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Professional
accounting
ethics
159
Received June 2002
Accepted October 2002
Mary Canning
Brendan O'Dwyer
Introduction
Professional ethics reveal a dual and complex role in that both the public and
private interests are pursued. While the public interest is readily declared, the
powerful private interest often remains submerged. Hence, according to Parker
(1994, p. 508) ``the role of ethics in protecting the private interest represents a
vital component of the accounting profession's ongoing commitment to
The authors are extremely grateful for the helpful comments of Clare Balfe, Yves Gendron, Lee
Parker, Ian Thomson and two anonymous reviewers on earlier drafts of this paper. We would
also like to thank participants at the 2002 Critical Perspectives on Accounting conference in
New York and the 2002 Irish Accounting and Finance Association conference in Galway for
further helpful comments.
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ensuring its own survival''. Parker (1994, p. 508) developed a private interest
model of professional accounting ethics which he envisaged would be
subsequently refined and modified with respect to any unique aspects of
particular national environments. This paper is responsive to this call given
that prior research concluded that the operation of the professional ethics
machinery of one professional body, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Ireland (ICAI) facilitates private interest motives on the part of the ICAI
(Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001). More specifically, the paper subjects elements of
the model to critical scrutiny given unique aspects of the Irish national
environment. This research comes at a time when the disciplinary
arrangements of professional accounting bodies in Ireland and the UK have
been the subject of governmental scrutiny and much adverse press comment
due to research and publicity alleging audit failures (Canning and O'Dwyer,
2001; Mitchell et al., 1994; Sikka and Willmott, 1995). The paper also represents
a direct response to Sikka's (2001a, p. 759) call for research to be undertaken
which ``scrutinize[s] the rhetoric and public interest claims of accountancy
bodies''.
Parker's aforementioned model is a comprehensive attempt to conceptualise
the private interest role of professional accounting ethics in certain western
contexts. Nevertheless, as with all models it is susceptible to examination and
may require modification given the impact of changes over time in specific
contexts. In this paper, we examine the descriptive power of the model in the
Irish context over time by undertaking two main tasks. First, we trace changes
in this context over an eight year period, from 1994 to 2001, directly impacting
on the professional ethics machinery of the ICAI[1]. These changes are
sketched by examining elements of the discourse surrounding three key
external events impacting on the disciplinary process over this period. This
initial examination focuses on viewing the model given events occurring
``outside'' the disciplinary process but impacting directly on its operation and
calls into question aspects of the model's descriptive power. Second, we
augment this investigation with evidence drawn from in-depth interviews with
members of the ICAI disciplinary committees in order to gain an understanding
of the operation of the process from the ``inside''. These interviews further
enable us to scrutinise the model's descriptive power. We use this evidence to
make some suggestions for the modification of the model, particularly the
interrelationships depicted therein. The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows: the next section comprises a discussion of the conflict between the
public and private interests of the accounting profession and in particular the
role played by their ethical codes and disciplinary processes within this
conflict. The private interest model of professional accounting ethics developed
by Parker (1994) is then presented. This is followed by a description of the
methods adopted in the study. The findings emanating from our examination
of the three critical events over the eight year period, in conjunction with the
interview evidence, are then presented and deliberated on. These findings are
used to examine the descriptive power of Parker's model. The final section
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Figure 1.
Parker's private interest
model of professional
accounting ethics
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within a changing Irish context. Given the apparent static and absolute nature
of the five roles depicted within the model we illustrate how these roles, as
depicted, struggle to incorporate fully the impact of change in this context over
time.
Research methods
The evidence in this study was collected using two methods. Firstly, a content
analysis of media reporting and ICAI pronouncements regarding three events
with public interest implications relating to the ICAI disciplinary process was
undertaken. While these three events, which occurred between 1994 and 2001,
happened ``outside'' the disciplinary process, they impacted directly on its
operation. The analysis focuses on whether Parker's model adequately
describes the operation of the ICAI disciplinary process over time in response
to these external events. Secondly, semistructured in-depth personal interviews
with eight individuals who had direct involvement with the ICAI disciplinary
process were undertaken. The purpose of these interviews was to draw on
perceptions from ``inside'' the process to inform the analysis of the descriptive
power of Parker's model.
