Case: 1:13-cr-00929 Document #: 106 Filed: 09/25/15 Page 1 of 19 PageID #:1369

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
STEVEN G. ZAMIAR

)
) No. 13 CR 929
)
) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
)

GOVERNMENTS SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

The United States of America, by its attorney, Zachary T. Fardon, United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, submits this memorandum in
advance of the sentencing of defendant Steven G. Zamiar, who was found guilty by
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of excessive use of force with a dangerous weapon
under color of law, resulting in bodily injury to the victim. The government
respectfully submits that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range of 87 to
108 months imprisonment is appropriate in this case.
I.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant Zamiar was a highly successful police officer. At the height of his

career, immediately prior to being charged in this case, he was Deputy Chief of
Police for the Midlothian Police Department, a position that made him second in
command of the department with supervisory authority over its police officers.
Trial in this case focused on Zamiars arrest of James Snyder on November
23, 2011. During that arrest, Zamiar used excessive and unreasonable force when
he beat Snyder with a metal police baton, repeatedly striking him in the head, neck,
and spine. Adding insult to injury, Zamiar directed his subordinate police officers on
the scene to arrest Snyder and take him into custody.

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At his first opportunity for contritionback at the police stationZamiar did

not admit his mistake; he lied about it.

He told one officer that he swung for

Snyders legs and missed, he prepared a false use-of-force form asserting facts that
were untrue, and he repeated those lies on a second police report, this one a level-ofresistance report. Trial in this case was his second opportunity for contrition. But
instead of accepting responsibility for his crime, Zamiar consciously sought to
obstruct justice. He deliberately took the stand at trial where, under oath, he lied to
the jury about critical facts.
Moreover, the governments continued investigation has revealed that
Zamiars actions on the night of November 23, 2011, and at trial were no aberration.
He has violated other individuals civil rights and has gained notoriety within the
Midlothian Police Department as an unethical and corrupt police officer.
A fair and just sentence in this case will account for Zamiars history and
characteristics, including his repeated civil rights violations and obstruction of
justice, as well as the need to deter other law enforcement officers from engaging in
the same or similar type of conduct. A sentence of 87 to 108 months imprisonment
is sufficient, but not great than necessary, to accomplish those goals.
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Defendants Offense Conduct

On the night of November 23, 2011, Zamiar was conducting surveillance of

Durbins Bar in Midlothian, Illinois, from across the street when he saw a large
crowd of people outside. Zamiar called out to his fellow Midlothian police that there
was a fight at Durbins, even though he did not see a fight. Zamiar then drove to
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Durbins, parked his unmarked car, walked up to the bar, and stood in the front
beer garden.
When a Durbins bouncer looked out the glass window from inside the bar, as
he testified at trial, he saw a man (Zamiar) holding an extended police baton. That
the Zamiar was standing outside the bar with an extended metal police baton is
telling; Zamiar was primed for a fight and looking for an opportunity to use the
baton. The bouncer approached Zamiar who was wearing plainclothes with no
outwardly visible police markingsand Zamiar responded by pulling out his police
badge, identifying himself as a police officer.
After walking through the beer garden and not finding anyone to arrest,
Zamiar went to an adjacent parking lot where he saw a bar patron, James Snyder,
entering a car driven by his girlfriend. Zamiar approached, but did not show his
police badge, or otherwise identify himself as a police officer. Instead, Zamiar took a
deadly and dangerous weaponhis metal police batonand lunged. Snyderfaced
with a man armed with a deadly weaponturned and ran for help. As Snyder ran
back towards the bar, Zamiar repeatedly struck Snyder with a metal police baton
across the back of Snyders head, neck, and back, leaving large welts, red marks,
and bruises. These welts, marks, and bruises are evident in the photographs of
Snyders back and head that the government introduced at trial, taken several
hours after the incident

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Defenseless, Snyder tried to block the swings to no avail. Zamiar chased

Snyder through the Durbins parking lot as Snyder ran to other Midlothian police
officers for help. Snyder then hid behind one of the police officers and tried to shield
himself from any further attack by Zamiar. Zamiar walked up to those other officers
and instructed them to arrest this asshole.
Back at the police station, Zamiar proceeded to lie to cover up his mistake.
He told another officer that he was swinging with his baton for Snyders legs, but
missed. Zamiar prepared a police report from the incident, falsely claiming that
Snyder turned toward me in an aggressive manner, leading Zamiar to have to
utilize[] my ASP baton. Defendant also prepared a Level of Resistance/Response
Report, which falsely stated that Snyder engaged in active resistance to arrest.
B.

