NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION Case No. 951297 INTEGRATION OF WOMEN INTO CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN 10 February 1997 ‘The information contained herein relates to the internal practices of the Department of the Navy and is an internel communication within the Navy Department. THIS REPORT IS NOT RELEASABLE without the specific approval of the Secretary of the Navy. Its contents may not be disclosed outside original distribution, nor may it be reproduced in whole or in part. All requests for this report, extracts therefrom, or correspondence related thereto shall be referred to the Naval Inspector General. REDACTED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE —FOR-OFFIGIAL USE-ONEY—NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION OF CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN TABLE OF CONTENTS. TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION Original Complaint Initial Investigation a Follow-Up Investigation : Requests of Under Secretary Outline of Report Acknowledgements BACKGROUND, Non-Combatant Sea Duty Experience Perceptions of Men in the TACAIR Community Perceptions of the Women Entering TACAIR OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS ‘The Deployment Cycle Impact on Timing - Detailing Personnel Preparations in the Fleet Problems Identified Training and Deployment LEADERSHIP AND THE GENDER NEUTRAL POLICY LT LOHRENZ IN VF-124 - THE FRS Early Training Allegation of Hostility in FRS Findings of Fact Conclusion Reasons for Hostility Perceptions of Preferential Grading Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion Perceptions of Preferential Training Opportunities MEDIA POLICY General Issue of Effect of Positive Media Coverage Allegation That Media Coverage In The FRS Added To Stress Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion Negative Media Coverage In CVW-11 Allegation That Navy Improperly Did Nothing to Investigate Release of Records -FOR-OFFIGIALUSE-ONLE Nou v7 23 23 23 24 25 25 26 26 30 30 3 39 39 40 40 43 43 43 44Findings of Fact Conclusion STRESS General Issue of Recognizing and Dealing with Stress Symptoms of Maladaptive Stress Coping Allegation of Stress on LT Lohrenz Findings of Fact Regarding Reluctance to Admit Effect of Stress Regarding LT Lohrenz’ Emotional Condition Regarding Flight Surgeon Failure to Recognize Stress Regarding Chain of Command Failure to Recognize Stress Regarding FNAEB Consideration of Stress Regarding NAEB Consideration of Stress ‘Other testimony Collateral Matiers Discussion Conclusion Recommendations LT LOHRENZ’ LANDING TECHNIQUES Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion FIELD NAVAL AVIATOR EVALUATION BOARD (FNAEB) Description General Issue Concerning Documentation and FNAEBS in CVW-11 Allegations of LT Lohrenz LSO Grading Practices Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion LT Lohrenz’ Landing Grades Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion Opportunity to Improve Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion wee a CAG Pressure on CO to Call for Lohrenz FNAEB, Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion FNAEB Without Sutficient Training, Goals or Waming Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion 44 46 47 47 48 48 49 4g 82 58 61 70 73 13 73 75 76 76 78 78 3 92 94 94 95 100 101 101 102 103 103 103 104 105 105 105 105 107 107 107 107 119 1218¢7) Ce) FNAEB ENDORSEMENTS Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion USE OF A(3) COMMUNITY CHANGE CLASSIFICATION Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion Recommendation “> DETAIL TO einaings of Fact Discussion Conclusion ~ONG DUTY DAY Hinaings of Fact Discussion Conclusion FNAEB Finaings of Fact Discussion Conclusion ALLEGATION OF UNFAIR TREATMENT Finaings of Fact Discussion Conclusion DIFFERENCES IN TREATMENT. IMPACT OF PREGNANCY TESTING REQUIREMENT Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion THE WOMEN ONLY MEETINGS. Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion BERTHING Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion DIFFERENCES IN COMMUNICATION SUCCESS OF INTEGRATION - THE END OF CRUISE SURVEYS FLAWS IN CINCPACFLT IG INVESTIGATION Findings of Fact Discussion Conclusion -FOR-OFFIGIAL USE-ONLY — 122 122 131 131 132 132 143, 143, 143 144 144 145 149 150 150 152 154 155 155 161 165 166 166 71 72 173 173 173, 183 185 185 186 194 195 195 195 197 198 198 201 208 208 209 209DEFICIENCIES IN THE 30 NOVEMBER 95 IG REPORT RAISED BY LT LOHRENZ FCLP Data Is Wrong Disputes LT Hultgren was Better Performer Disputes Declining Performance Assessment No More Practice Opportunities Than Peers Landing Score Charts Are Wrong Didn't Fly First with Squadron CO No More Frequent Interaction Preferential Treatment Notice of Marriage Plans Disputes Below Standard Performance Assessment CQ Ranking is Wrong More Extensive Preparation Not Required Comparisons are Misleading Remaining Aviators Didn't Improve RIO Pairings and LSO Debriefings Purpose of NIMITZ CO Below Minimum Standards Inconsistent Air Wing Cut-Pass Policy Improperly Characterized as a “Failed Aviator” Positive Performance Attributes Ignored Improperly FNAEBd After Only A Single Line Penod (<7 Cc) DEFICIENCIES IN CINCPACFLT IG REPORT RAISED BY Performance Data is Inaccurate Performance During NIMITZ CQ Misrepresented Impact of Length of NIMITZ Duty Day Minimized Reason for Rejecting Re-Training Improper Platform Transition Policy Favorable Performance Not Mentioned No Extra Help Provided No Preferential Treatment RECOMMENDATIONS APPENDIX END OF TEXT 210 210 210 212 213 214 215 216 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 228 228 229 231 231 232 232 233 234 235 236 237 239MIDE) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. The Naval Inspector General Investigation of Carrier Air Wing ELEVEN (CVW-11) examines the initial work up and deployment of women assigned to combat aviation positions aboard the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, In conducting our examination, we investigated specific complaints of LT Cary Lohrenz, her parents Robert and Caro! Dunai, and the parents of alleging gender bias and discrimination on ine pa o1 CAPT Dennis Gillespie, Cormmonuer air Wing ELEVEN (CAG) 2. In the course of our examination, we also addressed deficiencies contained in the November 1995 Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) Inspector General investigation of similar gender bias complaints against CVW-11, and the specific requests of LT Lohrenz and * for correction of the record of that investigation 3, At the request of the Under Secretary of the Navy, we examined broader issues conceming the integration of women pilots into tactical air (TACAIR) squadrons, focusing on policies and procedures used aboard the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, the first East Coast deployment, the USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, the first West Coast deployment, and their embarked air wings. 4. Our report of investigation begins with Background, a brief history of women in shipboard environments, the military rationale for assignment to such positions and the findings of a 1992 Roper poll of public and military members regarding the service of women in direct combat positions. This section further details the impact of Tailhook ‘91, and its aftermath, on the perceptions and attitudes of both men and women participating in the CVW-11 deployment. 5. The next section, Integration Overview, describes the selection process employed for assigning women to ait wings for the initial East and West Coast deployments and the Fleet preparation made for each of these deployments. Problems noted in this section include unintended consequences dictated by the deployment cycle. Some pilots were transferred to TACAIR from other aviation communities and may have lacked the motivation required to succeed in a new aircraft and new environment: at least one pilot felt pressured to change communities if she wanted to stay in the Navy. In order to meet deployment schedules, some women received the “benefit” of accelerated training. We found that at least one had insufficient opportunity to fully adapt prior to deployment and others were stigmatized by the perception of some males that the women were receiving “preferential treatment.” Senior officers under Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC) perceived a lack of effective leadership, policy guidance and interest on the part of those in Washington. Notwithstanding years of experience with women aboard non-combatant ships, we were unable to identify significant efforts by COMNAVAIRPAC to obiain “lessons leamed’ from either Naval Surface Force Pacific or from the initial TACAIR deployment on the East Coast aboard the USS EISENHOWER, 6. The section addressing Leadership and the Gender Neutral Policy explains how an otherwise commendable theory, intended by COMNAVAIRPAC to ensure that women received equal consideration and treatment, could be used by some squadron commanding officers (CO's) to justify their failure to make reasonable accommodations to assist struggling aviators, who happened to be women, for fear such accommodations would show “preferential treatment. 7. Our report on CVW-11 next addresses LT Lohrenz in the FRS - VF 124, reviewing her expenence in the Flee! Readiness Squadron (FRS) and examining the first specific allegation - that she faced hostility that adversely affected her performance. Though we found that there were some individuals in the FRS who exhibited hostility towards LT Lohrenz and other women “FER-OFFIGIAL.USE-ONLY— vin VF-124, the allegation was unsubstantiated, as this hostility did not impair LT Lohrenz’ performance. In connection with this allegation, we examine arguments made by Some men that LT Lohrenz and other women received preferential treatment, in the form of inflated grades and additional opportunities not available to the men, in order to be certain that they would complete their training and move on to CVW-11. We found no merit to these arguments; grades were not inflated and any exira attention givan to these aviators exemplifies good leadership skills that recognize treating people as individuals rather than as group symbols, regardless of gender 8. Within Media Policy, we substantiate the allegation that LT Lohrenz was placed under additional stress due to both positive (while in the FRS) and negative (while in CVW-11) media publicity, which adversely affected her performance. Although the Navy must permit that degree of media coverage necessary to appropriately inform the public, witnesses generally agreed that the amount of press coverage permitted in the FRS, and during workup and deployment of CVW- 11, placed unnecessary stress on the women and created resentment among some of the men. ‘The media coverage appeared to impress upon each woman an artificial obligation to succeed, for failure of any one of them, individually, could be portrayed as a failure of the entire gender For LT Lohrenz, the negative media coverage resulting from the unauthorized release and publication of her training records was a further hardship that placed her under additional stress. Coupled with other concems, it rendered her medically unfit to fly. The allegation that the Navy improperly failed to make any effort to identify the person responsible for the unauthorized release of LT Lohrenz’ training records is unsubstantiated. 9. The allegation that LT Lohrenz’ performance was adversely affected by stress is substantiated, The section of our report, entitled Stress, discusses the failure of many CVW-11 personnel, including the CAG, squadron COs and the flight surgeons assigned to the air wing to take effective action to address stress. Many could not identify the classic signs of stress and others, who could recite the symptoms, did not recognize them in pilots such as LT Lohrenz Those who did correctly associate aspects of LT Lohrenz’ conduct, behavior and performance with symptoms of stress failed to take effective action to address her problems because she assured them that she could cope without any assistance. They did not give sufficient consideration to the real possibilty that a new pilot, trying to prove herself, would likely be hesitant to admit that she could not deal with, or compartmentalize, her stress. This section concludes with a finding that LT Lohrenz was not physically qualified (NPQ) to fly at the time she appeared before a Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) in June, 1995. 40, The LT Lohrenz' Landing Techniques section tums to an examination of LT Lohrenz’ fight characteristics. The evidence demonstrates that LT Lohrenz consistently flew a high and overpowered approach to the carrer that is characteristic of a classic ramp strike and which scared everyone but her. The evidence suggests several reasons for her approach style, including some attendant to stress. Other evidence suggests LT Lohrenz deliberately flew this way in spite of many attempts by landing signal officers (LSOs) to correct what they believed was an extremely dangerous technique. This section concludes that a pilot who cannot, or will not, follow the directions of the LSO is inherently unsafe and must be removed from the carrier flying environment. Although the evidence indicates that LT Lohrenz’ performance may not have been suitable for a carrier environment, there is nothing in the record to suggest that she would not be ‘competent to fly in a non-carrier environment 14. Our report next examines eight specific allegations LT Lohrenz made regarding the Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB). Five of the allegations, intended to demonstrate that LT Lohrenz should not have been sent to a FNAEB, are unsubstantiated. In particular, the evidence clearly establishes that LT Lohrenz knew that her performance was substandard and received ample counseling and other assistance from the LSO’s and others, including trend vi FOR OFFICIAL USE-ONET—debriefs. We did, however, find an inconsistency in, and a lack of, documentation demonstrating poor performance, and attempts by the command to improve the performance, of struggling aviators, Lack of documentation weakens the command's position two-fold; first, raising a question as to the validity of the charge; and second, requiring the command to explain its failure to comply with administrative regulations regarding record keeping. The evidence does establish that the endorsement process introduced irrelevant matters that prejudiced her case; and that stress as a factor in her performance was not adequately considered and was largely ignored. 42. Following the discussion of FNAEBs, our report examines the general concept and Use of A(3) Community Change Classification, intended to permit pilots to change platform, that is, ‘operating similar or different type aircraft. Our investigation finds that the application of the A(3) classification is confused, in large measure due to debates over emotional issues that relate to its use, such as the relative skills necessary to fly in various platforms and environments and the perception that transfers to shore based communities will have an adverse impact on morale. ‘We take no position with respect to the decision to retain the A(3) platform change classification We do recommend that, if retained, the conditions under which it should be applied be clarified, and clear and reasonable criteria for such changes be established. 13. Inthe section entitled * ~ * Detail to we examine three allegations raised by conceming ner ueiawng, the lengus vs sw. duty day on 21 March 1995, which resuiteo in ner being FNAEB4, and the FNAEB itself. The evidence supports the allegation that her detailing, by strongly pushing her into TACAIR and by identifying her fleet squadron prior to her arrival in the FRS, adversely impacted her chances to succeed in 14. In Long Duty Day, the investigation centered on the length of her duty day which resunea in a CAG directed FNAEB. The evidence supports her allegation that 21 March 1995 was an unreasonably long day, 16 hours total, 10 in the cockpit. The report concludes, however, that the CAG was justified, based upon what he saw and heard, in directing FNAEB. Further, we found that her CO supported the CAG's decision, asseruuns 10 the contrary notwithstanding. The evidence did not support aliegauon that CAG’s decision to Human Factors Board two male pilots, who had lanaing aimicuities on that same night, demonstrated gender bias 45. As part of our examination, we found no evidence to support the allegations raised on behalf of that her CO verbally abused her and that she was subjected to a hostile environment. 46. Our report then tums to an examination of differences in the treatment of men and women during the work-up and deployment of CVW-11. No issue was as divisive as the USS LINCOLN CO's order that CVW-11 women undergo pregnancy testing at the outset of the deployment. The protest from the women was so intense that the order was withdrawn. CVW-11 women blamed the CAG and alleged it demonstrated gender bias; the CAG, leaming of the women’s complaints, made compliance voluntary; the men became upset at the apparent ease with which women could evade what appeared, to them, to be a reasonable order. Following the pregnancy test orderitescission, the CAG called a “women-only” meeting to discuss issues he thought would be of interest to them. Unfortunately, his language at the meeting suggested to most women that he had a patemalistic attitude toward them that might influence his assignment decisions. The meeting was cited by men as another example of “preferential treatment"; most women were embarrassed by the meeting; many asked that he not hold another. Nonetheless, the CAG called a second women-only meeting at the end of deployment, during which end-of-cruise surveys were distributedBerthing of women in segregated preferential spaces, normally reserved for more senior officers, was a source of annoyance to men and embarrassment to the women. Most women recommended that they be berthed with squadron mates, by rank, believing the benefit of unit cohesiveness outweighs any loss of privacy. 16. The last section of our report addresses the deficiencies and errors contained in the CINCPACFLT IG investigation of November 1995, and the specific requests for correction of the record. We find that most of the allegations of errors have merit and include a corrected version of that report as an appendix. END OF TEXT vil “HPSALSEHOMMLHSE ONE€89¢7¢e) OFFICE OF THE NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL Report of Investigation NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION OF CARRIER AIR WING ELEVEN Case No: 951295 10 February 1997 INTRODUCTION Original Complaint 4. In July 1995, the Office of the Naval Inspector General (NAVINSGEN) received a complaint about the initial workup and deployment of Carrer Air Wing ELEVEN (CVW-11) with women assigned to combat aviation positions aboard USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN. The complaint came from Robert and Carol Dunai, the parents of LT Carey Lohrenz, USN (nee Dunai), an F-14 pilot who lost her flight status during the deployment. 2. Mr. and Mrs. Dunai alleged CAPT Dennis Gillespie, USN. the CVW-11 Commander (CAG), treated LT Lohrenz and other women unfairly, creating a negative work environment that eventually led their daughter to lose her flight status They argued that her experiences demonstrated the Navy employed a double standard, requiring women to perform at a higher level than men in order to gain acceptance and remain in fight status. They contended the negative environment first became apparent after LT Lohrenz graduated from flight training and reported to the F-14 Fleet Readiness Squadron (FRS) at Miramar, California, for additional training before assignment to CVW-11. Mr. and Mrs, Dunai did not ask for any specific relief, but implied that LT Lohrenz should be retumed to carrier aviation or, at the least, be assigned to another aviation community. initial Investigation 3. NAVINSGEN tasked the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) to investigate the allegations, and received a report of that investigation in December 1995. The repog noted problems with low morale, continuity of leadership, and hostility toward women in the FRS. It also found certain initiatives related to women in CVW-11 were poorly staffed or executed, thereby creating confusion, misunderstandings and feelings of inequitable treatment. The report included several recommendations that, if adopted, may faciitate the integration of women into combat aviation. However, the report also found that the decision to remove LT Lohrenz from flight status ‘was justified by her performance, which was deemed substandard and dangerous. 4, NAVINSGEN reviewed and approved the report However, in early 1996, it received ‘complaints about the report from LT Lohrenz and two other CVW-14 female pilots discussed in the report, Each of the pilots alleged various inaccuracies in ine 1epur, etn paniculat empriesis un envuts in the Statistics used to evaluate and characterize their performance. -FOR-OFFICIAL-USE_ONLY—CIE) AVINISGEN No, 951295 Cvw-11 Follow-Up Investigation 5, NAVINSGEN reviewed the new complaints and found some of them had merit. For the most part, the inaccuracies found during the review were mathematical errors made while computing flight data used to measure pilot performance. However, because of the manner in which the report made use of this data, the errors appeared to be prejudicial to one or more of the complainants.” 6. The review also indicated the investigation did not comply with investigative standards set forth in the NAVINSGEN investigations manual. The investigators’ failure to document interviews when they were conducted was the most serious defect revealed by the review. But CINCPACFLT's, decision to assign as lead investigator an officer serving within Commander, Naval Air Forces. Pagific (COMNAVAIRPAC), the organization being investigated, was of greater concem, because it suggested the possibilty that the investigation was neither independent nor impartial. In combination, the two defects caused NAVINSGEN to reopen the investigation.” Requests of Under Secretary 7. At the request of the Under Secretary of the Navy, NAVINSGEN also examined broader issues, such as the overall process for the integration of: female aviators into tactical air squadrons, focusing on policies and procedures used aboard USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (for the first East Coast deployment), USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (for the first West Coast deployment), and their embarked air wings.” * These errors notwithstanding, there is merit in the original report. The errors in that report are discussed in detail at the end of this report. A corrected version of the original report appears in the appendix. 