12

_:..: :0

it. it seems that the

-:: ::'c demonstrated.

-=- 0:: ,-\postle says: The in,

.:J'~ clearly seen, being

5-- ::: i are made (Rom.
~ot be unless the ex
. ~:: c --remonstrated through
: =--,-_E': for the first thing
~:' :'1ing is, whether it
,0'

-::::-. :: e existence of a cause

: .. an effect, this effect
, -:: ~ i. - ni tion of the cause
_ . -, " ':'x:stence. This is espe- .
~"2C- ~rl to God, because, in
: :- ~:~'e .ce of anything, it is
_7:: :..:: a middle term the
_-._ :....d not its essence, for
-.::---,:e follows on the ques-'
, ,_' j',\' the names given to
:'-::"!: His effects; conse
,:::.::~,g the existence of God
:- -:::2)' take for the middle
_.' '.:-,= word "God."
::-:: -, effects not proportion
: ::-, dect knowledge of that
-:~-: Yet from every effect
': :'='.i..<e can be clearly dem
:~n demonstrate the ex
: :::" effects; though from
-:::-,:.,:::. know God as He is
o

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

3
THIRD ARTICLE

Pt. , Q.2 Art. 3

the staff moves only because it is put in mo

tion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary
Whether God Exiats?
to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no
Ve proceed thus to the Third Article;
other; and this everyone understands to be
Objection 1. It seems that God does not God.
_ .st; because if one of two contraries be in
The second way is from the nature of the
'te, the other would be altogether destroyed. efficient cause. In the world of sense we find
- ..t the word "God" means that He is infinite there is an order of efficient causes. There is
ness. If, therefore, God existed, there no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible)
uld be no evil discoverable; but there is in which a thing is found to be the efficient
'\ in the world. Therefore God does not cause of itself; for so it would be prior to it
st.
self, which is impossible. Now in efficient
Obj. 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose callses it is not possible to go on to infinity,
t what can be accounted for by a few prin
because in all efficient causes following in
, 'es has been produced by many. But it order, the first is the cause of the intermediate
, ':us that everything we see in the world can cause, and'the intermediate is the cause of the
_' accounted for by other principles, suppos
ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause
-~ God did not exist. For all natural things
be several, or one only. Now to take away the
cause is to take away the effect. Therefore,
,_": be reduced to one principle, which is na
-,e; and all voluntary things can be reduced if there be no first cause among efficient
one principle, which is human reason, or causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any in
'. Therefore there is no need to suppose termediate cause. But if in efficient causes it
's existence,
is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no
On the contrary, It is said in the person of first efficient cause, neither will there be an
: I am Who am (Exod. iii. 14).
ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient
! answer that, The existence of God can be causes; all of which is plainly false. There
_ oved in five ways.
fore it is necessary to admit a first efficient
The first and more manifest way is the cause, to which everyone gives the name of
_ument from motion. It is certain, and evi
God.
'itt to our senses, that in the world some
The third way is taken from possibility and
~ gs are in motion. Now whatever is in
necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature
- tion is put in motion by another, for noth
things that are possible to be and not to be,
since they are found to be generated, and to
:; can be in motion except it is in potential
.:' to that towards which it is in motion; corrupt, and consequently, they are possible
hereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in to be and not to be. But it is impossible for
these always to exist, for that whicn is possible
-I. For motion is nothing else than the re
~...:tion of something from potentiality to
not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if
" ality. But nothing can be reduced from everything is possible not to be, then at one
_ entiality to actuality, except by something .. time there could have been nothing in exist
. a state of actuality. Thus that which is encc. Now if this were true, even now there
ually hot, as fire; makes wood, which is would be nothing in existence, because that
which does not exist only begins to exist by
- ,entially hot, to be actually hot, and there
_ . moves and changes it. Now it is not pos
something already existing. Therefore, if at
: Ie that the same thing should be at once in one time nothing was in existence, it would
- uality and potentiality in the same respect, have been impossible for anything to have be
only in different respects. For what is gun to exist; and thus even now nothing would
ually hot cannot simultaneously be poten- be in existence-which is absurd. Therefore,
Iy hot; but it is simultaneously potentially not all beings are merely possible, but there
d. It is therefore impossible that in the must exist something the existence of which is
-!TIe respect and in the same way a thing necessary. But every necessary thing either
uld be both mover and moved, i.e., that it has its necessity caused by another, or not.
uld move itself. Therefore, whatever is in Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in
tion must be put in motion by another. If necessary things which have their necessity
t by which it is put in motion be itself put caused by another, as has been already proved
~ motion, then this also must needs be put
in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we
- motion by another, and that by another cannot but postulate the existence of some be
in. But this cannot go on to infinity, be
ing having of itself its own necessity, and not
receiving it from another, but rather causing
-'~se then there would be no first mover, and,
: "\sequently, no other mover; seeing that in others their necessity. This all men speak
i_ sequent movers move only inasmuch as
of as God.
-.ey are put in motion by the first mover; as
The fourth way is taken from the gradation
o