Defendants False Testimony At Trial

During trial, Zamiar chose to testify in his own defense. He took the witness
stand, swore an oath to tell the truth, and proceeded to tell lie after lie to the Court
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and to the jury. He lied in an effort to convince the jury that Snydernot him was
the aggressor that night and to portray himself as simply a police officer trying his
best to do his job. The jury was not convinced, finding Zamiar guilty of intentionally
depriving Snyder of his civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242. This Court, too,
should not be convinced; what Zamiar did was obstruct justice, plain and simple.
Zamiars lies began on direct examination when he testified about his
encounter with the bouncer outside Durbins Bar. When asked what he did when he
approached the bar, Zamiar testified that he made contact with an individual Id
seen pushing them [bar patrons] out, who I knew to be a bouncer or security at the
bar. Tr. 450. When asked if he had anything in his hand at that point, Zamiar
testified, I dont believe so, but maybe a flashlight, you know. Id. Zamiar was then
asked, Did you have your baton out? Zamiar responded, No. Id. This testimony
was directly contradicted by the unimpeached testimony by the bouncer, who
testified that he clearly recalled that the object in Zamiars hand was a baton,
approximately nine to sixteen inches long. See Tr. 356. Zamiars lies continued
throughout his direct and cross-examination:
When asked what he observed in the Krispy Kreme parking lot, Zamiar falsely
testified, They [Snyder and Burns] closed the distance, and Mr. Snyder threw a
punch. Tr. 471.
When asked what happened after the punch was thrown, Zamiar falsely testified
that he identified himself as a police officer, testifying that, I yelled, Hey,
police. Tr. 471. This is contradicted by the testimony, credited by the jury, of
Snyder and his girlfriend.
Zamiar then testified that he chased Snyder up an embankment towards
Durbins. Zamiar falsely testified that Snyderdefying the laws of physics and
common sensestopped on a dime with Zamiar a step or two behind him, and
took a fighting stance: Once we were up the hill on a flat surface, Mr. Snyder
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stopped abruptly and turned back towards me with his hands in the air. Tr.
474.
Zamiar falsely testified that he did not strike Snyder in the head and neck with
a police baton. Tr. 475. This testimony was flatly contradicted by the
photographs of Snyders head taken immediately after the incident, Snyders
testimony, the testimony of one of Zamiars own fellow officers, and the
attending paramedic.
Zamiar falsely testified that he struck Snyder three times with his baton, once in
the arm and twice to the back. Tr. 475-80. This testimony was flatly contradicted
by Snyders testimony, the testimony of another Midlothian police officer on the
scene, and the photographs of Snyders back and neck, showing multiple
(between nine and twelve) welts and strike marks.
Zamiar falsely testified that another officer gave the order to arrest Snyder. Tr.
480. This testimony, yet again, was flatly contradicted by the unimpeached
testimony of the Durbins bouncer, Snyder, and another officer on the scene.
Each of Zamiars lies was intentional, calculated, and material to the jurys
determination of guilt. By falsely testifying that he saw Snyder throw a punch in
the parking lot and that Snyder turned towards him in an aggressive manner,
Zamiar attempted to manipulate the jury into believing that he had a reasonable
basis to use force when, in fact, his actions were unjustified and excessive.
III.

DEFENDANT HAS A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

On at least two prior occasions, Zamiar violated other citizens constitutional

rights under the Fourth Amendment during arrests. Detail, including sworn
witness statements and photographs, regarding those incidents was provided to the
Court and Probation Officer as part of the Governments Version of the Offense,
dated June 3, 2015, and the Supplement to the Governments Version of the
Offense, dated July 31, 2015.

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The government submits that this evidence is relevant to the Courts

consideration at sentencing. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3661 provides
that, No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background,
character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence. 18 U.S.C. 3661. It is well established that the Court may consider
criminal conduct, as relevant to defendants personal history and characteristics
and the need for deterrence, even where that conduct was not chargedin fact, this
rule holds even where the conduct was charged but the defendant was acquitted of
it. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1997) ([W]e are convinced
that a sentencing court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been
acquitted.); United States v. Carter, 111 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1997) (charges on
which a defendant was acquitted or for which charges were dismissed can be
considered at sentencing so long as the governments evidence is reliable); United
States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990) (a sentencing court can
consider past conduct, even if defendant was acquitted, as long as conduct is
established by a preponderance of the evidence).
The evidence provided to the Court, though hearsay, is sufficiently reliable
and corroborated for the Court to consider and find Zamiars prior use of excessive
force to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (the relevant standard at
sentencing). See, e.g., United States v. Salutric, 775 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Jones, 635 F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 2011) (In arriving at an appropriate

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sentence, a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely

unlimited as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it
may come. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v. Neal,
662 F.3d 936, 938-939 (7th Cir. 2011) (The district judge properly considered [the
defendant's] history and character, noting that he smoked marijuana on a daily
basis in the past, had used illegal substances in 1999 and 2000 before he was
arrested, and had used cocaine prior to his incarceration.).
The specifics of each incident, and the reliability of the supporting evidence,
are discussed in turn below:
A.