2 The Naval Inspector General's investigative team consisted of six naval officers. Three were captains, each a cartier qualified aviator. One of the two commanders on the team was a Finht Surgeon and Board certified psychiatrist; the other was a special assistant on women’s issues at ‘The sixth officer was a Lieutenant who was a Wing qualified Landing Signals Officer (SO). An atomey was assigned to provide legal advice to the team. Between 27 June and 18 July 1996, the team conducted over one hundted interviews, some in Washington, D.C., but the majority in San Diego, CA. Those interviewed included: the complainants; ll officers in leadership positions, ranging from the Commander, Naval Alt Force Pacific, to squadron Commanding Officers; most of the female officers In the Wing, many other junior officers; and the Commanding Officers and instructors at the pertinent Fleet Readiness Squadrons. All interviews were. conducted under oath and recorded by a certified court reporter who provided verbatim transcripts. > Caner aviation includes aircraft ranging from the F-18 to the C-2, but the focus of this Investigation was. on the integration of the Tactical Aircraft community, Le., the F-18, F-14, S-3, E-2c and EA. CVW-11 began its integration with eight female pilots in tactical aircraft (TACAIR). There were other female pilots in the wing's VRC (flying the C2s) and HS (Hefcopter) squadrons but this Investigation focused onty on the pilots in TACAIR. Out of the eight female pilots who began with CVW-11, four are stil flying. One was killed during a landing, one dropped on request, and two were removed from flying as a result of Fick! Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) actions. One of the FNAFBA oificers IT! nhrenz. is exrrentty ‘on hold awaitina 'h= results of this investiaation’ the other, eae 2 TPOROFFIEIAE USE-ONEYNAVINSGEN No, 951295: CVW.11 8. The Under Secretary also asked NAVINSGEN to determine whether there were differences in how male and female aviators were treated in CVW-11 and, if so, to attempt to determine: a. Why the di requirements? fences occurred, and whether they were attributable to operational demands or b. Were the differences positive, negative, or merely different? c. Were any differences associated with different subgroups such as first tour versus more seni aviators, pilots versus Radar Intercept Officers (RIOs) or Naval Flight Officers (NFOs), particular ‘communities or aircraft types? d. How did command policies, directives, decisions and actions (or their absence) affect gender integration? ©. To what extent were officials above the squadron level aware of any differences in treatment, or perceptions of differences in treatment, that occurred? Outline of Report 9. For the sake of clarity, this report addresses the various allegations of the individual pilots and matters of more general interest, such as those mentioned by the Under Secretary, in chronological order whenever possible. Consequently, it moves back and forth between “Allegations” and "General Issues.” 10. The report begins with a brief background of the general problems associated with introducing women into the TACAIR community that result from a number of unfortunate incidents dating back to the 1991 Tailhook Symposium. It then provides an overview of the Integration Process, addressing some of the general issues raised by the Under Secretary. Next, it discusses the general issues of leadership and the "gender neutral" policy of VADM Spane, ‘Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC), in theory and app! 41. The report then tums to a discussion of LT Lohrenz’ experience in the FRS, VF-124. It addresses the allegations of hostility raised by Mr. and Mrs. Dunai. It also addresses two factors that could account for hostility and thereafter followed LT Lohrenz: allegations of preferential treatment in the form of favorablé grading and extra practice time. 12. Next, the report discusses the effect of media coverage, both positive and negative. It addresses general issues associated'with the "spotlighting" effect resulting from media attention, as well as the allegations Mr. and Mrs. Dunai made about media coverage in the FRS causing an unnecessary“and unwanted distraction. This section also includes a discussion of the “Donnelty fetter,” its impact upon “Pilot B” (LT Lohrenz), and concludes with a discussion of the reasons the officer who gave LT Lohrenz’ training records to Ms. Donnelly gave for making that unauthorized disclosure. 13. The report then begins to focus on the problems LT Lohrenz experienced in VF-213 that eventually led to her loss of fight status, and the allegations that flow from them. The first of the allegations examined concems the impact of stress on LT Lohrenz, Next, to provide context for LT Lohrenz’ Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB), a discussion of her flying in VF-213 is provided. The report then provides a general issue discussion of the FNAEB process and FOR OFFIGLHSE ONLY 3NAVINSGEN No, 951295: Cvw.1t documentation in CVW-11, followed by an examination of the specific allegations relating to the FNAEB and its endorsements. 14, Discussions of the allegations raised by and some next. After that, the report discusses some of the differences in reatniem between men and women, such as the pregnancy test, berthing, and all-women meetings. COMED 15, The final sections of the report discuss deficiencies in the CINCPACFLT IG report and the specific corrections that are made to it based on the requests of LT Lohrenz and Acknowledgements 16. NAVINSGEN wishes to acknowledge and express its appreciation for the efforts of the investigative team assembled for this endeavor. The five officers on the team who are not assigned to NAVINSGEN do not serve on any IG staff, were not familiar with the IG investigative process, and had to take time away from their normal duties to participate. NAVINSGEN required them to attend a mini-IG school where they learned basic interviewing techniques, then sent them out to question witnesses. They did an excellent job. Many of the insights gained during the investigation would not have been possible without their participation 17. NAVINSGEN must also acknowledge and express its appreciation to the many naval aviators it interviewed during the course of this investigation. At the outset, many expressed reluctance to participate in this inquiry, fearing the interviews would involve the interrogation techniques employed by the DoDIG during its Tailhook investigation. Others feared reprisal for cooperating with the IG. Most of these witnesses spent two or more hours in interview, a few were interviewed for a full day or longer. Scheduling constraints required a number of witnesses to wait hours before they were interviewed. 18. In some cases, it was obvious the witness was uncomfortable reliving events that took place during the workup and deployment. Nonetheless, the NAVINSGEN investigating team found almost every witness to be cooperative, thoughtful, and often insightful. They exhibited a sense of professionalism and loyalty to naval aviation that must be commended. It was clear that most of these officers were committed to making the integration of women into combat aviation a success, whatever personal misgivings they may have had about the wisdom or need for it. 19. After reviewing the transcripts of witness interviews, NAVINSGEN concluded the best way to present the facts developed during this investigation would be to let the witnesses speak for themselves as much as possible. This will give readers a greater appreciation for what the officers thought and allow them to draw their own conclusions from the testimony of the witnesses. In order to provide some measure of confidentiality for witnesses, most of the people interviewed are not identified. Among the naval personnel, only the names of complainants, the CAG, flag officers and those who are deceased are used in the report. END OF TEXTNAVINSGEN No 951205 Cvw.tt BACKGROUND Non-Combatant Sea Duty Experience 20. Women have served in the U.S. Navy since World War |. Until 1978, all assignments were ashore, with the exception of service on hospital ships. In 1978, the Navy began assigning women to non-combatant ships (auxiliaries) 21. Given its military context, the underlying principles justifying placement of women in non- ‘combatant sea duty billets must be firmly grounded in a rational assessment of the needs of the Navy. When the pool of candidates available for selection to sea duty billets is enlarged by the inclusion of a new group, such as women, one reasonably may expect that the overall quality of those selected for such positions will improve if proper criteria are fairly applied. 22. Nearly twenty years of experience in the Navy demonstrates the theory works in practice Based on the Navy's success in placing women in non-combatant sea duty positions, one then reasonably could anticipate that once combatant positions were opened to women, the overall quality of personnel serving in those positions also would improve. Of course, success depends ‘on ensuring that women assigned to such positions are fully qualified to serve in them. This may give rise to the perception, among both men and women, that women must demonstrate performance superior to that of the men with whom they will serve. 23. For years the assignment of women to combatant ships and aircraft was prohibited by law. The Army by policy extended that prohibition to assignment of women to combat units. Although. the law and policy had been under attack for a number of years before Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the role of women in that effort prompted a new examination of the issue. In December 1991, Congress authorized the establishment of a Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, and, in November 1993 lifted the statutory prohibition. 24. The commission tasked the Roper Organization to conduct two poles. One was a telephone survey of 1,700 members of the general population. The other was a written survey of 4,442 members of the active and reserve armed forces, including combat aviators. Survey results, obtained in 1992 indicated that 47% of the public supported, and 47% of the public opposed, the general proposition of assigning women to direct combat positions. The Navy was the only service in which the majority (53%) of active duty personnel supported the proposition, 78% of the Marines were opposed to it. About 70% of the Navy personnel surveyed thought it was appropriate to assign women to combat ships or fighters and bombers, although only forty percent of Navy personnel assigned to tactical aircraft supported that proposition. The survey also indicated that two-thirds of the Navy personnel believed the impact of assigning women to direct combat positions would be positive or neutral, although only one-third of the Marines agreed.* 25. In the Spring of 1993, the Navy, anticipating that the ban would be lifted, made policy decisions intended to prepare women for assignment to combat billets. When the ban was lifted, the Navy and the other Services immediately began the process of integrating women into combat “The information in this paragraph was obtained from an article written by CAPT Georgia C. Sadler, USN (Ret, that appeared in the February 1993 issue of the US Naval Institute “Proceedings.” -FOR-OFFICIALUSE-ONLY 5AVINSGEN Mo 951295 Cvw.1t units.” While the integration of women was a major change for all units affected, it was particularly significant for the Navy's tactical aircraft (TACAIR) community Male Perceptions_in the TACAIR Community 26. The TACAIR community is a tightly knit organization whose history and mission fosters an image, in the minds of the public and many individual aviators, of the strong and courageous warrior, a clearly masculine image. Placing women in combat constituted more than simply an introduction of someone new to the community, it required many in the community to reexamine their own image of themselves and their community 27. A number of TACAIR aviators had strongly and often publicly opposed the admission of women into their community. Few senior TACAIR leaders atlempted to counter these feelings, For example, at the 1991 Tailhook Symposium, some male aviators publicly displayed buttons proclaiming “not in my cockpit.” A female aviator who attempted to ask a panel of flag officer aviators about the Navy's plans to integrate women into combat positions was shouted down, and the response of the Navy's senior aviator made it clear to all present that he did not support the concept, 28. a During the DoDIG investigation of Tailhook, officers who believed their rights were not adequately protected felt the Navy's senior leaders had abandoned them in fear that support would be viewed as an example of leadership hostility toward women in combat. The leadership's apparent acquiescence to Congress’ increased scrutiny of the promotions of officers who had attended Tailhook led some aviators to believe their community unfairly was being punished for political effect. Due to Senate ‘opposition resulting from his review and support of a decision to remove a female helicopter pilot from flight training, ADM Arthur's name was withdrawn from consideration for the position of Commander in Chief, Pacific. Some aviators interpreted this as a sign that the most senior Navy leadership would permit a decline in the quality of naval aviation rather than stand upon principle Later, the public explanation of LT Hultgreen’s mishap, which many aviators saw as an attempt to conceal pilot error as a contributing factor, caused them to question some leaders’ integnity 29. One officer presented the following analysis of the impact TAILHOOK had on the plan to integrate women into combat aviation: Q. Id fke you to explain for us the connection {you drew) between Tailhook and Lieutenant Lohrenz and atitudes toward women. I don't understand the connection A. Okay. There were some — quite a few of the instructors at 124 were interrogated by the DOD IG {And when | say interrogated, that's exactly what I mean, And we, the Navy, nobody, no commander or above stood up to protect those people. And they sat there and took the brunt of it, both publicy inthe paper and privately. Some of those people got assigned to 124. And their attudes towards the ~~ Cadulbleadership in the Navy havent ~ at least didnt change then and they probably havent changed Tow because I dont think we've given them a reason to change. ©. When you say “attitudes towards the adul leadership.” do you mean theit~ they ~ | dont understand what that means. That they didn’ fke the leadership of they dint — > Within the Navy, integration has been limited to the surface and aviation communities: because of the unique environment of a submarine, the integration of women into that community remains under review 6 ~FOR-OFFIEIRL-USEONLNAVINSGEN No, 951295 COW.11 ‘aduit leadership in the Navy haven’ ~ at least didnt change then and they probably haven't changed now because I don't think we've given them a reason to change. Q. When you say “attitudes towards the adutt leadership.” do you mean their — they — 1 don't understand what that means. That they didn’ like the leadership or they didnt ~ ‘They coukdn' trust them. ‘And what is the consequence of that? How does that translate into anything? Well, apathy towards — the CNO wants this to happen This what? ‘The women in combat So it translates into apathy toward women in combat. Uke okay, we'll do it, Dont let me put words in your mouth. But that’s what they're saying. ‘You'te saying that i translates into apathy toward women in combat. Is that what you're saying? ‘Towards making his wishes come to fruition. That's what I'm saying. Not apathy. It's well, we hear you, Admiral. We'll do it. 'mteling you, that's — and you maybe got some folks on the east coast that are like that, too. And they'te stil here. And they're the guys that are going to lead the next strike, should you have to do it. >O>OPO>O>O> 30. The downsizing of the military after Desert Storm also adversely impacted the TACAIR ‘community. In that process, the Navy released many aviators in the US Naval Reserves who had been serving on active duty. Some of these aviators had served with distinction in combat positions during Desert Storm; a number were thought to be better aviators than some in the Regular Navy who were not released from active duty. Thus, as the competition for combat aviation positions increased between 1992 and 1994, it created fertile ground for fears that men would eventually be replaced by less qualified females, permitting the quality of naval aviation to deteriorate further in order that Navy leadership could say it had met a social or political objective. 31. Consequently, when the Navy decided to integrate women into combat aviation, members of the TACAIR community posed two questions that were important to them. Was there a genuine leadership commitment to making integration succeed? Did leadership have the integrity to ensure that integration would be accomplished in a fair manner that did not decrease combat effectiveness or readiness? Perceptions of the Women Entenng TACAIR 32, The women in Naval aviation were, of course, very much aware of the concems of the men. Many anticipated hostile reactions from the men as they entered the TACAIR community. Many felt inordinate pressures to succeed, if for no other reason than to prove a point to the men. Unfortunately, some felt that the best way to ensure they would succeed was to fly conservatively and not make a mistake that could serve as justification for their removal from flight status. Such “timid” flying could be perceived by men as a lack of ability or motivation to excel 33. Thus, the men and women entering CVW-11 in 1994 were-predisposed to perceive every ~event in terms of gender preference-or.gender.discnmination. The result was that the most innocuous statement by a person of one gender could be perceived as an inappropriate slight or insult by members of the other. Events such as additional carrier qualifications, which many men saw as a welcome opportunity to get extra practice, were perceived by some women as an excuse for the CAG or their COs to take their wings away if there were any flaws in their performance. In the ready room, when a male officer told a woman “get out of my chair.” the —FOR-OFFIGIAL USE ONLY 7NAVINSGEN No, 951295: cvw.tt woman was not sure whether he simply meant she had taken his accustomed seat, or whether was expressing the opinion that she did not belong in the ready room. 34. To begin the inquiry into these issues, and to place the complainants’ allegations in perspective, it is appropriate to tum to the Under Secretary's first request and examine the process by which female aviators were integrated into TACAIR squadrons. END OF TEXTNAVINSGEN No, 951295: CVW.4t OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS ‘The Deployment Cycle 35. The integration process started with the decision, made in Washington, to place women into ‘combat aviation positions on both coasts in 1994. This, in tum, drove the selection of carriers, squadrons, and personnel.* 36. In order to understand the impact of this decision, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of a carrier/air wing deployment cycle. That cycle actually begins with the end of a deployment, when the carrier and its air wing begin a post cruise stand-down. The squadrons return to their stations; some members go on leave while others are transferred. The ship, planes and other equipment are sent through an extensive servicing regimen. 37. For a month or so, little or no flying is performed. Then the squadrons begin flying again, first going through the fundamentals, followed by more intricate maneuvers. The tactical squadrons then go through advanced squadron training including the Strike Fighter Advanced Readiness Program for air-to-ground combat, and the Fleet Fighter Advanced Readiness Program for air-to-air combat. This is followed by training of the entire air wing at Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon. 38, The squadrons then individually begin brief workups (several days fo a week) on the carrier, and eventually the air wing comes together, on the carrier, for a major war exercise before the actual deployment. This entire period, from end of one deployment to the beginning of the next, takes, on average, 18 months, but can be shorter or longer based on operational needs. In the case of the West Coast deployment on USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN, however, the tum around for CVW-11 was limited to about 15 months. In order to permit aviators the maximum opportunity to assimilate successfully, it is important that they report to their assigned squadrons as early in the deployment cycle as possible. Impact on Timing - Detailing Personnel 39. The decision to integrate in 1994 had a number of obvious consequences. For example, of the women's arrival, which impacted the selection of ships. The decision also had other, less obvious, and probably unintended, consequences. The Navy leadership decision that integration ‘would take place on both coasts in 1994, set in motion a sequence of events that would have profound consequences for the participants in the integration effort at the squadron level. 40. Thus, detailers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) had to identify women for assignment to the ships and squadrons that would participate in the first deployment. Women already qualified as pilots in other aviation communities, especially those scheduled for downsizing or dissolution, were considered appropriate for selection. Many were eager for this © This investigation focused on the decisions and actions at the Type Commander (TYCOM) levet and below. Nevertheless, decisions made in Washington had serious ramifications in the fleet which were elated to NAVINSGEN by many of those interviewed. NAVINSGEN did not expand the investigation to determine the validity of every decision purported to have originated in Washington. —FOR-OFFCIALUSE OM 9aye) 86720) NAVINSGEN No, 951295 Cvw.tt opportunity; they had joined naval aviation in hopes the combat restriction would be lifted while they still had the opportunity to fly, and had actively lobbied for the change. 41. But others were satisfied with their existing position or preferred to transfer to another non- TACAIR community. One of the complainants, °~ is in this category; she believed her detailer left her no choice but to join TACAIR if auc «ewed to remain in the Navy. 42. Detailers also considered women who had recently joined the Navy and were at the very beginning of the aviation training pipeline appropriate for selection. In some cases, however, as with LT Lohrenz, they appeared to be, or were in fact, moved ahead of male aviators waiting for a training slot to open up. This created resentment toward her among men who viewed her placement in this manner as an early sign of preferential treatment for women. 