Forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology

Bradley Richards

Attention and Seeing Objects: The Identity-crowding Debate

Bradley Richards
1. Introduction
Objects are not consciously seen in the absence of conscious attention. This is conceptually apparent.
Countability is necessary for seeing objects and sufficient for attention to them; thus, no unattended
objects are seen. I will argue for this position by focusing on the recent debate concerning the
phenomenon of identity-crowding.
In sections 2-6 I clarify Ned Blocks (2013a; 2013b; 2014) argument that objects can be seen in the
absence of attention. I will consider various challenges that have been made to his view and his attempts
to accommodate them; this discussion focuses on introspective and empirical issues. Although Block has
raised and integrated many interesting lines of empirical research with admirable philosophical acumen,
the data and arguments presented do not established his conclusion.
In section 7 I consider some conceptual arguments against seeing unattended objects. I present the
argument that de re thought is necessary for conscious seeing and sufficient for conscious attention and
consider Blocks replies to it. I then present a related conceptual argument that is based on countability. I
bolster this argument with discussion of empirical data and theories as needed. These arguments are
strong enough that they place the burden of proof on Block. The empirical studies discussed in the first
section are very important and they deepen our understanding of both attention and seeing; nevertheless
the discovery that an object is seen but unattended would require a radical revision of one or both of those
concepts. Such a revision would only be justified by very compelling evidence. Identity-crowding does
not provide compelling evidence for seeing in the absence of attention, and successful reports of identitycrowded items can be given compelling alternative explanations. Rather, there is a good standing reason
to reject the claim that objects are seen in the absence of conscious attention and any empirical claims to
the contrary must directly and compellingly address this issue.
2. A Preliminary Sketch of Blocks Argument and the Debate
Block argues that there is a special case of the phenomenon of crowding, identity-crowding, that
demonstrates seeing in the absence of attention.
Crowding occurs when stimulus items are clustered tightly enough in the periphery of the visual field that
the ability to report the items is compromised. Crowding can be understood as a function of eccentricityrelative spacing, that is, the spacing of stimulus items relative to their distance from fixation (or the point
at which foveal vision is directed) measured in degrees of visual angle (Petrov and Popple 2007; Pelli
2008). In identity-crowding stimulus items are spaced such that vision would normally be impaired, but
all the displayed items are the same type (if the stimulus is an array of letters they would all be the same
letter, all Ts or As, for example); in these conditions report of crowded items is significantly
improved. For example a display with three letter tokens of the same type (e.g., TTT) allows subject to
report the center letter, but a display with tokens of three different types (e.g., ATR) does not (figure 1).

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XTX

TTT

Figure 1. When fixating on the cross subjects are more successful at reporting the bottom
'T'. Note that this figure is merely suggestive and should not be taken as decisive evidence of even
how these displays appear to subjects since this depends on item spacing, point of fixation, and
viewing distance.

In brief, Blocks argument is that as crowded objects, identity-crowded objects are not attended.
Crowding is taken to operationally exclude attention (Block bases this on Cavanagh et al. 2001) and
identity-crowding is taken to be a true instance of crowding. Thus, if identity-crowded items are
consciously seen, objects can be consciously seen in the absence of attention. The conceptual arguments I
will consider in section 7 give us reason to resist Blocks arguments in the absence of overwhelming
evidence. Blocks challengers claim that identity-crowded items are not consciously seen. However,
given the nature of the phenomenon it is important to remember that if the display items can be seen then
it may also be possible to attended to them (they may no longer be crowded or there may be an instance
of crowding that permits attention). If we take the conceptual arguments to be sound, then either identitycrowded items are unseen or they are unattended.
This issue is not easily resolved by appeal to introspection and subjective report. The phenomenal
character of crowded experiences (including identity-crowded ones) is dynamic and elusive.1 This
character is sometimes described as a "texture" integrating features of the crowded objects (for example
Cavanagh, He, and Intriligator 1999; Intriligator and Cavanagh 2001). This elusive character and the
disagreement over the character of identity-crowding experience itself provides some reason to doubt that
the identity-crowded items are seen (though as Block intimates, this could also be due to variation in the
contexts that are crowded for different individuals (2014a)). Importantly, there is some agreement on the
conditions that are sufficient for seeing an object. Block (2013a) writes:
Since identity-crowding allows detection (i.e., distinguishing between presence and absence),
differentiation from the background, discrimination from other items and visual identification of
the itemsall consciouslyit is difficult to see a rationale for denying that one can consciously
see them. (p. 6)
He (2013b) calls these abilities (somewhat contentiously) the identity-crowding abilities. Although both
sides agree that these consciously exercised abilities are sufficient for seeing, Blocks opponents deny that
they are present in the identity-crowding experiments. Thus, the question at issue becomes what is
Blocks argument that identity-crowded items are seen, that these abilities are exercised? Further, while
1

For examples see Pelli, Palomares et al. 2004 and Lettvin 1976. Crowded experiences are also described
as "grouped textures" see Cavanagh, et al. 1999; and Intriligator and Cavanagh 2001.

