G.R. No.

L-29155

November 5, 1928

JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA, vs. HERMENEGILDO

VILLANUEVA, OSTRAND, J.:
In G. R. No. 21706, the Court of First Instance ordered the
rescission of a lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Pleantation and the
payment by Villanueva of the unpaid balance of the rent with
interest. The decision also provided that the possession of the
leased land be delivered to Larena. before levy was made the
parties came to an agreement, under which the money
judgment was to be satisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash
and the transfer to Larena of a dwelling house. The agreement
was carried out in accordance with its terms.
In the meantime, Villanueva had harvested the sugarcane
crop produced, and after having satisfied the aforesaid money
judgment, he also continued in possession of the plantation
long enough to appropriate to himself the following ratoon
cane crop.
De Larena filed an action wherein she alleged that while
first case was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Villanueva
knew positively that the aforesaid lease was declared rescinded
by the Court of First Instance and that Villanueva, also knew
that he thereafter was not entitled to the possession of the
aforesaid hacienda; that he, nevertheless, in bad faith continued
in such possession during the agricultural year 1922-1924 and
appropriated to himself the cane harvest for that year.

In his answer Villanueva alleges that according to the

pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action
were included in that case and, therefore, must be considered
res judicata.
ISSUE: WON this case involved the doctrine of res judicata?
HELD: No.
Properly speaking, this argument does not involve the
doctrine of res judicata but rests on the well-known and firmly
established principle that a party will not be permitted to split
up a single cause of action and make it the basis for several
suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well established that
when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate
installments, each installment is an independent cause of
action, though it has been held and is good law, that in an
action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the
installments due at the time the action brought must be
included in the complaint and that failure to do so will
constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that
rent. The aforesaid action, G. R. No. 21706, was brought on
August 23, 1922, Larena demanding payment of then sue rent
in addition to the rescission of the lease. In 1923, Larena
amended the prayer of the complaint by asking judgment for
rent for years subsequent to 1922. The lease did not provide for
payment of rent in advance or at any definite time, and it
appears that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered
due until the end of the corresponding year. It follows that the

rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 has not become due at
the time of the trial of the case and that consequently the trial
court could not render judgment therefore. The action referred
to is, therefore, no bar to the first cause of action in the present
litigation.
BLOSSOM & CO. V. MANILA GAS CORPORATIONS
Facts:

defendant breached the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal

and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar
products and its desire to secure better prices than what the
plaintiff paid.
CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted
the recovery for damages but refused to order the defendants to
resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against
the defendants for any subsequent breach of contract.

Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations

(defendant) entered into a contract. The contract provided for
the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of specified
amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It
was agreed that the price would prevail only so long as the raw
materials (coal and crude oil) used by the defendants in the
manufacture of gas should cost the same price as that
prevailing at the time of the contract. In the event of an
increase or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would
be a corresponding increase or decrease in the price of tar.

Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground

that the defendant breached the contract once more after refusal
to perform its obligation under the same contract.

The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten
years. In consideration of the modification, the plaintiff agreed
to purchase from the defendant a certain piece of land lying
adjacent to its plant. The defendant sold and conveyed the land
to the plaintiff which in turn executed a mortgage to secure the
payment of the balance of the purchase price.

Divisible contracts (as a general rule)

Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff

filed an action against the defendant to obtain specific
performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the

second action for damages
Ruling: Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action
for damages.
Doctrine

- A contract to do several things at several times is

divisible. A judgement for a single breach of a
continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a
subsequent breach.
Entire contract (case at bar)

- When the contract is indivisible and the breach is

total, there can only be one action in which the plaintiff
must recover all damages. The recovery of a judgement
for damages by reason of a breach is a bar to another
action on the same contract and on account of the
continuous breach.
- The contract between the parties is an entire contract.
- In the case at bar, the defendant terminated the
continuing contract by absolute refusal. The claim for
damages is an indivisible demand. Where a former final
judgement was rendered, it is a bar to any damages
which plaintiff may thereafter sustain.