43. The deployment cycle also dictated the air wing squadrons to which women eventually would be assigned, even before their performance in the Fleet Readiness Squadrons (FRS) became known. The ~ of LT Lohrenz’ explained: ‘A... Atthe time that she was up for assignment the law had recently changed, allowing women to {90 into combat in aircraft tactical jets, ying off of aircraft caries. .. Lieutenant Lohrenz was doing extremely well. ... Negotiations with the Bureau, PERS 43, on assignments they said, “When are we ‘ving to have — do you have @ woman in the window that's going to have grades to make the TOMCAT cut?” And | said, "We have one possibilty. We have to wait and see how she does in carrier quals, but she's looking real strong right now", and that was Lieutenant Carey Dunai. She is now Lieutenant Lohrenz. ‘She went to the boat, did very well atthe boat. Her overall cumulative average was well above the cut to make TOMCATS and we — | beieve it was in the neighborhood of a composite cum of 225, which is a very high cumulative average. ‘She did very well at the boat, which is the number one criteria for making the TOMCAT cut. And [a detailer] and | both recommended her for TOMCATS and went through the reviewing chain up at BUPERS, | believe ... and PERS 43 ... okayed the assignment. @. Did he okay the assignment to the TOMCAT community or to @ specific squadron in that community? ‘A. Well, he okayed the assignment to the community. They dont make specific squadron assignments. However, during this time there was only one squadron that | was aware of that was standing up. YouVe got to start somewhere and this was the beginning ‘And there was only one squadron that was postured to stand up women and TOMCATS at the time, and one ship on the West Coast postured to stand up women and tactical jets at the time. So, by default, yes, they ended up being detailed to a specific squadron, but it wasn't because of the detailing process. The process details them to a specific community Q. But you knew that that squadron — you knew the name of thet squadron fairly early? ‘A. Sure, VF-213, the Black Lions.” Q, Tell us your opinion of that squadron. 7 Atthe time the decision that led to her assignment to VF-213 was made, LT Lohrenz showed every sign ‘of becoming an excellent pilot, and for that reason VF-213 appeared a reasonable choice for her, But given her performance in VF-124, the FRS to which she was assigned before proceeding to VF-213, the later questioned the wisdom of allowing her to continue along a path leading to the Black uur. 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE-ONLYNAVINSGEN No 951295 CYW.T A o oH The reputation a squadron develoos is largely. one, based on the leadership al the time and what's aoina on at the time | fe very comfortable with that. I had no problem at all with that, i also felt that Carey — we needed a woman that was going to be forceful to get through that community because I'm aware of attitudes in that community that make it difficut for minorities. and women to break into that community, because | was in that community for 16 years at Miramar ‘And | fett Carey had the mental strength and toughness to do what it takes to prove herself on a daily basis out there and successfully negotiate the FRS syllabus and go out there and do wellin the fleet. If nothing else, due to her size she could hold her own against the guys. 6807 KE) Preparations in the Fleet 44, The Type Commanders (TYCOMs) began to prepare for the appearance of women on their ships and in their squadrons by writing instructions governing the embarkation of women within their respective claimancies* COMNAVAIRPACNOTE 1300, which applied to the West Coast deployment, and COMNAVAIRLANTINST 1300.1, applicable to the East Coast, publish critena for the embarkation of women that cover a wide range of topics and training and are nearly identical in content 45. Fleet Introduction Teams (FIT) were established to serve as an advisory group for each carrier and air wing transitioning to mixed gender crews. Meetings were held among the senior leadership, ie., type commander, ship's commanding officer (CO), camer ait wing commander (CAG).’ and the FIT leader, to devise plans of action and milestones (POA&Ms) necessary for the orderly introduction of women into the air wing 46. Traditional management tools were utilized to ensure receiving commands were ready for the arrival of females, | POA&Ms, local instructions and policy guidelines, and inspection/certification requirements were employed. For example, each unit was required to prepare a command POA&M covering all aspects of the integration 47. Certification requirements were also imposed for such matters as berthing, habitabilily. medical facilities, watch standing, use of heads (restrooms), designation of jogging and recreational attire (dress codes), management of isolated spaces, and dating Each TYCOM issued a final certification that the wing was ready to receive servicewomen 48, Two training methods were employed, videotapes and lectures on Navy gender policy. The COMNAVSURFLANT "Choices" videotape series was the main training tool, These four videotapes focused on the subject of ‘women are sailors.” 49. Navy gender policy was addressed by unit Command Training Teams (CTT) in 2 lecture/discussion format similar to the typical Navy Rights and Responsibilities (NR&R) © The concemed type commanders were Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC) and ‘Commander, Naval Ait Force Atlantic (COMNAVAIRLANT). COMNAVAIRPACNOTE 1300, dated 29 March 1994, and COMNAVAIRLANTINST 1300.1, dated 8 April 1996, are the applicable documents ° The Navy still uses the acronym CAG but the actual ile is “Commander Air Wing” vice group FOR-OFFICIAL USE ONLY— "NAVINSGEN No 951295 CVW.11 workshop. CTT training consisted of a review of Navy policy on mixed gender or women's issues such as equal opportunity, sexual harassment, fraternization, assignment of women in the Navy. and management of pregnant service women, 50. Commands were encouraged to establish a spouse orientation program in which the CO, the exzcutive officer (KO), and command master chief (CMC) would meet with the spouses of unit members in order to explain the integration program, and hopefully alleviate some of the concerns many spouses had regarding a mixed gender crew. 51. In both fleets, the general integration of the units was preceded by the assignment of female officers and chiefs. This timing sequence was universally recognized as being necessary in order to afford the female leaders (officers and chiefs) an opportunity to establish themselves and become acclimated before the junior females arrived. The presence of senior women was intended to provide the junior women with role models and a sympathetic ear, if needed. The policy of having senior enlisted women arrive in the commands ahead of junior enlisted females was universally cited as the best way to avoid integration problems among enlisted personnel, 52. Personnel who reported to their units after initial training and certification were expected to receive the same basic information in routine indoctrination training. The Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEO) program was used {o assess the effectiveness of the training Interviews were conducted with air wing male and female officer personnel. Surveys were distributed to senior enlisted females. Problems Identified 53. During the NAVINSGEN investigation, a number of problems in the integration process were identified. From the outset, beginning with their attempt to prepare instructions, the TYCOMs perceived a lack of effective leadership and policy guidance from Washington. This caused some to question whether senior Navy leadership was attempting to distance itself from the whole project. One senior officer described the demoralizing effect of attempts to get help from higher authonity by stating Itwas very frustrating. Ibe very honest with you. I's very frustrating for us because we could get ‘no guidance from higher authority. If needed to ask a question about the integration of women at sea, | would call - | would have to call four or five agencies. There was no consolidated agency. We asked, We asked officially for training material and guidance, and didnt get it... I! needed to have 2 question answered on the integration of women into carriers and ait wings, ! would startin the bureau or in the Pentagon, and I'd be kicked around. ... I'm going to get really hammered for this one, but this is the perception we had, that there was a fear of anyone getting involved with the program. In other words, nobody really wanted to get involved with the program. Everybody was very apprehensive about it. Everybody kind of backed away from it, Nobody really wanted to be involved. Nobody wanted to put their name of ownership — And I'm not throwing darts or pointing fingers, but that's just my perception and the way it was. | think everybody was a little apprehensive, a litle scared. Nobody wanted to sign their name on the line and say that “I'm the person responsible for this.” 54, More senior officers agreed with this assessment, asserting that guidance and training from higher authority was inadequate. COMNAVAIRPAC personnel felt they were required to build the program from the ground up using existing resources and relying on the voluntary cooperationMAVINSGEN No. 951205: cvW.11 of anyone who might be interested. There was no clearly identified point-of-contact above COMNAVAIRPAC available for assistance on problems or policies."® 55. Detailing decisions are another matter of concem, because they have the potential to convey a lack of sensitivity. While the needs of the Navy ultimately control all personne! decisions, in this case permitting a deployment decision to play such a significant role in a major societal change was unfortunate, 56. In a non-war environment, for a detailer to tell a pilot that she could either transfer to tactical aircraft or leave the Navy is unnecessary and counterproductive to the goal of integration. Yet that is what was done in at least one case. Such heavy-handedness evidences a failure to appreciate that success “behind the boat" requires, beyond the physical and mental skills, an ‘extraordinarily high level of personal motivation. Actions which effectively forced an individual into tactical aircraft, without considering that individual's motivation increase the likelinood of failure", and the failure of any woman during the initial integration effort would have a disproportionate effect on the entire process. 57, The decision to move females ahead of males in the training pipeline, necessary to get them to the targeted carrier/air wing before deployment, contributed to the perception that women would receive preferential treatment to salisfy political objectives; a message that hurt morale and teamwork. The importance of morale and teamwork has been universally recognized, yet appears not fo have been considered during this phase of the integration. This deviation from the norm brought additional scrutiny to the women and separated them from their male colleagues during a phase of training where the stresses are intense and support from classmates and instructors is very important. 58. Inadequate attention to general policy issues was also identified during the investigation. These included interpersonal relationships, married couples who could end up on the same ship during a deployment and pregnancy. Indeed, no other single issue was more corrosive to the integration effort than the COMNAVAIRPACILINCOLNICVW-11 pregnancy policy, which is discussed in detail later. 59. In the absence of guidance from higher authority, type commanders developed their own. ‘Among these was the COMNAVAIRPAC policy of "gender neutrality” in the management of female aviators in TACAIR. This policy does not appear to have been documented, which allowed for great latitude in its interpretation and application. The policy was intended to mean “everybody is the same," so that everyone would get the same opportunities and integration would not become a "big PR event.” As discussed in detail later, this policy was sometimes interpreted to mean that any extra measures on behalf of the women were unnecessary and disfavored, © It must be noted that, although not exhaustive, a check with the cognizant BUPERS codes was conducted to determine if any formal requests came in from the fleet for assistance. No requests were identified. "The evidence does not suggest that the "push" needed to make the deployment dates of the carriers was, by itself, determinative of the individual failures that followed, rather it was a factor, among several others, that contributed to those failures. —FOR-OFFIGIAL USE ONLY 13NAVINSGEN No. 951295. CW.11 60. However much the TYCOMs attempted to fil holes in Navy policy and education during the assembly and structuring of their integration and certification programs, gaps still remained, For example, those programs contained no training elements that specifically addressed women officers and/or aircrews. 61. Moreover, although women have been serving on non-combatant surface ships since 1978, NAVINSGEN could not identify any systematic attempt to identify and apply lessons leamed from that integration effort to the integration of women into combat units and, specifically, TACAIR, ‘Commander, Naval Air Force Pacific reported”? that he had informal discussions with the ‘Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific about lessons that command had leamed in the process of integrating its surface ships with women. Other than that, the AIRPAC FIT leader indicated that he did not receive any lessons leamed from anyone. 62. Although the COMNAVAIRPAC program was well received, it fell short of providing detailed guidance and useful advice to senior leadership on such matters as interpersonal relationships, gender discrimination, patemalism, and specific training on the differences between men and ‘women in methods of communication and handling of stress. 63. Some training shortfalls were beyond anyone's ability to anticipate. For instance, as discussed in detail later, the experience in CVW-11 suggests the aviation community as a whole requires increased training in stress management and in recognizing and responding to the signs and symptoms of maladaptive stress coping and impaired compartmentalization. 64. Training in communication skills (verbaV/non-verbal) may have helped avoid problem areas encountered on deployment. There is no current Navy training on this topic, but there are some commercially available books that may be beneficial."® Senior leaders in CVW-11 did not feel they were personally trained to the level required to handle all the issues that would surface during the deployment. It was viewed as a “leam as you go” evolution. 65. Despite the Navy's objective of preparing to employ women in combat, no attempt to examine how women should be trained for, and used in, combat was identified. For example, some studies indicate women can pull more G's than men without blacking out, which raises the question of whether they could be trained to perform combat maneuvers that men cannot. NAVINSGEN did not identify any recent efforts to examine these issues; the approach appears to be that training for men and women should be identical despite an increasing body of evidence that men and women leam differently. 66. In the absence of effective and comprehensive guidance, individual commanders will follow the course of action that seems most appropriate and reasonable fo them under the circumstances. Some will make better decisions than others, simply because they are more ‘The transcript indicates that COMNAVAIRPAC had discussions with Commander, Naval Surface Forces. Atlantic, but VADM Spane further identified that person as his neighbor, “Dave.” VADM David Robinson was Commander, Naval Surface Force Pacific during the time in question; both officers lived in San Diego. "? One mentioned to NAVINSGEN was “Talking from 9 to 5: Men and Women in the Workplace, Language. Sex and Power,” by Deborah Tannen, a professor of linguistics at Georgetown University 14 —FOR-OFFIGIAL-USE-ONEY——Corer) NAVINSGEN No 951295 cvw-t1 experienced, better leaders, or more lucky than their counterparts. But all will be subject to cfiticism and second-guessing because there is no cntena against which to evaluate decisions 67. The evaluation process also had flaws. The CMEO program was identified as the principle vehicle for educating the command, assessing the effectiveness and resolving problems in the integration effort. NAVINSGEN inspections reveal that CMEO program implementation is still largely a matter of the commander's own opinion of its usefulness. The program is not actively supported in all commands. Assessments are time consuming evolutions and are not immediately responsive to emergent needs. 68. However, CMEO survey results did reveal some perceptions that may, upon review, prove to be problems, such as female CPOs being denied access to flight deck, Maintenance Control and Quality Assurance positions. FRAMP (Fleet Repair Airframe Maintenance Program) and fire ighting training was denied at least one female ATCS. Some reported that they were not given shipboard orientation training J neurrence of her commandin. in ‘sueWattitudes. In general, enlisted women reported more encounters with offensive language and treatment than officers. 69. In summary, the integration effort appeared to be a “work-in-progress” until well into the cruise. Guidance and useful policy from higher authority were in short supply and, without correction, will plague other integration efforts into the foreseeable future. Training shortfalls were substantial. Integration training is likely to experience the same limited support currently enjoyed by CMEO, which is a useful but cumbersome and unevenly supported assessment vehicle. Training and Deployment 70. Both TYCOMs and their subordinate activities completed essentially the same training prior to the initial deployment of women on the LINCOLN in the Pacific fleet and the EISENHOWER in the Atlantic fleet, yet their experience during their initial deployments were very different. 71, The EISENHOWER Air Wing (CVW-3) deployed between October 1994 and April 1995. Nine of the ten female pilots assigned to CVW-3 TACAIR squadrons successfully completed the deployment, although one was described as “one of the weaker pilots.” The tenth pilot was found not suitable for carrier aviation, but permitted {o transition to a non-camier aviation community. No significant gender related issues were reported, and no complaints relating to integration issues on that deployment were filed with an IG at any level. 72. The LINCOLN Air Wing (CVW-11) deployed between April 1995 and October 1995. Of the eight female pilots assigned to CVW-11, one died in an aircraft mishap, one dropped on request, and two, LT Lohrenz and were FNAEBd and lost their flight status. 73. In retrospect, there were a number of litle differences about the deployments that may have affected the reality and perceptions of their success. Some will be discussed in detail later in the report. Others may have contributed to the way matters discussed in the report were handled Each reader will have to form their own judgment about the significance of the following ‘a. All but two of the women TACAIR pilots assigned to CVW-3 came straight through the training Pipeline. ~ had the -FOR-OFFIGIALUEE ONLY 15 ))&)NAVINSGEN No 951295 CWT most problems. As noted, one of ther was FNAEBd and transitioned to a non-carrier community: the ther, although successful, was considered a weak pilot. By contrast, most of the women pilots Sssigned to CVW-11 had prior experience that made them more senior (in rank, time-n-grade, and fight hours) than other “nuggets,” but not more experienced in carrer landings or deployments b. Senior personnel in CVW-3, with the support of their superiors, targeted personnel to fill positions they considered important to 2 successful integration effort. For example, the most senior woman officer assigned to CVW-3 was the administrative assistant, a Lieutenant Commander who was also ‘an experienced NFO. She ran interference with other women for the CAG, and provided him advice ‘on issues of particular interest to women. By contrast, the CVW-11 CAG relied on the advice of his female ~ ‘a first tour Lieutenant. CVW-3 also obtained highty qualified and respected Seniot €sovw perounel to Support its deployment, including a female command master chief, CVW-3 ‘sought LSOs for theit “people skills” as well as their waving skills - not out of concern for the women, but because its leaders preferred a more relaxed, less “in your face” debriefing style. AIRPAC reported that it had difficulty finding senior enlisted personnel to go on the deployment. ceyernce> c. Neither CVW.3 nor EISENHOWER personnel appear to have undertaken any special efforts to assess compliance with pregnancy testing requirements before deployment. The few pregnancies that occurred during the deployment were blown all cut of proportion by the press. Medical personnel participating in the West Coast deployment cited the EISENHOWER pregnancies to justify conducting ‘a “baseline” pregnancy test of all women at the start of the LINCOLN deployment. d. The original berthing plan aboard the EISENHOWER called for segregating the women in the 0-2 berthing spaces, normally reserved for more senior aviators. These plans were scrapped when it became apparent that there was insufficient space for the men in other spaces and it became necessary to “integrate” the 0-2 berthing areas with men. The LINCOLN was able to maintain its 0-2 berthing spaces exclusively for women, which was not well received by men or women. e. During its deployment, CVW-3 never called a “women only” meeting. The CVW-11 CAG called two: fone at the start, the other at the end, of the CVW-11 deployment 1. The CAG for CVW-3 served in that position throughout the work-up and most of the deployment; his ‘change of command occurred just before the EISENHOWER returned from its deployed station. By contrast, the CVW-11 change of command took place about one month before the start of its deployment. men and women reported a change in command climate after the turnover. Some simply believed the new CAG was less "people oriented:” others thought he was biased against women. 9. Although the policy in CVW-3 was “equal treatment,” it never established or articulated a “gender neutral” policy by name. The unstated, but clearly understood leadership policy was that there would be an honest effort to help every member of the wing, male or female, do their best. By contrast, the policy in CVW-11, as dictated by COMNAVAIRPAG, required strict application of the “gender neutral” policy so that no action could be considered “preferential treatment” for women assigned to TACAIR. hh. Two female nugget F-18 pilots in CVW-3 were top performers. The men felt challenged to do better, and the performance of both squadrons improved. During the work-ups for the next deployment, one of those pilots was ranked in the top ten for air wing landing grades. i. Although the EISENHOWER was returning from its deployment as the LINCOLN was preparing to depart, the CVW-3 CAG recalls no contacts with CVW-11 personnel attempting to discuss any issues ‘elating to integration or obtain “lessons learned.” 74. Before going further, it is appropriate to examine the interrelationship of the "gender neutral” policy and leadership in CVW-11 16 -FOR-OFFIGIM-USE-ONEXNAVINSGEN No. 951295: cvW-11 LEADERSHIP AND THE GENDER NEUTRAL POLICY 75. "Gender Neutral” was the policy articulated by VADM Spane, COMNAVAIRPAC, to be applied to all issues relating to integration of women. Of course, he did not originate the policy The need for such an approach to integration was a key point made by the President's Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces." 76. This investigation did not produce any written instruction that identified "gender neutral” as an integration policy. But the phrase was used by everyone asked to explain the integration policy of the wing and will be referred to in this report as if it were a policy set forth in an instruction. It certainly was a policy known by virtually the entire air wing. Nobody who was asked what the policy toward women was failed to respond with the phrase “gender neutral.” In fact, some of the more senior people interviewed repeated the phrase as if it were a mantra, 77. VADM Spane told his people, and the NAVINSGEN investigators, that no matter what the issue was it would have to be resolved in a gender neutral manner. He shared this position with his staff and commanding officers at every opportunity. 