Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Africa Report
November 20, 2015
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
Executive Summary
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iii
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Map of Kenya
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
Acronyms
ANC African National Congress
ASP Assembly of States Parties
AU African Union
CID
CIPEV
CODESA
CSO
DPA
EU
European Union
ECK
HD Centre
ICC
IDP
IREC
KANU
KHRC
OCPD
ODM
OP
PEV
Post-election Violence
PNU
SCCG
UN
United Nations
UNON
US
WWII
World War II
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Contents
Acronyms....................................................................................................vi
1.0 Introduction...................................................................................1
2.0 A Historical Perspective on Victimhood............................3
2.1 1991-1993 and 1997-1998 Election Violence Victims......3
2.1.1 The Nature of the Violence and the Victims....................3
2.2.0 Responses to the 1992 & 1997 Election Violence
Victims.............................................................................................10
2.2.1 The Report by the Parliamentary Select Committee to
Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other
Parts of Kenya 1992 (The Kiliku Committee)....................10
2.2.2. The Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into
Tribal Clashes(The Akiwumi Commission)........................11
2.2.3 Jesse Jackson Visits Kenya.......................................................12
2.2.4 The International Community and Western Donors........12
2.2.5. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Displaced Peoples Programme.............................................14
2.2.6 Local Level Efforts......................................................................15
3.0.0 The 2007-2008 Elections........................................................16
3.1.0 The Nature of the Violence......................................................16
3.2.0 Table of 2008-200 Post-election Violence Victims.......19
3.2.1 Responses to the Violence......................................................22
3.3.1 Operation Rudi Nyumbani.......................................................22
3.3.2 The International Community: The Power Sharing
deal...................................................................................................23
3.3.3 The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election
Violence (CIPEV). (the Waki Commission)........................25
4.0.0 The International Criminal Court...........................................27
4.1.0 The Foundation of the ICC and its Quest for
Retributive Justice......................................................................28
6.0 The ICC Approach; Retributive Justice...............................35
6.1 The ICC and Victims...................................................................36
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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1.0 Introduction
politics and the issue of grievances over land and other historical
injustices was used to spur and camouflage the real causes of the
conflicts.
Over 5,000 people have died, over 1,000,000 people have been displaced
and property destroyed in all cycles of violence. The ICC has moved to
Kenya and chosen the 2008 victims as the poster children of a cause
of retributive justice that is increasingly making the Kenyan situation
worse by deepening differences while completely ignoring the need for
a wholesome restoration of all victims of violence.
This report addresses the victims question in Kenyan politics through a
historical approach, responses by different actors to the victims and the
current approach to victims and victimhood, especially the ongoing ICC
case at The Hague and what needs to be done to effectively deal with
the complex issue of victims, historically, in the context of the politics
in which their victimhood arose, the need for restitution, peace and
reconciliation and finding a lasting solution.
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
1.1.1.
Date
Length
Cause
Damages
Lives
Lost
People Displaced
Property
destroyed
Kericho
Nov 1991
-Nov 1992
13
Months
1991-1992
12
months
Land and
Politics
Nandi
August
1991-May
Tinderet, Miteitei, 1992
Cheboigony and
Songor
10
months
Politics and
Land
12
months
Border
Conflicts,
Politics and
Land
Trans Nzoia
12
months
Land and
Politics
Extending from
Muhoroni, Kiptenden, Ainamoi
to Londiani,
Kipkelion
Nakuru
Molo, Njoro, Mau
Summit, Keringet, Olenguruone
Endebess,
Kaptam, Mount
Elgon, Kapsokwony
UASIN GISHU
Ainabkoi, Burnt
Forest
BUNGOMA
Chwele
1991-1992
30
16,000 Farms,
Homes and
Food Storage Burnt
1,000
200,000 Farms,
Homes
and Food
Storage
Burnt Cattle
Stolen
10,000 Farms
Attacked
54
40,000 Farms
Attacked
16,000 Farms,
Homes and
Food Storage Burnt
1992 4
months
Politics
18
20,000 Farms,
Homes and
Food Storage Burnt
1992 5
months
Politics
68
2,000 Farms,
Homes and
Food Storage Burnt
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
1.1.2.
