Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 1 of 20 PageID 596

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
THE ESTATE OF TROY CAUSEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIKE MILES, et al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-00914-N

ORDER
This Order addresses Defendant Terry Smiths motion to dismiss [17] and Defendant
Mike Miless motion to dismiss [19]. Because neither the Department nor Dallas ISD had
a constitutional duty to protect Causey from private harm, the Court grants both motions.
I. THE BASIS OF THE ESTATES COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Estate of Troy Causey, Jr. (the Estate) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
1983 against Smith in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Dallas County
Juvenile Department and Chief Juvenile Probation Officer for Dallas County (collectively,
the Department) and against Miles in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Dallas
Independent School District (Dallas ISD). The Estate alleges that the Department and
Dallas ISD violated Causeys constitutional rights under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by causing his death at the hands of a third party, Johnathan Turner.
A. The Events Leading to Causeys Death
The Estate relates the following chain of events in its First Amended Complaint [14].

ORDER PAGE 1

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 2 of 20 PageID 597

In 2013, the Department obtained custody of Causey and placed him at the Dallas County
Youth Village (Youth Village), a residential placement facility for juvenile offenders.
During his placement at Youth Village, Dallas ISD personnel visited Causey and recruited
him to play basketball at Wilmer-Hutchins High School. The head basketball coach for
Wilmer-Hutchins High School, John Burley, was among the staff members who visited and
recruited Causey. The Estate alleges that Burley and other Dallas ISD personnel had
unadulterated and unsupervised access to Causey and his juvenile records during this
period. Pl.s First Am. Compl. 29 [14].
After recruiting Causey, Burley and Dallas ISD set up a residence within
Dallas ISDs attendance zone and caused Causey to be registered to attend WilmerHutchins High School. Id. 32. Burley and Dallas ISD allegedly took these steps so that
Causey, a resident of Richardson Independent School District, could play sports at WilmerHutchins High School upon his release from Youth Village. The Estate alleges that Causeys
paperwork at Dallas ISD was falsified to allow the transfer and was made without parental
approval. Id. 36.
Causeys placement at Youth Village ended in April, 2013. After his release, Causey
went to live at the Dallas ISD residence that Burley had set up. Dallas ISD arranged for
another young man, Turner, to live in the same home. Like Causey, Dallas ISD recruited
Turner to play basketball at another Dallas ISD school, Madison High School. Turner was
allegedly in the Departments custody at the time of his recruitment. According to the Estate,
Causey and Turner lacked adequate supervision at the home. Id. 42.

ORDER PAGE 2

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 3 of 20 PageID 598

On March 23, 2014, a fight erupted between Causey and Turner. Turner forced
Causey to the ground and beat Causey about the head, crushing his skull. Causey suffered
severe brain damage as a result of the attack. He died of his injuries the following day.
B. Investigations Concerning Dallas ISDs Recruitment of Student Athletes
According to the Estate, Dallas ISD has a longstanding practice of recruiting student
athletes to play for schools in its district. In 2012, a [Dallas ISD] investigation found a
concerted attempt by coaches and administrators to recruit players from both within and
without [Dallas ISD] without regard to the schools to which those students were properly
zoned. Id. 12. The result was a policy and practice where anomalies and clear deviations
on [University Interscholastic League (UIL)] and other rules and regulations were routinely
disregarded. Id. 14. Such rules and regulations included Dallas ISDs own policies and
procedures, which are supposed to prevent recruiting and the placement of students like
Causey into dangerous conditions. Id. 15.
The Estate alleges that Dallas ISDs Board of Trustees (the Board) charged the
Dallas ISD Enforcement Committee (the DEC) with the implementation of its policies on
recruitment.1 The DEC, as a matter of course, approved the athletic eligibility of students
who had transferred between schools. Id. 14. Dallas ISDs Athletic Compliance Director,

In his motion to dismiss, Miles contends that the DEC to which the Estate refers is
actually the District Executive Committee, a UIL committee composed of representatives
from each school within a UIL district. See Def.s Br. in Supp. 20 n.101 [19]. For purposes
of a motion to dismiss, however, the Court must assume that all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint are true. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012).