78. Although, as explained by VADM Spane, gender neutrality means "everybody is the same” he did not intend that the policy would rule out treating people as individuals. Properly interpreted, it should not preclude giving struggling aviators extra help, provided everyone met the same standards at the end. VADM Spane viewed this as a leadership issue, and explained that its proper application did allow for differences in individuals: ‘A. ... The other major issue that we always talked about was gender neutral, that whatever the programs were, whatever the policy was it had to be gender neutral and had to look at gender neutrality. But ... what does that mean ... we came to the conclusion that the final exams in the RAG had to be gender neutral, the treatment in the ships had to be gender neutral, but certainly since it was ‘a program that had to get started and different learning curves and different things, you could argue that the training itself could be slightly different as long as each final exam was the same. ... | talk with every PCO/PXO course and every department head leadership course and every time there is a segment about women, and i's always the same pitch, gender neutral, here's a great example of [Russian] women fighter pilots in World War Il, i's not @ motor skils/bravery issue, the issues are social in nature and they can be worked out. 79. As applied by some of his subordinates, however, VADM Spane's stated position of gender neutrality became an example of how an appropriate policy can lead to unintended consequences. In practice, it did not help to identify examples of leadership success. Rather. invocation of the phrase, by witnesses to explain a decision became a tool the NAVINSGEN investigators could use to identify leadership failures. 80. In theory, gender neutral decision making is a goal we as a society, nationwide and in the Navy, are striving to achieve. It is comparable to earlier efforts to build a “color blind” society. The TYCOM's requirement that all issues arising from the integration be resolved in a gender neutral manner is unimpeachable. It is the unintended consequence of that policy when applied by weak leaders, that is subject to criticism. Understanding how the policy came to be misapplied “The February 1993 issue of “Proceedings” contains an interesting discussion of the Commission.” FOR OFFICIAL USE-ONLY 7NAVINSGEN No, 951295: CVW.11 within AIRPAG thus becomes a study in leadership skills; one who does not examine the issues raised in this report from that perspective will miss the principal lesson to be drawn from it. 81. Begin with the premise that a major obligation of all commanding officers is to train and develop their people. They are in essence teachers, people committed to improving those entrusted to them. They are not, as some would argue, merely evaluators - individuals who simply observe and grade. Evaluations are necessary but they come later, after the commanding officers have done all they can to impart their knowledge and skills to subordinates, 82. Certainly no two commanding officers are just alike; some are more successful than others in imparting their knowledge and developing their subordinates. The crucial attnbute that distinguishes the successful commanding officer from the less successful is leadership. To understand that some commanding officers are better than others is simply to recognize that there is a spectrum of leadership and that our commanding officers fall along it. 83. Every commanding officer should know, certainly all leaders know it innately, that we are all different; we leam differently, we react differently to pressures, we have personal likes and dislikes, we are motivated differently. Great leaders discover in those they lead the individual strings that need to be pulled to develop each of their charges to the fullest, to maximize their strengths and to minimize their weaknesses. 84. To do this the leaders, our commanding officers and senior enlisted, must be fully engaged with their people. They must take the time to know them, care about them, understand them and help them. And they must be perceived as having these feelings for their subordinates. Without the personal engagement of the commanding officer no command will excel and only the extraordinary junior officer or enlisted will prosper. The Secretary of the Navy has repeatedly stated: Is there a single formula for leadership? ....No. But there is an attitude that each individual can foster with elf or herself. ... as a naval leader, remember, you are the Navy. ... To the individual Sailor _ the Navy is his or her immediate Division, his or her shipmates, and particularly the senior enlisted ‘and officers who are the direct supervisors. ... How he or she is treated by the members of that unit determines how he or she perceives being treated by the Navy 85. Military historians often have pointed out that at the most instinctive level, people do not fight for principle or for country, but out of loyalty to leaders and shipmates: ‘What causes our Sailors and marines to follow us ... What motivates ther ... What inspires them to give their very best? I's the trust and respect that our Sailors and Marines hold for their superiors ... who lead them. It's the knowledge that naval leaders are loolung after the best interests of their Sailors and Marines. 86. But if a commanding officer adopts the wrong interpretation of the gender neutral policy, biindly treating "everyone alike” without regard for their differences and the needs generated by those differences, then he or she will disengage from his people, will passively abdicate the role of leader, and consequently will not gain the trust and respect that results from the belief that the CO js looking out for every member of the command That is what happened in some of the squadrons in CVW-14 18 FORCOPPICIAL-USE-ONTY—NAVINSGEN No. 951295 cvw.tt 87. The weaker CVW-11 skippers thought the "gender neutral” policy prohibited them from providing individualized training for the women, or they used it as an excuse to avoid criticism they feared might come from subordinates and peers who were not favorably disposed to women in TACAIR, These skippers failed to recognize that all new pilots (male and female), especially in the high pressure environment of TACAIR, need individual attention, Naval aviation has been doing that since it was founded. 88. Gender neutral does not prevent giving a nugget, male or female, extra flights, an assigned mentor, additional debriefs or an encouraging word. Yet, unfortunately, that is how some applied it 89. Gender neutral applied property would preclude giving a woman pilot an extra flight because ‘she was a woman, it should not prevent a commanding officer from deciding that one of his pilots, who happened to be a woman, needed an extra flight to work on a noted deficiency. It would not prohibit using different debriefing styles for two different pilots, if the skipper knew that one pilot responded positively to a particular style and the other pilot reacted negatively to that same style, even if one of those pilots was a woman, 90. The distinction is easy to describe but its application requires strong leaders. Everyone realized that any difference in treatment between men and women during the initial integration of TACAIR was going to be placed under a spotlight. Every action would be subjected to second ‘guessing and impugned motives. The weaker commanding officers, and other like minded senior officers, wishing to avoid cniticism that they were giving women preferential treatment chose an easy way oul, they disengaged. They avoided creating an appearance of discrimination at the cost of neglecting their people. 91. One female pilot observed the difference leadership makes in a squadron: In there were no problems in assimilating women into the command. ... The CO ... was a very demanaing but fair man who was on-board with the integration of women in the squadron. Considering his background he was completely imparuar .. ne was JUSt 4S nara on us as Ne Was ON Ine men, ana sto00 up ‘oF all his, people with equal fortitude. | have great admiration for him because of the professionalism he exhibited in leading the squadron through the change of integrating women. The members of the wardroom also ‘welcomed us ... by the time we went on cruise six months later, it was like going on a long family outing ‘with 30 “brothers.” | felt very fortunate to be a member of the especially when | would hear stories from some of the other gals in the air wing about difficures eaperienced with some of their {fellow squadronmates ot XOs and COs. | never felt disliked by any of the guys in my squadron. They based acceptance on personality, not gender, and if they had any reservations about us being there, they certainly never voiced them to anyone CEL) | will never forget the day in April of 1993 when it was announced by Les Aspin that we would finally be allowed to fly in combat squadrons. My XO at the time ... sulked around the squadron and refused to congratulate us or even speak to the female aviators in his squadron. His next tour ... was XO of ‘one of the where he would be responsible for the welfare of men and women in mis syueur 19(8)¢79€e) oer > €a)e79¢ 5 X72€) NAVINSGEN No 951295 CWWe1t 92. Leading by example, effective COs created that "band of brothers" within their squadrons that is essential to unit cohesiveness. Squadrons commanded by weak leaders exhibited divisiveness between men and women that the COs were unable, or unwiling, to address. 93. The tendency to pull back, to take the less dangerous road possibly affected even the TYCOM. In the case of one of the complainants, — the circumstances that led to her being in TACAIR and those surrounding the fligi wat wed to her FNAEB, in light of her demonstrated skills a5 2 non-camier pilot, made for a strong argument thal the TYCOM should have considered making an exception to the general rule distavoring a change from one platform to another. 94. VADM Spane told the NAVINSGEN investigators that permitting a pilot to change platforms is wrong for two reasons. First, he argued it incorrectly concludes that some types of aircraft are easier to fly than others (P-3 v. F-14), Second, he asserted it creates a morale issue in the gaining community. The pilots in the gaining command, it is feared, will feel like second class aviators, and that their community is a dumping ground for failures from the other communities. 95. Notwithstanding his stated reasons, which are advanced by many in the aviation community VADM Spane’s refusal to consider transition to @ non-carier community in case, discussed later, is unreasonable. Most rules, including this one, are supject to making ‘exceptions; refusal to even consider an exception appeared to be based on VADM Spane's desire to avoid being criticized for giving a woman special treatment. The admiral should have remembered that gender neutral precludes giving a pilot special treatment because she is a woman, it does not preclude giving special treatment to a pilot who happens to be a woman."* 96, There are other, more invidious aspects to the gender-neutral policy that must be discussed As noted above, a negative aspect of the policy was that it could be used to characterize as improper “preferential treatment” any attempt to give extra help to a woman. The phrase “preferential treatment” served to stigmatize any deviation from common practice that was employed to assist a female aviator. Many women said they wanted to blend in, to be treated just ike the men, and from this standpoint the policy appeared helpful. But the anonymity and invisibility created by the policy also made the chain-of-command less likely to recognize the isolation of some women, the lack of encouragement from their fellow pilots, the erosion of self- esteem caused by unintended slights. Gender neutrality, as applied in some ready-rooms, meant that there would be minimal accommodation to the presence of women. It meant that the women were free to adapt to the behavioral standards of the male ready-room culture, but dare not express their uniqueness as warriors in their own right for fear it would change that atmosphere. 97. One woman, offered a competing theory that merits consideration: ** VADM Spane's position on platform changes (and he acknowledged that there are circumstances where an exception would be proper), is not Navy policy. The Navy routinely permits, under certain citcumstances, failed submariners and aviators to change their designation to surface warfare and, as discussed tater, aviators have been permitted to change platforms from time to time. There are several strong arguments for permitting this, including tax dollar savings and retention of dedicated personnel. This practice has not lead the surface navy to develop an inferiority complex. It is also important to note that COMNAVAIRLANT allowed a female aviator FNAEBd by uring its intial integrated deployment to change platforms 20 FOR -OF FICIAL USE-OntY—(oX27C0) NAVINSGEN No. 951295. cvw.tt [A I-my personal opinion, because | was listening to that Nighline thing the other night, and they were saying “Oh. The aircraft doesrit know the gender.” Well, | think that's true, | think that competency isnot at issue. Youre going to have crappy pilots that are worien and men, and really excellent ones that are women and men, I's just lke shooting a gun. There's no difference. But | think its—it's ooking—being stupid to say that there's not a difference in the real world. They talk about going, you know, of a lot of times people are like, “Oh. I's gender neutral. We need to move towards gender neutral” To me-and this is just my opinion—but gender neutral seems to be more the guys still being the guys and the women being guys. And I don’ believe in that. My personal opinion is the way I'm going to finish out my time as long as that gets to be in the Navy. a5 long as they'll keep me around, but I'm going to finish my time being an officer and a lady ‘And think that officers [men] should be officers and gentlemen. ... where | finally made that decision was way back in VT-10. The skipper there brought us in; there was six women there at the time. He brought us all in, and he sat us down and told us that—that the teachers would no longer tell jokes. the inappropriate—what do you call the inappropriate jokes, at the beginning of class, And he asked us ‘what we thought, and one git said that-one git was really adamant: “No, that's not the way i should be And another couple gits were Fke “Oh, Yeah. We're glad.” And | looked at it, and | was thinking this is going to be bad because everyone's going to blame us that this happened But | told the guy at the time, | was ike, "You know, sit.” go, Im ike, “I you're not-if you're doing that because i's unprofessional and it shouldn't-they shoukint be told because i's just unprofessional, then you should do that, But if you're doing it because we're women in there and you're not going to tell them, then that's not the reason to do i” And he said, “Well, you're looking at the world through rose colored glasses, if that's the way you think itis. You know, we're going to"-1 don’ think so ‘And maybe I'm an idealist and that's stupid, but, to me, you know. if| walk into the ready room and the guys are talking about something inappropriate and they look up and stop their conversation, because I'm there, that just makes me feel like an outsider and stupid, And my hope is that they wouldn't have the conversation in the first place except in their state rooms because i's just not professional, if Airman Smuckatell walks in and hears them talking ike that. He's going to think, “Wow. This is somebody that I'm supposed to respect and work for?” And that’s the-you know, i's hard. It's really hard being out there sometimes and you are a minority. And I think that there are things that {guys would never think of once doing to an Altican American; they woukin' think of making a crack about blacks, but they'll make cracks about women, and its okay, and i's kind of accepted, and it's frustrating, and it does make you fee! lke an outsider. But | think i's just going to go away with time. But I stil think that we could act more professional and make life a lot better for each other, But 1'm not going to go around and be a guy. | just don't agree with that, But'm going to go out there and 1'm going to do my job exactly as hard and be at just as much risk, when we go fy, you know. whatever happens in the future, And found that—that my way of thinking has been pretty well accepted and isnt offensive; it doesn’ tick people off, and they'e wiling to accept that. And I'm wiling to have the problems that | have along the way for that for whatever they might be. 98 “Wattnewextreme ease) gender riéutalty is nothing! more tan’ a! code word Tor passive (eegeeece comer ceReIRR OT NAVINSGEN investigators did not develop sufficient evidence to conclude the gender neutral policy was used this way in CVW-11, but they can not completely discount it either. The broader question for Navy leadership to address, however, is, why signals from Washington were not more clear. Was it necessary to apply a strict “gender neutral" policy? Obviously CVW-3 thought not. But was there a message from Washington that ‘encouraged commands to take a proactive approach to integrating women into combat aviation? NAVINSGEN found no evidence of it. 99. The NAVINSGEN investigators were Surprised and disappointed by the leadership qualities ahi ony SRR RR. Ironically, one of the people who did take a proactive integration of women was —FOR-OFFICIALUSE ONLY — 2NAVINSGEN No. 951295 CMW.At Yet he did not hesitate to give extra help where he perceived it necessary, and VADM Spane said his treatment of LT Lohrenz and LT Hultgren demonstrated proper application of the gender neutral policy: Q. Did you learn anything in particular from Admiral Bien's [CARGRU 7] report {about training women in VF-124] that you found useful? ‘A. [learned that the system was attempting to work the best it could, that, like anything, there are Variances about the mean, but that in the final analysis and at the final exam it was gender neutral and == was trying to do his job and I suspect everybody was trying to do their job, (6) e that 100. It is now time to tum to LT Lohrenz’ experience in the FRS. END OF TEXT 22NAVINSGEN Mo 951295 C¥w.ty LT LOHRENZ IN VF-124 - THE FRS Earty Training 101. LT Lohrenz’ father and brother were naval aviators. She did not participate in the University of Wisconsin ROTC program,'* but joined the Navy and entered the Aviation Officer Candidate School (AOCS) program after her graduation from college in 1990. In May 1991 LT Lohrenz graduated from AOCS with academic honors and received her commission. She did well in Primary Flight Training, completing the program in February 1992 with honors. Intermediate and Advanced Flight Training in jet aircraft followed. LT Lohrenz completed this phase of her training in June 1993, and received her designation as a naval aviator. 102. Because LT Lohrenz' overall performance in flight training ranked her in the top 10% of her graduating class, she was afforded the opportunity to enter combat training: she selected the F-14 for her combat platform. In July 1993, she reported to VF-124, an FRS, for F-14 training. At that time, LT Kara Hultgren" was the only other female pilot in the FRS. Later, they were joined by a third female aviator, who was a RIO. Allegation of Hostility in FRS 103. At this point in her career, LT Lohrenz began to experience difficulties. She and her parents assert that hostility toward women in VF-124, coupled with intense media pressure, were responsible, at least in part, for these difficulties. Despite these problems, LT Lohrenz successfully completed the training program and qualified in the F-14, In August 1994, she, along with LT Hultgreen and the female RIO, were assigned o CVW-11 and became part of the wing's initial workup and deployment with women assigned to combat positions. 104. Before examining conditions in VF-124, itis necessary to clarify an important point. Neither» of sovul harseunnPRABUn Goia elUe WOMRap toed” Tra tom ot cream of sexual hi i c "This form of discrimination typically involves a continuous barrage of lewd jokes or similar disparaging comments of a sexual nature, displays of explicit or sexually suggestive material, or repeated requests for a sexual or dating relationship made by others in the workplace. These complainants do not contend, and NAVINSGEN found no evidence to suggest, there was any pattem of such conduct as to create hostile working environment in VF-124, 105, The hostility LT Lohrenz and her parents object to took the form of questions about the capability of women to be effective combat aviators, assertions that women were given preferential treatment in the form of additional practice in order to meet training standards and, in the more extreme cases, speculation that instructors gave passing grades to women even when their performance did not meet the minimum standards to which men were held, Hostility ** During her FNAEB, this decision was used to question LT Lohrenz’ motivation to be a naval aviator "” LT Huttgreen was an experienced naval pilot with many hours in another aircraft. A vocal proponent of ‘opening combat aviation to women, she jumped at the opportunity to be one of the first women to deploy with a TACAIR squadron. Yet, just ike Lohrenz, she had to learn, and qualify, o land on a carer before she could enter combat aviation -FOR-OFFIGIAL-USE-ONLY- 23(6X72C) NAVINSGEN No 951295 Cwatt also 15 alleged to have been demonstrated by a reluctance on the part of some to provide reasonable assistance to help women pilots lear to fly or to undertake anything beyond the very minimum effort necessary to provide adequate training, assistance, and evaluation Findings of Fact 106, This issue was first examined and commented upon by RADM Lyle Bien, Commander, Cartier Group Seven (CARGRU7), who was tasked to investigate the training and performance of women in VF-124. In a May 1995 memorandum, he stated | found no small number of VF-124 instructors who were emobonally predisposed to see:{women aviators} fail Two incidents involving LT Dunai {Lohrenz] and one invoWing LT Hultgren clearly ‘exempliy this attitude: on one night famiarization fight, LT Ounai was given a “Signal of Difficuty” warning after she brought her F-14 into the pits with the nght engine stil turning, and; on another ‘occasion, during a tactics flight, LT Dunai specifically asked the instructor RIO for information regarding procedures. His reply was “I'm here to evaluate, not grve wnstiuction.” In both instances, the instructor RIO could and should have intervened, in the frst instance by reminding LT Dunai to shut down her engine and in the second by giving her the requested information, Worse, his failure to remind LT Dunai to secure the engine placed members of the ground crew in possible jeopardy. The incident with LT Huttgreen is similar. While practicing low-level bombang runs, the instructor RIO allowed LT Hutgreen to repeat significant ertors - errors which might have placed the aircraf in danger had actual bombs been dropped - without correction until after the fight In this instance, the instructor graded the fight a “down” and recommended a refly. 