Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
A since it involves more of both X and Y and lies on a higher community indifference curve. Nation 2 starts at A’ in production and consumption in autarky, moves to point B' in production, and by exchanging B'C' of Y for CE’ of X reaches point E'in consumption (which exceeds A’). At Px/Py=Pp=Pa, Nation 1 wants to export BC of X for CE of Y, while Nation 2 wants to export BC’ (=CE) of Y for CE’ (=BC) of X. Thus, Pp=Pp is the equilibrium relative commodity price because it clears both (the X and Y) markets. 3. Draw a figure showing: (1) in Panel A a nation's demand and supply curve for a traded commodity and the nation's excess supply of the commodity, (2) in Panel C the trade partner's demand and supply curve for the same traded commodity and its excess demand for the commodity, and (3) in Panel B the supply and demand for the quantity traded of the commodity, its equilibrium price, and why a price above or below the equilibrium price will not persist. At any other price, QD # QS, and P will change to P>. Ans, See Figure 2 on page 74, The equilibrium relative commodity price for commodity X (the traded commodity exported by Nation 1 and imported by Nation 2) is P2 and the equilibrium quantity of commodity X traded is Qh. “TBPhy PANEL A Phy PANEL Py PANEL 144, (a) Identify the conditions that may give rise to trade between two nations. (b) What are some of the assumptions on which the Heckscher-Ohlin theory is based? (©) What does this theory say about the pattern of trade and effect of trade on factor prices? Ans. (a) Trade can be based on a difference in factor endowments, technology, of tastes between two nations. A difference either in factor endowments or technology results in a different production possibilities frontier for each nation, which, unless neutralized by a difference in tastes, leads to a difference in relative commodity price and mutually beneficial trade. If two nations face increasing costs and have identical production Possibilities frontiers but different tastes, there will also be a difference in relative commodity prices and the basis for mutually beneficial trade between the two nations. The difference in relative commodity prices is then translated into a difference in absolute commodity prices between the two nations, which is the immediate cause of wade. (b) The Heckscher-Ohlin theory (sometimes referred to as the modem theory — as opposed to the classical theory - of intemational trade) assumes that nations have the same tastes, use the same technology, face constant retums to scale (i.e, a given percentage increase in all inputs increases output by the same percentage) but differ widely in factor endowments. It also says that in the face of identical tastes or demand conditions, this difference in factor endowments will result in a difference in relative factor prices between nations, which in tum leads to a difference in relative commodity prices and trade. Thus, in the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, the intemational difference in supply conditions alone determines the pattern of trade. To be noted is that the two nations need not be identical in other respects in order for international trade to be based primarily on the difference in their factor endowments. (©) The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem postulates that each nation will export the commodity intensive in its relatively abundant and cheap factor and import the commodity intensive in its relatively scarce and expensive factor. As an important corollary, it adds that under highly restrictive assumptions, trade will completely eliminate the pretrade relative and absolute differences in the price of homogeneous factors among nations. Under less restrictive and more usual conditions, however, trade will reduce, but not eliminate, the pretrade differences in relative and absolute factor prices among nations. In any event, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory does say something very useful on how trade affects factor Prices and the distribution of income in each nation. Classical economists were practically silent on this point. ETS5. Suppose that tastes change in Nation 1 (the L-abundant and L-cheap nation) so that consumers demand more of commodity X (the L-intensive commodity) and less of commodity Y (the K- intensive commodity). Suppose that Nation 1 is India, commodity X is textiles, and commodity Y is food. Starting from the no-trade equilibrium position and using the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trace the effect of this change in tastes on India's (a) relative commodity prices and demand for food and textiles, (b) production of both commodities and factor prices, and (c) comparative advantage and volume of trade. (d) Do you expect international trade to lead to the complete equalization of relative commodity and factor prices between India and the United States? Why? Ans. (a) The change in tastes can