ORDER PAGE 3

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 4 of 20 PageID 599

Anita Connally, found that DEC members made inconsistent voting decisions regarding
student eligibility matters:
[C]oaches do not vote against a [Previous Athletic Participation Form
(PAPF)] because the coaches voting on the issues could sometime in the
future get a PAPF with similar and/or questionable eligibility issues at their
campus that the coaches would have to present to the DEC for approval. In
that situation, the coach presenting the PAPF would expect a favorable vote
on their own questionable student eligibility issues because that coach had
previously voted favorably on eligibility issues for another coach.
Id. Ex. A. During one DEC meeting, Connally voiced her concerns about the authenticity
of a certain students PAPF. The Committee members voted to approve the students athletic
eligibility over Connallys objections. Connally believed that the DEC members were
unable to police themselves, and that Dallas ISD should establish an independent
compliance officer or department to rule on student eligibility matters. Id.
After Causeys death, Connally and Jeremy Liebbe, a Dallas ISD investigator, began
a fresh investigation into Causeys transfer and athletic eligibility. In his report, Liebbe
concluded that multiple Dallas ISD employees had forged Causey and Turners home
visitation documents. Dallas ISD subsequently fired both employees in response. According
to the Estate, Dallas ISD fired Connally in particular because she attempted to make
Dallas ISDs recruiting practices publicly known.
II. THE RULE 12(B)(6) STANDARD
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether
the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall,
42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). A viable complaint must include enough facts to state a

ORDER PAGE 4

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 5 of 20 PageID 600

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). To meet this facial plausibility standard, a plaintiff must plead[] factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally accepts
well-pleaded facts as true and construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a court does not
accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.
Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff must provide more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact). Id. (internal citations omitted).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court generally limits its review to the face of
the pleadings, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999).
However, a court may also consider documents outside of the pleadings if they fall within
certain limited categories. First, [a] court is permitted . . . to rely on documents
incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). Second, [a] written
document that is attached to a complaint as an exhibit is considered part of the complaint and

ORDER PAGE 5

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 6 of 20 PageID 601

may be considered in a 12(b)(6) dismissal proceeding. Ferrer, 484 F.3d at 780. Third, a
court may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are referred to in the
plaintiffs complaint and are central to the plaintiffs claim. Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC,
600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scanlan v. Tex. A & M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536
(5th Cir. 2003)). Finally, [i]n deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may
permissibly refer to matters of public record. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th
Cir. 2011) (stating, in upholding district courts dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), that
[t]he district court took appropriate judicial notice of publically available documents and
transcripts produced by the [Food and Drug Administration], which were matters of public
record directly relevant to the issue at hand).
III. THE ESTATE FAILS TO STATE CLAIMS FOR MONELL LIABILITY
Smith and Miles have each moved to dismiss the Estates complaint for failure to state
a claim. The Estate opposes the motions, arguing that the complaint successfully states
claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against both Smith and Miles. In the alternative, the Estate
argues that the Court should permit the Estate leave to amend its complaint after a period of
discovery into the Department and Dallas ISDs policies and practices. Because neither
entity had a constitutional duty to protect Causey, however, the Estates claims fail as a
matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants both motions to dismiss with prejudice and
denies the Estates request for discovery.

ORDER PAGE 6

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 7 of 20 PageID 602

A. The Court Treats the Estates Claims as Claims for Monell

Liability Against the Department and Dallas ISD
[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because the Estate sues Smith and Miles in their
official capacities, the Court treats the Estates claims as against the Department and
Dallas ISD, respectively. See, e.g., McKay v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2668007,
at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (Lindsay, J.) (treating lawsuit against Dallas ISD superintendent in
his official capacity as lawsuit against Dallas ISD).
Under 1983, a municipality or local governmental entity such as an independent
school district may be held liable only for acts for which it is actually responsible. Doe on
Behalf of Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998). [A]
municipality cannot be held liable under 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Monell
v. Dept of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, to establish the
Department and Dallas ISDs liability, the Estate must identify 1) a policymaker; 2) an
official policy; 3) and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy
or custom. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003); see also
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. For purposes of Monell liability, an official policy may consist of,
1.

A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially

adopted and promulgated by the municipalitys lawmaking officers or
by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making
authority; or

2.