107. The November 1995 CINCPACFLT IG investigation reported that: interviews with junior and senior officers — both instructors and students ~ revealed some instructors ‘were openly hostile to the assimilation of women into fighter aviation and the associated media interest 108. During his interview with the NAVINSGEN investigators, the at the time staled: there were probably half a dozen people that didn1 tke this female aviator business in the fighter community. But, | mean, it wasn't overt where | could put my finger on it and say come here, sit down, we're going to have a chat. 109, A VF-124 instructor told NAVINSGEN that My impression was that there were a certain number of very select individuals that were against having ‘women fly in combat, but the large majority of the people that were there were — had accepted that, ‘as our mission was to train females tke we had trained all the males preceding them ... And | dont believe that there was an altitude that where we collectvely, as instructors, are going to make it hard ‘or we're going to prove a point to our superiors by skewing the syllabus one way or the other to make ‘tGitficut for the females to successfully complete the syllabus ... But my bottom line was that | fett there were a select few that were against ft, but the large majonty was — had taken it on board as our mission to do thal and to treat them like any other aviator who walks through the door. They all start ‘on the same level and progress from there at their own abulty 110. When the NAVINSGEN investigators asked LT Lohrenz to comment on the attitude toward women in VF-124, she said 24 PORCOFFICIALUSE-ONLYcare ?Me> NAVINSGEN No 951295 Cvw.tt | think that there is some good and some not so good. There were some people who were fairly ‘supportive and other people that were definitely not supportive and who had in just ready room banter and conversation, made their feelings quite obvious about what they thought about women fiying in combat. I'm not sure that | would say that it was split $0-50, for lack of a better way to put it, pro: ‘women and anti-women, and | dont mean it to sound that strongly. But there were definitely — there was definitely a handful of RIO's who didnt want them there 114, The report of the Human Factors Committee convened in April 1994 contained the following statement about the pressure LT Lohrenz perceived, which did not include hostility LTJG Dunai found that the CO text, lectures, trainers and FCLPs were very adequate and that the LSO debriefs were always full and exacting ... With the start of her FCLP workup LTJG Dunai states that she began to let some external pressures get through to her and affect her performance. These pressures resulted from feeling “under the spotiight” through being one of the first two females in F-14 training. This pressure, which had aways been present. but while “hacking the program” was deat with, surfaced when LTJG Dunai found the going more difficult, She states that she developed a powerful fear of failure which manifested itself in extreme nervousness prior to and during fight. If she flew a particularly poor pass, got sent back to base earker than expected, or received a “tough, tell it like it is debrief she woud assume the worst, i... that she was about to be removed trom the program, This intense fear of failure led to a vicious citcle from which she could not extricate herself for some weeks. ... That extra pressure caused by the “spolight” factor will not go away soon and will certainty continue into a front line tour NAVINSGEN Conclusion 112. Based on the foregoing evidence, NAVINSGEN concludes some individuals were hostile toward LT Lohrenz and other women in VF-124, but that hostility did not impede LT Lohrenz’ performance in the FRS."* Some of the pressure LT Lohrenz experienced was selt-induced due to feeling that she was in the “spotlight” and to a negative aspect of the desire to succeed: the fear of failure. Nonetheless, she was successful in the FRS and her performance mented transition to CVW-11 for work-ups and deployment on the LINCOLN. . Reasons for Hostility 113. When LT Lohrenz reported to VF-124, morale was low and leadership was weak. The immediate cause of these problems was the temporary suspension ISO, ine FAS WaS Schedules 10 De Gecommissiones. more geneially, personnel in VF-124, part of the TACAIR community, reacted to the events mentioned in the background section of this report in the same way as did personnel in other TACAIR units, 114. Within VF-124, RADM Bien identified several reasons for resentment or hostility toward the female aviators in his January 1995 report. They included: (1) direct input of females into the FRS ahead of male students who may have been waiting in a pool up to a year. (2) personal visits and recognition from senior officers, VIPS, and the press; (3) frequent calls from a senior female Naval aviator in Washington to inquire into the status and progress of the womenyand (4) personal congratulations on the bridge from the commanding officer of the aircraft carrier following “In the next section, NAVINSGEN finds the stress imposed by positive media pressure did affect LT Lohrenz’ performance in the FRS FOR BERGA USE ONLY 25NAVINSGEN No 951295 CYA completion of the female pilots’ carrier qualification (CQ) while the male aviators were not similarly recognized, Perceptions of Preferential Grading 115. Another, more specific reason for hostility in VF-124 must be addressed because of the impact it eventually had on LT Lohrenz’ ability to function effectively. As noted in the background section, members of the TACAIR community were asking whether leadership was genuinely ‘committed to making integration succeed, and whether those leaders had the integrity to ensure integration would be accomplished in a fair manner that did not decrease combat effectiveness or readiness. In VF-124, some people believed their CO's commitment to getting women through the FRS program led him to compromise training standards. 146. About six months after LT Lohrenz left VF-124, this question was addressed in RADM Bier's investigation. That investigation examined allegations in a letter written by Elaine Donnelly of the Center for Miltary Readiness (the “Donnelly letter”), which asserted that the training standards were lowered and grades were changed for female pilots in VF-124 in order that they could pass and go on to the fleet. Findings of Fact 117. In his January 1995 report, RADM Bien said: ‘An impkcation raised throughout [the Donnelly letter] is that there was overt pressure placed on VF-124 Laz/*i@ to ensure that the female aviators ultimately completed the FRS. None of the 27 officers interviewed 2 Devn | could cite personal knowledge of any direction or ov ing applied to anyone inthe VF-124 jy a chain-of barat a oT Tene TH 1 am confident that, just as the “CO52Zcen commanding offcer testified, there was no official direction or pressure placed on him regarding the female aviators. Bur there was a persistent theme of perceived pressure on the command that warrants comment ‘Throughout the inquiry. | found considerable concern about perceived pressures on the commanding officer of VF-124, and others above and below him, with regard to the female aviators. Essentially all of the officers with whom | spoke felt that a combination of external factors, not all of them adverse, influenced the training of female aviators, to include motivating VF-124 to extend them special considerations, The interviewees felt it imperative that the Navy be successful in the Women at Sea ‘and Women in Combat initiatives. Moreover, many officers cited events like Tailhook and the TOMCAT Follies, and the issue involving Admiral Arthur and LT Hansen that, when taken together, created an atmosphere in which no officer wanted to appear to block the progress of integrating women into the Fleet. The Admiral Arthur incident is especially relevant to the question before this inquiry. Almost every officer interviewed mentioned this as a case where a four-star aviator took what appeared to them {as a correct and completely justified action to terminate the aviation training of a failing female officer. For his actions, he was seen to enjoy Kittle support while being effectively punished for his action. iven this highly charged environment, combined with the success orientation of naval aviators, | beleve that the junior officers’ impression that the Navy was predisposed to wanting these females to [succeed was well founded. That the three females were deserving of graduation and that the integrity of the evaluation process was upheld throughout their training is a fortunate coincidence. ake ty ‘ST. 118. RADM Bien ted to determine whether his perception infuances the acon of he CO 0 Aa) 1° the decisions of the instructors in making grade determinations. He reported 26 —FOR-OFFIGIAL USE-ONLY—3) 0IME) NAVINSGEN No 951285 CYW-11 ‘The [Donnelly] letter describes an incident in which the commanding officer of VF-124 allegedly directed ‘an instructor to change a fight grade from a “down” to an “up” during the final stages of LT Dunai’s Tactics phase. My interview with the instructor involved revealed this assertion to be false. Indeed, 1 could find no instance where that or any other instructor received direction to change a grade or the overall characterization of a fight. Relatedly, | actively pursued the question of whether the instructors feft they had the same latitude to call “a spade a spade" with the females as with the male aviators, They answered universally, “yes.” 149 The November 1995 CINPACFLT IG investigation report did not address this subject 120. When the NAVINSGEN investigators interviewed the the following exchange occurred: Q. Ithad been reported to us in another interview that, at the beginning of Lieutenant Lohrenz’ service in VF-124, that you addressed the instructors and told them that Lieutenant Lonrenz and Lieutenant Hungreen will pass the course, regardless of their abilities, A. Thatis a flat ass le. And whoever told you that, if they were under oath, should be taken to task 121. At another point in his interview, the CO gave, as a reason for his belief that the instructors, ‘as well as the students, were under stress ‘The fact that the Navy really did want this to work, and, frankly, | wanted it to work, but we weren't {going to drop our standards in order to make it work. In fact, maybe the AOM that you were referring to before, | stood up when | heard some rumors about the performance of the women. And I stood up and told them look, if you dont have the spine to look them in the eye and say look, you got a down here, you didn't do this right, if you can't write it in the grade sheet and give them a debrief, you cant expect me to go to the admiral and say hey, these women cant fly. You know, you've got to have the spine to do that. And you've got to document. If you can document it, then don't be running around whining. 122, Near the end of his interview, the CO stated How many different people flew with Dunai Lohrenz in the RAG? I dont know. | don't have her grade book. | flew with her several times. I never did get to fly with Huttgreen because the JOs liked flying with her. She could fly the airplane really aggressive. So! never got that — but if 'm being accused or accused of ordering that they're all going to graduate, you cant make six fighter RIOs and fighter pilots agree about something by order. And if more than six gave her good grades or acceptable ‘grades, then | contend that she was ready to go to the fleet 423. However, one instructor told the NAVINSGEN investigators: Being it was ditficut, because I'm trying to get the instructors to treat everybody the same, And | would get up and say. “Look, We've got one standard for everybody, and everybody performs the same, And that doesn't mean that because there are political sensitivities, that anybody makes it through if they're not cutting the course here. And there was real reluctance on some of the instructors parts. And this just doesn't go for females, it goes for others, to give anybody down, one. because they didn't want to be bad guy and two, they figured these people are going to go to the fleet anyway, regardless of what they did. And it didn't help my cause any one time when stands, up, and [says] “Read my lips, These women will make it to the fleet, and they will make #t on time, period, and we'll do whatever it takes to get them there.” If you want my opinion on where that pressure was coming, because i was out of character for” ‘10 say that, because he's, 6647) 6c) FOR OFFIGHALUSE ONDE 27NAVINSGEN No 951295 CYW-11 think that was coming from Admiral Spane, "We'll make it on time, and they ‘ym o@ inere, ana you guys will do what it takes to get them there.” 89076) 124, When asked if he could have misunderstood meaning, this officer went on to state that he later discussed it with “behind closea aoors* A... 1 said, “I'm going to have a real problem here with the instructors, because I've been telling everybody's to be treated equal, blah, blah, blah.” And he goes, "Well, these guys just dont understand, they will make it to the fleet.” And ~ “Okay.” Q. And that was essentially all he told you? A. Yes. sit 125, During the NAVINSGEN interview of another VF-124 instructor, the following exchange took place \Q ... When Lieutenant Lohtenz and [LT Hutgreen] were going through the FRS were they — the UY, allegation was that they were given special treatment, for instance. XA Yes, sir —Q And in the case of Lieutenant Lohrenz, that her aviating abilities weren't up to snuff; is that an X accurate description? SOA Yes. sir. \% And that that created some ~ | imagine some hate and discontent in the organization. A Yes, sit. Q What was done about that? A Specifically, there was @ meeting called an All Instructors Meeting that was held during ~ I don't remember the exact date, but early in 1994, | believe, where this issue was being discussed among the CO and his instructor staff on board. ... and {old the instructor staff that the women were ‘going to graduate regardless of how they perfortie. Were those his exact words? A Those ate not his exact words, but words to that effect, That's the impression that he gave? A Yes, sit 2. Regardless of how well they performed, that's a seemingly damaged statement. Did that ~ what did that statement mean to you? ‘A. Well, precisely what it meant; that the women were going to be graduated to the fleet, regardless ‘of how they performed Q Which means no matter how good or bad, or how bad they were, they were going to get graduated? A Yes. sit © Did that in fact occur? A. Well, in what regard specifically? Did you ever fy with these girts? A Yes, sir Did you ever give them a grade that they didn't deserve because they were women? A Nosir LQ Did anyone else? XA. Hthink in the overall atmosphere that you would have to say, yes, that some people probably did (Iwas an atmosphere wherein anytime anyone gave them less than a stefar evaluation, that person ‘J was placing their career on the ine Prod X 0" Od anyone's career suter rom making such an evaluation? ted a ‘A Not that 1am aware of “That was the overall impression that peopie had. Vea. 4 2 How was this impression created, by the statement of or = 28 FOR UFFICIALUSE-ONEY-NAVINSGEN No 951295 CVW-1! A Yes, sir. But you yoursel! provided honest evaluations and is that a correct statement? A No, | would have to say its not. | am probably just as guity as any of my compatriots of leaning the grades to the lighter side so that I did not have to deal with the political pressures that would be put on you if you were to give anything other than a passing grade A tetac wes CDE) Q Okay. If there were no consequences from giving a bad grade, do you think sould have created the mis-impression that he was willing to do something that he didn't do? . ww want to put ‘words in your mouth, but — A | would say that is conjecture, and | would have no way of knowing, Q- What I am trying to get to is that if something was threatened, but not delivered. From what you say. said he was going to graduate these folks regardless of how good ot bad they did? Assess ght And you felt pressure to pass ther as a consequence of what he said? A Yes, sit. Q But those who didn't pass them didn't suffer any penalty? A. No, sit. But you say as a consequence of statement that people gave them better grades than they deserved? A. I would have to say in that environment, yes, sit Was there a discretionary range normally afforded to nuggets based on a subjective evaluation, of was it greater than that? It was greater than that, at least in the case of Leutenant Dunai ‘She was [Dunai] at that time | guess? Yes, sir. Can you cite a specific example? Where she was afforded an opportunity that was not atforded someone else? That's right Justin the number of unsatisfactory performance evaluations that she was given, with no question being raised about it, about her capabilities and her competency How many were there? A. Imnot sure. Several, sir. poro>ro> 126. The third instructor"® the NAVINSGEN investigators interviewed said. A. 1do not recallif| was at that particular meeting, but | certainly recall overhearing other people relay that to me ... There were some rumors about the squadion that had received some phone calls from his superiors or high level individuals and this allanstructor meeting followed those rumors that were about the squadron and, again, | cannot recall! was there or not, but .. my impression of that meeting, whether | was there or not, was there were some concerns being raised about the performance and the progress of Lieutenant Dunat and her inability to progress at a normal pace through the tactics phase, and I think that’s when made the statement thal this is the way i's ‘going to be, that these females are going to the VF-414 and tha''s already been decided and they will ‘graduate from the FRS. ‘Q. But when people heard the statement they will graduate regardless, was the atmosphere in the squadron, was it the perception that that meant that they would graduate with below standard performance of that they would simply be kept there until they were able to complete the syllabus? SEEING ) A fourth instructor was interviewed, but he left the squadron before the events in question occurred Other instructors were not available for interview ——FOR-O FICIAL UEE-ONEY— 29ereey cence) MAVINSGEN No 951295 CVW.11 A never — and believe he was fairly clear on this, was that he supported his instructors and if the mnsuwuctor saw an unsatisfactory performance, then he was to record it as such, and if there was, ‘a below average performance, record it as such, if it was above average, record it as such, And ~~ would always back his instructors because he trusted us, and he said on many occasions that we were the best in the fleet to choose from to come do this mission and that’s why we were here and to calla spade a spade, and that was his bottom line, In answering your question whether the writing was ‘on the wall for the females to go fo VF-213, make it happen at all cost. | don't believe that that was his, policy and | don't believe that that was understood by any other instructor to be the policy. And this was — this came at a time when it was fairly late in the syllabus for both Lieutenant Dunai, Lieutenant Huttgreen and ithe female RIO}, Discussion 127. NAVINSGEN has the duty to resolve conflicting evidence and reach a conclusion, if t can do so. If ~ had directed that grades be changed or that lower standards be used to measure the performance ‘or women, it would be adverse to his interests to admit it. There is no particular reason why the instructors would feel it necessary to invent such a story. Despite the findings of RADM Bien and the protestations of it is more likely than not that said something that led at least three of the VF-124 instructors to conclude that “these women wu 1aKe it to the fleet” 128. Yet none of the instructors asserted that had expressly directed anyone to change grades or {grade the women higher than their performance deserved, Indeed, the third instructor expressed the belief that ‘would attempt fo protect any instructor who honestly gave low grades for poor performance. 129. The comments of the second instructor are particularly interesting. Although he asserts that the instructors, including himself, graded women easier than the men out of fear for their careers, he admits that there was no penalty imposed for doing otherwise. Indeed, he finally concludes that the special opportunity given to LT Lohrenz was receiving more unsatisfactory grades than men without being dropped from the program, 130, This, coupled with the additional training provided LTs Hutgreen and Lohrenz discussed below. suggests that when ‘said something to the effect that the women would pass, he meant that the Instructors must be wwsg to spend extra time with the women, and provide them more training opportunities if that would make it possible for them to meet standards. However, when the instructors heard this, given their morale and other reasons cited for resenting women, some interpreted it to mean that they were to pass them regardless of their performance. 