Swagman vs CA
Facts: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, Swagman through Atty.
Infante and Hegerty, its president and vice-president,
respectively, obtained from Christian loans evidenced by three
promissory notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14
July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of
US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an
interest of 15% per annum payable every three months. In a
letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the
petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans and
demanded from the latter payment of said loans.
On 2 February 1999, Christian filed with the RTC a complaint

for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner

corporation,
Hegerty,
and
Atty.
Infante.
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vicepresident, filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of
action. According to them, Christian had no cause of action
because the three promissory notes were not yet due and
demandable.
The trial court ruled that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint which states no
cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without
objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at
the time he filed the instant complaint, as defendants
obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he may
nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes in view
of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations
covered by the two promissory notes are now due and
demandable. When the instant case was filed on February 2,
1999, none of the promissory notes was due and demandable,
but , the first and the second promissory notes have already
matured during the course of the proceeding. Hence, payment
is
already
due.
This finding was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of action
at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a cause of
action during the pendency of the case.

Held: No. Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. Its essential
elements
are
as
follows:

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual

merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that
all other matters included in the case may be determined in a
single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.
[G.R. No. 182435. August 13, 2012.]

1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under

whatever
law
it
arises
or
is
created;

LILIA B. ADA, et al., vs. FLORANTE BAYLON

2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect

or
not
to
violate
such
right;
and

FACTS:

3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of

the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate
relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a
cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain
an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.
Such interpretation by the trial court and CA of Section 5, Rule
10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. The
curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of
action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the
complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential
facts.Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of

This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and

Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon) who died on
November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively. 3 At the
time of their death, Spouses Baylon were survived by their
legitimate children, namely, Rita Baylon (Rita), Victoria
Baylon (Victoria), Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez
(Panfila), Ramon Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner Lilia
B. Ada (Lilia).
Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976.
Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and was survived by her
daughter, herein petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon died
intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by herein
respondent Florante Baylon (Florante), his child from his first
marriage, as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second
wife, and their legitimate children, namely, Ramon, Jr. and
herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby,
all surnamed Baylon.

Florentino
Florentino +
+
Maxima
Maxima

Rita
Rita

Victoria
Victoria

Luz
Luz

Dolores
Dolores

Ramon
Ramon

Panfila
Panfila

Florante
Florante

Petitioners filed with the RTC complaint for partition,

accounting, and damages against respondent Florante, Rita, and
Panfila. They alleged that Spouses Baylon owned 43 parcels of
land. They claimed that Rita took possession of the land and
appropriated the income derived therefrom. Florante, Rita and
Panfila asserted, in their answer, that the co-owned the
properties in question. On July 1997, Rita donated a parcel of
land to Florante. In July 2000, Rita died. Petitioners learned of
the donation made by Rita in favor of Florante. They filed for a
Supplemental Pleading, asking the court to rescind the Deed of
Donation.
The RTC rendered a decision, finding the existence of coownership but ordered the partition of the estate of the Spouses
Baylon. RTC also rescinded the donation made.
The case was appealed to the CA. The appellate court set aside
the decision and remanded the case to determine ownership of
Lot Nos. 4706 and 4709.

The
complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC involves
Lilia
Lilia
two separate, distinct and independent actions partition and
rescission. First, the petitioners raised the refusal of their coheirs, Florante, Rita and Panfila, to partition the properties
+
Flora
+ Flora
which they inherited from Spouses Baylon. Second, in their
Ramon
Jr
Ramon Jr
supplemental pleading, the petitioners assailed the
Remo,
Remo, Jose,
Jose,
Eric,
Eric,
donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706
Florentino,
Florentino,
Ma.
Ma. Ruby
Ruby
made by Rita in favor of Florante pendente lite.

ISSUE/S: W/N
RULING:
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of
action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of
action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of
action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil
causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A
plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct
demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration,
complaint or petition. 29
While parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they may
have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action

is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not
include special civil actions governed by special rules. 31
Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for
partition filed by the petitioners could not be joined with the
action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in
favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition
is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action
governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance
in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in
the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in
one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to
avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the
conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of
the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of
action. 32
Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal. Indeed, the courts have the power, acting upon the
motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded
with separately. 33 However, if there is no objection to the
improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a
severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous
adjudication of all the erroneously joined causes of action.
It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if
the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes
of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined

cause of action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be

severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed,
any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same
would be a nullity.
Here, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC
direct the severance of the petitioners' action for rescission
from their action for partition. While this may be a patent
omission on the part of the RTC, this does not constitute a
ground to assail the validity and correctness of its decision. The
RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for
partition and rescission filed by the petitioners.
Asserting a New Cause of Action in a Supplemental
Pleading
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 6.Supplemental Pleadings. Upon
motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are
just, permit him to serve a supplemental
pleading
setting
forth
transactions,
occurrences or events which have happened
since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. The adverse party may plead
thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the
order admitting the supplemental pleading.
In Young v. Spouses Sy, 36 this Court had the opportunity to
elucidate on the purpose of a supplemental pleading. Thus:

