reflecting the continuing shift
to indirect consumption based tax, and was expected to bring in an extra
K23.5 million. But as the bank commented, an opportunity to broaden the
tax base had been passed up. The 2.5 per cent import levy on staples
(tinned fish and rice), which the rejected budget had imposed, was
dropped in the March budget. While revenue from dividends (up K25
million) and departmental revenues (up K18.2 million) were expected to
increase, the latter signalling perhaps a more determined and efficient
collection by the public service, company income tax and drawing on the
mineral stabilisation fund were set to fall, by K4.3 million and K18.1
million respectively.
On the expenditure side, the total appropriation of K930 million hardly
differed from the previous year's. But a major departure could be
discerned on the expenditure side. Past budgetary planning had
concentrated on the so-called "wedge", or the new expenditure in the
budget, and had thus inadvertently given insufficient attention to efficient
allocation of recurrent expenditure. Now, with the adoption of a sectoral
approach (in fact, a continuation of the previous government's initiative
in the rejected budget) five functional sectors were identified, and the
allocation of K508 million to them entailed the devotion of as much
attention to recurrent expenditure as to new capital expenditure: The Law
and Order Sector and the Economic Sector came out best, while the
Administrative and Social Services sectors suffered cuts. Provincial
financing, debt servicing and other items not classified by sector
accounted for the remaining K422 million.
In May the Minimum Wages Board handed down the minimum
urban and rural wages and the formula for, wage indexation for the three-
423
year period, 1987 to 1989. It replaced the 1983 determination which

expired after the March 1986 adjustments. The new formula allowed for
full indexation up to five per cent of the Consumer Price Index, none
between five and ten per cent, and a partial indexation, one-half of the
increase, between ten and fifteen per cent. As with the 1983
determination, adjustments were to be made once a year in March, made
retrospective to 1 January. The board also came up with a new set of the
minimum wages for new employees aged between 16 and 21. A novel
idea was that a Youth Group Employment wage for groups of ten or more
youths would be determined by negotiation between the group and the
prospective employer.
Throughout the year there was much talk of privatisation and
deregulation. While privatisation remained just talk (just like the "killing"
of the so-called handouts mentality, perhaps it awaited the passing of the
1987 elections)I 4 deregulation of the banking sector helped to produce,
ironically, "possibly more major monetary measures announced in any
comparable period since PNG gained its monetary independence".U Chan
had to intervene, more directly and personally than before deregulation,
to bring interest rates down.
The 1987 budget which was handed down in November on the whole
followed further along the path indicated by the March budget. But it was
much more obviously influenced by electoral considerations than the
previous one had been. Income tax cuts came to K31 million. As Chan
said, the budget gave "a pay rise to every wage-earner". 16 On the eve of
an election the pay packet becomes a very close relation of the vote, as
every Finance Minister knows. There was now a higher tax threshold at
K2,000 instead of K1,000 pa. Taxes now started at fifteen per cent, with
a top rate at forty-eight per cent, compared with the previous range of
four per cent to fifty per cent.
The government sought to put more money into the pockets of other
specific groups. War carriers and ex-servicemen would be compensated.
Landowners in timber areas would receive higher royalties. The national
government would forego its share in favour of the landowners.
Government projects and works under K500,000 were open to contract
bidding only by companies owned by nationals.
Total government expenditure was decreased by 3.2 per cent. Overseas
borrowing dropped further, while internal revenue was estimated at a
record K650 million, compared with K565 million in the March budget,
over fifteen per cent jump.
As with the two budgets, other activities in the economy also had the
dual purpose of pursuing desirable and totally defensible national policies
while at the same time wooing voters for some of the coalition parties.
For instance, the dramatically increased loan approvals and disbursements
and the subsequent very high profile of the Agriculture Bank could prove
an election winner for Chan.
Similarly, the coffee rust campaign and a very attractive package
worked out by Wingti to boost the coffee industry could also be seen as
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YawSaffu
easy money to buy votes in the coffee growing and thickly populated
Highlands. A plan initiated by Wingti and approved by cabinet would
involve an amount of K40 million and an estimated 200,000 familiesY
The scheme gave these small-time coffee growers access to cheap loans
of up to K2,000 per family, to enable them to take action against the
coffee rust disease and boost production. The loans would be payable in
four years after a grace period of two years at three per cent interest, with
the government paying the balance of the interest.
Alongside the loan facility, a Coffee Development Authority was also
created to administer the rehabilitation and rust control program and,
indirectly, rationalise the purchasing/marketing of coffee as well as
checking stealing and other crimes associated with the coffee industry.
The agency was to wage an awareness campaign and register every coffee
garden over the next two years. Growers would have to produce their
registration certificate in order to sell their coffee. The Highlands
Premiers strongly supported this initiative.
Provincial government affairs helped to emphasise several features of
PNG politics: the continuing fragility of PNG unity; instability of
coalitions and political alliances; the over subscription of elections and
the super-rapid circulation of elites; the weakness of financial controls;
and so on.
The suspension of the Simbu provincial government lapsed in March
when Parliament failed to extend it for another six months, as Warena,
the Minister for Provincial Affairs, had wanted. The Simbu Premier at the
time of the suspension, Peter Gul, sought a Supreme court ruling on the
status of his government. Was his government not entitled to complete the
balance of its term? And did it not have full powers of a duly elected
government? He got satisfaction on both points.
The suspension of the Enga provincial government was also lifted, in
May, after provincial elections were held. Over 160 candidates stood for
the twenty-two seats. Allegations of rigging were made by losing
candidates.
Provincial government office blocks were burnt down, and vehicles
were destroyed, in the violence that ensued. Nat Laina, a former kiap,
won the presidential type election to become the new Premier.
The Western provincial government remained suspended. In several
provinces, instability continued to characterise politics. In Madang, the
fourteen-month Moeder government was deposed in March, by sixteen
votes to eight. Andrew Ariako, a Melanesian Alliance man, became the
new Premier. Three months later, the Provincial Assembly voted
unanimously to change the manner of appointing its ministers, allowing
the Premier to choose the team he wanted, instead of having to choose on
the basis of the districts represented in the assembly. The size of the
cabinet was also increased from nine to eleven, in the twenty-four
425
member assembly. With the Speaker making twelve, it was expected that
future governments would thus be safe from successful votes of noconfidence.
In Morobe, Utula Samana survived a vote of no-confidence by twentytwo votes to twelve in March. He survived another motion in December.
In the Western Highlands Assembly notice of a motion of no-confidence
was given in March. In the Central Province (where the irony of the year
was perpetrated, when the provincial government suspended the Hiri
Local Government Council in August for not performing) the Premier
increased the size of his cabinet from six to ten, in order to reward four
members who crossed the floor to vote for him in a vote of noconfidence.
The continuing fragility of PNG as a united entity was exhibited
throughout the year, with the Islands provinces, East New Britain and
North Solomons, pushing for the repatriation of unemployed settlers from
the mainland provinces. The National party, perhaps seeing itself as the
true Highlands party, was the only party to take a firm stand against the
intentions of the provincial authorities in those provinces.
Provincial elections were due at the end of the year in Eastern
Highlands, Milne Bay and New Ireland. The Electoral Commissioner
sought to postpone all three elections on the implausible grounds that
they would interfere with the holding of the national elections, seven to
eight months later. He was challenged in court. The Supreme court
ordered him to hold the elections as scheduled. In the Eastern Highlands,
polling began on 30 December and finished on 21 January 1987. In Milne
Bay and New Ireland, polling began on 20 November and finished on 10
January 1987.
The elections were over-subscribed. 236 candidates contested the
twenty-nine seats in Eastern Highlands Province (EHP), 128 candidates
chased after twenty-one seats in Milne Bay while in New Ireland
ninety-three candidates slogged it out for the nineteen seats. All these
elections produced new Premiers. In EHP, James Yanepa, Premier since
the inception of the provincial government, failed to get re-elected to the
Assembly. Walter Nombe, a former Works and Transport Minister in one
of Yanepa's governments, was elected Premier in February, with the
support of the National party members and some independents. The PPP
group, the largest group in the Assembly, led the opposition forces. In
Milne Bay, Lepani Watson, the grand old man of Milne Bay politics, also
failed to gain re-election. Navy Aule, a former Shell executive and a
businessman who had served briefly in Lepani Watson's last government,
succeeded him as Premier, with the backing of PPP and the Milne Bay
Solidarity Group. In New Ireland, Pedi Anis, for a long time Fr. Momis's
executive officer, became Premier at the head of a Melanesian Alliance/
Pangu group. Robert Seeto's long innings as Premier ended, or was
perhaps merely interrupted, at the same time as Yanepa and Lepani
Watson's.
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Border AffaiJ;"S and Foreign Relations
Nineteen eighty-six was a year of dramatic initiatives and clearer trends

in PNG's external relations. Members of the younger political generation,
the post-independence generation, were in the majority in Wingti's
cabinet, and they took a more radical (in Third World terms, more
nationalistic) line on relations with Australia and Indonesia,
decolonisation in the South Pacific, relations with ASEAN and with the
Soviet Union and China, and on aid and trade.
In January PNG acceded to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Although the
government entered numerous reservations which added up to a
significant dilution of its commitment to the spirit of the Convention and
the Protocol, there was no question that the accession amounted to a new
policy for Papua New Guinea. For the first time, there was a clear
government policy on the issue of repatriation of the border-crossers.
There would be no further compulsory repatriation. Moreover, the
UNHCR would now be closely involved, doing the screening of the
refugees, supervising the voluntary repatriation of those who wanted to
return, and working out resettlement questions with the government and
with third countries.
But government had not as yet decided anything about how PNG
would respond to requests for settlement of the large numbers of
refugees in the country. At the same time that the government acceded to
the convention, cabinet rejected as a vote-loser the Foreign Minister's
submission that provincial governments be asked to take in the bordercrossers temporarily, pending decisions on their long term future. Instead,
an ad hoc cabinet committee of six was set up to look into the issue.
There was no further indication of what recommendations emanated from
this committee. From time to time, the UNHCR announced the voluntary
repatriation of Irian Jayans. But by the end of the year, there had been no
noticeable dent in the problem. The numbers appeared to remain static
around the 10,000 figure. The refugees continued to stay in the camps,
near the border, not resettled further inland.
Five top OPM leaders, including James Nyaro, his Defence Minister,
Alex Donald Derey, and Geradus Thommy, the former commander of
OPM's southern region, were sent by UNHCR to Ghana in August,
pending their final resettlement in a European country. But apart from
these, there did not appear to be much prospect of others following soon
into the welcoming(?) arms of third countries.
In October, a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Cooperation and Friendship
was signed with Indonesia. Although this was billed by government
officials as "breaking new ground", it is truer to say that the treaty built
logically on existing agreements and patterns of past relations. But it was
more comprehensive than existing border agreements. It reinstated defence
attaches in each other's capital. Two years before, PNG had initiated their
withdrawal in protest against Indonesian violation of her air space. The
427
treaty also promised the expansion of direct trade, shipping and air links.
Perhaps what was really new and different about the treaty, as
critics like Bernard Narokobi and the ex-Foreign Minister, John Giheno
pointed out, was that even the former theoretical ability of PNG to raise
questions about the treatment of the Melanesian Irian Jayans in
international forums seemed now to be sacrificed because such might be
taken as an unfriendly act. Unfriendly acts had been disallowed under
previous border agreements also. But in the context of those agreements,
unfriendly acts had referred to not giving aid and comfort to rebels, or
allowing the use of one's territory by unfriendly forces against the other.
Papua New Guinea had felt able, although not often, to raise the Irian
Jayan issues at international forums without feeling that any agreements
with Indonesia were being breached. In the context of the new
comprehensive Treaty of Friendship, such an activity could more easily
be claimed to be an unfriendly act. The basic objectives of the treaty,. to
deny a casus belli to Indonesia, and also to get PNG closer to ASEAN
through Indonesia, appeared to policy makers to justify that self-denying
ordinance.
Relations with Australia came under some strain, historical relations,
aid and trade, co-membership in the South Pacific Forum and the
Commonwealth and co-interest in ASEAN notwithstanding. 18 Indeed,
some of these elements accounted for the strain. The third quinquennial
aid agreement since independence had been signed in September 1985,
after lengthy negotiations. It was to cover the period 1986-91. But in July
1986 the Australian government slashed the aid by $A10 million in
response to Australia's economic problems. Papua New Guinea was told
of it only after it was done. The Australian government followed this with
a new formula, once again arrived at unilaterally, by which the agreed aid
would fall by $A15 million to $A45 million each year, depending on the
performance of the Australian economy.
Papua New Guinea authorities were not well pleased. The Secretary for
Finance publicly blamed an "Australian Mafia" in the Public Service for
blocking aid relations with Japan. The Australian actions helped to push
on PNG's search for alternative sources of aid. Tied aid from other
donors such as Japan which had been rejected in the past now became
acceptable not only because of the declining Australian aid, but also
because Australia was itself now very gradually shifting to tied aid and
also because the younger PNG politicians appeared to want a dilution of
the "special relations" with Australia.
Trade and investment relations with Australia also had a bumpy ride.
Deregulation of the rice trade, for instance, brought the first importation
of American rice in October, thus undermining Australian suppliers'
monopoly of the $A75 million a year trade. The attempts by the Wingti
government to repudiate the Somare government's agreements with two
Australian firms, Newcastle Broadcasting Network for television
broadcast, and James Barnes for a meat cannery, raised hackles in
Australian business circles. There was also the case of a $A4.8 million
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contract awarded first to an Australian firm to build houses for Air

Niugini but then transferred unceremoniously by the minister to a local
company.
On other foreign policy matters, the government showed an
assertiveness and independence that were new, perhaps a harbinger of
what is to come. Diplomatic relations were established with West
Germany, the biggest market for PNG exports, and with the Soviet Union.
Papua New Guinea boycotted the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games and
took the lead in resurrecting the New Caledonia decolonisation issue at
the UN. She worked with her South Pacific Forum neighbours to extract
from the US a belated recognition of the Pacific Islands' rights over
fishery grounds in the 200 mile economic zone. Both Wingti and his
Foreign Minister spoke publicly about PNG's wish to join ASEAN. The
influence of a new generation of politicians became discernible in PNG
foreign policy stands in 1986.
45
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The political chronicle of Papua New Guinea in 1987 can be written around
the 13 June to 4 July national election. Virtually every domestic political
event of significance could be related to the dictates of the impending
election or to its aftermath, the struggle to form and maintain a government
from a number of fractious groupings, otherwise known as parties.
Background to the Election:
The Economy
Compared with the economic recession which served as the backdrop to
the 1982 election, and which could be said to have adversely affected the
popularity of the incumbent Chan-led coalition government, the economic
conditions accompanying the 1987 elections were buoyant, particularly in
the Highlands and Port Moresby. 1 Private sector employment was rising:
3.2 per cent higher in the first half of 1987, compared with 1986. General
business conditions showed improvement in the first half of the year
compared with the corresponding period in 1986, and business outlook
was optimistic. Inflation, already low at 4.8 per cent for 1986, was falling
further, thanks largely to the depreciation of the currency of Australia and
New Zealand, major sources of PNG imports. Inflation was only three per
cent for the whole of 1987.
Although commodity prices were on the decline on the world market,
the stabilisation funds had healthy balances built up from the preceding
two years of relatively high commodity prices. Appropriately high bounty
payments, particularly for coffee, effectively insulated farmers from the
effects of the declining prices.
For the government, higher volumes and higher prices for gold exports
more than took up the slack in export earnings from other exports.
Government expenditure on goods and services was 11.5 per cent higher
in the first half of 1987, compared with a year before. Government's
internal revenues were up, in spite of the K32 million tax gifts which
Finance Minister Chan had handed to taxpayers in the 1987 budget,
described by opposition spokesmen as an election budget.
However, the increase in internal revenue was still below the
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unrealistically optimistic budget estimates. Further, the depreciation of the

Australian dollar was eroding the value of the Australian budgetary
subsidy. Thus, sharp cuts could be expected if the budgeted deficit was
not to be blown out, but any such worries were for the future, not for the
pre-election period. In any case, these were not the sort of issues that the
opposition parties thought to capitalise on.
The Parties
At the beginning of January, there were as many as fifteen parties in the
country ready to do battle in the impending elections. Five of them were
new and untested. Morobe Independent Group (MIG) was led by the fiery
Morobe Premier, Utula Samana. Wantok party was led by the erstwhile
United party minister, Roy Evara. Leiba party of Oscar Tammur was
based not on the emerging proletariat of Lae or Port Moresby but on the
Kokopo area of East New Britain because of kinship affiliations, local
loyalties and other personal factors pertaining to the founder. The
Country party of Sinake Giregire barely existed only around Goroka in
the Eastern Highlands where the founder lives. Finally, there was the
National Settlement party, another paper party, of Louis Vagi. Papua
Besena, the former secessionist group led by Josephine Abaijah, also had
no representation in the House which was dissolved in March.
Of the nine parties represented in Parliament, five were in the
governing coalition. Prime Minister Wingti's People's Democratic
Movement (PDM) had twenty members. Sir Julius Chan's People's
Progress party (PPP) had thirteen members. National party, led in
Parliament by Steve Tago (who was apparently at odds with the party's
power brokers, the rich, Highlands coffee farmers and businessmen) had
twelve members. Ted Diro's Independent Group, lately rebaptised as
People's Action party (PAP), had three members. Papua party, led by
Galeva Kwarara, also had three members. Finally, a section of the ever
disunited United party (UP), led by Paul Torato, was with Wingti.
For more than a year, intra-coalition solidarity had been weakening in
the face of the impending elections, with coalition leaders seeking to
mobilise their resources, differentiate their parties, and project
themselves. 2 There was no indication that the coalition partners were
going to cooperate electorally. On the contrary, the nearer the election
date approached, the clearer every party leader made it that they were all
free agents. They might be inclined towards continuing the coalition, but
their decision would depend on the outcome of the election. Wingti's
reshuffle of his cabinet in April, just four months after the December
1986 one, and only two months before the elections, with Parliament
already dissolved, fuelled intra-coalition disagreement further, as some of
the changes were resisted, in particular Torato's shift from "opportunity
knocks" Forests to thankless Police.
On the opposition benches were Pangu pati, led by Somare, with
thirty-five members; Fr John Momis' Melanesian Alliance (MA), with
431
four members; The League for National Advancement (LNA), with five
members; and two UP rebels, including Roy Evara, before he formed his
Wantok party. There were also eight independent MPs. Pangu and MA,
whose collaboration in the New Ireland provincial government election
had resulted in the ending of Robert Seeto and PPP's rule in January, said
they would go into the election as allies, although concrete manifestation
of this wish was not observable outside that particular province. To some
extent Pangu and MA were united by a sense of relative deprivation, as
they perceived the extent to which parties in government sought to use
state resources for their campaign. In February, Somare highlighted
instances of what he termed illegal distribution of minor works funds to
government MPs to hurry through projects in their constituencies during
the campaign period. Wingti did not deny the opposition's allegations. He
merely pointed out that the sums involved were only one percent of the
national budget, while the minister involved, Works Minister Peter
Kuman, advised his critics "to go jump in the lake".
Wingti himself was proving to be the primary beneficiary of the
governing coalition's access to state resources for partisan purposes. His
election campaign could only benefit from the coffee rust awareness
campaign that began in 1986 and which had him staring boldly out of
some 500,000 large, glossy posters, promising government support to the
growers and advising them to tend their farms. The same message, with
every sentence prefaced by "The Prime Minister says ...", was also on
radio throughout the campaign period.
Wingti's group stood to gain most from the operations of a Coffee
Development Authority hastily put together by the government in the
previous year to oversee the rehabilitation of the industry in the wake of
the coffee rust. Throughout the campaign period, this Authority was
engaged in disbursing funds to small growers throughout the Highlands,
alongside the Agriculture Bank, which was operating throughout the
country with much more funds than ever before. 3 A much more
controversial exploitation of his position for partisan advantage was
Wingti's three minute appearance at the beginning of a video tape
commissioned by the Electoral Commissioner for voter education.
Finally, all available evidence regarding the suspension of the Western
Highlands provincial government in March suggests that Wingti was
heavily involved. 4 Ostensibly, the suspension was for financial
mismanagement. However most observers seem to agree that it was
politically motivated. Wingti was standing for the province's Regional
seat. His political ally, Kagul Koroka, reputed to be one of the richest
men in the country, and apparently one of his major financial backers,
had been unseated as the Premier of the province through a vote of noconfidence in April 1986. The man who took over from Koroka, Philip
Kapal, was a National party man and his government was dominated by
National party men.
One Kingal Kai Kuri, a former minister in the suspended
government, testified under oath in court that Wingti had called a meeting
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YawSaffu
with opposition members of the Provincial Assembly and five government

ministers, including himself, to discuss a vote of no-confidence in
Premier Kapal. The meeting had taken place in the house of Kagul
Koroka. Kuri claimed that Wingti had said at the meeting that things
would be difficult for him during elections if Kapal remained Premier.s
Wingti admitted he had been at the meeting but denied he had said any
such thing. In February, a vote of no-confidence in Kapai was defeated in
the Provincial Assembly. In March, the Wingti cabinet decided to suspend
the provincial government on the basis of an Auditor General's Report
submitted in February. The speed of the action was most unusual. Further,
the Report covered the years 1983 to 1986. Kapal's government had been
in power only since April 1986.
In September, the National court overturned the suspension. Mr Justice
Hinchliffe pointed out that when cabinet discussed the Auditor General's
Report, it failed to take note of an accompanying letter dated 19
February, from the Auditor General to the Secretary, Department of
Provincial Affairs, asking for comments, explanations and remedial action
on the "major unsatisfactory matters" uncovered by the audit. Neither the
Auditor-General's letter nor the Departmental Secretary's reply was
presented to cabinet. The judge said: "If the NEC (Cabinet) had had the
opportunity to peruse the Secretary's reply, then I am of the opinion that
it may not have come to the conclusion that it did". 6 He was also satisfied
that cabinet was wrong in law when it said that "the matter can only be
put right by suspension".'
The Issues
What did the parties stand for? The point has been made often, and
correctly, by commentators on PNG politics that issues, in the form of
nationally highlighted controversies on which parties offer visible
policies, do not count for very much in PNG elections. It is not that there
are no issues crying out for debate. Of course there are, particularly in a
new state. But the electorate is not attentive to issues, unless these happen
to take on a micro, local garb, such as fish dying in streams from the
effects of mining ventures, payment of adequate compensation to
landowners, imbalance in the distribution of "development" projects in
the district, and so on.
Yet the issuing of glossy party manifestos, advertisements and jingles
to bring to the attention of radio audiences, the small reading public and,
lately, the even smaller television audience, are as much part of PNG
elections as bilas are of PNG culture. The manifestos were routinely
launched, but they hardly raised an eyebrow. Party candidates hardly
based their campaigns on them. And opponents hardly reacted to them.
But if issues and policies counted for more in PNG's elections, Chan's
PPP would have been miles ahead of its nearest rival.
PPP's election manifesto was easily the most elaborate, the most
coherent and detailed, including even attempts at costing the programmes
433
it promised to introduce. Sir Julius Chan sought to capitalise on his

reputation as something of an economic and financial guru by constantly
referring to efficient management of the economy as the number one
issue, and warning particularly about the dangerous levels which foreign
borrowing had been allowed to reach under the Somare government. The
law and order problem in the country was another issue on which PPP
had proposals, to tighten controls on weapons, use the defence force more
often to help the police and improve police training and equipment. There
were also fairly detailed proposals on rural development and free
community education. PPP ran a polished campaign and showed superior
organisation at every turn, but the Placer controversy constituted a
continuing blight on its prospects of doing well. 8
Pangu's manifesto was essentially the usual welfarist shopping list,
summarised in its claim that "national development means people
development", and that human development is the vehicle for economic
development - an argument against the Wingti approach which sought to
cut down drastically funds for education, health and other welfare
activities and to transfer these to the so-called economic growth areas
such as agriculture and fisheries, trade and industry, minerals and energy.
The three central promises on Pangu's manifesto were: to educate the
people (including overseas training for effective localisation); improve
health and social welfare facilities; ensure law and order.
Pangu claimed to have the experience to attack what it identified as the
basic worries of the ordinary Papua New Guinean: high school fees;
inability to get bank loans; lack of access to decent health services;
increasing lawlessness and crime; unemployment and vagrancy problems.
But apart from one uncharacteristic foray into the area of economic
policy, namely, a promise to devalue the kina in order to improve
earnings of PNG's primary producers (incidentally a policy that was
subscribed to by Fr Momis also), neither Somare nor any other Pangu
leader ventured far into specifics to say how they would solve the
problems they identified.
For Wingti's PDM, emphasis on agriculture and the record of his prime
ministership was the core message. Wingti's refrain was: "You gave
Somare ten years. All I ask for is another five years to continue what I
have begun". In the Highlands, however, the message became frankly
regionalist "Keep a Highlander in the Prime Minister's seat". PDM's
campaign strategy was to build up Wingti as its prime ministerial
material, capitalising on every opportunity, such as the coffee rust
campaign and the voter education tape referred to earlier, to achieve that.
There was an unsuccessful attempt, through a whispering campaign
and inspired leaks of National Intelligence Office reports, to label PDM
leaders, particularly Wingti himself and Gabriel Ramoi, the
Communications Minister, as closet communists. The word communist
appears to strike terror in hearts and minds of upwardly mobile Papua
New Guineans who tended to be strongly individualistic and businessminded, and people like Peter Wamp, the Pangu president, did not scruple
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to invoke the bogey term.

Ted Diro's PAP was also regionalist in its appeal, although at the
head of its declarations was its stated commitment to "a strong, united
PNG". PAP's public declarations could not have been bettered as tonguein-cheek statements. In view of later, post-election scandals centering
around Ted Diro, the irony in the following statements in PAP's
manifesto are of more than passing interest: ..There will be no shady
deals ... There will be no embarrassing or unruly behaviour in or out of
parliament ... There will be no scandal". 9 "PAP", one of its documents
proclaimed; "is committed to preserve democracy, security and stability
of our nation" . 10
PAP had specific proposals, going from marginal issues (such as
"immediate pay increase and review conditions of service and defence
personnel", the reintroduction of "government days") to law and order,
free primary education and localisation. But the overwhelming pitch for
PAP was its regionalist stance: "The only way to achieve development in
Papua is to be represented by a single and united force in parliament".n
However, at the campaign stage, there was no hint of a pooling of
resources between PAP and Papua party or Papua Besena. On the
contrary, as in the case of the two basically Highlands parties, National
and PDM, the struggle by the three Papuan parties for the Papuan vote
locked them into intense rivalry, with personal relations between the
leaders of the respective parties not particularly friendly.
An effective electoral pact between parties was one between MA
and MIG in Morobe. The pact was based on the common populist,
nationalist outlooks of the leaders of the two groups, Fr Momis and Utula
Samana. MA agreed not to put up any candidate in Morobe province and
to help MIG candidates. But as we shall see later, the validity of the pact
did not last long into the new Parliament. Evidently, Samana did not
accept that the electoral pact with MA entailed remaining on the
opposition benches together. And therein lies one explanation why
electoral pacts among small parties are not much more common in Papua
New Guinea.
But perhaps all this disquisition on parties and issues as a background
to the election is misplaced emphasis? First, issues, such as were thrown
up, were not really debated in any sustained manner. Their importance
even to the candidates was often seriously in doubt. Secondly, bold,
headline-grabbing policy initiatives, dropped bang in the middle of the
campaign by individual candidates, were what really attracted media
notice, and perhaps grassroots notice too, rather than anything the parties
proposed in their manifestos. A few examples of such bold personal
proposals will suffice. Fr Momis' "Bougainville Initiative", demanding
that three percent of the profits from Bougainville Copper Ltd be given
to the provincial government on behalf of the people; John Kaputin's
"Vehicle" or "Jumbo Float", by which he meant the state divesting its
shares in mining ventures and their sale to the people through an
organisation to be created; and Aruru Matiabe's promise to initiate
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legislation to demand a free transfer of twenty-five per cent of the shares

in mineral ventures in the Highlands to landowners, all attracted a lot of
comment. There were well-founded rumours of a rich oil strike in the
Southern Highlands Province. The capacity of such initiatives to capture
the popular imagination was obvious. Attacks on the proposals by
opponents evidently only served to enhance their dissemination.
The Candidates
More important than either of the above as reasons for down-playing the
significance of parties was the fact that two out of every three of the
1,513 persons who nominated between 27 March and 27 April did so as
independent candidates.
Parties endorsed candidates and gave them organisational and/or
financial support as follows: Pangu 98; PPP 87; PDM 68; National party
53; LNA 45; MA 39; PAP 33; United party 24; Wantok party 19; Papua
party 16; Papua Besena 10; MIG 10; and Country party 8. An unspecified
number of nominally independent candidates also received secret
subvention from the parties. Nevertheless a very large number of
candidates, definitely more than one half of all candidates, stood alone,
without any party support, and thus emphasised once more the nature of
PNG's elections as essentially constituency level contests among local
favourite sons (hardly any daughters as yet).
The Voting
According to the Electoral Commissioner 2,769,690 electors, computed to
be 72.9 per cent of the eligible voters, turned out to vote. The basis of the
Commissioner's calculation of voter turnout invariably inflates the turnout
rate because the number of the people on the electoral roll, instead of the
number of eligible voters, is used as the denominator. Given the effect of
section 141 of the Organic Law on Election, an inflated turnout figure
must necessarily result. Section 141 entitles any Papua New Guinean to
turn up at any polling station and vote, after making a statutory
declaration that although he or she is not on the electoral roll he or she
is eligible to vote, that is, over eighteen and residentially qualified.
With that kind of provision, and given that voting went on for three
weeks, it would take angels and saints to guarantee no abuse of the
provision. In some polling stations, over fifty per cent of the people
voting did so on the basis of section 141. Allegations of under-age voting,
of bribery of voters, of the use of guest voters ferried into the
constituency by candidates, and of multiple voting, were rife. Some
losing candidates based their petitions to the court of Disputed Returns on
just such grounds.
It must be made clear though that the administration and the conduct
of the election were fair and free from interference. Officials from the
Electoral Commissioner's own staff, down to the thousands of public
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servants on hire to the Commission, and the policemen who watched over
proceedings and guarded personnel and ballot boxes, performed
creditably under very difficult conditions. So-called scrutineers, looking
after the interests of candidates, were everywhere: at the polling stations;
at the police stations guarding the ballot boxes with the police men; in
the counting halls. Officials genuinely tried very hard not to give any
scrutineer an opponunity to question their impartiality. In any case, the
officials realized that their lives could be in grave danger unless they
were scrupulously fair and honest. The tendency for aggrieved groups to
take the law into their own hands and unleash their own brand of justice
is a familiar problem in Papua New Guinea.
Although democratic elections are meant to take violence out of the
resolution of the succession problem in politics, the election was attended
by a disturbing amount of violence. As one leader commented: "This is
the worst election I can remember. Unrest during polling and counting
must be taken as a warning of worse to come" .12 In terms of violence, the
Highlands region was the worst, with ballot boxes being burnt in the
Kandep area of Enga, and officials being assaulted and rivals being axed.
Worse violence often followed the declaration of results.
A basic reason for the increasing incidence of electoral violence is that
elections have become a very important factor in class formation in Papua
New Guinea. Elections have come to constitute a very rapid route to the
top of the heap. As in several contemporary post-colonial situations,
''elections have become the alchemy that turns base metal into gold" . 13
Because rewards of electoral success can be so spectacular, candidates,
their backers and supporters, are prepared to invest staggering amounts of
money and energy in the race to Parliament. Observing the elections in
the Highlands, I was constantly amazed at the sums of monies that I
learnt were being spent by candidates. Several candidates admitted to
spending 50,000 kina and over. The participants raised the stakes so high
that defeat often could not be just shrugged off with equanimity.
The Results
Voting finished at 6pm on 4 July. Counting started almost immediately,
but results were very slow to come, and it was not until a week later that
the final results came in. On 15 July the Electoral Commission officially
announced the results of 106 constituencies. 14 The two tables below
summarise most aspects of the results.
Only two parties managed to win more than ten per cent of the
votes. Pangu polled 14.8 per cent and took twenty-six seats, while PDM
took eleven per cent of the votes and seventeen seats. Eight parties
accounted for 31.5 per cent of the total votes and forty-three seats. The
remaining five parties, accounting for two per cent of the votes, obtained
no seats.
In contrast with the parties, most of which suffered a decline in the
number of seats held, the Independents increased their representation
437
significantly. They won forty-one per cent of the votes and secured
twenty-three seats, a significant proportional under-representation.
A number of the results were disputed by losing candidates.
Eventually, forty-one petitions were lodged with the court of Disputed
Returns, but by the end of the year, only three petitions had been
disposed of, one of them proving a successful challenge, with Albert
Karo being declared a winner in Moresby South instead of Legu Vagi, the
Police Minister. Miscounting was discovered after the judge ordered a
recount.
If the high degree of party fractionalisation indicated by Table 1 was
disappointing from the point of view of ensuring a strong stable
government, other features of the results, summarised in Table 2, were
equally disappointing, from the point of view of the legitimating
functions of elections. As Table 2 shows, only seven seats were won with
an absolute majority of votes cast, a decline of more than sixty per cent
from 1982, while at the other end, the number of seats won with less than
twenty per cent doubled.
Table 1: Papua New Guinea National Election, 1987 Results
PARTY
SEATS HELD AT
DISSOLUTION
VOTES
OBTAINED
PERCENT
VOTES
SEATS
WON
PERCENT
SEATS
Independent
1145839
41.0
23
21.8
Pangu pany
35
414424
14.8
26
23.8
People's Democratic
Movement (PDM)
20
307395
11.0
17
15.6
People's Progtess party (PPP)
13
174293
6.2
5.5
157188
5.6
6.4
12
145221
5.2
13
11.9
League for National

Advancement (LNA)
132720
4.7
2.8
People's Action party (PAP)
88328
3.2
5.6
Melanesian Alliance (MA)

National party
United pany
87243
3.1
Morobe Independent Group
60922
2.2
3.7
Papuapany
34636
1.2
2.7
0.9
Papua Besena
17122
0.6
Wantok party
17976
0.6
Country party
11058
0.4
Leiba pany
2611
0.1
National Settlement party

Total
164
109
2796690
0.01
99.910
0
109
0
100.0
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Table 2: Trends in Papua New Guinea Elections

Year
Number of
Number of Average per
Percentage of Votes per Winning Candidate
Constituencies Candidates Constituency 0%-20%
20%-40% 40%-50% Over 50%
1977
109
879
8.1
11
63
16
19
1982
109
1125
!0.3
20
55
14
18
1987
109
1513
13.9
40
50
Source: Repon to the Founh National Parliament, 5 August 1987

(Pon Moresby, The Electoral Commission. July 1987), p. 4.
Forming a Winning Coalition

The post-election situation in 1987 was far more confused and fluid,
compared to 1982. The results were clearly less decisive this time. The
PNG constitution gives politicians up to three weeks, after the return of
writs, to put together a winning coalition. Until virtually the last day
before Parliament met on 5 August to elect the Prime Minister, Somare,
rather than Wingti, looked the more likely candidate for the job.
As indicated above, Somare's Pangu and MA were in alliance.
Samana's MIG was quickly admitted into the camp largely because of the
similarity of the populist, nationalist outlooks of Samana and Momis and
the electoral understanding between them. The LNA was bound to feel
more comfortable in the Somare camp than in the Wingti camp, given the
history of bitter rivalry between Wingti and Tony Siaguru, during their
Pangu days. 15
For a brief moment, some journalists managed to make it look as if
Chan might join the Somare camp. The idea of Sir Julius Chan and
Somare teaming up again for stability had been touted even before the
election. 16 As the results started coming in, and with the independents
appearing to be doing well, and thus posing a threat to future stability,
the question popped up again. In response, Chan confessed: "It had been
a costly two years working in this government. I have had to keep quiet
to ensure stability in the country" .17 Then, referring to Somare, he said:
"I respect the man. I have worked with him in the past ... If it comes to
putting national interest first, anything is possible". To which two of
PNG's most senior journalists responded: "What may not be possible,
though, is PPP joining with Mr Wingti". 18 They evidently read too much
into Chan's confession. Chan's PPP remained in the Wingti camp, unlike
the National party which quit.
By 15 July, the National party had joined the Somare camp. The
struggle for the Highlands by the National party and PDM, the two
essentially Highlands parties, had been particularly bitter. Further, the
new leader of the National party (Iambakey Okuk had died in November
439
1986, Stephen Tago had lost his seat and Michael Mel, formerly the
party's president, now an MP, had just been elected leader) reckoned
realistically that the party stood to get more ministries in the Somare
camp than in the Wingti camp, seeing that PDM was also predominantly
a Highlands party. Certainly, while Michael Mel could aspire to become
Deputy Prime Minister under Somare, that would be out of the question
in the Wingti camp, because Wingti is also a Highlander.
From all the groups in the Somare camp, there were fifty-two MPs
presumably committed to his leadership. In addition, there were credible
claims that up to twelve independents were really camp members. The
number required to win the Prime Minister's position was fifty-four.
Because of delayed elections, 106 seats, instead of the full 109, would
have been filled by 5 August. Thus, if past experience was any guide, on
the basis of those figures, a bandwagon effect could be created easily to
put Somare firmly in the Prime Minister's seat. Creating such a
bandwagon effect was precisely the strategy Somare chose.
On the Wingti side, the official tally gave his camp thirty-two
members, as follows: PDM, seventeen; PAP, six; PPP, five; Papua party,
three; and United party, one. However, the Wingti camp also claimed the
support of an unspecified number of independent MPs.
Initial prospect thus seemed more favourable to Somare. His strategy
of media blitz, talking horse to the press to generate a bandwagon effect,
also appeared a reasonable one. However, a more astute handling of
negotiations with MPs was called for because in Wingti Somare had a
more cunning opponent, a more intelligent Machiavellian, than he had
ever had to deal with in such circumstances.
The Somare camp held a political bazaar in Rabaul from 15 to 20 July.
On the last day, the names of sixty-one MPs, said to be members of the
camp, were published in the Post-Courier. That was part of the bandwagon strategy. But it looked to some named MPs as Somare's overweening pressure to force them through publicity to join him, when all
they were doing at that stage was playing the favourite PNG MPs' game
of shopping around for the best deal.
The Rabaul meeting also committed two unpardonable errors
(according to the PNG rules of the political game). First, the meeting
went into details about firm ministerial allocations, including the question
of the deputy prime ministership, which expectedly went to Michael Mel.
The constitution makers had, with magnificent prescience, put an upper
limit to the number of ministerial positions. A maximum of only twentyseven ministerial positions (a quarter of the number of MPs) were
available. But virtually every MP who turned up in Rabaul believed he
was ministerial material. And even if he wasn't he did not see why he
should not be when he knew he could enjoy the trappings of office and
exploit the opportunities of the position as well as the next fellow.
Secondly, there was some attempt to hammer out agreed policies
which all coalition partners would be expected to support in Parliament.
Leaders of the MA-MIG group at the meeting, Momis, 'Narokobi and
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Samana, more articulate than most, and insistent upon discussing

fundamental issues from populist angles, apparently succeeded in
alienating a few MPs. Papua New Guinea politicians are among the most
pragmatic in the world. Agreed principles, in the manner which the MAMIG leaders and apparently Somare, too, wanted, were felt by some to be
inconsistent with their free-lancing beliefs and free-wheeling style. For
these reasons, it was not surprising that the day after the publication of
names, some of the named MPs denied publicly that they were members
of the Somare camp.
Wingti's approach was completely different. He preferred to meet with
individual MPs. In his negotiations with them he generally refused to
make specific promises. But he held up a pie for everybody. He let the
MPs know of the sort of opportunities he intended to create for his
parliamentary supporters if he became Prime Minister.
Elevation of the status of the Chairmanship of Parliamentary
Committees, and suitably increased remuneration along with the new
status, was one option. Another was the appointment of MPs to chair the
boards of strategic state corporations, such as the state-owned banks, the
Electricity Commission, PTC, where allowances, opportunities for travel
and so on, could rival those offered by a ministry. A most attractive
option was the scheme to improve re-election prospects of supporters by
guaranteeing to complete a list of projects in their constituency within the
five year life of Parliament. In PNG, the average casualty rate among
MPs seeking re-election is about fifty per cent. This year, forty-seven per
cent of MPs who sought re-election failed to make it.
Wingti strategists even dangled before MPs the possibility of
creating several Deputy Minister position. Given that the constitution
specifies an upper limit to the size of the political executive in PNG, how
that option could stand a constitutional challenge in the courts was not
made clear.
Meanwhile, the Wingti camp was benefiting from the quiet operations
of his allies, particularly Chan and the maverick Torato, who lost his seat
but still sought to be a king-maker. He lobbied successful candidates he
claimed to have financed. But Ted Diro proved to be the most valuable
ally. He was organising the Papuan bloc, to help his chances of securing
the deputy prime ministership and also to advance Papuan regionalism.
The effect of his efforts was that virtually all the independent MPs from
the Papuan region ended up in the Wingti camp.
The press kept a tab on the dizzy movements of politicians from camp
to camp. Up to 3 August the daily tallies gave the Somare camp an edge
over the Wingti camp. But on that day, two days before Parliament was
to meet Niugini Nius made the Wingti camp winners by fifty-five to fiftyone. The breakdown of members in his camp now stood as follows: PDM
twenty-four; PPP eight; UP three; the Papuan bloc twenty. The camp had
obviously succeeded in poaching members from other parties. On D-day,
Parliament voted fifty-four to fifty-one, with the Speaker not voting, to
install Wingti as the Prime Minister.
441
In a bitter speech, Fr Momis branded Wingti's victory as "not a

triumph of democracy but a triumph of money, manipulation and
backroom deals which have subverted the will of the people" .19 So mare,
for his part predicted instability: "Your coalition is a ramshackle gaggle
of unruly independents who are about to discover the hard way you can't
deliver the ministries they expect from you". 20 Wingti's strategy may have
aggravated the problems Momis and Somare indirectly pointed to, but it
has to be said that the real culprit was not so much Wingti's cunning and
superior guile. The system itself was the problem: its inability to produce
clear, decisive victories at the polls and, much more serious, its
devaluation of the party principle. A triumphant Somare camp would have
been just as liable to similar strictures.
Four Months of the New Government
A twenty-six member cabinet was sworn in on 11 August. The ministries
had been shared among the coalition partners as follows. PDM obtained
seven ministries, including the prime ministership. PPP secured five
ministries, including the deputy prime ministership for Chan. Ted Diro's
PAP got five ministries. All three UP members got ministries, while
Papua party got one ministry. Finally, there were five independent
members in cabinet. The Papuan bloc, as a whole, obtained twelve of the
twenty-six ministries. It had clearly done very well for itself.
The government's earliest efforts were aimed at increasing its majority
in Parliament and at extending its control over public bodies. At the first
session of Parliament in August, a law was passed enabling the
government to appoint MPs to boards of statutory corporations and the
National Capital District Commission. A similar move to allow MPs to
participate in Provincial Assembly meetings and ministers to participate
in Provincial Executive meetings failed because of strong opposition from
provincial governments. The idea of creating deputy ministers was also
killed by an Ombudsman Commission's warning. Guaranteeing to
complete a list of projects in the constituencies of government backbenchers proved such a hit with MPs that by the end of November, the
government had managed to entice enough opposition MPs to give it a
majority of twenty-five (from a majority of only four in August). From
the point of view of the government the defections had the added bonus
of precipitating a leadership crisis for Pangu pati with the normally loyal
Rabbie Namaliu, deputy leader of the party, throwing a veiled public
ultimatum to Somare and the Pangu caucus to straighten out the
leadership problem, a coded way of saying Somare should step down
from the leadership.
In the November session, a bill to enlarge Police powers, to search
without warrants, was defeated narrowly, by the casting vote of the
Speaker. A bill to create a Media Tribunal with powers to license, to
censor and to force the publication of materials if the Minister for
Communications certified that these were required in the national interest,
442
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was introduced in October. It faced a barrage of cnticism, was

withdrawn, then reintroduced in November, to even more widespread
condemnation by the opposition, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), and
the press itself. The Chief Justice publicly condemned the bill. A
constitutional amendment was initiated early, in the November session, to
change the composition of the Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal, to give
three places on the five-member Tribunal to MPs, where there had
previously been none.
From the suddenness of various government actions,2 1 tough talking by
ministers, 22 and ministerial interventions in obviously internal
management areas, 23 an uncharacteristically macho image of government
was being created in the first months of the government.
The ramifications of a major scandal posed early threats to the stability
of the government. In April, amidst rumours of massive corruption and
scandalous malpractices in the timber industry and mutual recriminations
by timber firms and the Forestry Industry Council (FIC), Wingti moved
Paul Torato out of the Forests Ministry and appointed Mr Justice Barnett
to enquire into aspects of the Forest industry. The Commission uncovered
a string of very serious instances of abuse of power, conflict of interest,
graft, transfer pricing, contravention of customs regulations, contravention
of laws prohibiting foreign funding of parties and election campaigns,
breach of the leadership code, and so on, on the part of Ted Diro. While
he was Forest Minister (from November 1985 to December 1986) he was
also heavily involved with a timber firm, Angus (PNG) Ltd, controlling
personally thirty-five per cent of its shares. On behalf of this firm, he set
aside departmental advice and smoothed the way for illegal timber
operations. He set up dummy companies in Hong Kong and the Channel
Islands to receive and manage over nine million kina of illegal profits to
be obtained through transfer pricing. He was also in the pay of another
timber firm, Santa Investments Pty Ltd.
Interestingly enough, it was only two days after the election of the
Prime Minister that the news hit the headlines. As a consequence, Ted
Diro could be legitimately passed over for the post of Deputy Prime
Minister. The best he could do was Minister without portfolio. The idea
was that he would assume the Foreign Affairs portfolio (temporarily
being looked after by the deputy leader of his party, Aruru Matiabe, who
was also Minister for Education) if he cleared himself sufficiently before
the Commission. However, once Diro appeared before the Commission,
more and more damaging revelations, agonizingly slowly and painfully
extracted from him (the exasperated judge had been forced to ask: "When
are you going to find the true story and stick to it?"), came to light. The
Commission found, for instance, that Diro had obtained K20,000 from the
Vanuatu government (Diro was Foreign Minister at the time) and
$US140,000 from the Indonesian Army Commander, General Benny
Murdani, for his election campaign.
Diro sought to maintain that the graft, foreign funding, illegal
operations by his firm, and so on, were all entered into for the sake of
443
Papua New Guinea. "I did it for PNG. I was using Angus to develop
Central Province. It is common in PNG for politicians to use the returns
from business to secure votes. Electoral benefits (votes) through
commercial linkages are not self-interest of a sinister kind". 24 Aruru
Matiabe sought to support his leader by saying that it was "normal for
PNG leaders to receive contributions from foreign sources". 25
For this and other embarrassments to the government, (his radical
positions on the New Caledonian issue, for instance, had had to be
contradicted publicly on several occasions by the Prime Minister) Aruru
Matiabe was made to give up the Foreign Ministry. After the Prime
Minister had had it for a fortnight, Akoka Doi, the Speaker and a member
of the Papuan bloc was appointed to the post in November. Diro had
resigned from cabinet on 8 November, after he had been charged on three
counts of perjury (later increased to five counts) in connection with his
evidence before the Forest Inquiry.
Diro's resignation was the signal for the start of strong rumours of an
impending coup throughout November and December. Diro had
apparently been a popular Commander of the Defence Force, the first
Papua New Guinean to occupy that position. The top echelons of the
Force were occupied disproportionately by Papuan Officers. Diro's
utterances, after his resignation, did nothing to dissipate the rumours. In
his resignation letter, he had said: "I am a peaceful man who believes in
the unity of PNG. But the events of the past couple of months have had
implications leading to rumours of disobedience in the disciplined
forces". 26
Meanwhile, Wingti was being reassured by the senior Defence
Force officers that the coup rumours were "rubbish", and that "any
attempt to overthrow a peacetime PNG government was more likely to
come from disaffected businessmen unable to get what they wanted
through the bureaucracy and parliament"Y But Diro, with his back now
to the wall, seemed bent on inciting some action by the military. He told
Parliament that "the ingredients are here for a coup, whether you like it
or not ... I do not want to be blamed when this arises". 28 Suddenly, he had
become the champion of the underdog, speaking in unfamiliar populist
tones: "50,000 young people leave school every year but the country is
able to cater for only 10,000 of them. The economy is dominated by
foreigners. Unless the leadership address itself to these problems, we are
sitting on a time bomb". 29 The two coups in Fiji were, of course, making
everybody more aware of the possibility of a coup, and hence more
nervous.
In December, in the midst of all these rumours, General Tony Huai,
Commander of the PNG Defence Force (and, incidentally, like Diro, a
Papuan), was sacked by the government, a year before the end of his
term. He was replaced by Brigadier Rochus Lokinap from Namatanai, Sir
Julius Chan's electorate in the New Ireland Province. Huai, who had
apparently been under National Intelligence Office surveillance for
months, was said to have made unauthorised trips to Indonesia to meet
444
Yaw Sa.ffu
and brief General Benny Murdani on the defence provisions in the Joint
Declaration of Principles being negotiated between PNG and Australia.
He was said to have accepted an offer of 1,000 army uniforms and a gift
of lounge furniture from Murdani. The Defence Minister, James Pokasui
a former Army Captain, alleged further that, by his slack leadership, Huai
had failed to stamp out incipient indiscipline, such as officers lobbying
politicians for promotion, and infighting among officers. All this was
allegedly beginning to affect discipline and morale among the troops.
Indeed, a Times journalist reported that Huai's close relations with
Murdani had nearly resulted in a mutiny of senior officers and NCO's in
November. 30
While the situation in the army appeared to be most threatening to
stability, the image of the Wingti cabinet (as a bunch of unruly politicians
intent on displaying their newly acqUired sense of power and publicly
squabbling over the distribution of perks) was also not particularly
reassuring for stability. A cabinet reshuffle became necessary not only to
improve the image of the government. It was also necessary because of
vacancies created, first by the resignation of Diro, (consequently the
Speaker Akoka Doi, was appointed Foreign Minister and Dennis Young
moved from Public Service to the speakership) and, secondly, by the
ousting of the Police Minister, Legu Vagi, from Parliament, as a result of
a successful challenge in the Court of Disputed Returns. The reshuffle
was also necessitated by the need to accommodate Utula Samana who
had been enticed to the government side by a firm promise to appoint
him a Minister. Samana had left his allies on the opposition benches in
October without notice and migrated with four followers to the
government benches. Finally, the virtual ultimatums issued by Peter
Kuman and Thomas Negints, PDM MPs who accused Wingti of
making them "sacrificial lambs", had to be addressed positively, because
of the ever present fear that disaffected backbenchers in PNG tend to
make common cause with the opposition and vote the government out of
power.
On 23 December, Wingti reshuffled his cabinet. Six new faces were
introduced Samana (Public Service); Joseph Aoae, Papua party,
Education; Albert Karo. PAP. Culture and Tourism (hived off from Hugo
Berghuser's Civil Aviation, Culture and Tourism); Peter Kuman, PDM,
Police; and Thomas Negints PDM, Internal Affairs (a new and powerful
ministry with responsibility for the increasingly active National
Intelligence Office, disaster management, and the independent
constitutional bodies such as the Electoral Commission, the Auditor
General's and the Ombudsman Commission). Tom Amaiu, UP, whose
short stint as Housing Minister had been accompanied by such
widespread allegations of greed, brazen wantokism and favouritism, was
shifted to Corrective Institutions (showing Wingti has a sense of
humour!). Housing was taken over by Bill Ninkama, ex-National party,
now PDM. Two ministers were not reappointed: Aruru Matiabe (PAP) and
Aaron Noaio, (PAP).
445
Foreign Affairs
Unlike 1982, when Iambakey Okuk tried but failed to inject foreign
policy issues into the campaign, particularly the Irian Jaya issue, this year
no politician appeared interested enough, or politicians were too realistic,
to raise any of the number of foreign policy issues on which PNG took
high profile stands, or in which she was directly involved. With the
precedent of the comprehensive Treaty of Friendship with Indonesia
towards the end of 1986, and also because of the 1986 unilateral
Australian revision of the aid agreement between herself and PNG, the
Wingti government initiated at the beginning of the year discussions
aimed at putting the whole range of bilateral relations between PNG and
Australia on a formal footing, in the form of a Joint Declaration of
Principles (JDP). The JDP which covered most aspects of relations
between two countries, aid, trade, defence, aviation, communications,
culture, was signed in Canberra on 12 December. It was hailed by PNG
spokesmen as having put PNG-Australian relations on a new, more equal,
more mature, less colonialist, footing.
From the point of view of Australia, the provision on defence had

proved the most difficult to handle because of the opposing views of Bill
Hayden and Kim Beazley; one urging caution because of Indonesia, and
the other urging greater commitment to PNG defence, again because of
Indonesia. It appears that PNG wanted an ANZUS kind of mutual defence
pact, with an automatic commitment to defend the other in the event of
an armed attack. In the end, although Wingti regarded the principles
agreed on defence to be an "improvement" on a 1977 defence
understanding between the two countries, the wording suggests that there
is commitment only to consultation in the event of an armed attack or a
threat of one. Each government decides what measures should be taken
jointly or separately in relation to the situation. 31
Membership of ASEAN was another foreign policy objective pushed

from the beginning of the year. This was a policy on which both the
governing coalition and the opposition agreed without any "ifs" or "buts".
In June, PNG was given approval by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
meeting to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. While this
allowed for closer ties with the six, it did not amount to full membership,
which was denied her.
Another vehicle of foreign policy on which PNG spent some time and
effort was the Melanesian Spearhead Group, joining her with the
Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. It was intended to give a greater voice to
each of the Melanesian states in the South Pacific Forum. Expectedly the
group took the Kanaky side in the New Caledonia decolonisation issue.
But they were unable to agree about what to do after the referendum in
which the French integrationists claimed victory over the Kanaky
separatists. There was also disagreement between Vanuatu and PNG over
the alleged subversive intrusion of Libya into the Pacific. While Vanuatu
insisted on her sovereign right to be friendly with Libya, if she so chose,
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PNG, with the excessively pro-West, anti-Soviet Ted Diro then in charge
of Foreign Affairs, joined the US-inspired anti-Libyan hysteria in the
Pacific in April. Whereas PNG politicians were divided over the
advisability of concluding a fishing deal with the Soviets, Vanuatu
evidently had no hesitation in plumping for a deal. In spite of such
differences, however, emerging practical cooperation among the three
Melanesian states foreshadowed the group as a cornerstone of PNG
foreign policy. Talks among the three to conclude a treaty to encourage
closer relations got under way after the return of the Wingti government.
So did negotiations for the loan of PNG officials to Vanuatu. Travel
between member groups was set to improve with Air Niugini obtaining
landing rights in both Honiara and Port Vila.
Events in Fiji (which PNG leaders insist on regarding as another
Melanesian state) provided opportunities for the Wingti government to
distance itself from Australia and New Zealand in a manner that was
hailed by the PNG press as a sign of PNG's new-found independence:
"the days of follow big brother are gone forever" Y Both at the Apia
meeting of the South Pacific Forum in May and at the Commonwealth
Heads of Government meeting in Canada in October, Wingti was a strong
champion of Sitiveni Rabuka's cause. Events in Fiji were seen almost
entirely in emotive, racial terms: Indians were threatening to turn
indigenous Fijians into second-class citizens in their own country. Only
a handful of PNG leaders, Fr Momis, Sir Julius Chan, Tony Siaguru and
the ex-diplomat and top bureaucrat, Sir Paulias Matane, clearly and
unequivocally lamented the setting aside of liberal democratic principles
in Fiji.
In September, the government unveiled a new slogan, "independent
commitment to international cooperation", as the underlying philosophy
of its foreign policy. This was accompanied by an announcement, in the
same month, of PNG's intention to apply for membership of the NonAligned movement.
Finally, the excellent relations with Indonesia, in the wake of the
October 1986 Treaty of Friendship, appeared to have been a factor in the
weakening of OPM's resolve. In June, a faction of the movement, under
Seth Meser and Benny Anaya, surrendered to Indonesian authorities in
the Arso area in Jayapura. They said they could no longer cope with the
harsh life they led as guerillas in the jungle. Meanwhile, the PNG
government and UNHCR made concrete moves to resettle Irian Jayan
refugees in areas away from the border.
46
JANUARY-JUNE 1988
Yaw Saffu
Wingti's Demise and Namalin's Rise

On 4 July 1988, Rabbie Namaliu, leader of the Pangu pati only since 23
May, became Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea. His predecessor,
Paias Wingti, was voted out of office that day, by fifty-eight votes to fifty,
in the country's third successful vote of no-confidence at the national
level since independence thirteen years ago. This chronicle will
concentrate on the turbulent and often unpredictable events leading up to
the successful motion of no-confidence. The central figure in most of
these events was Ted Diro. His political ambitions, and evident threats to
them, were the primary source of destabilisation. But, quietly,
unobtrusively and behind the scenes, Julius Chan's role also needs
attention.
The Papua Bloc's Grievances
The last chronicle explained why Diro had had to resign from cabinet in
November 1987, and why a cabinet reshuffle occurred on 23 December. 1
In that reshuffle, Aruru Matiabe, the deputy parliamentary leader of
Diro's People's Action party (PAP), was dropped for alleged
incompetence and because of scandals in his private life. On 21 January,
a District court Magistrate dismissed five perjury charges against Diro, on
the grounds that perjury was not an offence under the Commission of
Enquiry Act. (Strange as it may seem, this decision was later upheld by
the Supreme court.) Diro immediately demanded to be reinstated as a
minister and, further, demanded the deputy prime ministership and two
more cabinet portfolios for his PAP. 2 Wingti bravely said no to Diro on
both counts. Diro's "acquittal" was temporary at that point, because the
state was appealing and because the substantive charges arising from the
Justice Barnett Commission of Enquiry into the Forestry Industry were
still to be laid. There was also little hope that Wingti would move Sir
Julius Chan from the Deputy Prime Minister's position. Wingti depended
heavily on Chan's experience and reputation. Indeed, in February, Wingti
led his cabinet to delegate to Chan enormous powers in financial matters
which cabinet as a whole had exercised previously. 3
448
Yaw Saffu
The delegated powers to Chan were so extensive that the opposition

had charged, wrongly, that the constitution had been breached and,
correctly, that Kwarara's Finance portfolio was being undermined. The
explanation offered by commentators for the increase in Chan's power
was that Wingti wanted to concentrate on the parliamentary numbers
game, lobbying and poaching opposition MPs and retaining them to
ensure a margin of safety for the government and also to give it the
necessary numbers to carry through needed constitutional reforms. 4
However, Kwarara's handling of a crisis he had largely created at the
Investment Corporation at this time was also receiving adverse comments.
In response to the Corporation's Management decision to sack two
officers, who happened to be Papuans, Kwarara had suspended the
Managing Director and the General Manager, apparently without even
hearing their side of the story, and had instituted a committee of enquiry
into the administration of the Corporation. Even the parliamentary wing
of PAP expressed "extreme concern" over Kwarara's handling of the
Investment Corporation affair, and called on Wingti to intervene. 5 There
were threats of a mini backbench revolt and of defection to the
opposition. 6 Wingti had no choice but to step in, reverse Kwarara's
decision, and reinstate Leo Hannett as Managing Director.
Just as an Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research
(lASER) Fellow's research findings published in March had predicted/
some Port Moresby gangsters were beginning to acquire a political role.
In a letter addressed to Somare, two writers who claimed to be leaders of
rascal gangs, Mafia 105 and Papuan Black Snakes, threatened the lives of
the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister and threatened also to burn
down Parliament if Diro was not appointed a minister. 8 They said they
were concerned about the sacking in November 1987 of the Defence
Force Commander, Tony Huai, and three top officers, Colonels Kwago
Guira, Lima Dotaona and Robert Dademo in January 1988. All three
officers, like Huai, were Papuans. Further, Dademo is a brother of
Professor John Waiko, a founding member and vice-president of Ted
Diro's PAP, (which I described earlier as having a preponderance of exDefence Force/Defence Department personnel in its leadership). 9 The
letter also said that power and business were being concentrated in the
hands of Wingti's cronies. Although Vincent Eri, the president of PAP,
disassociated the party from the threats, his statement did not really
condemn the gangsters for threatening to introduce political violence of
that sort into PNG politics. Instead, the statement acknowledged that the
threats "reflect Papuan anger and frustration over the sacking of Papuan
officers", and suggested that unless "all other public investigations
initiated - Placer, Pelair, Harbours Board Enquiry, etc, [are] pursued
with as much vigour, the Forestry Enquiry would be seen as a trap to
damage the future parliamentary career of Diro and the solidarity
generated by PAP in the Southern Region". 10 Even more disappointing, as
far as it is known, Ted Diro did not publicly dissociate himself from the
threats, did not denounce the support as unwelcome, and did not condemn
January-June 1988
449
the introduction of violence of that nature into PNG politics. Somare, who
did, blamed manipulation "by unscrupulous politicians" for the threats. 11
The sacking in January of the three top Papuan officers, was never
satisfactorily explained by the government. The Defence Minister, James
Pokasui, said the officers had been dismissed for disloyalty. But it was
never made clear to whom the officers had been disloyal, whether to him
personally (as an ex-Captain in the Defence Force), to their superior
officers, or to the government and the state. But the sackings lent
credence to rumours of an impending coup that had circulated at the end
of 1987. At another time, Pokasui's explanation was that "continuous
infighting and back-stabbing, political lobbying by the colonels posed a
security threat to the country". 12 But a belief that the dismissals were a
"payback" by Pokasui was propagated by no less a person than the exAnglican Archbishop of PNG, David Hand, who wrote a weekly column
in the Times. Commenting on a clear instance of military insubordination
in June 1988 which had been allowed to go unpunished, when the top
brass defied government orders that the Lae Airport be closed and all
users relocate at Nadzab airport, some forty kilometres away, Bishop
Hand wrote: "Not long ago a Commander of the Defence Force was
sacked. A new Commander was appointed over the heads of a number of
officers with longer experience and records as good. Some of these
officers had been connected with the terminating from the Force (years
ago) of the present Minister of Defence. Three of them were sacked by
that same minister as soon as he took power, with no reasons given
except unproven disloyalty and lack of discipline. No opportunity was
given for self-defence. That looks to the general public like sheer
vindictiveness of 'payback'". 13
Waiting for Parliament
In March, a month before Parliament was due to re-convene, there was a
lot of movement on the political front. The opposition had set up a Task
Force in November 1987 to stem the tide of defections from its ranks, to
woo back the earlier defectors, and to prepare for a vote of no-confidence
in the April session. It was having some success. For instance, the Deputy
Speaker, Andrew Temo, said he would support an opposition motion of
no-confidence as "a matter of principle". 14 (He became a minister in the
Namaliu Government). Two MPs, Paul Wanjik and Bernard Vogae,
defected back to the opposition, making some damming statements along
the way. Paul Wanjik, for instance, said he was "fed up with the
underhand political tactics and manipulation of MPs for numerical
supremacy by Prime Minister Wingti and his deputy, Sir Julius Chan ...
I can no longer support a government that is morally corrupt ... I have
had a gutful of deceit and hypocrisy"Y Vogae's statement was equally
trenchant.
On the Papuan front, it appeared that some PAP MPs were
beginning to resent the power of the extra-parliamentary executive,
450
Yaw So.fji.i
especially because it sought, through press statements, to put pressure on

the government on behalf of Diro, in a way that seemed to suggest less
than total commitment to the Wingti coalition. A meeting of the
parliamentary wing in March, in the absence of Ted Diro in Australia,
sacked Aruru Matiabe as the deputy leader and reprimanded the party
executive for making "highly inflammatory and misleading statements"
regarding the party and the Papuan Bloc's position in government. 16 The
appearance of disunity within PAP was heightened by a press statement
put out by John Orea, a founding executive of PAP, saying there would be
a demonstration by Papuan Youths, "not against Mr Wingti, [but] against
our so-called leaders" .... He said these leaders were using them "to gain
their own ends". 17
The government appointed twenty-seven of its backbenchers to head
statutory corporations. 18 These twenty-seven, plus the twenty-eight
members in cabinet and the Speaker would make a total of fifty-six, more
than one half of Parliament's membership. The government sought to
make itself immune to motions of no-confidence. Further, according to
the Times, Civic Action Programme funds were transferred from Defence
and allocated to MPs for projects in their constituencies, what the paper
referred to as "hush money" and "support money"Y These actions in
themselves testified to the government's nervousness.
The Short Parliament

On 11 April, Parliament convened for the first time since the November
budget session. Within two and a half hours, the government had moved
successfully to adjourn Parliament until 27 June. The government
claimed, unconvincingly, that there was no pressing business for
Parliament. The real reason was, of course, Ted Diro. According to Fr
Momis, Ted Diro had written to Wingti on 21 March demanding that
the Forestry Enquiry be halted and the pending charges against him
be dropped. He also demanded to be reinstated as a minister and be
given the deputy prime ministership. He acknowledged he was
negotiating with the opposition also. "Whoever satisfies these demands
will get PAP and the bloc suppon". 20 Thirty minutes before the
session began, Ted Diro handed Wingti an almost identical list of
non-negotiable demands. He demanded to be appointed a minister by
11.30 am that day, and Deputy Prime Minister within one month;
that PAP ministries be increased from five to seven, including Foreign
Affairs, Finance and Primary Industry; and that the Commission of
Enquiry into the Forest Industry be scrapped. 21 He warned that failure to
meet the demands would result in PAP defecting to the opposition to
topple the government. In view of Diro's manoeuvres, the government
panicked when Fr Momis served the statutory seven day notice for a
motion of no-confidence, naming Somare as the alternative Prime
Minister. The early adjournment was the government's answer to the
threat of overthrow.
January-June 1988
451
The Aftermath of the Closure

Incomprehensibly, within thirty minutes of the closure of Parliament, Diro
was sworn in as Minister of Internal Affairs, a move which had a divisive
impact on Wingti's party. Gabriel Ramoi, the general secretary of the
People's Democratic Movement (PDM) and Communications Minister,
the man who masterminded the strategy of early closure, saw no need to
rush to reinstate Diro, now that the government had bought itself time.
He was also opposed to Diro being reinstated before he had been cleared
of the charges against him. Three days later, Ramoi resigned as PDM
secretary. The PDM executive refused to accept the resignation. But he
said he had resigned anyway, and that he might leave the party altogether.
But, four days later he was back as PDM secretary, and thanking his
colleagues for their confidence in him! Another PDM stalwart, Thomas
Negints, was bitter because he had been made to give up his Internal
Affairs portfolio. Diro, on the other hand, as was to be expected, declared
himself "extremely glad to be back in cabinet". He saw his restoration as
"a new era ... Wingti's PDM and PAP have now entered a major
partnership that will guide the destiny of the country". 22 He announced
that the three naturalised citizens in the Papuan Bloc, Berghuser, Young
and Suckling, had all officially joined PAP.
Reactions to the sudden adjournment were expectedly critical of the
government. Opposition MPs resolved to resign from Parliamentary
Committees to show their disgust. Thirty-five of them signed a petition
asking the Speaker to re-convene Parliament. They also considered going
to court to test the legality of the early closure. They petitioned the
Governor-General to demand the immediate resignation of the Speaker
(revealing that quite a number of MPs did not really understand the
workings of their parliamentary system). The Leader of Opposition
sought an audience with the Governor-General on the issue. But the
Governor-General refused to see him. There was a general feeling, as the
TUC general secretary put it, that the early adjournment was "a serious
and frightening event with serious future implications" .23 It was this
recognition of the possible collapse of the system, from threats of votes
of no-confidence, that was to produce efforts at negotiating a grand
coalition, or a government of national unity, within a week of the bitter
exchanges following the early adjournment.
Bigger Coalition or a Government of National Unity?