Defendant Used Excessive and Unnecessary Force During an

Arrest on November 16, 2009.

On November 16, 2009, Zamiar participated in the arrest of a person

suspected of having been involved in a bank robbery. After the suspect was
handcuffed and laying on the ground, Zamiar walked up to the suspect and kicked
the suspect at least twice in the face. Zamiars kicks to the suspects head were
excessive and unnecessary. The suspect did not do anything during arrest that
would justify the level of force Zamiar used, particularly when the suspect was
laying on the ground handcuffed. The suspect suffered cuts and bruising to his nose
as a result of Zamiars kicks. At the time of the incident, Zamiar held the rank of
Detective Sergeant within the Midlothian Police Department; his actions were
witnessed by two subordinate officers.
The evidence proving that this incident occurred is reliable. Attached as
exhibits to the Supplement to the Governments Version of the Offense are:

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(a) photographs of the arrestees face, reflecting bruises, swelling, and cuts in the
area of the nose, which are consistent with the strikes from a shoe or boot; (b) the
sworn statements of two law enforcement officers who witnessed the incident, both
of whom are currently employed by the Midlothian Police Department and, like the
victim, have no incentive to lie; and (c) a report prepared by an FBI special agent,
summarizing his interview of the victim-arrestee while that person was in custody
at Cook County Jail.
B.

Defendant Used Excessive and Unnecessary Force During an

Arrest on September 6, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, Midlothian police officers arrested two males

suspected of burglarizing and vandalizing vehicles in Zamiars neighborhood. When
one suspect was apprehended, Zamiar approached that suspect, stood over him, and
threw closed-fist punches repeatedly at his head and face. There was no lawful or
legitimate reason for Zamiar to use the level of force he did against that suspect. At
the time of the incident, Zamiar held the rank of Detective Sergeant within the
Midlothian Police Department; his actions were witnessed by a subordinate officer.
Just as Zamiar lied following the incident on November 23, 2011, and just as
Zamiar lied at trial in this case, Zamiar lied to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
when asked questions about the incident on September 6, 2010. In February 2013,
two FBI agents approached Zamiar at his home and asked him questions about the
incident on September 6, 2010. Zamiar stated that the suspect fought back during
the arrestcontrary to the statement of Zamiars fellow officer who witnessed the
incident. When asked if one of the officers laid hands on the suspect, Zamiar refused

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to answer. Zamiar then stated that the suspect had a black eye (neither of the two
agents mentioned the black eye and had not shown Zamiar a picture of the suspect
with a black eye). When asked how the suspect got the black eye, Zamiar falsely
stated that he did not know. Zamiar incredulously suggested that maybe the
suspect ran into a tree. Agents then asked Zamiar who hit the suspect. Zamiar
twice responded that neither he nor the other officer hit the suspect, again contrary
to the reliable evidence, including the sworn statements of Zamiars fellow officer
and the victim himself.
The evidence proving that this incident occurred is reliable. Attached as
exhibits to the Governments Version of the Offense are: (a) the sworn testimony of
the victim-arrestee regarding the incident; (b) the sworn testimony of a Village of
Midlothian police officer who witnessed Zamiar beat the victim-arrestee; (c) the
sworn testimony of a Village of Midlothian police officer who saw Zamiar in the
immediate aftermath of the beating; (d) photographs of the victim-arrestees face;
and (e) an FBI report of interview, summarizing FBI special agents interview of
Zamiar regarding the incident.
IV.

THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT

The government concurs in the Probation Officers determination regarding

the base offense level and applicable enhancements.

A.

The Base Offense Level Is 14.