As its very name denotes, a supplemental

pleading only serves to bolster or add
something to the primary pleading. A
supplement exists side by side with the
original. It does not replace that which it
supplements. Moreover, a supplemental
pleading assumes that the original pleading is
to stand and that the issues joined with the
original pleading remained an issue to be tried
in the action. It is but a continuation of the
complaint. Its usual office is to set up new
facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind
of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the
original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to
bring into the records new facts which will
enlarge or change the kind of relief to which
the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any
supplemental facts which further develop the
original right of action, or extend to vary the
relief, are available by way of supplemental
complaint even though they themselves
constitute a right of action. 37 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege
transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after

the filing of the pleading sought to be supplemented, even if

the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action.
Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos of
Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 made by Rita in favor
of Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the
filing of the original complaint. However, the petitioners'
prayer for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in their
supplemental pleading is germane to, and is in fact, intertwined
with the cause of action in the partition case. Lot No. 4709 and
half of Lot No. 4706 are included among the properties that
were sought to be partitioned.
The petitioners' supplemental pleading merely amplified the
original cause of action, on account of the gratuitous
conveyance of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 after the
filing of the original complaint and prayed for additional
reliefs, i.e., rescission. Indeed, the petitioners claim that the
said lots form part of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but cannot
be partitioned unless the gratuitous conveyance of the same is
rescinded. Thus, the principal issue raised by the petitioners in
their original complaint remained the same.

Petition is partly granted. The case is remanded to the RTC.

BANDA VS ERMITA
(GR NO. 166620; APRIL 20, 2010)

FACTS: The petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their

own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the
National Printing Office. They challenge the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 378 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo which amended Sec. 6 of Executive Order
No. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over
the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat to their security
of tenure as employees of the NPO contending that it is beyong
the executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO
No. 285 issued by former Pres. Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers and that EO No. 378 violates
petioners security of tenure because it paves the way for the
gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is indeed qualified as a
class suit.
Whether or not Pres. Arroyo can amend or repeal EO
No. 285 by the mere issuance of another executive order.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that an action does not
become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in
the pleadings. Under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common
or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the
court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to

fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend

for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right
to intervene to protect his individual interest. From the
foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the
subject matter of controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous
or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests
of all concerned.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO
employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive
Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It
was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who
pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO.
The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the
NPO employees whom they claimed to represent.
Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an
Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever
signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of
petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners
challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some
of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due
to pressure from people "close to the seat of power." Still, even
if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some
of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient,
representative number of NPO employees have instituted this
purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show

that
of
the
67
petitioners
who
signed
the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20
petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly
subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words,
only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case.
As to the merits of the case, it is a well-settled principle
in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in line
with the Presidents constitutionally granted power of control
over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part
of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has
been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press
Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information
Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the President (a) to
restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common
Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another,
and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive
Branch, and vice versa.

In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the

NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred to
another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378,
the NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for
all kinds of government forms and publications but in the
interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and
profitability, it must now compete with the private sector for
certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election
paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the
NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the
Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was a
mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the
exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.
Pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of
the same Code, the power of the President to reorganize the
Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and
functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be
sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents
power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently
supported by specific provisions in general appropriations
laws.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that the acts of
"scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and
does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions.
Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentralizing is included
in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which evidently
shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational

changes including the creation of offices in the department or

agency concerned.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General
Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004 (the year of
the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the
President the authority to effect a wide variety of
organizational changes in any department or agency in the
Executive Branch. Sections 77 and 78 of said Act recognize the
power of the President to reorganize even executive offices
already funded by the said appropriations act, including the
power to implement structural, functional, and operational
adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing,
modify or realign appropriations of funds as may be necessary
under such reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest
the limitation of the NPOs appropriations to its own income
under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily
authorized by the above provisions.

rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for

the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And
in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition"
is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or
where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample
funds.
In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show
any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President
Arroyos issuance of Executive Order No. 378.