A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which,

although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy,

ORDER PAGE 7

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 8 of 20 PageID 603

is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly

represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such
custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality
or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making
authority.
Johnson v. Deep East Tex. Regl Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 309 (5th
Cir. 2004). Monell liability will attach only if the alleged policy is facially unconstitutional
or if the municipality promulgated [the policy] with deliberate indifference to the known
or obvious consequences that constitutional violations would result. Piotrowski v. City of
Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bd. of Commrs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)).
B. Neither the Department nor Dallas ISD Had a
Constitutional Duty to Protect Causey
The Estate maintains that the Department and Dallas ISD violated Causeys
constitutional right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to
protect him from Turners assault. However, the Estate cannot demonstrate a violation of
Causeys constitutional rights because neither the Department nor Dallas ISD had a
constitutional duty to protect him from private violence. The due process clause forbids the
State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State
to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means. DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cty. Dept of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Generally, a States failure
to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the

ORDER PAGE 8

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 9 of 20 PageID 604

Due Process Clause. Id. at 197. And where there is no violation of the constitution or
federal law, there can be no section 1983 liability. See Leffal v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28
F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994) (To state a claim under 1983, a plaintiff must (1) allege a
violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2)
demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized one exception to this general rule of nonliability
namely, that a governmental entity may create a special relationship with a citizen that
requires the entity to protect the citizen from private harm. See Doe ex rel. Magee v.
Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 85556 (5th Cir. 2012). This exception
only applies where the entity takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will. Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199200). The Fifth Circuit has identified three
groups of individuals who have a special relationship with the government: prisoners,
persons involuntarily committed to mental institutions, and children in foster care. Id. at
856.2
Causey did not belong to any of these three groups at the time of his death. While the
Department may have had a special relationship with Causey as a result of his incarceration

In Order, September 9, 2014 [158], in Onie Jane Pena v. Dallas County Hospital
District, et al., Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-439-N (N.D. Tex. removed February 10, 2012),
this Court held that state-employed medical personnel had a special relationship with a
mental patient who had been restrained in the hospital involuntarily and against his will. See
id. 1720. As discussed below, however, neither the Department nor Dallas ISD restrained
Causey in this manner.

ORDER PAGE 9

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 10 of 20 PageID 605

at Youth Village, that special relationship ended after his release from custody. As for
Dallas ISD, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that public schools do not have a
constitutional duty to protect their students from private violence. See Covington Cty., 675
F.3d at 858. Thus, Dallas ISD did not have a special relationship with Causey purely by
virtue of his enrollment at Wilmer-Hutchins High School.
The Estate argues that Dallas ISD nonetheless had a special relationship with Causey
because he was in a de-facto foster care relationship. Pl.s First Am. Compl. 47 [14].
But to create a special relationship with a citizen, a governmental entity must, through an
established set of laws and procedures, render[] the person in its care completely unable to
provide for his or her basic needs and . . . assume[] a duty to provide for these needs.
Covington Cty., 675 F.3d at 859. The allegations in the complaint do not meet this threshold.
Although the allegations show that Dallas ISD heavily recruited Causey, they do not
demonstrate that Dallas ISD forced Causey to attend Wilmer-Hutchins High School or to live
in the residence with Turner. Rather, once Causey left the Departments custody, his parents
assumed the legal responsibility of providing him with food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety. Id. at 860. Accordingly, neither the Department nor Dallas ISD had
a special relationship with Causey requiring them to protect him from private violence. See
Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 130405 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding no special relationship
where resident student of state school for the deaf had the option to leave at will); J.D. v.
Picayune Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 2145734, at *56 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (finding school had no