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Blocks opponents believe that something like conscious detection, differentiation, and discrimination is
necessary and sufficient for at conscious seeing, it is not clear that Block agrees. Nevertheless, Block
must either demonstrate that the identity-crowded objects satisfy at least the necessary conditions on
minimal object seeing (conscious detection, differentiation, and discrimination), or successfully challenge
the apparent necessity of those conditions.
Of course, if the only explanation of a successful identification and report of an identity-crowded item
was that it was seen, then no further evidence would be required. However, Blocks critics have offered a
variety of alternate explanations which appeal to inference, unconscious perception, or some combination
of the two (Richards 2013; Taylor 2013; Tye 2014). In turn, much of Blocks argument (2013a, 2013b,
2014a) is concerned with showing that identity-crowded judgments are not merely inferential but are
conscious and perceptual in a way that involves the perception of a singular element and not a mere
texture. To this end Block employs evidence from metameres, images distorted by algorithms that appear
the same as their originals when viewed in the periphery of the visual field. He takes these to support the
claim that there is integration of features and seeing in identity-crowding, though he notes this doesnt
show that there is a singular element. Block takes this singular element to be, at least partly, unconscious.
Thus his argument gives an essential role to unconscious perception and I try to determine precisely what
that role is in section 6. I will argue that an unconscious singular element does not strengthen Block's
case. Further, Block supports his case with Freeman and Pelli (2007) and evidence from the overflow
debate (Block 2007; 2011), but I believe Freeman and Pelli (2007) actually provide evidence against
Blocks view. I claim that unconscious perception plays a role in successful reports, but does not result in
object-seeing; this view is better supported by the evidence. In sections 6 and 7 I also consider Pylyshyns
(1989; 1994; 2001) FINST visual indexing theory which can provide an unconscious singular element
consistent with Block's view. Although the theory offers a mechanism for unconscious singular elements
these only result in conscious ones when they are associated with items that are phenomenally discerned,
differentiated, and discriminated, that is, with items that are seen. Thus, this does not support conscious
object-seeing in identity-crowding.
3. Are the identity-crowded items seen?
The decisive question in the debate is whether identity-crowded items are seen despite the absence of
attention. Block appeals to the available information being consciously and visually appreciated and
writes:
To avoid the constant listing of these four abilities I will just speak of the identity-crowding
abilities, where that term is meant to specify that the abilities are conscious. (2013b 2)
Of course, Block cannot appeal to these conscious abilities; he must show that subjects have them. Since
both sides can agree that conscious detection, differentiation, discrimination, and identification are
sufficient for seeing, the dispute largely concerns whether they occur for identity-crowded items. It thus
encourages question begging to call these "identity-crowding abilities" when what is at issue is whether
they are possible in identity-crowding. So let us ask instead whether identity-crowded items are seen and
consider how Block defends the claim that they are. Note too that, although identification may not be
necessary for seeing an object, if the identity-crowded objects were to satisfy the necessary conditions for
seeing (e.g., conscious detection, differentiation, and discrimination), but were unconsciously or

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inferentially identified, then the experimental reports of identity would not be evidence that they are seen.
Thus, it is in Blocks best interest to establish that the objects are consciously identified as well.
There is an additional complication given that Block also gives an important role to unconscious
perception; this threatens to undermine his commitment to the conscious detection, differentiation,
discrimination, and identification of the identity-crowded items, but I will consider that in Section 6.
4. Inference as an Alternative
Subjects can report the identity of identity-crowded items, but it is not obvious that this is done
consciously. If the only explanation of this ability was seeing the objects (including conscious
identification), then Block would require no further argument. Likewise, if he can show that all the
alternative views are false, he will have established his conclusion. In part this is what he has attempted
(Block 2013b; 2014a). He has also tried to show that the identity-crowded objects are seen, which
challenges alternate views and directly supports his own.
Most of the alternative views appeal to inference, unconscious perception, or some combination of the
two. For example, Taylor (2013 4) argues that subjects consciously identify an attended flanker, see both
flankers and have an impression of "clutter" that indicates that there is at least one additional item, and
finally, that "the overall representation of the group of items shows congruity and uniformity". From this
they infer the identity of the middle item. They might also know from other displays that there are likely
to be three items (Tye 2014).
Tye (2014) offers another inferential account. Unlike Taylor, Tye denies the datum that subjects can
identify the middle letter in the identity-crowded letter display. He writes, "assuming you have no further
information at all about what is on the right, you cant identify the middle T" (Tye 2014 6; figure 1). In
this case Tye thinks it is only if subjects are primed by previous trials or asked leading questions (What is
the middle letter?) that they will report a third 'T' or that they will report three items at all on the right
unattended side of the display. When it comes to some of the other identity-crowded displays such as the
array of vertical lines (Figure 2), Tye emphasizes the collective character of the experience. One sees that
the group of lines is black, but one does not see that the sixth line is black. One can infer that the 6th line
is black from one's direct experiential knowledge that the lines collectively are black.2

Figure 2. Permission required from Intriligator and Cavanagh (2001): JohnWiley & Sons, Inc.
2

For a contrasting view see Dretske (2007).