In the present instance, involving neither an abolition

nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere
reorganization under the general provisions of the law
consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of
simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the
authority of the President motivated and carried out, according
to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual
assessment that this Court could only but accept.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the

prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded

as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general

FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before

the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages

SO ORDERED.
ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO

against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the

RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor
vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers, Navarro
alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints
stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the
Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the
lease agreements) the actionable documents on which the
complaints were based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside
the dismissal on the presumption that Glenn Gos (husband)
leasing business is a conjugal property and thus ordered Karen
Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff
as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Navarro filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a
complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be
converted into one with a cause of action by mere amendment
or supplemental pleading. CA denied petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest.
HELD: YES. Karen Go is the registered owner of the business
name Kargo Enterprises, as the registered owner of Kargo
Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to
Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest,
and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not
state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the
Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo
Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo
Enterprises and the properties registered under this name;

hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these

properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the
co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even
without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable
party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles,
he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit,
based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
Section 4.Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or
be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the
action, misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a
complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court.
Bacalso vs Padigos
It is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches.
Padigos et.al. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City a complaint against Bacalso et al. for quieting of
title, declaration of nullity of documents, recover of possession,
and damages. A parcel of land (the lot) located in Cebu was
registered in the name of thirteen (13) co-owners to which

Maximo Padigos, et al are all heirs. Rosendo Bacalso et al

occupied the disputed land for a couple of decades in which
they turned it into farmland. Padigos et al. alleged that Rosendo
Bacalso et al., heirs of Alipio Bacalso Sr. (Alipio, Sr.), secured
a fraudulent Tax Declaration covering the disputed potions of
the lot without any legal basis. In their answer, Bacalso et. al.
claimed that their father Alipio, Sr. bought shares
corresponding to some of the 13 co-owners via deed of sale
decades ago. Alipio, Sr. only failed to register the land to his
name but subsequently occupied the land and passed it on to
his heirs. Bacalso et. al also alleged that even if Padigos et als
claim over the land is valid, the action to recover is barred by
laches since Padigos et al did not claim the land at the earliest
possible time. After trial, RTC ruled in favor of Padigos et. al.
Bacalso et. al. appealed. The Court of Appeals found the deed
of sale valid Bacalso et. al s property and also cited laches as a
means of loosing of a right over the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Padigos et. al.s claim is barred by
laches
HELD: Having failed to establish their claim by preponderance
of evidence, Padigos et.als action for quieting of title,
declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession,
and damages must fail. Padigos et. al. lost the right of action to
the property by laches - the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined
to assert it. While, by express provision of law, no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner

shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is an

enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from
recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. Upon the
other hand, Bacalso et. al have been vigilant in protecting their
rights over the lot, which their predecessor-in-interest Alipio,
Sr. had declared in his name for tax purposes as early as 1960,
and for which he had been paying taxes until his death in 1994,
by continuing to pay the taxes thereon.
G.R. No. 177429

November 24, 2009

ANICIA VALDEZ-TALLORIN, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUANITO TARONA, Represented by CARLOS
TARONA, ROGELIO TARONA and LOURDES
TARONA, Respondents.
FACTS: On February 9, 1998 respondents Carlos, Rogelio, and
Lourdes Tarona (the Taronas) filed an action before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan, against
petitioner Anicia Valdez-Tallorin (Tallorin) for the cancellation
of her and two other womens tax declaration over a parcel of
land.
The Taronas alleged in their complaint that, unknown to
them, in 1981, the Assessors Office of Morong in Bataan
cancelled Tax Declaration 463 in the name of their father,
Juanito Tarona (Juanito), covering 6,186 square meters of land
in Morong, Bataan. The cancellation was said to be based on an
unsigned though notarized affidavit that Juanito allegedly

executed in favor of petitioner Tallorin and two others, namely,

Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, who
were not impleaded in the action. In place of the cancelled one,
the Assessors Office issued Tax Declaration 6164 in the names
of the latter three persons. The old man Taronas affidavit had
been missing and no copy could be found among the records of
the Assessors Office.
The Taronas further alleged that, without their fathers
affidavit on file, it followed that his tax declaration had been
illegally cancelled and a new one illegally issued in favor of
Tallorin and the others with her. The unexplained
disappearance of the affidavit from official files, the Taronas
concluded, covered-up the falsification or forgery that caused
the substitution. The Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax
Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and issue a
new one in the name of Juanitos heirs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Taronas complaint should be
dismissed for not impleading Margarita Pastelero Vda. de
Valdez and Dolores Valdez in whose names, like their coowner Tallorin, the annulled tax declaration had been issued.
RULING: The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable
parties. Thus:
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties
in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs and defendants.

Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the

controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.
Joining indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being
a requirement of due process. Without their presence, the
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not
only as to the absent party, but as to those present as well. And
where does the responsibility for impleading all indispensable
parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.
Here, the Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration
in the names of defendant Tallorin and two others, namely,
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez and, in
its place, the reinstatement of the previous declaration in their
father Juanitos name. Further, the Taronas sought to strike
down as void the affidavit in which Juanito renounced his
tenancy right in favor of the same three persons. It is inevitable
that any decision granting what the Taronas wanted would
necessarily affect the rights of such persons to the property
covered by the tax declaration.
The Court cannot discount the importance of tax declarations
to the persons in whose names they are issued. Their
cancellation adversely affects the rights and interests of such
persons over the properties that the documents cover. The
reason is simple: a tax declaration is a primary evidence, if not

the source, of the right to claim title of ownership over real

property, a right enforceable against another person. The Court
held in Uriarte v. People that, although not conclusive, a tax
declaration is a telling evidence of the declarants possession
which could ripen into ownership.
JESUS
G.
CRISOLOGO
and
NANETTE
B.
CRISOLOGO, Petitioners, vs.
JEWM
AGROINDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS: This controversy stemmed from various cases of
collection for sum of money filed against So Keng Kok, the
owner of various properties including two (2) parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 292597 and 292600 (subject properties),
which were attached by various creditors including the
petitioners in this case. As a result, the levies were annotated
on the back of the said titles.
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo
(Spouses Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2) collection
cases before RTC, Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15),
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 26,810-98 and 26,811-98, against
Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM AgroIndustrial Corporation (JEWM) was the successor-in-interest of
one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case before
RTC, Branch 8, Davao City (RTC-Br. 8), docketed as Civil
Case No. 26,513-98, against the same defendants.
On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on
a compromise agreement, dated October 15, 1998, between the

parties wherein the defendants in said case were directed to

transfer the subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The
latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda
Lam who, in turn, sold the same to JEWM on June 1, 2000.
Thereafter, TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually
issued in the name of JEWM, both of which still bearing the
same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in
connection with the other pending cases filed against So Keng
Kok.
A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate
collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against Robert Lim So
and So Keng Koc (defendants). Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said
defendants were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses
Crisologo. When this decision attained finality, they moved for
execution. On June 15, 2010, a writ was eventually issued.
Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale
scheduling an auction on August 26, 2010. The notice of sale
included, among others, the subject properties covered by TCT
Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM.
In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit
of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam. It
prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the
notice of sale. In an order, dated August 26, 2010, however, the
motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses Crisologo posted a
bond in order to proceed with the execution.
To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for
cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a

preliminary injunction before RTC-Br. 14, docketed as Civil

Case No. 33,551-2010. It prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject
properties covered in the writ of execution issued pursuant to
the ruling of RTC-Br. 15; the cancellation of all the annotations
on the back of the pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a
permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. "The
Register of Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea,
John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their
direction" were impleaded as defendants.
At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14 on September 22,
2010, Spouses Crisologos counsel appeared and filed in open
court their Very Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority
of the said court to restrain the execution proceedings in RTCBr. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo
were not parties in the case.
On September 24, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus
Motion praying for the denial of the application for writ or
preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their
recognition as parties.
In the Order, dated September 27, 2010, RTC-Br. 14
denied Spouses Crisologos Omnibus and granted JEWMs
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 1, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion before RTC-Br. 14 praying for
reconsideration and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010

Order, however it was denied on October 7, 2010 for lack of

legal standing in court considering that their counsel failed to
make the written formal notice of appearance.
On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the
"defendants" in default which was granted in an order given in
open court on November 19, 2010. Spouses Crisologo then
filed their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated November 30,
2010, arguing that they could not be deemed as defaulting
parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent
motion and order of default.
On November 19, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari 5 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the RTC-Br. 14 orders, dated September 27,
2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010, all of which
denied their motion to be recognized as parties. They also
prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
In its Resolution, dated January 6, 2011, the CA denied the
application for a TRO, but directed Spouses Crisologo to
amend their petition. On January 19, 2011, the Spouses
Crisologo filed their Amended Petition6 with prayers for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the
annulment of the aforementioned orders of RTC Br. 14, and the
issuance of an order dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in favor of JEWM.

Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA,

JEWM filed a motion on December 6, 2010 before RTC-Br. 14
asking for the resolution of the case on the merits and on
January 10, 2011, the RTC Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM.