ORDER PAGE 10

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 11 of 20 PageID 606

special relationship with student athlete who was free to quit baseball team or attend different
school).
Alternatively, the Estate maintains that the Department and Dallas ISD had a
constitutional duty to protect Causey because their policies placed Causey in harms way.
The Fifth Circuit has not yet adopted the state-created danger exception, but it has outlined
the contours of such a claim. See Covington Cty., 675 F.3d at 86465. In order to plead
Monell liability under the state-created danger exception, the Estate must allege that (1) the
defendants used their authority to create a dangerous environment for the plaintiff and (2)
that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plight of the plaintiff. Id. at
865. The Fifth Circuit has further held that the state-created danger theory requires a known
victim, and the fact that a schools policy or procedure presents a risk of harm to students in
general is inadequate to satisfy this requirement. Dixon v. Alcorn Cty. Sch. Dist., 2012 WL
6019053, at *3 (5th Cir. 2012). Causey was not a known victim for purposes of the statecreated danger exception because he was one of many students who allegedly faced a risk
of harm due to the Department and Dallas ISDs policies. Accordingly, even if the Fifth
Circuit were to adopt the state-created danger exception, the Estates allegations would not
meet its requirements.
Finally, the Estate contends that it has alleged a constitutional violation because the
Department and Dallas ISDs conduct shocks the conscience. However, the shocks the
conscience standard is not a separate exception to the DeShaney principle. See Covington
Cty., 675 F.3d at 868. To allow [the Estate] to proceed on a shocks the conscience theory

ORDER PAGE 11

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 12 of 20 PageID 607

without first demonstrating a constitutional duty to protect would be wholly inconsistent with
DeShaney. Id. at 869.
Neither the Department nor Dallas ISD had a constitutional duty to protect Causey
from private violence. As a result, neither entity violated Causeys constitutional rights when
they failed to protect him from Turners assault. The Estate has not explained how it can
correct this deficiency through further amendment of the pleadings. Because the Estates
section 1983 claims against the Department and Dallas ISD fail as a matter of law, the Court
denies the Estates request for leave to amend and dismisses the Estates complaint with
prejudice.
C. None of the Alleged Dallas ISD Practices
Support a Claim for Monell Liability
Even if the Estate could establish a violation of Causeys constitutional rights, the
Estates allegations against Dallas ISD nonetheless fail to state a claim for Monell liability.
The Estate presents two theories of liability against Dallas ISD. First, the Estate alleges that
Dallas ISDs practices concerning the recruitment of student athletes led to Causeys death.
Second, the Estate contends that Dallas ISD should be liable for its failure to train or
supervise its employees. The Court concludes that the Estates allegations do not support a
claim for Monell liability under either of these theories.
1. The Estate Does Not Identify Any Official Dallas ISD Policy or Custom That Was
the Moving Force Behind Causeys Death. The Estates First Amended Complaint lists
the following Dallas ISD practices that allegedly resulted in Causeys death:

ORDER PAGE 12

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 13 of 20 PageID 608

(1)

The practice among Dallas ISD employees of recruiting student athletes

while in the Departments custody;

(2)

The practice among Dallas ISD employees of placing student athletes

who had been recruited from the Departments custody in unsupervised
homes with other, dangerous recruits; and

(3)

The general practice among Dallas ISD employees of recruiting student

athletes to play for Dallas ISD schools.

None of these alleged practices supports a claim for Monell liability under section 1983.
The Estate first alleges that Dallas ISD has a long-time practice . . . [of] allow[ing]
[Dallas ISD] personnel to visit with otherwise incarcerated youth for the purpose of sports
recruiting. Pl.s First Am. Compl. 26 [14]. But the Estate points to only two student
athletes, Causey and Turner, who were in the Departments custody at the time of their
recruitment. And while the facts surrounding Causeys recruitment are relatively welldeveloped, the Estate alleges almost no details regarding the recruitment of Turner. Even if
the Court accepts the Estates position that Dallas ISD recruited both young men while they
were in the custody of the Department, [i]solated violations are not the persistent, often
repeated, constant violations, that constitute custom and policy as required for municipal
section 1983 liability. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 581 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In addition, the Estate has not alleged that Dallas ISD had actual or constructive
knowledge of this particular recruiting practice. Actual or constructive knowledge of [the
alleged] custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an
official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority. Johnson, 379 F.3d at