The two month period, from mid-April to mid-June, was probably the
most confused, and confusing, in PNG political history since
independence. The best supported version of how the grand coalition talks
began is Tony Siaguru'sY According to him, Sir Julius Chan convinced
Somare of the need to talk with Wingti on the formation of a grand
coalition for the sake of the country. Chan told Wingti of his conversation
with Somare. Wingti seized the opportunity with alacrity: On Saturday,
452
Yaw Saffi.J..
16 April, he phoned Somare who agreed that for the sake of stability he
was prepared to bring the opposition into a grand coalition. But before
the details could be worked out, indeed before Somare could consult
properly with his opposition allies, Wingti had called a big press
conference, to which diplomats and other dignitaries had been invited.
Somare and Wingti emerged from a scheduled meeting on the issue at
Parliament House on 20 April into the glare of a huge, expectant crowd
of diplomats, journalists and top public servants. Wingti announced that
an agreement had been reached in principle to form a grand coalition.
But even at the Press Conference, it was clear that Somare and Wingti
had different conceptions of what they had agreed in principle to achieve.
Asked if what they had in mind to achieve was a government of national
unity embracing all the parties, Somare said yes but Wingti said no.
Wingti only wanted a stronger coalition or, at any rate a weaker
opposition. If Pangu joined the coalition, the remaining opposition would
be so weak that Ted Diro's defection, even with all PAP members, would
no longer constitute a credible threat to his government. Thus the two
protagonists wanted different things. But they had not given themselves
enough time to work out the likely consequences of this divergence
before they unveiled their "agreement in principle".
There were specific points of disagreement as well. For instance,
Wingti rejected Somare's demands for a code of conduct whereby
ministers under investigation or facing charges would be excluded from
office. Somare also reportedly demanded that the proposed media bill be
dropped. These were the issues Roy Yaki, Minister for Transport and the
chief government negotiator, referred to as the opposition's emphasis on
"petty, parochial issues", when he blamed the opposition for the collapse
of the negotiations. He also blamed the opposition's "unrealistic
proposals", namely Somare's insistence that all the opposition parties
come in together.
For Somare, "the Prime Minister's complete failure to address the main
causes of instability in government", that is, the ability and willingness of
parties to switch sides at the drop of a hat, was the principal reason for
the collapse of the negotiations. It was for this reason he had insisted on
all party leaders (except those under a cloud) and their most able
lieutenants being included in the grand coalition. John Giheno, the chief
Pangu negotiator at this stage, was critical of Somare's insistence that
other coalition parties participate in the talks: "You have to think about
your own survival irrespective of our moral obligation to coalition
partners, the party comes first". 25
Developments on the Party Front

After the collapse of the grand coalition talks, Pangu spokesmen said they
were still willing to talk but they would also press ahead with the motion
of no-confidence in the next session of Parliament. Meanwhile there were
several developments on the party front. On 21 April, Utula Samana, who
January-June 1988
453
now wanted to lead a national party rather than a regional one, launched
his Melanesian United Front (MUF), timing it to take advantage of
possible defections occasioned by the reshuffle that would become
necessary if the negotiations for a grand coalition succeeded. He claimed
to have fifteen MPs in his party. But at least four of the MPs he named
denied they were with him. Samana claimed that the formation of his
party was aimed at bringing stability to "the current government". 26 But
that he felt it necessary to announce, four days later, that he did not
"want to be Prime Minister this session, not even Deputy Prime
Minister" 27 suggested that some people perhaps did not believe that
contributing to stability was his uppermost aim.
Disagreements within PAP, which had been simmering for
some time, boiled over with the sacking on 12 May of Albert Karo,
Minister for Tourism and Culture since the December reshuffle, and his
wife, a vice-president of the party. Karo was determined to stick with
Wingti and hang on to his portfolio rather than support Diro's threats, in
the name of party solidarity, and possibly lose his portfolio in a crossover
to the opposition. On 11 May, the Niugini Nius had claimed in a front
page story that PAP's deadline for Wingti to give the deputy prime
ministership to Diro was expiring that day. Albert Karo reacted to that
story by saying that he and six others, including Alan Ebu, the Minister
for Fisheries, and Tenda Lau, the only Highlander MP inPAP, (he was to
resign from PAP a week later) disassociated themselves from Diro's
ultimatum. He said Diro's moves were "a dead issue. He must clear his
backyard first before he comes up with demands. I don't believe in
regionalism, and there is no need to destabilise. If Diro wants to go into
opposition, he is welcome to do so". 28
Three of the six MPs Karo named, Daniel ltu (Kikori), David Beu
(Sohe) and Benson Garui (Northern) claimed the next day that they had
been forced by Karo to sign the letters! They now condemned Karo's
move as destabilising and embarrassing. The PAP executive told the press
that PAP continued to support the Wingti government, but that Karo's
position as minister was now untenable, as he was no longer a PAP
member. There was a clear message in this for the other "rebel" PAP
minister, Alan Ebu.
Pangu, for its part, was involved in replacing Somare as leader. On 22
May, Somare stepped down as leader of Pangu, three weeks before the
date he had set in November, namely the twenty-first anniversary of
Pangu and his leadership of that party. Namaliu was elected leader with
John Giheno and Jack Genia as deputy leaders. The changeover had been
advanced because PDM and Pangu had resumed talks on a coalition. In
spite of the fact that Namaliu was reportedly not in favour, 29 he had to go
along to save his party from a further split because it appeared that his
two deputies and a section of Pangu MPs had their minds set on going
into government.
454
YawSaffu
A Second Attempt at Grand Coalition

For Wingti, the original reasons for wanting Pangu on his side remained
as strong as ever. Arguably, they were even stronger in May because John
Kaputin, sensing an impending loss of his Minerals and Energy portfolio,
following PDM claims of non-performance and newspaper speculations,
had initiated a Ne\v Guinea Islands political leaders meeting in Rabaul on
25 April. It was attended by ten of the seventeen MPs from the region
and the five Premiers from North Solomons, East and West New Britain,
New Ireland and Manus. Of the seven MPs who did not attend, only
Michael Ogio and Alois Koki declared publicly their opposition to the
regional grouping. (Ogio was to be made a minister in the June reshuffle,
while Koki felt that the Pomio Development Authority, recently
established to help pull up the relatively dis ad vanlag~:J Pomio-Baining
area of East New Britain, put him in a special relationship with the
Wingti government.)
A working committee of eight was formed with Kaputin as
Chairman. All the other five MPs on the committee including Namaliu,
(Premiers Anis and Pokawin were the other members) belonged to the
opposition parties. A joint communique issued at a later conference
indicated the public objectives of the grouping: "to work for political
stability, social justice and a return to the principles of democracy as
enshrined in the national constitution. We will accept no less than the
goals and guiding principles we have set ourselves - constitutional
democracy, rule of law, a leadership code, maintenance of law and order,
Christian principles and attitudes, a stronger system of decentralisation,
recognition of traditional leadership, a fair distribution of government
revenue to the region and meaningful consultation between different
levels of leaders" .30 It was the hidden agenda, self-promotion of the
leading MPs through regional solidarity, that spoke more directly to the
current political situation.
On 25 May, the country was stunned yet again by the signing of an
"'irrevocable memorandum of understanding" for the formation of a
government of National Reconciliation. Did this mean that PDM, Pangu,
MUF, PAP and PPP would form a government and that MA, National
party, LNA and disaffected members of other parties and some
independents would constitute the opposition? The newspapers assumed
so. Momis immediately predicted that the grand coalition would collapse.
Kaputin called it a farce. Namaliu, whose heart was not in it nevertheless
eloquently defended the signing: "Since the national elections in June the
nation has watched ten months of political rumblings in which individual
politicians have tried to acquire power and position at the expense of our
national constitution and at the expense of participatory parliamentary
democracy". 31 Pangu and the country waited for Wingti to announce the
new cabinet. Five days passed. Wingti could not, or would not, name a
cabinet. Instead, unknown to Pangu, he was engaged in secret talks with
the National party. It has been suggested to me by a founding member of
January-June 1988
455
PDM and a confidant of Wingti that this was at Sir Julius Chan's
prompting, perhaps a move to preserve his Deputy Prime Minister's
position. Perhaps, more Machiavellian, it was a move to destroy Pangu.
The National party leadership, claiming justly that it was Pangu that had
broken faith with them by signing the memorandum of understanding,
jumped at Wingti's offer.
Another Reshuffle
On 1 June, the country was again taken by surprise. Wingti called off the
marriage with Pangu and, instead, brought in the National party.
Incredibly, he blamed Pangu for his action. He claimed that Somare's
decision to turn down the Foreign Affairs job breached the memorandum
of understanding. He announced a twenty-eight-member cabinet. Six
ministers had been dumped: Diro (Internal Affairs), Akoka Doi (Foreign
Affairs), Tom Amaiu (Correctional Services), John Kaputin (Minerals and
Energy), Gai Duwabane (Agriculture and Livestock) and Tim Ward
(Health). Michael Mel, the National party leader, got the new Treasury
Ministry, with Kwarara still in charge of a much depleted Finance
portfolio. There were two other National party men in the cabinet: Ben
Sabumei (Health) and Wiwa Korowi (Minerals and Energy). Chan kept
his deputy prime ministership and the Trade and Industry portfolio.
Samana obtained the Agriculture and Livestock Ministry, while Thomas
Negints took Fisheries, pushing Alan Ebu to Correctional Services.
Wingti's coalition now claimed to have seventy-two members in
Parliament. But, as it turned out, his troubles were far from over. First,
Wingti's modus operandi had helped to raise the levels of cynicism and
deception in PNG politics. For instance, Diro reportedly had a signed
letter from Wingti offering him the deputy prime ministership in AprilY
On 29 May, just two days before PAP was virtually wiped out from his
cabinet, Wingti had met with PAP officials in Room 314, Travelodge
hotel, and had expressed his interest in a long term partnership between
PAP and PDM until the 1992 elections. Trust had received such battering
since the aftermath of the 1987 elections that Wingti was soon to discover
that he too could not count on it. Secondly, the National party was, not
surprisingly, divided over the decision to join. 33 In any case, it was
claimed the party caucus was not consulted. 34 Finally, Diro and Pangu
were now more determined than ever to bring Wingti down.
The End
As soon as Parliament met on 27 June, notice of a motion of noconfidence was given. Namaliu was named as the alternative Prime
Minister. Within the one week period between the notice and the vote, the
exodus from Wingti's coalition was indicative of the way the vote was
likely to go. With each defection accompanied by a press conference or
a press release detailing in colourful language the alleged failings of the
456
YawSaffu
Wingti government, a powerful impression was created of a stampede to

get out of a sinking ship. By 4 July, the claimed surplus of thirty-five
over the opposition on I June had turned into a deficit of eight. The
switch by Ted Diro's Papuan Bloc, (excluding a few members such as the
ministers Berghuser and Karo ), and the defection of a section of the
National party under the leadership of the Mount Hagen MP, Paul Pora,
and Pangu's success in wooing back defectors accounted for the fiftyeight to fifty vote against Wingti 's coalition.
47
JULY-DECEMBER 1988
Michael Oliver
Namiliu's Cabinet
At mid-year, the political manoeuvring that had dominated the first half
of 1988 receded gradually. The new Namaliu government entered its six
months grace period, during which the constitution permits no vote of
lack of confidence. The cabinet Namaliu put together seemed to be a
masterpiece of political architecture. Out of twenty-eight posts, he
assigned seven to each of the four regions (Papua, Highlands, Islands and
Mamose) and named at least one person from each of the provinces and
the National Capital District. Pangu pati garnered thirteen seats and the
other members of the coalition (People's Action party, Melanesian
Alliance, National party, Papua party, and the League for National
Advancement) were rewarded in ingenious combinations of number and
importance of portfolios. 1 The outcries of those who had been left out, or
whose region, or party or province did not get what it hoped for were,
however, instantaneous and vociferous. Highlands students at the
University of Technology called the allocation of ministries a complete
mockery, complaining that the crucial economic portfolios like Minerals
and Energy, Forests and Agriculture and Livestock had been given to
other parts of the country. Papua spokesmen also voiced grievances,
although their share of powerful ministries included the deputy prime
ministership (Akoka Doi), Trade and Industry (Galeva Kwarara), and
Fisheries (Alan Ebu). 2 Discontent in Papua still focused on Ted Diro and
his exclusion from the National Executive Council. By the year's end, the
charges (other than perjury) that the Barnett Commission had proposed
had still not been laid against him. He remained a powerful figure, not
included in cabinet, with an unmatched capacity to destabilise Papua New
Guinean politics.
Most of the political shifts that took place in the weeks after the
election were caused by the customary defections from opposition to
government ranks, always made in response to demands from constituents
that might be almost inaudible to others, but were loud in the ears of the
defecting members.
Gabriel Ramoi's decision was an exception. He left the People's
Democratic Movement (once more) in August and announced his intention
458
Michael Oliver
to create a Social Democratic party. He claimed the support of several

sitting members (two of whom denied having made any decision to join
or support him)3 and promised that a full programme for the new party
would be released within a few weeks. By the end of 1988 the
programme had still not been revealed, but Ramoi had explained some of
the aims and purpose of his party in shorter statements. In one, he stated
that the Social Democratic party "would take the centre line between
socialism and democracy" 4 and in a second he spoke of support for
national businessmen. Neither of his attempts at definition made clear the
connection Ramoi saw between his party and the Social Democratic
tradition. Indeed, his deploring of the fact that "[w]e do not yet have
Papua New Guineans as captains of industry" and that "there is no Papua
New Guinean who owns and runs his own merchant bank, shipping
company and so on" 5 was more easily classified as bourgems natiOnalism
than as a recognisable strand of social democratic thought.
The New Government's Policies

Fundamental to Ramoi's desire to create a new party was the inability of
the PNG party system to produce governments that could be differentiated
one from another by policy, let alone ideology. Yet the programme
announced by the Namaliu government differed from that of the Wingti
coalition a little more than was usually the case. The new team would
stress political stability, law and order, economic growth and job creation,
priorities with which the Wingti opposition was unlikely to disagree. But
a change in emphasis was discernible in the importance assigned to
"human resource development", and especially education. Primary
education was again to be privileged along with literacy and technical
training, but Namaliu promised to maintain university budgets rather than
continuing the reductions imposed by the Wingti regime. 6 Another change
in direction was the result of a change in the minister responsible, more
than an announced shift in policy. Fr John Momis was named by Namaliu
as Minister of Provincial Affairs, and his fierce dedication to the
provincial system which he fathered when he was chairman of the
Constitutional Planning Committee, meant that talk of abolishing or
weakening the powers of provinces, rife under Wingti, would die out.
Namaliu made more particular promises regarding constitutional
reform, including calling for a general election after a successful vote of
no-confidence, giving more powers to District courts, establishing an
Anti-Corruption Agency, and streamlining and restructuring the National
Investment and Development Authority (NIDA). 7
The last two proposals, regarding corruption and NIDA, were linked
closely to the law and order promises of the Namaliu cabinet. Taken
together, they reflected concern about maintaining and expanding foreign
investment in Papua New Guinea. If the expectations of prosperity
coming from gold, oil and natural gas development in the 1990s were to
be fulfilled, the climate of investment had to be improved.
July-December 1988
459
Law and Order

In 1984, the Clifford Commission had dealt extensively with the kind of
policing that they believed would be necessary if the law and order
problems of Papua New Guinea were to be manageable. They stressed
quality above quantity and gave top priority to improving the ability of
the police to perform essential police services. 8 They were particularly
severe in their criticism of an approach which called for expanded police
powers and the use of armed forces as an adjunct to the police in special
"task force" operations. They wrote: "The police must begin to think,
train and behave like a police force that lives, works and becomes an
integral part of the community. More than just moving out of barracks,
out of squad cars, out of large, fortress-like police stations, it is necessary
to change a force which is rapidly becoming an alien invasion force into
an integral part of community life. A military force can never be
incorporated harmoniously into a community". 9
The Namaliu government's first major steps in implementing its
law and order priorities showed little sign of acceptance of these
Clifford Report injunctions. In response to tribal fighting in the
Highlands, the government established Operation Lo-met-88, a
combined police-military approach to restoring order. By the first
week in October, angry protests over the behaviour of police and troops
were pouring in. Fourteen villages in the Southern Highlands
reported destruction of property and the intimidation of villagers
by the Lo-met enforcers. 10 In spite of complaints, Lo-met continued and
moved from the Highlands to Mamose (the New Guinea north coast
provinces). There, the lasting value of the police and army combination
was called into question again when Premier Hagai Joshua called for
more help in Garaina in Morobe Province, where it was reported that
"provincial authorities believe the recent upsurge in crime ... is due to
escapees and other 'wanted persons' fleeing the recent combined police
and Defence Force operation".ll It seemed that the military/police
offensive succeeded only in displacing the criminal rather than
apprehending him.
Whether law and order increased because of Lo-met, was reduced by
it, or was on the whole unaffected is difficult to judge. But the notion that
giving the armed forces a law enforcement role would solve problems
was difficult to sustain, particularly when, during the same year, the
forces themselves had been involved in well-publicised threats to public
order. The first and most serious was the defiance of government orders
to close the airport at Lae. The other incidents were less threatening
except to those directly involved. On 22 September fifteen officers from
the rank of major to lieutenant, descended on the National Broadcasting
Commission in two busloads and threatened announcers. On the same day
twenty soldiers stormed a bakery; and, in a brief scuffle, the duty
policeman at a traffic light was attacked while attempting to arrest a
soldier for drinking in public. 12
460
Michael Oliver
Labour
Trade unions in Papua New Guinea began in 1988 to show concern for
the share their members might hope to enjoy in the promised prosperity
of the 1990s. Strike activity was concentrated in the resource sector. In
August, 200 workers stopped work for two days at the Kennecott
company on Lihir Island, where gold mining operations were getting
under way, calling for overtime allowances, compensation for industrial
accidents and company housing. 13 But the most spectacular conflict
occurred at Ok Tedi Mining Company's operation at Tabubil in Western
Province. The differences between national workers and management
built up towards the middle of the year. There were initial work stoppages
in July and August, the latter being sufficiently serious to require special
police reinforcement. But the major hlow-up came in September Workers
rampaged through the company offices in Tabubil and burned down the
Golf Club and the Hash House Harriers Club in a display of resentment
that could not be ignored. A special board of enquiry into the issues was
set up under the direction of Wep Kanawi, Secretary of the Department
of the Public Service, and a full investigation of workers' grievances was
required. The list of complaints was significant, in that it focused on the
perception of workers that expatriates were being much better treated
than they were. The company's housing policy came under attack, as did
its slowness in localising well-paid and responsible positions, and its
failure to provide an adequate training programme for increasing skill
levels and on-the-job training. The staff development failures were
alleged to go from mechanical trades through secretarial posts, to
foremen, middle-management and supervisory training. On top of these
questions of relative status between nationals and expatriates, there were
the strains of a two-shift system lasting for twelve hours each in a roundthe-clock operation. '4
Ok Tedi Mining had reached a stage in its operations when the highly
profitable gold had been mined out and copper, produced for a depressed
market, had to be mined rapidly and continuously, and by the lowest cost
methods, if profit expectations were to be fulfilled. Budget-paring had
reduced the staff development programme of the company to a very low
ebb, 15 and there is little doubt that the absence of clear paths to
advancement contributed to the disauiet of national workers at all levels
of the company.
'
Landowners, Mine-owners and Government

The land rights of indigenous populations are a fundamental element in
most significant conflicts in Pacific states. They underlie the tensions in
Fiji, the conflict between Walter Lini and Barak Sope in Vanuatu, and
Aboriginal claims in Australia. In Papua New Guinea, the share village
people are likely to get in the proceeds of development and the influence
they are going to have on the directions of economic growth depend on
July-December 1988
461
the strength of a bargaining position based on land control. Land rights

are crucial to the development of the forest industry, to the routing of the
planned trans-island highway, to the continuation of oil palm operations
in Oro province 16 and, most pressingly, to the sharing of proceeds from
mineral development.
In mid-1988, workers were concerned enough about their share of
development benefits to bring about work stoppages in the newer mining
areas; by the end of 1988, the worries of land-owners about their share
began to appear much greater. In the North Solomons, at the Panguna
mine site of Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), operations had been under
way for over a decade. Landowners had begun to comprehend the full
extent of the changes wrought by a huge extractive enterprise and the
potential for both wealth and destitution these changes implied. Plans for
further mining activity were in the offing. It seemed vital to look again at the
terms and conditions under which multinational mining corporations
could operate on or under Papua New Guineans' land. Demands for a
new deal were formulated by the Panguna Landowners' Association in
preparation for a review of the agreement under which BCL operated,
which was scheduled for 1988. As delays accumulated in the initiation of
these renegotiation talks, the atmosphere became more tense.
Other events in 1987 and 1988 formed part of the background to the
explosion at Panguna that occurred in November and December. Fr John
Momis' election campaign in 1987 had focused on the "Bougainville
Initiative", a plea to BCL to increase the amounts it was paying to the
North Solomons provincial government over and above agreed totals. The
company declined his invitation to make this unilateral increase in its
royalty payments and the matter seemed to die with the end of the
election. A second element in the background was a theoretical position
on land rights written by Peter Donigi a prominent national lawyer. In a
lengthy memorandum entitled The State and Property Rights in Papua
New Guinea, Donigi argued that the constitution of Papua New Guinea
did not give to the national government rights over mineral, timber and
marine resources in PNG unless they occurred on state land. Further, he
contended, the national government had no land rights except in the three
per cent of PNG's land mass that was state propertyY Under this
interpretation, the validity of the national government's agreements with
foreign firms on the terms of exploitation of timber and mineral resources
was undermined. Donigi's opinion was far from being the official view,
but it became part of a climate of opinion that favoured much more local
benefit from resource exploitation.
To some extent the landowners' position paralleled that of provincial
governments, especially those in which new mineral discoveries were
being made. The October meeting of the Premiers' Conference proposed
that provincial royalties for mining and petroleum be doubled (from 1.25
to 2.50 per cent). 18 The national government's increased sensitivity to
landowners' claims for a greater say and share in resource exploitation
was also evident. The Minister of Minerals and Energy, Patterson Lowa,
462
Michael Oliver
told the Panguna Landowners' Association in early September he would

ensure that current mining policies would be changed to give more
recognition to landowners and to increase their benefits. 19 Secondly, the
national government took a new initiative in inviting landowners to
participate in the two-day Mining Development Forum planned for midDecember.20
The record showed, however, that there was much more conflict than
harmony in the respective positions of national government, provincial
governments and landowners. Indeed, the responsibility for the delays in
accommodating landowners' claims seemed to lie with the national and
provincial governments more than the company. If the terms of the
agreement under which the company mined gold and copper did not
compensate the North Solomons landowners enough then the national
government had to answer for their inadequacy, for It had negotiated the
agreement with BCL and it had the responsibility for reviewing the
agreement in 1988. The sharing among national government, provincial
government and the landowners of the revenues which came from the
company's operation was properly the affair of the national government.
It had represented all PNG interests in the bargaining. It was ironic that
this agreement which had been hailed as a model for small Third World
countries bargaining with a multinational corporation, was now under
strong attack for having neglected the interests of landowners. 21 With
Donigi's claims in the air, avowing that the national government had no
rightful power to dispose of the resources that were being mined, the
national government was under strong pressure to make sure that it had
the agreement of the provincial government and the landowners when it
reviewed the BCL agreement. The company claimed that it had been
making offers since September 1980 to review the Bougainville Copper
Agreement and had proposed the inclusion of the North Solomons
provincial government in the discussions. It reported that the 1981 review
of the agreement had bogged down as a consequence of disagreement
between the provincial and national governments. 22
What actually transpired at Panguna in November and December 1988
was a sharp reminder of the depth of some landowners' feelings about the
mining of their land. Buildings were burned down, an estimated
K850,000 worth of property damage was sustained and a power line
tower was destroyed by explosives stolen from the company. During the
height of the violence against the company, the head of PNG's police
force, Paul Tohian, was quoted as saying that "there are 60-70 terrorists
in a group with mobile telephones in their 4-wheel drive vehicles
monitoring all our movements. They have hand-grenades, pistols, submachine guns and explosives" .23
The leader of the splinter organisation of landowners responsible for
the resort to violence, Francis Ona, voiced the rebel group's demand for
a fantastic K10 billion compensation. Others talked of secession. The
provincial Premier, Joseph Kabui, described these demands and threats as
"ways my people are trying to express their fear and the feeling of total
July-December 1988
463
loss of their environment and lifestyle". 24 In spite of the Police

Commissioner's labelling of the Ono-led group as terrorists, neither
Premier Kabui nor Fr John Momis seemed to think they were immune to
reason, and on 5 and 6 December the two were reported to be seeking
Ono out for conversations. 25 By mid-December a settlement had been
reached and the Deputy Prime Minister, Akoka Doi announced that the
company had promised to spend K3 million to build community
infrastructures and projects. The company secretary commented that this
was what the company had planned to do anyhow.
With things on an even keel again, the Prime Minister announced that
investor confidence had been restored. 26 Whether he had in fact found a
means of reconciling investor, national, provincial and landowner claims
to the revenues from mining or other resources exploitation was still to be
seen. North Solomons landowners were not alone in their discontent. A
spokesman for the Porgera landowners referred to the old policies as ones
"where the national government grabs most of the benefits and the
provincial government and the landowners are left with all the social and
environmental problems, and a big hole in the ground". 27 In spite of the
Prime Minister's confidence, the successful formula for dividing benefits
had yet to be announced, and perhaps had yet to be found.
Forests Policy
Judge Thomas Barrett's Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forest

Industry had made it clear that the legislation governing exploitation of
the forests of PNG was inadequate and faulty. The Namaliu government
prepared to amend this legislation and the Forests Minister, Karl Stack,
announced that the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act (Chapter 217) would
be abolished. 28 This legislation had been introduced by Julius Chan, and
showed his strong free enterprise bias. It permits the customary owners of
land to enter into contracts for the cutting and disposal of their timber,
provides for none of the environmental protection and reforestation
obligations that are part of the Forestry Act (Chapter 216). Given the
announced intention of the minister to rescind this Act, his subsequent
dispute with the Premier of Manus Province, Stephen Pokawin, was
difficult to explain. The disagreement showed that the different interests
that exist among national government, provincial government and
landowners in the forests sector are as difficult to reconcile as those that
occur in the mining sector.
Premier Pokawin had entered into an agreement with a foreign firm to
log a 44,000 hectare timber tract comprising almost the entire west coast
of the island and was proceeding under the terms of the Forestry Act
(Chapter 216). Under the terms of the agreement the company was to
establish a veneer plant in Manus and the provincial government would
share in the royalties payable. The scheme was jeopardised by applications
under the Private Dealings Act from two groups of Manus landowners.
They requested approval from the Forests Minister 'for timbering
464
Michael Oliver
agreements in two local forest areas within the west coast sector already
spoken for by the provincial government. The minister, Karl Stack,
announced his intention to approve the landowners' applications and
Pokawin then went to court asking for, and receiving, a temporary
restraining order forbidding Stack from "granting or declaring any local
forest areas in the Manus Province". 29 At stake was not only the
provincial government's claim to royalties, which would not accrue to it
under the Private Dealings provisions, but also the ability of a provincial
government to plan a rational system of forest exploitation that would
include an obligation to process timber in the province, rather than
permitting a company simply to ship out raw logs. 30 The possibility of a
national government/landowner coalition being mounted against a
province was evidently as great as the North Solomons style provincial
government/landowner combination against the national government.
The Namaliu Budget
Paul Pora, the Minister of Finance and Planning, presented his first
budget to the national Parliament in mid-November and it was passed by
the last day of the month. Although it did not represent any striking
departure from the fiscal policy of the Wingti regime, there were changes
of some significance, as well as the continuation of policies that might
well have been changed. The budget called for expenditures of Kl, 190
million and revenues of K963 million, leaving a deficit of K227 million.
It was posited on real growth of the Gross Domestic Product of 4.3 per
cent for 1989 and an inflation rate of seven per cent, which included the
effect of a shift to higher indirect taxes, on beer and spirits, cigarettes and
petrol. It foresaw slight improvements in agricultural commodity prices
and slightly lower mineral prices.
The main themes of the government, "unity, reconciliation and
reconstruction" were, Paul Pora claimed, the guiding principles of the
budget and changes in expenditure policy which embodied these
principles were concentrated in fields to which the Namaliu government
had assigned priority: law and order; education and social services; and
infrastructure development. Law and order expendimres were increased
by seventeen per cent, most of the monies to be devoted to improvement of
housing, salary and working conditions for the defence and police forces.
Social Services were assigned Kl9 million more than the previous year
and infrastructure development including the development of industrial
parks (or manufacturing estates), was assigned an extra K209 millionY A
new "Sectoral Policies and Strategies" document was prepared for the
budget and became Volume I of the budget papers. It revealed reasonably
developed policies of the government on questions like investment,
employment, wages, the exchange rate and population growth. More
generally, it seemed to mark a return to earlier planning policies, like the
Medium Term Development Plan of the last Somare government which
emphasised the links between sectors. Unfortunately, it also revealed the
July-December 1988
465
lack of coherent policy m the key fields of forests and fisheries

development. 32
More than the size of the budget deficit, which was still modest by
international standards, the method of covering the budget deficit drew
concerned comment. For the first time in two years, the government was
planning to go to foreign commercial money markets for K29 million of
its deficit. Perhaps more seriously, it was following the precedent set in
the previous budget presented by Julius Chan for the Wingti government,
of taking money from two funds that had been designed for quite specific
and different purposes. One of these was the Mineral Resources
Stabilisation Fund (MRSF). This fund was established to cushion the
shock of changing world mineral prices on the national budget, and funds
were to be drawn from it according to a precise formula. For the third
year in a row, this formula was set aside and K77 million dollars was to
be taken from the fund simply to reduce the overall budget deficit. As one
commentator put it "if the projected decline in mineral revenue from
1990 until 1993 eventuates, the current contribution levels would be
unsustainable". 33 The second fund from which deficit-covering funds were
to be drawn was the Stabex fund. EEC provided these funds and it had
strongly questioned the practice inaugurated by the Wingti government.
Para's budget speech did at least promise that these dubious Stabex
withdrawals would cease in 1990.
International Relations
In spite of the fact that one of the reasons given for the breakdown of
negotiations for the Grand Coalition had been the refusal of Michael
Somare to accept the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, when the
Namaliu cabinet was announced, the "chief' was listed in that portfolio.
Over the last half of the year, he guided Papua New Guinea along a path
that expressed both the commitment to conciliation for which he was
famous, and his willingness to use his personal prestige to advance causes
he believed were right. He welcomed the moves toward settlement in
New Caledonia, yet expressed the same reservations about the future in
that troubled country as the PNG Ambassador to the United Nations,
Renagi Lohia. 34 Concerning the Vanuatu crisis, he was circumspect indeed
about any direct PNG involvement. When Indonesian troops crossed the
PNG border and seized five citizens on PNG soil, his response was a firm
and measured protest and a call for an improvement in communication.
Indeed, the most controversial step he backed was the invitation to the
USSR to establish an Embassy in Port Moresby. This move had been
bruited for a long time under various governments, but the strength of
anti-Communist feeling in Christian and capitalist Papua New Guinea,
concern about Soviet espionage activity, and, above all worry about
Australian and US reactions, had always brushed the matter off the
government's agenda. In mid-August, at a cabinet meeting in Rabaul, the
decision was taken, and to sugar-coat the pill it was agreed at the same
466
Michael Oliver
time to open a PNG consulate in Jayapura in Indonesia, to invite

Taiwanese businessmen to open a trade office, and to appoint twenty
honourary consuls in the US, West Germany, Japan and Australia.
Conclusion
In an atmosphere free from imminent political threat the Namaliu
government was able to show what it could do to cope with the political,
social and economic problems faced by Papua New Guinea. It was tested
early in the mining sector with troubles in Ok Tedi and BCL and
although it was able to patch together settlements in each case, it could
hardly be said that either a coherent labour policy or a new approach to
landownership claims had emerged. The government was inheriting in
both cases situations which had been building up long before they
assumed office, but they would be challenged in 1989 to come up with
long term solutions which all their predecessors had failed to find. The
promise of huge mineral revenues by the mid-1990s when new mines
would come on stream and oil and gas production could be expected gave
the government every incentive to put in place the policies that would
make this new era of prosperity a reality. It could also count on timber
and fisheries revenues if order could be brought into those sectors. But in
each of these growth areas, the contending parties who might hope to
benefit most from new production - labour, business, landowners,
provincial governments - could be expected in 1989 to continue their
skirmishing for advantage. Those whose expectations were lowest like
unemployed urban youth, would probably continue to try to remedy their
situation through crime, which promised to become more organised and
widespread. It was questionable whether the Namaliu strategy of using
the military, and of trying to raise morale in both police and armed forces
through improved working conditions, would be enough to cope with the
law and order problem.
Papua New Guineans are accustomed to heari~g predictions of
imminent collapse from overseas observers and, when these predictions
become hysterical, 35 they treat them with the disdain they deserve. They
are conscious of grave problems, but they are also aware that there are
experienced ministers in charge, key provinces that are well run, and an
increasingly competent public service, not yet hopelessly tainted by
corruption, in place. The military is unlikely in the near future to emerge
as a united force intent on bringing in a new, non-democratic regime.
Namaliu and his government at the end of the year were making a strong
claim for the continued confidence of PNG and its friends abroad.
48
YawSaffu
Introduction
Events on Bougainville (the North Solomons Provi!lce) and their
extensive ramifications dominated PNG politics m 1989. The
uncompromisingly violent nature of the insurgency resulted in the shutdown of the Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) Panguna mine from 15 May,
and this was expected eventually to affect forty per cent of the country's
annual foreign exchange earnings and seventeen per cent of government
revenue. The insurgency posed a great challenge to the territorial integrity
of PNG because the insurgents' demands escalated to include secession.
It also posed a challenge to the viability of the emerging tradition of
open, constitutional politics because counter-insurgency measures tended
to undermine this, with restrictions on journalists, talk of internment bills
and human rights abuses by the security forces. The year also saw the
first political assassinations in modern Papua New Guinea. The usual
threats of instability within the ruling coalitions and the constant resort to
the vote of no-confidence by the opposition showed no abatement, even
in the face of the massive threats to the system unleashed by the
Bougainville crisis. The turmoil in the provincial government system also
continued, culminating in the suspension of the Morobe provincial
government, once regarded as a success story of decentralisation. On top
of all this, an escalation in the violence used or threatened by criminals
and by striking workers and political actors to back their demands, and in
the weaponry used by tribal fighters, 1 signified the descent to a new
plateau of political difficulties, and tested to the hilt the pragmatic genius
of PNG politicians.
Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency on Bougainville
There is a history, going back to the sixties and seventies, of both antiBCL and secessionist sentiments on Bougainville. 2 But to the extent that
such facets of social change can be dated, the current, violent revival of
these emotions may be dated from the formation, in the aftermath of the
1987 election campaign, of a new Panguna Landowner~ Association
(NPLA).3 Comprising younger, better educated members of the families
468
Yaw Saffu
whose land has been more or less cavalierly acquired by the colonial
administration and leased to BCL, NPLA began a campaign of sabotage
and political violence in November 1988, after its April demand for a ten
billion kina compensation had not been treated seriously. The campaign
spread and intensified throughout 1989, leading to a declaration of a State
of Emergency on the island in June, and a half-hearted prosecution of a
counter-insurgency war by the state against the NPLA's armed wing: The
Bougainville-Revolutionary Army (BRA).
What did the landowners (both moderate and militant and the armed
wing of the latter) want? How did the government react to the demands?
What was the opposition's stand? Initially, NPLA demands were directed
as much to their older kinsmen at the helm of the old Panguna
Landowners' Association (OPLA) as they were to BCL. There was evident
dissatisfaction with OPLA's alleged collaborationist stance towards BCL
and with the manner in which cash benefits were distributed (or not
distributed) to all entitled (especially younger) members of the extended
matrilineage families which owned the land. 4 Thus Matthew Kove, a
village elder, an executive member of OPLA, reportedly a maternal uncle
of Perpetua Serero and Francis Ona, respectively chairperson and
secretary of NPLA, was abducted by the militants in January and was
never seen again. Also in January, two boats belonging to Siverenus
Ampoai (a businessman, an executive member of OPLA and closely
associated with BCL's public relations efforts) were burnt while his
commercial vehicle was sprayed with bullets, nearly killing his brother.
Once the OPLA had been silenced by the terrorist tactics, the ten
billion kina compensation demand from BCL (for damage to the
environment, for past arrears and for allegedly arrogant, discriminatory
attitudes) came to the fore. The sheer magnitude of the demand (about
twice the mine's total gross earnings since its inception in the seventies)
suggested that NPLA's real demand was for BCL to cease mining. The
campaign of sabotage of BCL installations begun in November 1988,
which forced a temporary closure of the mine in December, escalated in
January with arson, destruction of power pylons, etc.
In response to the campaign of sabotage and terrorism the government
imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew in January in the affected central parts
and increased police strength on the island. The government also
appointed a Ministerial Review Committee headed by Deputy Prime
Minister Akoka Doi, to review the BCL agreement, more than a year after
it became due. The Committee considered and approved a review of the
Bougainville Copper Agreement (BCA), a reorganisation of the PLA
Trust Fund and implementation of social amenities and infrastructural
projects in the province, particularly in the mining area. It also agreed on
a Commission of Enquiry to determine the causes of the crisis. Cabinet
accepted the Committee's report.
Although a call-out of Defence Force soldiers had been authorised
by the Governor-General and had been gazetted on 23 December 1988,
and although some responsible opinion5 was already urging the
469
government to move in with troops to disarm the militants, it was not

until the second half of March, after the militants had extended their
campaign to non-BCL targets (specifically government offices and public
facilities) and had started terrorising non-Bougainvilleans, that the
government sent in troops, primarily to guard BCL installations and
public facilities. By mid-April it was estimated that there were 300 police
and 200 soldiers on the island. Despite the build-up, and the opposition's
view that the government should act tough, the government preferred
then, and most of the year, the "softly softly" approach. Dialogue and a
negotiated settlement, rather than a military solution, was the
government's preferred option.
At the beginning of February, after he had defied the first of several
ultimatums to surrender, Francis Ona was invited by the Prime Minister
to appoint an intermediary to negotiate on his behalf. He said that BCL
should pay ten billion kina compensation and shut down immediately.
Papua New Guinea should adopt a new economic order because the
economy was currently controlled by the "white Mafia". Unless a new
economic order was adopted, the province would break away. 6
While Ona's demands were clearly escalating, the government
apparently perceived an opening for dialogue and ordered a "raid
moratorium" by the police. They were ordered to desist from going into
the villages and the bush to find Ona, who was evidently in constant
touch with provincial politicians. Not surprisingly, the Police
Commissioner found the raid moratorium confusing and frustrating. He
was reported to have said: "I am tired of political interference with
essential police work and political indecision on issues requiring
immediate police action to maintain law and order". 7 He was also
reported to have threatened to disobey the government in dealing with the
Bougainville crisis. He claimed later that he was misrepresented. He was
reprimanded by the Prime Minister. Fr John Momis, the leading North
Solomons politician and national Minister for Provincial Affairs,
threatened to have him dismissed if he disobeyed the government. Fr
Momis was in turn confronted at his home by about one hundred angry
policemen who went in a convoy of six vehicles to warn him of trouble
if their Commissioner was sacked. 8 Chief Superintendent Gari Baki, in
charge of riot squads, VIP security and the anti-terrorist squad, was
suspended in connection with this incident.
In March, six policemen were shot and wounded by militants.
Policemen on the island were thrown into a rebellious mood. The top
officer on the island asked: "How long are we going to sit around and
wait? These rebels are firing at police at will ... My men are very
frustrated and angry, but we are doing our best to control them". 9 The
Post-Courier editorialised: "A decision is required now" .10 Paias Wingti,
Leader of the Opposition, implied that he would have sent troops by that
stage. 11 Finally, in the third week of March, the government decided to
send troops to Bougainville, after a night of what the Post-Courier
described as " ... fiery havoc across Bougainville" Y
470
YawSaffu
But even as the troops were being flown in, peace tmttatives were
being unveiled. A bipartisan committee under the chairmanship of Rabaul
MP, John Kaputin, was announced in response to Sir Julius Chan's
urgings for a national, all-party approach to the crisis. In April the
government unveiled a package of generous proposals, transferring half of
its nineteen per cent equity in BCL to the landowners and the provincial
government, and providing a special support gram of one per cent of the
gross value of BCL sales (worth about four million kina a year) as an
unconditional grant to the provincial government. In addition, a number
of infrastructural projects, including roads, health facilities and schools,
worth about K200 million, would be implemented in the province over
the next five years. The new improved formula of compensation worked
out for the landowners of the new Porgera gold mine in Enga and
covering occupation, damage and disruption fees, was otlered to Panguna
landowners. It was estimated that this would result in an average annual
receipt of about K47,000 by each landowner.B
The provincial government and members of OPLA regarded the
government proposals as a promising basis for negotiations. But the
militants rejected any prospect of negotiations until the riot police and
soldiers were withdrawn from the island. The security forces were
increasingly accused by militants, the Catholic Justice and Peace
Committee and Amnesty International, of gross abuse of human rights.
Like amnesty for Ona, withdrawal of the security forces had become a
newly pressing demand of the militants.
Alarmed by the enormous escalation of the militants' demand beyond
the virtually universally applauded one of securing a greater share of the
earnings from the copper mine for the landowners and the province
(secession had evidently become the primarily goal of the militants) and
also no doubt alarmed by the militants' methods of eliminating dissent
from its hardline position (for instance, the Premier claimed that
secessionists were after his life) the provincial government sought to
bolsters its relatively moderate position by mobilising moderate opinion
through a survey. The survey was conducted in April by a select
committee of the Provincial Assembly under the chairmanship of John
Bika, provincial Minister for Commerce, to determine the wishes of
Bougainvilleans over the secession issue. In May, the Committee
recommended to the Assembly rejection of calls for secession. It
recommended instead that the province press for increased autonomy,
with only foreign affairs, defence and currency to be controlled
exclusively by the national government.
In May the Provincial Assembly endorsed these recommendations as
well as the national government's peace package. Despite the endorsement
and the Premier's positive assessment of the national government's
sincerity, the deadline for the landowners and the provincial government's
response to the peace package expired on 12 May without any firm
response. In June the provincial government made its counter-offer. But
it was not until August that OPLA leaders, claiming to speak for all
471
landowners, made their response. They wanted the entire ten per cent
share the government was offering, and demanded tax exemptions for a
landowners' company to be formed, and a right to sell the shares at any
time to anybody, to national or foreign interests, and new royalty-sharing
arrangements. 14
Increased militants' attacks on BCL workers and installations led to a
shut-down on the mine on 15 May. Three days later, the government
authorised security forces to go and search for Ona, instead of them being
restricted to guarding installations and public facilities and maintaining
law and order, but even after this change of policy, the government still
ruled out a declaration of a State of Emergency and full military
operations against the militants. 15 Instead, the government actively
pursued the possibility of a dialogue, through the so-called bi-partisan
committee under John Kaputin, and through Catholic church
intermediaries led by Bishop Gregory Singkai, himself a Bougainvillean.
Indeed, on 23 May, the government declared a fifteen-day truce and
invited Francis Ona to come out for negotiations.
The government's faith in Ona's reasonableness was hard to reconcile
with a stream of clear statements from him in February, April and May,
indicating that he was not interested in any compromise and that
secession had become his primary objective. Ona's responses to earlier
government "raid moratoria" in February, at the beginning of March, and
in April, had been consistent with his disdain for compromise. Each time
the government reined in its forces to give peaceful solution a chance,
Ona stepped up his campaign. Admittedly, security forces on the ground
had not always abided by the government's orders on "raid moratoria"
and had thus reinforced the militants' perception of government duplicity.
But even if Ona had genuinely wanted to negotiate, the new demand that
he be granted amnesty from prosecution was one that even the extremely
accommodating and pragmatic Namaliu government felt unable to meet.
The truce period expired on 6 June with negotiations no nearer than
before.
After the expiry of the truce period, the Namaliu government appeared
at last to embrace the option of a full military offensive against the
militants. It received the opposition's support for that. 16 The BRA was
outlawed on 20 June and a State of Emergency was finally declared on 26
June. Police Commissioner Paul Tohian was appointed controller of the
State of Emergency with the officer controlling the troops on
Bougainville as his deputy.
The government's new offensive appeared to succeed sufficiently for
the militants to put out feelers in August for talks, for the mine to prepare
to re-open in September, and for a date, 12 September, to be named for
the signing of the peace package between the government, the provincial
government and the landowners. At the beginning of September the troops
were withdrawn to defensive positions, to allow leaders to make a "final
attempt" to entice Ona to the negotiating table. The mine re-opened on 5
September but militant activities forced it to close down eight and a half
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hours later. Then on 10 September, on the eve of the departure of a

provincial delegation for Port Moresby to sign the peace package, the
militants assassinated John Bika, the provincial Minister for Commerce.
The militants said he was killed because he had been "heavily involved
in destroying support for Ona by preaching that Ona was leading a cargo
cult movement" and "spreading government propaganda and trying to
create a division amongst the people of Bougainville with the aim of
destroying secessionist thoughts and dreams in the heads and minds of
Bougainville people" .17
Bika's assassination put off the signing of the peace package
scheduled for 12 September and triggered developments in several
directions. The postponement of the signing of the peace package
triggered bitter public accusations of double-dealing against Melanesian
Alliance politicians in the province: Momis, Raphael Bele, Joseph Kabui,
and others. In an "Open Letter to the People of North Solomons and
Papua New Guinea", Lawrence Daveona, secretary of the Panguna
Landowners' company, Road Mining Tailings, Leases Trustee Ltd,
accused these people of planting in the minds of landowners the idea of
expelling BCL and of secession. He invited them to explain their stand,
implying that their aim of replacing BCL with a new mining company
was at the root of the crisis. 18 The opposition leaders were to latch on to
his allegation.
In cabinet, Bika's assassination apparently strengthened the "hawks"
who gained an important temporary recruit in Michael Somare. Even he
now advised against signing the peace package, declaring: "What we
need is toughness". 19 Bernard Narokobi, the Justice Minister, deputy
leader of Melanesian Alliance, inveterate peace-monger and the scourge
of multinationals, declared his disillusionment with the militants. In the
aftermath of the assassination of a K200,000 prize was placed on Ona's
head, and a cabinet minister countermanded Defence Force Headquarters
orders and approved the use of booby traps by soldiers in Panguna. The
parliamentary Committee on the State Emergency reportedly urged an "all
out war". 2 Colonel Dotaona, who had come to the conclusion that the
crisis would not be solved with guns 21 was replaced in October by
Colonel Nuia as commander of 200 troops. Alongside the flurry of
expanding, hardline activities, however, a traditional peace ceremony
intended to end the war was organised.
On 27 October the traditional ceremony of breaking spears took place
in Arawa, with the Prime Minister and other national leaders bravely
participating. The ceremony was seen by some journalists as the
beginning of the end of the war. But it turned out to be Hamlet without
the Prince. Ona and his militants did not participate. Indeed, as if to
emphasise their contempt for what must have appeared a mere gimmick
to them, on the very day of the ceremony, they attacked targets in several
areas of Bougainville.
By the beginning of November, the Opposition Leader too had come to
the view that the crisis could "not be solved through the barrel of the
473
gun" Y Peace efforts occupied the rest of the year, with a meeting in
Rabaul between the North Solomons Premier and four senior government
ministers in the third week of November. The church leaders who had
played mediatory roles most of the year doubled their efforts. The Prime
Minister, ever willing to emphasise peace prospects, declared on 6
December that ceasefire talks were gong well. Two weeks later, he
admitted that the ceasefire talks had failed. The militants insisted on the
total withdrawal of security forces and total secession. At the very end of
the year, on 28 December, BCL reluctantly "mothballed" the mine. This
suggested that both BCL and the government had concluded that the end
of the Bougainville crisis was far out of sight.
Other Landowner Agitations
Panguna landowner dissatisfaction caused the greatest strife in 1989. But
the phenomenon of landowner agitations against resource developers (or
resource exploiters) and against their own government over alleged nonpayment or underpayment for land required for infrastructural and urban
facilities (often supported if not instigated by politicians) was as
widespread in 1989 as ever. In Enga, site of the still developing
mammoth Porgera gold mine, the Premier, Ned Laina, led his people to
make startling demands on the developers (or exploiters). In February, the
landowners demanded ten per cent of the shares in the mine without
payment. 23
Their delegation to Sydney in the same month demanded: the
construction of a permanent tailings dam before mining begins; the
upgrading of the health centre to hospital standard; the awarding of all
spin-off contracts to Porgerans, and Engans; and the starting of a training
and employment programme for Engans and Porgerans. In March the
Premier, who claimed he was supported by all Engan politicians and the
landowners, now wanted thirty per cent of the shares in the Porgera gold
mine to be given to the Enga Development Corporation, owned by the
landowners, six local government councils and the provincial
government. 24 He did not indicate whether the allocation should be free or
how it would be paid for. The Premier also wanted the Enga Development
Corporation to be an "automatic partner in any sub-contract work";
transportation of machinery, equipment, and goods between Lae and
Porgera to be restricted to Engans only, and no fly-in-fly-out of an elite
work force based in Cairns, an idea that resource developers and their
social impact consultants were beginning to sell hard. If these demands
could not be met, he proposed that "Porgera be put up to tender" and the
companies be compensated for work done so far. 25
In April the national government agreed to let the Enga provincial
government acquire a ten per cent share in the Porgera mine, and acceded
to practically all the other demands by the Premier regarding spin-off
contracts and employment of Engans. Then it was announced that Porgera
has twenty-seven per cent more gold than estimated earlier. 26 So, the
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YawSaffu
Premier staked out for a greater share for Enga. He wanted twenty per
cent. Further, he wanted the agreement with the developers (Placer,
Renison and Highlands Gold, a subsidiary of Mt Isa Mines) to guarantee
specified contracts to Porgerans and Engans and threatened he would not
sign otherwise. A month later, on 12 May, the Porgera agreement was
signed by all parties: the government, the developers, the provincial
government and the landowners. Within six weeks of the signing,
however, Engan politicians were accusing the developers of being
"dishonest and unfair" in not awarding contracts to the Enga
Development Corporation and were threatening to burn installations at the
mine which was expected to start operation on 15 July. 27
In the Western Province, the landowners of the established Ok Tedi
mine, led by the Premier and other politicians from the province,
demanded KIO million compensation for the mine access road; a
doubling of occupation fees to ten kina per hectare (for the 18,000
hectares); the supply of electricity to all the villages within the mine
lease area. As usual, violent action was threatened unless demands were
met. 28 Earlier in the year, the demands had been even higher: K20 million
a year compensation (presumably for polluting river systems in the
province) and a further K3 million to upgrade the Daru wharf (the port
used by Ok Tedi).
Pollution from Ok Tedi was a genuine concern, even if some opposition
politicians from the area also sought to embarrass the government with it.
In April the Environment and Conservation Minister threatened to close
Ok Tedi unless the company came up with an appropriate solution. A
tailings dam was estimated to cost K322 million. Apart from the cost, the
company claimed that geological instability in the area, manifested by
landslides in 1985 and again in August 1989, made the construction of a
tailings dam a hazardous enterprise. But concerns were raised by the
state's consultants, Applied Geology Associates, that marine life was at
risk from the Ok Tedi waste discharge. The Minerals and Energy
Minister, whose department took a view of mines pollution different from
that of the Department of Environment and Conservation, was instructed
to report to cabinet by 30 July with necessary scientific data on pollution
in the Fly River. 29 The fact of the matter, however, was that economic
benefits from the mine appeared to make environmentally destructive
total discharge the only viable option. As far as the developers were
concerned, three other options, including the building of a tailings dam,
would all lead to a close down of the mine, a situation the government
could not contemplate. It was calculated that in the lifetime of the mine,
the government would earn K750 million from its twenty per cent share
and taxes; the Western provincial government K120 million; the
landowners K20 million; while business associated with the mine would
be worth K22 million per year. Further, Ok Tedi employs, directly and
indirectly, 4,500 Papua New Guineans. 30 In October, university students
organised a demonstration against the government decision to allow Ok
Tedi to operate without building a tailings dam.
475
In the case of mining ventures such as Ok Tedi environmental