RULING: In an action for the cancellation of memorandum

annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons
considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear
as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

Spouses Crisologo then filed their Omnibus Motion Ex

Abudanti ad Cautelam, asking RTC- Br. 14 to reconsider the
above decision. Because no motion for intervention was filed
prior to the rendition of the judgment, a certificate, dated
March 17, 2011, was issued declaring the January 10, 2011
decision final and executory.

In Southwestern University v. Laurente,16 the Court

held that the cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance
cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties
annotated in the certificate of title itself. It would, thus, be an
error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be
given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the back
of a certificate of title.

On May 6, 2011, the CA eventually denied the

Amended Petition filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit.
It ruled that the writ of preliminary injunction subject of the
petition was already fait accompli and, as such, the issue of
grave abuse of discretion attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in granting
the relief had become moot and academic. It further held that
the failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to
intervene under Rule 19 rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a
vehicle to ventilate their supposed right in the case.9.
ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted
without grave abuse of discretion in failing to recognize
Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for
cancellation of lien.

Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos

liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675
and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they
stand to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the
cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other
words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final
disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many
lien holders.
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should
have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section
7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The reason behind this
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete
determination of all possible issues, not only between the
parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may
be affected by the judgment.18

In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by

Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties,
failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited
rule. In fact, in Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio, 19 a
related administrative case, the Court found the trial judge
guilty of gross ignorance of the law when it disregarded the
claims of Spouses Crisologo to participate.
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical grounds on
why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule 65.`
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was
available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been
availed of, failing to use this remedy should not prejudice
Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the
rule on joinder of indispensable parties, to simply recognize
them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through a
cursory reading of the titles, the Court would have noticed the
adverse rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of
any annotations in the subject TCTs.
Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since
only the original parties to an action can appeal. 25 Here,

Spouses Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could

not have utilized appeal as they never possessed the required
legal standing in the first place.
And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal
standing to appeal, it must be remembered that the questioned
orders were interlocutory in character and, as such, Spouses
Crisologo would have to wait, for the review by appeal, until
the rendition of the judgment on the merits, which at that time
may not be coming as speedy as practicable. While waiting,
Spouses Crisologo would have to endure the denial of their
right, as indispensable parties, to participate in a proceeding in
which their indispensability was obvious. Indeed, appeal
cannot constitute an adequate, speedy and plain remedy.
The same is also true if recourse to Annulment of
Judgment under Rule 47 is made since this remedy
presupposes a final judgment already rendered by a trial court.
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct
in their averment that the lack of legal standing on the part of
Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the
latters recourse via Rule 65.
This case, however, is an exception. In many instances,
the Court has ruled that technical rules of procedures should be
used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of
procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the
attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application
may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and

be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial

justice in the normal cause.28

Lanao del Sur. According to him, his actual birth date was
January 11, 1956. This application was eventually approved.

Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as

indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders and
the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the
Court has ruled that the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before
RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including the assailed orders,
which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head."29

Dimapinto then filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of

Marawi City for correction of entry in his public records. In his
petition, he alleged that his actual age is only 45 years old,
having been born on January 11, 1956; that his failure to
indicate his correct age was due to estimation, Muslims in the
south not being required to register their births and deaths; this
petition was subsequently approved in a judgment dated March
13, 2002.

All told, the CA erred in dismissing the amended

petition filed before it and in not finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
MACAWADIB VS POLICE
Facts: Dimapinto, a police officer with the rank of Senior
Superintendent, was notified in a General Order by the Chief of
The Directorial Staff that he will be part of a group of police
officers who will be compulsorily retired at the age of 56 on
June, 2002, it appearing that his date of birth appearing in PNP
records
was
January
11,
1946.
Dimapinto then filed an application for late registration of his
birth certificate with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Mulondo,

The Philippine National Police Directorate for Records and

Personnel Management thereupon filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment with prayer for temporary restraining
order, citing the fact that they were not impleaded as
indispensable parties to the petition filed by Dimapinto, hence
the RTC decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over the
PNP, an indispensable party.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition filed by the PNP, and
nullified the judgment of the RTC. It also issued a permanent
injunction barring Dimapinto from serving with the PNP
beyond
his
compulsory
retirement
age
of
52.
Dimapinto elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
Among the issues presented for consideration were: Is the PNP
an indispensable party to the petition for correction of entry in
the public service record of Dimapinto? Considering that the
decision had become final and executory, is the State estopped
from questioning its validity?