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Tye (2014 4) continues: "The fact that the lines are differentiated in ones experience does not show that
each individual line is." One perceives the lines as distinct from one another, but it does not follow that
one perceptually differentiates each line; that too could be inferred from the collective property. In
contrast, Block writes that the lines are differentiated in ones experience from the background. One can
see the white space in between the items (2012a, 8). However, Tyes collective experience claim applies
here too: experiencing the white spaces does not support individuation of the white spaces (Tye 2014;
Richards 2013). For now it is enough to note that when one cannot attended to the bars certain mental
acts, such as counting, and mentally pointing are prevented. While Tye and I argue that this prevents
experience of the individual bars and spaces, Block insists they are seen.
Like Tye and Taylor, I allow a role for inference, but I emphasize the role of unconscious perception in
identity-crowding. Identity-crowded items, like other crowded items, present as jumbled textures; some
features are generically discernible, but it is not possible to consciously detect, differentiate, discriminate,
and identify the items, so some combination of inference and unconscious features must explain the
successful judgments. I also offer an explanation for phenomenology associated with successful
judgments that may go beyond what is seen, and that is consistent with the other views.
When crowded items are successfully identified using inference, unconscious perception, or some
combination of the two, the subject may have phenomenology in addition to their texture perception or
the generic attribution of properties to an array. Specifically, they may have phenomenology, either
sensory or non-sensory, accompanying their thoughts about a third item (say the middle T), even though
the T is not consciously individuated. Similar experiences have been posited to explain correlations
between visibility ratings and successful reports in blindsighted subjects (Brogaard, 2011; 2012). This
would increase the likelihood that, given the elusive and dynamic nature of the perceptual experience, the
subject would report phenomenal experience of a middle item, say a T. And they would be right
(providing they didnt specify that they had visual perceptual experience of a T).3
5. Against mere inference and unconscious perception
Block allows inference and unconscious perception to play a role in identity-crowding. He writes:
To be clear: I do not deny that part of the explanation of subjects abilities are as Taylor and
Richards claim. Rather my point is that the explanation at least in some cases of the subjects
abilities involves conscious perception of identity-crowded objects. (2013b 3)
It is not clear what role Block thinks inference and unconscious perception should play, but whatever it is,
the centre item must be consciously seen for the argument to succeed; thus, inference and unconscious
perception alone cannot be sufficient for successful reports of identity-crowded items (or if they are
sufficient there must be another reason to doubt they are the basis of the reports).
One argument Block offers against inference employs Petrov and Popple (2007):

I am not committed to the view endorsed by Graham, Horgan, and Tienson (2007) that there is nonsensory propositional phenomenology inseparable from the intentional content of a given propositional
attitude state such that a subject has a phenomenal state P iff they have intentional state I (Bailey &
Richards 2014).
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One particularly dramatic result was that subjects were 96% correct if all the items slanted right (/
/ /), but only 53% correct if the middle item pointed in the opposite direction (/ \ /). The fine
structure of the results of this experiment suggests that subjects success in identity crowding is
genuinely perceptual and not just a cognitive inference from the look of uniformity and
identification of the flankers. For there are considerable asymmetries between left and right tilts
that only can be explained perceptually. (2013a 6)
The idea here is that inference is not enough to account for the higher success rate with the uniform
stimulus / / / versus the flanker-identical / \ /. This is only an argument against an inference view. It is
clear that inference from flankers alone would not be sufficient to explain this difference, but inference
from flankers and uniformity? The first array (/ / /) would appear more uniform and make judgments
easier; the second offers conflicting inferential data - the flankers are the same but it appears less-thanperfectly uniform, but still might have predominantly right-tilting phenomenology. And there are other
possible inferential views. This strategy also does little to address views on which unconscious perception
is used in conjunction with inference.
Block (2012b) emphasizes the idea that identity-crowding may permit the binding of features to objects
where crowding does not. This happens despite the fact that more than one object falls within a window
of integration, the minimal area within which features can usually be bound to an individual object.
However, it is not obvious that binding in this case would result in conscious experience of the center
item rather than a texture with the feature. Importantly, the decisive case is the one in which the items
displayed are below the grain of attention and therefore cannot be attended; it is thus tempting to assume
the features are merely attributed to the textures in the relevant area.
Block also employs metameres, algorithmically transformed, or texturized, images that are physically
distinct from their originals, but appear identical, or nearly identical, when viewed peripherally (see
Figure 3).4 Interestingly, some metamere producing algorithms that distort most images have very little
effect on certain regular repeating patterns. When informally tested on an identity-crowded array (TTT)
by Rosenholtz, with a variety of random noise 'seeds' and images as input, these algorithms often
(depending on the seed) produced images in which all Ts remained identifiable.

See Portilla and Simoncelli (2000); Balas, Nakano, and Rosenholtz (2009); Rosenholtz, Huang, and
Ehinger (2012).
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Figure 3. Original images (above) and their texturized counterparts. Permission required from Portilla
and Simoncelli (2000): Springer.
I have argued that metameres are not good indicators of peripheral character (Richards ms.). First, if they
are identical to peripheral experience of their original image they are uninformative. Second, viewing
these images foveally does not produce an experience like the dynamic, distorted, low-resolution
peripheral experience. Third, there are many such possible metameres that are uniquely distinct from the
original image, and many possible corresponding algorithms. Thus, metameres in general are not good
evidence of the character of peripheral experience. Finally, it is not possible to identify the specific set of
algorithms or processes responsible for the actual peripheral experience in subjects, or some subject,
without first knowing the character of their peripheral experience in identity-crowding; however,
metameres were introduced to illuminate the elusive character of these experiences. Further, an additional
strategy (such as the metamere strategy) was needed since more general facts about perception, such as
the eccentricity-relative size of windows of integration, dont settle the character of the experience on
their own.
It is important that Block (2013b) only intends metameres to support feature integration and the
perception of the relevant features, not the perception of individuals with those features. He says:
The points made so far falls short of showing that one actually sees the middle T as opposed to
a merely multiply-T-ish texture. Every percept is constituted by a perceptual attributive that
represents an attributeand a singular elementthat represents an individual (Burge 2010).
However, I have not yet given any argument that our perception of the middle T involves such a
singular element. (Block 2013b, 8)