pollution was a legitimate concern and the involvement of politicians for
compensation demands was therefore not necessarily to be condemned as
short-sighted or opportunistic. The same, however, could not be said
about other landowners' compensation demands championed by
politicians. For instance, Avusi Tanao, MP, was evidently not opposed to
threats by his constituents, the landowners of Arona valley near Kainantu,
to "block electricity supply" and the Highlands Highway if compensation
demands for K3 million were not met by the governmentY In New
Ireland, the Tiga Pressure Group, seeking compensation for the land on
which Kavieng town stood received the strong support of their MP, a
national minister, in Parliament. 32 A compensation demand of K12 million
for Hoskin's airport also had politicians behind it. In East Sepik, there
was a demand for K1 million for the Kainde Teachers College and K15
million for the Mt Atbowagi repeater station. One could go on and on.
And yet there was evidence in 1989 that if politicians can inflame
demands they can also defuse them if they are so minded. In April
Watabung villagers in the Eastern Highlands blocked part of the
Highlands Highway in support of a K6.8 million compensation demand
for a five kilometre section. After the intervention of the Premier and two
national MPs from the area the villagers not only withdrew their demand.
They apologised to the travelling public.D
The MPs Numbers Game
From the point of view of ensuring government stability, the 1987
election results were widely seen as satisfactory. 34 The conduct of the
three-week elections, and the month-long wait afterwards before a
government could be formed also convinced political actors and
commentators of the urgent need for several constitutional reforms.
However, by 1989, only the hardly relevant constitutional amendment to
the composition of the parliamentarians' salaries and conditions tribunal
had been effected. The slow pace of reform could be attributed to the
weakness of political parties (which allowed MPs to do exactly as they
liked), the self-interest of MPs (which was best served by the noconfidence numbers game) and the short sittings of Parliament (four two
or three-week sessions a year) which were sometimes made even shorter
by an early adjournment to avoid a no-confidence vote. With such short
sessions, and the very lengthy periods devoted to question time, and the
time lost through the suspension of sessions (because of lack of a
quorum, or so that the Speaker could restore control over proceedings)
important legislation kept piling up on the parliamentary agenda.
Before the February-March session of Parliament, a formidable list of
intended constitutional amendments was unveiled by the Leader of the
House. It included a bill to extend the grace period from six months to
two and a half years during which a new government could not be
challenged by a motion of no-confidence, a Vagrancy Act to control the
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spread of squatter settlements and (it was hoped) urban crime; a change
in the Leadership Code, to make it tougher and to extend it to include
provincial government members; changes to the Group Fighting Act to
shift the onus of proof on to suspects; to make perjury before a
commission of enquiry a punishable offence; and to abolish regional seats
and "sectional voting" (voting by those whose names are not on the
electoral roll) and to require the issue of picture identity cards to all
voters. 35 Only the bill to criminalise perjury before a Commission of
Enquiry became law during the year. A bill to amend the constitution to
limit motions of no-confidence was introduced. But it got no further than
that. The opposition and government backbench MPs were thus able to
pursue their favourite game of muddying the political waters with their
constant crossings. aided by somewhat unquestionine, unc.ritkal journalists
who dutifully reported the headline grabbing antics and exaggerated
opinions of self-promoting politicians, in the lead-up to sessions of
Parliament and the inevitable no-confidence challenges to the government.
Before Parliament sat on 21 February, the opposition made it clear
they would challenge. Wingti was clearly under pressure from his backbench and from other opposition leaders. On the eve of the session, he
promised: "I certainly do not want to see a change of government every
eight months. But at the same time I will not allow this country to slide
backwards". 36 On the day the session began, he reiterated "We should
give this government a fair go. And we have. But we cannot let the
government drag us to ruin"Y Sir Julius Chan, leader of the People's
Progress party (PPP), believed the opposition could win because Namaliu
was "presiding over mutinies and coups, not break and enters",'8 a
reference to the soldiers' rampage earlier in the month (on which more
further on). The media reported rumours of a split in Ted Diro's People's
Action party (PAP), a partner in Prime Minister Namaliu's government,
and also in two opposition parties, the People's Democratic Movement
(PDM) of Paias Wingti and the National party faction that remained in
opposition under Michael Mel. 19 As was usual in the numbers game, some
MPs announced their defection and rumours of even more defections
became inevitable. On this basis, Wingti claimed at the end of February
that he had the numbers to overthrow the government.
On 2 March, Utula Samana, leader of Melanesian United Front
(MUP), gave notice of a motion of no-confidence in the government, and
named Paias Wingti as the alternative Prime Minister. The next day, by
fifty-three votes to forty-six, the government abruptly adjourned
Parliament till July, rather than face the vote at the end of the required
seven-day notice. This was the third use of the early adjournment ploy
which had been first employed by the Somare government back in 1985,
and which the Wingti government had resorted to in April 1988. But
while in 1988 it was the government that had been criticised for
adjourning early, the much more aroused popular anger in 1989 was not
directed at the government but at the opposition. The March issues of the
national newspapers (the Post-Courier, Niugini Nius, and the Times) made
477
it clear that public opinion was overwhelmingly against the motion of noconfidence. Students, trade unions, press surveys, letters to the editor,
concerned citizens' groups, a conference of provincial education ministers
(which included four Premiers), a meeting of the five Islands Premiers,
and a hugely attended public debate organised at the University of Papua
New Guinea on 21 March between leading government and opposition
MPs, all conveyed the same message: the opposition had no convincing
case; seven months was not long enough to judge performance of a
government; the people had become rather tired of the MP's numbers
game.
For the first time there was a powerful impression of massive popular
participation in politics, outside of a general election. The aroused
popular interest did not impress some opposition spokesmen. They
claimed that motions of no-confidence had "nothing to do with any
member of the public except MPs" and that "those groups have no
legitimate standing or right to protest". "The power to reason and judge
is vested in the MP when he or she is voted into Parliament, our actions
and decisions must not be directed or influenced by sectional demands,
pressures or interests". "Politics should be left to politicians". Thus spoke
Wingti, Philomen Embel, Jacob Lemeki and Perry Zeipi, all leading
members of the parliamentary opposition. 40 Apart from everything else,
they managed to ignore a very significant political event which had
occurred only days before their pontification. A defecting MP, Ben Garry,
had been successfully pressured through the press by powerful
constituents and clan members to return to the government backbenches
or lose their support.
In April, virtually all the defectors from the governing parties streamed
back, amidst speculations about an impending cabinet reshuffle, to
consolidate government. The League of National Advancement (LNA), a
partner in the governing coalition, was successfully enticing opposition
members into its ranks with the aim of increasing its membership in
cabinet. The People's Action party (PAP) sought the reinstatement of its
parliamentary leader, Ted Diro, as minister. Akoka Doi, the Deputy Prime
Minister and a member of PAP, even claimed he wanted Diro to replace
him as Deputy Prime Minister. PAP also sought the reinstatement of
Aruru Matiabe, its deputy parliamentary leader. Namaliu's own Pangu
pati backbenchers also harboured ministerial ambitions. Namaliu's natural
reaction was to procrastinate. But Ted Diro reportedly issued one of his
familiar ultimatums: Namaliu should reshuffle and bring him back into
cabinet by 4 pm on Friday, 19 May, or he would move his group out of
the coalition. 41 The highly damaging findings against Diro, by the Justice
Barnett Commission of Enquiry into Forestry, were still pending. But
with sixteen members, PAP was the third largest group in the Parliament,
after Pangu and Wingti's PDM. Namaliu caved in. Diro was sworn in as
Minister of State on 20 May, replacing John Giheno, one of the two
Pangu pati deputy leaders, who moved to Trade and Industry. Dropped in
the reshuffle were Galeva Kwarara (Trade and Industry), leader of the
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evidently one-man Papua party, and two Pangu pati ministers, Arnold
Marsipal (Defence) and Paul Kamod (Administrative Services). Ben
Sabumei, who moved from the National party to LNA in April, and
Theodore Tuya, aiso LNA, were appointed respectively to the Defence
and Administration Services ministries.
In spite of popular outcry against the motion of no-confidence, and the
efforts of the government to strengthen its defences, the motion of noconfidence remained on the agenda for the next session of Parliament.
PPP declared it would back the vote of no-confidence, in spite of (or
perhaps precisely because of) its own internal dissension, which led to
Jacob Lemeki resigning from PPP, and accusing Chan of "personal greed
and ambition that has left the party in ruin and death" .42 On 30 June, five
days hefore Parliament reconvened, the Minister of Communications,
Malipu Balakau, was murdered by gunmen at his home in Mount Hagen.
The shock of the assassination (the body was laid in state in Parliament
on the second day of the July sitting) managed to squelch ardour for a
vote of no-confidence in that session.
But by October, on the eve of the November budget session of
Parliament, the hunt was on again for MPs who were willing to move
around in the numbers game. Once again, gyrations within PAP provided
the momentum. Towards the end of October, while Akoka Doi was acting
as Prime Minister, he replaced the Minister for Culture and Tourism, a
co-member of PAP with Aruru Matiabe, the deputy parliamentary leader
of the same party. Matiabe claimed that the mini-reshuffle was not what
had been agreed within the party. He was supposed to have taken over the
Health portfolio from Robert Suckling. He warned of rising discontent
within PAP on account of "unprincipled decisions": which had brought
the party to "breaking point", thus posing "a serious threat to the survival
of Mr Rabbie Namaliu" .43 Only the previous week, two PAP ministers had
also indicated their discontent with the affairs of the party. In July, the
deputy president of the party, Professor John Waiko, had resigned, also
claiming dissatisfaction with the performance of the party leadership.
Matiabe called on both Diro and Doi to resign, staking his own claim to
the leadership and to the deputy prime ministership. 44 At least three
restless PAP backbenchers, Daniel ltu, Benson Garui and Aaron Noaio,
were reported to be ready to support a motion of no-confidence, which
the opposition made clear it would introduce.
On 31 October, the first day of the session, the opposition sought to
give the required one week's notice of its motion of no-confidence.
However, the Clerk of Parliament delayed acceptance for one day, saying
he wanted to verify a signature on the document. The MP concerned was
out of the country and the Clerk suspected that his signature had been
forged. On 1 November, Utula Samana gave the required notice for a
motion of no-confidence, with Paias Wingti named as the alternative
Prime Minister. In the horse trading that preceded such votes, Matiabe
demanded from Wingti and was apparently promised, the deputy prime
ministership. So, a day before the vote, 7 November, he announced his
479
resignation from PAP. However, by the evening of the same day, he had
been made to see that the deputy prime ministership neither would nor
could be delivered, even if Wingti won. Not only is Matiabe a
Highlander, like Wingti and the Governor-General at that time, but the
idea that Sir Julius Chan or Utula Samana would yield the Deputy Prime
Minister's position to him was also pure delusion. Matiabe's return to the
Namaliu camp, along with other similar cases of "cold feet", forced Utula
Samana to withdraw the motion on 8 November. Theodore Tuya LNA
Minister for Administrative Affairs, who resigned and joined the Wingti
camp only hours before the motion was withdrawn, was replaced
immediately by William Ank, an opposition MP who crossed over to the
government side that morning.
Submissions of further interim reports from the Justice T. Barnett
Commission of Enquiry into the Forest Industry throughout the first half
of the year, and then of the final report in July, meant that allegations of
corruption or improper behaviour against prominent politicians constantly
engaged the public's attention. PPP and the United party were singled out
as beneficiaries of the timber operator Santa's largesse. The
Commission's reports, which formally came to a total of nineteen hefty
volumes, were referred to the Police Commissioner after they were tabled
in Parliament. But, by the end of 1989, of all the politicians named, only
the Kavieng MP and Minister for Housing, Gerald Sigulogo, had been
suspended from Parliament as a result of the Commissioner's findings.
The Military and Politics
On 8 February, some 300 and 400 soldiers (other ranks and NCOs) defied
their officers and took to the streets in Port Moresby, to protest over the
paucity of a pay increase they had just received. Joined by unemployed
youths with their own frustrations and grievances, the soldiers marched
on Parliament, damaging vehicles and property and threatening people en
route. A panicked government gave in to the soldiers' demands on the
spot, although it claimed that the pay increase the Deputy Prime Minister
announced to the demonstrating soldiers had been authorised earlier and
that it was Defence Department's tardiness in implementing the decision
that had resulted in the soldiers' frustration. The following day, soldiers
at Moem Barracks in Wewak also took to the streets in solidarity. The
government suspended the Commander of the PNG Defence Force, the
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Department of Defence, and set up
a General Defence Board of Inquiry to investigate the causes of the
rampage and the entire administration and management of the PNG
Defence Force and the Defence Department. In June the Report of the
Board of Inquiry was submitted to the government, and was tabled in
Parliament in November.
The Report called not only for the expansion of the Defence Force but
for improvements in everything: housing, transportation, recreational
facilities, welfare services, pay, leave entitlements, retirement awards,
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Yaw Sajji1
training facilities equipment, the calibre of training instructors, and so on.

It was a powerful statement of corporate grievances and suggestions
about what should be done. It portrayed a demoralised, discontented
Defence Force with discipline problems, poor training and indifferent
administration.
Three soldiers were jailed (in April) over the February riots, for five
months in two cases and four months in one case. The suspended officers
were exonerated by the Inquiry's findings and were reinstated in
September, although the civilian Secretary of the Defence Department
chose to resign from the public service.
The slow progress of the counter-insurgency effort in Bougainville
provided several occasions for a public airing of differences between the
military and civilian authorities. Colonel<; Dotaona and Maras publicly
criticised the politicians' handling of the Bougainville crisis, particularly
for not articulating objectives clearly enough, and for their inconsistency
and their attempts to dictate operational matters. For their public
outbursts, Ted Diro (now that the boot was on the other foot)' 5 threatened
disciplinary action against the soldiers for breaching military tradition and
discipline by making public comments on government decisions. Another
soldier, the acting Chief of Staff, Colonel Leo Nuia, publicly told off his
minister: "There is a crisis on the island and it is very delicate. Marsipal
as a politician should refrain from making wild statements on matters
affecting the operations of the soldiers and police there". 46 Lieutenant
Colonel Walter Salamus was recalled from Bougainville in October after
the Parliamentary Emergency Committee had complained about his
disrespectful orders to the visiting Committee not to meddle. Clear
evidence of the increasing impatience of the top brass of the military, or
their perception of an expanded military role, was a reported informal
approach by the acting Chief of Staff to a senior Australian Diplomat
with a request for an RAAF helicopter and crew for medical evacuation.'7

Provincial elections were held in East New Britain (March), Manus
(August) and Madang (December). In East New Britain a new Premier,
Sinai Brown, emerged in place of the long-serving Sir Ronald ToVue who
did not nominate for the election. But in Manus and Madang, the
incumbent Premiers, Stephen Pokawin and Andrew Arioko, retained their
positions. The Oro Provincial Assembly changed its Premier in March,
after only one year in office. West New Britain and Central Provinces
were plagued by leadership crises and, in the case of the latter and in
Milne Bay Province, by financial scandals. The Simbu provincial
government's financial records were described by the Public Accounts
Committee as a "total mess" .48
Disenchantment with the provincial government system was fuelled
in 1989, above all by long drawn out in-fighting among would-be
Premiers, and by the consequent collapse of responsible leadership in
481
Morobe, leading the Provincial Assembly to vote for suspension in June,

which the national government duly approved on 6 September. In the
wake of the suspension and a breakout of political violence, a curfew was
imposed on the province on 11 September. In a wide-ranging discussion
of the current state of PNG affairs, one of the most perceptive PNG
leaders, Sir Barry Holloway, described the provincial government system
as "a total disaster". 49 Paias Wingti, who as Prime Minister in 1980s
stopped a parliamentary committee review of the provincial government
system, and Utula Samana, who came to national prominence through his
premiership of Morobe Province, strongly backed calls by the Public
Accounts Committee to replace the nineteen provincial governments with
four regional governments. The provincial government system was clearly
under siege. Conflicts between provincial governments and the national
government over resource exploitation, for instance timber in Manus, and
in the examples cited earlier in this chronicle, were clearly on the
increase.
Foreign Relations
Papua New Guinea entered into several negotiations and agreements with
other countries in the course of the year. In January, a maritime and
seabed boundary pact was signed with the Solomon Islands. Another
agreement on the PNG-Solomon Islands border was signed in February,
to recognise the traditional rights of border residents. Also in February,
cabinet approved a Status of Forces Agreement with the US. This
provided for the presence of military personnel in each other's territory
for various purposes, including seminars, consultations, joint exercises,
personnel exchanges, military training, surveillance, acquisition of
equipment, visits by military planes and ships. In April, talks were held
with the US on a draft Economic Cooperation Agreement submitted by
the US government. A Development Cooperation Treaty with Australia
was concluded in March to govern an Australian Aid Package to PNG
over the next five years. The PNG-Australia Trade and Commercial
Relations Agreement (PATCRA) was renegotiated, apparently, to
guarantee the safety of Australian investment in the event of a major
crisis. But it had not been signed by the end of the year. With Malaysia,
however, a similar Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement was
signed in February. PNG's continuing interest in ASEAN was evident in
a cabinet decision in April to accede to that organisation's Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, although the accession did not confer
membership on Papua New Guinea. In June, PNG signed a technical
assistance agreement with Israel. One contretemps in PNG foreign
relations in 1989 was the probably inadvertent pursuit of a two China
policy. Among other reasons, a search for a soft loan by the Pangu pati
to build Somare House led to a semi official courting of Taiwan50 which
was expected to open a permanent Trade Mission in Port Moresby, and
thus led, reportedly, to China's displeasure. 51
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The Bougainville Crisis

In 1990, as in 1989, the Bougainville crisis 1 dominated PNG politics. The
December 1989 decision by Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) to mothball
the Panguna mine strengthened the hand of the "war faction" in the PNG
cabinet. At the beginning of January cabinet opted for an "all out war"
against the rebels. Prime Minister Namaliu announced on 11 January that
the military option was now the only option and Operation Footloose was
launched "to rid the island of terrorist scourge, restore peace, and reopen
Bougainville". 2 On 12 January, Parliament extended the State of
Emergency on Bougainville for the fourth time, for another two months.
But even as the military option was being adopted, the "peace
faction" in cabinet, led by Fr John Momis, 3 continued to pursue its
parallel initiatives, with Momis and the Bougainvillean Premier, Joseph
Kabui, dangling a greater autonomy for Bougainville in front of the
militants. The militants ignored the "peace faction" but responded
devastatingly to the "war faction", besieging Kaveria jail on 17 January,
killing seven, wounding over twenty and setting the place on fire. In the
next two days they shot an Australian BCL executive and an Australian
journalist. The militants' defiant response, exemplified by Sam Kauona's
"crazy letter" (Namaliu's description) challenging the government to a
fair contest ("You give us arms; give us ammunition; don't use choppers
and let's have a fair war with you."), sought to widen the scope of the
conflict.
By attacking Australians they hoped to draw the Australian government
directly into the conflict and thereby reap the benefit of the "David
effect"; that is, the sympathies that would flow to small, weak,
"exploited" Bougainville fighting mighty Australia and its "lackey", the
PNG government. The Australian government declined to take the bait.
But the militants succeeded in widening the geographical area of conflict
by drawing the security forces away from the Kongara valley in central
Bougainville with their vicious attacks on Buka and Buin, to the north
and south.
Hostilities quickened the pace of exodus from Bougainville. By the
end of January over eighty per cent of public servants on the island had
483
been evacuated. BCL reduced its workforce from 2,300 to 300 by the end
of February. The plantations had lost their labourers and in most cases
their managers as well. Commercial life ground to a halt with the banks
closing down, with airlines suspending flights to the island in February,
and insurance companies refusing to provide cover.
The ferocity of the militants' response, recognition by the government
that "any lasting solution will need much more than just a military
solution", 5 plus the influence of the peace faction, contributed to the
government's decision to declare a ceasefire, less than six weeks after
claiming there was no other option but the military one. On the militants'
part, a ceasefire was as good as victory. A ceasefire would herald
negotiations, constitute a de facto recognition by the government, and
probably mean the resumption of imports and services. There were all
kinds of groups, churchmen, academics, women's groups, concerned
citizens, trying to arrange a ceasefire. 6 On 1 March, Sam Kauona, on
behalf of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), and Colonel Leo
Nuia, on behalf of the PNG government, signed a ceasefire agreement.
The agreement called for a complete withdrawal of all security forces
by 16 March. Kauona insisted that regular police on the island before the
build-up were also to be withdrawn. Paul Tohian, the Police
Commissioner and controller of the state emergency, apparently out of
fear for the fate of his men if they were not withdrawn, perhaps out of
pique as well, agreed with Kauona's interpretation. Without notice to the
government, he withdrew all security personnel, including general duty
policemen. Not a single policeman was left on the island. The BRA, for
its part, agreed to surrender its arms. But while the government expected
that the arms would be surrendered to a team of international observers
appointed by the Commonwealth Secretariat, the militants insisted that
surrender meant handing the arms in to BRA headquarters. And that is
what the international team confirmed as having happened. In effect, the
ceasefire left the rebels in absolute control of the island while the
government waited for talks to begin. It was the BRA which welcomed
the international observers and looked after them on the island. No
wonder the Post-Courier editorialised, more than a month later, when the
expected talks were pushed further and further away: "In reality, we have
lost Bougainville". 7
On 17 May, the BRA declared Bougainville independent and renamed
it The Republic of Meekamui (Sacred Island), under interim President
Francis Ona. The interim government included Joseph Kabui and the
heads of all the religious denominations on the island. The new republic
failed to secure international recognition. It said much for the political
sophistication of the republic's leaders and their lack of touch with reality
that they actually approached the Australian Prime Minister for
recognition. 8 Furthermore, in a period of communist collapse and retreat,
and of the Soviet Union's strenuous efforts to ingratiate itself with the
West, Kauona threatened to look to the communist countries for support,
unless his neighbours recognised his republic. 9
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The Namaliu government responded to the declaration of independence

by imposing a communication blackout and tightening the economic
blockade on the island, (but in the divide-and-rule tactic, Nissan, the
Carteret and other outer islands were excluded from the blockade)
suspending all government and banking services, and deploying troops on
Nissan Island, eighty kilometres north of Buka. The effectiveness of these
measures, plus the failure of the new Republic to secure recognition,
finally persuaded the BRA leaders to attend peace talks on board a New
Zealand frigate, the Endeavour, from 29 July.
The so-called Endeavour Accord, reached on 6 August, did not really
touch on the basic issues of UDI and secession. These were deferred to
future talks. Apart from the promise of such talks, all that the Accord
achieved was an undertaking by the PNG government to restore
government services, and an undertakmg by the BRA to guarantee the
safety of government personnel returning to provide those services. It was
agreed that services would be withdrawn from those areas where the
security of public servants and other personnel providing them was at
risk. This was a subtle pressure on ordinary people to stand up to the
BRA. It was also an attempt by the government to regain a foothold and
resurrect its authority on the island.
The national government's strategy, after the Accord, was to signal
clearly to areas which wavered on secession the government's ability and
willingness to support and protect them. To that end troops and
policemen were sent along with services to Nissan Island and Buka. But
this strategy became one reason why the follow-up talks had not
materialised by the end of the year. The rebels wanted the troops
withdrawn. Their control over some sections of the island was almost
certainly based on the fear they could instil. The Bukas, who were
generally not in sympathy with secessionism, formed a Liberation Front
to fight their local BRA in September, with help from the Defence Force
detachment there. Nissan was almost wholly pro the national government.
With the consent of its former national politicians and chiefs, Buka was
designated the new temporary headquarters of the province with a new
Administrator appointed in place of the suspended provincial government
of Joseph Kabui. But the Administrator's writ did not run on the main
Bougainville Island.
The immediate impact of the Bougainville crisis on the polity and
economy was extensive. On 15 March, after attending a party to welcome
the troops, Police Commissioner Paul Tohian called out the mobile police
squad and attempted to abduct the Prime Minister and seize power. He
was dismissed for his drunken attempt to take over government. His
refusal to implement decisions of the National Executive Council was
also cited. He was charged with treason, together with Chief Inspector
Gari Baki, Commander of the Mobile Squads, and Senior Inspector
Ronnie Neai, Commander of the Papuan Mobile Unit.
The authorities evidently decided that discretion was the better part of
valour. The accused were released on bail in May. Over 200 policemen
485
had petitioned for Tohian's reinstatement, a move backed by an

opposition spokesman as a means of "calming the discontent in the
disciplined forces and the general public". 10 The case was still pending at
the end of the year.
Bougainville became a factor in the Parliamentary numbers game. At
the first session of Parliament in March, Paias Wingti, the Leader of the
Opposition, tendered documents purporting to prove that Fr Momis had
been involved in a giant "conspiracy" to fan the crisis so as to gain
prospecting rights over virtually the whole island for a company with
which he was associated. A 1985 aerial geophysical survey of the island
provided by the West Germans as aid had confirmed the enormous
mineral potential of the island. A company, Bougainville Resources Joint
Venture, involving Momis, the Kabui-led provincial government and two
Sydney-based businessmen, was consequently formed in 1987. The
association of the Australian businessmen, Benedict Chan and Martin
Dougherty, is what Wingti emphasised as sinister. Chan is "a personal
supporter of the Melanesian Alliance", 11 Fr Momis' party.
According to Rowan Callick, Benedict Chan, like Fr Momis, is a
trustee of the Melanesian Awareness Campaign, one of the top twenty
shareholders in an Australian-listed company, Mosaic Oil. Chan is a
director of Mosaic's wholly owned subsidiary, Mosaic Niugini, which
holds two petroleum prospecting licences in Papua New Guinea. Martin
Dougherty, on the other hand, a media consultant and owner of Asia
Pacific Communications, had been engaged by the PNG government on
a K240,000 consultancy, to promote PNG internationally. Wingti claimed
this was at the behest of Fr Momis and that the consultancy was awarded
without public tender. A letter allegedly written by Dougherty, insinuating
corruption among the Namaliu government, was tendered in Parliament.
The Post-Courier pronounced the letter a fakeY
The Economy, Landowners and Resource Exploitation
The impact of the Bougainville crisis on the economy, especially in

combination with low world commodity prices in 1990, was severe. Its
impact on the politics of resource exploitation, on the attitudes of
landowners, provincial governments and elite 'nationalist' businessmen
for a greater share of benefits, was also clear. They knew they could drive
home to the government the cautionary lessons from Bougainville.
On 8 January, the kina was devalued by ten per cent. Over the year, it
depreciated by at least another ten per cent against all major currencies.
The devaluation was part of a package of measures, apparently worked
out with the IMF and the World Bank, which included cuts in government
expenditure, a restrained wages policy and a cautious monetary stance that
attempted to ease credits to the non-mining private sector without putting
undue pressure on foreign exchange reserves and prices. The stabilisation
measures succeeded in securing international balance of payments support
for the country. A higher inflation, at seven per cent the highest since
486
Yaw Saffi..i
1984, followed the devaluation. A wages explosion was feared when the
Police Association sought a ten per cent salary increase a few days after
the devaluation, citing its likely effects on the cost of living. However, the
Public Employees Association, the largest and the most influential in the
Trade Union Congress, agreed that the embattled nation could not afford
trade union militancy and entered into agreement with the government in
January to limit pay increases by up to two percentage points below the
Wages Board determination for July 1989-March 1992.
In real terms, Gross Domestic Product contracted by more than the 1.6
per cent which the December 1989 Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic
Bulletin had forecast. Only increased output of gold from Ok Tedi and
Misima and the beginning of production at Porgera as well as the
exploration activities of several companies, particularly Conzinc Rio
Tinto of Australia (CRA) and the giant Chevron and its partners in the
proven Kutubu oil fields of Southern Highlands, stemmed the decline in
the economy. 13 To counter the negative impact of the Bougainville crisis
on foreign investor confidence, the government decided to replace the
National Investment and Development Authority (NIDA), the regulatory
body unloved by prospective foreign investors, with an investment board
which had a promotional rather than regulatory bias. Also, the
government decided to lower the level of local equity participation
required to qualify a company as a local company from seventy-five per
cent to fifty per cent, a move that was expectedly condemned by the
Melanesian Chamber of Commerce.
The increasing importance of the extractive sector, cultural values
about land and the impact of the Bougainville crisis on attitudes all
combined to make landowners the most powerful pressure group. They
were also readier than most to resort to the use of their chief weapon,
blocking access to sites. The tendency of landowners to ignore
agreements or to question them, taking the law into their own hands to
enforce their interpretation, and the government's "softly softly" approach
most of the time, all made for their enhanced visibility. Such was their
clout that even Pedi Anis, the Premier of New Ireland and a farsighted
PNG politician, sought payment of compensation to landowners before
the sealing programme could begin for a road which was built by the
Germans before the First World War. In January, Ok Tedi landowners,
demanding an increase of their share of royalty from twenty to fifty per
cent, blocked the mine access road and disrupted production. Landowners
at Mt Kare obtained forty-nine per cent ownership of the mine against
CRA's fifty-one per cent, plus an annual compensation of around
K200,000. Misima landowners, on the other hand, opted for an
impressive list of infrastructural developments and provision of one-off
capital for their company. 14
The Kutubu oil fields in Southern Highlands and the proposed 260kilometre export pipeline through the Gulf Province led to a proliferation
of landowner associations and elite nationalist intermediary companies.
The most ambitious of the latter was Monticello Enterprises Ltd. Its
487
directors read like a "Who Is Who" of PNG's economic technocrats.

From May, Monticello sought to use nationalism and populism to wrest
ownership of the impending pipeline from the developers of the
petroleum industry. It said that the Petroleum Act needed to be changed
to ensure active local participation. To them, active local participation
meant, above all, local ownership of the pipeline. As one of its prominent
backers argued: "State equity is no longer seen by the landowner in
Kikori or Kutubu as an acceptable substitute for his own participation"Y
This struck a sympathetic chord with some MPs, cabinet ministers and a
section of the public.
At the end of May, it was reported that the Southern Highlands
provincial government was lobbying the national government to accept the
idea of a separate ownership of the pipeline and it was talking with a
German financier to fund its expected participation in such a project. 16 In
July, Gabriel Ramoi introduced a Private Members' Bill seeking to amend
the Petroleum Act to restrict foreign petroleum company ownership in the
pipeline project to twenty per cent. Chevron said it would reassess its
position if the Bill was passed. On 16 July it actually halted work,
pending the outcome of the Bill. The next day, Ramoi, "under extreme
pressure", withdrew his Bill. But as soon as Ramoi withdrew his Bill,
another MP introduced another Private Members' Bill also seeking to
limit foreign companies' share in the pipeline to twenty per cent. 17
Chevron got significant support from unexpected quarters. UPNG
students staged a sit-down protest outside Parliament against the moves
to amend the Petroleum Act. 18 The Finance Minister also found
Monticello's financial proposal unrealistic. He spelt out what he believed
were very advantageous terms which the developers had agreed to: PNG's
twenty-two per cent equity would be paid for out of future profits.
According to another Minister, Ted Diro, who clearly understands
concerns of international capital, PNG's expected sixty-five per cent share
of net revenue from Kutubu, in the form of equity, taxes and royalties,
was generous. ' 9
At the end of July, the government decided that Chevron would own
the pipeline as well. Peter Donigi, a leading lawyer, an articulate
opponent of the doctrine of eminent domain, and one of the Directors of
Monticello, arraigned the government before the National court over
ownership of minerals and petroleum. He wanted the court to declare that
all mineral and petroleum deposits belong to the landowners and not the
state, and that the Mining Act and the Petroleum Act are unconstitutional.
He argued that "there is a common desire of landowners throughout PNG
to participate in development activities" and urged the court to recognise
that. 20
Threatened Votes of No-Confidence and Cabinet Reshuffies
The weeks preceding parliamentary sessions in PNG are trying times for
party leaders and Prime Ministers, and anxious or exciting, hopeful times
488
YawSaffu
for MPs, as the parliamentary numbers game gets underway. The game
begins with dizzyingly rapid movements by MPs flitting backwards and
forwards, between opposition and government benches. The free press is
crucial at this stage. Its rather undiscriminating highlighting of the
spectacle adds to the momentum of an impending showdown. The game
proceeds with the Prime Minister shuffling his cabinet and with notice of
a motion of no-confidence being given in Parliament. Depending on how
cunning the Prime Minister has managed to be, the motion may or may
not be pressed to a vote.
The year kicked off amicably enough with a much discussed Namaliu
luncheon in January with the ex-Prime Ministers in Parliament, Somare,
Chan and Wingti, to try and forge a consensus over pressing issues. Sir
Julius Chan's response to these discussions was to call in February for
the establishment of a grand coalition government under Somare.
Namaliu interpreted the call as the opposition's ploy to wreck Pangu, the
leading partner in the five party coalition government. The call was
rejected.
In anticipation of the March session, Philemon Embel, the treasurer of
Wingti' People's Democratic Movement (PDM), defected to the League
for National Advancement (LNA), a government coalition partner. He was
soon joined by five other opposition members. After the obligatory
altruistic reasons, 21 the real reason for the move was also given: "We are
elected to Parliament to be in government" _22 On 18 April another
defection was announced, this time from PDM to Ted Diro's People's
Action party (PAP). Two days later, some wildly optimistic projections
about PAP numbers in Parliament given by its general secretary were
dutifully reported in the Post-Courier. In view of those projections, Ted
Diro's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and Public Services
Minister at the end of April was not surprising. The matter which had
kept Ted Diro out of office, the charges of misconduct arising from the
Justice Barnett Forestry Enquiry, 2' had still not gone before a Leadership
Tribunal or the courts.
Just when it was claimed that the magical number, seventy-three MPs,
required to pass constitutional amendments was a certainty for Namaliu, 24
a prominent Pangu backbencher, Matthew Bendumb, resigned from the
party because, he said, "the current leadership is weak and indecisive". 25
He promised to lobby MPs to support any no-confidence motion to oust
the Namaliu government. However, more MPs were joining the
government parties than were leaving for the opposition. The general
secretary of PDM, Tom Horik, headed for the government side. Utula
Samana, leader of Melanesian United Front (MUF) and the person who
spearheaded two attempts to remove Namaliu in 1990, also moved with
four of his followers to the government side in June.
Samana's move caused three Southern Highlands MPs to leave the
government benches. They had moved only two months before to the
government side to provide needed political stability! In a brutally frank
statement, Wiwa Korowi, Soso Tomu and Philemon Embel said the
489
defection of Utula Samana and his followers to the government had

shattered their chances of getting a ministry. 26
Despite the apparently successful bolstering of his numbers, Namaliu
nevertheless reshuffled his cabinet in June in preparation for the
inevitable challenge in July. Four Pangu ministers were ordered to give
up their ministries in favour of Pangu colleagues, evidently on the basis
of a novel principle for sacking ministers: "not performance, but party
principle to give others a chance"Y Matthew Bendumb, who had resigned
from Pangu pati less than two months before, citing Namaliu's weakness
and indecisiveness as the reason, became Minister for Home Affairs under
the same Namaliu. He replaced Timothy Bonga. Tony Ila, another MP
with a recent history of resigning from Pangu pati and criticising the
quality of Namaliu's leadership, was also appointed, to the Labour
Ministry, in place of Peter Garong. Tom Pais replaced Galen Lang at
Agriculture and Livestock, while Tenda Lau replaced Melchior Pep at
Corrective Institutions.
An interesting feature of this reshuffle was that in each of the first
three cases, the two MPs involved in the swap were from the same
province: same party, same province, to minimise potential political
payback. Samana was not rewarded. Resistance to his appointment among
Pangu members in Morobe Province and most likely in the parliamentary
caucus caused Namaliu to pause. Samana had always seen the demise of
Pangu in Morobe as the necessary condition for his own political rise. 28
Counting on disgruntled government backbenchers and those who had
been dropped recently from the cabinet, the opposition leaders prepared
for yet another vote of no-confidence when Parliament convened in July.
The required seven day notice for a motion of no-confidence was given.
When the motion was abandoned on 12 July, Wingti's reason for the
opposition's failure to obtain the numbers was "we don't have the money
to change the government". 29 There could be no clearer admission of the
role of bribery in PNG's parliamentary democracy. Wingti told Parliament
that the government made huge payouts to retain the support of the four
ex-Pangu ministers.
In a letter dated 26 June, the former ministers submitted a list of
demands for immediate action by the government as loss of entitlements
and benefits for stepping down, and demanded action by 29 June. 30
According to press reports, the ex-ministers demanded they be paid a
total of K51 0,000; their ministerial staff be employed by the new
ministers for a period of six months; the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff,
Chris Haiveta, be sacked; all their outstanding invoices before they
resigned be met by the government; Timothy Bonga be appointed Speaker
not later than 31 July; all four be considered for overseas trips between
now and the end of 1990; Somare step down as Foreign Minister and Sir
Pita Lus be appointed in his place. 31 In a separate letter dated 11 June,
Galen Lang asked for K21,500 to pay off the remainder of his housing
loan and an immediate settlement of between KlOO,OOO to K200,000 for
his "electoral development programme" _32
490
Yaw Saffu
A memorandum of agreement on these matters was actually signed

between Namaliu and the president of Pangu pati, Peter Wamp, on the
one hand, and Galen Lang on the other. The Department of Finance
confirmed that a sum of K400,000 was approved on 6 July as
"Secretary's Advance", following a directive from the Finance Minister.
It was further revealed that each ex-minister had been paid K20,000 and
an additional KlOO,OOO given for distribution to business groups and
companies in their electorates. The opposition claimed that a company
search revealed that the companies did not even exist. Wingti told the
House he had lodged the documents with the Ombudsman and the Police
Fraud Squad for necessary action.
By referring to the Police and the Ombudsman, Wingti had unwittingly
thrown the government a lifeline. When University students boycotted
classes and organised a massive demonstration to Parliament at the end ot
July and demanded that Parliament be dissolved and fresh elections held,
a demand the opposition bravely claimed to support, the Prime Minister's
response to the students was: let the law take its course; let the proper
authorities, the Ombudsman and the Police, decide and prosecute any
wrong-doing.
The students had hoped for Trade Union support for their demands.
While it was not forthcoming this time, Lawrence Titimur, the TUC
general secretary, promised that workers would participate in any future
anti-corruption protests. 33 The students went back to classes, vowing to
take up the issue again in November "now that we are getting additional
support from the Trade Unions".'4 It was not clear whether the students'
November date was intended to coincide with the November session of
Parliament or because November would be after their final exams.
A further cabinet reshuffle at the end of August testified to continuing
uncertainty about MPs' loyalties. A new ministry, Resource Development,
was created. Jack Genia, Minister of Education and one of the two deputy
leaders of Pangu, was appointed to it. It was not clear how this new
ministry would avoid duplication of functions with Minerals and Energy,
Forestry and Education. Utula Samana was now appointed, to the
Education Ministry. Akoka Doi, having "voluntarily" stepped down to
make room for Ted Diro as Deputy Prime Minister and Public Service
Minister in April, had to be found a ministry. Alan Ebu's Fisheries
Ministry was the one found for Doi. Ebu had recently stepped out of line,
criticising publicly a fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union. In the
process, he had taken on the heaviest weight of all in PNG politics, Sir
Michael Somare, the Foreign Affairs Minister.
In the context of a five-party coalition where the parties themselves do
not exhibit much internal cohesion, discipline or loyalty, cabinet
solidarity cannot be expected to be high, and it is not. In the first week
of the year, Ted Diro, under pressure from his extra parliamentary party
executive to promote PAP supporters, broke rank with coalition partners
and teamed up instead with the opposition to get Vincent Serei Eri elected by
Parliament, forty-eight to forty-five, as the new Governor-General. Eri
491
was president of PAP.

Party leaders made some effort during the year to instil discipline
although, for some, such as the National party which was split right down
the middle with one faction in government and another faction in
opposition, discipline of any sort was completely out of reach. People's
Progress party (PPP) expelled William Ank in June, a year after defecting
to the government side. Pangu caucus also expelled two MPs, Ereman
ToBaining and Daniel Itu, for disloyalty. However, such efforts were as
nothing compared with the strength of the tradition of pragmatic affiliation
on the part of politicians, which made their loyalty unpredictable.
It was this unpredictability which led to the K1.3 billion budget for
1991 being bulldozed through Parliament in just eighty minutes on 8
November. Parliament was hurriedly adjourned that day, only the second
day, until 16 July 1991. The government avoided the likelihood of yet
another motion of no-confidence and possibly hostile popular
demonstrations. The very long adjournment was to ensure the government
would be immune from further challenges until the 1992 elections. The
constitution imposes a dissolution of Parliament and the holding of
elections in the event of a successful vote of no-confidence within one
year of the date of the next national elections. The opposition charged
that the long adjournment was unconstitutional and sought Supreme court
determination on the issue. Pangu pati's expulsion of three MPs soon
after the adjournment suggests that their loyalty had been suspect during
the crisis.
The Ombudsman Commission also tried to infuse discipline and
integrity among leaders. Its investigations and charges led eventually to
the dismissal in March of the Housing Minister, Gerald Sigulogo, and the
resignation of another MP, Gabriel Ramoi, in September. But, according
to the Chief Ombudsman, its activities in enforcing the leadership code
were undermined by inadequate fundingY Another MP, Roy Yaki,
Minister of Transport in Wingti's second cabinet, was sentenced to two
years hard labour for embezzlement in his last job before becoming an
MP in 1987.
The impact of the MPs' gamesmanship, the ferment and the turmoil,
on government efficiency and performance was manifested in many ways,
not least in the strong impression made on observers and representatives
of foreign governments and international organisations that a vacuum
existed at the top, that nobody seemed to be really in charge, and that
vital decisions were not being made. Within one month of each other,
officials of the Asian Development Bank, the EEC delegation to PNG and
the Japanese all commented on the apparent lack of commitment and
enthusiasm of PNG public servants, resulting in delays and loss of vital
foreign aid and loans. 36 In May, the Post-Courier carried a report on how
in a period of recession an unresolved political dispute over the
appointment of the Physical Planning Board was delaying a K55 million
construction workY
Ministers do not accept responsibility for any of these delays and
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YawSaffu
blame bureaucrats. Thus, for instance, the Trade and Industry Minister,
John Giheno, blamed bureaucrats for failing to get papers ready for a K9
million loan agreement with the Asian Development Bank. 38 But if
cabinet ministers were really in charge, might the frequency of such
lapses not diminish? The inability of Parliament to pass necessary reform
bills, for instance those advocated by the independent Electoral
Commission and endorsed by cabinet, 39 as well as those presented by
Parliament's own Committee on Constitutional Reforms, 40 strengthens the
impression of a system adrift and rudderless. The frequent public
evidence of cabinet in-fighting also strengthens this impression. But a
celebrated public squabble between two of PNG's highest public servants
was perhaps the best illustration in 1990 of this impression of a system
lacking an effective, controlling centre.
On 6 July, the Governor of the Central Bank caused a Puhlic Notice to
be published in the Post-Courier. The Notice blamed the Department of
Finance and Planning and the PNG Banking Corporation (PNGBC), the
government's commercial bank, for creating an embarrassing crisis for
the government. Government employees were not paid, causing rumours
that the government had no cash. The notice blamed the Finance and
Planning Department for neglecting to communicate effectively with the
Central Bank. The PNGBC was blamed for refusing to accept further
government cheques. Four days later, the Managing Director of PNGBC
also took a page in the Post-Courier to shift the blame back to the
Central Bank, saying that it was the Central Bank's bouncing of
government cheques presented by PNGBC in June that forced it to refuse
to accept further government cheques.
Whatever reasons the Central Bank had for its initial action (the most
charitable was that it was trying to force the government to adhere to the
IMF's conditions for its Balance of Payments Support) the fact remains
that the Central Bank's Public Notice constituted a most unfavourable
reflection on the performance of the Department of Finance and Planning
and of the government as a whole. It spoke volumes about lack of
coordination, of the left hand not knowing or perhaps not caring
sufficiently what the right hand did, or did not do.
Provincial Governments
Nineteen-ninety was a year of renewed, increased calls for the abolition
of the provincial government system. However, ironically, as part of the
efforts to resolve the Bougainville crisis, the year began with an
investigation by the Department of Provincial Affairs, under the political
leadership of that champion of decentralised government, Fr Momis, into
ways of making the North Solomons Province, and "others which
qualify", more autonomous. A team of experts was assembled in January
to advise on such a new autonomous status, in which the provinces would
manage all state affairs except key ones like defence, foreign affairs and
currency. 41
493
In the Gulf Province, the year began with a new Premier, Sepoe
Karava, in place of Tom Koraea who was removed through a vote of noconfidence. Turmoil in the Central provincial government also resulted in
the ousting of the Premier in a successful vote of no-confidence and his
replacement by Isaiah Oda in March. But it was the unfolding tales of
woeful mismanagement and seemingly complete absence of
accountability in the use of provincial government resources by the
suspended government in Morobe that led the Post-Courier to advocate
the abolition of the provincial government system in February. 42 The
suspension of the Morobe provincial government was extended for
another six months to the end of the year.
A Parliamentary Select Committee, the so-called Hesingtut Committee,
was appointed in March to review the provincial government system. It
provoked the Premiers' Council to set up its own committee to counter
the expected centralising recommendations of the Parliamentary
Committee. 43 In April the Governor-General broke with tradition and
commented publicly on a controversial political issue. He called publicly
for the abolition of the provincial government system by 1992 and
provoked a passionate debate about the propriety of such vice-regal
interventions. Wingti, the Leader of the Opposition, declared he was
personally in favour of abolishing the system. Namaliu, on the other
hand, said his government was not only committed to the provincial
government system, it would pursue increased autonomy for provincial
governments. But it was doubtful whether his cabinet was united behind
this view.
Attempts to change the government of the Sandaun Province through
a vote of no-confidence during its July-August sitting failed, while the
Deputy Premier of East New Britain Province survived a no-confidence
motion in September. In Enga, the June election was over subscribed (272
candidates for twenty-two constituencies) and it was attended by much
violence. A former Premier, Danley Tindiwi, replaced Ned Laina as
Premier. In the Southern Highlands, a former policeman, Albert Mokai,
leading the Southern Highlands Solidarity Group, became Premier in
place of Yaungtine Koromba after the June elections. In New Ireland, the
post-election horse trading in December resulted in the replacement of
Pedi Anis by his deputy, Demas Kavavu.
The Law and Order Problem

From all indications, the law and order problem got worse in 1990. There
was tribal fighting in Simbu, Enga, Southern Highlands and Western
Highlands much of the year. A curfew was imposed on Goroka in the
Eastern Highlands and on Popondetta in Oro Province in June, and Ted
Diro, the Deputy Prime Minister, suggested that Port Moresby also
needed a curfew. 44 To Ted Diro, PNG was becoming "so dependent on
the Police to maintain law and order that we are gradually moving
towards a police state where there can ultimately be a military
494
YawSaffu
dictatorship". 45
The police were involved in "special operations" in the Western
Province at the beginning of the year (Operation Fly Bagarap) and in the
Highlands, covering Southern Highlands, Western Highlands and Enga
(Operation Blue Beret) from the middle of the year. The special anticrime operations begun in 1989 in the East Sepik Province continued.
The Highlands, in particular, seemed to be overwhelmed by the law and
order problem and authorities seemed helpless. The Western Highlands
Deputy Premier lamented: "Criminals have taken over our province". 46
The first statement made by the new Premier of Enga was to call on the
national government to declare a State of Emergency in Enga. A meeting
of Highlands leaders in March passed such drastic resolutions that their
implementation would have put the Police in charge of the state. 47
In response, the government proposed a Repatriation Bill in June,
seeking to give the Police and a proposed repatriation court powers to
send unemployed persons back to their home province. This was hailed
by the Post-Courier as a step in the right direction. 48 A Peace and Good
Order Bill, 1990, was also talked about from August and was publicly
unveiled at the end of October, intended for the November session of
Parliament. According to the papers, it sought to restrict rights and
freedoms under the constitution, to outlaw squatter settlements and
control processions and public meetings. The Law Reform Commission
condemned it. 49 One uncontroversial response to the problem was a
proposal to set up a National Youth Service with an initial funding of K5
million in the 1991 budget. 50
A feature of the law and order problem which became clearer in 1990
was the emergence of politically motivated criminal activities, beyond
armed robbery, rape and break and enter. In August, the offices of the
Ombudsman Commission were broken into and vital documents were
reportedly stolen. Within three days, the offices of the National Fraud
Squad, the Police anti-corruption unit, were razed to the ground in what
the papers called a "mystery-fire", and secret files reportedly went up in
flamesY No less a person than the Police Minister claimed in public that
"criminals are working with politicians", 52 something that an academic
researcher had uncovered two years earlier, but which sounded strange
and incredible coming from a Minister of Police. A Police source claimed
that policemen were helping criminals out of frustration. 53 Reports of
repeated thefts of large quantities of explosives in Rabaul and of twelve
high-powered rifles from the Boroko police station in August could only
lend credence to such claims.
External Relations
The Bougainville crisis, particularly the economic havoc it wrought on
PNG, revealed the strong international goodwill which PNG enjoys,
thanks largely to Australian solicitations on her behalf and to PNG's own
bountiful natural resources. In May, aid donors, states and international
495
agencies, under World Bank auspices, met in Singapore and promised a

total support package of $US710 million to PNG for 1990.
The crisis also highlighted the extremely close relations between PNG
and Australia (some would say extreme PNG dependence on Australia).
The crisis induced a review of the Defence Cooperation Agreement
between the two countries, following a request by Namaliu to Hawke and
a commitment by Australia to increase its defence aid. 54 Because of the
operational inadequacies of the PNG Defence Force which the
Bougainville crisis had exposed, an increase of manpower by some 2,000
over a four-year period, to achieve a total of 5,200, was deemed
necessary by the Defence Minister. Cabinet approved his proposals and
the first manifestation of Australian support arrived in June, in the form
of eighty military instructors.
The Australian Prime Minister's visit in September, during which
Australia's aid commitment to PNG was stressed and an Investment
Protection and Promotion Pact to protect the more than K2 billion
estimated Australian investment in the country was signed, was in
addition to a high-powered Australian participation in the bi-annual PNGAustralia ministerial meeting in January. That meeting also agreed to
more aid for the PNG Defence Force and the Police, while a revised trade
agreement, PNG-Australia Commercial and Trade Relations Agreement
(PACTRA), and a new quarantine agreement were signed.
PNG's policy towards relations with Indonesia also became more
accommodating, in spite of Indonesian troop incursions into PNG in
August and September. In June, there were press reports of heightened
OPM activities. 55 These triggered Indonesian troop incursions into PNG in
which five OPM guerillas were killed and refugee camps on the PNG
side of the border were burnt down. 56 Papua New Guinea deployed a
mobile police squad of thirty men to the border while more than 150
soldiers were sent to Vanimo to monitor the situation. The troops were
later given orders to destroy OPM camps.
Justice Minister Bernard Narokobi, formerly a staunch supporter of
OPM aspirations, demanded that the OPM and the Indonesians confine
their war to their own side of the border otherwise he threatened to take
the matter to the International Court of Justice to claim compensation for
Papua New Guinea. 57 The Foreign Minister, Sir Michael Somare, viewed
OPM use of PNG territory for its activities as exploitative and promised
that PNG will not sit back and allow OPM to exploit her. 58
Apart from treaty obligations emanating from the 1986 Treaty of
Friendship with Indonesia and from other agreements stretching back to
the early seventies, PNG was looking to the Indonesians for weapons and
for help with its plans for the Defence Force's civic action programmes. 59
It was for these reasons also that PNG reversed its policy of not entering
into joint border patrols with Indonesian troops. The Defence Minister
now argued, in justification of the new policy: "Indonesia is our next door
neighbour. Our military personnel must cooperate and share a greater
understanding among themselves. Papua New Guinea enjoys excellent
496
YawSajfu
associations with Australia, New Zealand, US, and British armed forces
. .. There is no better way of creating better understanding and trust
between our two countries than having the armed forces in Indonesia
working with our forces and people to build a village project. It is this
type of cooperation that will slowly dismantle the psychological fear of
Indonesia held strongly by many of our leaders and people". 60 It was
announced that General Sutrisno, Indonesia's Chief of Armed Forces,
would visit PNG before the end of the year. 61
Relations with the People's Republic of China in 1990, on the other
hand, continued their downward trend, because of PNG's increasing
friendship with Taiwan, despite PNG's declared acceptance of the oneChina policy. 62
50
YawSaffu
The Bougainville cns1s constituted the largest item in the last two
chronicles and its settlement continued to elude the government in 1991.
Tensions between the government and the military, to which the
Bougainville crisis has contributed significantly, resurfaced during the
year.
Pay increases for members of Parliament, recommended by a body
whose composition had been changed by the same MPs in 1989 to give
them a majority, evoked a violent reaction and a boycott of classes by
university students. The boycott led to the closure of the two universities
and the loss of the second semester.
As if to atone for the odium they had brought on themselves, MPs turned
reformist and they passed several important constitutional amendments
which had been pending for years. Optimists on Papua New Guinea's
capacity to muddle through had further news about which to cheer. The
swiftness with which a constitutional crisis was resolved was testimony
to the maturation of a sound political tradition. The crisis was unleashed
by the refusal of the Governor-General to implement the recommendation
of a Leadership Tribunal to dismiss Ted Diro, Deputy Prime Minister, and
leader of the second largest party in the governing coalition.
The deteriorating law-and-order situation, and the threat it could pose
to the staging of the image-enhancing Sixth South Pacific Games on
which huge sums had been expended, prompted the imposition of curfews
in Port Moresby, Lae and Mount Hagen from March until October, after
the end of the Games.
The Bougainville Crisis

The Endeavour Accord, reached between the government and the
Bougainville rebel leaders in August 1990, was expected to be followed
by further talks in September or October. But it was not until the end of
January 1991 that the follow-up peace talks took place, in Honiara, the
Solomon Islands capital. As with the Endeavour Accord, the Honiara
Declaration of 24 January was essentially about the restoration of services
to Bougainville. A civilian task force was to be set up to oversee the
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YawSaffu
restoration of government and commercial services. The Bougainville

rebel leaders asked for, and the government agreed to, the installation of
a multinational force on the island.
From the point of view of the rebels, such a force would not only stop
the government infiltrating security personnel back to the island, but it
could also supervise a referendum on secession. They wanted a shield
behind which they could work. For the government, a wish to appear
conciliatory, and the belief that the presence of such a force might
convince the rebels that it was safe to disarm were the probable reasons
for agreeing to a multinational force.
The crucial political questions of secession and independence on the
one hand, and reintegration on the other, were side-stepped. And yet these
were the issues that governed the implementation of the Honiara
Agreement. Each side sought to extract trom the implementation an
advantage for its own purpose. That the two agenda, Bougainville
secession and PNG national unity and territorial integrity, were clearly
irreconcilable made the Agreement brittle.
Thus it was not surprising that, within a month of the Agreement, food
delivered by the first ship to call at Kieta wharf since the imposition of
an economic blockade in March 1990 was rejected (although fuel and
medicine were accepted). The task force members accompanying the
cargo were threatened with death by the Commander of the Bougainville
Revolutionary Army (BRA). On the government side, it was not
particularly surprising that in April the Commander of the troops on
Buka, Colonel Leo Nuia, landed troops in the north of Bougainville. The
top hierarchy of the Armed Forces believed that restoration of government
services should go hand-in-hand with government control, to avoid giving
the BRA the opportunity of claiming credit and enhancing its popularity.
Colonel Nuia's unauthorised landing and his blowing up of a major
strategic bridge caused a storm in cabinet. His action breached the
Honiara Agreement's prohibition on the use of force, an important point
with Fr John Momis. As the leading Bougainville politician and the only
cabinet member from Bougainville, Fr Momis' voice appeared to be the
dominant one determining the Namaliu Government's handling of the
crisis in 1991.
Nuia's action undermined Fr Momis' "kid glove" strategy. Above all,
the fact that Nuia's actions had been undertaken without cabinet's
knowledge or approval caused fear and embarrassment. However, Nuia's
effectiveness in eliminating BRA influence in Buka and his credible
claim that he was responding to an invitation by the chiefs in northern
Bougainville saved him from a worse fate than a reprimand.
The Honiara Agreement envisaged a critical third round of peace talks
at the end of July. For those talks, the government insisted that both rebel
leader Francis Ona and the BRA Commander, Sam Kauona, must attend.
They had exploited their non-attendance at the two earlier meetings to
pick and choose from the agreements, endorsing favourable provisions
while repudiating those they considered inimicd to their cause. The
499
government insisted further that the next round of talks should deal with
the political questions ''once and for all" .1
However, by suddenly renewing attacks on the troops in northern
Bougainville and inflicting casualties at the beginning of July, the rebels
gave notice that the talks were not on. The multinational force had not
been assembled by the end of July because, among other reasons, the
PNG Defence Force was reportedly opposed to it. Leading members of
the rebels' negotiating team went to to Geneva at this time to lobby the
world community on the plight of Bougainvilleans and to exert pressure
on the PNG government to recognise their right to self-determination.
The government announced that 26 August had been agreed on as the
new date for the talks. When the date passed without any talks, a new
date in October was announced. The October date also passed, with no
talks and no new date.
Meanwhile, the task force, under the leadership of Fr Momis, pressed
on with the establishment of district coordinating authorities on
Bougainville to win the peace, by restoring services and initiating
reconstruction. By November cabinet had approved the establishment of
six district authorities, four on Bougainville and one each for Buka and
the atolls, Nissan, Carteret and Bismarck, in what could be regarded as an
attempt at a bureaucratic solution, as against a military or even a political
solution. 2
Tensions in Political-Military Relations
The chronicles for 1989 and 1990 showed the impact of the Bougainville
crisis on the morale and attitudes of the Police and the Defence Force,
and on their relations with the government. Tensions between the military
and politicians were again evident in 1991.
Fr Momis was livid at the April unauthorised landing of troops in
northern Bougainville and said so vehemently, recommending that the
soldiers involved be sacked. In May, a serving officer on Bougainville
wrote to the Post-Courier, arguing that it was Fr Momis who should be
sacked for "being in the same boat" with the secessionists and the BRA:
"If anybody should be sacked ... lunatics like Fr Momis and his Task
Force members are the ones the government should sack". 3 The officer
was reprimanded for his public attack on the minister.
In June, Colonel Nuia gave an interview on the ABC's "Four Corners"
television programme. He contradicted the government publicly on
several controversial issues. He insisted, among other revelations, that the
Australian-donated Iroquois helicopters had been employed as gunships
and also had been used for dumping at sea bodies of civilians killed
during a massacre by the security forces. The government had persistently
denied that the helicopters had been used in that way or that such a
massacre had occurred.
Colonel Nuia had allowed his obvious frustration to get the better of
his judgement. He was sacked. The officer appointed to replace him on
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Yaw Saffu
Bougainville refused to take up the position, insisting the government

first clarify the military's role in the crisis. The Post-Courier supported
the officer, by editorialising: "Give Maras His Brief'. 4
The Defence Force hierarchy's reaction to the sacking of Colonel Nuia
was to announce a drastic reduction in troop levels on Bougainville,
blaming both lack of funds and lack of clarity about the role of these
soldiers. As a spokesman made clear in the Post-Courier: "Until the
government can tell the Defence Force elements in Bougainville what its
true role is and support this financially, we cannot be expected to carry
out our ta~k effectively without drawing unfounded criticisms from the
public and most politicians who usually do not know what is happening
on the ground". 5
Pay Increases for MPs Trigger Student Unrest