Date
Length
Cause
Damages
Lives Lost
People Displaced
Property
destroyed
Laikipia
December
1997-Jan
1998
2
Months
Border
Conflicts
and Politics
18
months
Politics
500
500 Farms,
Homes and
Food Storage Burnt,
Theft of
Livestock
100,000 Farms,
Homes and
Food Storage Burnt
Cattle stolen
Narok
1997 12
months
Border
Conflicts,
Politics
27
Mombasa
1997 3
months
Land and
Politics
62
100,000 Businesses
Destroyed,
Collapse
of Tourism
industry
Kwale
1997 4
months
Politics
67
60,000 Businesses
Destroyed,
Collapse
of Tourism
Industry
Nyanza
1997 5
months
Politics
38
28,000 Farms,
Homes and
Food Storage Burnt
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Coast Province.
Akiwumi presented his report to President Moi on 19thAugust, 1999. Its
contents, however, were to remain secret until the report was finally
published by the Attorney General on 18th October, 2002.
The Akiwumi Commission had recommended that 189 people be
investigated to ascertain whether they had played any part in the tribal
clashes that occurred between 1991 and 1998.
The handling of the Akiwumi Commissions investigation, however, and
the recommendation it made call into question the validity of its inquiries
and casts serious doubts as to its being an objective and independent
body.
2.2.3 Jesse Jackson Visits Kenya
In 1998 after the Likoni violence, President Clintons Special Envoy
for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, Rev. Jesse Jackson, visited
Kenya and toured areas of the Rift Valley affected by political violence.
Rev. Jackson spoke out strongly against the violence both publicly and
in a meeting with President Moi. As a result of his urging, President Moi
visited the affected areas shortly afterwards. This was the second trip
by Rev. Jackson
The local donor representatives who met Rev. Jackson failed to publicly
spell out the nature of the violence and its links to government. They
showed little or no interest in providing assistance for the newly
displaced and the visit did little to remedy the situation of the victims
2.2.4 The International Community and Western Donors
The international community responded mainly with strategies and tools
typically used for post-conflict peace building and conflict management
phases of prevention humanitarian assistance, resettlement, and the
promotion of reconciliation14. The international community did not also
14. Stephen Brown Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring Ethnic Clashes in Kenya. From Promise to Practice:
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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13
14
15
publicized call from the altar, told his congregation at the Cathedral of
Christ the King in Nakuru that unidentified lorries and a helicopter were
transporting unknown people into the Rikia forest.21.
Church efforts at peace building and reconciliation were also highly
pronounced, with communities being brought together under the
Church, especially under the Small Church Community Groups (SCSG).
16
Coast Province and the Rift Valley and other parts of the country formed
the bedrock of PNU Support. The Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin from Nyanza,
Western Provinces and the Rift Valley with a strong migrant presence
across the country as well formed the bedrock support for the ODM.
The Muslim populated areas of Northeastern and Coast provinces also
provided a strong backing for ODM.
The violence, for the first time in the history of Kenyan political violence,
took an ethnic dimension. The ethnic groups allied to ODM were the
first to protest the election result announcement and unleash violence
in several areas across the country.23 The violence took the form of forced
displacement of people, burning down of farms, houses and businesses
allied to the opposed groups, and the rape, killing and injury of victims.
Government infrastructure was also targeted in the violence as the
President-elect was also had of government.24
On the other hand, ethnic communities allied to PNU who suffered in
the first wave of attacks regrouped and countered the violence in their
own backyards by targeting communities allied to ODM. The use of
militia groups in the violence who had largely existed before as criminal
groups, arose especially the Kikuyu-allied militia, The Mungiki25. The
violence took the form of forced displacement of people, burning down
houses and businesses allied to the opposed groups, rape, killing, injury
and the forced circumcision of men. There were allegations of police
killings as they sought to intervene in ending the violence.
Within six weeks, the violence had come to an end as power-sharing
23. Table 3.2
24. The violence in Kisumu and other towns of western Kenya started on 29 December, as a protest against
delays in the announcement of results. The next day, immediately after the ECK announcement, riots broke
out across the country, mainly in Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret (the scene of the terrible church massacre which
did more to focus and sustain international attention on the erupting crisis than anything else) and Mombasa.
Odinga supporters turned their anger on those they perceived as supporters of Kibaki, mainly members of the
Kikuyu tribe. The ferocity and speed of the violence caught many by surprise. Hundreds were killed in less than
24 hours. Houses and shops were set ablaze. Thousands began fleeing. By the second day, Kenya appeared
to be on the brink of civil war. KENYA IN CRISIS Africa Report N137 21 February 2008 International Crisis
Group.