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Here Block employs Burges claim that every perceptual experience has an attributive and a singular
element (Burge 2009b). The attributive element attributes kinds, properties, or relations, to particulars
(Burge 2009a, 287). The attributive element alone is not sufficient to explain the reference to a particular.
Rather, the singular element is responsible for the perceptual representation being about the particular(s)
that caused it (Burge 2009b, 307). It is a context-bound, perceptually-based, singular reference that aims
at particulars or individuals, and, when successful, refers to them. Thus, in vision, this will involve
visually discerning the relevant particular, and representing that it has some attribute.
Block believes that metameres establish that there is feature integration in identity-crowding, and that
features are perceptually represented, but not that they are represented as belonging to particulars or
individuals. The singular element is most obviously necessary here so that crowded items can be seen as
distinct, and have properties attributed to them individually (though Burge (2009b) notes that the singular
element also ensures that the experience does not represent some other qualitatively identical scene (or
perhaps item)).
6. Unconscious seeing
Freeman and Pellis (2007) experimental design follows Lammes (2003) change blindness paradigm, but
with the addition of several types of crowded displays. Subjects are presented with an array of letters
peripheral to the point of fixation for 500 milliseconds; they are presented a second array of letters after a
1600ms delay and asked to report whether any of the letters have changed. A change occurs half the time.
In one condition, subjects are cued to the location where the change will occur if there is one. The cue is a
dot that appears after an 800 millisecond delay (Figure 4). Block takes these experiments to provide
evidence of the singular element required for object-seeing:
Features must be bound at least to a location in order to be spatially cued and the fact that
performance did not depend on whether the letters are crowded or not suggests the processes are
the same, and the uncrowded case is almost certainly object-perception. To summarize, there is
reason to believe that the singular element required for seeing obtains in identity-crowding but the
issue deserves further consideration. (Block 2013b, 8)5

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Figure 4. An example of an uncrowded (a), and a crowded (b), change detection task from Freeman and
Pelli (2007). This diagram shows only the cued condition. Permission required from Freeman and
Pelli (2007): the Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology.
I tend to agree that the features must be bound to a location or indexed in some way to explain the success
in both the crowded and uncrowded case (and this may provide an unconscious singular element, as
Block claims). What is less clear is that the two cases are similar in other respects, whether for example,
there is phenomenal experience of all the specific letters in both cases. In either case there are more items
presented than can be attended or held in short-term memory. Thus, we might posit that there is
phenomenal overflow in these cases as Block (2007; 2011) does for Lamme (2003). That would mean
that before the cue there is phenomenal experience of all the specific letters presented. Even if that were
true for the uncrowded case, there is good reason to believe that it would not be true for the crowded case:
conscious object identification is affected by crowding. Thus, it does not seem that these two conditions
would be the same with respect to conscious object experience, assuming overflow.
On the other hand, if we assume there is merely generic or texture perception and no overflow, it remains
true that the character of the conscious experience of the two displays is different, and for the same
reason: crowding affects phenomenal consciousness.6 This is borne out by the experimental details;
subjects in Freeman and Pelli's (2007) experiments are worse at identification of crowded initial stimuli
when cued despite the success rate for change reports (40% for uncrowded letters and under 20% for
highly crowded letters, versus 80% success at change reports). Thus, since there is no overflow in
crowded conditions, whether or not there is overflow in other cases, overflow cannot explain the
successful change reports here. Insofar as these reports require specific representations, this provides a
reason to think they are unconscious. Unlike Lamme (2003), Freeman and Pelli (2007) provide a reason
6

For discussion of generic overflow and unconscious content as an explanation of Sperling (1969) and
Lamme (2003) see, for example, Byrne et al. (2007), Grush (2007), Levine (2007), Naccache & Dehaene
(2007), and Sergent & Rees (2007).
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to think that unconscious change detection occurs and overflow of specific content does not. Thus,
Freeman and Pelli (2007) provide evidence against Blocks overflow view (2007; 2011; 2014b).
Further, this seems to undermine Blocks argument from identity-crowding.7 If the singular element is
unconscious, then the items are not consciously identified, detected, differentiated, or discriminated.
Notwithstanding, Block endorses the idea that this contribution is unconscious:
Since unconscious seeing is still seeing, seeing an individual item is compatible with failure of
object-based attention to it. So the Freeman and Pelli experiment shows that there can be seeing
an objecteven if unconscious seeingwithout attention to that object. (Block 2013a, 11)
Tye finds Blocks employment of Freeman and Pelli (2007) in this unconscious role perplexing:
Block asserts that in the Freeman and Pelli experiment the seeing of the crowded item after the
initial display is removed but prior to the application of the cue is unconscious. So, how is it
germane to what is at issue? (2014 3, footnote)
However, Blocks (2014) reply to Tyes paper is able to shed some light on this subject:
I described work by Freeman and Pelli that showed the presence of the singular element in
crowded vision, even if in part in unconscious seeing. I argued that the conscious percept could
single an item out even if that singling out was in part unconscious. This is the most controversial
step in my argument but is not raised explicitly by Tye. (3, my italics)
As I have just indicated Tye does raise the role of Freeman and Pelli in Blocks argument, but Block is
correct that he doesnt raise it as a step in the argument Block has presented, nor does he consider how an
unconscious singular element might support conscious singling-out. This passage clarifies the role that
Block sees for the unconscious contribution here. Block claims Freeman and Pelli provide evidence of the
unconscious singling-out of crowded items, and that unconscious singling-out somehow makes the
conscious percept count-as singling the item out. I use the phrase count-as to indicate that it is not
obvious that Block is committed to the singling-out being conscious; this is ambiguous. The evidence
from Freeman and Pelli (2007) supports unconscious singling-out, and as I have argued, there is good
reason to think that conscious identification fails in the same experimental context. Thus, unconscious
singling-out is not accompanied by conscious singling-out in that case (that is, there is no corresponding
single conscious percept). That said, I will consider two interpretations of Blocks strategy here.
First, Block may mean that the unconscious contribution leads to phenomenal consciousness of a singular
element (to the object being detected, differentiated discriminated, phenomenally). Block (2013a)
provides the example of a Kanizsa rectangle intended to illustrate how this could happen (figure 3).