On 20 May, the Parliamentary Salaries and Remuneration Commission
(PSRC) finished its report on new salaries for politicians, both national
and provincial, and constitutional office holders. The membership of the
PSRC was five: the Prime Minister or his representative; the Leader of
the Opposition or his representative; the Speaker of Parliament; the
Secretary for the Department of Personnel Management and the Secretary
for the Department of Labour and Employment. Thus politicians were in
the majority on the PSRC, in contrast to the earlier Parliamentary Salaries
and Conditions Monitoring Tribunal which it replaced in 1989. The view
had been expressed by observers in 1989 that the sole reason the earlier
body had been replaced was that the politicians were in a minority on it.
On 22 May, the last day of sitting before a two-month break,
Parliament approved, quickly and quietly, without debate or dissent, the
PSRC report recommending the salary increases, with effect from I July.
The following day, the Post-Courier announced the increases under a
banner headline on its front page: "MPs Vote Themselves Pay Rise".
Students at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) reacted
immediately to the news. They called the pay rise "day light robbery".
They seized and burnt fifteen government vehicles to show their anger
and to draw the attention of the media and the public. They manhandled
a few unfortunate public figures, blocked off access to the university and
began a boycott of classes to force Parliament to convene and rescind its
decision on the pay rises. Later, MPs of all persuasions were to unite in
blaming the media for inciting students.
Despite the violence and the wanton destruction of government
property, the students' protest met with wide public sympathy. The Public
Sector unions, for instance, petitioned the Speaker and the Chairman of
the PSRC to suspend implementation of the MPs' decision. They wanted
Parliament to rescind the decision when it reconvened and to review the
~omposition of the PSRC. 6 The Melanesian Chamber of Commerce
described the MPs' decision as "sinful and shameful". 7 The National
Doctors Association applauded the students' action and expressed its
501
support. Students at the University of Technology at Lae and other

tertiary students were soon organising their own protests.
The Prime Minister adopted a conciliatory attitude. He apologised for
the timing of the pay increase and promised to defer its implementation
until after the general election in 1992. The Speaker promised that
Parliament would be committed to rescinding the decision when it
reconvened on 9 July. The Clerk of Parliament was authorised to say that
the increases would not be paid.
It seemed fair to assume that a majority of parliamentarians would
have the commitment to rescind the decision to award themselves pay
increases. The Leader of the Opposition, Paias Wingti, was now saying
the government should not have allowed the increases in the first place. 8
The Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Sir Julius Chan, was also now
saying that the decision had been "insensitive and untimely". 9 There had
been no dissent from the opposition on the floor of Parliament on 22
May.
But the student leaders said they did not trust the politicians. More to
the point, the students now had a wider agenda. Their sense of power
inflated by the attention they were receiving from all sorts of groups with
their own agendas, and with half an eye on the 1992 elections, they
sought to instigate a general strike unless Parliament reconvened
immediately and dissolved itself. Parliament did not reconvene
immediately. It could not be expected to do so, for a good reason.
Until 9 July, the government would still be vulnerable to opposition
attempts to unseat it through a successful motion of no-confidence. This
is why the government had had to be dragged through the courts by the
opposition to have Parliament sit at least three times before 16 July 1991,
after the government had suddenly adjourned it in November 1990. In the
circumstances, the government could not be expected to be keen on an
immediate reconvening of Parliament. The fifth-year "moratorium" on
motions of no-confidence (because a successful motion automatically
triggers a general election) would begin on 16 July. As a week's notice
was required for such a motion, 9 July was the earliest possible safe date
for reconvening Parliament.
Students were thus hoist on their own petard. Their exams were only
two weeks away when they started their protest. They could not prepare
for them and bring off a general strike as well. So a boycott of classes
was begun. Strong-arm, stand-over tactics were employed to keep
wavering and doubtful students in line. A determined core of students
kept the mass of students in the dark about strategies and negotiations,
the better to manipulate them. A free debate on the merits or otherwise
of a boycott of classes and exams was not allowed. At UPNG at least,
students were meeting regularly in their public forum at the Student
Union, and less frequently in their provincial groups. But those who
dissented from the militant position were routinely booed, manhandled
and threatened with dire consequences.
Even when a detachment of the Royal Papua New Guinea
502
Yaw Saffu.
Constabulary encamped at the university to offer protection, it was

noticeable that the Library continued to be empty. In private, students
articulated their fear of militant colleagues. Although a referendum was
urged by the Administrations of the two universities at various stages of
the student unrest, none was ever held because the referendum (or its
most probable result) was not deemed acceptable to the student leaders.
The arrest in mid-June of two UPNG student leaders on charges of
destruction of government property helped to strengthen the hands of the
militants.
The students gained support from the influential National Academic
Staff Association (NASA) at UPNG. Ignoring the remarkable tendency in
the past for student unrest to coincide with exam periods, NASA called
for exams to be cancelled and continuous assessment marks to be used to
grade students. However, the students' agenda had widened beyond
parliamentary salaries and exams. By the second week in June, it
included a two-day show of civil disobedience, in the form of a general
stop work to be brought about by transport owners stopping their
services. The students wanted a general demonstration against corruption
in public office and an early general election, the June 1992 date
presumably being too far away.
The Leader of the Opposition and two or three opposition MPs backed
the students' call for Parliament to be dissolved. Wingti urged the
students to "campaign hard to get rid of the government". 10 The president
of the influential Public Employees Association (PEA) also chose to
support the deepening and widening and prolongation of the students'
protest. This was in stark contrast with the PEA's moderate, responsible
stance which had been of enormous help to the embattled government in
1990, at the onset of the austerity measures induced by the closure of the
Panguna copper mine.
It would appear that the PEA's militant position was largely inspired
by its opposition to the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress (TUC),
from which it had recently disaffiliated. Lawrence Titimur, president of
TUC, who had let it be known he was contemplating standing as a
candidate in the 1992 election, had taken a keen interest in the students'
protests. Although sympathetic, he had led the TUC to rhe conclusion
that, in view of the various public commitments to rescind the offending
decision, there were no longer grounds for a continued students' protest.
A Post-Courier editorial condemned the PEA's decision to support the
students' agitation for a "sit at home strike" or a general strike as wrong
headed. 11 But according to the Sydney Morning Herald, the PNG Council
of Churches also backed students calls for a general strike, "to show
people's disrespect for what they describe as 'over-privileged, corrupt
politicians' siphoning resources away from ordinary Papua New
Guineans" .12 The call for a show of civil disobedience was only partly
heeded. While transport owners did not run their buses, probably because
of fear of damage to their vehicles, thousands of people walked rather
than absent themselves from work.
503
On 11 July, two days after it reconvened, Parliament rescinded its

earlier decision on pay rises. The opposition - which now sought a
linkage between revoking the pay rise decision and the abolition of the
post of deputy ministers created in 1990 - walked out of the Chamber
when the vote was taken. Afterwards, the Leader of the Opposition
argued that Parliament had set a terrible precedent by giving in to
pressure: "If we are pressured by the people we should not give in ... if
we make decisions that do not suit the people we represent, they have the
democratic right to get rid of us in the ballot box. There is no point for
us to panic and shift around when a group of people are unhappy with
our decisions. We are so fearful of making hard decisions. I don't know
why we are so scared". 13
Although the offending legislation had been rescinded, and the student
leaders had declared it a famous victory and had ended their boycott of
classes, these had come too late to save the second semester. The
Academic Board of the University of Papua New Guinea had insisted all
along that the first semester should be concluded properly with exams
and that unless those exams could be held by the first week of July, the
second semester was not viable. Consequently, authorities decided on 16
July not to offer the second semester.
The University of Technology at Lae, which had tried a different tack,
pursuing its timetable and holding exams when they were due, as if
everything was normal, had seen their exams boycotted. It was forced to
the same conclusion that the second semester should not be offered
because it would not be viable.
Public opinion seemed, on the whole, to exonerate the students from
their share of blame for the closure of the universities. The government
and the university authorities were accused of heavy-handedness, although
the government had exerted no pressure of any sort in the decision to
close down the universities. However, the students' own "post-mortems"
confirmed what observers had suspected, that attempts by politicians to
use the students for their own purposes had been a significant factor in
the unnecessary prolongation of their boycott of classes.
A UPNG student observed that students had "acted with and were led
by their advisors who had links with the military, police, ex-PNGDF
[Defence Force] personnel and even NIO [National Intelligence Office] ...
In conclusion, the entire student operation was highly complex and wellcoordinated with briefings from the PNGDF personnel, the Police and
NIO sources". 14 At Lae, the Unitech Students Representative Council
president concluded that if politicians had not interfered in the unrest,
students would have returned to classes earlier than 9 July. He claimed
that certain politicians had used student leaders to prolong the boycott. 15
A Commission of Enquiry into the student unrest was promised by the
Prime Minister but it did not materialise. But even if it had sat, such a
Commission, necessarily taking a retrospective look, might have missed
one vital factor, the inordinate political ambitions of a handful of student
leaders.
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Yaw Saf/it
Even though the age of eligibility for a candidate was changed during
the year from 25 to 30 years, it would be interesting to see how many of
the 1991 student leaders stand for elections in 1992 and use the help of
students who stayed back in their villages because they could not enrol
in semester one, 1992. These students had to wait until semester two
because the courses they had taken in semester one, 1991 were the same
as those on offer in semester one, 1992.
Constitutional Amendments
The 1991 sessions of Parliament passed several important amendments to
the PNG constitution. The July and November sessions which followed
the students' agitation, stand out as by far the most productive sessions
of the post-independence legislature, generally as far as its primary
function of law-making is concerned, but especially for its significant
function of amending the constitution.
Eight constitutional amendment bills were passed in the two
sessions, including Constitutional Amendment No 14 - Motions of no
Confidence, to reduce the occurrence and the impact of the debilitating
numbers game. The Act, passed on 18 July 1991, increased from six to
eighteen months the grace period of immunity from votes of noconfidence offered an incoming government. The constant threat of noconfidence votes under which PNG governments have laboured, and
which has accounted for some of the political corruption and the
ineffectiveness of Parliament, is expected to be reduced considerably in
the future.
Constitutional Amendment No. 15 - Elections, Organic Law on
National Elections (Amendment No. 1) Law 1991 and Organic Law on
the Calling of Meetings of the Parliament Amendment No. I, all passed
in the November session, incorporated reforms which had been sought for
several years. These included the abolition of the so-called sectional vote
which, by allowing people who were not on the electoral roll to vote,
upon making a simple declaration that they were eligible to vote,
substantially legalised fraud and multiple voting. The shortening of the
voting period from three to two weeks and the period of horse trading
between the return of the writ and the first session of Parliament from
three to one week, was also expected to contribute enormously to the
reduction of burgeoning political corruption.
The student agitation in all probability helped to concentrate the minds
of the parliamentarians. But an underlying reason for the increased
productivity in Parliament was that the two-thirds majority required
(seventy-three MPs) over a longish period (by PNG political time) of two
sessions of Parliament separated by at least two months, was available in
1991. Paradoxically, the widely criticised Namaliu practice of paying for
parliamentary support with all sorts of patronage - short stints in a
ministerial office; overseas trips; cash from the Prime Minister's
discretionary funds for MP's private purposes - is what made the
505
reforms possible.
A Mini Constitutional Crisis

A constitutional crisis was unleashed at the end of September when the
Governor-General, Sir Serei Eri, refused to dismiss Ted Diro, as he was
required to do under the constitution, when a Leadership Tribunal found
him guilty on eighty-one counts of misconduct as a leader. Instead, Sir
Serei attempted to reinstate him as MP, minister and Deputy Prime
Minister, positions from which he had_ been suspended in April when the
Leadership Tribunal was empanelled to examine the Public Prosecutor's
charges of a breach of the Leadership Code against Ted Diro. Not only
that, it was revealed that the Governor-General had written twice to the
Chief Justice at the beginning of September to pressure him to subvert
the judicial process in Diro's favour. He requested that the charges
against Diro be dropped.
The long-running Diro Affair has featured in virtually every PNG
political chronicle since 1987 when a Commission of Enquiry was set up
into the Timber Industry. The interim and final reports in 1988 and 1989
of the Justice Barnett Commission were the bases of most of the charges
which the Ombudsman Commission referred to the State Prosecutor in
March 1991. In April, the independent State Prosecutor decided to
prosecute Diro on eighty-six charges and approached the Chief Justice
with a request to set up a Leadership Tribunal.
For five months, Diro's lawyers employed every tactic in the book to
delay matters. In August the National court had ordered the members of
the Tribunal to stand down. Ted Diro had claimed there was a "suspicious
association" between its chairman, Mr Justice Amet, and Mr Justice
Barnett who conducted the Forestry Enquiry. Eventually, on 9 September,
Diro announced he would not cooperate with the new tribunal (the one
empanelled in April having been dissolved) because it had decided that
the findings of the Barnett Commission were relevant to its work. On 27
September, the Tribunal convicted Ted Diro on eighty-one of eighty-six
charges and ordered his immediate dismissal from Parliament and a
K3,300 fine.
Under the PNG constitution, the Governor-General has no
independent or reserve powers. He acts strictly on the decisions of
appropriate bodies, such as the National Executive Council, the Speaker
of Parliament, and the Leadership Tribunals. Under the constitution,
section 28(2), the Governor-General had no choice but to dismiss Ted
Diro, in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal. Decisions of
Leadership Tribunals are not subject even to appeals before the Supreme
court.
But Sir Serei decided that Ted Diro should only pay the K3,300 fine
and he would not be dismissed. He refused to sign the dismissal papers.
Instead, he reinstated him to all his positions. He then wrote to the
Chairman of the Tribunal, Mr Justice Ellis, explaining why he rejected
506
YawSaffu
the Tribunal's recommendation. He claimed that to sack Ted Diro "would

cause enormous social and political unrest at a time when the country
needed to be united" . 16
Diro welcomed his reinstatement, saying the Governor-General was "a
man of impeccable integrity and great compassion who acted in the
interest of the nation". 17 He wrote to the Governor-General: "I have
recommenced duties, in accordance with your direction, as Deputy Prime
Minister of PNG, Minister for Public Service and Member for Central
Province" .18
The cabinet warned the Governor-General that he would be sacked
unless he implemented the decision of the Leadership Tribunal; he should
abide by the constitution, or he would be dismissed. An emissary from
the Prime Minister was on his way to see the Queen to inform her of the
cabinet decision to sack the Governor-General when Sir Scrci resigned.
Ted Diro then also resigned immediately.
Although the acting Governor-General signed the instrument
dismissing Diro from office, Ted Diro's earlier resignation as an MP, if it
had been addressed to the right quarter, namely to the Speaker, would
have raised interesting legal questions regarding, for instance, his
eligibility to stand for election in 1992. Leaders dismissed from office
under the Leadership Code are banned from standing for office for three
years. But what if they are convicted but not dismissed?
Atypically, in a political culture that does not put much premium on
loyalty or gratitude, the Governor-General had sacrificed his vice-regal
position for these. Sir Serei, a long-time friend of Diro, had been the
president of Diro's party and Diro's nominee for the governorgeneralship, in opposition to the coalition partners' candidate, Sir Joseph
Nombri. Sir Serei's views on the desirability and necessity for an active,
interventionist Governor-General, even against the constitutional
provisions and the traditions which had been building up in the first
fifteen years of PNG's independent statehood, also contributed to his
demise. The opportunity to contest the forthcoming election might also
have beckoned, as an earlier one had beckoned to the first GovernorGeneral, Sir John Guise, who tried to change his shackled position for
one with real power, half-way through his governor-generalship.
External Relations
The comprehensiveness and intensity of relations between Papua New
Guinea and Australia were illustrated once more in 1991. An Australian
National Audit Office Report severely criticised one aspect of the linchpin
of the relationship: the massive annual Australian budget subsidy grant to
PNG, which in 1991 totalled $A3.7 billion since independence. It decried
the lack of Australian say or supervision over how the money was used
and claimed that, as a result, the grants had made little impact on
improving the quality of life for the majority of Papua New Guineans. 19
An influential Australian government organ, the Joint Parliamentary
507
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, which had been

reviewing the whole spectrum of PNG-Australia relations during much of
1990, visited PNG in February. It obtained from provincial premiers a
critique of the untied aid which was remarkably similar to that contained
in the Australian National Audit Office Report. The premiers reportedly
wanted Australian aid tied, reinforcing a sentiment which appears to be
growing in Australia and which, were it to become official policy, would
further increase the degree of Australian involvement in PNG affairs. Tied
aid on a scale anywhere near the current untied grant will have a much
harder time escaping charges of being an instrument of neo-colonialism.
The kind of bind in which Australia finds itself in this relationship was
nicely illustrated at the opening in May by the Australian Defence
Minister of a K4 million naval wharf in Manus. At the ceremony the
PNG Defence Minister said: "PNG considers Australia a security
guarantee in the event of any major threat. Similarly, Australia considers
PNG to be a strategic outpost and an integral part of the region's stability,
peace and harmony". Then he added: "The father and son relations
however are gone. We are now like two brothers". 20 The sentiment behind
those words needed to confront reality. For instance, the same Ben
Sabumei and his Defence Commander had chafed under restrictions
placed by Australia on the use of helicopters that she had donated.
Australian investment in PNG, valued at "over $Al.2 billion" in March
1991, and at $A 1.6 billion in October, accounts for more than sixty per
cent of foreign investment.
In May, a PNG/Australian Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreement and a revised PNG/Australia Commercial and Trade Relations
Agreement (PACTRA) were presented to Parliament. It was reported that
a PNG/Australian Ministerial Forum was discussing the idea of a free
trade area between the two countries. In September, Prime Minister
Namaliu signed an Agreed Statement on Security Cooperation with Prime
Minister Hawke in Canberra. It provided for Australian financial and
technical aid to the PNG Defence Force to be redirected to law-and-order
agencies such as the police and correctional services. At the same time,
the Australian Minister for Trade welcomed PNG government efforts to
maintain a stable and predictable climate for investors, such as the
renewal of a prospecting authority for Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia
(CRA) Joint Venture at Mt Kare, which coincided with his visit. The
second PNG-Australian Colloquium in September discussed trade,
investment promotion and resource development.
At the end of the year, both aspects of the relationship - dependency
and resentment of it - were to the fore once more. In November,
Australia agreed to fund the establishment and operation of a maritime
surveillance network in the South Pacific for its first five years, from
1992 to 1996, from which PNG was expected to benefit. In the same
month, an Australian SBS television programme revealed that an
Australian electronics eavesdropper installed on the Cape York Peninsula
in Queensland was listening in to PNG communications and monitoring
508
YawSaffu
the Bougainville conflict, without the PNG government being aware.

Relations with another giant neighbour, Indonesia, confronted a
different reality, a widespread scepticism in PNG of the benefits or
positive impacts of establishing road connections. The negative impacts
appear to figure more in popular estimation. Official policy on both sides
of the border since the 1986 Treaty of Friendship, at least, is to promote
contact on a wide range of activities. The Western and Sandaun provincial
governments, bordering Indonesia, took steps to promote such contacts.
A Western provincial government delegation attended independence
celebrations and a trade fair in the southern Irian Jaya district centre of
Merauke in August. Also in August, the Sandaun Premier proposed the
construction of a highway to link Vanimo, the Sandaun capital, with
Jayapura, the West Irian capital. This proposal was greeted with a
uc;:monslration by over 200 members of the Vanimo Cathohc Women's
Association who claimed that social problems brought about by easy road
access to Jayapura would far outweigh any economic development it
would bring. They cited cheap alcohol, alcohol-related problems, and
exploitation of women in Jayapura. Similarly, the push by the Defence
Minister for closer defence cooperation with Indonesia was regarded in
the correspondence columns of the Post-Courier as premature. 21
Papua New Guinea relations with distant but important players in
South Pacific affairs, Japan and the US, and with the potentially
important players, the People's Republic of China and Russia, blossomed
unobtrusively. This contrasted with the acrimony which was beginning to
enter into relations with her closest Melanesian neighbour, the Solomon
Islands, thanks to the Bougainville crisis.
Papua New Guinea protests in July over BRA office and
communication facilities in Honiara and at Gizo, the administrative centre
of the Western Province of the Solomon Islands, were dismissed by the
Solomon Islands government. Instead, the Solomon Islands Opposition
Leader, probably in accordance with what is believed in PNG to be the
dictates of the adversarial nature of the Westminster parliamentary
system, put forward a six-phase plan to bring Bougainville to
independence within five years. If the Solomon Islands government were
ever to feel that there was domestic political mileage in supporting that
kind of proposal, the Bougainville crisis would take on a new and
troublesome dimension for the Papua New Guinea government.
NOTES
Introduction
I.
Jorge de Meneses, Portuguese Captain-designate of the Malukus may
have reached New Guinea in 1526,
sheltering from a storm in what was
probably Geelvink Bay. He called it
"II has dos Papuas", the name derived from "Papuwah", supposed to
be a Malay word describing the frizzy hair of its inhabitants.
2.
Inigo Ortiz de Retes took possession
of the island for the King of Spain in
1545, at the mouth of the Santo Agustin (Mamberamo) river on the northwest coast, naming it "Nueva Guinea" after Guinea in Africa.
3.
There are exceptional areas where
hereditary chiefs are acknowledged
and inherited leadership is common:
for instance, Wogeo Island, Manam
Island, Buka Island, on New Britain's Gazelle Peninsula; and in the
Trobriand Islands as well as Mekeo
and Roro districts in Papua.
4.
For example seeP. Lawrence, 'Introduction', andJ.B. Watson, 'Tairora:
the politics of despotism in a small
society', in R.M. Berndt and P. Lawrence (eds), Politics in New Guinea:
traditional and in the context of
change some anthropological perspectives (Perth, 1971), pp. l-34,
224-75; and D.L. Oliver's classic A
Solomon Island Society: kinship and
5.
6.
1.
8.
leadership among the Siuai of Bougainville (Boston, 1967).

These are Josephine Abaijah (MHA
1972-82), Rose Kekedo, now a leading public servant, and Susan Kanike
who designed the Papua New Guinea flag.
The 1848 claim was on the north
coast from Cape Saprop Maneh
(Bonpland) 14047' east longitude,
along the coast to the Cape of Good
Hope, then around the coast to 141
east, including the unspecified interior. The 1875 claim included a
straight line through the centre of the
island connecting Cape Bonpland
with the !41st meridian on the south
coast. P.W. van der Veur, Search for
New Guinea's Boundaries: from
Torres Strait to the Pacific (Canberra, 1966), pp. 12-13; idem (comp.),
Documents and Correspondence on
New Guinea's Boundaries (Canberra, l966),pp. 4-8; J. Van Baal, K.W.
Galis and R.M. Koentjaraningrat,
West Irian: a bibliography (Dordrecht, 1984), p. 88; J. Ryan, The
Hot Land: focus on New Guinea
(Melbourne, 1970), p. 89.
S. Firth, New Guinea Under the
Gennans(PortMoresby, l986),p.l.
Michael Somare's autobiography
tells of his experiences in a Japanese
school in the Sepik. M. Somare,
510
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Sana: an autobiography (Port Moresby, 1975), pp. 2-5.
C. Moore, "Workers in Colonial
Papua New Guinea: 1884-1975", in
C. Moore, J. Leckie and D. Munro
(eds), Labour in the South Pacific
(Townsville, 1990), pp. 3-46.
I. Grosart, "District Administration",
Encyclopaedia of Papua and New
Guinea, vol. I, pp. 266-9.
Refer to J. Sinclair, Kiap: Australia's
patrol officers in Papua New Guinea, Sydney, 1981, for a detailed account.
N.D. Oram, Colonial Town to Melanesian City: Port Moresby, 18841974 (Canberra, 1967), pp. 48-51.
L.P. Mair, Australia in New Guinea
(Melbourne, 1970)(2nded.),pp. 84-6.
Baluan was a single village, the home
of Manus cult leader Paliau Mal oat.
The Administration hoped to curb,
or at least channel his influence.
Refer to I. Downs, The Australian
Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea,
1945-75 (Canberra, 1980), pp. 63-4.
L.P. Mair and I. Grosart, "Local Govemment", Encyclopaedia of Papua
New Guinea, Vol. 2, pp. 657-63.
R.G. Crocombe, 'Local Government
in New Guinea: an example of conflict between policy and practice',
Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 3,
1968, pp. 131-4.
Mair, Australia in New Guinea, pp.
88-97; D. Stephen, ''TheMataungan
Association", in A History of Political Parties in Papua New Guinea
(Melbourne, 1972), pp. 104-121.
92-3.
Mair and Grosart, "Local Government", pp. 662-3.
A smaller Legislative Assembly existed before 1924.
B. Jinks, New Guinea Government:
an introduction (Sydney, 1971),
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
pp. 73-4.
G. Reid, A Picnic with the Natives:
Aboriginal-European relations in
the Northern Territory to 1910 (Melbourne, 1990); A. Markus, Governing Savages (Sydney, 1990); J. Long,
The Go-Berweens: patrol o.f.!icers in
Aboriginal affairs administration in
the Northern Territory, 1936-1974
(Darwin, 1992).
P. Hasluck, A Time For Building:
Australian administration in Papua
and New Guinea, 1951-1963 (Melbourne, 1976).
S. Bennett, Aborigines and Political
Power (Sydney, 1989), pp. 10-2;
C.D. Rowley, Recovery: the politics
of Aboriginal reform (Ringwood
(Vic.), 1986).
Mair, Australia in New Guinea,
pp. 44-5.
J.D. Waiko, A Short History of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne, 1993),
pp. 108-52; H. Nelson, Papua New
Guinea: black unity or black chaos?
(Ringwood (Vic.) 1974), pp. 126-7;
Hasluck,A Time for Building, p. 374.
Nelson, Papua New Guinea, p. 127.
Downs, The Australian Trusteeship,
pp. 239-42; Ryan, The Hot Land,
pp. 111-3.
44-7.
Ryan, The Hot Land, pp. 115-6, 120.
Nelson, Papua New Guinea, p. 129.
p. 49.
E.P. Wolfers, "Political Parties", Encyclopaedia ofPapua and New Guinea, Vol. 2, p. 937.
Wolfers, "Political Parties", pp. 93545, particularly 935-6.
E.P. Wolfers, "Political Parties", pp.
936-7, and "Simogen Pita", Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
Vol. 2, p. 1039; also referto P. Loveday and E.P. Wolfers, "Voting and
511
Notes
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Parties in the First Two Houses,

1964-1971 ",in P. Loveday andE.P.
Wolfers, Parties and Parliament in
Papua New Guinea, /964-1975: two
studies, Monograph No. 4, Institute
of Applied Social and Economic
Research (Boroko, 1976), pp. 6-16.
Pangu party developed out ofpolitical discussions at the Bully Beef
Club, a group of students at the Administrative College in Port Moresby from 1964. Most sources agree
that Pangu began as a party in 1967,
but Noel Levi says that it began in
1965. A. Maori Kiki, Ten Thousand
Years in a Lifetime: a New Guinea
autobiography (Melbourne, 1968),
pp. 148-60; Somare, Sana, pp. 4551. See also W. Noel Levi, letter to
editor, Pacific Islands Monthly, October 1993, p. 6.
p. 51; Wolfers, "Political Parties",
p. 937.
Wolfers, "Political Parties", p. 937.
J. Griffin, "Papua Besena", World
Review, Vol. 13, No.3, 1975, pp. 316; J. Abaijah and E. Wright, A
Thousand Coloured Dreams (Mount
Waverly (Vic.), 1991).
Stephen, "The Mataungan Association", in History of Political Parties, pp. 104-121.
J. Griffin, "Napidakoe Navitu", in
R.J. May (ed.), Micronationalist
Movements in Papua New Guinea
(Canberra, 1982), pp 113-138.
Refer toM. Hess, Unions Under Economic Development: private sector
unions in Papua New Guinea (Melbourne, 1992), on the background
and problems of trade unionism.
M. Hess, "Controlling the Workforce: the development of industrial
labour in Papua New Guinea", in
Moore, Leckie and Munro (eds),
Labour in the South Pacific, p. 220.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Ibid.
See also Wolfers, "Political Parties",
pp. 938-45.
A. Griffin, "Who Remembers Kondom Agaundo?", Times of Papua
New Guinea, 20 October 1985.
P. Brown, "Agaundo, Kondom",
Australian Dictionary ofBiography,
Vol. 13, p. 15; idem, "Kondom",
Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol. 1, No.2, 1967,
pp. 27-34.
"ToBaining, Vin(l915- )",Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
Vol. 2,p.ll37;Downs, TheAustra[ian Trusteeship, pp. 203, 332, 334,
337-8,435.
T. Dutton, Police Motu: lena Sivarai
(Port Moresby, 1985), p. 166; "John
Guise", Encyclopaedia of Papua
and New Guinea, Vol. I, pp. 506-7.
Hess, Unions Under Economic Development, pp. 79-98.
Ryan, The Hot Land, p. 141.
Downs, The Australian Trusteeship,
p. 243.
I. Hogbin, "Somare, Michael Thomas
( 1936- )", Encyclopaedia of Papua
and New Guinea, Vol. 2, pp. 107980; M. Somare, "Citizenship", Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 48, No.5,
1971, p. 157.
Maori Kiki, Ten Thousand Years in
a Lifetime, pp. 152-60.
Refer to the introduction in volume
one, p. xxviii and I. Hogbin, "Somare,
Michael Thomas (1936-)", Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
Vol. 2, pp. 1079-80; M. So mare,
Sana: an autobiography (Brisbane,
1975).
Entries for Namaliu and Wingti in A.
Turner, Historical Dictionary ofPapua New Guinea (Metuchen (NJ),
1994).
Also refer to C. Moore, "Politics
the Melanesian Way: biographies of
512
56.

Members of the Papua New Guinea
House of Assembly, 1964-1994", in
A. Talu (eel.), The Tarawa Papers:
Proceedings from the Xth Pacific
History Association Conference,
Tarawa, Kiribati (Brisbane, 1994),
pp. 37-489; and idem, ''The Papua
New Guinea General Election of
1992".
Letter from Professor E.P. Wolfers,
19 April 1994.
January-April1967
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
The Hon. C.E Barnes, Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary

Debates, House of Representatives
(CPD, HR), 7 March 1967, p. 378.
His Honour D.O. Hay, quoted in
South Pacific Post (SPP), 9 January
1967.
Ibid.
Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), 30
December 1966.
SMH, 5 January 1967.
SMH, and see also Age, quoted in
SPP, 9 January 1967.
Age, quoted in SPP, 9 January 1967.
Australian, 4 March 1967.
CPD, HR, 7 March 1967, p. 378.
Ibid.
Age, 7 March 1967.
Territory of Papua and New Guinea,
House ofAssembly Debates (HAD),
I, 11, p. 2195.
Age, 4 March 1967.
CPD, HR, 7 March 1967, p. 377.
Ibid.
Ibid.
CPD, HR, 7 March 1967, pp. 377-8,
380; 8 March 1967, p. 456
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
HAD, I, 12, p. 2050.

Ibid., pp. 2299-302.
J.F.G. Downs, in ibid., p. 2131.
Ibid., p. 2061.
Ibid., p. 2314.
Ibid., p. 2131.
ibid., p. 2316.
Ibid., p. 2246.
Editorial, Highlands Farmers and
Settlers Bulletin, January 1967.
HAD, I, 12, p. 2154.
Ibid. p. 2230.
SPP, 6, 8, 10 March 1967.
HAD, I, 12, p. 2167.
Ibid. p. 2231.
SPP, 1 March 1967.
Ibid.
SPP,l7 May 1967.
New Guinea Times Courier (NGTC),
27 May 1967.
NGTC, 8 June 1967.
SPP, 22 May; 14 June 1967, and
NGTC, 27 May 1967.
See e.g. the exchange between
Michael Bui of the Christian Democratic Party, and Thomas ToBunbun,
now of the Pangu pati, SPP, I June
1967.
Nu Gini Toktok, 3 May 1967.
SPP, 3 Aprill967.
SPP, 20 March 1967.
SPP, 3 Aprill967.
Detailed Explanation ofSupplementary Submission Placed Before the
Select Committee on Constirutional
and Political Development (roneoed), (hereinafter termed Document
3 ), n.d., p. 1.
C. Abel and A. Maori Kiki, Summary of Supplementary Submission
to Select Committee on Constitutiona{ and Political Development,
January 1967, p 5.
Document 3, pp. 7-8.
SPP, 20 March 1967.
Ibid.
Frank Martin, Wewak, in a letter to
513
Notes
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
theSPP, 29 March 1967.

Paul Munro, in a letter to the SPP,
22 March 1967.
SPP, 14 June, and party advertisement in the SPP, 16 June 1967.
Territory of Papua and New Guinea
(TPNG), Arbitration (Public Service) Ordinance I952-I965, Decision of L.G. Matthews, Esq., May,
1967, passim.
Public Service Association ofTPNG,
The Case for Review of Decision on
Local Officers' Salaries (roneoed),
n.d., p 3.
SPP, 5 June 1967.
See footnote 58 above.
House of Assembly ofTPNG, Standing Committee on Public Accounts,
Eighth Report: The Housing Division, Department of Treasury, 24
May 1967,passim.
SMH, 15 Aprill967.
SPP, 12 June 1967.
TPNG, House of Assembly, Final
Reportfrom the Select Committee on
Constitutional Development together
with Minutes of Proceedings, Port
Moresby, June 1967, p 10.
Ibid., p 3.
Ibid.
Ibid., p 4.
Ibid.
Ibid., p 9.
Ibid.
May-August 1967
l.
2.
The author thanks the staff of the

House of Assembly for access to the
early proofs of Hansard for the
fourteenth meeting, and the Director
of the United Nations Information
Centre, Sydney, for making the
necessary records available.
Percy Chatterton, MHA, in Pacific
Islands Monthly (PIM), 38, 7, (July
1967), p. 59.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30
31.
32.
33.
The House of Assembly of TPNG,

Standing Committee on Public
Accounts, Seventh Report: The
Department of Public Health, 24
May 1967.
SMH, 15 April 1967.
The House of Assembly of TPNG
Standing Committee on Public
Accounts, Eighth Report: The Housing Division, Department of Treasury, 24 May, 1967, p. 37.
HAD, I, 13, p. 2351.
HAD, I, 14.
TPNG, Economic Development of
Papua and New Guinea, 1 June
1967.
HAD, l, 13, p. 2443.
Percy Chatterton, MHA in PIM, 38,
7 (July 1967), p. 59.
HAD, I, 13, p. 2345.
SPP, 30 August, 1967.
HAD, I, 13, p. 2384.
HAD, l, 14.
HAD, l, 13, p. 2397.
Australian, 19 June 1967.
Canberra Times, 23 June 1967.
Ibid.
Canberra Times, 23 June 1967.
The Platform of the United Christian
Democratic Party (roneoed), n.d.
Australian, 7 July 1967.
SPP, 3 July 1967.
PANGU Newsheet No 3 (roneoed),
n.d., p. 1, and NGTC, 17 August
1967.
A.M. Kiki, et al., A Message to All
Supporters of Home Rule (roneoed),
n.d., p.l.
SPP, 19 July 1967.
NGTC, 20 July 1967.
SPP, 28 August 1967.
J. Leahy, in NGTC, 3 August 1967.
Pati Belong Ol: All Peoples' Party
514
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

(roneoed), n.d., p. 2.
HAD, I, 13, p. 2366.
Age, 19 August 1967.
Territory Country Party (roneoed),
n.d.
Page references are nor given in this
section as the relevant information
was taken from the provisional
records, and non-official press
summaries, of the Council's debates.
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
HAD, I, 10, p. 1709.

Peter Hastings in Australian, 14 September 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 2853.
HAD, I, 14, p. 2525.
Peter Hastings in Australian, 14 September 1967.
HAD, I, 14, p. 2519.
These figures are derived from
"Attachment 2: Expenditure Proposed 1967-8 Compared with Expenditure 1966-7, Functional Distribution ... l.B.R.D. Classification",
HAD, I, 14.
Includes expenditure on departments
of: Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries;
Forestry; Lands, Surveys and Mines;
Trade and Industry.
Includes expenditure on roads,
bridges, ports, coastal shipping,
aerodromes, electric power, posts
and telegraphs, etc.
Includes expenditure on education,
health, housing, water supply, sewerage, cultural and recreational facilities, labour.
Includes expenditure on law, order
and public safety, the legislature and
general administrative services.
By L.W. Johnson, HAD, I, 14, p.
2793.
HAD, I, 14, p. 2525.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Ibid., p. 2664.
Ibid., p. 2521.
Ibid., p. 2695.
Ibid., p. 2727.
Ibid., p. 2795.
Ibid., p. 2796.
Ibid., p. 2505.
W.W. Watkins, ibid., p. 2544.
Ibid., p. 2574.
Ibid., p. 2577.
Ibid., p 2578.
SPP, 6 October 1967.
SPP, 18 December 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 3000.
Letter to the editor, SPP, 29 November 1967.
SPP, 15 September; NGTC, 21
September 1967.
SPP, 2 September 1967; NGTC, 7
September 1967.
SPP, II October 1967.
NGTC, 7 September 1967; SPP, 8
September 1967.
SPP, 20, 25 October 1967; HAD, I,
15, p. 2979 et seq.
SPP, 20 November 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 2894.
HAD, I, 15, p. 2963.
SPP, 13 September 1967, and HAD,
1, 15, p. 2856.
J. Guise, Parliamentary Mission's
Visit to Malaysia to Examine Land
Resettlement Schemes - Minority
Report (roneoed), 18 October 1967.
HAD, I, 15, p. 2966.
January-Aprill%8
1.
2.
3.
4.

Canberra Observer, in SPP, 17 January 1968.
Alan Ramsey in Australian, 24 February 1968.
515
Notes
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
CPD, HR, 1968p 9.

Australian, 28 February 1968.
Ibid.
Canberra Times, 30 January 1968.
Australian, 29 January 1968.
Ibid.
Peter Hastings in ibid.
Courier-Mail, 30 January 1968.
CPD, HR, 1968, p. 9.
CPD, HR, 1968, pp. 215-6.
CPD, HR, 1968, pp. 431-4.
CPD, HR, 1968, p. 354.
SPP, 22 Aprill968.
Age, 19 April 1968.
Information about the candidates
was obtained from the chief electoral
office, and SPP, 10, 26 January
1968.
NGTC, 6 January 1968.
Policy Statement of the UDP for
1968 House of Assembly Elections
(roneoed), n.d., p. 2.
Soso Suvi et al., Olsem Wonem Long
Pati I Taim Bilong Gerapim Nau
Nogat?, n.d.
Department of Information and
Extension Services, This Week in the
House of Assembly, Number 2, 18
June, 1968, p. 5.
Information about the new members
is derived from Department of
Information and Extension Services,
The Members ofthe House ofAssembly 1968.
e.g., Australian, 18 March 1968, and
SMH, 18 March, 16 Aprill968.
NGTC, 18 January, 10 February
1968.
SPP, 24 January 1968, and Canberra Times, 27 January 1968.
SPP, 2 February 1968.
NGTC, 3 February 1968.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
SPP, 22 Aprill968.
Australian, 18 Aprill968.
Age, 5 February 1968.
Australian, II April 1968.
Peter Hastings, in Australian, 12
Aprill968.
SPP, 6 March 1968.
SPP, 15 April1968.
NGTC, 20 January 1968; SPP, 24
January 1968.
SPP, 8 April1968.
NGTC, 16 February 1968.
SPP, 5 Aprill968.
SPP, 17 April1968.
May-August 1968
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
HAD, I, 13, pp. 2409-10.

CPD, HR, Twenty-sixth session,
1968, p. 1059.
Ibid., p. 1058.
Age, 25 June 1968.
CPD, HR, p. 1058.
PIM, 39, 7 (July 1968), p. 16.
Age, 6 June 1968.
CPD, HR, p. 1056.
Ibid., p. 1057.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 1056.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 1058.
Ibid., p. 1057.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 1059.
SPP, 28 June 1968.
CPD, HR, p. 1057.
HAD, Second House, first meeting
of the first session. (Vol. I, No I
(hereinafter cited as HAD, II, 1)),
516
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

p. 171.
CPD, HR, p. 1059.
SPP, 10 May 1968.
PIM, 39, 6, (June 1968), p. 22.
CPD, HR, p. 1343.
Canberra Times, 28 May 1968.
Ibid., 29 May 1968.
SPP, 31 May 1968.
D. Barrett, ''The new Ministers may
only be stooges for the Government", and "Too Many Barriers
Placed on the New Ministers", SPP,
27 May. 3 June 1968.
SPP, 29 May 1968.
Ibid., 20 M!J.y, 14 June 1968.
CPD, HR, p. 1704.
SMH, 25 June 1968.
Ibid., 5 June 1968.
Daily Telegraph, 5 June 1968.
Ordinance No 53 of 1965, amending
the Public Service (Papua and New
Guinea) Ordinance 1963.
SPP, 13 May 1968.
I. Downs, "The new Assembly will
be 'enlivened by the radicals'", PIM,
39, 4 (April 1968), p. 25.
PIM, 39,7 (July 1968), p. 25.
HAD, 2, I, 1, p. 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. 2, I, 1, p 8.
Ibid.
S. Inder, "Apprehension as P-NG
Launches Active New Strain of
Party Politics", PIM, 39, 7 (July
1968), p. 24.
HAD, II, I, 1, p. 5.
Ibid. II, I, 1, pp. 16-17.
Ibid. II, I, 1, p. 150.
Ibid. Ii, i, I, p. 18.
Ibid. II, I, I, p. 99.
Inder, "Apprehension as P-NG
Launches Active New Strain of
Party Politics", p. 24.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
HAD, II, I, 1, pp. 37-38.

Ibid., II, I, 1. p. 177.
Ibid., II, I, 1, p. 20.
Ibid., II, I, 1, p. 22.
Ibid., II, I, 1, p.41.
Ibid., II, I, l, pp. 156-9.
D. Hogg, "Pangu Men Win Enemies
and Lose Friends", Australian, 17
June 1968.
Ibid.
PIM, 39, 10 (October 1968), p. 23.
D. White, "Aft~r the Elections in
New Guinea: Who is to Decide?",
SMH, 12 July 1968.
HAD, II, I, I, pp. 69-71.
Ibid. II, I, 1, p. 180.
Ibid. II, I, I, p. 93.
The Parliamentary Commissions of
Inquiry Ordinance 1967, ibid. I, I,
p. 82.
The Public Service (Papua and New
Guinea) Ordinance (No 2) 1967,
ibid. 2, I (l), p. 132.
SPP, 12 June 1968.
Ibid., 14 June 196'8.
Age, 14 June 1968.
Geoffrey Tebbutt, "Pity the Poor
NewMinisters",SPP,l7 June 1968.
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
PIM, 39, lO (October 1968), p. 22.

These figures are derived from
"Appendix 7: Expenditure Proposed
1968/69 Compared with Expenditure 1967/68- I.B.R.D. Classification", HAD, 2, I, 2.
Includes expenditure on departments
of: Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries;
Forestry; Lands, Surveys and Mines;
Trade and Industry.
Inciudes expenditure on roads,
bridges, ports, coastal shipping,
aerodromes, electric power, posts
and telegraphs, etc.
Includes expenditure on education,
517
Notes
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
health, housing, water supply, sewerage, cultural and recreational facilities, labour.
Includes expenditure on law, order
and public safety, the legislature and
general administrative services.
Includes transport, the government
printer, and stores.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 217.
Ibid., p. 212.
Ibid., p. 217.
Ibid., p. 213.
Ibid., p. 216.
Ibid., p. 217.
Ibid., p. 242.
Ibid., pp. 458-9.
SPP, 20 September 1968.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 494.
Ibid., p. 253.
Ibid., p 378.
Ibid., p. 502.
Ibid, p. 427.
PlM, 39, 10 (October 1968), p. 22.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 401.
Ibid., p. 243.
Ibid., pp. 245-6.
PlM, 39, 10, (October 1968), p. 22.
TPNG, Programmes and Policies
for the Development of Papua and
New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1968.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 315.
R. Crocombe, "That Five Year
Plan", New Guinea, 3, 4 (December
1968-January 1969): pp. 57-70.
SPP, 8 November 1968. The advertisement appeared, e.g., in NGTC,
5 October 1968.
Henderson, HAD, II, I, 2, p. 286.
Ibid., p. 293.
Ibid., pp. 353-5, and SPP, 9 September 1968.
Gire Gire- Ralum Lands Bill 1968,
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 210.
SPP, 4, 9 September 1968.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 523.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
W.W. Watkins, ibid., p. 522.

Ibid., p. 517.
Ibid., p. 51 I.
Ibid., p. 201.
Ibid., p. 380.
Ibid., p. 384.
Ibid., pp. 527-8.
Ibid., p. 456.
Hon. C.E. Barnes, MP, "Papua and
New Guinea - Aims and Aspirations", The Years Ahead (Canberra,
1965), p. 15.
SPP, 11 September 1968. For an
account of the background to the
Bougainville move see R.G. Crocombe, "Bougainville!", New Guinea, 3, 3 (September-October 1968):
pp. 39-47, and H. Nelson, "Bougainville Breakaway", Nation, 12 October 1968, pp. 8-10.
Australian, 14 September 1968.
The principal public defence of the
twenty-five signatories of the referendum request to date is Leo Hannett's speech in this debate, scheduled for publication in New Guinea,
4, 1 (March-April 1969).
D. Barrett, "Solomons People 'cool'
on Union", SPP, 20 September
1968.
SPP., 16, 23 October 1968.
HAD, II, 3, p. 650 (as from the
November meeting of the house,
Hansard has been regarded as
having entered its second volume,
back-dated to the first meeting of the
second house. Future notations in
this chronicle have been changed
accordingly).
SPP, I November 1968.
NGTC, 24 October 1968, and SPP,
8 November 1968.
D. Barrett, "Is New Secession Move
Inspired by Europeans?", SPP., 21
October 1968.
518
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
.4 Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle

SPP., 18 October 1968.
SPP., 21 October 1968.
e.g. Age, 190ctober 1968,andAustralian, 21 October 1968.
Age, 16 November 1968.
NGTC, 23 November 1968.
Editorial "Can Democracy Prevail in
a Multi-Racial Society?", New
Guinea Highlands Bulletin, 9, 4
(October 1968), p. 7.
T. Hodgkin, African Political Parties
(Harmondsworth, 1961), p. 68.
SPP, 25, 27 Novemher 19tiR, and
NGTC, 28 November 1968.
SPP, 2, 4, 7 October 1968.
Ninkama Bomai (MHA Gumine),
HAD, II, 3, p. 720
SPP, 13 September I968.
e.g. D. White, "Wage Freeze Plea
Made to Papuans",Age, I7 September I968; "Austerity for N.G. Foreseen'", West Australian, I7 September I968: and D. Hogg, "Wage
Freeze May be Needed for $IOOO m.
Plan", Australian, I7 September
1968.
HAD, II, I, 2, p. 441.
Ibid., p. 442.
Ibid., p 441.
HAD, II, I, 3, pp. 599-600.
Ibid., pp. 706-10.
SPP, 15, 18 November I968.
Editorial, "Canberra's Iron Hand",
SPP, I3 November I968.
SPP 20 November I968.
SPP 22 November I968.
HAD, II, 3, pp. 638-9.
SPP, 13 November I968.
SPP., 20 December I968.
SPP., 3 January I969.
HAD, II, 3, p. 6I6.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
Ibid., pp. 618-9.

Ibid., p. 702.
Ibid., pp. 565-77.
Ibid., p. 671.
Ibid., p. 806.
"Party Without a Platform Makes
Itself Felt", PIM, 40, l (January
1969), pp. 23-4.
Beilby, "Independents May Form
Party Soon", and "A Subdued Pangu
Tries Hard to End its Loser Image',
HAD, II, 3 pp. 603-04.
Ibid., p. 823.
January-Aprill%9
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
IO.
II.
I2.
I3.
14.
IS.
I6.
I7.
I8.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
HAD, II, 4, p. 847.

Ibid., p. 849.
Ibid., p. 848.
Ibid., p. 851.
Ibid., p. 857.
Ibid., p. 858.
Ibid., p. 859.
Ibid., p. 965.
Ibid., p. 9I4.
Ibid., p. 943.
See Australian, 2 January I969.
HAD, II, 4, p. 992.
Ibid., p. I007-8.
Ibid., p. 995 et seq.
Ibid., p. 999.
Ibid., p. l 000.
Ibid., p. IOOI.
Ibid., p. 994.
Ibid., p. 932.
SPP, 7 March I969.
SPP, 10 March I969.
HAD, II, 4, p. 935.
Ibid., p. 846.
Ibid., p. 955.
Department of Information & Extension Services (DIES) Press Release,
8 January 1969.
HAD, II, 4, p. I041.
Ibid, p. I 051.
Ibid., p. I055.
519
Notes
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Ibid., p. 1060.
See SPP, 30 Aprill969.
Taken from a printed statement
released on 29 Aprill969.
See PNG Bureau of Statistics Bulletin No. 20.
Age, lOJanuary 1969.
HAD, II, 4, p. 986.
SPP, 26 March 1969.
SPP, 28 March 1969.
Western Australian, 10 April 1969.
Australian, 10 April 1969.
Australian, 19 April 1969.
Australian, 15 Apri11969.
SPP, 14 April1969.
SMH, 16 Apri11969.
SMH, 26 February 1969.
Australian Financial Review, 10
February 1969.
Sun Herald, 27 April 1969.
Australian Financial Review 11
February 1969.
See e.g., Australian, 16 Apri11969.
DIES Press Release 28.
See Report.
May-August 1969
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
SPP, 5 May 1969.

SPP, 9 May 1969.
SPP, 12 May 1969.
HAD, II, 5, p. 1262.
Ibid., p. 1263.
Ibid., p. 1268.
PC, 28 July 1969. A week later this
was reduced to about 200 acres
which the Administration would
lease not buy outright. See the
Advertiser (Adelaide), I August
1969.
PC, 1 August 1969.
PC, 11 August 1969.
PC, 18 August 1969.
Australian, 21 August 1969.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
NGTC, 2 May 1969.

HAD, II, 5, p. 1123.
See Voutas, PC, 29 August 1969.
PC, 29 August 1969.
PC, 4 September 1969.
SPP, 19 May 1969.
HAD, II, 5, p. 1183.
SPP, 16 May 1969.
HAD, II, 5, p. 1340.
PC, 8 July 1969.
PC, 23 July 1969.
PC 11 August 1969.
Article by Don Barrett in PC, 7 July
1969.
SMH, 10July 1969.
Australian, 15 May 1969.
HAD, II, 5, p. 1301.
SPP, 19 May 1969.
C.L. Beltz, "High Level Manpower
in Papua and New Guinea". See
HAD, p. 1346 and p. 1376 et. seq.
See HAD, II, 5, p. 1346 and p. 1376
et seq.
HAD, II, 5, p. 1395.
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
HAD, II, 6, p. 1645-6.

See Transcript of Proceedings "In
the Matter of a Commission of
Inquiry into Local Government in
the Gazelle Peninsula and other
Matters", p. 291.
Ibid., pp. 164-168.
Ibid., p. 165.
Ibid., pp. 165-166.
Ibid., p. 452.
Ibid., p. 454.
HAD, II, 7, p. 2025.
Ibid., p. 2026.
Ibid., p. 2030.
PC, 29 October 1969, article by Don
Barrett.
HAD, II, 7, p. 2031.
Canberra Times, 4 December 1969.
Judgement in the District Court at
520
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Rabaul, 4 November 1969, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 25.
Ibid.
Report of a Commission of Inquiry
into Local Government and Other
Matters in the Gazelle Peninsula of
East New Britain, 29 September to
17 October 1969.
PC, 8 December 1969.
See Political Chronicle May-August
1969.
PC, 2 October 1969.
Pmft:~~UI C.D. Rowley'~ inaugural
address, "Australian Bureaucracy
and Niuginian Politics", University
of Papua and New Guinea, 1969.
PC, 20 October 1969.
HAD, II, 7, p. 2051.
Ibid., pp. 1881, 1985.
21.
22.
23.
1n"7n
17 IV.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
PC, 5 January 1970.

PC, 23 January 1970.
For details see Political Chronicle
September-December, 1969.
PC, 4 January 1970.
Announced on 8 January 1970.
James Hall, PC, 22 January 1970.
PC, 3 February 1970.
Press Release 385B, 14 Aprill970.
Press Release 146B, 20 February
1969.
PC, 11 March 1970.
New Guinea, 4, 4.
PC, 8 January 1970.
Ibid.
Sunday Observer, 29 March 1970.
Report of Advisory Committee on
Education, p. 75 (Weeden Report).
Ibid., p. 40.
PC, lO April 1970.
PC, 1 April 1970.
PC, 18 March 1970.

HAD, II, 6, p. 1511.
Press Release, 5 May 1970.
Press Release, 7 May 1970.
May-August 1970
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
January-April1970
1.
2.
3.
Cecil Abel was a member of staff

and Albert Maori Kiki and Michael
Somare were students at the college.
See answer to Question No. 168,
CPD, HR, 5 May 1970.
ABC Press Release, 14 January
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryAprill970.

Australian, 16 May 1970.
PC, 24, 31 July 1970.
PC, 5 August 1970.
PC, 11 May 1970.
Australian, 30 May 1970; PC, 1 June
1970; see also John Ryan in PIM,
July 1970.
From UPNG student magazine
"Nilaidat", 30 July 1970.
PC, 22 July 1970.
PC, 17 and 23 July 1970.
PC, 24 July 1970.
PC, 3 August 1970.
PC, 7 August 1970.
PC, 31 July, 13 August 1970.
M.W. Ward (ed.), The Politics of
Melanesia: papers delivered at the
fourth Waigani Seminar 9-15 May
1970 (Canberra/Waigani, 1970).
Advertiser(Adelaide), IOJune 1970.
Quotations from Smith's and Nwokolo's Waigani Seminar papers.
Reprinted in "Steps towards selfgovernment in Papua-New Guinea",
Canberra 1970.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See Ian Hicks in SMH, 13 August
1970.
Personal recollection of news items
521
Notes
22.
23.
24.
on ABC Port Moresby.

PC, 27 August 1970.
Personal knowledge. Not reported in
press.
PC, 28 August 1970.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
HAD, II, 11, p. 3056.

Political Chronicle May-August
1970.
HAD, II, 11, p. 3389.
HAD, II, 1, p. 3457.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
January-April1971
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
R.F. Salisbury, Vunamani (Melbourne, 1970) p. 261.

M.W. Ward (ed.), The Politics of
Melanesia, p. 81.
PC, 17 March 1971.
Details from Companies Registry,
Port Moresby.
PC, 28 Aprill971.
Focus, 1, 1 (April1971).
Pangu Pati Nius, March 1971.
PC, 1 March I 971.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
HAD, II, 4 June 1971, p. 4263.

PC, 5 July 1971.
PC, 23 July 1971.
PNG Press Release B 1139, 20 August 1971.
PC, 2 July 1971.
PC, 11 August 1971.
PNG Press ReleaseB1615, 20 August 1971.
PC, 4 June 1971.
Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of
New Guinea, 6 May 1971.
PC, 18 June 1971.
TPNG Press Release 8797, 5 May
1971.
Transcript of Press Conference with
Administrator and AEC Secretariat,
24 May 1971.
1971.
PC, I 1 August 1971.
Ian Hicks in SMH, 24 August 1971.
PC, 17 May 1971.
See a report on the cult by some
University of Papua New Guinea
students and staff: L. Hwekmarin,
"The Yangoru Cargo Cult 1971 ",
UPNG, Roneoed.
Evil under the Sun.
See D.S. Grove; "Land Use and
Land Tenure - The New Legislation", Fifth Waigani Seminar Paper,
May 1971.
PC, 26 August 1971.
Ibid.
May-August 1971
I.
2.
3.
4.
TPNG Press Release A907, 20 May

1971.
HAD, II, 31 May 1971, p. 4159.
PC, 4 June 1971.
HAD, II, 1 June 1971, p. 4168.
I.
2.
3.
HAD, II, 20, 19 November 1971, p.

5309.
HAD, II, 15, 31 August 1971, p.
4532.
HAD, II, 17,21 September 1971, p.
4793.
522
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ibid., p. 4816.
See Political Chronicle May-August,
1971.
HAD, II, 16, 7 September 1971, p.
4694.
Ibid., p. 4691.
PC, 9 September, 1971.
1971, and SMH, 25 October 1971.
HAD, II, 20, 15 November 1971, p.
5207.
Ian Hicks, SMH, 31 August, 27
September, 23 November 1971.
HAD, II, 1, 4 June 1968.
See P. Hastings (ed.), Papua New
Guinea: Prospera's Other Island
(Sydney, 1971).
Ibid.
See Matiabe Yuwi, HAD, II, 17, 21
September 1971, p. 4797.
"Report to the Administrator of
Papua New Guinea by Professor
R.F. Salisbury, McGill University,
on the problems of the Gazelle
Peninsula", 30 August 1971, (Port
Moresby: Government Printer).
HAD, II, 18, p. 4986.
PNG Press Release B 2058, 12
October I 971.
Ibid., B 1760 6 September 1971.
Ibid., B 1883 20 September 1971.
Ibid., B 1994,4 October 1971.
See Ian Hicks in SMH, 4 October
1971.
SMH, II September 1971.
Criticisms of the police have not
only come from expatriates; for a
Papuans' view, see Ebia Olewale's
Fifth Waigani Seminar Paper, May
1971.
PC, 28, 30 December 197 I.
See "Report to the Administrator by
the Electoral Boundaries Distribution Committee", 30 August 1971,
(Port Moresby: Government Printer), for the guidelines and criteria for
determining boundaries.
January-April1972
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

1971.
PC, 24 January I 972.
For comparison with the results of
the I 968 elections see E.P. Wolfers,
"The Elections I & II", New Guinea
3, 3-4, (1968 & 1969). For an analysis of the I 968 elections, see A.L.
Epstein, R. S. Parker, and Marie
Reay (eds), The Politics oflndependence (Canberra, 1971).
PC, 17 March 1972.
PC, 27 April 1972.
PNG Press Release A0948, 7 April
1972.
Ibid.
Cited in Age, I April I 972.
PC, 29 February 1972. In March the
price of copra was$ I 18 per ton compared with, $200 twelve months previously.
PC, 24 April 1972.
Vern Harvey, "Notes on the Papua
New Guinea Economy May 1972",
UPNG.
See Christopher Ashton in National
Times, 24-29 April I 972.
May-August 1972
1.
2.
3.
4.
For a fascinating account of locallevel politics and a description of the

1968 election campaign see Epstein,
Parker and Reay, (eds), The Politics
of Dependence, ch. 6.
SMH, 13 May 1972.
HAD, Ill, 4, pp. 320, 331-343.
ABC: Transcript of "Monday Conference-43", 8May 1972. Two of the
four Bougainville MHAs are Minis-
523
Notes
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
ters- Paul Lapun (Mines), Donatus

Mola (Business Development) and
the third, Fr John Momis, is Chairman of Committees of the House and
Deputy Chairman of the Constitutiona! Planning Committee.
Ian Hicks in SMH, 13 July 1972.
See ibid. and James O'Brien, PC, 2
July 1972.
PNG Press Release B2070, 27 July
1972.
See Peter Hastings, "New Guinea's
Luckless Heirs", SMH, 15 May
1972.
1970.
See Crocombe, Arndt, Fisk and
others in New Guinea, 3,4 and 4, 23 (1968-69). SeealsoP.W.E. Curtin,
in M.W. Ward, ed., The Politics of
Melanesia.
"The Development Programme
Reviewed", (Port Moresby, August
1971).
Tabled in the House of Assembly, 20
June 1972.
HAD, III, 5, pp. 421,437.
PNG Press Release B1701, 15 June
1972.
For a brief discussion of present
defence arrangements seeR. 0' Neill
in Australian Outlook, 26,2 (August
1972).
PC, 3, 4, 8 May 1972.
Courier-Mail, 25 May 1972.
Australian, 5 July 1972.
PC, 18 August 1972.
SMH, 19 August 1972.
Ibid., 15 June 1972.
SMH, 26 June 1972. See James
Griffin (ed.),A Foreign Policy for an
Independent Papua New Guinea,
(Sydney, 1974).
HAD, III, 5, p. 461.
HAD, III, 2, p. 133.
26.
27.
For a brief summary of this session

see Chris Ashton, the National
Times, 3-8 July 1972.
1971. For a summary of the trial and
some of its implications see J.L.
Goldring in Australian Quarterly,
44, 3 (September 1972).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
HAD, II, 3, 22 June 1972, p. 280.