25. Non-Kikuyu gangs such as the so-called Taliban and Baghdad Boyslargely Luo-basedand the Sabaot
Land Defence Force, the Chinkororo of Kisii origin and other previously organised criminal groups were also
responsible for some of the more organised violence.
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Area
Date
RIFT
Nandi
Hills,Nandi
North,Nandi South
VALLEY
Lives
Lost
People
Injured
People
Displaced
Property
Destroyed
508
Injured, 3
Rapes
Damages
Narok:
Songoo,
Tendwet,
Kimogor,
Nkopen, Olmekenyu
Centre, Oleshapani,
Meleleo, Ololungua
UASIN
GISHU;
Kiambaa, Langas, Juruma, Hawaya, Malime, Tarakwa, Munyaka, Kapsoya
30/12/2007
241
726
Kuresoi
16/1/2008
150
170
Rift
Naivasha District
Sotik
3/1/2008
2 60
479
26/1/2008 to
3/2/2008
84
Injured
+4 Luos
Forciby
Circumcised
45,000 1,215
Houses
Burnt
98
48
22,000
10000
3568 Buildings Burnt, 3
Chiefs Offices,
80 Schools,
2 Zonal
offices,7 Dispensaries
8,500
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Kericho
Western
Province
N y a n z a Kisumu
Province
11,250
98
From
29/12/2007 to
11/2/2008
117
256
35
Homa Bay
Rongo
Migori
Gucha
Nyamira,
Nyando,
Siaya,
Rachuonyo,
Kisii,
Bondo,
Borabu,
Suba,
Nairobi
55,862
2,886 50 GK
Vehicles
Destroyed,73
Business
Premises and
415 Residential Houses
Looted.
47
11
612
29
55
18
58
12
63
Toi Market
Burnt for
3000 traders
Central
Province
4/1/2008 to
5/3/2008
8,000
C e n t r a l Kiambaa Division
Province
1,435
2,100 12 Houses
Burnt
Githunguri
sion
Divi-
30
Kirima (Nyandarua
North)
900
19,096
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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900
5,390
Ruiru
620
Juja
600
Thika
552
Maragua
68
Kinangop
66
Karatina
193
Kikuyu
500
Thika
5,437
Kiambu East
8,164
Nyeri South
2,236
Nyeri North
3,872
Muranga North
2,503
Muranga South
2,910
Gatundu
3,452
Nyandarua South
16,800
Nyandarua North
19,605
Kirinyaga
149
Othaya
90
Coast
Province
Mombasa
24
Vehicles
Burnt,
240 Residential
Houses,240
Commercial
Houses
Burnt
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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Changamwe
Likoni
20 Shops
Broken
Into ,4
Houses
Burnt
109
10,000
22
23
and United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON), as well as the Genevabased Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre)28.
At a session held on 1st February, 2008 at the Serena Hotel, Nairobi,
the parties to the Kenyan Dialogue and Reconciliation Meeting on
the Resolution of the Political Crisis and its Root Causes, under the
chairmanship of Annan, namely Government of Kenya/PNU and the ODM
agreed on four main agenda for the talks. These were; immediate action
to stop violence and restore fundamental rights and liberties, immediate
measures to address the humanitarian crisis, promote reconciliation,
healing and restoration, how to overcome the current political crisis
and finally addressing the longstanding issues and solutions including
constitutional reform and inequalities in the country. Subsequently,
on 4th March, 2008, the parties agreed to form two commissions the
Independent Review Committee (IREC) and the Commission of Inquiry
on Post-election Violence (CIPEV). The two would be non-judicial
bodies mandated to investigate and report on different aspects of the
problematic issues in the crisis29.
After a dogged series of back-and-forth with a team of negotiators
appointed by both the PNU and ODM principals, the mediation process
seemed to make little progress with both teams digging in for their
preferred outcomes30. But on 27th February, Annan met the two principal
leaders at the Office of the President at Harambee House. Machel had
returned to South Africa, former Mkapa and his successor President
Jakaya Kikwete had come to help Annan close the deal.