For a different argument for this conclusion about Freeman and Pelli (2007), see (Richards ms.).
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Figure 5. permission needed from Vuilleumier and Landis (1998): NeuroReport.

The inducer shapes lead normal perceivers to see a rectangle; interestingly, neglect patients who cannot
see the inducers on the left side still see the rectangle (Vuillemier and Landis 1998). Block takes this to
show that conscious and unconscious perception can be integrated into a single percept (2013a 13). I
agree that unconscious information can contribute to conscious experience, but in this illustration the
objects that are unconsciously singled-out are not the same as those that are consciously singled-out. In
the neglect patients the left inducers seem to be unconsciously singled-out and yet are not consciously
seen; the rectangle is both consciously singled-out and seen. Thus, assuming the identity-crowded letters
are unconsciously singled-out, the question becomes, are they consciously singled-out? We have seen that
Freeman and Pelli (2007) suggests no. Thus, this strategy leaves us precisely where we began, wondering
whether the crowded items are consciously seen. On this interpretation of Blocks employment of the
unconscious singular element, seeing still requires phenomenally conscious detection, differentiation, and
discernment, but that requirement is not satisfied.
On the second interpretation of Blocks strategy there is an unconscious singular element and conscious
texture perception. It is hard to see how conscious detection, differentiation, discernment, and
identification occurs on this interpretation. Intuitively, in this case, the singular element is not conscious,
and the crowded items are not consciously individuated. We might think Block is intentionally endorsing
a position according to which object-seeing doesnt necessitate a conscious singular element, nor
conscious individuation, but this would contradict his commitment to conscious detection, discrimination,
differentiation, and identification of individual objects (if there is no consciously experienced individual,
then none of these happens consciously).8 Thus, I will proceed as if Block intends to make conscious
texture perception with an unconscious singular element consistent with conscious item individuation.
Consider the following passage:
[m]aybe a texture can be letterish but can it be A-ish or Times-Roman-A-ish? If one allows such
detailed textures, it is not clear that there is any incompatibility between seeing textures and
seeing objects that compose them. One can see an object and at the same time see it as fitting into
a pattern that includes other objects. (2013 7)

Block probably intends the first interpretation (the unconscious singular element leads to conscious
singling out), but I will consider the second interpretation for the sake of completeness.
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This passage endorses the claim that it is possible to see an object while seeing a texture it contributes to.9
This seems true; one might see an individual goose while seeing a gaggle-texture. However, Block needs
the stronger claim that subjects do see objects by seeing textures in identity-crowding. This would be
supported by the necessity claim: one must see individual geese while seeing a gaggle-texture. But that
claim is false.10 Block may think that although it is not necessary, the unconscious singular element is
what makes it the case that individual items are seen while seeing the texture in identity-crowding.
However, it is unclear how this would be defended on the basis of mere texture perception without appeal
to conscious singling-out. The idea of an unconscious singular element and no conscious one, mere
texture perception, is hard to understand, and section 7 will make it clear why.11
To summarize, Blocks argument depends on unconscious perception to provide the singular element
necessary for seeing identity-crowded objects. While an unconscious element could contribute to
conscious individuation and identification, it doesnt seem to in identity-crowding, and it certainly doesnt
advance the case that conscious detection, differentiation, discernment, and identification occurs. Further,
the example Block offers from Vuillemier and Landis (1998) shows that unconscious singular elements
dont entail the same conscious singular elements, and when they do contribute to conscious seeing there
is conscious individuation of the relevant item. An unconscious singular element that doesn't contribute to
conscious individuation is even less promising. It is interesting that Block, like me, actually gives
unconscious perception an important role in his theory; the difference is that Block thinks this somehow
supports conscious object seeing, but given the nature of these experiences, it is not clear how it could.
7. Conceptual arguments against seeing without attention
7.1 The argument from de re thought potential
The conceptual argument foregrounded in the identity-crowding debate focuses on de re thought.12 Tye
claims that it must be possible to ask Whats that? with respect to any object that is seen, and that that
ability requires attention, or the ability to attend (Tye 2010; 2014). If one can ask Whats that? of a
visually presented object, it can be the subject of de re thought, and is seen; if one cannot ask Whats
that? of a visually presented object, it cannot be thought about de re and it is not seen.
Intuitively, and roughly, de re thoughts (or perceptions) bear direct relations to their objects that enable
the direct attribution of properties to them.13 We can understand the potential for de re thought about a
visually presented object, and why it might be necessary for seeing, by considering an example. Tye
(2014) gives the example of a moth perfectly camouflaged against a tree. In this case it is not possible to
9

