Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of
Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal
ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general
and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is
to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of
government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he
reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7,
1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance
No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement
ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was
not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and
the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila,
Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree,
entitled Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License
or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or
Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The
government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree
No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of
P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution.
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO: Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that
PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when
the executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise by reason of
the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts First
Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as
unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of a
valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors,
if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
BINAY vs DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 92389, September 11, 1991 (201 SCRA 508)
Facts: The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 assisting those who only earn less than
P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in
the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission
on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its
implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen
any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public
safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants.
Hence, this petition revolving around the pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of
the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
Held: Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general
welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which
was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, Sic utere tuo et ahenum non
laedas (use your property so as not to impair others) and Salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the
government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is
generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good.
instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating thisauthority for legislation
in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
Facts: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop
the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and
dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the
ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation can prohibit the operation of nightclubs
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not
prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the
power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is
true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power
not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law
remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not
prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the
operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the
recently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation
of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Granted - Certiorari
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA [122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983]
Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment,
Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The
Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at
least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six
months from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after
the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial.
The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of
the ordinance would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question.
Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local
Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot
be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other
business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.
Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers
of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2)
eminent domain, (3) taxation.
The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as
follows:
To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall
deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, , and for the protection of
property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City
Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the
power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof
is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate
and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the penal
provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.
Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.
municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet encourage parents and children
to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children?
Clearly such ordinance invades the personal and property rights of petitioners because it has been fully
shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights.
Sanggalang vs. IAC
FACTS: The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to
the general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily
opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said
street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought against
Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of
the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in
opening the Jupiter street for public use.
HELD: No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
RATIO: Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a
[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing
obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a
contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than
for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary
or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. The petitioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform
area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
The contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise
eminent domain.
Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998)
G.R. No. 127820 - 292 SCRA 676. July 20, 1998
Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels of land.
Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the
underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. Petitioner,
pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter
into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. The RTC
authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon its deposit with the clerk of court of
an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value. Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that
(a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to
an ordinance as required by RA 7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment
or res judicata. On private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial
court dismissed the complaint
Issue: Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution by its law-making body.
Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite
that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative
body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an
opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was
the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the
Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which
cannot amend the former.
EUNICE R. TABINAS
2012-0085
Public Corporation Wednesday 5:30 to 7:30pm