be visualized by a shift toward the textile axis in India's indifference map in such a way that an indifference curve is tangent to the steeper segment of India's production frontier (because of increasing opportunity costs) after the increase in demand for textiles. This will cause the pretrade relative commodity price of textiles to rise in India, (b) The increase in the relative price of textiles will lead domestic producers in India to shift labor and capital from the production of food to the production of textiles. Since textiles are L-intensive in relation to food, the demand for labor and therefore the wage rate will rise in India. At the same time, as the demand for food falls, the demand for and thus the price of capital will fall. With labor becoming relative more expensive, producers in India will substitute capital for labor in the production of both textiles and food. (©) Even with the rise in relative wages and in the relative price of textiles, India still remains the L-abundant and low-wage nation with respect to a nation such as the United States. However, the pretrade difference in the relative price of textiles between India and the United States is now somewhat smaller than before the change in tastes in India. Asa result the volume of trade required to equalize relative commodity prices and hence factor prices is smaller than before. That is, India need now export a smaller quantity of textiles and import less food than before for the relative price of textiles in India and the United States to be equalized. Similarly, the gap between real wages and between India and the United States is now smaller and can be more quickly and easily closed (i.., with a smaller volume of trade). (@) Since many of the assumptions required for the complete equalization of relative commodity and factor prices do not hold in the real world, great differences can be expected and do in fact remain between real wages in India and the United States. Nevertheless, trade would tend to reduce these differences, and the H-O model does identify the forces that must be considered to analyze the effect of trade on the differences in the relative and absolute commodity and factor prices between India and the United States. -16-6. (a) Explain why the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model needs to be extended. (b) Indicate in what important ways the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model can be extended. (©) Explain what is meant by differentiated products and intra-industry trade. Ans. (a) The Heckscher-Ohlin trade model needs to be extended because, while generally correct, it fails to explain a significant portion of international trade, particularly the ‘ade in manufactured products among industrial nations. (b) The international trade left unexplained by the basic Heckscher-Ohlin trade model can be explained by (1) economies of scale, (2) intra-industry trade, and (3) trade based on imitation gaps and product differentiation. (©) Differentiated products refer to similar, but not identical, products (such as cars, typewriters, cigarettes, soaps, and so on) produced by the same industry or broad product group. Intra-industry trade refers to the international trade in differentiated products. -17-CHAPTER 8 TRADE RESTRICTIONS: TARIFFS OUTLINE *8.1 Introduction *8.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis of a Tariff Case Study 8-1: Average Tariff on Industrial Products in Major Developed Countries Case Study 8-2: Average Tariff on Industrial Products in Some Major Developing Countries 8.2a Partial Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff 8.2b Effects of a Tariff on Producer and Consumer Surplus 8.2c Costs and Benefits of a Tariff Case Study 8-3: The Welfare Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Some U.S. Products Case Study 8-4: The Welfare Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Some EU Products *8.3 The Theory of Tariff Structure 8.3a The Rate of Effective Protection 8.3b Generalization and Evaluation of the Theory of Effective Protection Case Study 8-5: Rising Tariff Rates with Degree of Domestic Processing Case Study 8-6: Structure of Tariffs on Industrial Products in U.S., EU, Japan and Canada 8.4 General Equilibrium Analysis of a Tariff in a Small Country 8.4a General Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff in a Small Country 8.4b Illustration of the Effects of a Tariff in a Small Country 8.4 The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 8.5 General Equilibrium Analysis of a Tariff in a Large Country 8.5a General Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff in a Large Country 8.5b Illustration of the Effects of a Tariff in a Large Country 8.6 The Optimum Tariff 8.6a The Meaning of the Concept and Retaliation 8.6b Illustration of the Optimum Tariff and Retaliation. Appendix: 8.1. Partial Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff in a Large Nation ‘A8.2 Derivation of the Formula for the Rate of Effective Protection A8.3. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem Graphically 8.4. Exception to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem - The Metzler Paradox A8.5Short-run Effect of a Tariff on Factors’ Income A8.6 Measurement of the Optimum Tariff -78-Key Terms Trade or commercial policies Consumer surplus Import tariff Rent or producer surplus Export tariff Protection cost or deadweight loss of a tariff ‘Ad valorem tariff Nominal tariff Specific tariff Rate of effective protection Compound tariff Domestic value added Consumption effect of a tariff Prohibitive tariff Production effect of a tariff Stolper-Samuelson theorem Trade effect of a tariff Metzler paradox Revenue effect of a tariff Optimum tariff Lect juide 1. Iwould cover sections 1 and 2 and assign problems 1-2 in the first lecture. The most difficult part of section 2 is the meaning and measurement of consumer and producer surplus. Since a clear understanding of the meaning and measurement of consumer and producer surplus is crucial in evaluating the effect of tariffs, I would explain these concepts very carefully. 2. I would then cover section 3 and assign problems 3-6 in the second lecture. The theory of tariff structure is also very difficult and important, and so I would also explain this concept very carefully. I found that the best way to explain it is by using the simple example used in the text of the suit with and without imported inputs. 3. The rest of the chapter can be skipped without loss of continuity by those Instructors who do not wish to cover the general equilibrium effects of tariffs. 4. For those Instructors who wish to cover the rest of the chapter, I would take up another two lectures to do so. I would also assign and grade problems 8-14 to make sure that students understand the material. 5. In covering section 8.4, I would pay special attention to the explanation of Figure 8-5 and to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 6. In covering Section 8.6, please note that the optimum tariff can only be discussed intuitively without trade indifference curves (examined in Appendix A8.6). -19-Answer to Problems 1. a. Consumption is 70Y, production is 10Y and imports are 60Y (see Figure 1 on the next page). b. Consumption is 60Y, production is 20Y and imports are 40Y (see Figure 1). ¢. The consumption effect is -10Y, the production effect is +10Y, the trade effect is -20Y and the revenue effect is $40 (see Figure 1). 2. a. The consumer surplus is $245 without and $180 with the tariff (see Figure 1). b. Of the increase in the revenue of producers with the tariff (as compared with their revenues under free trade), $15 represents the increase in production costs and another $15 represents the increase in rent or producer surplus (see Figure 1). ¢. The dollar value or the protection cost of the tariff is $10 (see Figure 1). 3. This will increase the rate of effective protection in the nation. 4. g=0.4- (0.50.4) = 0.4 -0.2=0.2= 40% 1.0-0.5 05 (05 260% 880% 0 8=20% pose 6. a. g=70% b. See the first paragraph of section 8.36. 7. See Figure 2. 8. When Nation 1 (assumed to be a small nation) imposes an import tariff on commodity Y, the real income of labor falls and that of capital rises. 9, Py/Px rises for domestic producers and consumers. As production of Y (the K-intensive commodity) rises and that of X falls, the demand and income of K rises and that of L falls. Therefore, r rises and w falls. 10. If Nation 1 were instead a large nation, then Nation 1's terms of trade rise and the real income of L may also rise. -80-> h 8111. India is more likely to restrict imports of K-intensive commodities in which India has a comparative disadvantage and this is likely to increase the return to capital and reduce the retum to labor according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. 12, See Figure 3 on the previous page 13, See Figure 4, 14. The volume of trade may shrink to zero (the origin of offer curves). App.. App.2. App.3. App.4. App.s. App.6 The more elastic Sy and Sr are, the lower is the free trade price of the commodity and the lower is the increase in the domestic price of the commodity as a result of the tariff. a. The supply curve of the nation for the commodity shifts up and to the left (as with the imposition of any tax); this does not affect the consumption of the commodity with free trade, but it reduces domestic production and increases imports of the commodity; it also increases the revenue effect and reduces producers’ surplus. b. The imposition of a tariff on imported inputs going into the domestic production of the commodity will have no effect on the size of the protection cost or deadweight loss. See Figure 5 (on the next page). |. See Figure 6. Real w will fall in terms of Y and rise in terms of X. On the other hand, real r will rise in terms of Y and fall in terms of X. This can be seen by drawing a figure similar to Figure 8-10, but with the VMPLy curve shifting upward. a, See Figure 