Q. 3 Art. 1 Pt. 1

GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

14

THE S

achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intel

t:.:... parts to God. Hast thou an
ligence cannot move towards an end, unless it
. (Job xl. 4); and The eyes oj tJo.f
be directed by some being endowed with
~ on the just (Ps. xxxiii. 16); a,,::
knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is
;:.1nd oj the Lord hath wrought i"
shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore
cxvii. 16). Therefore God is a
some intelligent being exists by whom all nat
,: j. 4. Further, posture belongs
ural things are directed to their end; and this
:.;;. But something which suppooes ~
being we call God.
-c :s said of God in the Scriptures: J : ~
Reply Obj 1. As Augustine says (Enchir.
; "'jliing (Isa. vi. 1), and He standz. ~
xi) : Since God is the highest good, He would
1ge (Isa. iii. 13). Therefore GOC 1,
not allow any evil to exist in His works, un
less His omnipotence and goodness were such
~: " 5. Further, only bodies or thin~ -,
as to bring good even out oj evil. This is part
'~can be a local term wherejrom or ~
of the infinite goodness of God, that He should
;Jt in the Scriptures God is spoke2 :
allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
- ...,==.1 term whereto, according to the ~:Reply Obj. 2. Since nature works for a de
<' ye to Him and be enlighten.'
terminate end under the direction of a higher
;.6), and as a term wherefrom: ,.,.
agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
-!epart jrom Thee shall be writt.er:
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So
, (]er. xvii. 13). Therefore God i" a :.,;t:
also whatever is done voluntarily must also be
... the contrary, It is written in the ('::':5
traced back to some higher cause other than
i:.. John (iv. 24) : God is a spirit.
human reason or will, since these can change
.. ~""!SWer that, It is absolutely true th?: ~
and fail; for all things that are changeable
:: a body; and this can be shown ill :.:..
and capable of defect must be traced back to
_.3. First, because no body is in mot:,,::..
an immovable and self-necessary first principle,
, '\ be put in motion, as is eviden: ~
as was shown in the body of the Article.
-,;: ~:tion. Now it has been already po:
~, ~, A. 3), that God is the First 5~:
,- : ;., Himself unmoved. Therefore it 1.3- :'-f
QUESTION 3

...;.:~ God is not a body. Secondly, beca'l.5e .::.

:-<: heing must of necessity be in act, ~,.:
Of the Simplicity of God

ay in potentiality. For although :" ::-.

(In Eight Articles)
-E.. thing that passes from potentLal::7
';~ity, the potentiality is prior in
posed of subject and accident? (7) Whether
WHEN the existence of a thing has been ascer
actuality; nevertheless, absolutely
tained there remains the further question of He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
actuality is prior to potentiality ~
the manner of its existence, in order that we (8) Whether He enters into composition with
~ ~f'ver is in potentiality can be reduce-C !
may know its essence. Now, because we can
other things?
..:3.lity only by some being in aet~,
not know what God is, but rather what He is
FIRST ARTICLE
'-e' it has been already proved that Goi ~ :..:,
not, we have no means for considering how
~E: Being. It is therefore impossible tLo.:
Whether God Is a Body?
God is, but rather how He is not.
;: there should be any potentiality, ~_
We
proceed
thus
to
the
First
Article:
Therefore, we must consider (1) How He is
~:: body is in potentiality, because the
not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How
Objection 1. It seems that God is a body.
'--iUS, as such, is divisible to infinity' ::
He is named.
For a body is that which has the three dimen
,'tiore impossible that God should :.f
Now it can be shown how God is not, by sions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
-'-=1. Thirdly, because God is the rna;:! >;.::
denying of Him whatever is opposed to the dimensions to God, for it is written: He is
:oeings. Now it is impossible for a oc--::
idea of Him-viz., composition, motion, and higher than IIeaven, and what wilt thou do?
:Qe most noble of beings; for a body ::. ~
the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou
~ either animate or inanimate; and a:: "-="
simplicity, whereby we deny composition in know? The measure oj Him is longer than the
-.:::.c body is manifestly nobler than allJ ' .
Him; and because whatever is simple in ma
earth and broader than the sea (Job xi. 8, 9).
.:......-:-;ate body. But an animate body i5 ~
terial things is imperfect and a part of some
Therefore God is a body.
':...;:'..ate precisely as body; otherwist 0..
thing else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection;
Obj. 2. Further, everything that has figure
:o.::...es would be animate. Therefore its 2,.
(3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity.
-"",:i.on depends upon some other thing, as- :_
(5) His unity.
But God seems to have figure, for it is written:
'"'~:' depends for its animation on the s:_
Concerning His simplicity, there are eight Let us make man to our image and likeness
-:='ce that by which a body becomes "'-=
points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is a body? (Gen. i. 26). Now a figure is called an image,
~:OO must be nobler than the body. The""'!
(2) Whether He is composed of matter and according to the text: Who being the bright
-" it is impossible that God should b'? '_
form? (3) Whether in Him there is composi
ness of His glory and the figure, i.e., the image,
tion of quiddity, essence or nature, and sub
of His substance (Heb. i. 3). Therefore God
.,d;ply Obj. 1. As we have said above !Q,
ject? (4) Whether He is composed of essence is a body.
9), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual ~'
and existence? (5) Whether He is composed of
Obj. 3. Further, whatever has corporeal
. !e things under the comparison of CG."'T:
genus and difference? (6) Whether He is com
parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes cor-- things. Hence, when it attributes to G:,

to be found in things. Among beings there are

some more and some less good, true, noble,
and the like. But "more" and "less" are predi
cated of different things, according as they
resemble in their different ways something
which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be
hotter according as it more nearly resembles
that which is hottest; so that there is some
thing which is truest, something best, some
thing noblest, and, consequently, something
which is uttermost being; for those things that
are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as
it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum
in any genus is the cause of all in that genus;
as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the
cause of all hot things. Therefore there must
also be something which is to all beings the
cause of their being, goodness, and every other
perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance
of the world. We see that things which lack
intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for
an end, and this is evident from their acting
always, or nearly always, in the same way, so
as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain
that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they

f=-""