After five hours, Annan had his deal; a 50/50 split of all the Cabinet
positions between the two sides and an agreement The Agreement on
the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government. This process
resulted in the draft National and Reconciliation laws that would be
28. E, Lindenmayer., J .L Kaye, A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya, IPI
August 2009
29. Kriegler and Waki Reports Summarised Version; Dialogue Africa Foundation, Revised Edition, 2009
30. The negotiation process took place in the Orchid Room at the Serena Hotel, where Kofi Annan and his
team led negotiations between PNU represented by Martha Karua, Sam Ongeri, Moses Wetangula and
Mutula Kilonzo. On the ODM side were James Orengo, Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto and Sally Kosgei
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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major recommendations as to the case for justice for the victims were
as follows:
In carrying out its TOR, the Commission had to make a crucial decision
on whether or not to name those persons alleged by various witnesses
to have perpetrated violence at some level. In the end, the Commission
recommended thorough investigation and eventual prosecution of
people alleged to have masterminded the violence in parts of the country.
These names were placed in a sealed envelope, together with supporting
evidence. Both were kept in the custody of the Panel of African Eminent
Persons, pending the establishment of a special tribunal to be set
up in accordance with the recommendations. However, in default of
setting up the Tribunal, consideration would be given by the Panel to
forward the names of alleged perpetrators to the special prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague to conduct further
investigations in accordance with the ICC statutes. The Special Tribunal
was never implemented as recommended despite two guarantees to
Kofi Annan and on 8th July 2009, Annan handed over the envelope to
Luis Moreno Ocampo.
4.0.0 The International Criminal Court
In 2005, Kenya ratifiedthe Rome Statute, the ICCs founding treaty,
giving The Hague-based court complementary jurisdiction for crimes
against humanity committed in Kenya. Complementary jurisdiction
means that the ICC can only step in if a state proves unable or unwilling
to investigate and prosecute crimes committed on its territory or by one
of its nationals.
Using this power, in July 2010 the ICC Ocampo invokedhis proprio
motu powers, for the first time ever, to request ICC judges to look into
PEV crimes. The proprio motu powers allow the prosecutor to open
Peace Betrayed:
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International Military Tribunal for the trial of those war criminals whose
offences have no particular geographical location 36The Charter of the
Tribunal granted jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, and over conspiracy to commit the crimes as
they were defined in the Charter.
In his book, The Nuremberg Trials: Last Tragedy of the Holocaust,
Ellis Washington proposes that the Framers of the United Nations and
its international legal arm, the Nuremberg Tribunal, utilized a defective
legal philosophy and jurisprudence sixty years ago where adherence
to this ineffective legal philosophy has virtually destroyed subsequent
international war crimes cases that in modern times have devolved into
symbolic show and farcical trials at The Hague.
Critics of the Nuremburg trials have called them out as a spectacle of
victors justice, mainly in the fact that the trials saw the vanquished
Nazis tried by the victorious Allies and that the standards of judgment
applied to the defeated Germans were not applied to the victorious Allies
who were also guilty of war crimes during the same conflict. Victors
justice is simply a form of vengeance that is hidden behind a curtain of
legality. It emanates from and leads to the concept of retributive justice.
Justice requires that crimes should be punishable by law.
Retributive justice requires that consequences to of crime should
be proportionate in their magnitude to the crimes. Evil incurs a
public debt that is only addressed adequately by retributive justice.
Retributive justice as argued by its proponents is one that is first and
foremost rooted in moral principle. When properly understood, it serves
society in important ways, especially by isolating individuals who are a
threat to society. It expresses social outrage at morally perverse acts; it
controls the extent to which the citizenry is victimized by criminal acts;
it rewards the perpetrator proportionately with consequences befitting
the crime; and it rehabilitates the offender by forcing him to reflect on
36. Paulson, S. L. (1975). Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 4(2), 132158. p. 137).
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Nonetheless, these population movements did not cause any largescale violent attacks before 1991. Historically, members of Kenyas forty
two ethnic groups have coexisted, traded, and intermarried, often in a
symbiotic relationship between pastoralist and agricultural communities.
The result was a peaceful coexistence that led to Kenya being branded
an island of peace in a sea of turmoil. This settlement pattern would
however later be exploited by the government of President Daniel arap
Moi in the 1991 and 1997 elections to kill the vote45 in certain regions
by ensuring perceived opposition party supporters were displaced from
their homes and therefore disenfranchising them. This would allow
KANU to retain control in the regions where it had a significant power
base.