The Probation Officer correctly concluded that the base offense level is 14 by
reference to Guideline 2A2.2, which governs aggravated assault. Specifically,
Guideline 2H1.1 covers offenses involving civil rights violations. Pursuant to
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2H1.1(a)(1), the applicable offense level is the offense guideline applicable to any
underlying offense. As defined in Application Note 1, that means any conduct
established by the offense of conviction under federal, state, or local law.
In this case, the jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Zamiars use
of excessive force resulted in Snyders bodily injury and that defendants actions
included the use of a dangerous weapon. That fits within the definition of an
aggravated assault, which is a felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous
weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that
weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; (C) strangling, suffocating, or attempting to
strangle or suffocate; or (D) an intent to commit another felony. U.S.S.G. 2A2.2,
note 1.
B.

There Is a Seven-Level Increase Because Zamiar Caused Bodily

Injury and Used a Dangerous Weapon.

The Probation Officer correctly concluded that, pursuant to Guideline

2A2.2(b)(2)(B), Zamiars offense level is increased four levels because a dangerous
weapon was otherwise used during the offense. This is consistent with the jurys
finding and with the evidence presented at trial. A metal police baton falls well
within the definition of a dangerous weapon, which is an instrument capable of
inflicting death or serious bodily injury. U.S.S.G. 1B1.1, note 1(D). As Midlothian
Police Officer Thibo testified at trial, a metal police baton is a dangerous weapon
that is capable of causing death and spinal injury if used to strike a person in the
head, neck or back. See Tr. 120 (You can cause severe, permanent injury to
somebody by striking them in the head, neck, or spine, or actually, death.).

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The Probation Officer also correctly concluded that, pursuant to Guideline

2A2.2(b)(3)(A), defendants actions caused bodily injury, which is defined by that
Guideline as an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for which medical
attention ordinarily would be sought. See also United States v. Ashley, 141 F.3d 63,
68 (2d Cir. 1998) (This definition [of serious bodily injury] appears to encompass a
wide range of injuries such as broken bones or other nonpermanent wounds that
require medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical
rehabilitation.). In this case, Snyder testified that he suffered contusions and welts
on his head, neck, arm, and back as a result of Zamiars assault, corroborated by the
photographs introduced by the government as exhibits at trial, and he sought
medical treatment for his injuries at the police station and also at the hospital. As a
result, an additional three-level increase to the offense level was appropriately
included.
C.

There Is a Six-Level Increase Because Defendant Acted Under

Color of Law.

The Probation Officer correctly concluded that Zamiar acted under color of
law, warranting a six level increase to the offense level under Guideline
H1.1(b)(1)(B). At the time of the incident, Zamiar was on duty as a police officer
holding the rank of Deputy Chief of Police, and he committed the offense under
color of law as a sworn Midlothian police officer.
D.

There is a Two-Level Increase Because Defendant Obstructed

Justice at Trial.

The Probation Officer correctly concluded that Zamiar receives a two-level

enhancement under Guideline 3C1.1 because he attempted to obstruct justice at
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trial by falsely testifying about material facts while under oath on the stand. In
addition, defendant prepared two materially false reports in the hours after the
incident, each of which falsely stated that Snyders injuries were attributable to his
own aggressive conduct; this, too, warrants the enhancement.
E.

Defendant Is Not Entitled to a Three-Level Reduction for

Acceptance of Responsibility.

The Probation Officer correctly concluded that Zamiar does not receive a
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Not only did Zamiar put the
government to its burden at proof and deny essential factual elements of guilt, but
he also falsely testified at trial. 1 This is a clear case of a defendant failing to accept
responsibility for his criminal conduct; therefore no reduction is appropriate.
V.

A SENTENCE WITHIN THE ADVISORY GUIDELINES RANGE IS APPROPRIATE IN

THIS CASE.
With placement in Criminal History Category I and an offense level of 29,

Zamiar has an advisory Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months imprisonment. This

case presents sufficiently compelling reasons to sentence Zamiar within that range
under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), 2 particularly in light of his history of civil rights

The commentary to Guideline 3E1.1 explains that an adjustment for acceptance is not
intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by
denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and
expresses remorse. USSG 3E1.1 (comment, n.2). Moreover, [c]onduct resulting in an
enhancement under 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice)
ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal
conduct. USSG 3E1.1 (comment, n.4).
1

Sentencing has four purposes: retribution; deterrence; incapacitation; and rehabilitation.

See United States v. Milbourn, 600 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2010). Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3553(a), sets forth the facts courts are to consider in fashioning a sentence
that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with these purposes. First,
however, the Court must calculate the applicable Guidelines range, which provides a

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violations, his efforts to cover up his criminal conduct from the Midlothian Police
Department, his lies to the FBI, his obstruction of justice at trial, and the need to
deter other law enforcement officers from engaging in similar conduct.
A.