131 standards upon leaving the FRS is the performance of LTS. |. Both performed at an Had they received inflated grades in order to complete FRS training, they would have been unable to demonstrate the required level of performance upon thelr arival in CVW-11 NAVINSGEN Conclusion 132. Based on the foregoing evidence and analysis, NAVINSGEN concludes the female pilots in VF-124 did not receive i END OF TEXT 30 FOR -OFFIGIAL-USE-ONEY————NAVINSGEN Ne. 951295: CVW.11 erceptions of Preferential Training Opportunities 133, In his report, RADM Bien addressed another form of preferential treatment alleged to have been afforded the female pilots in VF-124 that tended to create hostility. This was the charge that, even if they eventually did meet standards, women had to be given more opportunities to practice or train in order to meet those standards then men. Had a male pilot required such “special consideration” to meet standards, so the argument went, he would have been dropped from the program. This allegation would haunt LT Lohrenz throughout her time in CVW-11 134, In his report, RADM Bien stated: | bekeve the perceptions that gave rise to [the Donnelly later] are reflective of the means by which the female aviators met the standards, not that any standards were lowered. | found evidence of special considerations given to the three female aviators during their course of instruction. In the cases of LT Kara Hultgren and these considerations were neither unreasonable nor extraordinary In the case of the remaining prot, LT Carey Dunai (now Lohren2), significantly greater concessions were made. Examples include a greater number of sorties, especially during the Tactics phase of instruction, a less strenuous fight schedule during that phase, a second opportunity to cartier quality despite performing poorly on the first attempt, and the provision of a fully ready spare airplane during the Tactics phase. With the exception of the “Iuming spare" aircran, none of these special considerations is unprecedented. To be sure, extending extra help (special considerations) to students. ‘male or female, is @ hallmark of the success of any FRS. What is unusual in the case of LT Dunai ss the combi i ¢ of instruction. Many of the officers interviewed, especially junior officers, thought the amount and nature of the accommodations extended to LT Dunai were excessive. In my opinion and that of the FRS commanding officer, the ‘question of special considerations for individual student officers at the FRS is largely a matter within the legitimate discretion of the commanding officer. As long as safety and common standards are maintained and progress is apparent, the FRS should accommodate a reasonable range of “learning curves.” | believe that VF-124 was generous but reasonable in making the concessions fisted to ‘accommodate the learning curve of LT Dunai : B)670Le) 135. The November 1995 CINCPACFLT IG investigation report also made reference to additional efforts made on behalf of LT Lohrenz while addressing the allegation that the instructional environment in the FRS was poor. Additional carrier qualifcation opportunities, frequent interaction with the commanding officer, earmarking of spare aircraf to ensure required fight training was completed, and fight logbook entries revealing significantly more fight hours than a typical fist tour FRS graduate normally receives suggest 2 maximum effort was made to provide LT Lohrenz with a high qualty introduction to the F-14 Reviewers should note that 458 hours of total pilot time was recorded in LT Lohrenz’ fight log book at FRS graduation, compared to average recordings of 415 hours in randomly selected first tour F-14A Pilot log books at similar points in their careers. This disparity in fight hours between LT Lohrenz and other first tour contemporaries. suggests to the investigating team thal many extra fights were ‘scheduled and flown in VF-124 to ensure requited training milestones were property completed” * LT Lohrenz took exception to the implication that her “interaction” with the CO was any more “frequent” than that of other pilots in the FRS. She also objected to the statement that she logged more fight hours than others. As discussed later in this report, the CO denied that he had more contact with LT Lohrenz than others and NAVINSGEN was unable to “develop any evidence to support the statement that LT Lohrenz received more fight time than other student pilots in the FRS. —FOR-OFFIGIAL-USE-ONLY 31 NAVINSGEN Mo 951295 Cvwatt demanding world of camer aviation, no distraction should be welcomed or tolerated if it can be prevented 154, In hindsight, the Navy should have deflected, as much as possible, the media's focused attention on individual aviators. It should have provided general stories until after a successful deployment, and should not have subjected the pilots to specific media inquiries. Allegation That Media Coverage In The FRS Added To Stress 155, Mr. and Mrs. Dunai alleged that LT Lohrenz was subjected to “a difficult situation” due, in art, to “intense focus on the two women” in VF-124. NAVINSGEN and the CINCPACFLT investigators have inferred Mr. and Mrs. Dunai were referring to “intense media focus.” The CINCPACFLT investigation examined the negative media coverage resutting from the Donnelly letter, published in January 1995, but it did not examine the effect of positive coverage while LT Lohrenz was assigned to the FRS in 1993 and 1994 Fine s of 156. LT Lohrenz told the NAVINSGEN investigators: ‘There was all sorts of media attention. The press was calling all the time to the ready tom and it just made for a pretty uncomfortable situation. It was one that | hadn't really deat with before, | didnt really expect it to be — there to be such a barrage of interest. Because | had been — when | went through the training command | was pretty much — once | got to jets, the only girl ever in my squadion, in my class ~ | mean, there were some gitts quite 2 few months behind me, so | had done a couple of interviews and the guys never ~ never really thought much about it. They — you know, they thought it was a bad deal because I'd get pulled off the fight schedule for a half a day and they knew it was 2 pain and they didn’ really make a big deal out of it. And it certainly didnt seem like there was any sort of animosity. But once we got to the RAG and there was all that interest, it seemed like the ‘environment changed. We were invited over to [the COs} house for a sort of welcome aboard and this is — I think it was either his house maybe, or it was the XO's. | can't remember at that time, | thought it was his house but it may have been the XO’s. But he was there, so that was the first time that | had met him, and hhe was hoping to come back to the squadron pretty soon. And eventually that got ironed out and he id come back, He was as supportive as | think @ skipper probably in his position could have been, of us. He knew my position on talking to the media, and that I didn't want to deal with them. Any attention to me seemed to be negative attention and it surely wasn’ efciting a positive response from ‘anybody in the ready room who was fielding any of these calls. So, I didn't really want to have anything to do with that. Ueutenant Hultgren, who had been more experienced and had been in the Navy for three or four ‘more years longer than I, had had a fot more experience with pubic affairs, and she fked working with the press and | think that interested her a fttte more. So for me it was easier because it took the heat off of me because she didn't mind as much, | dont think, But for me it was very unwelcome because of all the hostiities. But, tke | said | think that the skipper of the squadron was as supportive as he could have been ‘and was a screen for us that if anybody called him directly. he would try to tell them, "No, they really don’t want fo talk fo you until they're done qualifying, and that's when they feel Ike maybe they can talk, because then they'e a qualified fleet aviator. But try to leave them alone until then.” 157. The NAVINSGEN investigators discussed media coverage in the FRS with 40 FOR OFFIGIAL-USE-ONEY-NAVINSGEN Ne. 951295. cvw.11 Do you think the intense media focus on women was a stressor for the women students? Sure. Can you expand on that? When they originally got there, you know, it was the big race between us and the Air Force, who's ‘going to have the first fernale fighter pilot. Q. Who was forcing that race on you? Is it an appropriate thing to say? A. Well — . Who started the race and did you feel the pressure of the race and from whom, if you did? ‘A. Well, we had our PAs in the Navy who would call — they wouldnt call me, they'd call AIRPAC, ‘who, in tum, would let us know that boy, the interest is high and we'd sure fke to make this happen and get this done. Well, so! approached the women about it and not until I got back from being TAD for roughing did | have a chance to do this. So, I talked to them about that and Kara.Hutgreen and Catey and [the RIO] said look, why dont we do one to start with because if — Kera*had a lot of experience in this because she had been in VAQ33 and been one of the fist aviators to get jets and ail that. So she said let's just do one to start and then keep them away from us because we want to team how to fly and be good wing men and be good fighter pilots. And then, when we're all done, then we'll talk to them. But we dont want to — they'll be hounding us throughout all ofthis. Q. Were you able to screen them, according to their wishes? ‘A. Yes. We did the one interview to start and then, whenever somebody would call, and we got calls {rom D.C., how are they doing, they don't want to talk to you. Pore 158. One VF-124 officer told NAVINSGEN that: A. We actually fended off the media pretty well. | did not want it there, 1 did not wan it there because | felt it would be a big distracuon, anu 1 would have been, And it wou nave veen rar to ane other students, either, to see all this attention being accorded to ‘8 few individuals. And then there was enough of that as it was. | mean, because Hultgreen and Dunai and —""" were already highlighted because of who they were coming in. But we did the best inai we couio. And their classmates, | thought, accepted the situation very well Q. Okay. If any of those women would have come up to you and said they were having trouble ‘compartmentalizing because of the perceived media focus or attention, was there any avenues in place that you guys would do something about that, or allow them to sit out, time out, or whatever? What did you have going there? A. Well, it didn't occur, fortunately. So, | did not have to deal with that issue. And a lot of that had to do with Huligreei's leadership. And we sat down and talked and said, “Look. This is big interest know the news wants to come in here. I don't want themin here, because of these reasons,” and she agreed with that. That would have been entirely, | suppose, out of my hands if they'd wanted to talk to the press. But she sat down with the other two, Dunai and [ . Supposedly, and they came to @ consensus that they would not talk to the media whne they were in training, under training in the RAG, which helped me. | think it helped the squadron, as a whole, deal with the whole thing and not get distracted by the circus that the media can become. CBdCID CE) 159, One of the VF-124 instructors made the following comments about stress: Q. Okay. Do you think the pressure on the women was unusually high? Was it manageable? Did people talk about handling stress in any way, or — A. Well, there was a lot of differences because they were women. Thore was a lot of press interest ‘There was a lot of times where the PAO at Miramar would t= saying, “Hey, we want to interview here. We want to do this. We want to do that.” That's going to put a lot more pressure on somebody. It's going to cause pressure on the women, and it's also going to cause resentment among the other students in the same class. So, there was some of that going on at the time {ican remember with — a couple of times with Lieutenant Hultgren, especially, there were cameras out on the fight fine to film her on her first couple of fights. And I've seen a lot of footage on different FOR-OFFIGIAL USF ONL aNAVINSGEN No, 951295: CWW-11 ‘shows to the news since then, and | know the footage comes when they were leaving maintenance control on their way out to their airplane. And | — To relate that, this person has just gone through a brief as a student to go fly an F-14 mission. And now, between the time where they sign up for their airplane and they get to the airplane, there's somebody out there filming them. So, s their mind 100- percent on going fying? There's probably some added factors in there, you know. that's going to lower their level of concentration at that point. So, | woukint say they've had exactly the same experience as any male aviator going through that squadron, Q. Okay. How did their male peers take all of this press interest? ‘A. Naval aviators, by design, | guess, try and stay as far away from cameras as possible. I's a loseflese proposition to have anything to do with the media when you're in the miltary, in general. So, they didn’ ike having those cameras around, | would say. But that's not, you know, not to say that they didnt understand why it was happening. 1 mean, i's a big event in history, and everybody understands what's going to happen. 160. Another instructor did not become aware of media pressure until after LTs Hultgren and Lohrenz had left the FRS: 161 a2 Q. Did you think that the feriale aviators were under any particular stressors that perhaps the males werent dealing with? A. Yes, Ido. And I know there was a high level of press interest in them, on the first female fighter pilots in the history of the Navy. And | wasnt very closely aware of this at the time, but after they left the FRS and went to VF-213 | only then realized that, you know, | saw articles, I saw newspapers and became aware thal, you know, while they were students in the RAG all this was going on, which I did not know of before and was not particularly aware of at the time with only a certain few, very rare instances when | was aware that there was some press coming to the squadron for an interview with Lieutenant (Hut}green but | did not realize that it was as immense as it was. So! think maybe that the ress interest in the three females as F-14 aviators was — it probably had something — some kind of stressors on them, you know. . NAVINSGEN also interviewed RADM Yakeley: A... But there was that uniqueness and these women were doing ke many have done. That was new ground. They were leading a new, frst time ever, West Coast deployment, that carries with it baggage with the press. I cant tell you how many times we said, can we just nat have any press about it? 1 would sit there and I'é have so and so up, and | said, we're going to have female pilot representation. We want you to see this. They said, Admiral, do! have to 90? | said fsten, I just pick lotienes and whoever shows up, shows up. If happens to be female — that's what | went fo. If King Abid shows up, it doesn't matter who he is, okay, give me six lesders. ‘Where was this direction coming from? Was it coming from CHINFO or Vice Chief? Direction for what? To have ~ Most of the publicity was CHINFO. You didnt have the option to deny? Oh, we did, and | tumed CHINFO down on occasion and said, this is disruptive, You know, some ‘of the things they wanted the TV cameras to do. Your testimony sounds ke you didn have the option on certsin occasions. A Some cases, you didn't. Q That was, again, CHINFO directed? A Well, was something that had been developed and I get » phone call saying, oh, so and so is. ccomring out from NBC, it's al been set up and everything. Can |tumit off? | would go to the CAG ang ‘say, CAG, what do you think? What does the captain, and then you'd go to the CO and then the indwidvals involved. Oo you really want to do this? If you really dont want to do this, lel us know >O>o0>0 —FOR-OFFICIAL-USE-ONLY—NAVINSGEN No. 951295 CvW-11 162. A Human Factors Committee (HFC) was convened on 19 Apr 94 due to LT Lorenz’ failure to CQ on her first attempt. The committee report states that LT Lohrenz had felt the pressure of being “under the spotlight” as one of the first two females in F-14 training. Although the HFC report does not specifically mention media coverage @s a component to the spotlighting effect, it can reasonably be inferred to be so. “Equally important is the level of self induced stress, fear of failure, which the HFC reports resulted from LT Lohrenz’ difficulties in CQ and which may have increased her feeling of being in the spotlight: LTJG Dunai found that the CQ text, lectures, trainers and FCLPs were very adequate and that the LSO debriefs were aways full end exacting ... With the start of her FCLP workup LTJG Dunai states that she bogan to let some extemal pressures get through to her and affect her performance. These pressures resulted from feeling “under the spotight” through being one of the first two females in F-14 ‘raining. This pressure, which had always been present, but while “hacking the program” was deat with, surfaced when LTJG Dunai found the going more difficut. She states that she developed a powerful fear of failure which manifested itself in extreme nervousness prior to and during fight. If she flew a particularly poor pass, got sent back to base earfer than expected, or received a “ough, tel it fke itis" debrief she would assume the worst ie. that she was about to be removed from the program. This intense fear of failure led to a vicious citcle from which she could not extricate herself for some weeks. ... That extra pressure caused by the “spotlight” factor wil not go away soon and will certainly continue into a front fine tour. Discussion 163. Press interest in the first females to fly the F-14 was inevitable and unavoidable. It was also a distraction, not only to the women, but to VF-124 as a whole. The testimony indicates that VF-124 leadership took reasonable, and for the most part, effective, steps to shield the women from press attention. 164. VF-124's ability to shield LT Lohrenz from the press was due, in no small part, to LT Hultgreen’s attitude toward the press. In and of itself, he pressure on LT Lohrenz caused by the press was benign. However, when combined with the stress caused by self-imposed pressures fo succeed at a tasking and dangerous profession, LT Lohrenz’ press notoriety became a distraction and had a negative effect, at least to some limited degree. The HFC wamed LT Lohrenz that she could expect this pressure to continue as she progressed in her career. Conclusion 165. LT Lohrenz was placed under additional stress due to media coverage while she was in the FRS. Much of the pressure to permit media coverage during training was generated in Washington for the purpose of portraying the Navy in a favorable light. It is unfortunate that leadership in CINCPACFLT sometimes felt it was impossible to fefuse requests for interviews Negative Media Coverage In CVW-11 166. Elaine Donnelly is the president of an organization called the Center for Military Readiness (CMR), an advocacy group opposed to women in combat. In a letter to ~>nator Strom Thurmond dated January 16, 1995, Ms. Donnelly attacked the Navy's method of training LT Hultgreen and an unidentified "Pilot 8° while they were in the FRS, VF-124. Purporting to be quoting from a letter written to her by a person whose identity she could not reveal, Ms. Donnelly alleged that LT Hultgren and Pilot B were substandard pilots who would not have graduated from the FRSNAVINSGEN No. 951295. cvw-11 nad they been men. Attached to the Donnelly letter was detailed information conceming the {raining records of LT Hullgreen and Pilot B, who was recognized within the Navy as LT Lohrenz 167. In the Spring of 1995, CMR released a "Special Report,” which contained substantially the ‘same information as that appearing in the January Donnelly Letter. 168. The adverse impact on LT Lohrenz resulting from this letter, ts investigation by RADM Bien, the Special Report, and subsequent media publicity, which continued throughout the months that LT Lohrenz remained in CVW-11, is the subject of the section of this report dealing with stress This section of the report addresses the allegation Mr. and Mrs. Dunai made about the Navy's response to the CMR letter. Allegation That Navy Improperly Did Nothing to Investigate Release of Records 169. In their July 1995 letter, Mr. and Mrs. Dunai allege that the Navy did nothing to investigate the unauthorized release of LT Lohrenz' training records to Ms. Donnelly, or to correct the adverse “Pilot B” publicity that resulted from it, thereby implying that CMR’s allegations of special treatment were true and causing stress and embarrassment to LT Lohrenz. To failry address this allegation, it must be assumed that Mr. and Mrs. Dunai are referring to steps taken by the Navy before they wrote their letter, and that the Navy's failure to act was improper. Findings of Fact 170. VADM Spane directed RADM Bien to investigate the allegations made by the Donnelly letter. A discussion of his findings appears elsewhere in this report. During the course of that investigation, it became apparent that Ms. Donnelly had been given access to detailed training ‘information pertaining to the performance of LT Hultgren and LT Lohrenz while they were assigned to FRS. The information was substantially accurate, although, as noted in his report, there were some errors and RADM Bien did not agree with the conclusions Ms. Donnelly and the anonymous writer would draw from that information. 171, VADM Spane confirmed that he did not direct RADM Bien, or anyone else, to try to determine who released the information to Ms. Donnelly. He said he was concemed about the turbulence and impact on morale an investigation would generate: A. ... talked about that, thought abéut that, My view of that is that at that point in time to go after who released those records would have been a poor, poor morale event than just leting i yo. We'd probably never find them. We would have just put bunch of turbulence and thrown down the gaunt, s0 to speak, to those that were doing #. By that me the RAG had disbanded. The RAG was on the East Coast in the process of being on the East Coast, But the real principle was, to make a ti desl ‘ut that and fo go after the people thal dit woud have caused more damage. more damage to Naval aviation that it would have done good if we'd have caught them. 172, The COMNAVAIRPAC IG also confirmed that no investigation into the release of the information was conducted. 173. CAPT Gillespie thought higher authority would order an investigation into the release of the {raining information, He thought that the "Pilot B* data was harmful to LT Lohrenz’ morale, but did not think an internal CVW-11 investigation would be appropriate for several reasons 44 FOR CFFIGIAL-USE-ONEYLNAVINISGEN Ne. 951295: CvW.11 ‘A... 1 didnt get the impression from talking with Carey that that was something that she wanted to do internal to the air wing deployed. ...| think corporate knowledge reasoning was let's not distract the ship air wing team. Let's try not to distract the team with some of these issues. We're on cruise. We had an awful lot of things on our plate to try and chum up the water and say, okay, ... go ask ‘everybody in your squadron if they sent this thing to the press. I asked [LT Lohrenz’ CO] do you think this came from 213? No, sir. I mean through the course of conversatio anybody have any clue? No. But Ithink the consensus of opinion was that it “came from Miramar, And the consensus of opinion which | think fs reasonable is that it came from a disgruntled individual or # group of individuals et VF-124 which was In fact the RAG, | think the reasonable man [thought] that it somehow leaked from that. 174, RADM Bien's 4 May 95 Supplementary Report, which was prepared upon review of the CMR Special Report, noted that the discussion of the training records presented in the report was “largely accurate,” having been obtained from the “actual training jackets.” Although RADM Bien disagreed with some of the facts asserted in the CMR report, and the implications drawn from them, he recommended against making a detailed rebuttal fo the Donnelly letter or the ‘Special Report out of concem for giving the CMR allegations more visibility than the organization deserved The possibility of making a detailed rebuttal to Ms. Donnelty’s "Report" must be considered, But | recommend against it on the grounds that it would only fuel an endless debate that will give Ms Donnelly a continuing forum. If the choice (or direction) is to enter a head-to-head debate, | absolutely believe that the facts support the position weve taken that the training was proper, and that our standards were upheld. In any case, itis not in the Navy's interest to carry this debate on piecemeal in the press. 