Taylor discusses this passage arguing that such detailed textures are not needed for his inference view.
Further, he thinks it is question begging to claim objects are seen in textures since one of the main
contentions of the texture view is that we can see a group and some of their features collectively without
seeing the individuals (2013 6).
10
See Richards (2013 8) for a more detailed consideration.
11
The FINST visual indexing theory (Pylyshyn 1989; 1994; 2001) offers a possible mechanism for
unconscious singular elements, but it is unable to address the concerns expressed here (see section 7.2).
12
For similar arguments see Siegel (2006), Dretske (2007; 2010), Peacock (1981), and Tye (2009; 2010).
13
De re (literally about the thing) sentences are often understood semantically as ones that allow the
substitution of co-referring or co-designating terms while preserving the truth of the sentence. Sentences
that do not allow these substitutions are de dicto (literally about what is said).
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ask Whats that? of the moth, and consequently the moth is not seen. In contrast, if one views the moth
through a distorting glass one can ask, Whats that?, one can have de re thoughts about the moth, and it
is seen, though indistinctly. In this case one can think about that thing directly. Perception affords an
opportunity to directly think about objects (for example, by employing demonstratives like that), rather
than thinking indirectly about them (for example as the insect on the tree in front of me, where that
refers to the perfectly camouflaged insect (the moth) that you have been told is there).
Block presents Tyes argument in his reply:
Tye argues from the premises that (1) conscious seeing requires de re thought potential and (2) de
re thought requires attention to the conclusion that conscious seeing requires attention potential.
(2014 1)
Against (1) Block argues that we cant exclude the possibility of conscious, seeing creatures that lack
thought (and therefore the capacity for de re thought) a priori. He mentions that
jumping spiders (genus Portia) can identify and stalk their prey (Burge 2010, pp.514517) and
these abilities involve a perceptual analog of a linguistic demonstrative or indexical that serves to
track the prey and as a context-bound locus of binding together properties such as size and
shape that allow for identification of the prey. Jumping spiders can see but there is room for doubt
about whether jumping spiders have any capacity for thought or judgment, including de re
thought or judgment. (2014 1)
It is not obvious that there is a conscious creature with these hunting abilities that doesnt think at all, but
as Block claims, the possibility is not obviously excluded a priori. More importantly, whether or not there
is thought in this case, what Block and Burge have shown is that the conditions that would permit the
spider to have de re thought about an object, were it a conscious thinking creature, are met. We can
isolate perceptual properties that make de re thought about an object possible; these properties give these
creatures de re thought potential. Creatures that lack these perceptual abilities simpliciter, or with respect
to a certain object will not be able to see. Block claims that counterfactuals about adding cognitive
capacities to creatures with these abilities are too obscure to be informative (Block 2014 1). I disagree,
and I will further motivate my case with an analogy.
Suppose I want to view a flea with a light microscope and I know that I need 40x magnification for the
desired image (say an image similar to the one Hooke illustrated in Micrographia (1665)). I acquire a
microscope capable of 40x magnification, but the lamp needs replacing. I cannot view the flea, yet it is
perfectly intelligible to say that I have satisfied one condition necessary for attaining the desired image: a
microscope with a 40x lens (or combination of lenses). If that microscope were to have a functioning
lamp, it would produce the desired image. The microscope has Hooke-image potential. If the lamp is
replaced it satisfies yet another condition for producing the desired image, but to produce the image the
lamp must also be turned on. By analogy, the spider has the correct lens combination (tracking ability
etc.), but lacks a lamp (conscious experience and possibly thought). If the spider acquired conscious
experience and thought, it would have de re thought potential (and if it thought about the prey it tracked,
it would have de re thoughts. At that point the lamp is on). The actual unaltered spider is closer to
having de re thoughts then say a nematode (who we will assume lacks both the relevant perceptual
abilities and conscious experience). I find this quite intelligible because, as with the microscope and

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magnification, we have a good grasp of the kinds of perceptual abilities that are required for de re thought
and their role in seeing. Further, and for the same reason, the reference to thought potential is inessential
to Tyes argument; the de re argument could be recast in terms of the perceptual de re capacities that
convince Burge and Block that jumping spiders see; the employment of these too requires attention. This
argument will succeed whether or not there are actual cases of these perceptual abilities without thought.
The second premise in the argument from de re thought potential as Block expresses it is: (2) de re
thought requires attention. Block (2014 2) challenges this premise with an illustration (figure 4).

Figure 6. permission needed from Marisa Carrasco.

The idea is that we fixate on the small square, roughly in middle of two patches, and attend, without
moving the eyes, to the patch on the left. Block thinks that the patch on the right can still be seen although
it is unattended. This is contentious: first, it is not obvious that the unattended right patch is seen.
Anecdotally, I find that when I really fixate on the little black square and then try to attend to the left
patch they sometimes both disappear! Second, the right patch may well be attended despite efforts to the
contrary. Trying to see the right patch may well allocate some attention to it. Again, anecdotally, when I
check whether I can see the right patch it feels as if I am allocating attention to the right patch. Further, if
one does succeed in asking whats that? without attention, what is the question asked of? It may be
directed at a spatial area the boundary of which is attended, but it is not clear that any object in that area is
attended. In that case there is nothing that is seen but unattended (see Mole (2008) for a similar
argument). It is worth noting that the object meant to be seen here, the patch, is a kind of texture, so in
this case attention to the texture is attention to the object and there is nothing to prevent it.
7.2 The argument from countability
Can one see an object without attending to it in identity-crowding or any other context? There are a
variety of things one might mean by see. Block clearly believes that identity-crowded objects are seen
in a very strong sense; he claims they are consciously detected, differentiated, discriminated, and
identified. Here I will argue that to be seen an object must be countable, and the relevant notion of seeing
requires at least detection, differentiation, and discrimination. It is this kind of seeing of objects in the