PNG Press Release B3186, 10 November 1972.
HAD, III, 7, 19 September 1972, p.
709.
587.
Ibid, p. 574.
Ibid.
687.
HAD, III, 8, 26 September, 1972, p.
869.
PC, 27 September 1972 wrote of
Michael Somare's "plan to sack
4,000 expatriate public servants".
See also PNG Press Release B2868,
16 October, for an address by the
Chief Minister to the Senior Executive Programme.
For a summary of the recommendations, see: "Acceptance by the
Australian and Papua New Guinea
governments of the Simpson Report",
(Port Moresby: Government Printer,
1972).
HAD, III, 5, 29 August 1972, p. 438.
915.
Ibid., p. 886.
See Christopher Ashton, Financial
Review, 16 November 1972.
HAD, III, 10, 23 November 1972, p.
1246.
Ian Hicks, Age, 23 September 1972.
'=""
J""'1"
18.
19.
20.
21.
A Papua New Guinea Politicai Chronicle

PNG Press Release A3591, 15 December 1972.
1011; and III, 11, 27 November
1972, p. 1324.
PC, 9 November ! 972.
PC, 14 November 1972.
January-April 1973
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
Speech by the Prime Minister, Papua

Hotel, Port Moresby, 18 February
1973. PNG Press Release A0465,
18 February 1973.
Minister for External Territories,
Hon. W.L. Morrison, "Development in Papua New Guinea- Australia' s Role up to Independence and
Beyond", Seventh Waigani Seminar,
29 April 1973.
See footnote I.
PC, 5 January 1973.
PC, 9 January 1973.
Ibid.
E.g at Wahgi, PC, 15 January 1973.
Age, 11 January 1973.
PNG Press Release A0148, 17
January 1973 and Age, 18 January
1973.
Australian, 7 February I 973.
Cited in Age, 19 February 1973.
SMH, 20 February 1973.
HAD, II, l, 8 March 1973.
Government backbenchers at one
stage threatened to walk out, until a
hastily convened coalition meeting
dissuaded them.
See HAD, III, 12, I March, where a
Highlands politician, Traimya Kambipi (Kompiam-Baiyer) claimed that
the government in their pursuit of
independence, would lead the majority of Papua New Guineans into "a
deep, fiery hole" (p. 1467). "Patrol
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Officers and overseas officers have

done an excellent job in my electorate, but when it was decided that we
should have self-government, they
became uncertain. The patrol officers did not work as hard as they
used to. They became uncertain,
fights broke out all over my electorate and many schools are locked
up ... roads are now closed because
of the advance towards self-government'' (p. 1464).
Indudes public service, higher
education, mining legislation, the
Development Bank, the Investment
Corporation, and probably banking
and civil aviation.
Includes powers which still require
considerable negotiation such as
currency, membership of internationa! organisations, and taxation
agreements.
Includes defence, foreign relations,
international trade, border arrangements and aspects of internal security.
Australia, Papua New Guinea Act
1949-72, Determination Under
Section 24, 30 April 1973. W.L.
Morrison, Minister for External
Territories. See also Age, I May
1973.
See Political Chronicle SeptemberDecember 1972.
PC, 30 March 1973. The boycott
attracted considerable publicity. The
writer of an article in the Financial
Review (2 April 1973) was warned
by the academic consultants of
possible legal action against him.
Professor J.W. Davidson (Pacific
History, Australian National University)- a permanent consultant, died
on 8 Aprill973.
PNG Press Release 1047, 30 April
1973.
He is to become High Commissioner
after self-government.
525
Notes
28.
29.
30.
3l.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
4l.
PNG Press Release B I 047, 30 April

1973.
PNG Press Release B 1050, 30 April
1973.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ian Hicks, SMH, 2 May 1973, suggests that the Australian government
would welcome the collapse of the
advisers' influence on the Committee and perhaps of the Committee
itself.
Hicks also suggests that Morrison
had good reason to force the pace in
view of the inability of the coalition
"to arrive at quick, clear decisions".
Ibid.
HAD, III, 12, 27 February 1973, p.
1411. "A Report on Development
Strategies for Papua New Guinea".
Prepared by a Mission from the
Overseas Development Group (University of East Anglia) for the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, February
1973. Another report by the Economist Intelligence Unit: "A Study of
the Less Developed Areas of Papua
New Guinea" ordered by the former
Minister C.E. Barnes in 1971, was
also presented to the House.
HAD, III, 12, 27 February 1973.
PNG Press Release B0698, 19 March
1973.
PNG Press Releases B0898 and
B0905, 9-10 April 1973.
Separated in January 1971.
The Cabinet also established a SubCommittee on National Planning to
which the coalition leaders and three
public servants - Dr Gabriel Gris,
John Natera and Makere Morautawere named.
PC, 8 January 1973. A Goroka clan
collected money for compensation. A Highlands Liberation Front
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
5l.
spokesman commented that the

same fate would have been met by
either coastals or Highlanders.
PC, 3-15 January 1973.
PC, 5, 8, 12 March 1973.
PC, 15 March 1973.
SeePeterPappas,PC,l3,14March
1973.
HAD, 8, 9 March 1973, 30 March
1973.
For an excellent political interpretation see Bill Standish: "Warfare,
Leadership and Law in the Highlands", Seventh Waigani Seminar,
UPNG, April 1973.
For example, older people in the
Menyamya area are undergoing
nose-piercing and initiation ceremonies which they had previously
discounted.
HAD, 12 March 1973.
For thoughtful summaries of the first
year of the Coalition government see
Ian Hicks, SMH, 13 March 1973 and
Chris Ashton, National Times, 30
April-S May 1973. For a "hoary
bureaucrat's" comments see D.M.
Fenbury in PC, 27, 28 March 1973.
May-August 1973
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
For an eyewitness account see Bill

Standish, National Times, 30 July-4
August 1973.
Josephine Abaijah used this expression herself while campaigning for
votes in the 1972 elections.
PC, 30 July 1973.
PC, 24 August 1973.
For a summary see PC, 26 July 1973.
PNGPressReleaseA1976,16August
1973, 17 August 1973.
A SMH editorial critically analysed
the proposals, 20 August 1973.
PC, 5, 7, 13 June 1973.
E.g. Ebia Olewale, Minister for
526
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Education, HAD, III, 15, 21 June
1973.
PNG Press Release B 1977, 16 August
1973.
PNG Press Release Bl717, 11 July
1973.
PNG Press Release B2044, 23 August
1973.
For a discussion see Hank Nelson,
Papua New Guinea: Black Unity or
Black Chaos? (Ringwood Vic.,
1972), pp. 25-30. For contemporary
press interpretations see Peter
Hastmgs, SMH, 4, 31 July, and
James Griffin, Age, 8 August 1973.
HAD, III, 15, 21 June 1973.
For press speculation see SMH, 22
June 1973 and PC, 22 June 1973.
Some Pangu members claim that
their argument is more with Treasury
officials over policy on foreign
investment and economic development than with Julius Chan.
On I July PPP members Mola, Boas
and Maneke announced their intention to form a breakaway group based
on the New Guinea islands. On 4
July Michael Pondros (Manus Open)
announced that he would form a
Country party with 18 backbench
supporters. John Kaupa (Chuave)
later walked out of the House and
threatened to form a new Highlandsbased party.
PNG Press Release B2047, 24 August
1973.
E.g. L. Blaxter and P. Fitzpatrick,
'The Informal Sector: A Strategy for
Development", NGRU Seminar,
July 1973.
PC, 4 July 1973.
HAD, 28 August 1973.
PC, 16 August 1973.
PC, 19 July 1973.
PC, 20 June 1973.
HAD, III, 16, 19 June 1973. At the
same time that these "principles"
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
were tabled, Bougainville Copper

and its parent companies declared
record dividends, and Kennecott
Copper submitted proposals for the
establishment of a mine at Ok Tedi.
See Stephen Zorn, "Criteria for
Government Control of Foreign
Investment', Seventh Waigani Seminar Paper, UPNG, May 1973.
PC, 23 May 1973.
Age, 2 August 1973.
The harmony will probably be tested
once the CPC has to decide on
specific recommendations.
Age, 2 August 1973.
Y.P. Ghai "Constitutions and the
Political Order in East Africa",
International and Comparative Law
Quarterly, fourth series, 21, 3, (July
1972).
New appointments: 5 July; Alkan
Tololo (Education), Dr Ako Toua
(Health), Sam Piniau (Information
and Extension Services): 19 July;
Simon Kaumi (Social Development
and Home Affairs), John Natera
(Agriculture Stock and Fisheries).
Previous appointments: Paulias
Matane (Business Development),
Sere Pitoi (Public Service Board).
Tololo was previously Commissioner of the Teaching Service Commission, and Taviai was a member of the
PSB and later became Acting Director, Depanment of Lands.
All quotes from "Programme of the
Social Workers Party of Papua New
Guinea", l page roneoed, n.d. See
PC, 22 May 1973.
1.
In fact not all power over domestic

affairs had been transferred. At the
request of the Constitutional Planning Committee, matters concerning
the Supreme Court, the admini-
527
Notes
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
stration of courts, the Public Solicitor, Prosecutions, House of Assembly and electoral policy were left in
the hands of the Australian government.
Ten thousand expatriates left Papua
New Guinea in the twelve months
November 1972 to November 1973.
(November 1972-49,607: November 1973- 38,898). PC, 3 January
1974.
"Second Interim Report of the
Constitutional Planning Committee"
(Port Moresby, November 1973),
Roneoed.
HAD, Ill, 18, 28 August 1973, p.
2309.
HAD, III, 21,25 September 1973, p.
2763.
Ibid.
HAD, Ill, 18, 28 August 1973.
"Papua New Guinea's Improvement
Plan 1973-74", Prepared in the
Central Office by Authority of the
Cabinet Committee on Planning,
September 1973. (Consists of three
parts: Plan, Summary and Districts
Supplement.)
HAD, 17 November 1973.
Tabled in the House of Assembly, 15
November 1973.
PNG Department of Education:
"Proposed Five Year Plan, November 1973, p. 109.
CPD, HR, 29 November 1973.
PNG Press Release B288l, 20
December 1973.
The United Kingdom was the first
foreign country to establish a Consulate in mid-1973.
PNG Press Release B2557, 2 November 1973. The agreement in fact, had
been drawn up by representatives of
Australia, Indonesia and PNG in
Jakarta in September. Age, 26 Sep-
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
tember 1973.
ChrisAshton,NationalTimes, 19-24
November 1973. Michael Pondros
(Manus Open) criticised his government for not taking into account the
views of the West Irianese on the
border agreement. PC, 21 November
1973.
National Times, 17-22 September
1973.
Paul Grocott: "A Report on the Thirteenth Conference of the South
Pacific Commission", UPNG, l
October 1973, roneoed.
PNG Press Release 82677, 19
November and PC, 20 November
1973.
PC, II September 1973.
Age and Australian, 15 September
1973.
SMH, 16 August 1973.
Financial Review, 23 October 1973.
PC, ll September 1973.
Pressure began to mount against the
expatriates' role, an example of
which occurred during the budget
debate when Oscar Tammur walked
out of the House in protest at John
Middleton leading the Opposition's
reply.
PC, 26 November 1973, See also
Ralph Premdas, "Parties and Independence in Papua New Guinea",
Administration for Development, 4,
1974.
For example the Chief Minister
explained his support for the Public
Service Board chairman's call for
impartiality immediately after the
Pangu convention, by saying that he
supported his party's policy but it
was not yet government policy. See
two thoughtful articles on Somare's
style by Creighton Bums in the Age,
26, 27 September 1973.
HAD, 24 September 1973.
528
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

HAD, 27 September 1973.
PC, 25,26 October 1973.
PC, 16, 18 October 1973.
January-April1974
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Financial Review, PC, 5 February

1974.
PC, 15 March 1974.
PNG Press Release A0325, 27
February 1974.
For the views of Momis and Kaputin
on the CPC' s role, see PC, 9 April
1974.
PNG National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) "Newsman", 4 April
1974.
PC, 5 Aprill974,Age, 6 Aprill974.
PC, 8 Aprill974.
PC, 4 Aprill974.
PC, 25 March 1974.
PC, 22 March 1974.
May-August 1974
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
PC, 13, 14June 1974.

Papua New Guinea: 'Incomes,
Wages and Prices Policy", Report of
Interdepartmental Committee, Port
Moresby, February 1974.
PC, 4 June 1974.
"Economic Strategy and the Eight
Point Plan". Public lecture by Julius
Chan, MHA, Minister for Finance, at
the University of Technology, Lae,
20 June 1974, roneoed, 13 pp.
PC, 11 June; Australian, 29 June
1974.
HAD, 25 June; 8 July 1974.
CPD, HR, 9 July 1974.
PC, 17 June 1974.
Age, 27 June 1974.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
PC, 28 August 1974. Membership of

the Task Force: chairman: Moi Avei;
deputy: Naipuri Maina (MHA Westem District); members: Tom Koraea
(MHA Gulf District), John Kasaipwalova, Dus Mapun, John Waiko,
Jean Kekedo, Louis tv1ona.
PC, 24, 27 May 1974.
Ibid., 2 July 1974.
Ibid., 4 July 1974.
Ibid., 5 July 1974.
See Age, 15 July 1974.
A summary of the major recommem.lations of the CPC report and
government paper appears in the
Political Chronicle for SeptemberDecember 1974, together with a
report on the debate in the House of
Assembly.
PC, 31 May; 21, 22 August 1974.
Ibid., 19, 22, 23, 24 July 1974.
Ibid., 24 July 1974.
NBC "News", II August 1974.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryApril 1974.
PC, 6, 17 May 1974.
Ibid., 8 May 1974.
I.
2.
3.
(a) "Final Report of the Constitutiona! Planning Committee, 1974",

Parts ! & II, 13 August 1974. Part I
consists of fifteen chapters of narrative followed by recommendations;
Part II consists of four schedules and
three appendices. (b) "Government
Paper- Proposals on Constitutional
Principles and Explanatory Notes"
(Port Moresby, Government Printer,
August 1974). For a summary of the
United party proposals see PC, 27
September 1974.
CPC final report, Chapter 4, p. 2.
The government stood to lose at least
529
Notes
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
two ministers without this provisional arrangement.

CPC final report, Chapters 6 & 7.
Of the present eighteen regional
electorates the government holds
fourteen.
CPC final report, Chapter 10, p. l.
Ibid.
This chapter was held over for
debate untill975.
See HAD and Minutes, 27 November 1974.
Ralph Premdas, "Leadership in
Emerging Nations: Papua New
Guinea" Yagl-Ambu, I, 3 (September 1974).
PC, I August 1974.
PC, 9, 11 October 1974.
A cut in the rate of localisation and
active recruitment of expatriate
public servants created further resentment amongst national officers.
See the "Sirinumu Declaration", PC,
12, 15 November 1974.
PC, 20 November, 5 December
1974.
PC, 5, 17, 19,20 December 1974.
HAD, 15 October 1974.
HAD, 17 October 1974.
January-June 1975
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
PC, 17 March 1975.

Ibid.
PC, 19 March 1975.
PC, 17 March 1975.
PC, 18 March 1975.
On Simon Kaumi see Political
Chronicle September-December
1974.
PC, 6 June 1975.
James Griffin, "Papua Besena",
World Review, 14,3 (October 1975).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

PC, 24 June 1975.
PC, 25 June 1975.
PC, 5 March 1975.
PC, lO March 1975.
PC, 21 March 1975.
PC, 27 May 1975.
PC, 26 May 1975.
Patrick Boyce, Age, 2 June 1975.
PC, 18 June 1975.
PC, 19 June 1975.
PC, 25 April1975.
Ibid.
PC, 20 May 1975.
PC, 27 June 1975.
PC, 30 June 1975.
PC, 6 January 1975.
PC, 26 May 1975.
PC, 5 June 1975.
PC, 6 January 1975.
See Kakamora Reporter, June-July
1974.
PC, 18, 21 March 1975.
Ibid., 24 April 1975. (The PostCourier reported the speech, not
knowing it had not been delivered,
4 April1975.)
PC, 28 Aprill975.
CIPEC is an organisation of copperproducing countries: Chile, Peru,
Zaire and Zambia.
PC, 30 April1975.
Ibid.
PC, 23 April1975.
PC, 5 June 1975.
PC, 15 May 1975.
Patrick Boyce, Age, 19 May 1975.
PC, 23 April 1975.
530
July-December 1975
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ibid.
ibid.
PNG Planning Office, Programmes
and Performances 1975-6 (Port
Moresby, 1975), p. 323.
Ibid., p. 324.
PC, 13 August 1975.
PC, 21 August 1975.
l'C, lS August 1975.
PC, 20 August 1975.
PC, 14 August 1975.
PC, 15 August 1975.
Ibid.
PC, 18 August 1975.
Ibid.
PC, 20 August 1975.
Ibid.
PC, 2 October 1975.
Ibid.
James Griffin (ed.), A Foreign
Policy for an Independent Papua
New Guinea (Sydney, 1974), pp. 8688.
PC, 27 April 1973. See also James
Griffin, "Papua New Guinea and the
British Solomon Islands Protectorate", Australian Outlook, 27, 3
(December 1973), p. 319.
Ibid.
PC, 16 July 1975.
PC, 8 October 1975.
PC, 8 October 1975.
PC, 9 October 1975.
PC, 15 July 1975.
PC, 16 July 1975.
PC, 24 May 1975.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
PC, 25 July 1975.

PC, 14 August 1975.
PC, 25 July 1975.
Ibid.
PC, 24 July 1975.
PC, 21 August 1975.
PC, 31 July 1974.
PC, 18 July, 6 August 1975.
PC, 31 July 1975.
PC, 18 August 1975.
PC, 3 October 1975.
NBC Interview, 16 September 1975,
7.30pm.
Ibid., "Contact",29July 1975,7.15
pm.
Ibid., 16 September 1975.
PC, 30-31 December 1975.
PC, 13 August 1975.
PIM 46, 11 (November 1975), pp.
17, 84.
PC, 15 July 1975.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PC, 2 July 1975.
PC, 3 July 1975.
PC, 10 July 1975.
PC, 7 August 1975.
531
Notes
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
llO.
Ill.
112.
113.
l14.
115.
116.
117.
I 18.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

PC, 27 August 1975.
PC, II October 1975.
Ibid.
PC, 14 July 1975.
PC, 27 August 1975.
PC, I October 1975.
PC, 6 November, 5 December 1975.
PC, II December 1975.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PC, 7 October 1975.
PC, 8 October 1975.
Ibid.
PC, 28 August 1975.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Ibid.
Ibid.
PC, 20 August 1975.
PC, 22 August 1975.
PC, 20 August 1975.
PC, 7 July 1975.
PC, 8, 9 July 1975.
PC, 18 July 1975.
PC, 14Ju1y 1975.
PC, 28 July 1975. See also Political
Chronicle September-December
1974.
"The Case for Bougainville Secession", Meanjin Quarterly, Papua
New Guinea Issue, 34, 3 (September
1975), pp. 286-93. Also serialised in
Arawa Bulletin (July-August 1975).
Actually it was achieved on 2 January 1976.
Information on Bougainville and the
Solomon Islands is in general the
result of personal contacts and
research.
PC, 29 July 1975.
PC, 4 August 1975.
PC, 21 August 1975.
J.M. Abaijah, 'The Suppression of
Papuan Independence", World Review, 15,1 (1976), pp. 13-22.
January-June 1976
l.
2.
3.
See John Kaputin' s Comments, Post

Courier (PC), 30 March 1976.
Figures culled from Encyclopaedia
of Papua New Guinea, 1 (Melbourne, 1972).
PC, 5 March 1976.
532
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

J.A. Ballard, Wantoks and Administration (Port Moresby, 1976); also
PC, 3 May 1976.
E.g. speech of Minister of Justice, E.
Olewale, to law students at University
of Papua New Guinea, 26 June 1976.
PC, 5 March 1976.
PC, 23,26 and 20 January 1976.
PC, 5 March 1976.
PC, 11 June 1976.
PC, 17, 18, 19,20 May 1976.
PC, 3 June 1976.
PC, 22 June 1976.
PC, 26 May 1976.
PC, 15 Aprill976.
PC, 16, 18 March 1976.
PC, 28 April 1976.
PC, 6 May 9176.
PC, I, 2 June 1976.
"Educational Policy", Encyclopedia
of Papua New Guinea, I.
PC, 25 May 1976.
PC, 30 June 1976.
Ibid.
PC, 24 May 1976.
PC, 26 March 1976.
PC, 3 May 1976.
PC, 20 May 1976.
PC, 3 June 1976.
PC, 14 April1976.
PC, 26, 31 March 1976.
PC, 13 May 1976.
PC, 21 Aprill976.
PC, 25 June 1976.
PC, 26 April 1976.
PC, I Aprill976.
PC, 23 March 1976.
PC, 24, 25 February 1976.
46.
47.
PC, 2 March 1976.

PC, II June 1976.
July-December 1976
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
PC, 19 August 1976. Aid for these

years is part of a "package" worth
just less than $AI ,000 million to be
given over a five-year period.
Ibid.
Central Planning Office, "The PostIndependence National DevelopIut:ul Slralegy", PNG Government
White Paper (27 October 1976),
also, "PNG National Investment
Strategy" (November 1976).
Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in
Kenya (London, 1975), p. 27.
Tony Barnett, "Land and People in
Papua New Guinea", Yagl-Ambu, 3,
4 (November 1976).
PC, 15, 19 November, 2 December
1976.
PC, 7 October 1976; see also, PC, I
November 1976 for Utula Samana' s
criticisms of the Prime Minister's
views on China.
PC, 16 August 1976.
At the same time, however, the Minister for Primary Industry, Boyamo
Sali, had argued that the government
should assist to keep certain companies afloat and that pressure on
companies to develop processing
facilities be relaxed. PC, 21 September 1976.
Details of the agreement unfortunately received little press coverage.
The phrase belongs to Walker
Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism", Journal of International Affairs, 27, 1 (1973).
Australian, 16 September 1976.
533
Notes
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

PC, 24 August 1976; Namaliu
replaced Sere Pitoi who refused a
diplomatic posting to London, but
later accepted a knighthood.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Text of the address, PC, I October
1976.
SeeJ. Griffin (ed.), The Torres Strait
Border: Consolidation, Conflict or
Compromise? (Townsville, 1976).
PC, lO November 1976.
PC, 12 August 1976.
Bill Standish, Australian National
University research scholar in the
Chimbu, personal communication.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
January-June 1977
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
PC, 21 July 1977.

PC, 10 August 1977. The method
used to elect a prime minister is
interesting. The constitution-makers,
recognising the weakness of the
party system, provided for the election of the prime minister from the
floor of the legislature. To ensure
that the prime minister knew who his
supporters were, Standing Orders
were amended to provide for an open
ballot in which members grouped
themselves behind the nominees.
Don Townsend, "The 1976 Coffee
Boom in PNG", The Australian Geographer, 13, 4 (December 1977)
reports on other indicators (e.g. car
and truck registration) which shows
rising affluence.
Ian Morris, "Australia and PNG",
Quarterly Economic Review of the
E!U, 2nd quarter, 1977.
PC, 13 April 1977.
The issue of citizenship, however,
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
lingered on. Foreign Minister Kiki

expressed dismay at expatriate males
taking out PNG citizenship while
their families remained foreign. PC,
28 February 1977.
PC, 26 April 1977. The Police and
Teachers' Associations negotiated
similar agreements.
See e.g. Kiki's statement, PC, 27
January 1977.
PC, 29 April1977.
PC, 25,30 May 1977.
PC, 24 May, 9 June 1977.
PC, 27 June 1977.
PC, 2 March 1977. Kasaipwalova,
poet, author and founder of the Kabisawali Peoples' government, was sentenced to two years' jail on 20 January for stealing funds which had
been given him by the National
Cultural Council for the development of cultural projects in the Trobriands. (See the replies to Okuk's
question, PC, 3, 4 March 1977).
Kasaipwalova successfully appealed.
PC, lO January 1977 (Okuk); 17
February 1977 (Wabiria); 16 March
1977 (Kaputin).
This was published in 1983: Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea:
Studies of the 1977 National Election, edited by David Hegarty.
For summaries of party platforms,
see PC, 7 January 1977 (Pangu); 23
February 1977 (PPP); 4 April 1977
(UP); 2 May 1977 (Country party);
26 May 1977 (Papua Besena).
The Organic Law prohibiting foreign
contributions to parties had not come
into force.
Description of Julius Chan used on
many PPP leaflets.
An Auditor-General's report in mid-
534
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

1976 pointed to financial mismanagement. The figure was subsequently corrected to K3 million.
PC, I6 June I977.
PC, I8, 25 March I977.
Somare later enlarged the ministry
(wit.'1out consulting Chan) to twentytwo giving each province representation. Nine parliamentary secretaries
were also announced.
SeeP. Loveday and E.P. Wolfers,
Parties and Parliament in PNG,
1964-1975, lASER monograph no.
4 (1976), chapters 10-13.
Wide variations of this linkage
model apply throughout the country.
On class formation see the work by
Ken Good, Papua New Guinea: a
false economy (London, 1986); also,
A. Amarshi, K. Good and R. Mortimer, eds., Development and Dependency: the political economy ofPapua
New Guinea, (Melbourne, 1979).
July-December 1977
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
PC, II August I977.

Somare's decision to expand the
ministry by four surprised Chan but
could hardly have annoyed him.
Chan, however, was annoyed at the
role played by senior public servants
in assisting Somare during the
coalition negotiations.
PC, 19 August 1977.
PC, 12 August I977.
PC, 30 August 1977.
Chan, Holloway, Jephcott, Kitchens.
PC, 21, 28 October I977.
PC, 4 August, 27 October, 9 Novemher I977.
Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister,
Intelligence Service. Lowa confirmed this report but denied that
threats had emanated from the army.
John Waugh, SMH, 6 October 1977.
PC, 2, 2I September 1977.
12.
13.
14.
I5.
I6.
17.
18.
I9.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
SMH, 6, 7 October 1977.

PC, I2-I5, 2I September I977.
PC, 9 December I977.
PC, l3 December I977.
PC, 17 Augusr 1977.
PC, 16-18 November 1977.
PC, 12 August 1977.
PC, 7 September, 14 November
1977.
l'C, lll October 1977.
PC, 2 September 1977, SMH, I8
November 1977.
January-June 1978
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Hansard, 3 March I978. See also the

PNG Government Gazette, 5 April
1978.
Ibid.
PC, 8 March 1978.
PC, 17 March 1978.
PC, I May 1978.
Department of Finance, Budget
Speech, I978.
National Planning Office, The
National Public Expenditure Plan,
I978-81, p. 3.
National Planning Office, National
Development Strategy (PNG Government White Paper), October I976.
See also A. Amarshi, "Whither
Melanesia? A Critique of Papua
New Guinea's Development Strategy", Yagl-Ambu, 4, 2 (May 1977);
Roger Berry, "Some Observations
on the Political Economy of Papua
New Guinea: Recent Performance
and Future Prospects", Yagl-Ambu,
4, 3 (August 1977).
PC, 12, I3, 21, 22 June 1978.
535
Notes
10.
PC, 26 May 1978.
July-December 1978
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
PC, 20 July 1978.

John Momis, "Decentralisation and
Development", Waigani Seminar
paper, 10 September 1978.
NBC Current Affairs Programme,
24 July 1978.
PC, 21 August 1978.
PC, 23 August 1978.
PC, 22 August 1978.
PC, 8 August 1978.
PC, 18 August 1978.
See Hansard, August session 1978.
Hansard, 7 November 1978.
Ibid.
Ibid., 16 November 1978.
For press coverage see PC, 10
September to 2 October 1978. The
proceedings were published. R.R.
Premdas and S. Pokawin, eds, Decentralisation: The Papua New
Guinea Experiment, (Waigani Seminar Papers, 1978), (Waigani, 1979),
pp. l-4.
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
S.P. Pokawin, A Political Analysis

of PNG's Eight Point Aims, MA
thesis, McGill University, Montreal,
Canada, 1979.
Constitution of the Independent
State of Papua New Guinea, 16
September 1976.
PC, 18 April; 7 May; 2, 5, 12, 19
July; 16, 30 August; 19, 24, 25
September; 20, 25, 27, 31 October;
27 November; 17 December 1979.
PC, I October 1979.
The National party emerged from
what was previously the People's
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
United party and defected members

of the United party.
The opposition under Okuk aimed at
using any means and every opportunity to overthrow the government.
See S.P. Pokawin, "Decentralization: A Challenge to the Inherited
Status Quo", in Premdas, and Pokawin, eds, Decentralisation The
Papua New Guinea Experiment, l-4.
PC, l, 25, 30 October 1979.
Ibid., 20 March 1979.
Ibid., 8 October 1979.
Ibid., 4 April1979.
P/M, September 1979, p. 10.
Ibid., December 1979, p. 15. Earlier
at the United Nations, the foreign
minister called upon France to
relinquish its claim to the Pacific
Islands. PC, 27 September 1979.
PC, June 1979. Also S.P. Pokawin,
"Analysis of Current Events",
National Broadcasting Commission,
10June 1979.
PC, 17 April-15 May 1979.
See Olewale's statement in PC, 30
April1979, p. 5.
See note 3.
PC, 23 June 1979.
Yagl-Ambu 5, 2 (June 1978).
Pokawin, "Analysis of Current
Events", National Broadcasting
Commission, 29 April 1979. Also
PC 5, 12 April1979.
PC, 7-10 August 1979.
PC, September-October 1979.
PC, 20 September; 2, 5 November
1979; also Final Report of the Investigation Conducted by the Ombudsman Commission Concerning
Revocation on the Entry Permit of
Dr Ralph Premdas, 16 November
1979.
PC, 7 November 1979. Also delivered by the Minister for Finance,
Barry Holloway, 6 November 1979.
536
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
S.P. Pokawin, Political Chronicle

January-December 1979; David
Hegarty, "Issues and Conflict in
Post-Colonial Papua New Guinea",
World Review 18,3 (August 1979).
David Weisbrot, "Judges and Politicians", Legal Service Bulletin
(December 1979). Bernard Narokobi, "How Independent are the
Courts in Papua New Guinea? The
Somare/Rooney Affair", Pacific
Perspective 9, 2 (1980).
PC (September 1979). Kevin Egan,
"Law andOrder in PNG: Bring back
theKiaps?",P/M51,4(Aprill980).
In the event of a successful motion
of no-confidence in the government,
PNG' s Constitution does not require
recourse to a general election, but
stipulates that an alternative Prime
Minister must be named in the
motion (s. 142 (5), 145). A motion
of no-confidence in the Prime Minister or the ministry may not be moved
in the first six months of a Prime
Minister's term of office, thereby
guaranteeing a short "honeymoon"
period (s. 145 (4)). lfamotionofnoconfidence is successfully moved in
the last twelve months of the Parliament's five-year term, the head of
state (Governor-General) dismisses
the Prime Minister and calls a
general election.
See Note 1. For a somewhat different
perspective on the events of 1979 see
R.R. Premdas, "Papua New Guinea
1979; a Regime under Siege", Asian
Survey XX, 1 (January 1980), 94-99.
See also Far Eastern Economic
Review, 28 March 1980.
The VEDF is a fund controlled by
the Minister for Commerce and used
to encourage the establishment of
agricultural and community projects
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
by village-based development groups

The fund has been used largely as
patronage by MPs.
August 1978: Somare 68, Okuk 35.
November 1978: Somare 63, Okuk
45. September 1979: Somare 63,
Okuk34.
Hansard, 24 June 1980.
Economists doubted, however, that
any growth in public expenditure
was possible. See R. Callick, "Sir
Julius Under Pressure", Far Eastern
Economic Review, 10 October 1980.
See Post Courier, April and May
1980.
Post Courier, 9 June 1980, and Note
8. Police statistics showed a 55 per
cent rise in reported crimes for the
first four months of 1980 compared
with the corresponding months in
1979.
For example Bill Standish, Provincia/ Government in PNG - Early
Lessonsfrom Chimbu (lASER Monograph no. 7, 1979); the "Observer"
column in Niugini Nius, 20, 27
September 1980; PC, 1 July 1980.
PC, 19 August 1980.
Hansard, 1 July 1980.
Hansard, 23 November 1980.
For a journalistic account of the rehellion, see Richard Shears, The
Coconut War: the Crisis on Espiritu
Santo (North Ryde, Australia, 1980).
PC, September and October 1980.
PC, I October 1980.
'The Times of Papua New Guinea
(hereafter Times), 24 December
1980.
Ombudsman Commission of PNG:
Fifth Report, 30 June 1980.
Times, 24 December 1980.
Times, 9 January 1981.
I.
Gabriel Ramoi, "Silence is not
537
Notes
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
12.
Golden", Times, 18 September 1981.

Bernard Marjen, "Okuk, Kaputin
Line Up for Duel", Times, 3 April
1981.
Yash P. Ghai and David Hegarty,
"Ministerial and Bureaucratic Power
in Papua New Guinea: Aspects of
the Dutton!Bouraga Dispute", paper
for Canberra Law Workshop IV,
"Constitutional Law and Constitutiona! Developments in the Pacific
Islands", 1982.
PC, 3 April 1981.
PC, 8 July 1981.
The Melanesian Alliance ministers
demanded an Ombudsman Commission enquiring into the Dash deal
(and other Okuk initiatives) (PC, 3
April 1981 ). Later in the year Deputy
Opposition Leader John Noel repeated accusations made throughout
the year that bribes had been taken
over the Dash deal (PC, 6 November
1981).
Speech by Fr John Momis to the
annual conference of the Australian
Society of Labor Lawyers, Melbourne, 3-5 July 1981 (Australian
Council for Overseas Aid, Research
and Information Service, 8/81).
"Okuk-Momis Letters", PC, 19
November 1981.
R.T. Jackson, C.A. Emerson and R.
Welsch, The Impact of the OK Tedi
Project (Consultants' Report to the
Department of Minerals and Energy,
July 1980).
"North Fly Names Its Independence
Day", Times, 24 July 1981.
"Mine Dispute has cost K3m",
Niugini Nius, 3 October 1981; "Bougainville Warns Cops to Stay Out",
PC, lO October 1981.
"Utama Ban Sought", PC, 3 April
1981; "Gulf Fishery near Spent Premier", PC, 28 May 1981.
"Poachers 'escaped'", PC, 25 No-
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
vember 1981.
"Move to Halt Vanimo Talks",
Times, 6 March 1981; "Vanimo
Talks Halted", Times, 20 March
1981. See also "Vanimo Pact Draws
Protest", Times, 23 April 1982, for
a full reconstruction of the original
deal, and Rowan Callick, "Chan
Gets Tough on Forestry", Times, 10
April1982.
"Sandaun Business Arm Winds up
in Red", Times, 6 November 1981.
"It's War on City Thugs", PC, 3
December 1981.
Richard Jackson, "Budget Weakens
Ties of Common Interest Between
State and People", Times, 4 December 1981.
Minister of Finance, Estimates of
Revenue and Expenditures for the
Year Ending 31st December 1982,
Tabled in Parliament, 3 November
1981 (Port Moresby, 1981). The
1982-85, November 1981.
"Free Education .. . How Will the
Government Pay for It?", PC, 2
October 1981.
"Development on the Border",
Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs
Review, 1, 2 (1981).
Times, 15 May 19.81; Hank di Suvero (University of PNG Law leeturer and organiser of the Tribunal),
"No Despair in West Papua", and
"'Irian Jaya None of Your Business'
-Indonesian Official", Times, 22
May 198 I ; Hank di Suvero, "Our
Fight Will Never End", Times, 29
May 1981; "Human Rights Group
Reveals Indonesian 'Abuses"', PC,
20 May 1981; "Claims Against
Indonesia Heard", PC, 29 May 1981.
Franzalbert Joku, "Ramoi is Charged
over Hamadi", Times, 24July 1981.
"Foreign Policy", Papua New Guinea
Foreign Affairs Review 1, 4 (1981).
538
23.

But see Peter King, ''The New Foreign Policy: Steady as She Goes Where?", Times, 13 November
1981.
14.
January-June 1982
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
PC, 6 April1982.
The National Public Expenditure
Plan, 1982-1985, National Planning
Office, November 1981, 17.
See Times, 30 April and 7 May 1982.
For the full version of the Trebilcock
report see Public Enterprzses m
Papua New Guinea, Institute of
National Affairs Discussion Paper
No.9, 1982.
Times, 5 February 1982.
S.C. 224: In the matter of a Special
Reference by the Ombudsman Commission under Section 19 of the Constitution, and in the Matter of the
Organic Law on National Elections
(Amendment) Act 1981 (S.C.R. No.
2 of 1982), (ii).
"Vanimo Pact Draws Protest",
"Lawyers Played a Vital Role in
Securing Contract", Times, 23 April
1982; Rowan Callick, "It's Not
Over", Times, 30 April 1982. See
also "NEC Rejects Expert Advice on
Vanimo Timber", Times, 2 April
1982.
"Foreigners are Flooding NIDA with
Business Plans", Times, 2 April
1982.
"Chan wanted to sell the Danica for
KlOOO", Times, 19 March 1982.
Times, 18 June 1982.
The case concerned a distinguished
international consultant Professor
Fraudberg(!) extolling PNG's feature film industry (total production
three films), and speaking expan-
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
sively of development loans from

Swiss banks. See PC, 6 April 1982.
The constitution intended that parties
should not receive foreign-sourced
funds; that they should declare their
assets and funds to the Ombudsman;
and that a limit should be placed on
electoral expenditure. But no Organic Law on parties has yet been
adopted.
PC, 18 March 1982, 2 Aprill982.
Times, 22, 29 January 1982.
Indonesian Newsletter, Embassy of
lndonesta, Port Moresby, No. 3/III
1982,5.
Melanesian Alliance Party Platform
(Draft), n.d. (1982).
E.P. Wolfers, "Election 1982",
Papua New Guinea Foreign Affairs
Review, 2, 2 (1982).
David Hegarty, "Electoral Vulnerability in Papua New Guinea" (Department of Political Studies Seminar Paper, University of Papua New
Guinea, June 1982).
Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, March and
June 1982.
July-December 1982
1.
2.
3.
Nahau Rooney was the only woman

in the new Parliament and the only
electoral petitioner to succeed in
supplanting an incumhent MP. (His
margin over her after the first official
count was one vote!)
Budget Speech, 1983.
The Law Reform Commission's
report is summarised in "Corruption
-Act Now or Else", Times, 26
November 1982.
Ombudsman Commission of Papua
New Guinea, Corruption in Government: a Case Study, November
1982. See also "The Asian Connection", Times, !?November 1982.
539
Notes
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
PC, 25 October I982; Times, I2

November I 982.
Paias Wingti, "Standing by our Principles in Tough Times", 5 September 1982; Utula Samana, "The
Eight Aims, Decentralisation and
Development in Papua New Guinea:
The Morobe Experience", 9 September 1982. The Morobe premier's
paper strongly attacked Pangu's
record in government. The outstanding paper in the women's section
was that of Barbara Rogers, "Women
in Development", 8 September
1982.
Tarcissius Bobola, "Decision in
lASER, at Last", Times, 26 November 1982. See also Patterson
Lowa, "Waiting for Pangu to Show
the Way', ibid., and "lASER May
Stay", ibid., 29 October 1982.
Times, 22 October 1982.
"We Were Right to support Indonesia on Timor" and "A Parroting of
Djakarta's Line", Times, I October
1982.
Times, 18 October 1982.
See "What is the Future of Media in
PNG?", Times, 22 October 1982.
See also "A Government Daily for
PNG?", Times, 29 October 1982.
Times, I5 December 1982.
January-June 1983
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
PC, I I April, 1982.

Philip Bouraga, "Australia has been
Generous to Us", Times, 10 June
1983.
PC, 3 June 1983.
"Sackings of 200", PC, 17 May
1983. See also "Sack Plan Set", PC,
I I November 1982.
"Spy Bungle a Farce", "Snoopy and
the Kangaroo", Times, 6 May 1983;
"NIO 'Spy' a Border Expert", PC,
21 May 1983.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
I2.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
PC, 10 May I983.

Ibid.
For example, "Come off it, Ted",
Niugini Nius, 16 May 1983.
PC, 5 May 1983.
Sunday Telegraph, 29 May 1983.
See also Niugini Nius, 30 May 1983.
"PNG Knew of the Phone Bugging
Too", Times, 3 June 1983.
Neville Togarewa, "Road Report
Angers Wingti", Times, 15 April
1982. Statement by Acting Foreign
Affairs Minister, Tony Siaguru,
Draft Hansard, 3 May 1983, 10/2/l4. On the Trans-Irian Highway see
Times, 20 April 1983.
David Broadbent, "Fear Strains Our
PNG Ties", Age, 1 July 1983.
cf. Peter Hastings, "Bumps on the
Road", Far Eastern Economic
Review, 16 June 1983.
Neville Togarewa, "New Tokyo
Envoy Wants Trade with PNG
Lifted", Times, 22 Aprill983.
Rowan Callick, "In the Shadow of
the Axe", Far Eastern Economic
Review, 2 June 1983; "Sohbu Fights
to Keep Open Bay Timber Lease",
Times, 20 May 1983.
"DirotoQuit,OkukorNot",PC, 14
March 1983; "Okuk Marches On",
Times, 25 March 1983; "Blessing for
Okuk Lead", PC, 11 August I983.
"Give PNG a Real Leader- Make
lambakey Okuk the Next Prime
Minister" (National party advertisement), PC, 4 June 1983; "Okuk Call
for New Government", PC, 25 July
1983.
Franzalbert Joku, "One Wage Structure Under Study", Times, 11 February 1983; "Strikers will be Sacked",
PC, 7 February, I983.
PC, 23 February I983. On the doctors' strike in June see PC, 30 June
1983.
540
22.
Chris Mackay, "Localisation in the

Private Sector" in Peter King and
Wendy Lee, eds, From Rhetoric to
Reality? The Eight Point Plan and
National Goals after a Decade,
Papers from the 1982 Waigani
Seminar, (Port Moresby, 1984).
12.
July-December 1983
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
"Okuk wants Wingti", PC, 12 August 1983; "Namaliu for PM?", Times,
12 August 1983.
Babani Maragc, "Big Vote Aborted", PC, 16 November 1983.
"Block Members Pull Out", Niugini
Nius, 11 November 1983; "Bouraga
'No' to Offer", PC, 10 November
1983.
Times, 18 November 1983.
Richard Laidlaw, ''The Great Coffee
Debate"; "Behind the Coffee Furore", PC, 18 October 1983.
"NIDA Probes Links in Coffee",
PC, 19 October 1983. (The National
Investment Development Authority
falls within the Deputy PM' s portfolio).
Times, 21 October 1983; Niugini
Nius, 21 October 1983.
Ian Glanville, ''The Changing Face
of Papua New Guinea's Defence
Force", Pacific Defence Reporter,
10, 10 (April1984).
"Indonesian Attack Warning", Niugini Nius, 9 September 1983; "Invasion Not On", PC, 14 September
1983; ''Tito Stands Firm", PC, 15
September 1983; "Australia
Wouldn't Defend Us", PC, 23 September 1983.
Times, 25 November 1983, Weekend
Nius, 26 November 1983.
"Border Plans Being Held Up",
Niugini Nius, 15 November 1983;
Robin Osborne, "Big Masta Watches
over PNG", National Times, 13
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Aprill984; Peter King, "Papua New

Guinea in 1983: Pangu Consolidates", Asian Survey, 24, 2 (February
1984), p. 161.
"The Coup that Might Have Been",
ABC Radio Programme, Background Briefing, 21 August 1983
(Producer: Geoff Heriott). See also
Rowan Callick, ''The Coup: A Story
Twice Told", Times, 26 August
1983: "Ex-Colonel Attacks NIO Plot
Denial", Times, 15 September 1983.
Times, 11 November 1983. See also
issues of 18 Novemut:I, 25 Nuvt:mber, and 2 December.
"Indonesia- A Threat to PNG?",
Current Intelligence Brief, No. 231,
27 September 1983, pp. 15-18.
Transmigration projects are officially supposed to include at least ten per
cent of peoples indigenous to the
outer islands where they are established. See H.W. Arndt, "Transmigration Problems and Prospects",
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic
Sties, 19 (December 1983), p. 64.
General Constitutional Commission,
Final Report. The GCC was set up
under section 260(5) of the Constitution and section 12(3) and (4) of the
Constitutional Commission Act of
I978, with a five year mandate to
recommend changes to the Constitution and the Organic Laws.
John Nilkare, "What the Fuss is All
About in the Southern Highlands",
Niugini Nius, 10 August 1983. See
also Niugini Nius, 30 July 1983; PC,
19, 28, 29 July. Premier Ebeial
finally got back his majority in
August, but promptly angered the
national government again when he
moved successfully to extend the life
ofthe provincial assembly by a year.
See Niugini Nius, 26 August, 29
September 1983.
Budget Speech, 1984.
541
Notes
18.
19.
Times, 15 July 1983.

Times, 11 November 1983.
January-June 1984
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
What the identification of a provincial government with a particular

party usually boils down to is that the
person who emerges as the premier
identifies, for the time being at least,
with the particular party. It is possible, indeed likely, that some of the
support he receives in the Assembly
will be based on party identification,
but there is no guarantee that this will
be so. As for what the electors vote
for see below.
Pangu is in coalition with the usually
disunited United party, which has six
members in Parliament.
PC, I February 1984.
See, for instance, the debate on Kindi
Lawi's motion "That this Parliament
establishes a committee to review
the system of provincial governments and looks at ways of upgrading the local government councils which are closer to the people
and which reflects their wishes",
Hansard, 24 May 1984.
See Rabbie Namaliu, Foreign Affairs
Minister's statement to Parliament,
Hansard, 28 May 1984.
See article on this and other aspects
of the tangled border issue by Dr K.
Nyamekye in Times, 12 Aprill984.
Professor R.T. Jackson discusses
what he terms "Safety First in the
Aussie Strategy", as revealed in the
leaked documents published by the
Australian weekly, the National
Times. See Times, 5 Aprill984.
See PNG Chronicle, July-December
1983. On the retrenchment exercise,
3,500 positions were identified to be
axed but the actual number of public
servants retrenched was 1,820. They
9.
10.
ll.
were paid a total of KI1,343,301.

But 420 of these, after receiving their
golden handshake, were re-employed
by the same government.
"Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Alleged Political Pressures
on Police Investigations" or Kapi
Commission Report (June I984).
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., p. 50.
July-December 1984
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
PC, 23 October I984.

PC, 29 October, 8 November 1984.
Franzalbert Joku in Times, II November I984.
Ibid.; and Hansard, IS November
1984, 39, for Wingti's personal
statement to parliament.
On the politics of Kumul Kopi, see
Political Chronicle July-December
1983.
John Kaputin, Minister for Finance
in the 1980-82 Chan Cabinet was coordinating the opposition's contacts.
See November issues of Post-Courier
for various statements by him.
Hansard, 2I August I984, 22.
Times, I9 July I984.
Times, 5 July I984.
See Hansard, 13 August 1984, for
the debate on the attempt to amend
section l 04 of the Constitution, to
make an MP lose his seat if he resigns
from the political party that sponsored him at the elections, or if he is
expelled from that party, or if he
consistently fails to support that
party in parliament, or if he fails to
support that party in a motion of noconfidence. This amendment was
originally contained in recommendations of the General Constitutional
Review Commission under the
chairmanship of Mahuru Rarua
Rarua.
542
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
Hansard, 13 August 1984,25.

Hansard, 15 November 1984, 39.
See Niugini Nius, 22 December
1984, for details of the reshuffle.
Ibid.
NiuginiNius, 10January 1985.
Alfred Sasako in Niugini Nius, 24
December 1984.
PC, 2 January 1985.
PC, 8 January 1985.
PC, February 1985. See also Times,
3 February 1985.
PC, 21, 22 August 1984.
See Niugini Nius, 25 October 1984,
for a full listing of the forty-nine
measures. The government took out
double-page advertisements in the
Niugini Nius, the Post-Courier and
the Times, over the next two weeks
or so, to publicise the measures.
William Clifford, Louise Morauta
and Barry Stuart, Law and Order in
PNG (Port Moresby, 1984), 2 vols.
January-June 1985
1.
2.
3.
4.
See the Times, 10 February 1985.

Ibid.
AkepaMiakweresignedhis UnggaiBena seat to make room for Okuk,
after his defeat in Chimbu in the
1982 elections. Ted Diro gave up the
leadership of the parliamentary
Opposition in 1983 when Okuk
came back to parliament. Stephen
Tago stepped down as parliamentary
leader of the National party when
Okuk returned to Parliament in May
1985. Gai Dawubane had to resign
as parliamentary deputy leader so as
to allow Tago to revert to that
position.
Niugini Nius, 8 March 1985.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
l 0.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
John Kaputin, Momis' deputy in

parliament, refused to go along. He
had written: ''To assist in propping
up the leadership of such a corrupt
machine is to me immoral and
unacceptable. It is also, I believe,
poiitically and ideoiogicaiiy incompatible forMA". Niugini Nius, 19
March 1985.
Paul Torato, the parliamentary
leader of the United party, raised a
question about Sali' s uncontrollable
behaviour on an Air Niugini flight to
Singapore. See Hansard, 18, 19
March 1985.
Niugini Nius, 10 April1985.
PC, 18January 1985.
Hansard, 22 March 1985, pp. 30-33
for details of the agreement.
See Rowan Callick, "The Aid Option", Times, 9 May 1985.
PC, 8 July 1985.
Times, 8 June 1985.
PC, 13 June 1985.
Times, 28 April 1985 and Frank
Senge' s article therein, ''The Gang's
Land".
See the Political Chronicle for JulyDecember 1984.
PC, 13 June 1985.
PC, 3 June 1985.
July-December 1985
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Draft Hansard, 28 March 1985.

Draft Hansard, 21 August 1985, 8.
Draft Hansard, 15 August 1985, for
the list of nine documents tendered.
Times, 18 August 1985.
Quoted ibid.
See Bill Standish, "They want to be
the Highest Always- The elections
in Simbu" in David Hegarty, ed.,
Electoral Politics in PNG (Port
Moresby 1983) to which I owe this
543
Notes
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
notion of Okuk's special facility to

make himself indispensable in virtually every political crisis in recent
PNG politics. As a Niugini Nius
editorial put it: "What Okuk wants,
Okuk gets", Niugini Nius, 8 August
1985.
PC, ll November 1985.
Sir Julius Chan, speaking to his
motion of no-confidence. Draft
Hansard 21 November 1985.
See Times, 2 November for report on
the PPP Conference. Also Niugini
Nius, 29 October 1985. Wingti had
also admitted cash problems for his
party: "Financially we can't say we
are confidenct about 1987 because
we have no money but electorally we
are gaining". Times, 60ctober 1985.
See Frank Senge's brutally frank
piece in the same issue on the link
between the need for electoral funds
and the no-confidence motions
during the period.
See PC, 1 August 1986, for Chan's
political vituperation which will rank
as a classic anywhere.
See PC, 10 December 1985.
See Neville Togarewa's excellent
report in Times, l4December 1985.
The whole border issue in 1985 was
reviewed in Times, 28 December
1985.
Draft Hansard, 20,21 August 1985.
1.
2.
PC, 3 January 1986.

The dailies, Post-Courier and Niugini Nius, plus the weekly, the Times
and Hansard are the principal sources
for this chronicle. The activities of
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
ministers in this connection, Torato

at Lands, Chan at Finance, Ramoi at
the PTC and NBC, Bourne at the
Harbours Board, Okuk, cited above,
can all be followed through the
papers.
PC, 1 August 1986.
Ibid.
PC, 18 March 1987.
Thus, in August, it was Wingti, not
Okuk, who launched a K 190 million
government program for agriculture
over the next five years. A reportedly
K 150,000 video tape promotion
material, to educate the rural folk on
the importance of agriculture and
how their contribution could be
improved, featured Wingti not the
Agriculture Minister.
PC, 3 December 1986. After the
vote, Steve Tago, leader of the
National party since Okuk's death,
and one of the three NP ministers
who voted with the government, said
at a press conference: "National
Party will never again join a coalition in which PPP features. My party
has no confidence in Sir Julius Chan.
I want to make it clear that we do not
support him. Our vote was for
stability and for Wingti's government. The last wish of Okuk was for
us to support Wingti as the first
Highlands PM". PC, 4 December
1986.
See Political Chronicle July-December 1985.
See PC, 28 July 1986, for details.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryJune, 1984.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryJune, 1985.
Quarterly &onomic Bulletin, March/
June, 1986 (Port Moresby, 1986), p.
33.
Ibid.
The spectacle of the Prime Minister
544
15.
16.
17.
18.

and his Ministers travelling to deliver cheques personally to various
groups became virtually an everyday
one as the elections got nearer and
nearer. It is also noteworthy that the
first budget of the Wingti government doubled the MP' s personal
handouts to K40,000 per member.
Quarterly &onomic Bulletin, March!
June, 1986, p. 32.
PC, 17 October 1986, for details of
the scheme approved by cabinet.
This section substantially It:pwduce~
a part of my article, "Papua New
Guinea in 1986- Pre-election Mobilisation and some Nationalism",
Asian Survey, (February 1987).
I.
2.
3.
4.
Quarterly Economic Bulletin (Port

Moresby, PNG, June and Septemher, 1987) for economic conditions
in the March and June quarters.
Political Chronicle January-Decemher, 1986.
PC, 3 March 1987. The Finance
Minister gave figures on the expanding operations of the Bank. In 1985,
the Bank lent K7.969 million for
agriculture. In 1986, the figure was
K19.348 million, equal to eightyfive per cent of the bank's total
lending. Geleva Kwarara indicated
that the bank's operations were still
higher at the beginning of 1987 and
were targeted primarily at "smallholder borrowers in rural areas".
See PC, 2 December 1987 for an
article by Frank Senge on the saga of
the suspension. Senge, one of the
best journalists in PNG wrote:
"Perpetrators of the suspension in
the government must feel guilty
because over the months it has
become apparent that they have been
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
wrong". See also, PC, 20 November

1987 for the report of the Parliamentary Committee on Provincial
Government Suspension which was
critical of the government. Five
out of the six committee members
weie govemment back-benchers.
The report said, among other
things: "There is no evidence that
the National Government actively
pursued avenues other than suspension to put matters right."
PC, 18 August 1987.
PC, 14 September 1987. Later, the
Supreme Court contradicted Mr
Justice Hinchliffe on this point.
On the Placer Shares Controversy,
see Political Chronicle JanuaryDecember 1986.
PC, 5 June 1987 for PAP president's
message entitled, "People First".
See PC, 25 March 1987.
PC, 9 April1987.
The view of the Lae City Manager,
PC, 13 July 1987.
13 Gopal Krishna, quoted in Norman
D. Palmer, Elections and Political
Development: The Asian Experience
(London, 1975), p. II.
Elections in Mendi, Kundiawa and
Mount Hagen were postponed on
account of the deaths of candidates.
Political Chronicle July-December,
1984.
The Australian journalist, Craig
Skehan, published an interview with
Chan at the end of January in which
he claimed Chan had indicated a
willingness to work with Somare and
this was followed by much correspondence on it in the Post-Courier.
PC, 6 July 1987.
Ibid.
PC, 6 August 1987.
Ibid.
The National Capital District Interim
545
Notes
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Commission was dissolved at the

end of October and new members
appointed before the old members
knew of it.
Gai Duwabane, Agriculture and
Livestock Minister, gave coffee
exporting firms up to 31 October
1988 to become 90 per cent nationally-owned.
Galeva Kwarara, the Finance Minister, suspended the Managing Director and the General Manager of the
Investment Corporation principally
so that he could reinstate two officers
who had been sacked by management.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Neville Togerewa, Times 24 December 1987.
Niugini Nius, II December 1987, for
the text of the Declaration.
Frank Senge, PC, 27 October 1987.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Times, 30 June - 6 July 1988.
PC, II April 1988.
PC, II March 1988.
Ibid.
PC, 14 March 1988.
Times, 10-16 March 1988.
Times, 14-20 April1988.
Times, 21-27 Aprill988.
PJM, May 1988.
PC, 12 April1988.
PC, 15 Aprill988.
Tony Siaguru, "Anatomy of Coalition", PC, 29 Apri11988.
PC, 25 April 1988.
PC, 26 April 1988.
PC, 27 April 1988.
Times, 12-18 May 1988.
PC, 25 May 1988.
Niugini Nius, 3 June 1988.
PC, 26 May 1988.
Serna Rea, Niugini Nius, 3 June
1988.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryDecember 1987, for why this was
not surprising.
Niugini Nius, 3 June 1988.
January-June 1988
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryDecember, 1987.

Times, 28 January-5 February I988;
PC, 27,29 January I988.
Government Gazette, II February
I988; PC, I8 February I988.
PC, I7 February I988.
PC, II March I988.
PC, 10 March 1988.
Bruce Harris, The Rise ofRascalism:
Action and Reaction in the Evolution
ofRascal Gangs (lASER Discussion
Paper No. 54, I988).
PC, 15 February I988.
Political Chronicle January-December I986.
Niugini Nius, 16 February I988.
July-December 1988
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
I2.
Niugini Nius, 9 July 1988.

Niugini Nius, I2 July I988.
PC, 3 August I988. JosephAoaeand
Johnson Maladina were the two MPs
in question.
PC, 2 August 1988.
Times, 4-10 August 1988.
Times, 11-17 August I988.
Ibid.
W. Clifford, L. Morauta, and B.
Stuart, Law and Order in Papua
New Guinea, vol. 2, p. 55 (1986).
Ibid., vol. I, p. 206.
Times, 6-12 October 1988.
Times, 27 August-2 November 1988.
546
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Times, 29 September-S October
1988.
Personal communication from Ok
Tedi's manager, Human Resources,
Arthur Laflin on 2 September 1988.
Laflin stated that before 1983 the
staff of Ok Tedi' s training programme had grown to 165. It now
consisted of two expatriates and four
nationals. There were four expatriate
positions unfilled. The impression I
received was that senior management did not assign a high priority to
human resource training.
Times, 8-14 December 1988.
Times, 30 June-6 July 1988. The text
of Donigi 's memorandum is printed
in Times, 7-13 and 14-20July 1988.
Times, 1-7 September 1988.
Discussions in the media paid little
attention to the redistribution argument, which would support national
government action to share the
benefits from resource development
among rich and poor people and
among rich and poor provinces.
Frequently, there was an underlying
assumption in the debate that justice
lay with the landowners.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Times, 24-30 November 1988.
PC, November 1988, passim.
Personal communication with Premier Pokawin.
Times, 10-16 November 1988. This
issue contains the full text of Paul
Pora' s budget speech and two useful
commentaries: Roslyn McCullagh,
"Strategy and Expenditure" and
32.
33.
34.
'2<:
-'-'
David Storey, "An Interesting Budget".

McCullagh, "Strategy and Expenditure".
Ibid.
Times, 18-24 August 1988.
E.g., B.A. Santamaria, "A Return to
Barbarism", Australian, 9-16 August
1988.
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
See John Burton, "Tribal Fighting:

The Scandal oflnadiun", Times, 28
December 1989,4, 11 January 1990.
See, for instance, R.D. Bedford and
A. Mamak, Compensating for Development: The Bougainville Case
(Christchurch, 1977) and James
Griffin "Bougainville- Secession of
just Sentiment?", Current Affairs
Bulletin, 48, 9 (1972).
See Colin Filer, "The Bougainville
Rebellion, The Mining Industry and
the Process of Social Disintegration
in Papua New Guinea, Canberra
Anthropology, 13, I (1990), pp. 139; Henry Okole, "The Panguna
Landowners' Organisation", unpublished Seminar paper. Both papers
were presented at a UPNG seminar
on the Bougainville crisis, in September 1989.
See Okole, "The Panguna Landowners".
For instance, the Post-Courier editorialised, on 4 January 1989: "It is
time to move in and disarm them for
the sake of many innocent lives now
at risk".
See PC, 24 February 1989.
PC, 6 March 1989. See also PC, 27
February 1989.
PC, 6 March 1989.
PC, 10 March 1989.
Ibid.
See SMH, 11 March 1989. At a
547
Notes
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Public Debate organised at UPNG in

March the opposition spokesmen
also sought to create the impression
that they would have moved in
troops earlier.
PC, 22 March 1989.
PC, 20 September 1989. BCL also
offered a separate package worth
K45.3 million over seven years.
PC, 9 August 1989.
PC, 18 May 1989.
PC, 9 June 1989. Inconsistently,
however, Wingti had condemned the
government's use oftroops in Bougainville. PC, 8 May 1989. Then,
later, he denounced the declaration
of a truce as "the worst decision ever
by any government in the history of
PNG" PC, 26 May 1989. There were
other inconsistencies.
Australian; 13 September 1989.
Australian, 18 October 1989, quoting Sir Hugo Berghuser, the Chairman of the Committee.
PC, IS September 1989.
PC, 31 October 1990, l November
1990.
PC, 21 March 1989.
PC, 7 Aprill989.
PC, 17 April1989.
PC, 22 June 1989.
PC, 9 June, 27 July 1989. For earlier
demands, PC, 29 March 1981.
PC, 7 April1989.
PC, 25 July 1989.
PC, l November 1989.
Draft Hansard, 21 July 1989, p. 7.
PC, 7, 14 Aprill989.
See Yaw Saffu, "Papua New Guinea
in 1987: Wingti's Coalition in a
Disabled System",Asian Survey, 28,
2 ( 1988), pp. 242-8.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

PC, 20,21 February 1989.
PC, 20, 27 February 1989.
PC, 7, 8 March 1989; Niugini Nius,
7 March 1989.
See Franzalbet Joku in PC, 25 May
1989.
PC, 2June 1989.
PC, 300ctober 1989.
When Diro was Commander of
PNGDF, he was not known particularly for subscribing to the view he
now propounded. See David Hegarty' s Political Chronicle for 1978 for
the so-called "Diro Affair".
Niugini Nius, 12 April1989.
Ibid.
PC, 22 June 1989.
With Somare as Foreign Minister,
the lines between private Pangu and
public PNG affairs in this instance
were sometimes hard to draw.
Times, 4-!0 May 1989; PC, l May
1989.
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryDecember 1989.