Content analysis
The content analysis (see Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1985)
involved a comprehensive review of media and ICAI pronouncements
surrounding the three events examined: the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry
into the Beef Processing Industry; the Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry
(Dunnes Payments); and the Parliamentary Inquiry into DIRT (Deposit Interest
Retention Tax) by the Dail (Irish Parliament) Public Accounts Committee
(PAC). A number of key words and categories were developed and agreed by
the researchers in order to focus this analysis. Articles were identified using online search systems on newspaper, business magazine and academic journal
web sites as well as general searches on library web sites[5]. Where on-line
search facilities did not fully cover the period being examined, we examined
individual newspapers' content in certain years (particularly, 1994, 1995 and
1996) for evidence of articles relating to these three events using microfiche
facilities. We also collected and examined information on the ICAI web site for
press releases and pronouncements in relation to the three events. The articles
were organised according to the event they related to and were examined in
detail in order to obtain some understanding of the core issues involved while,
at the same time, reflecting on the evolution of the issues and how the ICAI
response to them impacted on the descriptive power of Parker's model.
Interview evidence
The interviews were guided by a small number of broad open-ended
questions[6] and ranged from 45 to 90 minutes in duration. Interviews were
conducted with three ICAI members directly involved in the internal
administration of the disciplinary procedures and who also acted as members
of the various committees within the ICAI's disciplinary apparatus. The other
five interviews were conducted with lay members[7] of the various committees.
Our core focus in these interviews was to examine perceptions of the openness
and transparency of the disciplinary process and its purported objective to act
in the public interest. We initially wrote to the ICAI for contact details of these
members as we wished to be open with the ICAI regarding the nature of our
research. Before releasing any contact details, the ICAI insisted on liaising with
these members in order to ascertain their willingness to be interviewed. We
were also asked to provide a detailed outline of our research objectives in which
we guaranteed the confidentiality of the interviewees given the apparent
sensitivity of our research. We acceded to this. When interviewees agreed to be
interviewed the ICAI provided us with contact details and we proceeded to
organise the interviews.
Conducting the interviews
Before commencing each interview, the nature of the research was again
outlined to each interviewee. It was stressed that it was perceptions we were
examining and that we were not looking for definitive, wholly defensible
answers to questions. We were extremely conscious not to lead interviewees in
any way and attempted to formulate an informed conversation (Patton, 1990;
Smith, 1972). It should be noted that while we made extensive attempts to
establish a relaxed atmosphere and establish a rapport, on two occasions we
got the impression that interviewees were somewhat concerned about
elaborating in too much depth about the inner nature of the ICAI disciplinary
process. However, all other interviewees were extremely forthcoming and
elaborative in their responses to questions.
Evidence analysis
All of the interviews were recorded by tape and subsequently transcribed
(Jones, 1985; McKinnon, 1988). The evidence analysis constituted a pervasive
process throughout the study's life. For example, throughout the interview
collection phase, ongoing analysis was aided by: extensive notes taken during
and immediately after interviews; recorded de-briefing sessions between the
two researchers immediately after each interview; tape-recorded reflections on
interviews recorded separately by both researchers as well as each interviewee
recording an inner dialogue reflecting on the interviews in separate journals
(see Baxter and Chua, 1998; Silverman, 2000). This, in effect, provided us with a
provisional running record of analysis and interpretation (see Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Tesch, 1990). Initial readings of early transcripts throughout
the interview collection phase also meant that in subsequent interviews certain
issues that appeared to be arising from these readings were probed more
deeply. In conducting the post interview analysis, the broad areas addressed in
the interview guide provided a framework/template from which a detailed
analysis of transcripts could proceed (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996; Lillis, 1999;
Miles, 1979). In total, the transcripts were read on five separate occasions by
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both researchers after data collection had ceased. The first and second in-depth
reading of each transcript was undertaken with the tape of the interview
running in order to focus in on emphasis, mood, intonation and so on (Jones,
1985, p. 58). A number of key themes apparent in the evidence were then
developed after much discussion and debate. Mind (cognitive) maps were
prepared for each interview in order to support or, in some cases, challenge the
themes identified. These also helped in the search for any apparent
contradictions in the initial themes derived from the transcript evidence
(Huberman and Miles, 1994; Jones, 1985; Patton, 1990).