Kenyas political history since Independence was dominated by a single
party, the Kenya African Union (KANU), for 39 years following the partys
victory in the 1963 elections; Kenya became a de facto one-party state
under President Jomo Kenyatta. Moi took office in 1978 following the
death of Kenyatta. In 1982, following a coup attempt, the Moi regime
amended the Constitution and subsequently Kenya officially became
a one-party state. Police and security forces dispersed demonstrations
against this move forcibly. Only after intense internal strife and donor
pressure did Moi allow multi-party elections to be held in 1992 and he for
the first time faced a formidable challenge at the ballot.
In order to keep power through the ballot, the Moi state manufactured
political violence in strategic areas where they could manipulate voting
patterns by displacing certain communities perceived to support the
opposition parties. While the commonly used term ethnic clashes
suggests reciprocal conflict based on tribal animosity, it belies the
overall one-sided source of the violence. The main perpetrators of the
violence were in fact to be linked to prominent leaders of the ruling
party KANU and though a few revenge attacks occurred, the victims
were overwhelmingly members of ethnic groups associated with the
45. Killing the Vote: State-Sponsored Violence and Flawed Elections in Kenya, Mwangi, Kagwanja. KHRC
1998
Peace Betrayed:
The ICC Politics of Victimhood and The Threat of Instability in Kenya
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justice that has failed to appreciate the communal and political context
the violence took place in and the need to restore the victims of the
violence.
6.0 The ICC Approach; Retributive Justice
Thambo Mbeki and Mahmood Mamdani47 argue that the logic between
current approaches of prioritizing perpetrator (individual) responsibility
are contrary to actually addressing the underlying political issues that
are communitarian in nature. They give the example of CODESA (the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa) and the way it brought
about a South Africa that addressed its huge problems coming from
the apartheid era through negotiations rather than the pursuit of
perpetrators of the grave injustices of that infamous era.
The ICC, whose form and substance is largely borrowed from the
Nuremburg Trials of World War II, is built for accountability in the exclusive
domain of a Western democracy, where the individual accountability
of the vanquished took centre stage. The application of The Haguebased ICC on conflicts that do not lend themselves to its construction
of individual perpetrator accountability and in contexts whose political
organisation, participation, determination, redress and justice are built
on completely opposed ideologies creates the huge backlash the ICC
is facing in trying to end conflicts through a court system. This conflict
has brought about serious ramifications for the Court that has at times
threatened its very existence48
This has led to the opposition by African states to the ICC that is built
around individual retribution while the context of the conflict and the
victims revolves around the regulation of relationships between opposing
groups and not the singling out of individuals within these groups for
persecution. This regulation of relationships was the hallmark of the
47. The International New York Times, Op-Ed Courts Cant End Civil Wars
48. The African National Congress (ANC) party of South Africa has been the latest body to resolve to withdraw
its country, South Africa, from the ICC. Other countries, including Kenyas Parliament, have made resolutions
to withdraw entirely from the Court
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36
37
38
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in the Kenyan case. The anti-ICC camp in the Jubilee Coalition won the
election; the ICC however continues to dig into healing wounds. It is
this splitting of victim, offender and their community from processes of
resolution that continues to further polarise the country and aggravate
the situation of victims.
Restorative justice as aprocess in post conflict situations like Kenyas
tends to be more effective. Restorative justice is concerned with
healingvictims wounds, restoring offenders to law-abiding lives,
and repairing the harm done to interpersonal relationships and the
community rather than attempting closure on harm through retribution.
American scholar Michael Umbreight explains it in a most succinct way:
Restorative justice emphasizes the importance of elevating the
role of victims and community members through more active
involvement in the justice process, holding offenders directly
accountable to the people and communities they have violated,
restoring the emotional and material losses of victims, and providing
a range of opportunities for dialogue, negotiation, and problem
solving, whenever possible, which can lead to a greater sense of
community safety, social harmony, and peace for all involved.52
Through restoration victims take an active role in directing the exchange
that takes place, as well as defining the responsibilities and obligations
of offenders. Offenders are encouraged to understand the harm they
have caused their victims and take responsibility for it. Restorative
justice aims to strengthen the community and prevent similar harm
from happening in the future.53
In order to fully and finally restore the whole gamut of victims in Kenyas
history, the following stages in the process need to be brought about:
52. M. S. Umbreit; R B Coates; B Kalanj, Victim Meets Offender: The Impact Of Restorative Justice and Mediation 1994 (Criminal Justice Press)
53. J. A. Jenkinss discussion on Types of Justice, inThe American Courts: A Procedural Approach (Jones
& Bartlett Publishers, 2011)
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