SMH, 13 January 1990; see also PC,
12 January 1990; Australian, 12
January 1990; Australian Financial
Review, 12 January 1990.
Fr John Momis is a Bougainvillean
and leads the Melanesian Alliance,
the party that dominated Bougainville politics in the eighties.
PC, 22 January 1990; SMH, 22
January 1990.
Namaliu, quoted in SMH, 22 January
1990.
For an account of the efforts of one
group that succeeded, see Graeme
Kemelfield, "A Short History of the
Bougainville Ceasefire Initiative", in
548
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
n.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

R.J. May and Matthew Spriggs, eds,
The Bougainville Crisis, (Bathurst,
1990).
PC, 25 April 1990.
PC,6June 1990.
PC, 26, 27 Aprill990.
Times. 19 March 1990.
Rowan Callick in Australian Financial Review, 12 Aprill990. Details
about Chan's business connections
and interests in the next paragraph
are from Callick's article.
PC, 17 March 1990.
The Quarterly Economic Bulletin
issued by the Central Bank offers
excellent analyses and statistics on
the PNG economy.
SeePC, 19February,4April,26,29
June 1990.
Mekere Morauta, Managing Director of PNG Banking Corporation,
PC. 7 May 1990.
PC, 31 May 1990.
See PC, 10 July 1990; 17-19 July
1990 for this paragraph.
PC, 18 July 1990.
PC, 19 July 1990 for the Finance
Minister's statement and PC, 3
August 1990 for Diro' s.
For instance, this typical one offered
by the defectors: ''There is too much
political instability making it difficult for the Prime Minister to govern
decisively". So, they were joining
the government side to give the PM
the necessary numbers to allow him
to take bold actions without worrying about no-confidence motions.
PC, 17 April 1990.
See Political Chronicle JanuaryDecember 1987 and January-June
1988.
PC, 3 May 1990.
PC, 4 May 1990.
PC, 21 June 1990.
PC, 26 June 1990.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Personal communications. See Political Chronicle January-June 1984.

PC, 13 July 1990.
PC, 19 July 1990.
Ibid.
Ibid. The figures in the following
paragraph come from this source.
PC, 1 August 1990.
PC, 2 August 1990.
PC, 6 June 1990.
PC, 4 April 1990.
PC, 28 May 1990.
PC, 25 June 1990. See PC, 13 July
1990 for other ministets blaming
bureaucrats.
SeePC,2May,and 17 July 1990for
lists of changes recommended by the
Electoral Commission and approved
by cabinet.
See PC, 2 March 1990 for a list of
such recommendations.
PC, 30 January 1990. Included in the
team were Professors Bill Tordoff of
Manchester University and Professor Andrew Axline of Ottawa
University.
PC, Editorial, 22 February 1990.
The issue contained details of the
mess in Morobe.
PC, 19 July 1990 for the Hesingut
Committee's anti-Provincial System
recommendations.
PC, 24 August 1990.
See PC, 8 March 1990, pp. 24-5, for
the range of the Leaders' draconian
recommendations.
PC, Editorial, 27 June 1990.
PC, 24 August, 31 October, 2 November 1990.
PC, 7, 8 August 1990.
PC, 29 June 1990.
549
Notes
PC, 15, 23 August 1990.
PC, 17 August 1990.
PC, 20 August 1990.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PC, 14, 18 September 1990.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
I.
2.
This section draws on my article,
''The Bougainville Crisis and Politics in Papua New Guinea", Contemporary Pacific, 4, 2 (1992), pp. 32543.
3.
PC, 17 May 1991.
4.
PC, 27 June 1991.
5.
PC, II July 1991.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
4June 1991.
27 May 1991.
6 June 1991.
27 May 1991.
6 June 1991.
5 June 1991.
Marie Louis O'Callaghan, SMH, 6
June 1991.
PC, 17 July 1991.
PC, 19 July 1991.
PC,
PC,
PC,
PC,
PC,
PC,
Ibid.
Ibid.
PC, !OJanuary 1991.
PC, 3 May 1991.
PC, 23 August 1991.
APPENDIX I
PAPUA NEW GUINEA COLONIAL CHRONOLOGY
BC 50,000- 1,000
Human migratton mto New Guinea and adjacent islands
1512 AD
Probable first European sighting of New Guinea
1526
De Meneses gave the name Papua to the northwest coast
1545
De Retes named the island New Guinea
1847
Catholic Society of Mary mission established briefly on Woodlark and Umboi Islands
1871
London Missionary Society (LMS) mission established in Torres

Strait and Papua
1875
J.C. Godeffroy and Sons established the first permanent trading

station in the Duke of York Islands
1875
1882
Methodist mission established in the Duke of York Islands
1884
Proclamation of the Protectorate of the German New Guinea

Company, the mainland known as Kaiserwilhelmsland
Sacred Heart (MSC) missionaries arrive at Matupit Island, New

Britain
Proclamation of the British New Guinea Protectorate
1885
1886
1888-98
MSC established at Yule Island

Lutheran mission established at Simbang, German New Guinea
British New Guinea Protectorate became a British colony
Sir William MacGregor became Administrator, later LieutenantGovernor of British New Guinea
1889
1899
1902
1905
German New Guinea's southeastern border moved north to between Bougainville and the Shortland Islands
German New Guinea Company taken over by the German state
Transfer of British New Guinea to the Commonwealth of Australia began
Australia passed the Papua Act
551
Appendix I
1906
British New Guinea became the Australian Territory of Papua

Royal Commission appointed to enquire into conditions in Papua
1908
Hubert Murray appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Papua
1910
Capital of German New Guinea moved from Kokopo to Rabaul
1914-1921
Australia occupied German New Guinea
1919
Treaty of Versailles. Australia granted a mandate to administer

German New Guinea
1921
Mandated Territory of New Guinea established
1922
Gold prospecting began on the Waria and Bulolo rivers
1924
Legislative and Executive Councils established in Papua
1926
Gold discovered at Edie Creek
1927
First Motu-Koita local government councils elected in Papua
1933
Legislative and Executive Councils established in Mandated New

Guinea
1941
Japanese invasion
1942
Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit; first joint civil administration of Papua and New Guinea
1945
Japanese surrender
Provisional civil administration established
J.K. Murray appointed Administrator
Staff Conference established
1946
Amalgamation of the administrations of the Australian territories

of Papua and New Guinea
1949
Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 passed

First local government ordinance creating village councils
1951
Staff Conference replaced by Legislative Council, with three

nominated positions for Papuans and New Guineans
1954
Ordinance passed to create local councils
1957
Ordinance passed to allow Papuans and New Guineans to enter

the Public Service if they possessed appropriate qualifications
1959
Inaugural Local Government Conference
1960
United Progress party formed, the first home-grown political

party
1961
Indigenous participation increased and the size of Legislative

Council expanded
1962
Select Committee established to consider a new constitution
552

UN mission led by Sir Hugh Foote recommended establishment
of a national parliament by extending the Legislative Council into
a House of Assembly
1963
Local Government Ordinance extended the local councils system;

these councils become responsible for implementing development
plans
Public Service Ordinance of 1963 aimed at localisation of administration and professional sections
1964
Papua New Guineans vote in the first national election

World Bank recommended selective rural-based development and
reform of traditional land tenure systems
1965
New Guinea United National party established, the first indigenous-sponsored political party
1967
United [Christian] Democratic party and Pangu (Papua and New

Guinea Union) pati established, the first substantial political parties
1968
Administrator's Executive Council formed as the premier decision-making body in Papua New Guinea, but the Australian Minister for External Territories reserved some important departments
and functions
1969-73
Construction of Panguna copper mine on Bougainville
1970
Powers of final decision-making handed over to the Administrator's Executive Council
1972
First National Coalition Government, led by Michael Somare as

Chief Minister
1973
National Investment and Development Authority (NIDA), and

Central Planning Office established
Local Government Association formed
Bougainville Interim Provincial Government recognised

1 December 1973
Self-government
1974
Re-negotiation of agreement with Bougainville Copper
15 March 1975
Papua Besena UDI
17 August 1975
Constitution adopted
1 September 1975
Bougainville UDI
16 September 1975 Papua New Guinea Independence Day

Governor-General Sir John Guise
Prime Minister Michael Somare
APPENDIX II
MEMBERS ELECTED TO THE
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, 1964-1997
Papua New Guinea voters have elected their national leaders since 1964
when Australia established the House of Assembly. Elections have been held
in 1964, 1968, 1972, 1987 and 1992. Some Members were also elected at
special by-elections. This list covers all 440 elected members of the House
up until 1997. The names of provinces and the National Capital District
(NCO) are given within brackets. Some provinces have changed their names
since Independence: Chimbu became Simbu; Northern became Oro; West
Sepik became Sandaun; Western became Fly River. Port Moresby is the
centre of the National Capital District which is contained within Central
province. The type of electorate is indicated at the end of each entry:
P = Provincial (Regional) electorate
D = District (Open) electorate
Where a Member served in more than one electorate these have been listed
in chronological order of the membership of the House. Where the Member
has served in both types of electorates it is indicated by double letters: ie.
PO, orDP.
Abaijah, Josephine, 1972-82 (Central/
NCD)P
Abal, Tei, 1964-82 (Enga) D
Abe, Dirona, 1964-68 (Central) D
Abel, Cecil, 1968-72 (Milne Bay) P
Adesim, Juda, 1987-88, 1992-97 (East
Sepik) D
Agiwa, Herowa, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands) D
Aipe, Yambal, 1992-97 (Western Highlands) D
Amaiu, Tom, 1977-80, 1987-92 (Enga) D
Andrew, Poate, 1982-87 (Milne Bay) D
Anggua, Caspar, 1977-87 (Madang) D
Ank, Posu, 1977-82 (Southern Highlands)
D
Ank, William, 1982-92 (Southern Highlands) D

Anugu, Anthony, 1977-87 (North Solomons)D
Aoae, Joseph, 1978-92 (Central) D
Aparima, Lennie, 1979-87 (Eastern Highlands) D
Arek, Paulus, 1968-73 (Oro) D
Arek, Sergius, 1974-77 (Oro) D
Aruno, Pupuna, 1968-72 (Eastern Highlands) D
Ashton, Roy, 1964-72 (East & West New
Britain) P
Atopare, Sailas, 1977-82 (Eastern Highlands) D
Auali, Vincent, 1992-97 (Western High-
554
lands) D
Avei, Moi, 1992-97 (Central) D
Avini, Yaip, 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Awasa, Tom, 1964-72 (Morobe) D
Awol, Brere, 1968-77 (West Sepik) D
Azanifa,Bono, 1967-72,1973-77 (Eastern
Highlands) D
D
Bubec, Bob, 1987-97 (Western) D
Buchanan, Dennis, 1968-72 (Eastern Highlands) D
Burege, Esorom, 1987-92 (East New
Britain) D
Buseng, Phillip, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
Baing, Andrew, 1992-97 (Morobe) D

Bais, Anthony Luke, 1977-87 (Eas Sepik)
D
Baiyang, Kui, 1972-77 (Madang) D
Bakani, Gabriel, 1977-82 (West New
Britain) D
Balakau, Malipu, 1987-97 (Enga) P
Barrett, Donald, 1964-68 (East New
Britain) P
Barter, Peter, 1992-97 (Madang) P
Bam, Nappotti, 1992-97 (Sandaun) D
Bebe, Onamauta, 1972-77 (Eastern Highlands) D
Bele, Raphael, 1972-75, 1977-92 (North
Solomons) D
Belo, Yano, 1968-82(SouthernHighlands)
Casey, Noel Michael, 1968-72 (Eastern

Highlands) D
Chan, Julius, 1968-97 (New Ireland) D
Chatterton, Percy, 1964-68, 1968-72
(Central/NC.D) PD
Clowes, Waliyato, 1977-82 (Western) D
[female)
Counsel, Virgil, 1968-72 (Western & Gulf)
p
D
Bendumb, Mathew, 1977-92 (Morobe) D
Beona, Gerald, 1982-92 (Milne Bay) D
Berghuser, Hugo, 1987-92 (National
Capital) P
Beu, David, 1987-92 (Oro) D
Bilas, Angmai Simon, 1968-82 (Madang)
D
Biri, Delba, 1977-82 (Simbu) D
Biritu, Ugi, 1964-88 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Bloomfield, William, 1964-66 (Morobe) D
Boas, Obed, 1972-77 (New Ireland) P
Bokap, Daniel, 1968-72 (New Ireland) D
Bolt, Talu, 1977-82 (Western Highlands)
D
Bomai, Ninkama, 1968-77 (Simbu) D
Bonga, Timothy, 1982-92 (Morobe) D
Bonggere, Karigi, 1968-77 (Simbu) D
Bouraga, Philip, 1982-87 (National Capital) p
Bourne, Neville, 1978-87 (Morobe) D
Brokam, Nicholas, 1964-68 (New Ireland)
Damena, Goasa, 1978-82 (National Capital) D

Daugi, Mackenzie, 1972-77 (Oro) P
Dewe, Konia Mark, 1977-82 (Simbu) D
Dibela, Kingsford, 1976-82 (Milne Bay) D
Diria, Kaibelt, 1964-77 (Western Highlands) D
Diro, Edward, 1982-92 (Central) P
Doa, Raphael, 1976-82 (Western Highlands) P
Doi, Akoka, 1977-92 (Oro) D
Doi, Popou Malenggu, 1972-77 (Morobe)
D
Downs, Ian F.G., 1964-68 (Eastern Highlands) P
Duba, Kaura, 1968-69 (Western Highlands) D
Dutton, Warren, 1968-72, 1977-87
(Western) D
Duwabane, Gai, 1977-92 (Eastern Highlands) D
Ebei'al, Tegi, 1968-72 (Southern Highlands) D
Ebu, Allan, 1987-92 (Gulf) D
Edimani, Justine, 1977-82 (Milne Bay) D
Egaiano, lnuabe, 1972-77 (Simbu) D
Egilio, Joseph, 1992-97 (New Ireland) D
Eichhorn, William, 1972-82 (East Sepik)
555
Appendix II
D
Elo, Paiale, 1977-82 (Southern Highlands)
D
Embahe, Wesley, 1977-82 (Oro) P
Embel, Philemon, 1987-97 (Southern
Highlands) D
Endekan, Kantigane, 1968-72 (Simbu) D
Esef, Camillo, 1992-97 (Central) D
Eupu, Edric, 1964-68 (Oro) D
Evara, Ava Roy, 1977-87, 1992-97 (Gulf)
D
Evennett, Norman, 1968-70 (Milne Bay) D
Farapo, Tony, 1982-87 (Gulf) P
Fielding, William, 1968-72 (Oro) P
Fifita, John Camma, 1972-77 (Milne Bay)
D
Foieke, Simon Ngu' n, 1977-92 (Central) D
Gaige, Peter, 1987-97 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Gainda, Mafuk, 1977-87 (Madang) D
Gam, Rauke (Dana), 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Garong, Peter, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Garrett, Jason, J., 1968-72 (Madang) P
Garry, Ben, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Garui, Benson, 1987-92 (Oro) P
Genia, Jack, 1982-97 (Central) D
Giheno, John, 1982-92 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Gilmore, Graham, 1964-77 (Eastern Highlands) P
Giregire, Sinake, 1964-77 (Eastern Highlands) D
Goiye, Waguo, 1977-82 (Simbu) D
Guise, John, 1964-75, 1977-82 (Milne
Bay)D
Gukguk, Walla, 1977-81 (New Ireland) D
Gwaju, Gidisa, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
Habe, Dambali, 1977-82 (Southern Highlands) D
Hai, Billy, 1977-82 (Eastern Highlands) D
Haiveta, Chris, 1992-97 (Enga) D
Harepa, Paulus, 1976-77 (North Solomons)
p
Hepau, Lainus, 1973-77 (East Sepik) D
Hesingut, Henu, 1982-92 (Morobe) D

Holloway, Barry, 1964-68, 1972-87 (Eastem Highlands) DP
Horik, Tom, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Humphreys, Henry C., 1972-77, 1982-87
(West New Britain) D
Iangalyo, Leme, 1964-72 (Enga) D
Iangalio, Masket, 1987-97 (Enga) D
ljape, Mathias, 1987-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Ila, Tony, 1972-92 (Morobe) D
Ipuia, Mark, 1977-87 (Enga) D
ltu, Danile, 1987-92 (Gulf) D
Iuanga, Joseph, 1972-77 (Simbu) D
Iuri, Poio, 1964-72 (Enga) D
Ivarato, Aita, 1987-97 (Eastern Highlands)
p
Iwoksim, Wesani, 1968-72, 1977-82(West

Sepik) D
Jaminan, John, 1977-83, 1992-97 (East
Sepik) D
Jephcott, Bruce R., 1972-82 (Madang) P
Johnson, Peter G, 1968-72 (East Sepik) D
Jovopa, McKenzie, 1982-87 (Oro) D
Kabai, Toromble, 1972-77 (East Sepik) D
Kakarya, Pato, 1972-87 (Enga) D
Kakun, Mangobing, 1968-72 (Eastern
Highlands) D
Kalagune, Undaprnaina, 1977-78 (Eastern
Highlands) D
Kale, Kobale, 1972-77 (Sirnbu) D
Kamb, John, 1992-97 (Sirnbu) D
Kambipi, Traimya, 1968-77 (Western
Highlands) D
Kamod, Paul, 1982-92 (Madang) D
Kanadi, John, 1992-97 (Mile Bay) D
Kange, Pundia, 1977-87 (Southern Highlands) D
Kaniniba, Michael, 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Kapalik, Silingi, 1977-82 (Morobe) D
Kapena, Toua, 1968-72 (Central) D
Kaputin, John, 1972-97 (East New Britain)
D
Karo, Albert, 1992-97 (National Capital) D
556
Karani, Mathias, 1992-97 (Eastern Highlands) D

Karava, Gabriel E., 1964-68 (Gulf) D
Kannel, Anskar, 1972-77 (West Sepik) D
Karo, Albert, 1987-92 (National Capital) D
Kasau, Pikah Leli, 1972-77 (Manus) P
Kaumi, Simon, 1992-97 (Oro) D
Kaupa, John Numoi, 1972-77 (Simbu) D
Kavali, Thomas, 1969-82 (Western Highlands) D
Kavori, Jerry, 1987-92 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Kawo, Marcus, 1972-77 (Madang) D
Kernen, Neapukali, 1980-87 (Enga) D
Kenu, Wegra, 1964-68 (West Sepik) D
Kepi, Billy, 1987-88 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Kiki, Albert Maori, 1972-77 (Central/
NCD)D
Kimi, Atiheme, 1972-73 (Eastern Highlands) D
Kiniyafa, Malo, 1982-87 (Eastern Highlands) D
Kipilan, Albert, 1982-97 (Enga) D
Kofikai, Sabumei, 1968-72 (Eastern Highlands) D
Koimanrea, Francis, 1992-97 (East New
Britain) P
Koki, Alois, 1979-97 (East New Britain) D
Konga, Nakikus, 1992-97 (East New
Britain) D
Kor, Ibne, 1972-82 (Southern Highlands)
D
Koraea, Tom, 1968-72, 1972-82, 1992-97
(Gulf) D
Korowaro, Bebes, 1982-87 (Eastern Highlands) D
Korowi, Wiwa, 1977-82, 1987-92(Southem
Highlands) P
Kouk, Bitak, 1992-97 (Western) D
Kroki'e, Sunnunku, 1977-82 (Eastern
Highlands) D
Kuman, Peter Kakep, 1982-92 (Simbu) DP
Kurnun, Nebar, 1977-82 (Simbu) D
Kunangel, Opai, 1977-82 (Western Highlands) D
Kungka, Peter, 1987-92 (North Solomons)
D
Kungo, Tani, 1977-87 (Morobe) D
Kupul, James, 1977-82, 1987-92 (Western
Highlands) D
Kuri, Parua, 1972-87 (Western Highlands)
D
Kurondo, Siwi, 1968-72 (Simbu) D
Kwan, Perry, 1972-77 (New Ireland) D
Kwarara, Geleva, 1977-92 (Central) D
Laimo, Michael, 1992-97 (North Solomons) D
Laki, Philip, 1982-97 (East Sepik) D
Lang, Galen, 1987-92 (Madang) D
Langro, Paul, 1968-77 (West Sepik) P
Lapun, Paul, 1964-77 (North Solomons) D
Lasaro, Iairo, 1987-97 (Milne Bay) D
Lau, Tenda, 1987-92 (Enga) D
Lawi, Kindi, 1982-87 (Western Highlands)
p
Leahy, Thomas J., 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Lemeki, Jacob Tali a, 1977-92 (Milne Bay)
D
Levi, Noel, 1977-87 (New Ireland) P
Levy, Keith, 1964-68 (Western Highlands)
D
Libe, Balus, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands)
D
Lokoloko, Tore, 1968-77 (Gulf) D
Lowa, Patterson, 1977 (National Capital),
1987-97 (West New Britain) D
Lue, Joseph Adrian, 1968-72 (North
Solomons) P
Lus, Pita, 1964-97 (East Sepik) D
Lussick, Walter, 1968-72 (Manus and New
Ireland) P
Magnolias, Waitea, 1972-77 (Enga) D
Mai, David Garo, 1992-97 (Simbu) P
Mai, Halalu, 1982-92 (Southern Highlands) D
Maibawa, Castan, 1987-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Maie, Gideon Apeng, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
Maina, Naipuri, 1972-77 (Western) P
Maino, Anani, 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Makiba, Marabe, 1982-92 (Southern High-
557
Appendix//
lands) D
Maladina, Johnson, 1987-92 (Milne Bay)
D
Malip, Pius, 1987-92 (East Sepik) D
Maloat, Paliau, 1964-72 (Manus) D
Mambei, Paul, 1992-97 (Sandaun) D
Mambon, Steven, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Maneke, John, 1968-72, 1972-77 (West
New Britain) D
Manlel, Paul, 1964-68 (West New Britain)
D
Mano, Koitage, 1972-77 (Western Highlands) D
Marsipal, Arnold, 1983-97 (Manus) P
Martin, Frank, 1964-68 (East Sepik/
Madang) P
Masa, Galopo, 1972-82 (West New Britain)
Masani, Tukape, 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Masive, Kevin, 1992-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Matiabe, Aruru. 1982-92 (Southern Highlands) D
Matias, Yambumbe, 1977-82 (East Sepik)
D
Matibri, Suguman, 1964-68 (Madang) D
Matik, John, 1972-77 (East Sepik) D
McKinnon, James C., 1968-72 (Madang)
D
Meanggarum, James, 1964-72 (Madang) D
Mel, Michael, 1987-92 (Western Highlands) D
Melo, Tambu, 1964-68 (Southern Highlands) D
Merimba, Wagi, 1987-92 (Simbu) D
Miakwe, Akepa, 1972-82 (Eastern Highlands) D
Micah, Ben, 1992-97 (New Ireland) D
Middleton, John M., 1968-77 (Madang) D
Mirau, Gaudi, 1964-68 (Morobe) D
Mo, Makain, 1968-72 (West Sepik) D
Moar, Kare, 1977-87 (Madang) D
Mola, Donatus, 1968-77 (North Solomons)
D
Momis, John, 1972-76, 1977-97 (North
Solomons) P
Mona, Louis Sebu, 1968-87 (Central) D
Mopio, James Eki, 1976-81 (Central) P
Morea, Sevese, 1977-82 (National Capital)
D
Motawiya, Gerald Beona, 1992-97 (Milne
Bay)D
Muliap, Tom, 1982-97 (Madang) D
Mump, Genjim, 1982-87 (Madang) D
Mumurit, Simon, 1982-87 (Milne Bay) D
Mune, Dick, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands) P
Nagle, Robert, 1992-97 (Western Highlands) D
Nalau, Jerry Kasip, 1992-97 (Morobe) P
Nali, Michael, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands) D
Namaliu, Rabbie, 1982-97 (East New
Britain) D
Napo, Samson C., 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Narokobi, Bernard 1987-97 (East Sepik) D
Negints, Thomas, 1982-92 (Western Highlands) D
Netin, Bob, 1992-97 (Sandaun) D
Neville, Ronald, 1964-77 (Southern Highlands) P
Neville, Tim, 1992-97 (Milne Bay) P
Ni, Pyange, 1977-78 (Western Highlands)
D
Niall, H.L.R., 1964-68 (Morobe) P
Nilkare, John, 1982-87, 1992-97 (Simbu)
PD
Nilles, John, 1970-72 (Simbu) P
Nimambot, Patik, 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Niniku, Raphael, 1976-77 (North Solomons) D
Ninkama, Bill, 1982-92 (Simbu) D
Noaio, Aron, 1977-92 (Gulf) D
Noel, John, 1977-82 (Milne Bay) D
Nugints,Mek, 1968-77, 1978-82(Western
Highlands) D
Numi, John, 1982-92 (Simbu) D
0' Shannessy, Thomas, 1972-77 (East
Sepik) D
Oala-Rarua, Oala, 1968-72 (Central) P
Ogio, Michael, 1987-97 (North Solomons)
D
Okona, Amenao, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
558
Okora, Kerenga, 1992-97 (Simbu) D

Okuk, Iambakey, 1972-82 (Simbu), 198386 (Eastern Highlands)
Olewale, Niwia Ebia, 1968-82 (Western)
D
Onguglo, Joseph, 1992-97 (Simbu) D
Onzenga, Johnny, 1977-82 (Morobe) D
Orea, John, 1992-97 (Central) P
Oringawai, Godfried, 1992-97 (Madang) D
Otio, Suinavi, 1972-87 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Ou, Pena, 1968-77 (Western Highlands) D
Pais, Tom, 1982-92 (Madang) P
Palme, Roger, 1982-87 (Western Highlands) D
Pakena, Anton, 1992-97 (Enga) D
Pangia!, Momei, 1964-77 (Southern Highlands) D
Parao, Anton, 1972-77 (Western Highlands/Enga) P
Pariwa, Samuel, 1987-97 (Madang) D
Parua, Reuben, 1992-97 (Western Highlands) D
Pasom, Singin, 1964-68 (Morobe) D
Pasquarelli, John, 1964-68 (East Sepik) D
Pasul, Nenk, 1972-77 (Enga) D
Paua, Joel, 1982-92 (Western Highlands)
D
Pelika, Thomas N., 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Pep, Melchior, 1987-92 (Western Highlands) D
Pepena, Gerega, 1977-82 (Central) D
Philemon, Bart, 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Philemon, Titus, 1992-97 (Milne Day) D
Pil, Stanley, 1992-97 (Madang) D
Pilisa, Kamena, 1982-87 (Western) D
Poe, John Baptist, 1968-77 (Madang) D
Pokasui, James, 1987-92 (Manus) D
Pokia, John, 1972-77 (Eastern Highlands)
D
Pondros, Michael, 1972-83 (Manus) D
Pople, Graham H.J., 1964-68 (Simbu) D
Pora, Paul, 1987-97 (Western Highlands)
D
Posai, Andrew, 1992-97 (West New
Britain) D
Poye, Clement, 1977-82 (Simbu) D

Pundari, John, 1992-97 (Enga) D
Pusal, Francis, 1982-87 (Southern Highlands) P
Pyne, Eric James, 1968-70 (Simbu) P
Ramoi, Gabriel, 1982-92 (West Sepik/Sandaun) D
Rarua, Mahuru Rarua, 1977-87 (National
Capital) D
Rarupu, Eriko, 1964-68 (Central/NCO) D
Rea, Gavera, 1972-77 (Centrali(National
C.apital) D
Rem, Wokam, 1977-82 (Madang) D
Rimoru, Opotio, 1977-82 (Madang) D
Riyong, Yauwe, 1992-97 (Simbu) D
Rooney, Nahau, 1977-87 (Manus) D
[female]
Ruddaka, Andrew, 1987-92 (Central) D
Sabumei, Ben, 1987-92 (Eastern Highlands) D
Sali, Boyamo, 1972-87 (Morobe) P
Samana, Utula, 1987-92 (Morobe) P
Sambre, Christopher, 1977-97 (West
Sepik/Sandaun) D
Sangumai, Pius, 1982-87 (West New
Britain) D
Saonu, Ginson, D., 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Sasakila, Moses, 1972-77 (Eastern Highlands) D
Sauinambi, Nauwi, 1964-68 (East Sepik)
D
Sauk, Jimson Papaki, 1992-97 (Enga) D
Saul, Jimson, 1987-92
Sawasi, Babadi, 1987-92 (Western) D
Seravo, Viviso, 1992-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Seregi, Nagibo, 1977-82 (Morobe) D
Siaguru, Anthony, 1982-87 (National
Capital) D
Siembo, Sylvanus, 1992-97 (Oro) P
Sigulogo, Gerard, 1987-92 (New Ireland)
p
Simogen, Pita, 1964-68 (East Sepik) D
Sinamoi, Brown, 1985-92 (Simbu) D
Singan, Michael, 1987-92 (New Ireland) P
559
Appendix I/
Singeri, Buaki, 1972-77 (Morobe) D
Singiliong, Meek, 1968-72 (Morobe) D
Sio, Stephen, 1977-82 (West Sepik) D
Sisioka, Pawa, 1982-92 (Simbu) D
Siune, Waiye, 1972-77 (Simbu) D
Skate, Bill, 1992-97 (National Capital) P
Slaughter, Stanton R., 1972-77 (Central) D
Somare, Michael, 1968-97 (East Sepik) P
Sowa, Gunia, 1992-97 (Eastern Highlands)
Stack, Karl Kitchens, 1977-92 (West
Sepik/Sandaun) P
Ston, Asimboro, 1977-87 (East Sepik) D
Stuntz, John Ronald, 1964-68 (Milne Bay)
p
Suckling, Robert, 1987-97 (National
Capital) D
Suja, Wilson, 1968-72 (Oro) D
Swokin, Kala, 1977-92 (Western) P
Tabua, Robert, 1964-68 (Western) D
Tago, Stephen, 1972-82, 1982-87 (Oro) DP
Tai, Kim, 1992-97 (Western Highlands) D
Talis, Yakob, 1968-77 (West Sepik) D
Tamindei, Pita, 1964-68 (East Sepik) D
Tammur, Oscar, 1968-82 (East New
Britain) D
Tanao, Avusi, 1982-97 (Eastern Highlands) D
Tapineng, Felix, 1982-92 (West Sepik/Sandaun) D
Taureka, Reuben, 1972-77 (Central) D
Tekwie, John, 1992-97 (Sandaun) P
Temo, Anthony, 1987-97 (Southern Highlands) D
Tetley, Keith, 1964-68 (Gulf) D
Thompson, Martin, 1992-97 (Manus) D
Tiaba, Handabe, 1964-68 (Southern Highlands) D
Titimur, Epineri, 1968-72 (East New
Britain) D
Tito, Epel, 1982-87 (New Ireland) D
ToBaining, Ereman, 1982-92 (East New
Britain) P
Tohian, Paul, 1992-97 (New Ireland) P
ToKereku, Damien, 1972-77, 1977-82
(East New Britain) DP
Toliman, Stanis B., 1972-77 (Madang) D
Toliman, Mathias, 1974-87 (East New

Britain) D
Tomu, Soso, 1982-92 (Southern Highlands) D
Torato, Paul, 1977-87 (Enga) P
Tou, Bewa, 1972-77 (West Sepik) D
ToVadek, Martin, 1974-87 (East New
Britain) D
Tul, David, 1982-87 (Simbu) D
Tulapi, Daniel Bali, 1992-97 (Southern
Highlands) D
Tulo, Sam, 1977-87 (North Solomons) D
Tuya, Theo, 1987-92 (Madang) D
Ulia, Kokomo, 1968-72 (East Sepik) D
Umut, Stoi, 1964-68 (Madang) D
Unagi, David, 1987-97 (National Capital)
D
Ungunaibe, Awali, 1972-75 (Southern
Highlands) D
Ungunaibe, Tombol, 1975-77 (Southern
Highlands) D
Urekit, Koriam M, 1964-78 (East New
Britain) D
Uroe, Nathaniel Ian, 1968-72 (Central) D
Vagi, Legu, 1982-87 (National Capital) D
Voeto, Manasseh, 1968-78 (Morobe) D
Vogae, Bernard, 1987-92 (West New
Britain) D
Voutas, Anthony C., 1966-68, 1968-72
(Morobe) DP
Wabiria, Andrew, 1968-77 (Southern
Highlands) D
Waiba, Bai, 1982-87 (Southern Highlands)
D
Waiko, John, 1992-97 (Oro) D
Waim, Jim Yer, 1987-92 (Simbu) D
Wainzo, Ainde, 1987-92 (Morobe) D
Waka, Lucas, 1977-97 (West New Britain)
p
Wamaro, Dere, 1992-97 (Western) P

Wan, George, 1992-97 (Madang) D
Wanjik, Paul, 1982-97 (East Sepik) D
Ward, Timothy J., 1970-77 (Milne Bay),
1987-97 (Madang) D
560
Warebu, Muriso, 1964-72 (Eastern Highlands) D

Warena, Glaima, 1977-87 (Southern Highlands) D
Wari, Turi, 1968-77 (Southern Highlands)
D
Watson, Lepani, 1964-72 (Milne Bay) D
Watts, John R., 1968-72 (Western Highlands) P
Wautia, Dobobai, 1972-77 (Gulf) D
Wauwe, Yauwi, 1964-72 (Simbu) D
Wauwia, John, 1984-92 (East Sepik) D
Wemalo, Willard, 1982-87 (Morobe) D
Wes, Micah, 1982-87 (West Sepik) D
Wii, William, 1982-97 (Western Highlands) D
Wili, Wena, 1972-77 (Simbu) D
Wingti, 1977-87, 1987-97 (Western Highlands) DP
W onhenai, Krenen, 1972-77 (Western) D
Yabanoya, Labi, 1982-87 (Eastern Highlands) D
Yabara, Robert, 1977-84 (Simbu) D
Yagabo, Dibara, 1992-97 (Central) D
Yago, Mathew, 1992-97 (Southern Highlands) D
Yaka, John, 1977-87 (Enga) D
Yaki, Roy, 1987-97 (Southern Highlands)

D
Yakip, James, 1987-92 (Madang) D
Yaliwan, Matias Wabiju, 1972-73 (East
Sepik) D
Y ama, Peter, 1992-97 (Madang) D
Yamandi, Amos, 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Yarn, Girl, 1977-87 (Morobe) D
Yawo, Wap, 1977-82, 1987-92 (West
Sepik/Sandaun) D
Yembanda, Beibi, 1968-72 (East Sepik) D
Yomo, Philip, 1992-97 (Simbu) D
Young, Dennis, 1972-77, 1982-92 (Milne
Bay)P
Yulaki, Yubiti, 1977-82 (Eastern Highlands) D
Yuwi, Matiabe, 1968-82 (Southern Highlands) D
Zeipi, Perry, 1982-97 (Western) D
Zeroing, Soling, 1992-97 (Morobe) D
Zurenuoc, Zibang, 1977-82 (Morobe) D
Zurenuoc, Zure, 1964-68 (Morobe) D
Source: Jackson Rannells, A Fact Book on

Modern Papua New Guinea, Melbourne,
1990, pp. 84-90; Times of PNG, 9 July
1992.
INDEX
Major index entries begin with bold typeface.

Abaijah, Dame Josephine (MHA Central),
xxvii, 153,156,172-3,193-7,204,211,
218,221,232-3,235,238-9,246,248,250,
261,270,275,277,302-3,310,313,322,
331,359,430
Abal, Sir Tei (MHA Wabag), 3, 31, 35, 50,
51,52,118-9,125,153,155,161,168,182,
184,230,242,276,294,301-2
Min. Agriculture, Stock & Fisheries, 57,
144
Min. Public Utilities, 328
Opposition Leader, 210, 221, 224, 229,
236-7,247,255-7,263-5,290,309,331
Tarangu Pty Ltd, Dir., 265
Abe, Dirona (MHA), xxv, 49
candidate for Central Regional, 275
Abel, Sir Cecil (MHA Milne Bay), xxxi, 10,
20,38,46,53, 70
Administrative College. See Public Service
Administration
Administrator, xix, xxiv, 2-3, 17, 28,44,47,
49,51,57,64,69-70,76,84,88,95,97,
100-2, 108, 112, 115, 117, 120-1, 1234,128-9,131-2,134-6,138,140-1,1456,149,154-5,157,162,184,196-7,204.
See also High Commissioner
Assistant Administrator, 2, 5-6, 13
Council, xxii, xxiv, 3, 23, 25-6, 29, 44
Defence, 166
Department of, 88-9, 142, 157
Deputy Administrator, 135
Executive Council (AEC), xxii, xxiv, 13,
44-6,53,57,60,63,67,87,97, 102,105,
ll1, 114-5, 117, 118-9, 121, 123, 1289, 138, 145, 146-7, 154, 156-7, 162-3,
171, 176
International Affairs Branch, 166

Staff Conference, xxiii
See also Local Government
Agaundo, Kondom. See Kondom
Age (Melbourne), 3-5, 237
Agriculture
cash crops, 8, 287,311
cocoa, 126-8, 135-7, 147, 201, 244, 25960,295-6,311,355,392,416
coconut oil, 259
coffee, xxviii, 8, 158, 244, 259-60, 293,
295-6,311,355,361,374,392,429
export licences, 418
International Coffee Agreement, 158
International Coffee Organisation, 392
Kumul Kopi Export Co., 387,418
levy proposed, 293
mills, 219
rust disease, 421,423-4,431,433
Coffee Development Authority, 424, 431
Coffee Industry Assoc., 403
Coffee Marketing Board, 158,416, 418
copra, 38, 158, 201, 244, 261, 296, 355,
361,392,416
Copra Industry Stabilisation Board, 158
development, 38, 177
exports, 220, 244
food crops, 164
garden magic, 140
marketing boards, 416
palm oil, 259, 273, 289, 392
prices, 201
production figures, 24
rice, 27, 220, 427
rubber, 38, 296
Rural Development Programme, 206
Stabilisation Funds, 361,392,416,429
sugar cane, 220, 332
562
sweet potato, 8
tea,201,259-60,296
timber. See Forestry
tree crops, 68
vegetables, 220
See also Bank of Agriculture; Cooperatives; Departments: Forestry
Ahi, Karo, Huon LGC, Pres., 19
Air Niugini. See Transport
Aitape, xxvi
Alar, Mr, interim Premier, East New Britain
Province, 332
Alatas, Prof. Syer Hussein, 364
Alcohol, 24-5, 261
abuse, 149,216,245,265,293
Comm. of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink,
149
Okuk's election beer party (1983), 370
sale banned, 204, 247
Allen, Dr W., UN visiting mission, 39
Amaiu, Tom (MHA), Min. Corrective
Institutions, 444, 455
Min. Housing, 444
Amet, Mr Justice, Diro Leadership Tribunal,
505
Amin, Idi, Pres. of Uganda, 297
Ampoai, Siverenus, Bougainville businessman,468
Anakapu, Penuelli, 10
Anaya, Benny, OPM leader, 446
ANG house, Port Moresby, 34
Anglican church, xxix, 141, 196, 201
Angua, Casper (MHA Bogia), Min. Labour
& Employment, 363
Anio, Pama, 133
Anis,Pedi
Ex. Off. to Momis, 425
Premier, New Ireland Province, 425, 454,
486,493
Ank, William (MHA)
Min. Administrative Affairs, 479
PPP, expelled from, 491
Anthony, Doug, Aust. Country Party leader,
158
Anthony, James, ANU post-graduate student,
40
Aoae, Joseph (MHA)
Min. Education, 444
Min. Forests, 356
Aparima, Lennie (MHA), Min. of State,
Public Service, 348, 354
Arawa. See Bougainville
Arek, Paulus (MHA Ijivitari), xxviii, 64, 78,

155
Min. Information & Extension Services,
156, 186, 198
SCCD, Chair., 90, 96, 100-1, ll5, 120-1,
170
Arek. Sergius (MHA), 322
Ariako, Andrew, Premier, Madang Province,
424,480
Ariks, Johan, xxx
Ashton, 0.1. (Roy) (MHA East & West New
Britain), 7, 50, 84, 92
Min. Public Works, 57, 61,63
Asiba, Gerai, 10, 68
Assassination. See Political
Aule, Navy
Premier, Milne Bay Province, 425
Shell executive, 425
Australia
imports from, 285
investments in PNG, 495
Australia and New Guinea Holdings, 166
Australian business interests in PNG, 427-8
Australian Council for Trade Unions (ACTU),
41
Australian Country Party, 102, 130, 158
Australian government
Aborigines
1967 Referendum, xxiii
attitude to, xxiii, 116, 460
Air Force, 140, 480
Archives, 159
armed forces, 58, 149, 236
operation "Cocoana", 209
seconded to PNG Defence Force, 310
Australia House, London, 241
Australian Broadcasting Commission
(ABC), 61,85-7, 150, 161, 176,375
James Nyaro interview, Four Corners,
381
Australian New Guinea Administrative
Unit (Angau), xx, xxix
Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO), 368
Burns Philp subsidy, 28
citizenship applications, 254
Civil Aviation, 23, 115, 206
Conciliation and Arbitration
Commission, 12,28
constitution, 252
currency, 429-30
defence, 23
563
Index
Dep. Aboriginal Affairs, 292
Dep. Education & Science, 24, 77
Dep. External Affairs, 3, 17, 97
Dep. External Territories, 5, 32, 40, 41, 42,
43, 71, 76, 100, 104, 145, 183
Dep. Foreign Affairs, 292
Dep. Labour & National Service, 41
Dep. Territories. See External
Territories
Development Assistance Agency, 250
Development Bank, 24
Governor-General, 12, 17, 33, 44, 45, 46,
52,56, 71, 76,146,155,224,238,247,
256
High Court, 252
House of Representatives, 5, 48,230
immigration policy, 17
Indonesia, relations with, 368
Irian Jaya
attitude to, 80, 368
border, 273, 326
refugees, 414
Jackson Committee of Australia Aid Program (1985), 401
Joint Australian Parliamentary Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
401,507
League of Nations Mandated Territory, xix
local government, attitude to, 89
Minister External Territories, 1-3, 13, 49,
62. See also Barnes; Morrison; Peacock
Minister, Transport, 201
Papua. See below
Papua New Guinea
Administration, xvi, xix-xxv
devolution of decision making, 1145
Agreed Statement on Security Cooperation,507
Commercial and Trade Relations
Agreement (1991), 507
aid to, 24, 99, 157, 175, 181, 185, 218,
248,272~,286,295,318,337,341,
355,364,367,376,392,401,427,
445,481
National Audit Office Report, 506
Defence Cooperation Agreement, 495
Development Cooperation Treaty, 481
High Commission, 247,298,480
phone bugging accusation, 367,368
High Commissioner, 204, 224, 232, 235,
247,369
Investment Protection and Promotion

Pact (1990), 495
Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreement (1991), 507
Joint Declaration of Principles (1987),
445
Papua Act 1905, xix
Papua [and] New GuineaAct 1949, xxi,
72, 183
revised 1968, xxvi, 72, 183
Papua-New Guinea Provisional Administration Act 1945, xviii
PNG-Australia Commercial and Trade
Relations Agreement, 495
PNG-Australia Trade and Commercial
Relations Agreement, 481
post-Independence relationship with
PNG, 271, 381, 427
See also Administrator
Prime Minister, 4, 32, 213
See also Gorton; McMahon; Whitlam
Public Service, 64, 97, 173-5,206
See also below
quarantine agreement, 495
Royal Australian Navy band, 247
Seas and Submerged lAnds Act, 252
Senate Inquiry into the Army, 209
Seventh State concept, 6, 9, 17-9,22,33,
52
Torres Strait, 166
border dispute, 243,251-3,292
legislation, 297, 320, 326
See also Foreign Affairs
Trans-Australia Airlines (TAA), 61
United Nations
attitude to, 39
New Guinea Trust Territory, xix
veto, right of, 138
"White Australia Policy", xxiii
Australian Institute of Directors, 215
Australian Institute of International Affairs,
270
Australian Institute of Political Science, 33
Australian National Capital Development
Commission, 2
Australian National University, 40
New Guinea Research Unit, 120, 168, 171
Australian public opinion on PNG, 28
Australian School of Pacific Administration
(ASOPA), 157
Australian, 4, 17,32-3, 80
Australian University Law Schools Assoc.,
564
115
Avei, Moi, 196
candidate for Central Regional, 275
Pangu, Pres., 210, 222, 264
resigned, 276
research officer CM's Office, 210, 222
Village Development Task Force, 264, 290,
275
Avi, Patrick, candidate for Central Regional,
275
Avosa, Seaea, 171
Ex. Off. CPC, 213
Awasa, Tom (MHA Huon Gulf), 387, 398
Min. Religion, Youth, Recreation and
Women, 363, 389
Awol, Brere, MBE (MHA West Sepik
Coastal), 71, 86
Azanifa, Bono (MHA Henganofi), 17
Dais, Tony (MHA Wewak), 309,314
Min. Justice, 363
Bakani, Gabriel (MHA)
Baki, Gari
Chief Inspector, 469, 484
Commander of the Mobile Squads, 484
coup attempt, 484
treason charge, 484
Balakau, Malipu (MHA)
Min. Communications, assassinated, 478
Balandier, Georges, 190
Bale, Fide, women's group
demonstration, 407-8
Banking,24
Agriculture Bank, 417,423,431
ANZ Bank, 312
Asian Development Bank, 491-2
Bank ofPNG, 201,345-6,492
Governor, 76
Quarterly Economic Bulletin. 392,422,
486
deregulation, 423
PNG Banking Corporation, 206, 492
strike, 403
See below Development Bank
Banono, John, candidate for Bougainville Regional, 279
Barnes, C.E., Aust. Min. Territories, l, 3-5,
12-3, 15,34,42-3,45-6,48, 50, 65, 67, 71,
76-7,79-81,85,103-5,111,114,122,130,
133-3, 145, 149, 156-7
Independence, attitude to, 17, 22,32-3, 138

Barnett, Mr Justice T., 442. See also Forestry
Enquiry
Barrett, Donald (MHA), xxvi, 25, 29, 47, 49,
52,79,89
Basor, Alexander, USSR Ambassador, Australia, 260
Batton, Dr Ilimo, 10
Beatty, David, Dir. of Planning, 207, 291
Beazley, Kim sr., Aust Labor Minister, 33, 48,
89, 120
Beazley, Kim jr., Australian Labor Minister,
445
Beeby, Dr C.E., former NZ Dir. Education, 77
Beilby, Malcolm, 72
Bele, Raphael (MHA Central Bougainville),
84,278,472
resignation announced, 235
Bellaard, Andree Margaret, restaurateur, 16
Belo, Yano (MHA Kagua-Erave)
Min. Housing & Supply, 262
Min. State, assisting Min. Decentralisation,
328
Min. Works, 198,328
Bendumb, Mathew (MHA Bulolo), 488,489
Min. Home Affairs, 489
Min. Transport & Civil Aviation, 363
Berghuser, Sir Hugo (MHA), 451,456
Min. Civil Aviation, 444
Min. Civil Aviation, Culture & Tourism,
444
Best, Lloyd, 164
Beu, David (MHA Sohe), 453
Bika, John
North Solomons Min. Commerce, 470;
assassinated, 472
Bilas, Angmai (MHA Madang), 50, 302
Min. Trade & Industry, 57
Taiangu Pty Ltd, Dir., 265
Birch, Robert, Australian High Commissioner, 369
Biri, Delba (MHA)
Min. Corrective Institutions, 328
Min. Justice, 328
Biritu, Ugi (MHA Henganofi), 17
Biu, Mr. Deputy Speaker, East New Britain
Province, 332
Bjelke-Petersen, Job, Qld Premier, 166,251-
2
Black & White, 86
Boas, Obed (MHA)
Member, Ministerial Nomination Commit-
Index
tee, 197
Bogagu, Brian, 133
Bomai, Ninkama (MHA Gumine), 90, 303
Bonay, Eleizer, xxx
Bonga, Timothy (MHA), Min. Home Affairs,
489
Bougainville, xvi, 271
air strips dug up, 278
Arawa,84,96,234,245
Arawa Bulletin, 267
Arawa plantation, 81, 83-5
Arovo Island tourist resort, 284
Bougainville Airways, 234, 268
Bougainville Copper Agreement, xxvii, 176
Ministerial Review Committee, 468
Momis' "Bougainville Initiative", 434
PLA Trust Fund, 468
renegotiation, 176-7, 212-3, 215, 221,
231,235,244,267,273,289,462,470
Bougainville Copper Pty Ltd (BCL), 96,
153,158,166,176,244,267,350,461,
466
executive shot, 482
mine shut-down, 353,467,471,482
revenue, 214, 267, 355, 367, 376, 392,
434
taxation, 206, 214
Bougainville Development Corporation,
284
Bougainville Initiative, 461
Bougainville Resources Joint Venture, 485
Bougainville Workers' Union strike, 245
Buin, 242, 279, 482
Buka Island, xvi, 267
Carteret Island, 484
Central Bougainville Open electorate, 279
civil war, 467-473,480,482-3,497-8
Administrator appointed, 484
Amnesty International, 470
Australian-donated Iroquois helicopters,
499
Australian electronic monitoring, 507-8
Bougainville-Revolutionary Army (BRA),
468,471,483,498
Buin,482
Buka,482,498,499
Liberation Front, 484
Carteret Island, 499
ceasefire talks, 473, 483, 499
communications blackout, 484
compensation claim, 462, 468
Endeavour Accord, 484, 497
565
Honiara Declaration, 497
Kaveria jail siege, 482
Kieta wharf, 498
Kongara valley, 482
mine shutdown, 467
multinational peace force called for, 498
Nissan Island, 484, 499
peace ceremony, 4 72
peace talks, 484, 497
PNG Defence Force
booby traps authorised, 472
Honiara Defence Accord broken, 498
involvement, 468-9, 471
Operation Footloose, 482
Police, 469,483
raid moratorium, 469,471
Republic of Meekamui declared, 483
sabotage, 462, 468
State of Emergency, 468, 471, 482
curfew, 468
Task Force, 499
terrorism, 468
See also Kauona; Ona; new Panguna
Landowners' Assoc.; Solomon
Islands
copper mining, 69, 79-80, 83-5, 141, 165,
232, 244, 268-9
commencement, 177
royalties, 81, 232, 234,262, 379
District Commissioner, 85, 235, 267
education, 103
geophysical survey, 485
Guava, 83
Independence Day (North Solomons Republic), 269
Independence Day (PNG), 248
Jaba river, 232
Kieta, 84
land acquisition, 81, 83-5, 96
leaders, 234, 268, 284
Lemankoa village, Buka, 267
LGC Conference, 211
Methodist church, 269
Mining Development Forum, 462
Mortlock Atolls, xvi
Nakar Kas society, 267
North Solomons Republic, 269-70
Panguna,5-6,26,245
Panguna Landowners' Assoc., 461,462,
468,470
new Panguna Landowners' Assoc. (NPLA),
467-8
566
Papuan Republic, bill from, 235

police, use of, 84, 269
riot squad, 279
politicians, 36, 66, 96, 262, 294
public servants, 179, 188
radio, 83, 101, llO
referendum, call for, 66, 101
Regional electorate, 279
Regional Local Government Conference,
188
regionalism, 276
riots, 245,262, 267, 269
Roman Catholic church, 103-4, 269
Justice and Peace Committee, 470
Rorovana, ll4, 96
secession, 65-8,72,97, 102, 179, 188,205,
213,234-5,238,240,249,255,266-70,
278,289,296,498
1 September 1975, 269
17 May 1990,483
Seventh-Day Adventist church, 269
Siwai, 83, 242
Solomon Islands, relations with, 242, 252,
268
Special Development Committee, 202
Tasman Atolls, xvi
Teop-Tinputz LGC, 66
UNO involvement requested, 268
upi, 234, 269
violence, 278
women, 84
See also CRA; Napidakoe Navitu (under
political party); North Solomons
Province
Bouraga, Philip (MHA NCD)
Min. Finance, 363, 367, 376, 389, 411
Min. State (assisting PM), 489
Police Commissioner, 334, 342, 348, 364
PMs Dept. Sec., 334
Bourne, Neville (MHA)
Min. Fisheries & Marine Resources, 420
Min. Primary Industries (acting), 417
Min. Transport, 409
Brash, Nora Vagi, 196
Breademeyer, Mr Justice, 406
Comm. of Enquiry into Corruption ( 1985),
406,410
Brisbane, 115, 157,270
Britain. See United Kingdom
British Commonwealth of Nations, 209,243
PNG boycotts Edinburgh Games (1986),
428
British New Guinea Protectorate, xix

British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP),
xix
Protectorate ended, 268
See also Solomon Islands
Brokam, Nicholas (MHA New Ireland), xxv,
11,26
Brooks, Angie, UN Trusteeship Council,
Pres., 39
Brown, Sinai, Premier, East New Britain
Province, 480
Brussels, 166, 260
Bryant, R.R., Chief Electoral Officer, 107
Buchanan, Sir Dennis (MHA Eastern Highlands), 38, 53, 78, 119, 149, 154
Buka, Sergeant, 245
Bully Beef Club, xxxi
Bulmer, Prof. Ralph, 90
Bulolo, MV, 28
Bunting, R.F., xxvi
Burau, Cromwell, 68
Bureau oflndustrial Relations, 216
Burns Philip Pty Ltd., xxix, 28, 165
Caine, A.F., UN visiting mission, 39
Callick, Rowan, journalist, 485
Cambridge University, United Kingdom, 71
Canberra Times, 4, 17,47
Carey,Arthur,DCEastNewBritain, 148,153
Cargo cults. See Political Cults
Caroline Group, xix
Casey, N.M. (MHA), 50, 55
Casey, Lord R.G., Aust. Governor-General,
33, 52,146
Cattle industry, 38
James Barnes meat cannery, 427
Central Province
cabinet, 425
Central Regional electorate, 275
District, 150, 189, 192, 194
forestry, 289
Hula, xxix
Kairuku-Hiri electorate, 153
Magarida, 101
Motu-Koitabu, 353
National Capital Regional electorate, 261.
275
no-confidence motions, 390, 412, 425, 493
politicians, 306
Premiers, 425, 480, 493
Provincial Assembly, 292
Index
Speakers, 390
Chamber of Commerce, 144
Chamber of Manufacturers (Aust.), 41
Chambers, E.A.C., C'W Public Service Arbitrator, 71, 76-7
Chan, Benedict, Mosaic Oil & Mosaic Niugini, 485
Chan, Sir Julius (MHA Namatanai; PM
(1980-82; 1994-)), xxxii, 64, 118-9, 1545, 294, 301, 303, 305-6, 318, 322-3, 359,
361,362,379,387,388,398,405,406,
408,409,430,432,433,438,440,443,
446,447,451,463,465,470,476,478,
479,488
business interests, 318
Deputy Opposition Leader, 501
Deputy PM, xxxii, 304,328,409,417,441,
447,449,455
extra financial powers, 448
Min. Finance, xxxii, 198,200,206,215-6,
218,243,249-50,260-3,272,283
Min. Finance & Planning, 409,417,423,
429
Min. Foreign Affairs, xxxii
Min. Internal Finance, 156, 164, 175-6,
177, 185
Min. Primary Industries, xxxii, 311, 324,
328
Min. Trade & Industry, 420, 455
no-confidence motion in, 419
Placer Share Affair, 419-20,433
Prime Minister, xxxii, 338, 339, 340, 342,
343,345,347,351,353,355,364
acting PM, 313
Charles, Prince of Wales, 247,396
Chatterton, Rev. Sir Percy (MHA Moresby),
17,26,46,50,62-4,70,76-8,97,106,132
Chenoweth, Dr David
Localisation Section, PSB, 104
Principal, Administrative College, 90, 104,
109
Chevron, Katubu oilfield shareholder, 486
Chief Minister, Dept. of, 155-246
Development Administration, 186
Government Liaison Branch, 171-2
Government Paper on the
Constitution (1974), 227
Improvement Programme, 183-4, 186
Office of, 162, 168, 184-5, 194
Papuan Task Force, 222
Political Education Branch, 172
transfer of power, 183
567
See also Somare; Prime Minister
Chimbu. See Simbu
China, 243,250,343,481,508
Deputy PM visits, 353
one-China policy conflicts, 496
PM visits, 292
trade,259
See also Foreign Affairs, Taiwan
Chinese in PNG, xxxii, 35, 68, 88, 93-4, 125,
132,155,179,191-2,205
Christian churches
involvement in politics, 9, 92, 120, 141,
154,269
leadership, 339
Melanesian Council of Churches, 200, 502
missions, 140
See also individual churches
Christianity
ecumenical, 120
influence of, 9
Citizenship. See Constitution; Nationalism
Clark, Hector, 281-2
Cleland, Sir Donald M., Administrator, xx, 2,
7, 145
Clowes, Waliyato (MHA), 303-4
Cochrane, Prof. Donald, 139
Cocoa. See Agriculture
Coconut Products Ltd, 110
Coffee. See Agriculture
Colombo Plan, 209
Commissions
Electricity, 60, 440
Housing, 60, 280
Commonwealth and New Guinea Timbers,
165
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), 319, 353, 396
Commonwealth PMs Conference, xxiv, 297
Commonwealth Trading Bank, 123
Communications, 38
Comparison with other colonies, ex-colonies
Biafra, 114
BSIP, 79
Cook Islands, 4
Kenya, 5
Malaysia, 5, 31
Puerto Rico, 4
Rhodesia, 12, 20,67
West Africa, 90
Connolly, P.D., 92, 95, 99
Connolly Commission (1970), 108
Constitution, 114, 121,201,221-2, 227-30,
568
236,263,435
adopted, 17 August 1975,255
cabinet size, 362
citizenship, 172, 217-8, 222, 227-8, 234,
236-40, 250, 253-4, 264
Citizenship Advisory Committee, 253
General Constitutional Commission. 365.
376
Ministerial positions, 439
provincial government. See below
See also House of Assembly, National
Constituent Convention
Constitutional development, 79-80, 90, 96-7,
113-5, 120-1,129-130, 157,164,167, 170,
184,201-2,205,217
debate over permanent union of Papua and
New Guinea, 25
federalism, 114
National Constitutional Assembly, 236-42
Papua and New Guinea Act, 42, 46, 114
Seminar, 114
See also House ofAssembly; CPC; SCCD
Conzinc Rio Tinto (Australia) Exploration Pty
Ltd (CRA), 5, 26, 65, 84-5, 96, 486, 507
See also Rio Tinto Zinc Corp Ltd
Cook, Dr H., Dept. Labour & National Service, Sec., 41
Cook Islands, 171
Coombs, Dr H. C. (Nugget), 252
Cooperatives. 10, 126
Copra industry. See Agriculture
Council for New Guinea Affairs, 114
Council of Social Services, 120
Counsel, Bert (MHA Western & Gulf), 135-6
Coup d'etat
attempt, 484
rumours of, xxxiii, 310-11, 324, 375, 443,
449
Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 33, 166
Crawford, Sir John, 2
Aust. aid adviser, 341, 376
Crean, Frank, Aust. Labor Minister, 243
Creative Arts Centre, 246
Crime, 190
adolescent, 16
drunkenness, 149
urban,245
See also Social Cha11ge
Critchley, Tom, Australian High Commissioner, 232,235
Currency. See Banking; Economy
Currie Commission (1963-4), 40
Curtis, L.J., Dept. Law, Sec., 115, 120, 128

Dademo, Brigadier Robert, Defence Force;
sacked as a Colonel, 448
Daugi, Mackenzie (MHA), 240, 264
Daveona. Lawrence. Road Mining Tailings;
Leases Trustee Ltd, Sec., 202
Davidson, Prof. J.W., 171
Davis, Joe, Port Moresby car wrecker, 415
Dawubane, Gai (MHA), 129
Debessa, Leo, Police Senior Inspector, 311
Decentralisation, 7, 112, 148
See also Local government; Provincial
government
Defence Forces, role of, 28, 132, 138, 199,
236,286
Arava aircraft, 405, 406
Australia, defence relations, 445, 495
Australian personnel, seconded to, 310
band,247
Civic Action Programme, 450
Commanders, xxxiii, 247, 310,449,479
See also Dademo; Diro; Huai; Lokinap;
Noga; Nuia; Singirok
cooperation with Indonesia, 208
Defence Act, 236
funding, 351
General Defence Board of Inquiry, 479
Goldie River camp, 403
Indonesian Army connections, 442, 443-4
internal security, 209
Irian Jay a border patrols, 208, 370, 394
Joint Force Commander, 166,247
localisation, 210
Manus naval base, 507
Mirigeda Assoc., involvement in, 311
morale,444
officers sacked, 449
officers storm NBC, 459
Operation Lo-met-88 (1988), 459
Pacific Islands Regiment, 111, 149
patrol boat base, 374
PNG Volunteer Rifles, 209, 396
Police, relations with, 402, 459
review (1983), 374
Santo rebellion, Vanuatu, 343, 344
wages, 479
See also Bougainville civil war
Demena, Dr, PSA, Pres., 282
Denoon, Donald, xxxiv
569
Index
Departments
development of ministerial authority, 13-4
list of Departments when first mentioned:
Administrative Services, 420
Administrator, 88
See also above
Agriculture, 216,311
Agriculture, Stock & Fisheries, 47
Business Development, 124, 314
Chief Minister. See above
Civil Aviation, 444
Civil Aviation, Culture & Tourism, 409
Commerce, 216
Cooperatives, 47
Corrective Institutions & Liquor Licensing, 262
Culture & Recreation, 216
Culture, Recreation & Youth Development, 262
Community & Family Services, 342
Decentralisation, 314
Defence, 216
District Administration (DDA), 11
District Services, xxix
Education, 11
Environment & Conservation, 262
Extension Services, 47
Finance, II
Finance & Planning, 409
Fisheries & Forests, 216
Fisheries & Marine Resources, 420
Foreign Affairs & Trade, 262
Foreign Relations, 199
Forests,47
Health, 156
Home Affairs & Youth, 409
House of Assembly, 49
Housing & Supply, 262
Information, 215
Information & Broadcasting, 262
Information & Culture, 11
Information & Extension Services, 57
Interior, 156
Internal Affairs, 444
Internal Finance, 156
Justice, 183
Labour, xxviii, 3, 312
Labour, Commerce & Industry, 262
Lands, 156, 208
Lands, Surveys & Mines, 11
Law,47
Local Government, 5
Minerals & Energy, 352