The detailed field notes, mind maps, tape-recorded reflections, memos,
interview summaries, and journals were then re-visited and analysed further.
This led to the formulation of an initial ``thick description'' (Denzin, 1994, p. 505)
of the interview findings using the interview guide questions as a loose
framework (see King, 1999, 1998). This description was then examined using
Parker's model as a lens in order to discover if the perceptions gained
supported the model's descriptive power. This was a crucial part of our
analysis and involved numerous sessions where we discussed and debated the
themes identified with regard to Parker's model. Finally, a narrative was
developed (Llewellyn, 2001) based on this analysis and this is primarily
presented in the second section of the findings detailed below.
Interrogating the descriptive power of Parker's individual private
interest roles
This section reports on the examination of the impact of three critical events of
a public interest nature on the ICAI professional ethics machinery in the period
from 1994 to 2001. These impacts are explored by analysing elements of the
discourse surrounding these events using the content analysis of media
coverage and ICAI pronouncements in conjunction with the interview evidence
analysis. The examination focuses on whether Parker's model, particularly the
individual roles depicted therein, adequately describes the operation of the
ICAI disciplinary machinery over time in response to these three events. These
events were chosen as they represent the three major events of a ``public
interest'' nature which directly impacted on the ICAI's disciplinary apparatus
from 1994 onwards. The decision to commence in 1994 is due to the seminal
nature of the first event analysed which reached its conclusion in 1994 (Bougen
et al., 1999). This event represented the commencement of a strong societal
push for greater accountability and transparency in Irish public life which has
led to greater questioning of powerful, well established professions such as law,
medicine and accountancy in this context.
Privacy and secrecy supporting the descriptive power of Parker's model
Event 1 The Beef Tribunal. In 1994, revelations arising from the Report of the
Tribunal of Inquiry into the Beef Processing Industry (hereafter the Beef
Tribunal) (Beef Tribunal, 1994) into alleged tax evasion and other malpractices
in the Irish beef processing industry implicated members of the ICAI in the
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We d[id] take people to task, but [under the old system] . . . nobody knew about the end result
. . . (M2).
In summary, at this time, it was apparent that the ICAI did not consider its
internal procedures to be the domain of the wider public despite the public
interest implications of the Beef Tribunal findings. From the outside looking in,
there was a sense that the ICAI considered itself to be immune from public
scrutiny by virtue of the professional authority it felt it possessed. Therefore,
the private operation of the ICAI disciplinary process combined with its lack of
a public response to findings regarding its members' actions which had a
public interest dimension suggests that Parker's model adequately describes
the operation of the ICAI professional accounting ethics machinery in its own
(private) interest at this time in this (Irish) context. The ICAI effectively
depended on its professional authority supported by professional insulation,
interference minimisation and perceptions of self-control in order to preserve
the socio-economic status of its members. However, the ensuing years brought
two further critical external threats to Parker's depiction of the individual roles
and their interrelationships within his model. The following sections examine
these threats and the ICAI response to them. In doing so, despite illustrating
some further support for the model's descriptive power, they overwhelmingly
indicate a number of threats to this power.
From privacy and secrecy to ostensible openness and transparency support for
and challenges to the descriptive power of Parker's model
Event 2 The McCracken Tribunal. In August 1997, the Report of the Tribunal
of Inquiry (Dunnes Payments) (hereafter the McCracken Tribunal) (McCracken,
1997) into, inter alia, claims of payments to politicians named a number of
prominent ICAI members thought to have been involved in the process[10]. As
part of its disciplinary apparatus, the ICAI set up a committee to investigate
these members. By establishing this committee, the ICAI, under the
disciplinary rules existing at this time, effectively acknowledged the public
interest nature of this case. This investigation would have proceeded along
similar lines to the Beef Tribunal (i.e. in a completely private manner) but for
severe external pressure imposed on the ICAI, initially emanating through the
print media. For example, when the operation of this committee was threatened
by outside interference with the media calling for public hearings, the ICAI
adopted an extremely defensive stance and insisted that its investigation be
held in private, as was normally the case heretofore. The ICAI made this clear
in a public statement declaring that it ``wishes it to be known that its
procedures and affairs are private, and that the (investigation) committee has
not issued or authorised the issue of any comments or reports on its activities''
(Murdoch, 1998a). Effectively, the body was asserting its professional authority
and was unwilling to permit this to be undermined by allowing any
interference in its disciplinary procedures as it was well capable (in its own
view) of exerting self-control over its members. This statement further
illustrates the insular nature of the ICAI disciplinary proceedings at this time. It
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ethics
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Figure 2.
