March 2014

The End of Power by Moiss Nam

Adam Moscoe, MA Candidate,
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa
Conversations about the future of global governance typically focus on who or
what holds power at a given moment in time. Discussions surrounding the hypothesized
decline of the United States as a hegemon inevitably turn to the question of which actors
will inherit the reigns of global order. While the majority of recent literature on global
governance devotes attention to shifts in power, Moiss Nam a former cabinet minister
in Venezuela argues in The End of Power that power is not merely shifting from State
actors to non-State actors, but rather that power itself is mutating into a form as diffuse as
it is destabilizing. Nam agrees with Zbigniew Brzezinski that we are living in a posthegemonic era where no nation has the capacity to impose its will on others in a
substantial or permanent way (131). Defining power as the ability to direct or prevent
the current or future actions of other groups and individuals (16), Nam explores how
individuals healthier and better-educated than ever are creating and joining niche
networks that suit their unique preferences with respect to everything from national
politics to charitable giving.
Traditional barriers to power, such as natural monopolies and government
restrictions, are weakening in response to three revolutions: the More revolution, which
involves an increase in output and population and overwhelms barriers to power, making
control and coordination difficult; the Mobility revolution, which is propelling
unprecedented movement of people, goods, and ideas, and which circumvents barriers to
power, leaving megapowers without a defined constituency or captive audience; and the

Mentality revolution, characterized by major changes in mindsets, expectations, and

aspirations (11), including higher quality of life expectations among the middle class,
that undermine barriers to power. These three revolutions are perhaps irreversibly
constraining megapowers from exerting power through four interrelated channels: muscle
(coercion), code (norms and moral obligation), pitch (the power of persuasion), and
reward (the power of inducement). While muscle and reward can reshape incentives and
the structure of a situation, pitch and code alter assessments and perceptions of a situation
without changing incentives. Yet all four channels are weakened as barriers to power are
lowered. Nam does not see megapowers from the Republican Party to the Catholic
Church as disappearing, but he observes that decentralized organizations are denying
them options for dominating and expressing power. Power decay allows smaller actors to
challenge incumbents, yet it also risks bringing about Hobbes war of all against all
(18), a crippling paralysis whereby untamed pluralism and unlimited niche
organizations (micropowers) impede the formation of consensus on collective action to
address the complex issues with which humanity is currently grappling.
Nam draws upon a rich array of empirical evidence to support his concept of
power decay, and his lucid writing illuminates trends in geopolitics, business, and several
other fields. However, his case studies would be more useful were they more explicitly
connected to the aforementioned three revolutions and four channels, as they are in
chapter 5 in the discussion of national politics. One evidential problem is that he overextends the concepts of market power the ability of firms to charge higher than the
marginal cost and barriers to entry such as economies of scale (in which larger firms
are more efficient and smaller firms are less able to compete). While these concepts can

be easily employed to explain the rise of small businesses that use disruptive
technologies (182), prioritize speed over scale, and take advantage of lower barriers to
entry, he stretches these economic explanations to non-commercial arenas, such as
international politics, without accounting for differences in institutional types. Moreover,
the evidence Nam provides to explain power decay is often highly specific yet easily
misread as foreshadowing the dissolution of megapowers entirely. He notes, for instance,
that the probability that a company will fall from its standinghas increased (162),
that union density has declined, and that security alliances are weakening while informal
coalitions of the willing (or of the angry) are becoming more prevalent. He stresses
that decentralized groups from Kickstarter to Pentecostal churches are not replacing
established megapowers but rather are constraining their options for exercising power.
Yet considering he analyzes long-term phenomena and the transformation of social life,
the evidence upon which he relies plenty of annual reports and speculative magazine
surveys is often shallow.
Where there is no shortage of evidence, however, is in the failure of the
increasingly fragmented and paralyzed international community to address contemporary
problems, from curbing climate change to regulating asymmetric warfare. Power decay
and the proliferation of niche actors decrease cooperation, exacerbate collective action
problems and weaken incentives to provide global public goods all while causing
disorientation and heightened anxiety (231). Some of Nams judgements are
questionable. For example, in contrasting minilateralism where the smallest number
of countries needed to make a change assemble to do so without the risk of veto by great
powers from multilateralism, he romanticizes the extent to which the latter advanced