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absence of attention that would be surprising, and to which Block seems committed. Any weaker sense of
seeing is not personal; the object is not apparent to the subject. Thus, it would be less surprising if weaker
senses of seeing proceeded independently of attention; for example, neither, receiving subpersonal level
information from an object, nor consciously seeing properties of an object without separating the object
from its background (recall Tyes example of the perfectly camouflaged moth), seem to require attention
to the same degree.
The countability argument focuses on the relation of attention and seeing to countability. Specifically,
countability is sufficient for conscious attention and necessary for seeing; thus, no unattended objects are
seen. In other words, object-seeing (of the relevant kind) implies countability, and object-countability
implies object-attention, so if an object is seen it is attended, and if an object is not attended it is not seen.
Uncountability entails a failure to individuate which entails a failure to identify individuals. The relevant
concept of seeing requires that objects be detected, differentiated, and discriminated, and that makes them
countable by normal adult humans. Thus, countability is necessary for conscious object seeing.
Is countability really logically necessary for seeing objects? Beings that see but cant count certainly seem
conceivable and even actual. Nevertheless, in both cases, if an object is consciously seen the conditions
for counting are met, specifically the object is consciously detected, discriminated, and differentiated, and
if the subject has the capacity to count the object will be countable by them. Not all those who can see can
count, yet any object that is seen is countable by one who can. Thus, if a perceived object o is countable,
then it satisfies the necessary conditions for counting consciously visually perceived objects in beings that
are counters.
This mirrors my discussion of the jumping spiders and de re thought in section 5.1. Like Burge and
Block, we can have some confidence in attributing de re perceptual representations of objects to jumping
spiders because they appear to satisfy various conditions on de re representation; moreover, when a
conscious thinking being has experiences of this kind, it sees the represented objects. Further, when an
object is seen, it will be countable, partly because it satisfies these conditions on de re representation. This
follows from the minimal concept of an object as being unified or a unit, an individual; a visually
apparent distinct unit, just is something countable. Being a visual unit in the relevant sense is necessary
and sufficient for detection, differentiation, and discrimination (for seeing), and for countability. If
experience presents a unit, an individual, it is countable; if it presents a countable object, then it presents a
unit. That is enough to know that if an experience presents objects, then if that experience were had by a
counter, the objects would be countable. Here the idea of seeing individuals, or units, (which was
important in the de re argument) is doing a lot of work, though we need not appeal to the notion of de re
thought or representation. Seeing an object implies seeing an individual, which implies countability.
It is also important to distinguish between counting and subitizing. By counting I mean the familiar
process of enumerating objects one at a time, though not necessarily verbally; this can be understood as
establishing cardinality by pairing objects with numerals or other markers. In contrast, subitizing is a
much faster process of enumerating small numbers of items, usually four or less, without counting.14
When I say that an object o presented by an experience E is countable I mean the former, familiar notion
of enumeration. More specifically, given an experience E, an object o is countable on the basis of E if o
could be counted in E given the character of E at t. Lets call this being E-countable. Nevertheless,
14

At least subitizing is usually taken to be distinct from counting, but we will see that it may not be.
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counting occurs over time and in counting we usually move our attention, at least the focus of our
attention, from one object to the next.15 The suggestion here is that if we take E at t, E, as it is without a
change of attention, would permit the counting of certain items; those items are E-countable.16
Accordingly, the entire argument can be stated:
Countability Argument (I)
Background assumption: If an object o is seen by a subject S at t, then o is detected,
differentiated, and discriminated by S at t.
1. If o is seen by S at t, then o is E-countable by S.
2. If o is E-countable by S, then o is attended by S at t.
Thus, if o is seen by S at t, o is attended by S at t. 17

I think (2) is the less controversial premise. Nevertheless, while it is evident that counting requires
attention, it is not obvious that countability does. Importantly, that is not at issue; premise (2) claims that
attention is necessary for E-countability, and recall that an object o is E-countable if o can be counted in
E, given the character of E at t, without a change of attention. Thus, since it is evident that counting
requires attention, being E-countable requires being attended.
There is a possible objection to this argument from subitizing. The objection requires that objects are seen
and subitized but are not E-countable (a denial of the first premise), and that subitization does not require
attention. Such objects are seen but not attended. I find this scenario implausible since when objects are
consciously subitized the conditions for E-countability are met (that is subitizing implies E-countability).
Further, it is important to emphasize that if the first premise of Countability Argument (I) is true, then the
relationship between subitization and attention is of no consequence for the argument: seeing implies E-

15

In fact an operational definition of the minimum grain of attention involves moving from one object to
another (Cavanagh 2001).
16
This distinction is important because there are also broader senses of countability: for example, items
that are crowded in the periphery are countable in the sense that if one were to fixate on them, making
them attendable, it would be possible to count them. When a flock is seen, but the birds composing it are
not, they still affect the phenomenology of the experience; in that extensional sense the objects (birds)
that contribute to the experience are countable. If the worldly birds were detected, differentiated, and
discriminated, they would be countable.
17
It is also possible to make this argument using a broader notion of countability that implies attention
potential (in similar fashion to Tyes de re argument) from which it is possible to conclude that no objects
that are unattendable are seen. The conclusion that if an object is seen it is attendable (no unattendable
objects are seen) is sufficient to show that identity-crowding is not an instance of object-seeing without
attention.