Tension between
professional insulation
and interference
minimisation
process more open and transparent in May 1998[13]. Under the new proposals,
certain inquiries would now be held in public, the procedures for dealing with
complaints were to be speeded up, a greater representation of non-accountants
(lay members) was allowed on the disciplinary committees and sanctions
imposed by the process were to be publicised more extensively (ICAI, 1999a).
Furthermore, the level of fines was to be increased (ICAI, 1999a). These
changes represented an about-turn from the body who greeted the Beef
Tribunal findings with silence and a degree of annoyance that any external
body or person should question, or indeed intervene in, the private operation of
their disciplinary proceedings. Pierce Kent, the newly elected president
encapsulated this volte-face when stating ``we now recognise that open justice
is far more convincing than private discipline. The changes approved by the
Council will help reassure the public'' (O' Sullivan, 1998). A former president
hailed the new procedures as reflecting a new ``open institution'' challenging
perceptions of the body as a ``self protective organisation (given) the private
nature of current disciplinary hearings'' (The Irish Times, 1998). The proposed
changes were overwhelmingly supported by ICAI members[14].
The ICAI's gradual acceptance of an erosion in professional insulation
suggests a perception of reduced professional insulation facilitating the
maintenance of interference minimisation. For example, many interviewees
argued that by making their disciplinary procedures more transparent and open
in order to show that they were regulating themselves adequately (in effect,
reducing professional insulation) the ICAI minimised the possibility of outside
interference (maintaining interference minimisation). They perceived the nature
of the relationship between professional insulation and interference minimisation
as hindering rather than facilitating in nature. This tends to indicate, as depicted
in Figure 2, some form of perceived tension or negative relationship (represented
by ()) between professional insulation and interference minimisation, a tension
Parker's model does not consider. Instead, Parker's model suggests the opposite,
that decreased professional insulation contributes to decreased interference
minimisation, i.e. an absence of tension or a positive relationship.
Lee (1995, p. 64) has argued that one of the results of the accountancy
profession's public response to criticism is the ``gradual exposure of the
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I actually think it [ICAI] needs to go further [reduce professional insulation further] because
otherwise the internal review will be taken from the Institute [ICAI] and there will be another
review system imposed by the state authorities [thereby reducing interference minimisation]
(L1).
Figure 3.
Varying levels[1] of
individual roles
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Prior research has shown that such delaying tactics by the bigger firms are not
unusual (Arnold and Sikka, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2000; Sikka, 2001a). Referring
to the Blayney Inquiry one interviewee claimed it gave the ``appearance of
having power rather than `real' power'' and referred to the whole process of
delegated self-regulation as ``only a regulatory arrangement by consent'' (M1).
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He claimed that ``if you are a member of the Institute (ICAI) willing to submit
yourself to those powers that's fine, but if you're saying `look, to hell with you,
your powers are limited and I'm not willing to do so' [then] it's very difficult for
the Institute (ICAI) to withstand that'' (M1)[18].
Given that the larger firms were ``big contributors to the ICAI payroll'' (L5),
another interviewee questioned whether ``the ICAI [was] the proper body to
investigate serious, almost criminal actions'' by these firms. He felt strongly
that ``this is an area where the ICAI might be conflicted'' (L5). This concern was
shared by other interviewees:
. . . there is a perception among our members that the [small] guy would be beaten around a
room and blindfolded, [and that] the big boys control the Institute [ICAI] and won't have their
reputations damaged . . . [However], I think we are going to see some changes very soon (M2).
We had the Beef Tribunal which produced serious questions about major accountancy firms
. . . you know there was fear and horror at the extent of this and when you consider one or two
of the firms that were involved, they were major accounting firms . . . then there was almost a
balance of power in these type of things . . . with so few firms controlling so many chartered
accountants the size of the firm might well exceed the resources of the ICAI and things like
that . . . so I could see it as a problem and it was a problem for them (L3).
order to protect the operation of its disciplinary process in the private interest
of its members, it was contended that the ICAI had encouraged some state
interference (some reduction in interference minimisation).