175. The CINCPACFLT IG investigators attempted to identify the person who released the information to Ms. Donnelly. They were able to trace the documents to a fax machine in a commercial establishment in San Diego, but no further. + PATRICK be Rules 176. The individual who provided the information to Ms. Donnelly identified himself to the NAVINSGEN investigators during the course of this investigation. During an interview in the ‘Summer of 1996, when asked about the impact of the release of LT Lohrenz’ training records within the wardroom, he produced a letter that had been prepared in advance by his attomey, and declined to answer any questions regarding the release of the training records. Upon completion of all other interviews, NAVINSGEN determined that no further information could be developed that might identify the person who released the records to Ms. Donnelly. Therefore, it recommended that the individual be provided a grant of immunity, and ordered to testify. After due consideration, the VCNO issued the grant of immunity, and the officer was interviewed again in December 1996.” ® This procedure is consistent with NAVINSGEN policy, as set out in the NAVINSGEN investigations ‘manual, and highiights a major difference between IG investigations and others. The princ’-~! purpose of an IG investigation is to obtain facts in order that decision makers may determine whether allegations are substantiated and decide what corrective and remedial action to take in response to substantiated allegations. While the results of an investigation may be used for disciplinary action, itis the least important of the three purposes, and occasionally must give way to other considerations. In this case, there are ample administrative sanctions available to apply to this officer, should the Navy decide that is appropriate FAR prriciatiice oy asNAVINSGEN No. 981295: CVW.11 177. AS CAPT Gillespie suspected, the officer who disclosed the training records to Ms. Donnelly ‘was a member of VF-124 who did not go on to CVW-11. Because of the manner in which he obtained the information, no one else could have identified him or provided other information that ‘would have resulted in his identification. In truth, had he decided to lie during his interview with the NAVINSGEN investigators, they would not have identified him, either. 178. This individual testified that he began collecting training records on LT Hultgren and LT Lohrenz about halfway through their training program because his attempts to protest their preferential treatment within the squadron through the chain of command had been ignored. He also stated that he got in touch with Ms. Donnelly several months before he released the ‘information to her, and that she used him as a sounding board to test the accuracy of information she was receiving from senior Navy leadership. When he became convinced the Navy would not take seriously the safety concems Ms. Donnelly was raising, he decided to provide the training records to Ms. Donnelly so that her arguments would have more credibility. He also was upset by the way the Navy dealt with LT Hultgreen’s mishap, which he thought was an attempt to cover- ‘up her errors that contributed to the mishap. Discussion 178. The evidence demonstrates that, prior to July 1995, the Navy did not take any steps to investigate the release of training records or to rebut the implications flowing from the contents of the Donnelly letter and the CMR report. The justification given for not reacting more quickly however, appears reasonable and prudent. The decision not to conduct a formal investigation in the January through July 1995 time frame was based on concem that it would cause more institutional harm than good at that point in the work-up and deployment of CVW-11 180. The evidence also demonstrates that the Navy did litte to correct the adverse publicity resulting from the disclosure, but it too was based on a reasoned decision by Navy leaders not to lend more credibility to the Donnelly letter or the CMR Special Report. The inferences to be ci i it ql silence caused stress and embarrassment for LT Lotwenz Conclusion 181. The allegation that the Navy improperly did not investigate the disclosure of LT Lonrenz/ {Luo training records or attempt to correct the public record 1s UNSUBSTANTIATED. ? lat of see oh fo Apne ig te He Prd - a4 END OF TEXTCIDE) o>.) NAVINSGEN No, 951295: CVW.11 STRESS General Issue of Recognizing and Dealing with Stress 182. In the TACAIR environment, diminished concentration for even the briefest moment may result in death. For that reason pilots must remain focused on flying the mission. When external influences impair that ability the pilot must be removed from flying until the problem is resolved. Stress is a commonly acknowledged impairment. 163. Everyone is under some level of stress; acceptable levels of stress vary from person to person and from occupation to occupation. The TACAIR pilot takes pride in being able to perform with precision under enormous stress. The pilot supposedly does this by compartmentalizing it. To think otherwise would expose a fatal flaw in a person expected to win in the stressful world of air combat. The key questions, therefore, are when does the stress level exceed a pilot's capacity to compartmentalize it, and who is to make that call? 184. Everyone interviewed recognized, in theory, that stress at some level sufficiently interferes with a pilot's ability to perform, and at that level forms the basis to take a person out of the cockpit, at least temporarily. But the NAVINSGEN investigators found far too many veteran aviators, including Flight Surgeons, who could not identify the signs of stress. Others could recite the textbook definitions, but appeared unable to apply them to individual aviators. 185. When asked whose responsibility it was to determine whether a pilot is stressed beyond his or her ability to compartmentalize and consequently should not fly, most witnesses, after some hesitation, stated that ultimately it is the commanding officer's responsibilty, with input from his XO, operations officer, flight surgeon and other observers. Yet, in practice, most of them did not apply their knowledge. 186. Thus, the investigators often heard senior aviators state that their concem for a particular pilot's stress level was dispelled when the pilot herself indicated she could handle the stress. Apparently, none of these officers was willing to act on the assumption that a nugget trying to prove herself might be somewhat hesitant to admit she could not compartmentalize her stress, or admit to themselves that reliance on a pilot's assertion is inherently untrustworthy. 187. Perhaps even more disturbing was the finding of the investigative team’s fight surgeon that - were unable to recognize the stress levels in LT Lohrenz exceegea ner apiity 10 comnpartiemalize; and that medically she should not have been flying or FNAEBd without further medical evaluation. To compound the problem, one of the involved was even unsure of authority to ground a pilot on a compartmentalization issue. 188. The importance of stress management in Naval aviation can not be overstated. The widespread ignorance of CVW-11 personnel in stress related issues had a significant deleterious impact on at least one of the complainants. Worse yet, it portends a far wider problem for Naval Aviation. Pilots and platforms represent significant investments for the Navy, in human and(607 2EC) NAVINSGEN No. 951298: CVW.11 monetary terms. The Navy simply can not afford to be ignorant of an issue which can so quickly and fatally jeopardize that investment. Symptoms of Maladaptive Stress Coping 189. The 1994 "Handbook of Aviation and Operational Psychiatry.” which was distributed to the CVW-11 Flight Surgeons, is produced as a training guide and reference source for Flight ‘Surgeons and includes the material that has been taught to student Flight Surgeons during their training at the Naval Aerospace and Operational Medical Institute (NAMI) since 1993. The training guide includes sections on Stress Management in Aviation (Chapter 18). Fear of Flying and the Failing Aviator (Chapter 22), and Grief Reactions (Chapter 10) =" -” 190. The Stress Management in Aviation chapter lists the symptoms of inadequate stress management and maladaptive coping. Cognitive: Worry, dread, fear, decline in motivation, self-doubt; impaired sense of one's own limitations; inability to assess potentially troublesome situations; forgetfulness, inattentiveness, confusion, b. Emotional: Argumentativeness, irritability, emotional liability; personality changes; panic; depression. ©. Behavioral: Decline in work performance and productivity; withdrawal and avoidance of others; inability to get along with peers and supervisors; impatience, carelessness, sarcasm, hostility. 191, Chapter 22, “Fear of Flying and the Failing Aviator,” describes various clinical scenarios of aviators who may have developed a fear of flying, to include: . Delayed Stress Reaction: resulting from the cumulative effect of multiple causes or unresolved single traumatic event. May be observed as an Adjustment Disorder, among others. Accurate diagnosis and treatment must be provided swiftly. The aviator must address realistic disposition options, resolve anger and conflicts, work through remorse, or grieve losses. b. Adjustment Disorder: This is the most common psychiatric diagnosis in aviation. When an aviator has stress-related symptoms, don't look at flying as the cause, look at his/her personal He. There must be evidence of a precipitating event to which the aviator is adjusting Cc. Manifestations of the Failing Aviator: Social withdrawal when the aviator begins to experience mood ‘swings or anxiety and fatigue, health concems, distraction, poor concentration or compartmentalization, Procrastination, unrelability, and/or cynicism which may be reported by the aviator or observed by others. Allegation of Stress on LT Lohrenz 192. In their July 1995 letter, Mr. and Mrs, Dunai alluded to the fact that LT Lohrenz was placed under a great deal of stress, and implied that it adversely affected her performance. The NAVINSGEN investigators examined these allegations and, as discussed below, confirmed them. They also attempted to determine whether the stress LT Lohrenz was under was adequately 48 FOR -OFFIGIAL-USE-ONLY—(6)679C) GdCIEC) NAVINSGEN No 951295 CVW-11 considered as a factor in her performance, In order to determine whether LT Lohrenz experienced such stress that she became unable to comparimentalize, the psychiainst member of the team conducted a one-on-one interview with LT Lohrenz Findings of Fact Regarding Reluctance to Admit Effect of Stress: 193. Recognition of a problem with compartmentalization during the work-up and deployment of CVW-11 was complicated by the fact that most pilots, nuggets in particular, are reluctant to admit the problem because they fear they will appear weak and lose the respect of their peers and commanders. This reluctance was even greater among the female pilots in CVW.11 because they thought an admission by any one of them would reflect adversely on all of the women, 194. LT Lohrenz told the NAVINSGEN investigators that, up to the point of her interviews with them, she had repeatedly denied that she was having difficulty compartmentalizing because of fear that admitting to difficulty handling stress would result in being found unsafe to fly due to psychological problems. She cited the examples of another female pilot who was medically boarded for psychological problems and — who felt her FRS training time-out was used against her by her chain-of-command in « suvscyuent FNAEB ‘A... But, you know, ... when you were hoping that your skipper wouki have been looking out for you weeks before that, you cant, you know, say to your Flight Surgeon can you please tell him that this is teally bothering me, because then they're going to say no, she's gol some real problems here. And there was @ HELO pilot who had had some psychological factors | guess who actually had been vp in Fallon, ... And people trashed her in the air wing for a long time about oh, she's a typical git, she couldn't handle it. ©. Now, what time frame was that? A. When did she stop flying? She may have stopped flying either right after the November or right after the December at sea period @ So December of 94? A. Correct. Yeah, because actually she was hen Kara [Hultgren] went in. So it probably ‘would have been right after that. So either in November or December, ‘94. And, you know, right away they pigeon holed her into the typical unstable gist who that's why women shoukdn' be in combat, So the last thing I was going to do was tell a Fight Surgeon who | didn’ really know anything about other than he just told me I had 20/20 vision that oh, by the way, do you happen to think that getting slayed in the national media probably affects me? I didnt really feel that that was 2 — @. Sothat was your reasoning then for saying that you could compartmentalize? | assume they asked you that? Did they? ‘A. Oh, IVe been asked, you know, at my boards Ive been asked thal and Ive always said yes, I can ‘compartmentalize. And what it boiled down to me was my problems were the last — not even the last 18 seconds, but the last maybe 10 seconds of a pass where | would either get a fttle bit high. And | am telling you | am not thinking about Elaine Donnelly when I'm fying the ball, When I'm thinking ottered again and, God, that's just adding fuel to the fire, yeah, I'm thinking about a, But in that window, where I'm having problems, I'm not thinking about that 195. Other female aviators also feared admitting to difficulty compartmentalizing One told the NAVINSGEN investigators that although the death of LT Hultgren tremendously affected her and others, she flew the day after LT Hultgreen’s death, even though she experienced performance difficulties, because she thought she needed to appear tough in front of the male aviators —FOR-OFFICIAL SEAN 49BMC) NAVINSGEN Ne 951295 cvw.tt Q. How did [LT Lohrenz} do after Lieutenant Hutigreen's accident? A. We all did shitty. I mean, here we are, and we are the firs! group that are going to be doing ths. and I didn't know if | coukd do i, | think Kara was a better pilot than I was, and when she died, | didnt know if I could go on. I mean, doubts come into your mind. Your best tend dies and ft kind of affects you And when I went out, # affected me Why? Because | had no confidence No, why did they send you out there? Because everyone went out Wry? You have to get back on the horse ‘The same night? Carey [Lohrenz] did That's the night that you guys found out about her death though? Guess what? When Canine (phonetic) died, his tnend, his roommate, his best friend on the ship, coukin’ fly until he felt lke it, There was pressure on us. We coukin" just say no. We couldn’ say we're not ready to do this, We have to have some time. Q. But whose responsibilty do you feel that is to do that? Do you think it is the aviator himself, ot should somebody else do it? ‘A. Well, you know, | would say itis the aviator himself, except that what would you do in a situation where your are the first to go out and do something, and now something affects you really badly. Are you going to come out and say | cant do this? That's what they want you to say, you know, and it's really tough I didn't fy that day that | found out about it, My jet was down. But | didn't know. I didn't know what the fleet wanted. | didnt know that you could actually take some time. When our skipper lost a really good friend of his, he didn't fly for a week. | mean, he didnt fly at all, He actually got off the boat for a while, and I didn’ know that you could do that, you know? | thought, well, what happens if there is a war. You have to just keep going, right? You have to just press through it. In retrospect. | would have said, sorry, but | need some time, guys, especially then, and especially when, you know. | mean, if she can't do that, how can. I mean, that kind of stuff ‘Those kinds of doubts have no business in the Navy >O>rOPOPrOPrO 196. Another testified that the women aviators believed that they would be perceived as weak if they acknowledged stress was affecting them. She took a day off after LT Hultgreen's death and felt her squadron mates viewed her as weak because of it Q__Do you think that in carrier ~ there's a lack of appreciation for the effects of stress on the aviators, both male and female? A. | just think that's the way in carrier aviation. I mean, you suck it up and do it. Q_Ifan aviator had come forward, particularly a female aviator, such #s Lieutenant Lohrenz, had come forward and said, I'm really having trouble compartmentalzing all these stressors that are on me, what do you think would have happened? What's your idea of what would have occurred? A. Well, 'iluse a personal example. One of my best friends was Lieutenant Kara Hultgren and after she died | emotionalty just fell apart. And the attitude of my squadron — I took one day off. But the attitude of my squadron was what is your problem? People die all the time. Just get with it. Get with the program, What is your problem? My skipper didnt share that view or my XO, but below that level ‘twas bke that. You just suck it up and just deal with i. And that's just the attitude. © Do you feel that most of the female aviators were aware of that attitude? ‘A. They never wanted to appear weak and that woul! definitely make you appear weak. 197 believed that if she said she was having trouble comparimentalizing that her squadron wou have used it against her and that it would have been damaging to her career 50 —FOR-OFFISIAL-USE-ONEYNAVINSGEN No 951295 Cvw.11 ©. In looking at stress within the aviation environment, did you think that there was a lack of appreciation for the effects of stress on aviators in general within carrier air wing 117 A. I think so, especially with the numerous accidents we've had. Q. Okay. Do you think that stressors played @ part In those female aviators who were unsuccessful in cartier aviation? A. I think they definitely had a part, although I cant, you know, talk to them. Q. Did you think that stress was adequately addressed prior to your FNAEB?. A. No. Iwas given an interview from the Fight Surgeon who had actually been on an interview before with me. Things were brought up and asked, but, as far as outside stressors, no. | think, you know. there's atways the work stress that’s there. | don’ think that was really brought into as a major portion of the contributing factors. Q. Okay. How do you think that carrier sir wing 11 or your squadron would have responded had you come forward at some point and said | have a lot of personal stressors going on, just the stress of being a female aviator in this environment and the isolation? What do think the response would have been if you said I'm having trouble compartmentalizing? A. I think they would defintely use it against me, You know, OPS wise, | can just see the OPS department just laughing, going, well, too bad, youve got to fly and, you know. you're not a hacker You know, they always joked and alluded to stuff ike that to anyone who did try to, you know, or took off a couple of days or whatever. And we were always flying with a minimum amount of pilots and ‘seemed to get the job done. So if anyone was sick or anything, oh, that was just a big straw to carry fon their back and | don’ think it would have been well received Q. Do you think it would have been damaging to your career or any other aviator's career to have ‘asked for that kind of help? A. Yes. 198. An officer at COMNAVAIRPAC seemed to confirm the fears expressed by these women stating that a novice aviator might not be likely to admit to difficulties handling stress, and that a time-out would likely be held against a weaker pilot as an indicator of further weakness: Q. ... LT Lohrenz ... alleges in effect that because she was a woman, she was on the horizon line. land because she was on the honzon line ... that she did not have the luxury of admitting that she coukint compartmentalize For fear that admitting so would have placed he in jeopardy of being FINAEBs for her inability to compartmentalize. She alleges, in effect, that it would have been the straw that broke the camels back. A. I think that's not an atypical view. Going through the training command, you didn’ want to not fy you didnt want to sniffle because you had a cok, and you didnt want to give an appearance of anything but great performance. ...t is a bit of a dilemma, isnt it, for an aviator to admit the inability to compartmentalize, which is something we encourage . Is it your opinion that we, to a certain degree, have a double standard when it comes to admitting human factors, habilties that..tn the training command, for instances, the admission that you're temporanly overloaded is held against you as an inability to cope, and therefore, sligmatizes you as a weaker aviator A. W's a negative Q. Does [it] make an aviator more or less reluctant to admit to a stressor? A. think that i's individually independent and a lot has to do with self confidence. | think if some of these fairly successful people going through the training command, not on the bottom, but in the middie oF up. And goes through the RAG, that's got a good aviation training atmosphere. Q._ And takes a timeout, t's not going to be held against him as much taking a timeout if you're a weak aviator? A. Yeah. if your community reputation which starts both the minute you walk in the Ready Room. ‘and the minute you take off from the simulator. Q. So, in effect, the more trouble you are the less likely you will be believed when you take time out A think that is a tendency Yeah —FOR OF HGIALUSE ONLY 51DG) DE) NAVINSGEN No 951295 Cvw.1 52 Regarding LT Lohrenz’ Emotional Condition —FOR-OFFICIAL USE ONLY ——MAVINSGEN No 951205 Cvw.11 OUI? ALM (71? C6979 83NAVINSGEN No 951295 Cvw tt 274299 (224097 (29¢090 C7 [eC 9 54NAVINSGEN Ne. 951205: CvW:11 C7UXD (orcer co? 55NAVINSGEN No. 951295: CvW.1tG67 6) NAVINSGEN No. 951295. cvw.11 203. One of LT Lohrenz’ roommates testified she noted signs of stress in LT Lohrenz, such as a 25 pound weight loss in the three weeks prior to the FNAEB, and a marked increase in frequency of exercising, sometimes exercising from midnight to 3 AM in the week prior {o her FNAEB™ Q. The-do you think the pilot B article added stress to Lieutenant Lohrenz from what you saw as [her] roommate? A. Yeah. | think it did Q. Were there any indications that she was under stress to you? A. Yeah. She was-towards that last week or so before she got FNAEBd she was up realty late at night. She was working out for ike 3 hours from midnight to 3.@.m...._ And thal was not normal {for her at all. And she wasnt eating. | think she lost probably about 25 pounds before we pulled into the gulf. So that was probably in about a 3-week penod she lost a ton of weight. 