7. b. After Nation 1 has imposed an optimum tariff and Nation 2 has retaliated with an optimum tariff of its own, the approximate terms of trade for Nation 1 is 0.8, while the approximate terms of trade of Nation 2 is 1.25. c. Nation I's welfare declines from the reduction in the volume and in the terms of trade. Although nation 2's terms of trade are higher than under free trade, the volume of trade has shrunk so much that nation 2's welfare is also likely to be lower than under free trade. -82-Fu FoesMultiple-choice Questions 1. Which of the following statements is incorrect? a. Anad valorem tariff is expressed as a percentage of the value of the traded commodity. b. aspecific tariff is expressed as a fixed sum of the value of the traded commodity. ¢. export tariffs are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution *d. The U.S. uses exclusively the specific tariff 2. A small nation is one: a. which does not affect world price by its trading b. which faces an infinitely elastic world supply curve for its import commodity €. whose consumers will pay a price that exceeds the world price by the amount of the tariff *d. all of the above 3. Ifa small nation increases the tariff on its import commodity, a. consumption of the commodity increases b. production of the commodity decreases ¢._ imports of the commodity increase 4, none of the above 4. The increase in producer surplus when a small nation imposes a tariff is measured by the area: *a. to the left of the supply curve between the commodity price with and without the tariff b. under the supply curve between the quantity produced with and without the tariff . under the demand curve between the commodity price with and without the tariff d. none of the above. 5. Ifa small nation increases the tariff on its import commodity: *a. the rent of domestic producers of the commodity increases b. the protection cost of the tariff decreases c. the deadweight loss decreases d. all of the above10. Which of the following statements ii incorrect with respect to the rate of effective protection? a. for given values of ai and ti, g is larger the greater is t b. fora given value of t and ti, g is larger the greater is a, ¢. gexceeds, is equal to or is smaller than t, ast; is smaller than, is equal to or is larger than t *d. when att exceeds t, the rate of effective protection is po: With a=: 10%, t=0, and t=20%, g is: a. 40% b. 20% c. 80% do . The imposition of an import tariff by a small nation: “a, increases the relative price of the import commodity for domestic producers and consumers b. reduces the relative price of the import commodity for domestic producers and consumers . increases the relative price of the import commodity for the nation as a whole d._ any of the above is possible The imposition of an import tariff by a small nation: a. increases the nation's welfare *b. reduces the nation's welfare c. leaves the nation's welfare unchanged d. any of the above is possible According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the imposition of a tariff by a nation: ‘a. increases the real return of the nation's abundant factor **b. increases the real return of the nation's scarce factor c. reduces the real return of the nation's scarce factor d._any of the above is possible . The imposition of an import tariff by a nation results in: a. an increase in relative price of the nation’s import commodity b. an increase in the nation's production of its importable commodity c. reduces the real return of the nation's abundant factor *d. _alllof the above -85-12, The imposition of an import tariff by a nation can be represented by a rotation of the: ‘a. nation's offer curve away from the axis measuring the commodity of its comparative advantage b. the nation's offer curve toward the axis measuring the commodity of its comparative advantage ¢. the other nation’s offer curve toward the axis measuring the commodity of its comparative advantage 4. the other nation's offer curve away from the axis measuring the commodity of its comparative advantage 13. The imposition of an import tariff by a large nation: a. increases the nation’s terms of trade b. reduces the volume of trade c. may increase or reduce the nation's welfare *d_ all of the above 14, The imposition of an optimum tariff by a large nation: a, improves its terms of trade b. reduces the volume of trade c._ increases the nation's welfare *d,all of the above 15, The optimum tariff for a small nation is: a. 100% b. 50% *c.0 d. depends on elasticities*CHAPTER 9 (Core Chapter) NONTARIFF TRADE BARRIERS AND THE NEW PROTECTIONISM OUTLINE 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Import Quotas 9.2a Effects of an Import Quota 9.2b Comparison of an Import Quota to an Import Tariff 9.3 Other Nontariff Barriers and the New Protectionism 9.3a Voluntary Export Restraints Case Study 9-1: Voluntary Export Restraints on Japanese Autos to the United States 9.3b Technical, Administrative, and Other Regulations 9.3c International Cartels 93d Dumping Case Study 9-2: Antidumping Measures in Force in 2001 9.3e Export Subsidies Case Study 9-3: Agricultural Subsidies in Developed Nations Case Study 9-4: Countervailing Measures in Force in 2001 Case Study 9-5: The Pervasiveness of Nontariff Barriers 9.4 The Political Economy of Protectionism 9.4a Fallacious and Questionable Arguments for Protection 9.4b Infant-Industry and Other Qualified Arguments for Protection 9.4c Who Gets Protected? 