ORDER PAGE 13

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 14 of 20 PageID 609

309. Here, the relevant policymaker for purposes of Monell liability is the Board. See Tex.
Educ. Code 11.151(b) (providing that an independent school districts board of trustees has
the exclusive power and duty to govern and oversee the management of the public schools
of the district); Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247 (holding that state law determines whether a
policymaker has final policymaking authority). Yet the only people who allegedly knew
about the circumstances of Causey and Turners recruitment were Burley and other
unspecified staff members who visited the young men while they were in the Departments
custody.
These facts are insufficient to establish that Dallas ISD had an official policy of
recruiting student athletes from the Departments custody. To attribute Burleys knowledge
to the Board on these alleged facts would be dangerously close to holding Dallas ISD
vicariously liable for the actions of a rogue employee or two a result that courts have
repeatedly cautioned against. See Rivera, 349 F.3d at 247 (Municipal liability cannot be
sustained under a theory of respondeat superior.); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
Accordingly, to the extent the Estates allegations relate to a practice among Dallas ISD
employees of recruiting student athletes while they are in the Departments custody, this
theory of Monell liability fails.
The second alleged practice concerns Dallas ISDs placement of young and immature
students, with (albeit juvenile) violent backgrounds[,] into inadequately supervised housing,
solely for the purpose of ensuring their athletic eligibility. Pl.s First Am. Comp. 46 [14].
The Estate never specifies who placed Causey and Turner at the Dallas ISD residence, or

ORDER PAGE 14

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 15 of 20 PageID 610

whether their parents or guardians consented to the living arrangement. See id. 34 (Both
Causey and Turner were placed in the same residence . . . .); id. 40 (Causey was placed
in the home with Turner.); id. 42 (alleging Turner and Causey had been placed in the
home). The Estate also fails to specify whether either young man had a history of violence.
Thus, the Estates allegation that Dallas ISD has a custom of placing dangerous recruits in
unsupervised housing is speculative at best. Because [f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
citations omitted), this theory of liability fails as well.
Dallas ISDs third practice, according to the Estate, entails the recruitment of student
athletes to play for Dallas ISD schools. The Estates descriptions of the DECs voting
practices and the results of Connally and Liebbes internal investigations render this third
alleged practice slightly more plausible. The Court is also willing to entertain the notion that
the Board had constructive knowledge of the recruiting practice,3 as at least one internal
investigation dating back to 2012 allegedly uncovered its existence. Thus, at the motion to
dismiss stage, Dallas ISDs practice of recruiting student athletes could constitute an official
policy.

The Estate also argues that Dallas ISD had actual knowledge of its employees
recruiting practices because the Board delegated its final policymaking authority to the DEC,
which witnessed the recruiting practices first hand. However, the Estate cites no law, edict,
or other official document that either authorizes or effectuates the Boards delegation of
authority to the DEC. A federal court would not be justified in assuming that municipal
policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put
it. Rivera, 349 F.3d at 248 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly,
the allegations do not support the inference of actual knowledge on the part of Dallas ISD.

ORDER PAGE 15

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 16 of 20 PageID 611

Nevertheless, Monell liability for this policy cannot attach. In order for an official
policy to be the moving force behind a constitutional violation, there must be a direct
causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. Valle v. City
of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bd. of Commrs, 520 U.S. at 404).
The Estates allegations do not show that Dallas ISDs general policy of recruiting student
athletes to play for Dallas ISD schools directly caused Causey and Turner to reside together
in the same home, to live with inadequate supervision, or to fight and argue. In addition, the
Estate has not alleged that Dallas ISD knew its recruiting policy would endanger the life of
any student athlete; hence, the allegations fail to show that Dallas ISD acted with deliberate
indifference to Causeys rights. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 326 n.8
(5th Cir. 2002) (To act with deliberate indifference, a state actor must known of and
disregard an excessive risk to the victims health or safety. (quotation marks and citations
omitted)). Because the Estate fails to show causation and deliberate indifference, this third
alleged practice does not support a claim for Monell liability.
2. The Estate Fails to State a Claim Against Dallas ISD for Failure to Train or
Supervise. The Estate names one additional practice which allegedly resulted in Causeys
death: Dallas ISDs failure to train or supervise its employees. To plead a section 1983 claim
for failure to train or supervise, the Estate must allege that (1) the supervisor either failed
to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to
train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiffs rights; and (3) the failure to train or
supervise amounts to deliberate indifference. Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of