The analysis above suggests that focusing on maintaining or enhancing
interference minimisation may actually work against self-control. In essence,
there is a perceived lack of control over larger members which the ICAI has
attempted to address by, on occasion, seeking reduced interference
minimisation through increased state intervention in the form of statutory
backing for its disciplinary process. Hence, it would seem that, on occasion, the
ICAI is perceived as being open to its disciplinary process sustaining some loss
in interference minimisation in order to improve self-control. This indicates, as
shown in Figure 4, the existence of a tension or negative relationship between
these two private interest roles (represented by ()).
The implications for Parker's model are that the relationship between selfcontrol and interference minimisation may sometimes be competitive as
opposed to contributory. This apparent willingness to allow some reduction in
interference minimisation (in order to enhance self-control) contrasts with
evidence presented earlier suggesting a core focus on maintaining interference
minimisation by the ICAI. We cannot ascertain how committed the ICAI
actually are to any reduction in interference minimisation necessary to improve
self-control, but what we can conclude is that there is a clear perception that a
reduction in interference minimisation is required to improve self-control.
Whether the ICAI is totally committed to this reduction is debatable given our
earlier evidence suggesting a core focus on maintaining or enhancing
interference minimisation.
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ethics
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Figure 4.
Tension between
interference
minimisation and
self-control
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However, it could be argued that the more authority the profession commands
(greater professional authority) (be it from professional insulation, interference
minimisation, self-control or socio-economic status preservation) the more
likely it is that outside scrutiny will be minimised by, for example, deterring
potential complainants, thereby enhancing professional insulation. One
interviewee clearly saw the current promotion of the disciplinary system and
how it operates from the potential complainant's perspective as enhancing the
sense of mystique surrounding the process. For example, the professional
authority afforded to the profession is used to facilitate the operation of a
system which, instead of encouraging complainants and facilitating them, acts
to shroud the process. This creates a sense of mystique around the process
which could not have been established unless professional authority already
existed:
I think the Institute [ICAI] has had a culture of being seen not to be very proactive and being
seen not to be particularly helpful to complainants [although] I think that might be more of a
perception than a reality (M1).
The average person that deals with a firm of accountants would not know that there is a
process available through the Institute [ICAI] for them to remedy some mistake that may be
made against them (L1).
I think that the complainant should have somebody articulate the thing ... A lot of people
would have complaints and they wouldn't be in a position to articulate them and they might
get put off because they couldn't do that (L3).
One interviewee also spoke of a sense of ``tired resignation among the public
regarding how professions (not just the ICAI) were regulated'' (L5) which he felt
further deterred complainants. In summary, while professional insulation is
deemed to facilitate professional authority in Parker's model (but not vice
versa), when considering the role of the complainant in the disciplinary process,
many interviewees viewed established professional authority as actually
contributing to professional insulation thereby suggesting a reciprocal
facilitation between professional insulation and professional authority.
Discussion and conclusions
The primary aim of this study was to examine the descriptive power of the
private interest model of professional accounting ethics developed by Parker
(1994) over a certain time period in the Irish context. The paper draws on
evidence regarding three critical events occurring outside the disciplinary
process but impacting directly on its operation and on perceptions from within
the process. This encompassed examining the discourse surrounding the
disciplinary process from 1994 to 2001 using media coverage and ICAI
pronouncements and augmenting this examination with in-depth interviews
held with members of the ICAI disciplinary committees. This investigation
therefore allowed us to scrutinise the model's descriptive power. The paper is
responsive to Parker's call for research to attempt to modify and refine his
model with respect to unique aspects of particular national environments. It
also extends prior research which concluded that the operation of the
professional ethics machinery of the ICAI facilitated private interest motives on
the part of the ICAI (Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001). Furthermore, the paper
represents a direct response to Sikka's (2001a, p. 759) call for the instigation of
research which ``scrutinize[s] the rhetoric and public interest claims of
accountancy bodies'' and comes at a time when the disciplinary arrangements
of professional accounting bodies in Ireland and the UK have been the subject
of governmental scrutiny and much adverse press comment due to research
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Figure 5.
Private interest model of
professional accounting
ethics in Ireland
and publicity alleging audit failures (Canning and O'Dwyer, 2001; Sikka and
Willmott, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1994).