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Bradley Richards

countability, which implies attention. Thus, the conclusion is not affected by whether a particular
experience is subitized.
In the unlikely event that premise (1) is false because in some cases objects that are seen are subitized and
are not E-countable, I offer the second argument:
Countability Argument (II)
1a. If o is seen by S at t, then o is E-countable or subitized by S at t.
2. If o is E-countable by S, then o is attended by S at t.
3. If o is subitized by S at t, then o is attended by S at t.
Thus, if o is seen by S at t, o is attended by S at t.
Intuitively, (3) seems true. In a subitized array, say of three objects, it seems one selects and enhances,
that is attends to, all three objects. One may focus on or enquire about properties the three objects share.
This intuition has been challenged. Trick and Pylyshyn (1994) argue that subitizing is a preattentive
process. However, they write when we refer to attention we are simply referring to analyses that occur in
one location at a time. This is ambiguous since locations can be of varying sizes, yet, in the context of
subitizing, the intention seems to be analyses that occur at the location of one object at a time. By
definition subitizing (for more than one object) does not occur with analysis of only one object-location;
thus, Trick and Pylyshyn (1994) are correct that subitizing does not require this kind of attention, but it is
equally obvious that there is attention to all subitized objects in some other sense. All these objects are
selected. There is a limit on the number of objects that can be selected in this fashion; that is, subitizing
usually applies to a maximum of four objects, and these objects can be enhanced and operated upon or
associated with properties. They are available for operations that other early processing does not permit.
In short, these items are attended.
Pylyshyns (1989; 1994; 2001) FINST visual indexing theory employed by Trick and Pylyshyn (1994) to
explain subitizing makes this even clearer. According to the visual indexing theory, objects (or feature
clusters) are assigned tokens by a bottom-up process. The objects are selected, marked as distinct, and
given historical continuity (this is important for tracking moving objects). Once objects are assigned
tokens visual search is not required to access them, properties are not required to distinguish them, and
motor movements and programs can employ them. Subitizing is a purposefully initiated process in which
the indices or tokens for the indexed objects are associated with or mapped to numerals. Although, the
objects are indexed in parallel (so the process is fast), the enumeration proceeds serially (so it takes longer
to subitizes larger groups than smaller ones).
It is interesting that according to Pylyshyns indexing theory, indexing and many subsequent operations
on objects can proceed in a parallel, automatic, and unconscious fashion. Subitizing is not taken to be
such a case, yet the theory provides a mechanism according to which objects are represented
independently of phenomenal properties. This theory can provide the kind of unconscious singular
element that Block posits (though it seems antithetical to the close relationship between the attributive
and singular element in perception that Burge outlines). Although these indices can operate
unconsciously, as presumably they do in action (see Milner and Goodale (2008) for example), they are

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Bradley Richards

often used to attribute phenomenal properties - color, shape, location in the visual field. As I claimed in
my discussion of Block, the instances of attributing conscious properties to distinct objects are instances
in which the (potentially) unconscious singular element results in a conscious one. The same reasoning
applies in this case: if the items are consciously subitized, each item is consciously individuated. 18
Although, the first steps of this process are taken to be preattentive and parallel, it is clear that subitizing
is limited to a small number of objects (four), according to the index theory this is because of the limited
number of tokens. Early processing that contributes to subitizing may be unlimited, but clearly subitizing
is not. Rather, it involves a selection and enhancement process, a form of attention.
There is empirical support for these claims. Several theorists have claimed that conscious report relies on
attentional selection, so at least the report of the number of subitized objects requires attention (Lamme,
2003, Mack and Rock, 1998 and Wolfe, 1999). Further, Ralio et al. (2008) use inattentional blindness
paradigms to limit attentional resources during subitizing. Only numbers one and two could be
enumerated with minimal attention available, and increased attentional resources improved accuracy for
all numbers of items. Further, reaction times between one and two items (20ms), two and three items
(50ms), and three and four items (100-200) (Dehaene & Cohen, 1994), suggest that resources are stressed
by increased load. Finally, Balakrishnan and Ashby (1991) and Balakrishnan (1992) have argued that the
continuous non-linear growth of enumeration times undermines the division between counting and
subitizing.
To summarize, when an object is seen, it is E-countable by a being that can count, but this does not mean
that all beings that can see objects can count. Further, both E-countability and subitizing require attention,
as has been argued and supported empirically. Thus, if an object is seen, it is attended.
Does the argument from countability improve on the argument from de re thought? I find both
compelling, and I have defended the argument from de re thought (section 7.1). I also make a similar
argument focusing on demonstration (2012). The appeal of the countability argument is that the necessity
of attention for counting (or E-countability) is more apparent than that of attention for de re thought. It
may also be clear that something is countable on the basis of an experience even if it is unclear whether it
is de re thinkable.
8. Conclusion
There is reason to doubt that objects are consciously detected, differentiated, discriminated, and identified
in identity-crowding, and given the conceptual considerations just presented, we should conclude that in
the absence of attention they are not. I dont insist the concepts employed here are beyond revision, only
that such revision would require compelling empirical evidence. Since the empirical evidence and
arguments considered in sections 1-6 are not compelling and given the strength of the conceptual
arguments presented in section 7, I conclude that object-seeing requires object-attention.

18

The treatment of the FINST theory here is a cursory one and its potential to illuminate this debate
merits more detailed consideration than can be pursued here.

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Bradley Richards

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and helpful comments.
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