ORDER PAGE 16

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 17 of 20 PageID 612

North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). A municipalitys culpability for
a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). Here, the Estate alleges
that [t]here was a complete lack of training as to policy and a complete lack of enforcement
and oversight at Dallas ISD, presumably because employees failed to follow the districts
written policies prohibiting the recruitment of student athletes. Pl.s First Am. Compl. 37
[14]. However, the Estate has pled no additional facts such as a particular deficiency in
Dallas ISDs training programs or supervision with respect to this claim. Moreover, the
Estate offers no reason to assume that the employees failure to follow Dallas ISDs policies
on athletic eligibility and recruitment was the result of any failure to train or supervise. The
Estates conclusory assertions do not survive the motion to dismiss. See Ferrer, 484 F.3d
at 780 (holding that a court should not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted
factual inferences, or legal conclusions).
The Estate contends that the Court should not dismiss its section 1983 claim against
Dallas ISD until it has had an opportunity to conduct discovery on Dallas ISDs policies and
practices regarding training and supervision. Yet a failure to train or supervise will not
render a governmental entity liable for the actions of a third party absent a special
relationship between the victim and the entity. See Teague ex rel. C.R.T. v. Texas City Indep.
Sch. Dist., 386 F. Supp. 2d 893, 895 (S.D. Tex. 2005), affd 185 Fed. Appx. 355 (5th Cir.
2006). Because there was no special relationship between Dallas ISD and Causey, discovery
will not cure the Estates claim.

ORDER PAGE 17

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 18 of 20 PageID 613

D. None of the Alleged Department Customs

Can Support a Claim for Monell Liability
As with the Estates claims against Dallas ISD, the lack of any constitutional violation
in this case is fatal to the Estates section 1983 claim against the Department. Even if the
Estate could establish a constitutional violation, though, the Court still concludes that its
allegations fail to state a claim for Monell liability against the Department.
1. The Estate Does Not Identify Any Official Department Policy or Custom That
Was the Moving Force Behind Causeys Death. In its First Amended Complaint, the
Estate sets forth two Department practices that allegedly resulted in Causeys death:
(1)

The Departments custom of allowing Dallas ISD personnel to recruit

young men and women while under the Departments custody; and

(2)

The Departments custom of placing these recruits in unsupervised

homes with other recruits.

The Estates allegations regarding the Department suffer from many of the same deficiencies
affecting its allegations against Dallas ISD. First, the Estate points to only two student
athletes, Causey and Turner, who were in the Departments custody at the time of their
recruitment. Second, the Estate never specifies who placed Causey and Turner at the
Dallas ISD residence, whether their parents or guardians consented to the living arrangement,
or whether either young man had a history of violence. Accordingly, neither of these
practices could be fairly considered so common and well settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy. Johnson, 379 F.3d at 293.

ORDER PAGE 18

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 19 of 20 PageID 614

2. The Estate Fails to State a Claim Against the Department for Failure to Train
or Supervise. The Estate also alleges that the Department violated Causeys constitutional
rights through its failure to train or supervise its employees. The Estate bases this allegation
on the Department employees failure to follow the Departments own written policies
regarding access to Youth Village residents and their records when they permitted Burley to
recruit Causey. However, the Estate does not identify any particular inadequacy in the
Departments training or supervision that the Department needs to remedy. Nor does the
Estate offer any reason to assume that this alleged breach in protocol was a result of the
Departments failure to train or supervise its employees. Because the Court does not accept
conclusory allegations as true, see Ferrer, 484 F.3d at 780, the Estates assertions do not
survive the motion to dismiss.
The Estate contends that the Court should deny Smiths motion to dismiss because the
complaint shows the need for discovery on its face. Pl.s Br. in Resp. 4 [15]. However,
even if the Estate could provide more specific allegations regarding the asserted practices,
discovery would not cure the Estates failure to allege a violation of Causeys constitutional
rights. See Leffal, 28 F.3d at 525. Because the Department did not have a constitutional duty
to protect Causey from private harm, the Estates section 1983 claim fails as a matter of law.
As a result, discovery in this case would be futile.
CONCLUSION
Because neither the Department nor Dallas ISD had a constitutional duty to protect
Causey from private harm, the Estates claims fail as a matter of law. Further discovery and

ORDER PAGE 19

Case 3:15-cv-00914-N Document 28 Filed 11/19/15

Page 20 of 20 PageID 615

amendment will not correct this deficiency. Accordingly, the Court denies the Estates
request for leave to amend and dismisses the Estates complaint with prejudice.

Signed November 19, 2015.

_________________________________
David C. Godbey
United States District Judge

ORDER PAGE 20