Our analysis provides evidence of some support for the descriptive power of
the Parker model in the Irish context. However, the investigation of subsequent
changes in this context over the eight year period in conjunction with the
interview evidence also serves to highlight a number of challenges to this
descriptive power. These revolve primarily around the absence of any
depiction of differing levels/degrees of professional insulation, interference
minimisation, etc. within the model and the proposed interrelationships
between the individual roles within the model. Therefore, we propose, in
Figure 5, a reconceptualisation of the model, to take into account this evidence.
Around the time of the Beef Tribunal, the ICAI did not consider its internal
procedures to be the domain of the wider public despite the public interest
implications of the findings. The ICAI effectively depended on its established
professional authority supported by professional insulation, interference
minimisation and self-control in order to ensure the socio-economic status of its
members thereby suggesting that Parker's model adequately reflected the
operation of the ICAI professional ethics machinery at this point in time. In
Figure 5 below, we illustrate the initial positive/contributory relationship
between the separate private interest roles, as initially depicted by Parker,
using (+) beside the relevant arrow linking roles to one another.
However, two further critical events, which occurred in the ensuing years,
challenged elements of the descriptive power of Parker's model. These events
reflected the inability of his model to encapsulate changes in the Irish context
over time which our model, as reflected in Figure 5, attempts to redress. Firstly,
the evidence presented challenged the Parker model by illustrating the rigid
and static nature of the separate roles depicted within the model. For instance,
the discourse surrounding the McCracken Tribunal and DIRT Inquiry
demonstrated that the Parker model appears to ignore the level/degree of
interference (degrees of interference minimisation) that may need to be allowed
in certain contexts as it fails to consider different levels of professional
insulation and interference minimisation. Because all of the roles are considered
in absolute terms, Parker's model appears overly static and therefore cannot
encapsulate potential trade-offs between individual roles or any degree of
latitude within each separate role. We have attempted to incorporate levels/
degrees of the various private interest roles in our model using multiple rather
than single depictions of these roles.
A further challenge to Parker's model relates to the interrelationships
between the various private interest roles depicted therein. Three such
relationships (professional insulation and interference minimisation;
interference minimisation and self-control; and professional insulation and
professional authority) as depicted within Parker's model were challenged by
our evidence. Firstly, Parker identifies the relationship between professional
insulation and interference minimisation as being one of facilitation, whereas
our evidence suggests an apparent tension in this relationship. For example,
the ICAI response to the McCracken Tribunal and DIRT Inquiry in conjunction
with the interview evidence suggest that reduced professional insulation is
perceived as facilitating the maintenance of interference minimisation.
Consequently, this suggests that increased professional insulation may not, in
this specific context at least, contribute to interference minimisation. This tends
to indicate the need for the recognition, as in Figure 5, of some form of tension
(denoted ()) between professional insulation and interference minimisation in
Parker's model. Secondly, while Parker considers the relationship between
interference minimisation and self-control as contributory, our evidence
suggests that interference minimisation may actually work against self-control.
In essence, there is a perceived lack of control over larger ICAI members which,
according to the interviewees, the ICAI needs to address by allowing a
reduction in interference minimisation through increased state intervention in
the form of statutory backing for its disciplinary process. By focusing
primarily on maintaining interference minimisation in its disciplinary process,
the ICAI appears to have traded-off self-control over its members. Hence, it
would seem that the ICAI may recognise the need to sustain some loss in
interference minimisation in order to improve self-control and reduce the
possibility of greater interference (further reduced interference minimisation).
This suggests the need for Parker's model to recognise a tension (denoted (-))
between these two private interest roles as illustrated in Figure 5.
The third interrelationship challenged relates to professional insulation
and professional authority. While we accept that professional insulation
facilitates professional authority given that professional authority may not
exist without professional insulation, our evidence suggests that once some
level of professional authority is established, this in itself can contribute to
further or enhanced professional insulation. Support for this emanates from an
analysis of interviewee perspectives regarding the role of complainant's within
the ICAI disciplinary process. Hence, using this evidence we suggest, as
reflected by the additional arrow emanating from professional authority to
professional insulation in Figure 5, a reciprocal contributory relationship
between professional authority and professional insulation.