The Seriousness of the Offense

The seriousness of the offense defendant committeda criminal violation of a

citizens civil rights by a sworn police officercannot be understated. When Zamiar
assaulted Snyder outside Durbins bar, he certainly caused serious injuries to
Snyder. Zamiars strikes with his steel baton to Snyders head, neck, and back
easily could have left Snyder paralyzed or even dead.
Even apart from the severity of the physical wounds, Zamiars baton strikes
have significant ramifications for the criminal justice system. Sworn law
enforcement officers are held to a higher standard of conduct, not merely because of
the authority that they enjoy, but because society relies on their trustworthiness,
their honor, and their integrity in upholding and enforcing the laws that protect the
community. With each baseless and unnecessary baton strike in front of that crowd
of people outside Durbins Bar, Zamiar gave the Midlothian community every
reason to believe that police officers could not be trusted, that police officers were
aggressive, and, worst of all, that police officers were abusive. As the Court is all too

starting point and initial benchmark for sentencing. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 4950 (2007); see also 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4). Next, the Court must consider the other 3553(a)
factors. United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). These factors include the
need (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
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well aware, bad police officerslike bad applestend to spoil the bunch, making a
difficult job all the more difficult for police officers while straining the relationship
and balance between the police and the community.
Compounding the injuries inflicted outside Durbins, Zamiar came to this
Court, swore an oath, and then lied to a jury of his peerspeople who will go back
to the community knowing that the Deputy Chief of Police from a local community
was willing to lie through his teeth at a federal criminal trial. Zamiars actions
both outside Durbins Bar and in the courtroommake it more difficult for law
enforcement officers, including those from the Village of Midlothian, to do their job
well, and undermine the communitys trust.
B.

The Need for Deterrence

The Village of Midlothian meted out a certain level of specific deterrence by

suspending Zamiar from duty following the initiation of federal charges and then
subsequently removing him from the police force. But this case brings with it a
unique opportunity for the Court to reinforce to the community, and especially the
law enforcement community, that violating citizens constitutional rights and then
lying to cover up those crimes are very serious offenses that will be prosecuted and
punished to the fullest extent of the law. Not only do stiff sentences send such a
message to the community, but they also make it clear that law enforcement officers
will be held accountable just like any other criminal defendant if they violate the
law.

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C.

The Defendants History and Characteristics

At the time of the charged offense, Zamiar was a trained and experienced
police officer who held a clear position of authority with the police department. In
fact, Zamiar had been a police officer since approximately 1997 and, throughout the
years, had attended a number of training sessions on proper use of forcea fact
that was thoroughly established at trial. That Zamiar committed this offense near
the pinnacle of his career is not a saving grace for him. To the contrary, it exposes
Zamiars cavalier attitude and arrogance that led him three times, beginning in
2009 and continuing through 2011, to egregiously violate the constitutional rights of
members of the community.
The government acknowledges that it is likely true that, throughout Zamiars
career, he experienced the daily stresses of a being a police officer, which
undoubtedly can be a difficult job. This is absolutely no excuse for his behavior. If
anything, the reactions of Zamiars fellow police officers speak volumes about
Zamiars lack of character and unethical behavior. In the statements provided to the
Court, one officer described specific instances of unethical behavior by defendant
that he witnessed; another officer described Zamiar as a bad dude who would have
jammed up the officer had the officer disclosed what happened when Zamiar beat
an arrestee; a third described Zamiar as hyper, aggressive, and out of control as a
police officer; and a fourth described Zamiar as devious and not trustworthy.

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VI.

CONCLUSION
The government respectfully submits that, under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a),

defendant has earned himself a sentence of 87 to 108 months imprisonment in this

case.
Respectfully submitted,
ZACHARY T. FARDON
United States Attorney
By:

Dated: September 25, 2015

18

/s/ Patrick M. Otlewski

PATRICK M. OTLEWSKI
ANDRIANNA D. KASTANEK
Assistant United States Attorneys
219 South Dearborn, Fifth Floor
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 353-5300

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned Assistant United States Attorney hereby certifies that in
accordance with FED. R. CRIM. P. 49, FED. R. CIV. P. 5, LR 5.5, and the General
Order on Electronic Case Filing (ECF), the following document:
GOVERNMENTS SENTENCING MEMORANDUM
was served pursuant to the district courts ECF system as to ECF filers on
September 25, 2015.
Respectfully submitted,
ZACHARY T. FARDON
United States Attorney
By:

/s/Patrick M. Otlewski
PATRICK M. OTLEWSKI
Assistant United States Attorney
219 South Dearborn Street, 5th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 469-6045