Araceli Segura

Prof. Gary Ortega

Intro to Philosophy of Mind
6 September 2015
Composition 1
To understand whether the mind causes physical events is very challenging and a never
ending issue. Jerry A. Fodors article, The Mind-Body Problem, is based on the evolution of
theories that have evolved over time. Fodor goes through all the problems and downfalls the
theories contained, until it was possible for philosophers to come to an agreement on a theory
that made sense. Philosophers settled with functionalism due to the fact that all the explanations
and all the problems philosophers had with other theories, such as radical behaviorism, logical
behaviorism and central-state identity theory, had finally been answered and all made sense.
After looking at Fodors article, it is clear that the problem of the mind and body and the
relationship they have is a huge topic for philosophers; the importance of this is to fully
understand and comprehend the way an immaterial substance affects material substance.
To begin with, Fodor examines the integration of philosophy and psychology in
understanding how the mind and body work together by discussing different materialist theories.
He does this by exploring multiple theories that begin with radical behaviorism and logical
behaviorism. He starts with an exploration of Radical behaviorism, which was suggested by John
B. Watson in the 1920s, and which demonstrated that behavior does not have mental causes.
(Fodor 2) Watson claims that behavior is the response to stimuli. Radical behaviorist envision
that the more willing to understand the relation between stimuli and responses, psychologists
will find it increasingly possible to explain behavior without postulating mental causes. (Fodor

2) The outcome of radical behaviorism is that the mind and the body have no interaction
whatsoever. Similarly, logical behaviorism agree that there is no such thing as mental causation.
Logical behaviorism arose in the 1960s when philosophers began to doubt radical behaviorism.
Logical behaviorism differs from radical behaviorism in the minor aspect in which logical
behaviorist acknowledge the presence of the mind and simply the way phrases are stated. When
simple sentences are stated, such as Smith is thirsty, logical behaviorism takes out the mental
terms (thirsty) (Fodor 2). It would then be put into a if-then statement which is also called
behavioral hypothetical. So the sentence would be, if there were water available, then Smith
would drink some. (Fodor 2) The if-clause targets the stimuli, while the then-clause aims at the
behavioral responses. Logical behaviorism, in addition to radical behaviorism, are materialist due
to the fact that stimuli and responses are physical actions.
Furthermore, Fodor continues on in examining more theories beginning with central-state
identity theory. The central-state identity theory considers the idea that the mental states,
processes and events are equivalent with the neurophysiological events brain.
Neurophysiological events are chemicals and neurons in the brain. The central-state identity
theory ensures that the concept of mental causation is as rich as the concept of physical
causation. (Fodor 4) This theory differs from behaviorism due to the fact that the mental
causation is just as important as the physical causation. There always seemed to be a problem
with each theory and with that said, functionalism arose as the problems and misunderstanding
of the central-state identity theory began to boil. Functionalism is, in summary, the belief that the
mental state is comparable to a machine. It is suggested that machines provide good examples
of two concepts that are central to functionalism: the idea that they can be understood by many
systems and the idea that mental states are inter defined (Fodor 5). Compatible with machines,

mental states are inter defined and also understood by systems. That being said, functionalism is
absolutely distinct from behaviorism. Functionalism does not foresee, even in principle, the
elimination of mentalistic concepts (Fodor 5). Granted, functionalist are glued to the idea that
there is no way the mental state is illusory, unlike behaviorist. Functionalism has, essentially,
compared the mental state as computers, and with that, functionalism has become the most
suitable for the mind-body problem.
The theory that is the most mind-boggling and eye opening is the central-state identity
theory. The fascination is due to the fact there are different ways to view the identity theory. The
ways consist of: token physicalism and type physicalism. Token physicalism provides us with the
idea that all the mental particulars that happen to exist are neurophysiological (Fodor 2). In
other words, anything that exist the relate to the mind of the mental state are due funtions in the
nervous system. Whereas type physicalism provides us with the idea that all the mental
particulars there could possibly be are neurophysiological. (Fodor) Type physicalism argues on
the fact that disembodied spirits nor machines contain neurons, while token physicalism believes
different. Type and token physicalism seem very contrastable, however they are placed in the
same theory. It may be make it more unstandable to make these two concepts, and instead of
planting them into one theory, splitting them into two.
Fodor goes into great and deep description about each and every theory, however, only
goes over dualism briefly. As outsiders looking in, it may seem like dualsim does not have very
much importance. Fodor explains the defect of dualism by mentioning that dualism failure to
account adequality for mental causation. (Fodor 1) It made philosophers confused as to how is it
possible for the mind to be nonphysical, to have position in physical space. Due to the fact that
dualism failed to provide facts behind the mind causation, philosophers do not believe that mind

causation plays a role in physical causation. Although Fodor covers the reason philosophers had
no interest or connection with dualism, he did not go in depth with the topic or theory as much as
the other theories that evolved over time.
In summary, Fodors article on the mind and body problem reviews a lot of content
regarding the theories that have evolved overtime. Fodor begins that the beginning of the
timeline and briefly goes over dualism. Due to the fact that philosophers discovered many issues
with dualism, Fodor continues on with radical behaviorism and logical behaviorism. Radical and
logical behaviorism are very similar in beliefs with a minor difference. They both believe that the
mind contributes to physical actions, however, logical behaviorism acknowledges the existence
of the mind while the radical behaviorism does not. Furthermore, central-state identity theory
comes along with two different views which are called token physicalism and type physicalism.
Philosophers continued to discover minor issues with the theories, resulting in functionalism,
which ultimately solves and answers all the questions that philosophers had about the mind and
body problem.