204. LT Lohrenz’ lack of response to LSO signals and slow scan led to her FNAEB. This type of performance impairment is consistent with impaired compartmentalization. LT Lohrenz admitted that during briefs and while flying she had concems and anxiety which intruded upon her ability to focus on the task at hand, She naively believed, since she wasn't thinking about her stressors during the last 10 seconds of flying the ball, that her landing performance problems were not due to impaired compartmentalization. This 1s indicative of the lack of understanding about the overall impact of chronic stress on compartmentalization: ‘A. Oh, Ive been asked, you know, at my boards Ive been asked that and I've always said yes, I can compartmentalize. And what it boiled down to me was my problems were the last — not even the last 18 seconds, but the last maybe 10 seconds of a pass where | would either get a itle bit high. And | ‘am telling you | am not thinking about Elaine Donnelly when I'm flying the ball When I'm thinking | boltered again and, God, that’s just adding fuel to the fire, yeah, I'm thinking about it. But in that window, where I'm having problems, 'm not thinking about that Q. All fight A. And that is taking compartmentaization to its very most fteral sense Q. So let's clarify that point as well, You're saying the last 10 seconds, But during your briefs, during yout preparation to land on the carrier. were you having wornes? Were you having concems about the articles, about Lieutenant Hutgreen's death? A. Iwoukl say concems because, I mean, even, you Know, my would show me an article right ~sfore | briefed one time. And you can’ just click off iat part of your orain and say okay, out bad idea * LT Lohrenz admitted using exercise to relieve stress. but did not report any weight loss. Another roommate did not notice changes in behavior or mood other than frequent exercise to relieve stress. —FOR-OFFICIM-USE-ONEY 87CEO) NAVINSGEN No. 951295: CWW.11 ‘Now think just about this. But | really tried to focus on okay, there's a time and a place to worry about that and now | just got to keep af this task at hand 205. LT Lohrenz admitted that she had never disclosed her emotional symptoms to either of the Flight Surgeons at the time of her HFB and FNAEB medical evaluations, nor to her chain of command. : aan Kegaraing rignt Surgeon Failure to Recognize Stress 206. Flight Surgeons received approximately 45 hours of lectures and clinical instrucuon in tne subject of aviation and operational psychiatry while student Flight Surgeons ‘The 1994 "Handbook of Aviation and Operational Psychiatry,” was distnbuted to one Flight Surgeon at the December 1994 Problems Course and to the other as a student Flight Surgeon at NAMI 207. The chapter on "Stress Management in Aviation” states that the Flight Surgeon is tasked with taking a proactive role in providing information, teaching, and participation in the command's effort to promote stress management programs. Such programs include training of personnel and teaching stress management programs, and training supervisors to observe inadequate stress coping as manifested by noticeable change in behavior or affect, recurrent interpersonal problems, and maladaptive defense mechanisms (an example of which would be failure to compartmentalize) 208. The Flight Surgeon's role in the management of the failing avie or includes: prevention and early recognition, involvement and monitoring within the squadron, and timely and accurate evaluation referral and intervention, the establishment of a clinical confidence and sense of contro! to demystify the process and reduce the stigma; and making every effort to salvage the career of the aviator. 58 POR-OFFICIAL-USE-ONTY——OD) 676) (ode7760) IKE NAVINSGEN No 951295 CuW.11 209. The Flight Surgeon who had most contact with LT Lohrenz was serving on first tour told NAVINSGEN that had many conversations with LT Lohrenz regarding now she was uianuling the stress of the “Fux 8” publicity, although LT Lohrenz denies that these conversations took place. A review of the health record reveals no evidence of formal documentation by the Flight Surgeon of these conversations with LT Lohrenz or of other attempts to assess LT Lohrenz’ stress coping ability, other than evaluations required before HFBs. 210. The Flight Surgeon described the "Pilot B* article as the major stressor for LT Lohrenz, but stated that LT Lohrenz never admitted to that it was a real stressor and always stated she could compartmentalize. The Flight Surgeon admitted that thought that the "Pilot B* articles had affected Lt Lohrenz’ performance, but that Leucved LT Lohrenz was able to compartmentalize. testified that “told LT Lowen second CO that "was not sure LT Lohrenz was comparimentalizing and waited the CO to check with LT Lohr.ise about her coping ability The CO denies that conversation took place. 211. LT Lohrenz’ FNAEB report, under "Findings and Opinion,” stated that the possible causes of LT Lohrenz’ sub-standard performance were determined to most likely be. lack of motor skills and slow scan or scan breakdown on the ball, an inability to compartmentalize completely while under the burden (real or perceived) of scrutiny from the press and higher authority, and/or a lack of total commitment or motivation to excel. 212. This statement is contradicted by the statements the Flight Surgeon who sat on the board made to NAVINSGEN _ repeatedly told NAVINSGEN that believed LT Lohrenz was able to comparimentalize Tue uther Flight Surgeon, who acted as we independent Flight Surgeon for the FNAEB. found LT Lohrenz Physically Qualified (PQ) and Aeronautically Adapted (AA) tor the FNAEB 213. The Flight Surgeon's statements to NAVINSGEN demonstrated knowledge of some, but not all, of the behavioral symptoms that would indicate impaired compartmentalization skills. knowledge appeared to be selective and incomplete. correctly recognized that ceasing tu exercise was an indicator o: did not recognize that the opposite might also be true, and that exueine venaviors oF any Kino might indicate problems with stress resolution. Although testified that LT Lohrenz’ was “Working out like a fiend al all hours of the day and night,” 31d not interpret this behavior as a clinical symptom and an indicator that LT Lohrenz was attempting to cope with significant stress that might require further evaluation Q_ Whaat indicators do you look for, as a Flight Surgeon, to assess someone's stress coping ability? ‘What do you look for it someone is showing impaired stress coping ability? ‘A. I guess | also look at what people use for their stress release. And il people dont have stress releases, they're someone Id probably watch a little closer. Someone who doesnt exercise, someone who doesn’ have a support network, things Bke that. You know, a single person who doesn't have 2 lot of famity support or, you know, things lke that, I'd certainly look for. Id look for what are the stressors in their fe? New babies, new changes in jobs, whether i's a ground job, how demanding is their ground job, their collateral duties in the squadron. Kind of look af the whole big picture What kind of behavioral indicators do you look for? A Well, yc. ~vould look for ~ I mean, for performance, you'd look to see if they were having problems with performance You'd look and see how are they performing in their ground job You know, are they sleeping? Are they communicating with other people? Are they trying lo improve? Are they talking about problems. if hey have them? Are they eating? Are they sleeping? You know, the normal things £OR OFFICIAI 1SF ON! Y_ ence07E) NAVINSGEN No 981295 CWI where stiess infects us. Have they stopped working out? Are they — you know, kind of looking at the whole prcture Q. Did she ever say that she was having trouble sleeping? ‘A. Nol to me she didnt. And she was working out bke a fiend, | know that, at all hours of the night and day. She was working out all the time, Q_ Did you feel ike that she had people she was talking about these issues with? A. Yes. did She was talking about them | know with _. up until the FNAEB 214, The Flight Surgeon told NAVINSGEN that spoke to LT Lohrenz, who denied the inabilty to.compartmentalize. said. told the CU about LT Lorenz and that believed it was “his decision to grouno net veieved would be overstepping _boutius to ground LT Lohrenz unless could prove compartnemalization problems, parturarly since LT Lohrenz continued to deny inem. ~ believed it had to be a safety issue before could ground someone just for the inabimy wW compartmentalize. did not believe this was the case with LT Lohrenz, testifying that _>elleved LT Lohrenz voped "pretty well” with stress ©. Speaking of the stressors that you listed for us, of Lieutenant Lohrenz, did you think that those affected her fight performance? ‘A. {thought the Pilot B thing — | think that the Hultgreen thing kind of went away That was in October and it was way before cruise. Her performance problems really were more focused on once we got on curse she was having a hard time. | think the Pilot 8 stutf probably did have an effect, which is why ‘we talked to her about il, you know, a number of times, and, you know, as | told you, | mean, she just said, hey. you know, they're wrong. you know, and I'l show them type of attitude as opposed to, you know, if you're ~ and | always tok her, you know, if you feel like you just can’ put it out of yout mind or if tts really bothenng you, we need to address it. She denied 1 Q. Did you ever feel yourself, as a Flight Surgeon, that she was having trouble compartmentalizing the Pilot 8 article? A No I didn't fee! like she was. | mean, just from her attitude, | actually thought she had a pretty healthy attitude about because, | mean, | know if someone was saying things about me, I'd want to prove them wrong as well. And | thought maybe that that was a heatthy way to look at #, okay? | can't avoid it, okay? This is going to happen. There's nothing | can do. | have to deal with #. These things are beyond my control. These things that are coming out and are being written, | have no control over them. So how did | deal with them? Well, try and make it something posttive instead of, you know. dwelling on the negative, But, you know, 25 | said. | asked her a number of times and, you know. her performance, tt was kind of — I mean, she was doing okay there for a while and then just all of 3 sudden had some problems on a couple nights in particular. Looking at the month in April, April and May, prior the FNAEB, when you, even yoursel, saw that she had a really bad night pass that scared her, at that time, did you ever consider grounding her because of occupational stress? ‘A. Labways spoke to the skipper about it, And, you know, | would check in with her. | woukd tell the skipper what she said, how she was doing, and left — you know, it was his decision, | mean, because ‘she was adamantly denying that she had a problem, that that was even related to anything outside Q. But did you personally ~ A No Q. ever think | ought to ground her? A No, not me alone | don't have that knowledge, fke | told you, about performance, | dont fly tne airplane, especially the TOMCAT. I's hard for me to be the one that ~ I think Id be eerstepping my bounds if | said I'm grounding this pilot unless | coud thoroughly. you know, prove that sne was having a problem dicectly related to compartmentakzation when, in fact, | checked in with her numerous times land she’s saying no, she didn't 60 —FOR-OFFIGIAL-USE-ONLY——NAVINSGEN No. 951205: cvw.11 @. When you talk about that you asked her numerous times could she compartmentalze and that she ‘said yes each time, and you mentioned several times what else could | do. Whose responsibity is i do you think to determine if an aviator is compartmentaizing? ‘A. ‘The commanding officer probably utimately. You know. | can only tell him what | think. Anything say —1 cant — you know, if really fee! that she's compartmentalizing when I've asked somebody over and over again and | really feel they are, and she wasnt — you know, she had one bad night, you know, that one night she scared herself, | mean, that wasnt anything | felt ike | should have grounded her for. | just feel fke | discuss it with the commanding officer, someone who has a Jot more experience than | do, and see what he thinks. You know, it has to be a safety issue | think before I'm going to Ground somebody, you know, just for the inabifty to compartmentalize. ‘A... But it was — you know, most of the aviators | felt coped pretty well with stress. Q. And is that how you felt about Lieutenant Lohrenz? A. Yes. 215. The Flight Surgeon said that discussed LT Lohrenz’ FNAEB with the Senior Medical Officer (SMO) of the LINCOLN, ang that he concurred with the decision to FNAEB her although he never talked with LT Lohrenz himself. There is no documentation of this conversation in health records or FNAEB documents. rec) 216. The other Flight Surgeon told NAVINSGEN that" never evaluated LT Lohrenz individually other than to perform her independent FNAEB Flight Surgeon evaluation. At the time of that evaluation did not know what the "Pilot 8" publicity was and had never read the article. testified that__did not believe that the negative publicity from LT Huligreen's death and "Pilot BY was a stressor that affected the aviation performance of the female aviators, although comments in LT Lohrenz’ FNAEB seem to indicate otherwise. FNAEB flight evaluation describes the LT Hultgren accident as a significant event. It also reports LT Lohrenz' comments to __ that she had been under constant criticism, the focus of media attention and stressed by the political visibility of being a female fighter pilot. accepted LT Lohrenz’ declaration that she was able to compartmentalize these issues when flying and that she did not attribute her performance to any outside psychosocial factors. found her PQ and AA COCKE) 217. This Flight Surgeon testified that knew the indicators of impaired compartmentalization and maladaptive stress coping. _stated that the responsibility of determining whether an aviator could compartmentalize was shared by the CO, Flight Surgeon, squadron mates, and the aviator. was aware that could ground an aviator for indicators of impaired compartmentalization regardless of whether the aviator admitted to difficulty compartmentalizing, but felt that LT Lohrenz could adequately compartmentalize. did not recall stress management training in CVW-14 that she could throw some — S Lieutenant Lohrenz was Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. When she was Dr. Jekyll, she was — 1 was Z_ ecstatic with her. But in ~ she could also show me, not unsafe passes, but she could ~ it was very J obvious with her fight performance when her head was not in the game. Reference the January/February time frame. You know, she was, again, showing up for briefs late; argumentative in the debriefs; argumentative with LSOs. It was, ke, whoa, where did this person come ~ this isnY the same person that's been in six months. So sho had shown me that sne coula ~ that she does well, but that her performance can decline When her head is not in the game, you said. In January and February is what you referred to as 2 period when her head was not in the game? ‘A. She came ~ yes; yes, sit. She came back in January and her ~ the whole affect had — her whole affect had changed. I — Q Do you attribute that to any particular event? A No. The ~ the — trying to fink that with the Bien thing 1s a stretch. Q 1am asking you ‘A__'mteling you that the Admiral Bien thing happened the very end of January and I noticed a marked = that her again, her whole affect around the squadron She was very — Q Ate you talking about right after she got back trom Christmas leave? A Yes, sir. Yes, sir Q So before the Pilot B and the Bien business, you noticed — ‘A Well the Pilot ~ no, the Pilot B was in the ~ I think that ~ | don't know when that was — when that was out there. But that was poor. You know. that didnt help ~ that didnt help our situation. And it is, this is our situation. IVe got a pilot here that's ~ that’s being crucified in the paper and she knows who Pilot B and we all know who Pilot B and that was ~ that was unfair. But — but | want to say Pilot B, that that thing was around there in the November-December time frame.”” Q! Okay. ‘A But the — but the Bien thing is happening all of a sudden near the end of — near the end of January Okay. So now, as far as timing, you had the st-sea penod in December. .. So a itle bit of time off and then you go out to sea in January. A Yes, sir: Do you remember roughly the — ‘A January 20. It's near the end of the month @ ... Okay. So she shows up then and that is when you said you noticed @ marked difference. A Yes. Yes... fo answer your question, Captain, | attnbute — I dont — I dont know why her head was not in the game. It was — her head was not ~ 1t was a different person after the holidays and | noticed it before the at-sea period, bele «we were out a!-sea, and! thought, “Well, isnt that ~ that's 2” The Donel letter is dated 16 January 1995, and RADM Bien's first report is dated 31 January 1995 ‘These events coincide with the “Mr. Hyde” personality observed by FOR OFFIGIAL-USE-ONLY— 63Bin) NAVINSGEN No. 951295: cvW.11 kind of weird.” Keeping in mind, | didn't see her fying around the ship, so | didnt think, oh, the alarm belts going off. But! specifically remember, “Oh, that's..." — | think | went over, jeez, you know, how much leave — maybe she didn’ have — you know, she didn't have @ good leave, | will say from the start, too, that Lieutenant Lohrenz was @ moody individual and the - was a ‘moody individual throughout her time at the command. And I'm sure that youve heard that before. 221. He also testified that in the January-February 1995 time frame she displayed @ changed affect and began showing up late for briefs and became argumentative with the LSOs. He described her as a moody person and he became concemed in January 1995 when her mood stayed consistently down, although he did not associate her altered temperament with an inability to comparimentalize: Q Okay. Well, then let me ask you this. You stated that Lieutenant Lohrenz, in your testimony, that she was not the same person as of January, correct? Came back, was not the same person. Showing up late, argumentative, unresponsive to LSO calls. | think that kind of ~ yes, okay. And had — ‘Shows up late for work, argumentative, just — Had a changed affect was the term you used, Yes, ma'am, Do those look like signs to you of someone who is having trouble compartmentalizing? No. To me, this is — that — she was in one of her moods that | talked about before that she just didn’ rally out of it. She was moody. She was moody throughout the turnaround, throughout the first ‘six months in the squadron. But, you know, kind of up, down, and wouki aways kind of bounce back ‘out of it so much that it wasn't ever an issue with me, And I'm kind of hoping that this is — that she's bouncing back and she never really bounced back. She stays in the funk. Q So lets clanty for the testimony then, A. Yes, ma'am, Q__ So then you, at another point, said that it was in January that she became Mr. Hyde. So now you are not saying that January was different? A. I'm saying that January, that her mood of being — her moodiness — that she never rallied from her Pororo> ae & tank SQ Okay A. Lieutenant Lohrenz was 2 moody person and she had been moody from the time that she S checked into And she was ~ the mood swings would go ~ would normally ~ she'd be, you know, down and then she'd be up. And then she'd be down, she'd be up. How long would those usually last? A. Very, very short. Maybe a day. And I woukint ~ and you never ~ you know, everybody has bad days. So it was ~ it was noted, obviously, because particularly having watched Hultgreen fly in the water, | was keeping a very close eye on her. So knew when she was up and | knew when she was down. And that was okay. Now, so | knew in January when she came back that she was down, okay? She was down, okay? And she never really ~ really bounced back. Really bounced back, 222 did not consult the Flight Surgeon. Although he could not list the indicators of an aviator having trouble compartmentalizing, an HFB in February 1995. He testified that did not conduct the HFB because of flying skills but because he believed there was a human factor involved in her change of affect. Although the reasons for which the HFB are clinically accepted signs of impaired compartmentalization, he stated that ire a1a not believe those ‘signs were indicative of someone having trouble compartmentalizing. He testified that he did not believe that LT Lohrenz had any more stressors than any other nugget, except for the media hype from which he felt he protected her. He did not see LT Hultgreen's death as a stressor for LT 64 FOR OFFIGIAL-USE-ONLYNAVINSGEN No 951295: cvw.11 -ohrenz because he felt there was some animosity between them. He did not appear to know hat conflictual relationships often produce more complicated bereavement, and admitted that he never personally asked LT Lohrenz how she was handling LT Hultgreen's death: Q So, at any point, did you ever see her bounce back, then, after January, as far as her moodiness? ‘A As of— as of right after — the Human Factors. The Human Factors Board and then its, tke - and | dont mean that she was totaly, you know, down. I mean, there may have been spikes in there, but the — her affect in January, | had seen it before but | had never seen it not get better QA right ‘A But it but she responded almost, tks, as soon as we gave her another RIO. Then she was — she bounces right back and does very well. Very long ops for the graduation JTFX. Q Okay. At that time, though, in January, before you scheduled the HFB and you noticed that her mood was staying consistently somewhat down, did you ever discuss that with the Fight Surgeon? ‘A No, I did not. No, | did not. Or! — I dont remember doing it. 1 dont remember doing that @ Did the Fight Surgeon ever come to you at any point and voice concems about Lieutenant Lohrenz’ ability to compartmentalize or difficuny win stressors ‘A. Not ~ not that | recall, ma'am, Q Looking at Lieutenant Lohrenz, could you just state for the record what particular stressors you think that she did have to deal with that could have caused her problems? A. Inthe January time frame? Q No, just while she was in _quadron A Nothing that any other "Nugget. woukin' have to do, that they wouldn't have to put up with, except that she was, you know, one of ~ one of the females that was, you know. under the media hype, which 1 protected them from the media. They didnt do any media unless they went through me and I got rid of most of it Q Did you see Lieutenant Huttgreen’s death as a stressor for her since they had been paired together? ‘A”_No. There ~ there was not a whole lt of love lost between the two of them, quite frankly. Matter of fact, 1 ~1 don't — 1 kind of viewed Lieutenant Lohrenz as a loner. Matter of fact, | think there was 4 lol of ~ for the record, no, | feel that there was a lot of animosity between the two females, quite frankly, Hutgreen was, again, was the outgoing classic fighter pilot affect in the ready room and around the ready room and socially, where Lohrenz — Lohrenz — Lohrenz was not. Hutgreen was ~ was the ‘media — was the media person. if you will, and — and | know that she did do — Lohrenz ~ excuse me, Huttgreen was in PAO at the time and that there were some issues. .. Q You said that, or course, after Lieutenant Hutigreen's death, you kind of kept Lieutenant Lohrenz in sight. You kind of were watching her, is what you said A Yes, ma'am. Did you ever, though, talk with her or ask her how she was doing after Lieutenant Hutgreen's death? A I—not any different — again, not any different than I do my other “Nuggets.” ! would — you know, did | ever sit her down one-on-one and ~ and in a private situation? No, ma'am, | did not. No, ! did not We talked as a group about — about ~ matter of fact, that night — again, | had seen my — the — not handle the situation of death on the carrier very well, So! ~ I kind of, in my mind at that ume you're - “God, help me. If this ever happens to me, | know I'm going to do A, B, C, D, E.” So, unfortunately, I got to experience that and we did just that. So we, as a group, talked about, you know, about Hutigreen dying and about that the command has to move forward and that the command fs not ~ the 213 had been very aways had not beer “ry good and the squadron was — was making the turn. Was doing much better. We don't ~ we cant let this slow us down, We have to continue to strive forward, You know, that's whal Kara would have wanted us to do. Quack, quack. You know, all the typical psyche stuff. 679¢C) CIC) C867)