Mines, 156
Mines & Energy, 199
National Development, 215
National Planning & Development, 325
Native Affairs, xxi
Natural Resources, 216
Personnel Management, 382
Physical Planning, 409
Police,262
Post & Telegraphs, 47
Primary Industry, 262, 314
Provincial Affairs, 262, 314
Public Health, 15
Public Service, 59
Public Utilities, 262
Public Works, 29
Religion, Youth & Recreation, 363
Resource Development, 490
Rural Development, 47
Social Development & Home Affairs, 88
Technical Education & Training, 47
Trade, 216
Trade & Industry, 47,409
Transport, 156
Transport, Works & Supply, 262
Treasury, 15, 455
Works, 156
See also Boards and Commissions; individual ministers
Derham, Prof. David P., 65
Development
Australian Development Assistance Agency,250
Bank,5,60,81, 124,147,200,253,282,
288
See also Banking
Business development
expatriate, 125
Indigenous Training Scheme, 81
leases, security of tenure, 91
village trade-stores, 70
Central Planning Secretariat, 178
Dept. CM & Development Administration,
186
economic, 16,20,23-4,43,48, 70, 79,83,
124-5,157-8,164,165,225
Economic Development
Office of Programming & Coordination,
165, 177
Programmes, 144, 164-5, 177
Eight Point Aims, 199-200,206-7,212-4,
570
216,221,241,271,318-9,330
Faber Report, UNDP(l972), 165, 177, 186
five year plan, 59, 69, 78, 115, 177, 207
General Purpose Development Corporations, 199
indigenous participation, 23, 67, 69, 141,
165,265
Investment Corporation, PNG, 124, 165,
176,201,215-6,244,253
General Manager suspended, 448
land tenure problems, 141, 311
Medium Term Development Plan, 464
National Goals and Directive Principles,
330
National Investment & Development Authority (NIDA), 207, 216,245, 260, 323,
357,458,486
National Planning Office, 16, 370, 409
New Guinea Development Corporation,
125,147,179,198,224,283,303,336
See also Economy; Mataungan Assoc.
Papua, 135
plantations, role in, 12
priorities, 164, 210, 212
Rural Development Programme, 206
strategies, 274
trade. See individual nations
Village Development Task Force, 232, 264
village-level, 70, 81, 165, 170, 264
See also Agriculture; Mining
Dibela, Sir Kingsford (MHA), GovernorGeneral (1983-89), 304
Dickson, 0., 68
Dihm, Bill, 27, 68
Diria, Kaibelt (MHA Wahgi), 75, 160-1
Ass. Min. Local Government, 57, 73, 118
Member, Ministerial Nomination Committee, 197
Min. Post & Telegraphs, 156, 19R, 262
Diro, Brigadier Edward (MHA Central),
359,373,421,430,434,440,441,448,
449,452,453,455,457,477,478,487,
488,497
accepts election funds from Indonesian
General, 442-3
Angus (PNG) Ltd, 442, 443
Barnett Forestry Enquiry, 442, 447, 450,
457,463,477,479,488,505
coup d'etat, rumours of, 310,375,443,449,
493
Defence Force Commander, 247,344
demands reinstatement, 450, 477
dismissed from parliament (1991), 505

Deputy PM, 488, 490, 493, 506
suspended, 505
votes with opposition, 490
Diro Affair. See Barnett Forestry Enquiry
Governor-General refuses to dismiss, 505
Leadership Tribunal finds guilty. 505
Min. Foreign Affairs, 420, 446
Min. Forests, 409
Min. Internal Affairs, 451, 455
Min. Public Services, 488, 490, 506
Min. of State, 477,480
Min. without Portfolio, 442
resigned, 443, 477
Opposition Leader, 362, 369, 370
Parliamentary Committee on Port Moresby
State of Emergency, Chair, 404
perjury charges, 443,447
rascal (criminal) gang support for, 448
Santa Investments Pty Ltd, 442, 479
Discriminatory Practices Ordinance 1963,7
District Commissioners (DC), 47, 54, 187,
210
Advisory Councils, xxii, xxx, 109
Bougainville, 85, 235, 267
Central, 47
Chimbu, 47, 54
conferences, 162, 186-7
East New Britain, 93, 1!1, 135-7,148,153,
168
localisation, 100, 108, 175
Morobe,47,54, 132
Trobriand Islands, 188
Western Highlands, xxv, 54, 121
See also Local government; Provincial
government
District government. See Provincial Government
District Inspector, 54
Doa, Raphael (MHA), 275,322,324
Min. Health, 328
Dougherty, Martin, Asia Pacific Communications, 485
Doi, Akoka (MHA)
Deputy PM, 457,463,468,477,478,490
Min. Fisheries, 490
Min. Foreign Affairs, 443, 444, 455
Speaker, 443, 444
Donal, Alex, OPM Min. Defence
refugee to PNG, 414
Donigi, Peter, lawyer
Monticello Enterprises Ltd, Dir., 487
Index
"The State and Property Rights in Papua
New Guinea", 461,462
Dotaona, Col. Lima, Defence Force commander Bougainville troops, 472,480
sacked, 448
Downs, Ian (MHA Highlands), xxx, 7-8, 16,
23-4,26,29,50,52
political comment, 85, 101
Dumont, Prof. Rene, 164
Dunbar-Reid, Donald, 94, 127
Duncan, Sir Val, Rio Tinto Zinc, Chair., 244
Dutton, Warren (MHA North Fly), 78, 86-7,
119,407,415
assistant to John Poe, Min. Interior, 231
kiap, 370
Min. Police, 342, 345, 348
no-confidence motion in, 345
Duwabane, Gai (MHA), 389
Min. Agriculture and Livestock, 420, 455
Min. Defence, 328
East New Britain Province, 36, 112, 332,
349
Assembly, 292
Bainings, 454
Duke of York Islands, 204
elections, 303,401,480
finances, 342
Japlik, Ill, 123, 148
Kerevat High School, 7, II 0
Kokopo, xxix, xxxii, 135, 430
Latramat village, Gazelle Peninsula, xxv
lottery, 62
Matanatar, 123
no-confidence motion in Deputy
Premier, 493
politicians, 294, 315
Pomio Development Authority, 454
Premiers, 391,401,454,480
Rabaul, 9, 20,66-7,79, 92, 97, 108, Ill,
144
hospital, 24
LGC proposed, 106, 131
Matupit Island, 99, 135-7
movie ban, 219
Paparatava, 68
political meetings, xxvi, 92, 99-100,439
protest marches, 88, 95
radio, 110, 128, 148
Town Council, 106
violence, 134-7
571
See also Gazelle; Mataungan Assoc.;
Tolai
Rabuana village, Gazelle Peninsula, 135
Raluana
mission printery, xxix
village. Gazelle Peninsula, 88
Rasimen village, Gazelle Peninsula, 136
settlers, repatriation, 425
Toma, 179
Vudal Agricultural College, 7
Vunadidir LGC staff college, 121
Vunamami Community Centre, 93; village,
xxviii
Vunapaladig, Ill, 123
East Sepik Province, xxvi, 20, 36, 97, 151,
368,408
Angoram, 20,36-7,408
Assembly, 292
cargo cults, 39, 140-1
constitution, 278
Kainda Teachers College, 475
Mount Atbowagi repeater station, 475
Mount Turu, 140
Maprik, 9, 36
Murik Lakes, xxx
no-confidence motion, 390
Regional electorate, xxxi, 47
sugar cane projects, 332
timber resources, 350
Wewak, 9-10,27, 39, 130
radio, xxxi
Yangoru sub-district, 140
Eastern Highlands Province, 17, 20, 83,
152,186,192,306
Asaro, 219
Assembly, 292
constitution, 278
elections, 425
electorates, 303
finances, 342
Henganofi, xxxiii
Kainantu, 37, 219
Lufa, 17-18,407
Premiers, 425
State of Emergency, 334, 335
tribal wars. See Highlands
Unggai-Bena by-elections (1985), 397,399
Watabung village, 475
Eastman, Nathaniel, Liberian delegate, UNTC,
21-2
Ebu, Alan (MHA)
Min. Correctional Services, 455
572
Min. Fisheries, 453,457,490

Econoiny,307,410,421-2,429-30,485-7
Australian aid to, 24, 99, 157, 175, 181,
185,218,248,271,272,273,274,2856, 295, 318, 337, 341, 355, 364, 367,
376,392,401,427,445,481
Consumer Price Index, 295-6, 423

currency, 158,244,260
revalued, 296, 485
strategy, 296
exports, 244, 429
government policy, 287
inflation, 220,340,421,429,464,485-6
international aid, 38, 312
See also Australia
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 296,
485,492
investment
from overseas, 11-2, 20, 25, 28, 38, 61,
69-70,152,158,164,176,200,207,
210,215,230,260,273-4,286,296,
307,341,458,463
Chinese, 282
guidelines, 207,210, 214, 221
Japanese,273,289
manufacturing, 341
National Fiscal Commission, 356
National Investment and Development
Authority (NIDA). See Development
post-Independence Eight Aims, 271, 318.
364
price control, 220
recession, 355-7,361
Stabex (EEC) fund, 465
trade, 259-60
Australia, 286, 507
European Economic Community, (EEC)
260,491
Lome Convention, 260, 285
Standardisation Commission, 260, 265
See House of Assembly, Budgets
Edimani, Justine (MHA), 304
Edoni, Israel, Chair., PSC, 348
Education, 5, 10
Aiyura High School, 334
apprenticeships, 82
community level, 208,210
Currie Commtssion (1963-4), 40
Dental College, 77
Director, Department of, I 03
elite, 78
Five Year Plan (1973), 207
funding, 112
job training, 82
Kerevat High School, 7, 10, 334
localisation, 98
mission, 77-8, 103
National Library, 250
national system proposed, 64, 77-8, 98, 103
overseas allowances, 72
PNG Teachers' Assoc., 186, 245, 279
policy, 280, 312-3,458
political, 75, 79, 138
political candidates, 34, 37, 154
primary, 7, 9, 21, 97, 112, 313, 351
curriculum schools, 279
multi-racial schools, 279
universal, 208
religious, 103
school cadets, 396
secondary, 77-8, 97-8, 208, 278
standards, 280
Strikes and demonstrations
Administrative College, 104
Papuan Medical College, threat, 104
See also PNG UOT; UPNG
students
enrolled, 77-8, 97
involved in politics, 80, 116
teachers, 132
Bougainville, 279
government, 77, 98, 103
mission, 77, 98, 103
registration of, 103
salaries, 103
teniary, 37,312-3,458
National Union of Students, 258
vocational training, 164
Vudal Agricultural College, 7
Vunadidir LGC staff college, 121
Weedon Advisory Committee Report, 78,
103
See also Public Service, Administrative
College; Goroka Teachers' College;
Papuan Medical College; PNG UOT;
UPNG
Edwards, George, 88
Elections
196}, XXiii, XXV
candidates, xxv
political education, xxv
1964, xxiii, 27, 34-8, 51
1968,28,31,34-8,151
candidates
Index
age, 154
Asian, 38
European, 35
indigenous 34-5,68, 154
qualifications, 129
re-elected, 143
unopposed,35
gifts, 34
malpractice, 36
political education, 79
1972, 96, llO, 130, 135, 138, 141, 143,
149-55, 177
candidates, xxviii, 156
age, 154
education, 152-4
European, 152, 154
first female, 153
Highlands, 151
indigenous, 152, 154
occupations, 154
unopposed, 152
1976, postponed, 242, 263,277
1977,255-6,263,289,294-5,298-307
by-election, 287
candidates
education, 299, 303
naturalised citizens, 303
re-elected, 295
statistics, 299
women. 303
constitutional provisions, 239
delayed. 298
frequency, 228
results, 33
1982,345,348-9,357-361,378,430
candidates, 357, 361
komiti, 359
re-elected, 361
issues, 445
nomination fee increase (disallowed),
354,356
1987,374,408,416,425,429-37,475
candidates, 435
independent, 435
re-elected, 440
class formation, 436
results, 436-7
petitions, 437,444
violence, 436
voting, 435
1992,501
political parties, 152-3
573
endorsement by, 358
finances, 153
UN observation, 74, 139, 153
See also LGCs and Provincial Governments
Electricity Commission
charges, 261
compensation claims, 218
Irian Jaya power, 257
Ok Tedi hydro-electric project, 393, 400
power stations, 136, 273
strike, 333
Electoral System
boundary redistribution, 27, 149, 151,298
by-elections, 276
Chief Electoral Officer, 107, 153, 234
Commission, 444, 492
Commission of Inquiry, 55, 72
Commissioner, 298, 397,431,435
counting,299
Court of Disputed Returns, 153
Electoral Act, 300
Electoral Distribution Committee, 27
nomination fee, 150-1
Open (District) Seats, xxiv, 27, 35, 129,
149-51, 154
qualifications of candidature, 21
rolls, 298
Regional (Provincial) Seats, 22, 35, 129,
149-51,154,228,261,275
Special Seats, xxiv, 16
voter residence, 151
voting age, 150-1
Elijah, Elliot, lO
Elizabeth II, Head of State, 238, 256, 281
requested to dismiss GG, 506
visit to PNG (1982), 365
Ellis, Mr Justice, Diro Leadership Tribunal,
505
Ellis, T.W. (MHA)
Dept. Administrator, Sec., 88-9, 96, 100,
123, 148
District Administration, Dir., 54, 60, 88
Embel, Philomen (MHA), 477,488
Emanuel, E. Jack, DC East New Britain, murder of, xxix, 135-6, 144, 148, 168
Embane, Wesley (MHA)
Min. Media, 328
Employers' Federation (Australia), 41
Employers' associations, 76
Employment
annual leave, 7-8
574
A Papua Nev. Guinea Political Chronicle
expatriates, 7
job creation, 79
localisation, 11, 28, 75, 273
overseas recruitment, policy towards, 2, 23
private sector, 361
Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea,
158-9
Enga Province, 247,276, 332
designated a "fighting zone", 383
elections, 424, 493
government
Administrator, death threats, 402
buildings burnt, 154
suspended,380,390,412,424
Kandep, electoral vmlence, 436
Mount Kare gold rush, 486, 507
police Operation Blue Beret, 494
politicians, 306
Premiers, 390, 424, 473, 474
Regional electorate
created, 261
divided, 275
State of Emergency, 334, 335, 494
Wabag,L-47,303
See also Pogera Gold Mine
Environment, 351
cyanide, 2,375 drums lost in Fly River
mouth, 393
mining pollution. See Bougainville; Ok
Tedi
See also Forestry
Epstein, Dr T. Scarlett, 93, 95
Eri, Sir Vincent Serei, 448
Governor-General (1990-91), 490,493
attempt to subvert judicial process, 505-6
constitutional crisis, 505
resignation, 497
Peoples' Action party, Pres., 491
Esa' ala Losuia electorate, 35
Ethnic tensions. See Bougainville; Gazelle
peninsula; Highlands; Papua
Eupu, Eric (MHA Popondetta), 20, 26
Lands, Surveys & Mines, Under-Sec., 20
European Economic Community (EEC) delegation,491
See also Economy, Stabex fund
Evara, Roy (MHA Kikori), 322-3, 348, 362,
421,430,431
Min. Primary Industries, 328, 339, 340,
348,349,350,356
sacked, 347
Utama Co., connection to, 350
Faber, Prof. M.L.O., 165
See Development, Faber Report UNDP
(1972)
Fairbairn, D.E., Aust. Min. Defence, 166
Falkinder, Mr, 2
Farapo, Tony (MHA)
Min. Provincial Affairs, 412
Feeney, G.M., Police Superintendent, 136
Fenbury, David
Administrator's Department, Sec., 88, 13940
Dept. Social Development & Home Affairs,
Sec., 88-9, 139-40
Fielding, Bill (MHA), 149, 153-4
Fiji, 164,167,224,226,259,327,446,460
coups (1987), 446
PNG diplomats withdrawn, 285
Financial Review (Melbourne), 120
First World War, xvi
Fishing, 260, 350, 392
cannery, 336
Danica, USA tuna ship confiscated, 357
economic resources zone (200 mls), 259,
428
Fish Marketing Corporation, 417
Fisheries College, 370
Fisheries Development Authority, 417
licences, 417
Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency, 314,
326
USSR, 446, 490
Focus, 114
Fofoe, John, 132
Foley, S.M. (MHA)
DC: Ch1mbu, 54
Western Highlands, 121
Foot, Sir Hugh (Lord Caradon), xxiv
Foreign Affairs, 445
Administrator's Department, 166
ASEAN, relations with, 209, 257,300, 314,
343,352,353,394,413,426,427,481
bid for membership (1987), 445
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 445,
481
Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meetings (CHOGM), 353,396,414,446
Defence Act, 236
defence policy, 166-7, 209
575
Index
diplomats
training, 166
withdrawn, 285
economic resources zone (200 mls), 259,
428
non-aligned foreign ministers'
meeting, 353
non-aligned movement, 446
nuclear-free Pacific, 209, 243, 257
policy,208,272,465
independent commitment, 446
selective engagement, 343, 353
universalism, 291, 313-4
regionalism, 209
relationship with
Australia. See above
China. See above
Fiji. See above
France,209,243-4,332,428
Hong Kong, 260
Indonesia. See below
Israel, 481
Japan,243,250,427,508
Malaysia. See below
New Caledonia, 428, 443, 445, 465
New Zealand. See below
Pacific nations, 243, 257
Philippines. See below
Solomon Islands. See below
South Korea, 343
Taiwan, 260, 353,481,496
United Kingdom, 260
USSR. See below
Vanuatu. See below
West Germany, 428
South Pacific Conference (19th), 332; (20th),
343
South Pacific Forum, 314,326,332,427,
428,446
inPNG, 314
Melanesian Spearhead Group, 445
Pacific Regional Fisheries Agency, 314,
326
territorial sea zones, 259,428
treaties, 240
UNO membership, 257-8
White Paper (1981), 353
See also British Commonwealth of Nations; Colombo Plan; Fishing; South
Pacific Commission; South Pacific
Forum
Forestry
Barnett Commission of Enquiry, 442, 447,

450,457,477,479,488,505
Bunning Brothers, 392
customary land rights, 461
Forestry Industry Council, 442
Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, 463
Halla Resources, 392
Hetura Meja Co., 350, 356-7, 364, 392
Manus,463
Office of Forests, 364
royalties, 423
Santa Investments Pty Ltd, 442, 479
Sohbu Trading Corp., 370
timbe~69,94,259,289,350,356-7
Fraser, Malcolm, Aust. PM, 266, 272, 297-8

Freeman, Colin, UPNG Librarian, xxxiv
Gaius, Bishop Simon, 92
Galloway, R.T., DC Morobe, 132-3
Garong, Peter (MHA)
Min. Labour, 489
Garrett, Jason J. (MHA Madang), 56, 69, 72,
86
Garry, Ben (MHA), 477
Garui, Benson (MHA Northern), 453, 478
Gaschinard, P., UN visiting mission, 39
Gazelle Peninsula, New Britain, xvi, xxix, 67,
92, 94, 100, 108, 112, 123-9, 135-7, 1469,153,163,168,172,179,211-2,219,2245,267,292
See also LGC; Mataungan Assoc.; Tolai
Geneva, 166
Genia, Jack (MHA Central), 387, 453
Min. Education, 490
Min. Resource Development, 490
Min. Works & Supply, 389
German New Guinea, xvi, xix
Ghai, Prof. Yash P., 171,202
Giheno, John (MHA Henganofi), 452, 453,
477
Acting PM, xxxiii
Min. Foreign Affairs, 427
Min. Police, 363
Min. Trade & Industry, 492
Gilmore, Graham (MHA South Markham), 6,
9, 25-6
Giregire, Sinake (MHA), 50, 57, 86, 102,
118,149,161,218,237,240,255-6,303,
430
Min. Posts & Telegraphs, 56
Gita, Joel, 136
576
Goava, Sinaka, xxxi, 10

Goroka,36, 179,263,430
curfew, 493
hospital, 79
Open electorate, 35
Teachers' College, 38,98
Gordon, Alec, 282
Gorton, Sir John,Aust. PM, 32, 85,101, 105,
111
PNG tour (1970), 113-4
Government Contracts Act, 261
Government House, 204
Governor-General, 239,248,256,309,365,
403,479,493
civil list, 256
call to abolish Provincial
government, 493
role of, 291,451
See also Eri; Dibela; Guise; Kilage; Korowi; Lokoloko
Greece, accepts OPM refugees, 375
Greenwood, Prof. Gordon, xxxiv
Grenville Smith, John, Crown Solicitor, 122
Griffin, James, xxxiv
Griffin, John, 77
Gris, Dr Gabriel
Dental College, 77
Office oflmplementation, Min. of Decentralisation, 314
UPNG, Vice-Chancellor, 246,314
Grove, Don S., Dept. Lands, Surveys &
Mines, Dir., 5
Guam, xv, 209
Gueronik, Sacha, CIPEC, Ex. Dir., 244
Guira, Col. Kwago, Defence Force, sacked,
448
Guise, Dr Sir John (MLC; MHA Milne
Bay), xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxix. xxx, xxxi, 57, 11, 17, 27, 30,37-8,46-7, 155,170,309,
312,350,506
CPC, 170
Deputy Chief Minister, xxx, 182, 184-5,
186-7,216,222,241,249,251
Doctor of Laws honoris causa, UPNG,
XXX, 152
Emergency Committee, Chair., 335
Governor-General (1975-77), xx, xxx,
xxxi,247,256,263,281
resignation, 298
role in politics, 291
Legislative Council, 37, 152
Min. Agriculture, 216

Min. Interior, 156, 192, 196, 198
Mirigeda Assoc., involvement in, 311
proposed as leader of "national alliance",
294,304,308
SCCD, Chair., xxv, xxx, 46
Speaker.xxx,S0-1,53,55,80, 86,89
Guise, Reginald, xxix
Gulf Province
Katubu oil pipeline, 486
Kerema, 37, 298
Kikori, 36
no-confidence motions, 390, 493
Premiers, 408: resigned, 412
Gul, Peter, Premier, Simbu Province, 424
Gumine Open electorate, 35
Gunther, Dr Sir John T.
Assistant Administrator (Services), 2
Dept. Public Health, Dir., 104
UPNG, Vice-Chancellor, 2, 40, 87, 98, 104
Hagon, Mr, 149
Haiveta, Chris (MHA)
Deputy PM, xxxiii
PMs Chief of Staff, 489
Hall, James, 129
Halla Resources, South Korea, 392
Hamadi, John, Irian Jaya refugee, 352
Hand, Archbishop Sir David, 182, 449
llannett,Leo, 116,179,211,224,234,2678,269,303
adviser to Somare, 188, 2123
Bougainville Special Development Committee, Chair., 202, 213
Investment Corporation, Managing Dir.,
448
Planning Officer, North Solomons Province, 284; resigned, 293
Premier, North Solomons Province, 379
llansard, 1,13,54,242
Harrison, Brian, 103
Harvard University, USA, 202
Hashimoto, Torao, Japanese Consul-General,
243
Hasluck, Sir Paul, Aust. Min. Territories, xx,
1-2. 19. 89
Hastings, Peter, journalist, 4, 34
Hawarri, William, 130, 141
Hawina. Daniel, Yangoru cargo cult deputy
leader, 140
Hawke, Robert, Aust. PM, 507
Index
visit to PNG, 367,368,369
Hay, Sir David 0.
Administrator, xx. 3-4, 12, 47, 69, 71,845, 87, 108, 110-11, 114, 140, 145
Dept. External Territories, Sec., 108
Hayden, Bill
Aust. Min. Foreign Affairs, 367,414,445
Aust. Opposition Leader, 367
Aust. Treasurer, 243, 249-50
visit to PNG, 367-8
Health, 24, 422
cemeteries, 106
doctors, strike, 333
hospitals, 24, 26, 79
fees, 15, 24
Laloki mental hospital, 26
See also towns and provinces
medical practitioners, 10
Red Cross, aid to Irian Jaya
refugees, 393
tuberculosis, 16
urban sanitation, 106
Vanimo acting District Medical Officer, 15
Hegarty, David, xxxiv
Henao, Hoidae, candidate for Central Regional, 275
Henderson, Frank C., 4, 29-30, 43
Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs),
13,69, 77
Hess, Michael, xxviii
Hetura Meja. See above Forestry
Highlands, 10, 53-54, 76
attitude to Independence and self-government, 102, 146, 182, 204-5
coffee growing, 8, 219
boom, 293
rust, 431
See also Agriculture
development, 71, 89
elections, violence, 436
electorates, 150-1
famine relief, 178
highway, 149
labourers, 135
leaders, 119, 178, 182
Liberation Front, 178-9
migrants, 192
political parties, 19-20, 36, 119-20, 130,
152-3,263
politicians, xxviii-xxix, xxxii-xxxiii, 11,
35, 37, 50-1, 65, 75, 89, 99, 120, 135,
142-3, 150, 152, 155-6, 162, 182, 261,
577
263,278,344,365
public servants, 263
riots, 149
tribal wars
compensation, 336
loyalties, 287
Operation Lo-met-88 (1988), 459
State of Emergency, 334-5,351
wars, 149 ,178, 182-8, 189, 232, 288,
334,351,368,383,415,493
Highlands Farmers and Settlers Bulletin, 7
Hinchliffe, Mr Justice, 432
Holloway, B., Comm. of Police, 245
Holloway, Sir Barry (MHA Kainantu; Eastern Highlands), xxvi, xxxi, 6, 11, 19, 26,
29,68,154,303,415,421,481
Kibbutz scheme proposed, 395
Min. Education, 363, 374, 386
resigned, 399
Min. Finance, 312, 328,337
Min. National Planning & Development,
389
Speake~ 168,206,254,278,293
Holt, Harold, Aust. PM, 4
Hong Kong, 260
Horik, Tom, 488
House of Assembly, 3-4, 9, 33
Chairmen of Parliamentary Committees,
440
Clerk of the House, 478, 501
Committee on Constitutional Reforms, 492
composition of, xxiv, 121
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC),
160,167-8,170-1,184,201-2,205,211,
217-8, 221-3,227-31,254-5, 263,288,
296,314
contempt of the House, 87
demonstrations at, 371,479,487,490
District Commissioners, xxv, 54
See also above
District Inspector, 54
elected members, 23
Elected Members Group, xxvi
elections. See above
Governor-General. See above
Hesingtut Committee, 493
indigenous participation, problems, 16, 23,
25
interpreters, 64, 196
Leadership Code, 316-8, 321, 322, 323,
327,371,419,420
Leadership Tribunal, 239, 488
578
members
decorum(lackof), 144,216,264-5,266,
331,383,417
first female, 153
Ministers. See below
nominated, 129
officiru,23,45,51,54,57. 129.149
salaries, 497, 500, 501
Ministeriru Nominations Committee, 224.
See also below
Ministers, 138, 197
code of ethics proposed, 345
defy Cabinet solidarity, 331
perquisites, 241
Sapphire Creek chalet, 266
sex scandals, 383
staff, 266
travel, 266
National Executive Council Secretariat
(NEC), 228,261-3, xvi, 79, 86, 104,125,
144, 162
merged with Prime Minister's Department, 410
right to suspend Provinciru governments,
376,380
Nationru Planning Committee, 261
Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG). See
Politicru Alliances
new building opened, 396
No-confidence motions
1976, Somare considers use of, 277
1978, 322-5
1979,331
1980,338
1983 (withdrawn), 373
1984 (withdrawn), 388, 399
1985, 398-400
1985 (withdrawn). 405, 406
1985,407,417
1986,419
1988,447,450,455
1989,476-7
1989, (withdrawn), 478
1990, (withdrawn), 489
Nominated Members, 239
Opposition, 54
Leader of, 51, 167-8,210
role of, 264
See also Abal; Diro; Momis; Okuk;
Somare; Toliman; Wingti
Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Ordinance,86
Parliamentary Salaries and Conditions

Monitoring Tribunal, 442, 500
Parliamentary Salaries and Remuneration
Commission, 500
Parliamentary Secretaries, 308, 324
Prime Minister. See below
Public Accoums Committee, 216, 332
Select Committees on Constitutional Development (SCCD), xxvi, 3, 6, 10, 13-5,
22, 27,42-3,46, 48, 50, 90,96-7, 1001,115.117, 129-130, 137,145, 149, 161,
170,201
Speaker, 49-51, 58, 65, 80, 86, 155, 228,
406,417
partisan natllle uf vu~itiun, 417
urination in the Members' bar, 417-8
Under-Secretaries, xxv, 23, 37, 43, 45, 46,
57
violence, 266
1967 First House
12th Session, 5-14
Appropriation Bill (No. 2), 6
Budget, 14
Native Employment (Amendment)
Bill (No. 2), 7-8
Public Accounts Committee, 12
Public Officers (Employment Security) Bill, 7
SCCD. See above
13th Session, 15-22
Animal Diseases and Control Bill, 16
Child Welfare Bill, 16
Dep. Health, 15
Local Government Bill, 16
Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry Bill, 17
Public Accounts Committee reports
Public Officers (Employment
Security) Bill, 17
public service housing, 15
SCCD, debate on
See also Language
14th Session, 23-8
Appropriation Bi111967-68, 23
Budget, 23-5
Electoral Distribution Committee, 27
Income Tax Bill, 25
Income Tax (rates) Bill, 25
Land (Tenure Conservation) Bill, 26
Mining (Bougainville Copper
Agreement) Bill, 26
Native Employment Ordinance, 27
579
Index
Public Accounts Committee, 9th report,25
Public Officers (Employment Security) Bill, 27
15th Session, 28-31
Appropriation Bill 1967-68 (No. 2),
30
Budget, 29-30
Committee on the Public Service, 29
Public Service (Papua and New Guinea) Bill (No. 2), 30, 45
Standing Committee on Public Accounts, 28-9
Standing Committee on Public Works,
29
1968 Second House
1st Session, 42-57
Budget Standing Committee, 45
Development Capital Guarantee Declaration, 200
Gaming (Playing Cards) Bill, 56
Governor-General's address, 146
Industrial Relations Bill, 56
Ministerial Nominations Committee,
53,57
National Fitness Bill, 56
Ordinances, 56
Papua and New Guinea Bi111968, 42-
8
2nd Session, 58-65
Appropriation Bill, 58-61
five year economic development plan,
59,61
Land Titles Commission
Jurisdiction Bill, 63-4
Public Service Arbitration
Commission Bill, 63, 70
Public Service Commission of Inquiry Bill, 62
3rd Session, 68-73
Bill to establish local government section in DAA, 72
Bill to name Papua New Guinea (defeated), 72
five year economic development plan,
68-9
SC on national names and symbols,
71
SC on role of permanent overseas public
servants, 72
Supreme Court (Appeals) Bill, 72
1969, 74-98
Advisory Committee on Education, 98

Committee of Privileges, 86
education, 77
Evidence by Affidavit Bill1968, 77
Evidence (Land Titles) Bill, 91
Gazelle Peninsula, Commission of Enquiry, 92-4
Irian Jaya plebiscite, 74
localisation, public service, 75
Public Service Arbitration Ordinance
1952-1965; 76
Public Services Conciliation & Arbitration Bill, 76
SC on Constitutional Development, 90
United Nations, attitudes, 74-5
1970
Investment Corporation Bill, 124
Public Order Bill, 109, 115-6, 119-20
1971
June Session
Land Bills postponed, 141
Papuan opposition to united PNG, 135
request for C'W all-party committee
on Papua, 125, 145
September Session, 143
Budget, 143-4
Commission of Constitutional & Political Development, 144-5
Salisbury Report on Gazelle Peninsula, 147
November Session, 143
Parliamentary Integrity Bill, 145
Public Officers Integrity Bill, 145
Public Service Appeals and Promotions system, 146
Salisbury Report on Gazelle Peninsula, 147
White Paper on Employment Security Scheme, 145-6
1972 Third House
April Session, 154-60
Ministerial Nominations Committee,
155
Pangu-led National Coalition, 151,
154-6, 160
June Session, 161-73
Pangu-led National Coalition, 168
Public Service Board Information
Paper, 173
August Session, 175-182
Budget, 175-6
Gazelle Local Government Bill, 179
580
1973
February-March Session
motion on independence, 183-3
June-July Session
Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters, 200
CPS 2nd Interim Report, 205
mini-Budget, 201
One Year Improvement Programme,
200
August-September Session
Budget, 206-7
Commission of Inquiry into Land
Matters, report, 207
Education Five Year Plan, 207
Improvement Plan 1973-4, 207
Lands Report, 207
1974
Motion for Compensation, Papua, 218
June-July Session
CPC Report, 222-3
August Session, 225
mini-Budget, 261
1975
National Constituent Convention, 23542,253-7,263
citizenship, 253
elections, 239, 255
emergency powers, 240
Head of State, 238-9
Leadership Tribunal, 239
National Executive Council
(NBC), 238
nationalisation, 240
Ombudsman Commission, 239
political candidates, 239
provincial government, 240
righl~ of lhe individual, 239
Treaties wilh foreign nations, 240
September Session
Budget, 261
1976
Commission of Enquiry into the Standardisation of Selected Imports, 284-5
1977
Public Order Bill, withdrawn, 290
constitution amended, 298
offshore resources, 298
Organic Law of Provincial Government, 315
provincial government, 298

August Session
Budget, 312
September Session, 309
Select Committee on Foreign Business, proposed, 309
1978
February-March Session, 316
Budget, 318
Leadership Code, 316-7
318
organic law on political parties, 317
August Session
Leadership Code, 318,323
No-confidence motion, 323
Budget, 324
325
1979
Committees of Inquiry
Constitutional Review Committee,
330
Emergencies, 330
Hanuabada disturbances, 330
Information Services, 330
Local Government, 330
Menyamya, alleged mistreatment,
330
prison unrest, 330
ToRobert investigation into
Public Services, 330
Waigani fire, 330
August Session
Emergency Committee, 335
State of Emergency, 334-5
September SessiOn
State of Emergency, 335
November Session
Budget, 337
1980
No-confidence motion, 338, 339
June Session, 340
August Session
interim Budget, 341
November Session
Budget, 341,351
581
Index
341,351
1981
Constitutional Review Committee, 354
November Session
Budget, 364, 367
Electoral Nomination Fee, 356
1982
November Session
Budget, 364
1983
General Constitutional Commission
Report, 376
November Session
Budget, 376
NEC power to suspend provincial governments, 380
no-confidence motion (withdrawn),
373
Peace and Good Order Bill, 384
1984
Constitutional Amendment (Public
Services Commission) Law 1984,
382
Minimum Penalties Act, 384
Organic Law on the Public Services
Commission (Repeal) Law 1984,
382
White Paper on Industrial Policy, 383
May-June Session
Morgan Committee Report on Crime,
Law and Order, 384
National Intelligence Organisation
Bill, 382
Public Service Commission amendment laws passed, 382
November Session
Budget, 392
Irian Jaya refugees, 394
388
PNG Volunteer Rifles, 396
reserve police, 396
school cadets, 396
1985
March Session, 398
June Session
Bill to counter rape with castration
and execution, 403-4
State of Emergency, 404
August Session, 406
Commission of Enquiry into Corruption, 406

Parliamentary Select Committee on
Provincial Government, established, 410
Summary Offenses Act, 415
November Session
Budget (rejected), 402,407,408,410
no-confidence motion, 407, 417
Parliamentary Select Committee on
Provincial Government, abolished,
410
Supply Bill, 410
1986
March Session, 410
Budget, 422
Public Service Bills, 420
May Session
Speaker's resignation demanded, 417-8
November Session
Budget, 423, 429-30
no-confidence motion in Chan gagged,
419
Placer Share Affair, 419-20
1987
August Session, 441
Deputy Ministers, 441
Statutory Authorities, 441
Provincial Assemblies, 441
November Session
Bill to create a Media Tribunal, 441,
452
Bill to enlarge police powers, 441
1988
April Session, 449, 450
adjourned, 450
June Session
no-confidence motion, 447, 455
November Session
budget, 464
1989
adjourned, 476
proposed legislation
Group Fighting Act, 476
Leadership Code amendment, 476
no-confidence motions, 475
Regional Seats, abolition 476
Sectional voting, abolition 476
Vagrancy Act, 475
582

successful legislation
perjury before Commissions of Enquiry, 476
July Session, 476
Barnett Forest Industry Enquiry Report, 479
October Session. 478
479
November Session
General Defence Board of Inquiry,
479
Peace and Good Order Act, 494
1990
July Session
489
Repatriation Bill, 494
November Session
adjourned, 491
Budget, 491
1991
May Session
salary rises, 500
July Session
Constitutional Amendment No 15:
salary rises rescinded, 503
Constitutional Amendment No 15:
Elections, Organic Law on National Elections (Amendment No. 1)
Law 1991 [sectional voting], 504;
Organic Law on the Calling of
Meetings of the Parliament Amendment No. 1, 504
1993
September Session
PM Wingti resigned and was re-elected, xxxiii
1994
August Session
Chan elected PM, xxxii
Namaliu elected Speaker, xxxii
1997
March Session
Chan stands down, xxxiii
Howard, Peter, 159
Huai, Brigadier Tony
Air Niugini, Security Chief, 411
allegations against, 443-4
Defence Force Chief of Operations, 410
Defence Force Commander, 410-11,443

sacked,443,448,449
People's Progress party, staff, 411
Huon Gulf Electorate, 36
ldris, Mahorrunad, 105
!hove, Conway, Premier, Oro Province, 402
!jape, Mathias
Min. Defence, xxxiii
Ila, Tony (MHA Lae), xxviii, 156, 387
CPC, member, 222, 229
declined parliamentary secretaryship, 309
Lae Misc. Workers' Assoc., leader, 283
Min. Forests, 328
Min. Labour, 328, 489
Min. Lands, 389
463
Illich, Dr Ivan, 164
Immigration policy, 105
residency permits, 105
Independence, 1-2, 4, 32-3, 116, 119, 142.
156
Australian government attitudes to, 11, 17,
43
Australian Labor party, policy, 33, 181
Independence Day, 16 September 1975, xx,
238, 247-8
forecasts of a date, 4-5, 19, 34, 53, 80,
85, 99, 137, 181-2, 217-8, 221, 223,
230,237
indigenous attitudes to, 74, 90, 102
National Library building, gift from Australia, 250
opposition to Independence, 9, 39
Papua New Guinea Act, amendments, 183
Papua, declaration of independence, 233
See also Secession; Papua Besena
political party policy, 18-9
relationship with Australia, 7, 9, 17
transfer of power, 183, 217, 230. 236
defence and foreign policy, 235
unity of Papua with New Guinea, 26, 101,
134
See also Constitutional development;
Self-government
Inder, Stuart, journalist, 52
Indians, 105
Indonesia, 80, 270
Consulate, 208
East Timor, 258-9, 284, 292
Index
PNG Foreign Minister visits, 365
Embassy, 284, 319, 358, 365
defence attache recalled, 381
Foreign Min. to PNG, 208-9, 326
Irian Jaya, xxx, 333, 353, 368, 374-6, 3934,413-4
border, xvi, 166, 208, 244, 296-7, 314,
319-20,326,333,352,375,381,394,
413
Free West Papua Movement. See OPM
Jayapura,352,368,369,446,508
OPM attempt to seize parliament, 380
PNG consulate, 466
Kennecott Copper Ltd, 145
Merauke, 369, 375,508
military incursions into PNG, 319,326,
358,369-70,380,394,426,465,495
musjawarah, 80
Netherlands New Guinea, xvi, xxx
Organisasi PapuaMerdeka(OPM), 167,
203,257-8,284,296-7,310,319-20,
326,352,358, 370,375,380,413,446,
495
abduction of AMS pilot, 380
attack on Jayapura, 380
PNG school teacher abducted, 394
Scotchian village warned, 413
plebiscite, UN, 74-5, 80
refugees, 72, 80, 290, 297, 314, 326,
352,380,393-4,413,426,446
Blackwater camp, 394, 413
camps burnt, 495
Red Cross aid, 393
re-settled, 414
South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal,
352
Trans-Irian Highway, 369-70
transmigration, 358, 370, 374-5
treaty (1979), 381
PNG relations with, 284, 296, 314, 319,
352,365,393-4,413-4,426
South Moluccan independence movement,
259
Suharto, Pres., visit to PNG (1979), 332-3
Sutrisno, Chief of Armed Forces, visit to
PNG (1990), 496
trade,427
Treaty of Mutual Respect, Cooperation and
Friendship (1986), 426, 445, 446, 495,
508
West Papua provisional government, 319
See also Netherlands New Guinea
583
Industrial Relations, 330, 333
See also Trade Unions
Industry. See Agriculture; Fishing; Forestry;
Manufacturing; Mining; Pastoralism
Inglis, Prof. Ken, 40
UPNG, Vice-Chancellor, 246
Institute for Applied Social and Economic
Research (lASER), 365, 448
Institute of Current World Affairs, xxxiv
Institute of Higher Education, 24
Institute of National Affairs Clifford Report
on law and order (1984), 395,459
Institute of Technology, 107. See also PNG
UOT
Irian Barat. See Indonesia, Irian Jaya
Irian Jaya. See Indonesia, Irian Jaya
Islands region, 47, 76,278
politicians, 71, 156, 454
secessionism, 65, 67-8
Itu, Daniel (MHA Kikori), 453,478
Pangu, expelled from, 491
Jack,John,68
Jack, Mrs, 68
Jackson, Philip, Aust. HC, Solomon Islands,
268
Jackson, Prof. Richard
lASER, Dir., 365
UPNG,351
Jakarta, 166,285,297
demonstrations at PNG Embassy, 394
Jaminan, John (MHA), 39
Min. Health, 348
Japan,xix,2,80, 158,161,369,491
aid,285,312,370,427
Ambassador, 100
Consul-General, 243
fishing, 357
investment, 209,215
timber leases, 370
trade,209,260,265,370
Javopa, Mackenzie (MHA Sohe)
Min. Culture & Tourism, 363
Jephcott, Sir Bruce (MHA)
Min. Fisheries & Forests (Natural Resources),216,218,222,254,256
Min. Transport, 156, 198
Min. Transport & Civil Aviation, 199,216,
323,325
Min. Transport, Works & Supply, 262-3
Min. Works, 328
584
John Paul, Pope, visit to PNG (1984), 126

Johnson, Leslie W. (MHA)
Administrator, xx, 108-9, 111-2, 124-5,
134,146,149,154,264
Assistant Administrator (Services), 6, 54,
76, 79,92,94-5,100
Australian Development Assistance Agency, 250
Education, Dir., 108
High Commissioner, 204
Johnson, P.G. (MHAAngoram), 71
Jouwe, Nicolaas, xxx
Kabaira Bay, Gazelle Peninsula, 135-o. 16~
Kabisawali Movement. See Trobriand Islands
Kabui, Joseph, Premier, North Solomons,
463-3,472,482,483,485
Kagere (Kageri), Denis, Premier, Oro Province, 402,412
Kaiserwilhelmsland. See German New Guinea
Kaisiepo, Marcus, xxx
Kakarya, Pato (MHA Wapenamanda)
expelled from Pangu, 398
Min. Environment & Conservation, 328
Kakun, Mangobing (MHA Munya), 38, 523, 72
Kale, Kobale (MHA Sinasina), 255
Min. Education, 275, 299
Kambipi, Traimya (MHA Kompiam-Baiyer),
64,285
Kamod, Paul (MHA)
Min. Administrative Services, 478
Kanawi, Wep, Dept. Public Service, Sec., 460
Kange, Pundia (MHA Ialibu-Pangia)
Min. Corrective In~tilutions & Liquor
Licensing, 363
Min. Forestry, 328
Kanike, Susan, designer ofPNG flag, 129
Kaniniba, Michael (MHA Huon Gulf), 38, 53
Kapal, Philip, Premier, Western Highlands
Province, 402, 431
Kapena, Toua (MHA)
local government, 132
Min. Labour, 56, 57,62-3, 82
Kapi, Sir Murray
Commission of Enquiry, 383
Deputy Chief Justice, 383
firstindigenousjudge,336
State Solicitor, 336

Kaputin, Sir John (MHA Rabaul). xxvii, 99,
llO, 111-2, 123-4, 125, 128, 147-8, 1556,176,198,231,237-8,241,250,254,283,
288,303-4,309,434,471
Alliance for Progress and Regional Development, 294
Bougainville Bipartisan Committee, Chair.,
470
children, 240
dismissed, 222-4, 230, 232, 263
jailed, 335
Min. Finance, 341, 342, 348, 351
Min. Higher Education, 339
Min. Justice, 198, 200-1,214-6
Min. Minerals & Energy, 409, 454, 455
Min. National Planning & Development
(assisting PM), 325, 328, 335, 339
Min. State, assisting PM, 328
wife, 283
Karara, Ephraim, 68
Karava, Gabriel Ehava, 36
Karava, Sepoe, Premier, Gulf Province, 493
Karkarya. Mr, expelled from UP, 301
Karo, Albert (MHA Moresby South), 437,
456
Min. Culture & Tourism, 444, 453
Kasaipwalova, John, 116, 188-9,232
jailed,298
Village Development Task Force, 290
Kasau, Pikah L. (MHA Manus)
member CPC, 222
Katubu oil field, Southern Highlands, 486
Monticello Enterprises Ltd, 486-7
Kaumi, Simon
Chief Electoral Officer, 107, 153
Deputy Electoral Officer, 107
Dept. Interior, Dir., 226, 231
Dept. Social Development & Home
Affairs, Dir., 288
Republic of Papua, interim CM, 233-4
Kaunda, Kenneth, Tanzania, Pres .. 1"25
Kauona, Sam, Commander, BRA, 482, 483
Kavavu, Demas, Premier, New Ireland Province, 493
Kavali, Sir Thomas (MHA Jimi), 119-20,
143,153,155,277,290,305-6
Min. Housing, 328
Min. Lands, 199,207,253-4,261,263
Min. Natural Resources, 262-3, 265
Min. Works, 156, 177, 198
resigned from cabinet, 329
Index
sacked from cabinet, 275
Western Highlands Review Committee,
402
Kavieng. See New Ireland Province
Kekedo, Rose
adviser to UN delegation, 39
Kennecott Pty Ltd, 158, 196, 244, 273, 460
Kenu, Wegra (MHA), 11, 25
Kepore, Kopii, 193
Kerepia, Pious
Law and Order Task Force, 403
Police Commissioner, 290, 311, 313
Kerr, Sir John, Aust. GG, 247
Khan, Dr I.H., 105
Kiaps (patrol officers), xxi, xxv, 10, 83, 138,
144, 153, 162-3, 175, 187,292
in Parliament, 47, 51, 53-4, 58, 145, 370,
378,424
Kiki, Sir Albert Maori (MHA), xxvii, xxxi,
10,20,32,68,80,85-7,99, 104,116,141,
157,246,303,306,312
acting PM, 257
ANZ Bank, Dir., 42
assaulted by women, 220
call for resignation of
GG, 291
Damai Pty Ltd, Dir., 265
Deputy CM, 261
Deputy PM, 261-2
Min. Defence & Foreign Relations, 199,
208-9
Min. Defence, Foreign Affairs & Trade,
216,230,235-6,242-3,249,250,257,
260-2,268,291,310
Min. Lands, 156, 164, 179, 186, 198
National Shipping Corporation, Chair., 312
New Guinea Motors, Dir., 312
Port Moresby Council of Trade Unions,
Pres., 312
Port Moresby Town Council, 132
King, Peter, xxxiv
Kirk, Norman, New Zealand PM, 209
Kitchens, Carl. See Stack, Carl Kitchens
Knox, Bill, Qld Min. Justice, 252
Koe, John, 140
Kofikai, Sabumei (MHA Goroka), 74, 120
Koki, Alois (MHA), 454
Komboni, Andrew, Premier, Sandaun Province, 391
Komoiam-Baiyer electorate, 37
Kompian-Ambun, Member for, 407
585
Kondom, Agaundo, xxviii-xxix, xxx
Kopi. Veva, Madang Town Council, Pres., 142
Koraea, Tom (MHA GulO. 234
Min. Media, 328
Premier, Gulf Province, 493
Korokal, Kagul, Premier, Western Highlands
Province, 402,431,432
Koromba, Yaungtine, Premier, Southern
Highlands Province, 401,493
Korowara, Bebes (MHA Goroka)
Min. Lands, 363
Korowi, Sir Wiwa (MHA), 488
Min. Health, 328
Min. Minerals & Energy, 455
Kove, Matthew, Bougainville leader, 468
Kovingre, Otto, Wewak-But LGC, Vice-Pres.,
xxvii,9
Kumaina, Robin, 110
Kuman, Peter (MHA), 387, 444
Min. Police, 444
Min. Works, 431
Kunangel, Opai (MHA), 338
Minister, 69
Kupul, James, candidate for Western Highlands regional, 276
Kuri, Kingal Kai, Western Highlands, 431-2
Kurondo, Siwi (MHA), 11, 38, 51, 53, 119
Ass. Min. Forests, 57,61
Kusumaatmadja, Dr Mochtar, Indonesian
Foreign Min., 326
Kutas, Alphonse, 21
Kwan, Perry (MHA Kavieng), 68
Speaker, 155, 168
Kwarara, Galeva (MHA), 430
Deputy Opposition Leader, 331, 340
Minister, 348
Min. Finance & Planning, 420, 448, 455
Min. Trade & Industry, 409, 457, 477
Labour
contracts, 16
indigenous, 81
Lae,9, 17,20,67, 79,107,110,142-3,150,
152,201,281,309,379
airport, 449, 459
curfew,497
hospital, 24
Kavieng Club, 67
Niall Community Centre, 150
586
Progressive Citizens' Assoc. (1969), 132

Show, 150
Town Council, 106, 131, 142
Young Christian Centre, 150
Laina, Ned, Premier, Enga Province, 424,
473,493
Land
acquisition, 79, 81, 83-5, 88, 91, 93, 1101,207,253
alienation, 141, 460-1
Board, 111
Commission oflnquiry Report ( 1973), 207
compensation claims, 475,486
customary ownership, 26, 93, 168, 207,
311, 4bl, 4~6
disputes, 136, 353
indigenous rights, 460-1
Land Development Authority proposed, 5
Lands Acquisition Act, 253
legislation. See House of Assembly
mining leases, 26
non-citizen leases, 207
policy, 5, 100
registered, 141
resettlement schemes, 123
squatter settlements, Ill, 135, 148, 396
Kibbutz scheme proposed, 395
tenure, 141
Titles Commission, 141, 148
urban, 106, 357
Lang, Galen (MHA)
Min. Agriculture, 489-90
Langro, Joe Paul (MHA West Sepik), 50,
155,172,210,257-8,264,301,391
Ass. Min. Information & Extension Services, 57, 61, 63, 97, 224
Premier. Sandaun Province, 391,412
Sandaun Independent Group, 391
shadow Min. for Foreign Affrurs, 297
support for Irian Jayan refugees, 290
Language
citizenship, 253
English,xxv,29,57,65,264
Hiri Motu, 195,253
interpreters, 35, 154
lingua franca, 37
Tok Pisin (Pidgin English) in elections, 152
in Parliament, xxv, xxix, 50, 58, 64, 68,
242,264
national language, 9, 12, 62, 253
vernacular, xxv, xxix, 253
World Bank Report, TokPisinsummary, 16

Lapun, Sir Paul (MHA South Bougainville),
xxvii,xxxi,5-6, 11, 20, 27, 38,50, 52-3,57,
64,66,72,75,83~,86,94-6,135,143,239
Member, Ministerial Nomination Committee, 197

Min. Health, 262
Min. Mines, 156, 176-7, 198
Min. Mines & Energy.l99-200, 211-2, 262
rescued by helicopter, 278
Lau, Tenda (MHA), 453, 489
Law Council of Australia, 92
Lawi, Kindi (MHA Western Highlands)
Lawrence, W., 90
Lawrence, William
Dept. Primary Industries, Sec., 348
Leach, Jerry, 145
League of Nations Mandated Territory, xix,
XX
Leahy, Tom J. (MHA Markham), 281

non-ministerial member AEC, 57, 63, 78,
117-8,125,145. 154
Lee, J., 68
Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore PM, 326
Legal system
Corrective Institution Service, 384
gaol breaks, 384
Court of Disputed Returns, 444
courts, 279, 357, 501
criticism of, 225
District Courts, 86, 149
evidence, 91 ; by affidavit, 77
International Commission of Jurists, 115
International Court of Justice, 253
judges, 77.138,224,229,239
land disputes, 207
law and order problems, 178, 334, 394-5,
402,414-5,458,467,493~
Clifford Report on law and order ( 1984),

395,459
Morgan Committee Report on Crime,
Law and Order (1984), 384
sectoral funds, 422
Somare proposes introduction of execution, castration and flogging, 403
Law Reform Commission, 258, 288, 494
local court magistrates, 138, 149, 178
localisation, 138
National Court, 335, 336, 354, 389, 392,
Index
432,505
Public Prosecutor, 377
reforms, 158-9
Rooney Affair, 335, 336, 338
sorcery, 136
Special Judges' Report on the Application
of the Minimum Penalties Legislation,
415
stipendiary magistrates, 40, 95, 115, 127,
138, 188
Supreme Court, 63, 85, 91, 138, 276, 309,
311,344,348,356,395,424,425,447,
491
Chief Justice, 49, 70, 145, 335, 336, 442,
505
Court of Appeal, 72, 94
Vagrancy Act, 395
village courts, 169, 178, 239, 395-6
Legislative Assembly, xxiv
Legislative Council, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, xxviiixxix, 37, 152, 229
education standards of members, xxi
Select Committee on Political Development, xxiv, xxvi, xxx
Lemeki, Jacob (MHA), 477, 478
Min. Labour, 328
PSA, Sec., 282
Levi, Noel (MHA), 325
Min. Foreign Affairs, 343, 352, 353
Min. Housing, 329
Parliamentary Secretary, 309
Ley, John
CPC legal adviser, 171, 237
Leys, Colin, 387
Liberia, 39
Lihir Island; Kennecott involvement, 460
Lilje, Uwe, 104
Lindblom, C.E., 190
Lini, Fr Walter, PM Vanuatu, 460
Littler, C.G., (MHA)
DI Mount Hagen, 54
Livestock, 16
Local(;overniDent, 140,172,178,255
Area Authorities, 171
Association, xxii, 261
Authorities Act 1971, xxii
Bougainville Regional Conference, 188
business licenses, 125
Citizens Consultative Committees, 106,
131
Commissioner, 72
Committee of Inquiry, 330
587
community education, 208
constitutional development, 120
consultation, 101
cooperatives, 126
Councillors, 150
Councils (LGC), xxi, xxii, 10, 35, 89, 189;
staffing, 121-2
Abau, 189
Ambenob, 133
Asaro, 219
Association of, 89, 109
Baiyer River, 162
Bainings, 92
Baluan, xxi
Bougainville LGC Conference, 211
Gazelle, xxix, 168, 179, 189
Gazelle Peninsula, xxii, 87-8, 92-6, 100,
109-12, 123-4, 126-9, 137, 147-8,
179,189,292
Connolly Commission (1970), 108
elections, 148
Greater Toma Council, 189,219
Warkurai Nigunan, MataunganAssoc.
LGC, 137, 179, 189, 137, 189
Hanuabada, xxi
Hiri, 425
Huon, 19
Jimi, 162
Kainantu, 219
Laiagam, 162
Losuia, 188-9
Motu-Koita, xxi
Mount Hagen, 162
Nawae, 143
Teop-Tinputz, 66
Toma, 219
Vunamarni, xxix
Wahgi, 160, 162
Waiye, xxviii
Western Highlands, 99, 162, 379
Wewak-But, xxii, xxvii, 9
Department, 89; included in CM's Dept.,
186
Director of District Administration, xviii
elections, 9, 88, 95, 131
kivungs, xxi
luluai, xxi, xxviii
Ordinances: Local Government 1963, xxi;
Native Local Government 1949-60, xxi
politicians, 37, 163, 266
taxation, 95, 112, 123, 137, 148, 188-9
Town Councils
588
A Papua ,"lew Guinea Political Chronicle
See individual towns: Port Moresby;

Lae. See also under individual Provinces
tultul, xxi, xxix
village constables, xxi
Vunadidir staff college, 121
ward connnittees, 27, 131
See also District Commissioners
Lohia, Renagi
Ambassador to the UNO, 465
PSC, Chair., 371
Lokinap, Brigadier Rochus, 443
Lokoloko, Sir Tore (MHA), 86, 102, 117-9,
229
Governor-General (1977-83), 298, 309
Min. Health, 57
Lome Convention. See above Economy, trade
London,xxx,80,260
Lotu, Tolai leader, 96
Lowa, Patterson (MHA Moresby Northeast)
Defence Force, Colonel, 265
Damai Pty Ltd, Dir., 265
Min. Minerals & Energy, 461-2
Min. Police, 311
Lue, Joseph (MHA Bougainville), 66, 83-4
Ass. Min. Technical Education & Training,
57
Los, Sir Pita (MHA Dreikikir; Maprik), xxxi,
6, 11,20,38,52,65, 70, 76,125,489
death penalty, advocate 245, 262
Min. Commerce, 309,312,328
Min. Corrective Institutions & Liquor Licensing, 262
Min. Parliamentary Services, 363
resigned, 388
Min. Police, 245, 265
Min. State, 198
supports Irian Jayans, 258
violence in House of Assembly. 266
Lussick, Walter A. (MHA Manus & New
Ireland), 62-63,70-1,73-4.76, 91, 118-9,
125,150,154,264,309
Lynch, C.J., legislative draughtsman, 236
McCarthy, J.D., 21
McCarthy, J.K., 35, 49
McCasker, Bill, 165
McEwan, J .M., NZ Dept. Island Terr. & Maori
Affairs, Sec., 39
McGill University, Canada, 137
McKillop, F.R., 81, 83-4