In both, the Supreme Court answered no:

In his first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent
is not an indispensable party. The Court is not persuaded. On
the contrary, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it
is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the
custody of the PNP, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which
are involved and which would be affected by any decision
rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner.
The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to
be made parties to the proceeding. They are indispensable
parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. An indispensable party is defined as one who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring
or affecting that interest.In the fairly recent case of Go v.
Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc., the
Court had the occasion to reiterate the principle that:

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, parties in

interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. If there is a
failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment
rendered would have no effectiveness. It is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action
should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even to those present. The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues
not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards
other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision
valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want
of indispensable parties.[
Citing previous authorities, the Court also held in the Go case
that:

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a

civil action requires the joinder of all indispensable parties
under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua
non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47
Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held
that when it appears of record that there are other persons
interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not
made parties to the action, it is the duty of the court to suspend
the trial until such parties are made either plaintiffs or
defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). x x x Where
the petition failed to join as party defendant the person
interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same
should be dismissed. x x x When an indispensable party is not
before the court, the action should be dismissed.

The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable

parties is on the plaintiff.
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP,
NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be adversely
affected by petitioners petition which involves substantial and
controversial alterations in petitioners service records.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), if petitioners service is extended by
ten years, the government, through the PNP, shall be burdened
by the additional salary and benefits that would have to be
given to petitioner during such extension. Thus, aside from the
OSG, all other agencies which may be affected by the change
should be notified or represented as the truth is best ascertained
under an adversary system of justice.
As the above-mentioned agencies were not impleaded in this
case much less given notice of the proceedings, the decision of
the trial court granting petitioners prayer for the correction of
entries in his service records, is void. As mentioned above, the
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

On the question of whether or not respondent is estopped from

assailing the decision of the RTC for failure of the OSG, as
government representative, to participate in the proceedings
before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioners
petition for correction of entries in his service records, this
Court rules that such an apparent oversight has no bearing on
the validity of the appeal which the petitioner filed before the
CA. Neither can the State, as represented by the government,
be considered in estoppel due to the petitioners seeming
acquiescence to the judgment of the RTC when it initially made
corrections to some of petitioners records with the PNP. This
Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of
opposition from government agencies is of no controlling
significance, because the State cannot be estopped by the
omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the
Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the
petition for correction of entries if, on the basis of the law and
the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.

One last note from the High Court:

At this juncture, it may not be amiss to point out that, like the
CA, this Court cannot help but entertain serious doubts on the
veracity of petitioners claim that he was indeed born in 1956.
The late registration of petitioners certificate of live birth on
September 3, 2001 was made forty-five (45) years after his
supposed birth and a mere 34 days after the PNPs issuance of
its Order for his compulsory retirement. He had all the time to
make such registration but why did he do it only when he was
about to retire?
The Court, likewise, agrees with the observation of the OSG
that, if petitioner was indeed born in 1956, he would have been
merely 14 years old in 1970 when he was appointed as Chief of
Police of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. This would not have been
legally tenable, considering that Section 9 of RA 4864,
otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, provides, among
others, that a person shall not be appointed to a local police
agency if he is less than twenty-three years of age. Moreover,
realistically speaking, it would be difficult to believe that a 14year old minor would serve as a police officer, much less a
chief of police.

The Court also gives credence to the pronouncement made by

the CA which took judicial notice that in the several hearings
of the petition before the appellate court where the petitioner
was present, the CA observed that in the several hearings of
this petition before Us where the private respondent was
present, he does not really appear to be 52 years old but his old
age of 62
Republic vs Uy
Facts: Dr. Anita Sy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in
her Birth Certificate. She impleaded as respondent the Local
Registrat of Gingoog City. In her petition, she asked that her
name, Anita Sy be changed to Norma S. Lagunay, her status be
changed from legitimate to illegitimate, and her citizenship
from Chinese to Filipino, contending that her parents were
never married and her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and
are all Filipinos. After Anita Sys compliance with requirement
of publication in a newspaper of general circulation of the
notice of hearing of the said petition, the RTC granted the
same. On appeal, CA affirmed RTCs judgment on the ground
that respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties
was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the
Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors
Office.
Issue:

Is the petition dismissible for failure to implead the

indispensable parties?
Held:
Yes. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy
of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that
the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and
another given to other persons who are not named in the
petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for
the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest if he so chooses.
In this case, Anita Sy should have impleaded and notified not
only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings
as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make, in
compliance with Rule 108, Rules of Court.