We fully accept that expecting Parker's model to encapsulate all possible
situations pertaining to the professional ethics machinery of different
accountancy bodies in different contexts is both unrealistic and foolhardy.
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However, our examination has shown that in one context over a certain time
period, given prior evidence that the professional accounting ethics machinery
studied works in the private interest (Canning and O' Dwyer, 2001), the model
needs to evolve somewhat to encapsulate changing circumstances. Therefore,
our suggested modifications to Parker's model may more accurately describe
the operation of the ICAI's professional accounting ethics machinery in the
private interest. We suggest that future research should consider the model's
descriptive power in other contexts over time in order to provide some
comparison with the evidence presented here.
Notes
1. As observed by one of the anonymous reviewers, we should point out that the analysis is
only loosely over time: the 1994 to 2001 time period is, to quote the reviewer, merely ``a
grain of sand in the continuum of time''.
2. This perspective views professions as ``integrated communities whose members undertake
highly skilled tasks that are crucial for the integration and smooth operation of society''
(Willmott, 1986, p. 557). Within this perspective, distinguishing characteristics of a
professional such as the custody of specific knowledge, independence, altruism and self
discipline are highlighted but remain largely unquestioned (Willmott, 1986).
3. Parker (1994) notes that these third parties may encompass corporate shareholders (or
intending shareholders), borrowers and lenders, regulators, government, social interest
groups, or any other members of the public.
4. Interference primarily from the Government and its agencies.
5. As well as academic papers, the search covered newspapers and periodicals such as, The
Irish Times, The Irish Independent, The Examiner, The Sunday Business Post, The
Financial Times, Business and Finance, Accountancy Ireland and Accountancy Age.
6. The five broad areas that our questions spanned included perceptions as to: the
transparency of the disciplinary process and reporting mechanisms; the difficulties/
pressures imposed on the disciplinary procedures; the fairness and equity of the
punishments meted; the accountability to complainants in the public interest; and the
impact of recent amendments to the procedures.
7. Lay members are invited on to these committees in order to provide some non-accountant
(quasi-independent) influence to the disciplinary proceedings.
8. This was despite the letter having been vetted by senior legal counsel.
9. M1 to M3 refers to interviewees directly involved in the internal administration of the ICAI
disciplinary procedures and who also sat on various disciplinary committees. L1 to L5
refers to the five lay members of the various committees interviewed.
10. The ICAI members mentioned in the report included former Taoiseach (Prime Minister)
Charles Haughey; Dunnes Stores (a major privately held retail chain) trustee, Noel Fox, and
Dublin accountancy firms, Oliver Freaney and Co. and Deloitte and Touche as joint
auditors of Dunnes Stores.
11. Tanaiste is a Gaelic term meaning ``deputy Prime Minister'' in the English language.
12. While the inquiry was set up in September 1997, it is still ongoing due to a combination of
further tribunals that may impact on its findings and delaying tactics adopted by some of
the parties being investigated (Keena, 1999). It also faced difficulties gaining access to
certain files because of concerns in various accountancy firms about client confidentiality.
An interim report in April 1999 revealed that some parties had been informed that a prima
facie case had been established by the committee. While the report was completed in June
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
2000, it is currently (June 2002) being appealed and ICAI regulations as well as legal advice
received by the ICAI prohibit publication of the report until the appeals have been
determined or abandoned.
These changes were implemented in December 1999.
A postal ballot of members resulted in 91.24 per cent supporting the changes (ICAI, 1999b).
As part of its response to the PAC findings the ICAI appointed a special investigator,
Professor Ian Percy to conduct internal inquiries. Such an inquiry is in keeping with the
new procedures introduced in December 1999. According to the ICAI, this new approach
allows complex complaints and cases involving the public interest to be investigated more
efficiently and in a very focused manner. The ``Percy Report'' was issued in December 2001
and found no evidence of any wrongdoing on the part of the auditing firms involved
(Percy, 2001).
In April 2001, the Tanaiste established the body, entitled The Irish Auditing and
Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA), on an interim basis pending new legislation.
While only three levels are reflected in Figure 3, we are trying to illustrate the notion of
levels here as opposed to being restricted to a particular number.
This is evidenced in the stalling process adopted by many of those members being
investigated by the Blayney Inquiry, which, despite having commenced in September
1997, has still to issue its report publicly.
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