McKinna, Brigadier, SA Commissioner for
Police, 149
McMahon, Sir William, Aust. PM, 105, 156,
181
McMeekan, Dr C.P., 38
McKinnon, Jim (MHA Middle Ramu), 20,
38,53,94
Macquarie University, Sydney, 171
Madang Province, 306, 368
cabinet, 425
elections, 391,480
Karkar Island, 39
Madang,xxxi,9,20.1,35-7,39,79,90,152
demonstration, 395
Town Council, 106, 131, 133, 142
no-confidence motions, 412,424
Premiers, 391, 412, 424
Sepik settlers, 395
Magic
garden, 140
masalai, 140
rainmaker, 248
sorcery, 136
Mai, Halua (MHA Tari)
Min. Environment & Conservation, 363
Maiah, Joel, Premier, Manus Province; jailed
for embezzlement, 402
Maino, Andrew
Standardisation Commission, Chair., 265
Maina, Napuri (MHA Western), 251
Magnolias, Waitea (MHA), 290
Makere University, Uganda, 171
Malaisa, Francis, Premier, Gulf 412
Malawi,260
Malaysia
Investment Promotion and Protection
Agreement, 481
land resettlement scheme, 31
palm oil, 289
Malik, Dr Adam, Indonesian Min. For. Aff.,
167, 208-9
Maloat, Paliau (MHA Manus), xxvii, 11, 38,
53, 70, 73
Mamaloni, Solomon, Solomon Islands CM,
242,268
Mamose district. See East & West Sepik,
Madang & Morobe Provinces
Maneke, John (MHA), 155, 264
Manlel, Paul (MHA West New Britain), xxvii
Mano, Koitaga (MHA Kandep-Tambul), 65
Index
Manus Province, xxi, xxvii, 35, 67, 90,97
cannery project, 336
elections, 480
electorates, 150
governmentsuspended,390,413
Premiers, 413,454,463
timber leases, 463
Maor, Kare (MHA)
Min. Higher Education, 328
Mapun, Dus, Village Development Task
Force, 290
Mara, Premier, Western Highlands, 402
jailed for embezzlement, 402
Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, Fiji PM, 226, 344
Maras, Col., Defence Force, 480
commander Bougainviiie troops, 500
Marcos, Ferdinand, Philippines Pres., 281,
292
Marcos, Immelda, 247
Mariana Group, xix
Marsh, R.B., NSW T &LC, 41
Marshall Islands, xix
Marsipal, Arnold (MHA)
Min. Defence, 78, 480
Martin, Frank (MHA Madang-Sepik), 8, 20,
26
Matane, Sir Paulius, 446
Ambassador, 297
Dept. Business Development, Dir., 122,
124,288
Dept. Foreign Affairs & Trade, Sec., 365
East Timor, attitude to, 365
Public Service Board, 110, 122
Matiabe, Aruru (MHA), 434-5, 443, 444,
447,450,477,479
Min. Culture & Tourism, 478
Min. Education, 442
Min. Foreign Affairs (acting), 442, 443
Matibri, Suguman (MHA Madang), 20, 25
Matlaun, Tolai leader, 96
Matthews, L.G., Public Service
Arbitrator, 12, 28, 41, 62
Maughivu, O'ongu, Papua Besena
rainmaker, 248
Maut, Peter, Wewak-But LGC, Pres., xxvii, 9
Mazrui, Prof. Ali, 171
Mead, Prof Margaret,266
Meanggarum, James (MHA Ramu; Bogia),
10-11,38,53,66,70-1
Me~a.9, 12, 17,32,33,34,38,40,57,667,69,80,89, 110,185,218,233,323,373,
387,400,407,439,500
589
advertising campaigns, 152, 336
Australian, 195, 218, 250, 311, 319-20,
325,369-70,375,381,507.
See also ABC
Dept. Information & Public Broadcasting.
See above
elections, 152, 379
freedom of, 282,441-2
llansard,accessto,242
journalists, xxv, 21, 40, 119, 162, 181,282,
292,297,390,438,472,476,482
National Broadcasting Commission, 235,
237,313,411,416,459
Chairman, 366
Okuk stops interview on air, 348
television, 357, 366, 411
New Guinea News Service, 110
Newcastle Broadcasting Network, 427
newspapers, 72,215,267,366,414,440
Pravda,40
press conferences, 224, 452
press releases, 187
radio, xxxi, 10, 12, 79, 83, 101, 110, 128,
148,193,199,204,215,217,224,235,
256, 325,431,432
political advertisements, 431
political broadcasts, 150, 153, 290
television, 85-6, 161, 250, 357, 366, 411,
432
Tribunal, 441
See also Niugini Nius; Post-Courier;
Times of Papua New Guinea
Mel, Michael (MHA), 439, 476
Min. Treasury, 455
Melanesian Chamber of Commerce, 486, 500
Melanesian Council of Churches, 200
Melanesian Institute, Goroka, 415
Melanesian Investments Pty Ltd, 265
Melanesian Way, 211, 241, 288, 354
Asian influences, 364
compensation,336,475
conflict resolution, 333
corruption, 12, 216, 241, 262, 288, 364,
376,377,391,412,419-20,444,458,
466, 489, 490. See also Forestry
election strategy, 299
feminism, 364
Leadership Code, 316-8,321-2,327
myth attacked, 341
Narokobi's Melanesian Way
philosophy, 288, 354
590
A. Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle
nationalism, 288
No-confidence motions. See House of Assembly
parliamentary system, 325
political ideology, 287, 327, 378, 398,452
political parties
business arms, 288, 300
coalitions, 408
function of, 287, 290, 300, 307
policies, 300-3, 353, 398, 432-5
politicians, 211
criminal connections, 494
in business, 288
lack ofloyalty to party system, 288, 305,
357,369,371,388,439,475,488
leadership, 353-4, 450
Ministers, defying Cabinet, 331
refuse to vacate office, 390
wantok vote, 359
politics
characteristics, 306, 339, 344, 390
cynical amoralism, 397-8,440,441,449,
489
payback syndrome, 390, 398, 489
provincial, 315
tangential approach, 388
post-election lobbying, 294
public servants, attitudes, 348
riots at Okuk's funeral, 418
wantokism, 444
See also Provincial Government; Social
Change
Melo, Tambu, (MHA Kutuba}, 20
Meser, Seth, OPM leader, 446
Methodist church, 137,269
Miakwe, Akepa (MHA Unggai-Bena}, 389
Micronesia, 171
Middlemiss, Barry, 84, 102
Middleton, John (MHA Sumkar), 153, 303
Mileng, James, Electoral
Commissioner, 298
Milne Bay Province, 306
Commonwealth Development Corp., investment, 392
Dogura, xxix
Gedulalara village, xxix
elections, 425
electorates, 36, 304
financial scandal, 480
Milne Bay Solidarity Group, 425
Premiers, 425
Samarai, xxviii
Speaker, 390
timber, 289
Mining
copper, 5, 26, 66, 69, 79, 145, 158, 244,
259,261,267,296,355,361,400-1
exploration, 485, 486
gold,393,400-1,429,486
land rights, 461
Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund
(MRSF), 355,465
Mining Act, 487
oil, 435, 485, 486
Petroleum Act, 487
policy, 170,176,200,458
See also Bougainville; Ok Tedi
Ministerial advisors, 273-4
Ministers, expenses, 277-8, 290
Ministries, major changes announced, 156,
198-9, 215-6, 262
Minj, Western Highlands, 119
Minogue, Chief Justice John, 168
Misima mine, 486
Missions. See Christianity
Moeder, Max, Premier, Madang Province,
391,412,424
Mokai, Albert, Premier, Southern Highlands
Province, 493
Mola, Donatus (MHA North Bougainville},
38,66,234
Lemankoa village, 267
Min. Business Development, 156, 198,
211-2, 216
Min. Health, 216,262
Nakar Kas society, 267
Momis, [Father] John (MHA Bougainville),
156, 176-7, 179,235,263,268-70, 278,
299,303-4,340,348,356.359,362,376,
378,379,388,391,394,398,401,406,
430,433,434,438,439,441,446,450,
463,467,472,482,485,492,498,499
Alliance for Progress and Regional
Development, 294
Bougainville Initiative, 434, 461
CPC,DeputyChair., 167,170,184-5,2001, 205-6, 214, 222-4, 229, 237-9, 241,
255,314,458
Deputy PM, 399, 407, 414
meeting with James Nyaro, OPM
Index
Pres., 394
Min. Decentralisation, 314-5, 321-2, 328,
332,339,342,349,354
Min. Public Service, 399
Opposition Leader, 397
threatened by police, 469
Mona Louis (MHA)
Min. Administrative Services, 328
Min. Defence, 328
Monash University, Melbourne, 139
Monk, A.E., Chairman ACTU, 41
Mopio, James, candidate for Central Regional, 275, 310
Morea, Sevese (MHA), 68
Moresby Open electorate, 35
Morgan, Leo
CM's Office, 163
NBC, Chair., 357; sacked, 366
New Zealand, HC to, 260
Morgan Committee Report of Crime, Law
and Order (1984), 384
Morobe Province, 20, 35-7, 90, 152, 332,
349,354,368
Assembly, 383
election, 378
electorates, 36, 54, 150, 153, 303
Finschhafen, xxxi, 9
Garaina, 459
government suspended, 467, 480, 493
Irian Jay a refugees re-settlement offer, 414
Menyamya, 330
Morobe Independent Group (1984), 378
Wau, xxvi
Morris, A., PNG Associated Industries, Mgr.
Dir., 265
Morrison, W.L. (Bill)
Aust. Min. External Territories, 181, 1835,196,201,209,215,217,236
Moses, Henry, Bougainville Workers' Union,
Pres., 246
Moses, Sasakila (MHA)
Min. Culture & Recreation, 216
Min. Culture, Recreation & Youth Development, 262
Min. Forests, 156, 198
Muliap, Tom (MHA)
Min. Police, 411
Murdani, General Benny, Indonesian Army
591
Commander
funds to Diro, 442
gifts to Huai, 444
gifts to PNG Defence Force, 444
Murray, Sir Hubert, Lieutenant-Governor of
Papua, xix, xxi
Murray, J.K., Administrator, xx, xxii
Murtopo, Major-General Ali, 208
Museum, of war, 28
Nairobi, Kenya, 166
Namaliu, Rabbie (MHA Kokopo (PM
(1988-92)), xxxii, 110,441,454
CM, principal private secretary to, 210
East New Britain Provincial Commissioner. xxxii, 290
education, xxxii, 290
Min. Foreign Affairs & Trade, xxxii, 363,
365,374,376,386,394
visit to United Nations, 394
Min. Primary Industries, xxxii
Opposition Leader, xxxii
Pangu, Chair., 453
Pangu, Vice-Pres., 210
Prime Minister, 447, 449, 458, 476, 478,
479,482,485,488,489,494,507
Public Service, Chair., xxxii
Grand Coalition talks, 488
policy, 458
PM, priv. sec. to, 290
research officer to, xxxii
PSC, Chair., xxxii, 290, 313
Speaker, xxxii
Napidakoe Assoc. See Political Parties
Narokobi, Bernard (MHA), 354,401,407,
415,427,439
CPC consultant, 171
Judge, 352
Law Reform Commission, Chair., 258, 288
Melanesian Way philosophy, 288, 354
Min. Justice, 472,495
South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal,
Chair., 352
Natera, John, Dept. Agriculture, Stock &
Fisheries, Dir., 288
National Capital District, 306
Commission, 441
State of Emergency (1985), 404
Regional electorate, created, 261
National Executive Council (NEC). See House
of Assembly
592
National Intelligence Organisation (NIO), 352,

368,369,375-6,381,433,443,444,503
National Investment & Development Authority (NIDA). See Development
National Shipping Corporation, 312
National Times, 368
National Youth Service, 494
Nationalism, 270
citizenship, 172, 217-8, 222, 227-9, 234,
236-40,250,253-4,264
CPC report (1974), 223
development of, 65, 148, 197, 202
economic,215,225
Kaputin Affair, 224-6, 230, 232
Kaumi Affair, 231
Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG), 229-39
radical. See Political Radicalism
See also Political Parties
Natural disasters, 444
drought, 178
earthquakes, 135, 137
frost, 178
SPF regional disaster fund, 259
tidal waves, 135
Nauru, 171,243
Neai, Senior Inspector Ronnie
Commander, Papuan Mobile Unit, 484
coup attempt, 484
Negints, Thomas (MHA Tambul-Nebilyer),
387,389,398,444
Min. Fisheries, 455
Min. Internal Affairs, 444,451
Nemea Landholders Assoc. See Papua
Netherlands New Guinea. See Indonesia
Neville, Ron (MHA Southern Highlands), 29,
51,57,60-1,155,176
Neville, Ron T.D. (MHA Southern Highlands), 35, 50, 54,64-5, 69, 119, 144, 150
New Britain, xxvi, 35-6, 67, 88, 92, 108
Acting District Commissioner, 93
Advisory Council, 92-3
Palm Oil Development Ltd, 82
New Guinea, 102
New Guinea Islands Produce Company, 303
New Guinea Mandatedlfrust Territory, 39
administration, xix-xx
Development Corporation. See Development
See also Mataungan Assoc.
Executive Council, xxii
Grazier's Assoc., 28
Highlands Bulletin, 61
Islands electorates, 151

Islands Produce Company, 127
Islands region, 47,76
Legislative Council, xxiv
local government, xxiii, xxiv
News Service, 110
politicians, 7i, 156
secessionism, 65, 67-8
Territory politicians, 11, 36
New Guinea Motors, 312
New Guinea Research Unit (NGRU). See
ANU
New Guinea Times-Courier, 85-6
New Hebrides. See Vanuatu
New Ireland Province, xxxi, 67, 96, 119,315
cannery, 336
elections, 425,431
finances, 342
Kavieng, 9, 20, 27
Fisheries College, 370
Open electorate, 475
Leadership Code Bill, rejected, 412
Namatanai, 119, 303; Open electorate, 35
New Hanover Island, 21
Premiers, 408, 454
Tiga Pressure Group, 475
New South Wales Trades and Labour Council,
41
New York, xxx, 166
New Zealand
aid, 209
currency, 429
disaster relief, 259
Endeavour, frigate, 484
investment, 260
PM visits PNG, 209
PNG diplomats withdrawn, 285
workers, 281
Newby, L.R., Information &
Extension Services, Dir., 110
Newman, A.P.J. (MHA), 6, 23, 59
Assistant Administrator (Economic Affairs), 83-4, 124. 128
Deputy Administrator, 135, 154
Niall, H.L.R., 49
Speaker. 4. 35-6
Nilkare, John (MHA Simbu), 386,421
Min. Decentralisation (Provincial Affairs),
363,374,376,386,420
Min. Lands, 389
Ninkama, Bill (MHA)
Index
Min. Housing, 444
Niugini. See Papua New Guinea
Niugini Nius, 365, 369, 387, 440, 453, 476;
issue pulped, 366
Noaio, Aaron (MHA), 478
Noel, John (MHA)
CM's Office, 163
Min. Defence, 328
Parliamentary Secretary, 309
Noga, Brigadier Ken, 411
Nombe, Walter
Min. Works & Transport (EHP), 425
Premier, Eastern Highlands Province, 425
Nombri, Sir Joseph Kaal (MHA), IO, 68
Comm. of Police (associate), 175
kiap, 175
North Solomons Province, 205, 224, 297,
349,493
abolished, 269
Assembly, 270, 292
elections, 234, 278, 378
finances, 268, 342
insignia, 234
local governments, 315
planning officer, 284
Pollee "21 Squad", 351
Premiers, 454, 470
restored, 278, 291
secession, 470. See also Bougainville
settlers, repatriation, 425
See also Bougainville
Northern Province. See Oro Province
Nuclear-Free Pacific, 209, 243, 257
Conference, 243
Nuia, Col. Leo, Defence Force
ABC "Four Corners" interview, 499
Commander (acting), 480
commander Bougainville troops, 472,483,
498
sacked, 499
Nwokolo, !kenna, lawyer, 114
Nyaro, James, OPM, Pres.
ABC interview, 381
Fr Momis, meeting with, 394
Ghana, resettled in, 426
refugee to PNG, 414, 426
Nyerere, Julius, Tanzania, Pres., 257
Oakes, Laurie, journalist, 369
Oala-Rarua, Oala (MHA Central), xxvi,
593
xxxi, 8-12,38,46-7,50,53-4,68,85, 119,
135, 143-5
Ass. Min. Treasury, 57,62-3
Pangu party, expelled from, 19-20
Port Moresby Town Council, 132
Pres., 142
Oda, Isaiah, Premier, Central Province, 493
Ogio, Michael (MHA), 454
Minister, 454
Ok Tedi, 158, 214, 244, 273, 350, 352, 355,
361,377,385,400-1,466
Additional Projects Tax, 400
Amoco, Ok Tedi shareholder, 393
Applied Geology Associates, 474
Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd, 261, 393,400
closure threat, 393, 400
compensation claims, 474, 486
cyanide, 2,375 drums lost in Fly River
mouth, 393
hydro-electricity project, 393, 400, 474
Jackson Report, 350
Kiunga, port, 374
Ok Tedi Development Company Pty
Ltd, 245, 393
pollution,474
revenue from, 474
shutdown, 400
strike, 460
Tabubil, workers burn buildings, 460
tailings dam, 392-3, 400, 474
See also Kennecott Pty Ltd
Okuk, Sir Iambakey (MHA Simbu; UnggaiBena), 155,156,277,290,299,302,3045,309,316,322-3,325,344,345,358,365,
378,383,389,397-8,399,405,406,408,
409,416-8,445
business interests, 322
Chair. of Committees, 155
death from cancer (1986), 416, 438; funeral, 418
defeated, 1982 election, 362, 370
Deputy PM, 341,348,349,354,356
Highlands bloc leader, 298
loses parliamentary seat, 362, 385, 389
Min. Agriculture, Stock & Fisheries, 156,
161,186,198,216
Min. Education, 262-4; dismissed, 275
Min. Primary Industries, 409, 416
Min. Transport & Civil Aviation, 216, 237,
241-2,253,254,263,275,342,345,348
NBC radio broadcast stopped, 348
Opposition Leader, 321, 331, 338, 339,
594
A Papua 1Vew Guinea Political Chronicie
340,371,373
People's United Front, leader, 317
sacked from cabinet, 275
World Anti-Communist League, 417
Olewale, Sir Niwia Ebia (MHA South Fly),
xxxi,IO, 38,51-2,70-1,74-6,97,124, 135,
144
Deputy PM, 328
Min. Commerce, 27
Min. Education, 156, 164, 166, 186, 198,
215,221
Min. Foreign Affairs and Trade, 319,326,
328,332
visit to East Timor, 319
Min. Justice, 235, 251, 255, 262-3, 267,
277,298
Min. assisting PM on Provincial Affairs,
262,267
Oliver, Michael, xxxiv
Olmsted, Mary Seymour
USA Ambassador, 260
USA Charge d'Affaires, 260
Ombudsman Commission, 17, 170, 239,
308,311,322,345,349,383,441,444,
490,505
Chief Ombudsman, 491
Corruption in Government, 364
documents stolen, 494
Executive Diaries Affair, 364, 377
Interim Report of Air Niugini, 342
Placer Share Affair, 419,433
Ona, Francis
Bougainville rebel leader, 462, 468, 469,
471,498
K200,000 prize for capture, 472
Republic of Meekamui, Pres., 483
Ondawame, Otto, OPM leader, 326 , 333
Oram, Nigel, 132, 142, 194
Orea, John, 450
O'Regan, Prof. R.S., 158
Oro Province
cabinet size, 379
curfew,493
leaders, 278
no-confidence motions, 402,412
oil palms, 461
Popondetta, 233
Premiers, 480
sugar cane projects, 332
Post & Telecom Corporation (PTC), 411,
416,440
Ou, Pena (MHA Mount Hagen), 75, 89
Overall, Mr, 2
Overseas volunteers, 56
Pacific Islands Monthly, 46, 51, 61,72
Pago Pago. xxx
Pais, Tom (MHAJ
Min. Agriculture, 489
Paliau Movement. See Political cults
Palm oil industry, 38
Papeete, French Polynesia, 332
Papua,39
Act 1905, xix
Administrator, xix
Bereina, 192, 204
Black Power group, 211, 234
Boera, 196
economy, 244
electorates, 151, 153
ethnic tension, 191-4
Executive Council, xxii
forestry, 350
Goilala, 192
Kairuku-Hiri electorate, 153
Koiari, 218
leaders, 39
Legislative Council, xxii
Lieutenant-Governor, xix
Nemea Landowners Assoc., Abau, 189,
196,210,218
Papua Action, 255
Papua Besena. See Political Parties
Papua Group. 232
Papua Liberation Movement, 234
patrol officers, xxi
political parties, 27
politicians, 10, 35-7,50, 156,218
regionalism, 440
Republic of Papua, 233-4
bill sent to Bougainville, 235
declaration of independence ( 16 March
1975), 233
Papuan republican fighters army, 233
Kokoda Trail march, 233
Resident Magistrates, xxi
Rigo-Abau. 192
secession from PNG, 270
separatism from New Guinea, 134-5, 145,
173,193-7,204,211,218,221,232,255,
257,270,278
Tapini, 192
Index
Tatana, 234
Papua and New Guinea, administrative union,
135
Papua New Guinea
Citizenship Advisory Committee, 253
flag, 121,129,204,247
Head of State, 238, 256
Independence Day, 247
naming the nation, 71-2
Niugini, 66, 72, 102, 129
Pagini, 121
national anthem, 121, 246
symbols, 71
Papua New Guinea Investment Corporation,
124,165,176,201,215-6,244
Papua New Guinea University of Technology (UOT), 24,201
closed second semester 1991,497, 503
demonstrations, 281
funding, 206
police intervention, 333
staff, 281-2
students, 273,457
boycott classes, 497, 50 l
demonstrations, 281, 335, 393-4, 474,
501
Mount Hagen meeting, 263
Representative Council, 503
strike, 221, 282
Vice-Chancellor, 273, 281
Papuan Medical College, 98, 104
Parao, Anton (MHA Western Highlands),
143,161,172,261,263-4,275-6
expelled from UP, 30 l
Pasom, Singin (MHA Lae), 20
Pasquarelli, John (MHA East Sepik), 26
Pastoralism
beef cattle, 69
Patrol Officers. See Kiaps
Peacock, Andrew
Aust. Min. Army, 149, 156
Aust. Min. External Territories, 156-8, 164,
167, 171, 174, 249
shadow Min., 209, 250, 252, 259
Pedarcher, Wally, Mount Hagen
coffee planter, 418
Pelair, Australia air firm, 405
Peli Assoc. See Political Cults
Pep, Melchior (MHA)
Pepena, Gerega (MHA), 348
Philippines, 352, 354
595
businessmen, 357
Hetura Meja, timber company, 350, 392
workers, 281,358
See also Marcos
Physical Planning Board, 491
Pigs, attitudes to, 16
Piniau, Sam, 109-10
Dept. Information & Extension Services.
Dir., 288
Pitoi, Sir Sere
Dept. Post & Telegraphs, act. Dir., 122
PSB, Chair., 122, 266, 288
Placer Pacific share float, 419-20
Plantation Holdings Ltd, 135
Plantations, 127, 135, 233, 253, 282-3, 311
acquisition scheme, 341
National Plantation Management
Agency, 418
Planters' Assoc., 115; NewGuinea,81;Papua,
68
PNG Associated Industries Ltd, 265
PNG Motors, 265
Poe, John (MHA), 64
Min. Foreign Relations, 199,212
Min. Interior, 216, 226
Min. Police, 262
Min. Trade & Industry, 156, 198-9, 216
Pokasui, James (MHA)
Defence Force Captain, 444
Min. Defence, 444, 449
Pokawin, Stephen, Premier, Manus Province,
xxxiv,413,463,464.480
Pokio, John (MHA Okapa), 261
Police,84,97,111,115,120,132,135~.142,
148-9,152,161,167,178,187,199,204,
233,269,334,341,402,441,493,494
21 Squad, 351
Association, 149, 245
band,247
Boroko police station, rifles stolen, 494
Commission of Enquiry into, 383
Commissioner, l 00, 132, 175, 204, 245,
334, 4ll, 469,479
Defence Force, relations with, 402, 459
discipline, 56
East New Britain, illegal, 332
help criminals, 494
National Fraud Squad, 490; burnt down,
494
Operation Blue Beret, 494
Operation Fly Bagarap, 494
Operation Lo-met-88, 459
596
A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicie
Police Offenses Act, 188

power to repatriate, 192
Reserve Force, 396, 402
riot squad, 161, 188-9, 191-4,245,278-9
States of Emergency, 404,414-5
threaten John Momis, 469
training, 149
used on university campus, 333

weapons stolen, 494
See also Clifford Report
Polites, George, Australian
Employers' Federation, Ex. Mgr., 41
Political
alliances
Alliance for Progress and Regional
Development, 294
"ginger" groups, 214-5, 231,309
Highlands bloc, 290, 298
National Pressure Group, 229-30, 236,
250,253,296,322
Papuan bloc, 440,441,443,456
Papuan Solidarity Bloc, 373
Papuan Solidarity Group, 390
People's United Front, 317
assassination, xxix, 135-6, 144, 148, 168,
467,472,478
corruption,345,289
Parliamentary Integrity Bill, 145
cults, xxvii, 39, 143
Hahalis Welfare Society, xxix
Paliau Movement, xxvii
Peli Assoc., 141
West New Britain, xxvii
Yali (East Sepik), 39
Yangoru (East Sepik), 140-l
education,79,10l,l38,150,153,172,183,
201
ideology, 274-6. 348
socialism, 324
marches and rallies, 161, 191-4, 231,258
Opposition, role of, 276
participation, 137
Parties
Administration's attitude to, 138
allegiance to, 211
characteristics, 275
local government, involvement in, 132
radicalism, 20, 94, 99, 102, 113, 116,
135, 146, 170, 203,211-4,216,221,
224-7,230,426,433
violence, 96, 100, 123, 135-7, 191-4,
220,266
Politicians
allowances, 48
communism, attitude to, 417,433
corruption, 12,216,241,262,364,377,
405,412,431,489,490
demeanour in the House, 73
education, 290
in-service, 69, 79
literacy, 57, 68, 211
parliamentary procedure, 30, 50-1, 578,64
standard, 37,223
English, lack of, 57, 68
expatriate, 9, 16, 19, 20. 26, 34-37, 53-5,
57-8,75,88, 120, 142, 144, 151-2,222,
264
Asians, 35, 68, 88, 132
Ministers, 156
housing, 47
Leadership Code. See House of Assembly
misconduct, 239
naturalised citizens, 303, 309
new generation, 416,426
participation, 75
retirementloans,30
salaries, 47, 211
sectoral funds allocated to, 431
agriculture, 342, 356
Civil Action Programme (Defence), 450
health, 342, 356
transport, 342, 356
socialist, 135
statutory corporations, appointed to, 450
superannuation, 55
Village Economic Development Funds,
allocated to 339, 345
women, 142
See also Local Government Councils;
Melanesian Way
Parties formed in PNG, 37,53-5, 118-9
Agricultural Reform party ( 1967), 21,
27,36,38,68
All Peoples' party/group (1967), 19-20,
27-8, 36, 38, 53
Combined Political Associations party
(Compass), (1970), 102, 118-9, 125,
130-1. See United party
Country party (CP) (1974), 223,229,
236,237,240,253,255,277,294,
301,303,305,309,430,435,437
Independent Members' group (1968),
72, 85-6, 118
Index
Independent Members' party (1970),
102
League for National Advancement
(LNA) (1986), 420, 431, 435, 437,
457,477,478,488
Leiba party (1987), 430,437
Mataungan Association ( 1969), xxii,
xxvii, xxix, 92-5, 99-101, 109-13,
115, 120, 123, 125, 127, 144, 147-9,
151, 153, 156, 170, 172, 179, 188-9,
198, 203, 210, 212, 219, 224, 267,
274,283,292,299,302,304-6,309
violence, 135-7
See also NG Development Corporation; LGC; Tolai; Rabaul
Melanesian Alliance (MA) (1980), 339,
340, 345, 348, 349, 357, 359, 360,
362, 376, 378, 389, 391, 399, 401,
402,404,409,414,424,425,430,
431, 434, 435, 437, 438, 439, 457,
472,485
Melanesian Independence Front (MIF)
(1968), 65-8, 71
Melanesian United Front (MUF)
(1988), 453, 488
Morobe Independent Group (MIG)
(1987),430,434,435,437,438,439
Napidakoe Navitu Association (1969),
xxvii, 85, 96, 101-2, 113, 153
National Labour party (1971), 130
National Progress party (Napro)
(1967),27,36,38,68
National Settlement party (1986), 421,
430
New Guinea United National party
(1965), xxvi, 8, 12, 143
Pangu (Papua and New Guinea Union)
pati (1967), xxvi, xxviii. xxxi, 11, 1720, 26-7, 32-3, 35-8,47, 50-5, 61-2,
64-8,70-4,76,80,84-6,91,94,96-7,
99, 102, 104, 113, 118, 130, 132-3,
142-4, 149-51, 170, 175, 210, 213,
216,218,222-3,225,230,261-2,2645, 275-6, 287, 292, 294, 298, 300-6,
308-9, 317, 322, 324-5,328,339,340,
345,357,358,360,361,362,363,
370, 371, 373, 378, 383, 38~ 391,
399,402,409,416,425,431,433,
435,436,437,441,447,452,453,
455, 456, 457, 477, 478, 481, 488, 489
Damai Pty Ltd, 265, 4, 282-4, 288,
312,387
597
lack of policy, 276
National Convention (1973), 210
Nius, 102
Pangu Independent Group (PIG)
(1986), 421
Pangu-led 1972 National Coalition,
153-4, 156-7, 163, 185, 198, 211,
213, 215-6, 223, 228, 230, 263-5;
ended,321
Papua Action party (1982), 357,359,
360
Papua Besena (1973), xxvii, 193-7,
204,211,218,221,232-5,251-2,270,
275-7,294,300,302,304-6,309-10,
322, 324, 331, 340, 348, 357, 359,
360,362,390,402,430,434,435
bill sent to Bougainville, 235
dissolved (1987), 430
Papuan Democratic Union, xxvii, 211
rainmaker, 248
[Papua] New Guinea National party
(NP) (1970), 119-20, 151, 153, 156,
161, 170, 177, 198,216,223, 230,
253, 261-4,275, 277, 294, 303, 305,
331,340,345,348,357,358-9,360,
362,389,402,406,408,409,417,
420, 425, 430, 431, 434, 435, 437,
438,444,454,455,456,457,476,
478,491
Papua-New Guinea Workers' party,
xxviii
Papua party (PP) (1982), 359, 360,
409,430,434,435,437,439,441,
444,457,478
People's Action party (PAP) (1986),
421,430,434,435,437,439,441,
444,447,448,449,450,457,476,
477,491
People's Democratic Movement (PDM)
(1985), 398,401,408,409,420,430,
434,435,436,437,438,439,440,
441,444,451,453,455,476,488
People's Progress party (PPP) ( 1970),
xxviii, xxxii, 119, 131,150-1, 153-4,
156,170,177,185,198,215-6,218,
221-2,230,240,261,263-4,275,277,
294, 300-1, 303-6, 308-9, 318, 321-2,
324, 329, 331, 332, 340, 348, 357,
359, 379, 391, 401, 402, 408, 409,
419-20, 435, 430, 431, 432-3, 435,
437,439,440,441,476,478,479
People's United Front (PUF) (1978),
598
322,324
PNG Independent Group ( 1982), 357,
359, 360, 421, 430. See above PAP
Social Democratic party (1988), 458
Social Workers' party (1973), xxviii,
203,218
Territory Country Pany (1967), 21,
27,36
United [Christian] Democratic party
(UDP)(1966), xxvii, 9, 17-18,20,28,
35-6,38,68
United Islands Progress Society ( 1968),
68
United Niugini party (1968), 68
United party (UP) (1971), 130, 133,
142-3, 149-50, 152-6, 160-l, 168,
170,176,184-5,197,199,204,206,
210-1,216,218, 222-3,227-30,236,
238,240-1,275-7,287,290,294,298,
300-l, 303-6, 309, 321-2, 324, 328,
331,339,340,345,348,357,359,
360, 362, 373, 385, 387, 388, 390,
409,430,431,435,437,439,440,
441, 444, 479; investments, 263-5,
274
Wantok party (1986), 421, 430, 431,
435,437
See also Trobriand Kabisawali Movement
Parties from outside PNG:
Australian Country party, xxvi, 130
Australian Labor party (ALP), xxii, xxv,
33, 46, 48, 99, 105, 130, 162, 173,
181,209,249
Australian Liberal party, 157,252, 292
Australian Liberal-Country party
coalition, xxii, 70
Coi!'..munist Party of Australia, xxvi
Democratic Labor party (DLP), xxvi,
114
German Nazi party, xxvi
Italian Fascist party, xxvi
Kuomintang, xxvi
United Australia Movement, xxvi
Porn Porn, G., Bougainville Workers' Union,
Pres., 246
Pondros, Michael (MHA Manus). 185. 255.
304-5,309,314
OPM, support for, 314
Popondetta. See Oro Province
Pora, Paul (MHA), 153, 456
Min. Finance & Planning, 464

Porgera Gold Mine, 470, 486
Enga Development Corporation, 473-4
landowners, 473
Mt Isa Mines, 474
Placer,474
Renison, 474
tailings dam, 473
Port Moresby, xix, xx, xxvi, xxx, xxxi, 9, 20,
27,34,40,48,66,76-7,79,115, 147,152,
201,272,274,282,300,310
Badili, 395
Baruni, 233
blockade of, 353
Boroko, 191,231
Citizen's Consultative Committee, 132
Community Development Group, 200
demonstrations, 12,231,395,479
See also House of Assembly; UPNG
ethnic tensions, 55
Gordonia, 194
Gordons, 194
Hanuabada, 192,196,202,330
Highlands migrants, 191-4
Hohola, 116, 195
hospital, 24, 26, 355
Jacksons airport, 406
Kaugere, 204
Kila Kila, 196
Koki, 154, 192, 204, 231
Kokoda Trail Motel, 408
Konedobu, 113
land subdivision, 357
local government
Consultative Committee, I 06, 131
elections, 132
Town Council, 132, 194, 218
support for Papuan republic, 234
marches, 231
markets, 220
Mixed Race Assoc., xxx
Moitaka, 395
National Capital Regional electorate, 261
Newtown, 64
politicians, 37, 48
population estimates, 106, 192
radio. 193
rascal (criminal) gangs, 342,351,386, 383,
396,403
Mafia, 448
Papuan Black Snakes, 448
political connections, 494
Index
threat to burn down Parliament, 448
riots (1973), 191-4, (1974), 220
Salvation Army hostel, 154
Show, 221,255
Sixth South Pacific Games (1991), 497
Sogeri plateau, 233
squatter settlements, 192, 395, 396
State of Emergency (1985), 404,414-5
curfew proposed, 493; implemented, 497
Tokarara, 191-2, 204, 245
Waigani, xx, 191-2, 247, 282, 330
women, 220
Postal service, 101
Post-Courier, Papua New Guinea, 87, 89, 92,
99.100,110,120,129,145,174,177,193,
222,235,237,241-2,245,254-5,259,263,
265,267,274,279,282-3,288,292,298,
301-2,357,366,387,400,403,407,408,
439,469,476,483,485,488,491,492,
494,499,500,502,508
Prai, Jacob, OPM leader, 319, 326,333
Premdas, Dr Ralph, 230, 335-6
Premiers' Conference, 315
Prentice, Mr Justice, 335
Prisons, 100,123,168,178,245
Committee of Inquiry, 330
Corrective Institution Service, 231
security, 415
unrest, 335
Pritchard, J., Chief Magistrate, 288
Provincial governments, 172, 206, 225, 232,
253,277-8,292,297,313-5,332,349-50,
401-2,412-3,424-5,480,492-3
Affairs Office, 255
Bougainville, 232; restored, 278.
See also Bougainville; North Solomons
Commissioners, 258
constitution, restored to, 289
constitutional debate, 254-5
corruption, 376,412
CPC proposal, 204, 228-9
elections, 378,401,425,480
financial autonomy, 342
Interim Arrangement Act, 332
Island Provinces threaten secession, 391
Leadership Code, 476
lotteries, 332
McKinsey & Co, consultants, 297
national government power, 315, 342
no-confidence motions, 390, 402, 412,
424-5
referendum mooted, 391
599
sectoral funds diverted from, 342, 349
suspension of, 376
Enga(1984-6),380,390,402,412,424
Manus (1984), 390,402
Morobe (1989), 467,481
Simbu (1984-6), 390,402,412
Western (1985-6), 412,424
Western Highlands ( 1987), 431
transfer of powers to, 314
PublicOrderOrdinance, 109,115-6,136,194
Public Servants, 239
advisers to Ministers, 186,290
arbitration, 63, 70
Association, 41
candidates for political office, 35
corruption, 145
demonstration by, 12
education of, 90, 113, 160
equal pay, 46
expatriates, 105-6, 146, 173,250,273,281,
286,313
''Australian Mafia", 427
education of children, 72, 279-80, 371
Employment Security Scheme, 173-4,
249
localisation, 203, 364; "golden handshake", 27, 146, 368
nominated in House, 130
promotions, 122
recruitment of, 90, 138
salaries, 30, 144, 273, 371
security of employment, 17
wage differences, 281
wives, employment of, 78
Highlanders, 263
housing, 12, 15, 280
Leadership Tribunal, 239
local government candidates, 132-3
misconduct, 239
Papuan support for Papua Besena, 196
political activity, 225,231,266,313,348
political appointments, 290
political candidates, 154, 299
provincial government, 298, 315, 342
safety of, 188
salaries. 103, 221
strike planned, 261
training, 79
Public Service, 7, 10,43, 97,106-7,136,139140,173-5,248,313,341,348,351
Administrative College, xxxi, 90, 104, 108
Arbitration Ordinance, 71
604
A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicie
Spann, Prof. R.N., xxxiv

Sport
Rugby League, 191, 193
Sir Hubert Murray football stadium, 220
Stack, Carl Kitchens (MHA West Sepik),
386,421
Min. Commerce & industry, 363
Min. Forests, 463,464
Min. Industrial Development, 386, 389,
405,420
Standish, Bill, ANU, 315
Stevens, Jimmy, Nagriamelleader, Vanuatu,
344
Stewart, Frank, Aust. Min. assisting the Treasurer, 249
Stone, Dr David, 171
Strikes and demonstrations. See Education;
PNG UOT; UPNG; Trade Unions
Stuntz, John (MHA East Papua), 7-8, 26, 2930,49,52
Suckling, Robert (MHA), 451
Min. Health, 478
Sudjarwo, Dr Indonesian Dep. Foreign Min.,
80
Suharto, Indonesia, Pres., 208, 297
visit to PNG (1979), 332-3
See also Indonesia
Sumkar electorate, 303
Supply and Tender Board, 25
Sweden, accepts Irian Jay a refugees, 353
Swiss Ambassador, Canberra, 380
Swokim, Karla (MHA Western)
Min. Urban Development, 363
OPM, support for, 314
Primary Industries, Pari. Sec., 314
Sydney, 157,285,3!9
Sydney Morning Herald, 3, 80, 89, 217,502
Sydney University, Sydney, xxxiv, 85-6
Tabua, Goodwill, 68
Tago, Stephen (MHA), 389, 399, 430, 439
Min. Defence, 399
Okuk pressures to resign, 406
Min. Environment & Conservation, 262,
328
Min. Science & Culture, 339
Min. State, 216
Taiwan, 260
fishing, 350
World Anti-Communist League meeting,
417
Talair. See Transport
Talis, Yakob (MHA Wapei-Nuku), 38, 237
Tammur, Oscar (MHA Kokopo), 75, 87-8,
92-3, 96, 99, 112, 120, 123-4, 148, 158,
303,306,430
Mataungan Assoc., patron, 267
Min. Provincial Affairs, 277-8, 291
Taniguichi, Makato, Japanese Ambassador,
370
Tanoa,Avusi (MHA), 475
Min. Lands, 420
Min. Police, 420
Tanzania, 257,286, 322
Tapimeng, Felix (MHA Telefomin), 421
Tarangu Pty Ltd, 265
Tau, Lahui, candidate for Central Regional,
275
Taureka, Dr Reuben, xxxi, 10, 306
Min. Health, 156, 192, 198,212,216
Min. Information & Broadcasting, 262
Premier, Central Province, 390
resigned from Pangu, 262
Taviai, Aisea, 92-3
Dept. Lands, Acting Dir., 288

PSB, member, 288
Taxation, 16, 21, 60, 69,207,407,410,429,
464
cornpany,24-5,60,8!, 144,200,206,2145,244,370,422
concessions, 60, 70,261
customs, 206, 261
dividend withholding tax, 175, 206
excise duties, 24, 144, 175, 206, 261,341
head tax proposed, 40
"Hut-tax", 106
import duties, 144,422
incorne,60, 175,261,318,423
local government, xxi, 95-6, 123, 132
luxuries, 261
motor vehicle registration, 144
stamp duty, 261
transfer pricing, 350
withholding tax, 318
Telecommunications, 56
Temo, Andrew, Deputy Speaker, 449
Tetley, Keith (MHA Gulf), 28, 36
Index
This Week in the House ofAssembly, 57
Thommy, Geradus
Ghana, resettled in, 426
OPM Commander, 414
refugee to PNG, 414
Thompson, Maurice, SRC, UPNG, 110
Thurecht, Ray, editor-proprietor, Niugini
News, 366
Tiabe, Handabe (MLC Tari), xxv
Tiden, William, Police Commissioner. 334
Times of Papua New Guinea, 356, 357, 364,
365.366,369,375,392,402,414.444,
449,450,476
Tindiwi, Danley, Premier, Enga Province,
402,493
jailed for embezzlement, 402
Tirupia, Tolai land holder, Ill
Titimur. Epineri (MHA). 38, 92
Titimur, Lawrence, PNG Trade Union Council: Pres., 502; Sec., 490
Tito, Epel (MHA Kavieng). 68
Min. Defence. 363. 375
fear of Indonesia, 375
Min. Media. 375
ToBaining, Ereman (MHA)
Pangu. expelled from, 491
ToBaining, Yin (MHA East New Britain),
xxv, xxvi, xxviii, xxix, xxx. 11, 67, 96
ToBunbun, Thomas, 67
Tohian, Paul. Police Commissioner, 462
Controller, Bougainville State of Emergency, 471,483
drunken coup attempt, 484
Tokai Leveller company, 289
ToKereku, Damien (MHA East New Britain), 92-3,95, 100, 112, 123, 172,303,306
Tokiala, Nason, 20
Tokyo, 166
Tolai, 92, 100, 123, 144, 153, 179
cocoa project, 126-8, 135-6, 147
economic development, 71, 111-7
leaders, xxix, 11, 20, 35, 37, 67-8, 87, 92,
96, 108, 111, 112, 136, 147, 172, 179,
212, 224-5, 315
Likun Trust, 212
resettlement, 123
self-government demanded, 112
violence, xxix, 135-6, 144, 148, 168
Warmaram Group, 109-10
Toliman, Matthias (MHA), xxvi, 50, 92,
148, 150, 155, 179,210
605
Min. Education, 57, 77, 128
Opposition Leader, 167, 182, 185
ToLiman. Stanis Boramilat, 68
Toliron, Napitalai, 96
Tololo, Sir Alkan
Chancellor, UOT & UPNG, 282
Dept. Education, Dir., 287
Dept. Education, Sec., 282
Teaching Service Commission, Comm.,
288
Tolulupa, Berriona, 137
ToMarita, Stanley, 127
Tomot, Melchior, 92-3, 95, 100
Tomu, Soso (MHA), 488
Tonga.259
ToPaivu, Bishop Hermann, 246, 269
Torato, Paul (MHA), 387, 390, 409, 415,
430,440
Min. Forests, 420, 442
Min. Justice. 78
Min. Lands & Physical Planning, 409,418
suspended, 419
Min. Police, 430
Min. Primary Industries, 348, 350
Tordoff. Prof. William, 229
ToRobert, Sir Henry, 330
Governor, PNG Bank, 346
Torres Strait, 166
border dispute, 243, 251-3
Islanders, xxiii
legislation, 297, 320, 326
See also Australia; Foreign Affairs;
Queensland
Toua, Dr Ako, Dept. Health, Dir., 287
Tourism, 164, 179, 188,284,343,351
ToVadek, Martin (MHA Gazelle), 239,309
Min. Health, 363; resigned, 387, 388
Minister, 339
To Vue, Sir Roland, Premier, East New Britain
Province, 391, 395,401,480
ToWartovo, Hosea, 112, 123, 127
Towns: Lae, Port Moresby; for other urban
centres see under individual provinces
Trade stores, 70, 125, 188, 191, 283
Trade Unions and Associations, 113, 120,
287-8, 460, 490
Arbitration, 62-3, 280-1
Bougainville Workers' Union, 245, 334
Building and Construction Industry Workers' Union, 105
Central District Building Workers' Union,
606
68
Central District Waterside Workers' Assoc.,
68,280,312
employee associations consulted, 76
government attitude to, 312
Lae Workers' Assoc., 142
Lae Miscellaneous Workers' Union, 283;
taxi service, 283
leaders, 220, 225, 246, 261
Milne Bay District Workers Assoc., xxx
Miscellaneous Workers' and Clerks' Union,
141
National Academic Staff Assoc., 502
National Doctors Assoc., 500
National Medical Officers' Union, 188
Papua New Guinea Teachers' Assoc., 188.
245,334
Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress,
442,486,502
Police Assoc., 149,245,486
political candidates, 154
political support, 280
Port Moresby Workers' Assoc., 68, 104-5
Public Employees' Assoc., 371, 486
Public Service Assoc., 12, 28, 41. 62-3, 69,
71, 76, 106-7, 122, 139, 145-6, 174-5,
188,220,223,282,296,312,334,502
funds invested, 282
Savings and Loans Society, 282
Rabaul Workers Assoc., 219
riots, 267
strikes, 141-2, 220, 245-6, 261, 280, 312,
330, 333, 403, 460.
See also Education
UPNG Staff Assoc., 105
wage increases, 141
Waterside Workers' Union, 105, 141
Workers' Associations, xxviii, 37
Trans-Pacific Palm Oil company, 289
Transport, 38, 164
ru~ 118,145,153,248
helicopter, 278
Air Niugini, 195,201,206,246,263,301,
313, 334, 341,410, 446; De Havilland
Dash-7s, purchase of, 344-5, 349
air strips dug up, 278
Ansett Airlines, 263
Associated Mission Aviation (AMS), 380
Bougrunville Airways, 234, 268
bus strike, 333
Harbours Board, 60, 313,416
ministerial
rurcraft, 261
Kumul I (Grumman) Lear jet, 352, 353.
405,406
vehicles, 241, 283
motor vehicle. 274, 276
National Airlines Commission, 313, 342
national shipping line, 241
ports & harbours, 60
regional shipping line, 260
roads, 336
Talair, 119
traffic signs, 65
trans-island highway, 461
vehicle imports, 265
Wings Australia, 410
Trebilcock, Prof. Michael, 355
Trobriand Islands
Kabisawali Movement/Peoples' Government, 188, 203,210,219
Tulo, Sam (MHA)
Min Education, 399
Turner, Prof. H.A., 71,76-7
Tuya, Theodore (MHA)
Min. Administrative Services, 478,479
Uganda, 171,297,314
Umut, Stoi (MHA Rai Coast). 20
United church. 92. 196
United Kingdom, 260
workers, 281. See also British
United Nations, 42, 52
Children's Fund, 39
Commissioner for Refugees, 326, 375, 381,
394,426,446
Committee on Decolonisation, 38
Committee on Trade & Development, 257
delegations to, xxx, 161
Development Programme, 39, 165
Faber Report (1972), 165, 177
elections, observation of, 74, 139, 153
General Assembly, 74, 230, 257
High Commissioner for Refugees, 375,
381,393,394,426,446
PNG signs Convention and Protocol, 426
Information Centre, Sydney, xxxiv
International Legal Centre, 171
International Monetary Fund, 287, 296
Irian Jaya refugees, 413. See also Indonesia
New Caledonia issue rrused, 428
PNG Foreign Minister visits, 291
Index
Trusteeship Council, xxiii, xxx, 41, 74,236
Agreement, 183
China, 22
debates on PNG, 75, 138
Liberia, 21
New Zealand, 22
Russia, 138
Soviet Union, 21
Territory delegates, 27
United Kingdom, 139
woman adviser, 22
Yali for king, 39
visiting missions, 36, 42, 135, 137-9, 166
Foot Report, xxiv
See also Foreign Affairs; World Bank
United States of America, 508
Air Force, 140
Ambassador to PNG, 260
Ambassador to UN visits PNG, 333
Charge d'Affaires, 260
Economic Cooperation Agreement, 481
fishing,314,326-7,357
seizure of Danica, 357
Joan, 242
rice, 427
Status of Forces Agreement, 481
University of Hawaii, East-West Centre, 93
University of Papua [and] New Guinea
(UPNG), 2, 7, 24, 34, 40, 60, 90, 108
Academic Board, 503
academic staff, 40, 77, 90, 97, 103, 105,
113-5, 132, 141, 145, 157-8, 163, 168,
194,208,230,273,351
deported, 335, 351
Chancellor, 104
closed second semester 1991,497,503
Council, 105
Education Research Unit, 208
funding, 206
graduates, 152-3, 171, 188, 212
honourary doctorate, 152
Law Faculty, 115
Medical Faculty, 98, 104
National Academic Staff Assoc., 502
Pangu branch, 104
police intervention, 333, 501-2
Professor of Public Administration, xxxiv,
273
seminars and debates, 167,477
Waigani Seminars, 112-3, 116, 164, 185,
282,326,364
Solomon Islands Society, 66
607
South Pacific Human Rights Tribunal, 352
Staff Assoc., 105
students, xxxii, xxxiii, 107, llO, ll6, 120,
193,212
black power movement, 116
boycott of classes, 497, 500
demonstrations, 192,281,284,335,371,
419,474,487,490,500
Highlands Liberation Front, 178-9
Melanesian Action Group, 200
Mungkas Assoc., 179
Papua Besena branch, 196
Papuan Black Power group, 211
political involvement, ll9, 157, 178,
200-1, 212, 214, 223-5, 230-1, 239,
502
Representative Council, 110, 352, 501
strikes,221,246,333
sympathy for Irian Jayans, 209
violence, 333
Vice-Chancellors, 2, 40, 104, 246, 371
See also Goroka Teachers' College;
Papuan Medical College
University of Queensland, xxxiv
University of Technology (UOT). See PNG
University of Technology
Unkles, Gerald, 140
Chair., PSB, 90, 104, 107, 122, 124
Upper Sepik Open electorate, 35
Urami, Peter, 136
Urban
crime, 190, 342, 351, 368, 383, 394, 396,
403,448,494
customary land ownership, 106
development, 24, 36, 79, 283-4
education,98
health services, 106
limits, 41
services, I 06
social problems, 131, 149
squatters, 106, 115, 132, 149
UN visiting mission's view, 138
vagrants, 115
See also Social change; Lae; LGC; Madang; Port Moresby; Rabaul
Urekit, Koriam Michael (MHA), xxvii, 61, 304
Uroe, Nathaniel, I. (MHA Rigo-Abau), 53-4,
74
USSR,250,260,343,426,428,446,508
Australian Ambassador, 260
visits PNG, 250
608
fishing agreements, 446, 490

PNG Embassy, 465
Utama Company, 350
Vagi, Legu (MHA Moresby South) 398, 437
Min. Police, 437, 444
Min. Transport, 420
Vagi, Louis, 421, 430
Vangeke, Bishop Sir Louis, 182
Vanoi, Chief, Trobriand Islands, 188
Vanuatu (New Hebrides), 465
Diro obtains money from, 442
Lybia, relations with, 445, 446
Melanesian Spearhead Group, 445
Port Vila, 446
Santo rebellion, PNG troops, 343, 344
See also Lini; Sope; Stevens
Vanuawaru, Kone, Premier, Central Province,
390,412
Vietnam moratorium rallies, 123
Vogae, Bernard (MHA), 449
Voutas,A.C. (Tony) (MHA Kaindi; Morobe),
xxxi, 8, 10-1, 19,25-6,30, 35-7,45-6,50,
53-4, 56, 60, 64, 70,76-7, 84, 87, 91, 99,
131,143,265,378
Aust. Devel. Assistance Agency, 250
kiap, 378
Pangu, Vice-Pres., 210
Research Officer CM's Office, 163
UPNG tutor, 163
Vuvu, Elias, Dept. Transport, Sec., 241
Wabiria, Andagari (MHA), 266
Ass. Min. Lands, Surveys & Mines, 57,
76.118
Waddell, Robert, xxxiv
Wages, 10, 12, 28, 30, 41, 46, 266, 280-1,
485-6
indexation base, 261
Minimum Wages Board, 175, 221,422-3,
486
Police Association seeks increase, 486
riots and demonstrations, 220,479
rural, 104-5, 139, 220, 280
seamen, 259
urban, 141,220,280
Youth Group Employment wage, 423
See also Trade Unions
Waibe, Bai (MHA)

Waigani Seminar. See UPNG
Waiko, Dr John
UPNG Professor, 448, 478
Waka, Lukas (MHA West New Britain)
Min. Forests, 363
Min. Police, 328
Wall, Geoff
advisor to Iambakey Okuk, 344, 370
Queensland Liberal party, 358
Walo, Kamona, 10
Wamp, Pt:ll'J, 433, 490
Wanjik, Paul (MHA), 449
Ward, Dr Alan, 141
Ward, Tim (MHA Esa'ala Losuia), 143
Min. Health, 455
Warena, Glaima (MHA)
Warwick Smith, George H.
Dep. External Territories, Sec., 33, 60, 114
Dept Interior, Sec., 108
Watkins, W.W., 50
Dept. Land, Sec., II
Dept. Law, Sec., 7, 87
SCCD, Dep. Chair., 11
Watson, Lepani (MHA Esa'ala Losuia), 6
Ass. Min. Cooperatives, 57, 61,63
Premier, Milne Bay Province, 425
Watts, Prof., 229
Watts, John (MHA Western Highlands), 55,
102, 119
Watson, V., PSB legal counsel, 139
Wauwe, Yauwe (MHA Chuave), 73, 78
Weedon, W.J., Aust. Dept. Education & Science, 77, I 03
Weedon Report (Advisory Committee on
Education), 103
Welsh, Bob, National Intelligence Org., 368
Wes, Micah (MHA)
Min. Health, 420
Min. Police, 420
Wessor, Moses, 413, OPM supporter, 413
West Irian. See Irian Jaya
West Sepik Province. See Sandaun Province
West, Harry, DC East New Britain, 93, Ill,
124
West New Britain Province, xxvii, 97
Bialla oil palm scheme, 285, 289
election, 378
Harrison and Crossfield palm oil
Index
project, 392
Hoskins airport, 475
Pacific Seafoods, 370
Premiers, 454, 480
Sohbu Trading Corp., 370
See also Political Cults
West Sepik Province. See Sandaun Province
Western Province, 306, 350, 361
Daru, 145, 474
Defence Force base, 374
District, 166, 244
Fly River, xvi, 474
government suspended, 412, 424
Irian Jayan refugees, 297
Kiunga,414
North Fly area requests separate province,
350
police Operation Fly Bagarap, 494
Premier, 474
Star Mountains, 244, 261
Torres Strait, relations with, 251
Trans-Irian Highway, 369
See also Ok Tedi
Western Highlands Province, 83, 192,201,
247,332
cabinet size, 380
District Advisory Council, 89
elections, 378, 380
electorates, 35, 150, 261
famine, 178
LGC opposition to Independence, 992
Mount Hagen, 54, 79, 179, 263, 418;
curfew, 497
no-confidence motions, 402,425, 432
police Operation Blue Beret, 494
Premier, 431
Regional electorate, 275
State of Emergency, 334, 335
suspension, 431, 432
women, 334, 336
Western Samoa, 171; Apia, 446
Westminster system of government, 19, 33,
48,51, 79,86, 102,164,211,266
Weston Prof. A.B., 115-6
Wewak. See East Sepik Province
White, M., Qld Liberal party, 252
White Australia Policy, xxiii, 2
Whitlam, E. Gough, 33, 105, 113
Aust. PM, 181-2, 218, 230, 247, 249-51,
266,272
609
LeaderALP,99, 130,166
Whitrod, Ray, Police Commissioner, 100, 108
Wi, William (MHA)
Min. Civil Aviation, 399, 408
Okuk pressures to resign, 406
Willesee, Senator Don, Aust. Min.
Foreign Affairs, 242, 249-50, 259
Wingti,Paias(MHA;PM(l985-1988, 19924)), 398,402,430,431,432,433,438,439,
441
business, 388,411
challenge to Somare's leadership, 386-7
Deputy PM, xxxii, 363,365,373,374,385,
397
resigned, 388, 398
education, xxxii
Government Whip, xxxii
Min. Education, 389
resigned, 398
xxxii, 363, 365, 386
Min. Primary Industries, 363
Min. Transport and Civil Aviation, xxxii, 328
Opposition Leader, xxxiii, 399, 405, 469,
476,477,485,488,493,501
part in WHP no-confidence motion
(1987), 432
Prime Minister, xxxiii, 405, 409, 413, 416,
419,440,447,449,451-2,454,456,478,
479, 481; Grand Coalition talks, 4512,454; Supreme court declares his reelection invalid, xxxiii
Wolfers,DrEdwardP.,xxvi,xxxiv, 146, 171;
advisor to Min. Foreign Affairs, 434, 353
Women,22
adviser to UN delegation, 39
assault on CM and DCM, 220
candidates for election, 153, 303
Eve perfume advertisement, 336
expatriate women raped, 395
in politics, 35, 142, 336
Melanesian feminism, 364
Min. ofYouth, Women, Religion &
Recreation, 389
Papua, 193
riot, 220
Rorovana, Bougainville, 84
Western Highlands, 334, 336
610
Women's Action Group, 258

Women's groups, 407
See also Abaijah; Bale; Clowes; Elizabeth II; Kanike; Kekedo; Moitz;
Rooney; Serero
Womsiwor, Herman, xxx
Wootten, Chief Justice, 336
Wootten, H.L., 33
Word Publishing, 366
Workforce
localisation, 70
See also Employment; Public Service
World Bank (International Bank of Reconstruction and Development), 38, 261, 485,
495
loans, 56
Reports, 16, 70
Visiting Missions, 38-9,69, 287
Wright, Dr Eric, 248; Health, Ass. Dir. 1956; deported, 270
Wuvalu Island, 164
Yaki, Roy (MHA)
embezzlement, 491
Min. Transport, 452

Yaliwan (Yali), Matthias (MHA YangoruSaussia), 39, 153
Yanepa, James, Premier, Eastern Highlands,
425
Yangoru (Yali) cargo cult. See Political Cults
Yangoru-Saussia electorate, xxvii
Yasnev, Yuri, Pravda correspondent, 40
Yauieb, Andrew, Office of Forests, Dir., 364
Yembanda, Beibi (MHA Wewak), 38, 140
Yocklunn, Sir John, 68
Young, Andrew, US Ambassador to UN, 333
Young, Sir Dennis (MHA Milne
Bay), 165,451
Min. Primary Industry, 363, 374
Min. Public Service, 444
Speaker, 444
Youth survey, 40
Yuwi, Matiabe (MHA Tari), 144, 256, 264
Minister, 339
Zeipi, Perry (MHA), 477
Zurecnuoc, Zure (MHA), xxvi, 49
Treasury, Under-Sec., 22

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A Papua New GXnea

A Papua New Guinea

Clive Moore with Mary Kooyman

CRAWFORD HOUSE PUBLISHING

C. HURST & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD

Contributors and Editors

Papua and New Guinea's Political Development to 1967

DAVID HEGARTY and PETER KING

CONTRIBUTORS AND EDITORS

Donald Denoon was Professor of History at the University of Papua New

Contributors and Editors

University, a Senior Adviser in the Department of the Prime Minister and

A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle

the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National

Stephen P. Pokawin is currently serving his third four year term as

Edward P. Wolfers is Foundation Professor of Politics, University of

Contributors and Editors

intermittently for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade as well as

The following abbreviations appear in the text and in the index.

A Papua New Guinea Political Chronicle

Napro: National Progress party

I have come from 50,000 years ago

informal, lengthy and circumlocutory, arriving at decisions by consensus

Colonial boundaries in East New Guinea and the Solomon Islands

,_\ '- - v -"'\.

Administrators, but on the re-introduction of civil government in 1921 the

advancement. Neighbouring west New Guinea was in turmoil as Indonesia

of Information, became leader of the Elected Members Group in the House,

any support in the House and ceased functioning when Oala-Rarua

supported three successful candidates in the 1972 elections.40

fluent in Tok Pisin, he was a great Highlands orator. In the Legislative

The Prime Ministers

September 1975 to August 1977

* Also Chief Mil!ister 1972-75

No description of Papua New Guinea would be complete without

Development (1984-85), briefly Leader of the Opposition, then Prime

The Political Chronicle

independence of Australia, especially in the administrative sphere. The

Nineteen sixty-seven opened with the promise of a further liberalisation of

character, and comparative surprise of the appointment, of D.O. Hay, CBE,

conservative leadership in the house.

however, developed into a series of attacks on the Panguna people for

dismaying, can only have reinforced the feelings of disaffection aroused by

The Select Committee's report was presented to the House of Assembly in

by the House after a minimum of two years, as the "capability of a Minister

The Thirteenth Meeting of the House of Assembly 1

particular ... are under-sized, under-ventilated and underlit and there is no

consequent upon the inequity and mutually contradictory nature of various

one indicates in Territory elections), so that Bono Azanifa from the

The Minister and Political Parties

"immediately increased efforts to educate the people in the meaning of

to accept the possibility of independence.

The Fourteenth Meeting of the House of Assembly

particular emphasis on the expansion of exports . . . on the basis of the

Among the more important increases in individual allocations were a rise

between private and public companies and to introduce one common

authorises the Administrator-in-Council to remove the restriction in all

The Political Parties

direct localisation within the public service. In accordance with these

functions and structure of departments, and overall changes in the salaries

neglect in favour of the interests of their electorates" .39

The Minister and His Critics

The House of Assembly Elections

It is certainly there in the elites. It is certainly there in the electorates which