progress since the Second World War, from decolonization to nuclear deterrence, to the
Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, he does not adequately justify his lack of
confidence in minilateral initiatives context-sensitive solutions designed by likeminded actors to bring about tangible improvements in quality of life. Just because an
increase in entropy due to decentralization will constrain authority and power projection
does not necessary mean it will impede all forms of governance (140) and worsen global
outcomes. Furthermore, Nam fails to justify his evident optimism for impending
positive political and institutional innovation (243), as he offers no evidence to suggest
the sordid alternative growing extremism and polarization in national politics can be
mitigated. In spite of these limitations, Nam skilfully maps how the three revolutions
more, mobility, and mentality are reshaping capacities and aspirations, sprouting niche
organizations, and challenging incumbents and established megapowers.
The End of Power raises a number of fascinating questions that Nam does not,
and perhaps could not be reasonably expected, to resolve. First, are the three revolutions
yielding power decay or rather the restructuring of power into formations that are more
convenient for elites, such that everyone can be king of their own isolated castles? Are
the power dynamics at play within micropowers somehow more mild than those within
megapowers? Second, at what point might the harm caused by political paralysis due to
inaction on vital policy challenges such as climate change spur coalition building,
compromise and collaboration? Third, what are the long-term implications of polarization
and extremist politics, such that small actors can increasingly take a stand on a
parochial, ideological, or even whimsical issue, often for short-term domestic political
reasons rather than because of any defense of principle (152)? How will we respond to

a state of enduring impasse? Fourth, what are the social-psychological implications of a

world in which individuals interact almost solely with those who share their specific
context and worldview, and in which no real negotiation or consensus is pursued with
respect to the allocation of scarce resources? How might collective action problems be
exacerbated in a world where everything seems tailor-made for our preferences and
understandings? Fifth, assuming Nam is correct that megapowers are not on the verge of
disappearing, is there a threshold point at which power decay might pose an existential
threat to these megapowers? Sixth, is it possible to test whether the policy outcomes of
minilateralism differ in any meaningful way from those derived through multilateralism
(i.e. through the United Nations or other institutions)? Seventh, what is the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of pursuing consensus-based, universally-applicable solutions
to global problems when such processes increasingly lead to the adoption of watereddown resolutions that meet the lowest common denominator (see the discussion of the
Copenhagen climate summit, 152)? Eighth, how might we reconcile what appear to be
two contradictory ideas: the need for stability and predictability (228) as well as for risktaking activism (230)? Ninth, how can accountability be ensured in a decentralized
distribution of power? To what norms or principles should diverse private actors be held
accountable, and how and by whom? For example, Nam is enthusiastic about new and
less cumbersome ways of managing foreign aid, from large private foundations to
microloans, but he fails to address concerns regarding accountability, as discussed by
Mazower in his conclusion to Governing the World. Tenth, do smaller, decentralized
organization have an advantage over megapowers in terms of legitimacy, since they more
faithfully represent the views of their (smaller set of) members? For example, a common

complaint among union members is that they feel their unions take strong positions
contrary to their beliefs. Eleventh, how might we resolve the clash between the three
revolutions and the ongoing existence of State-owned enterprises and State-imposed
limits on institutional innovation?
The End of Power offers an important contribution to the literature on global
governance since it dares to imagine what globality the end being pursued by
globalization might look like. Nams discussion of power decay and institutional
innovation is compelling and unsettling, for it appears we are witnessing the triumph of
the niche and the end of solidarity due to the growing constraints on but, crucially, not
the elimination of megapowers in politics, diplomacy, business, and nearly all
dimensions of social life.