9.5 Strategic Trade and Industrial Policies 9.5 Strategic Trade Policy Case Study 9-6: Welfare Effects on the U.S. Economy of Removing All Import Restraints 9.5 Strategic Trade and Industrial Policies with Game Theory 9.5¢ The U.S. Response to Foreign Industrial Targeting and Strategic Trade Policy 9.6 History of U.S. Commercial Policy 9.6a The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 9.6b The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 9.6c The 1962 Trade Agreements Act and the Kennedy Round 9.6d The Trade Reform Act of 1974 and the Tokyo Round 9.6e The 1984 and 1988 Trade Acts 9.7 ‘The Uruguay Round and Outstanding Trade Problems 9.7a The Uruguay Round -87-Case Study 9-7: Gains from the Uruguay Round Case Study 9-8: The Multilateral Rounds of Trade Negotiations 9.7 Outstanding Trade Problems Case Study 9-9: International trade and the Anti-Globalization Movement ‘Appendix: A9.1 Centralized Cartels 9.2 International Price Discrimination A9.3 Tariffs, Subsidies and Domestic Goals Key Terms Quota ‘Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 Nontariff trade barrier (NTBs) Trade Agreements Act of 1934 ‘New protectionism Most-favored-nation principle Voluntary export restraints (VERs) Bilateral Trade Technical, administrative, and General Agreement on Tariff and other regulations Trade (GATT) International cartel Multilateral Trade Negotiations Dumping International Trade Organization (ITO) Persistent dumping Peril-point provisions Predatory dumping Escape clause Sporadic dumping ‘National security clause Trigger-price mechanism ‘Trade Expansion Act of 1962 Export subsidies Trade Adjustment Assistance (AA) Export-Import bank Kennedy Round Foreign Sales Corporations ‘Trade Reform Act of 1974 Countervailing duties (CVDs) Tokyo Round Scientific tariff Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 Infant-industry argument Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 Strategic trade policy ‘Uruguay Round Industrial Policy World Trade Organization (WTO) Game theory Globalization Anti-Globalization Movement Lecture Guide: 1. This is an important core chapter examining some of the most recent developments in international trade policy. 2. I would cover sections 1 and 2 in lecture 1. I would pay particular attention to Figure 9-1, which examines the partial equilibrium effects of an import quota. 3. I would cover section 3 in lecture 2. Here I would clearly explain the difference between a regular import quota and a voluntary export restraint. I would also clearly explain dumping and Figure 9-2 (which deals with export subsidies). The five case studies serve to highlight the theory and show the relevance of the theory in today’s world. -88-4. I would cover section 4 in lecture 3. Here I would give special attention to the fallacious arguments for protection since they are often heard in common discussions of trade matters. | would also clearly explain the importance of strategic trade and industrial policy and the political economy of who gets protected. 5. I would cover section 5 in lecture 4, which examines strategic trade and industrial policies with game theory. This is not difficult and the students will find it very interesting. 6. Sections 6 and 7 can be covered in lecture 5, Here I would stress the Uruguay Round and the outstanding intemational trade problems. Answer to Problems: 1. Nations restrict trade either in response to lobbying by the producers of a commodity in which the nation has a comparative disadvantage or to gain a strategic advantage in relation to other nations. The first leads to a welfare loss for the nation as a whole. The second is very difficult to achieve. 2. The partial equilibrium effects of the import quota are: P,=$1.50; consumption is 45X, of which 5X are produced domestically; by auctioning off import licenses, the revenue effect would be $15. 3. The partial equilibrium effects of the import quota are: .50; consumption is 40X, of which 10X are produced domestically; the revenue effect is $45, 4. The partial equilibrium effects of the quota are: P,=$2; domestic production and consumption are 50X; The revenue is zero. 5. The partial equilibrium effects of the quota are: P,=S1; consumption is 70X, production is 30X, and revenue is zero, 6. The partial equilibrium effects of a negotiated export quota of 30X are: P.=$4; domestic production is 40X, of which 10X are consumed at home. 7. An export tariff or quota, as an import tariff or quota, affects the price of the commodity and domestic consumption and production. But the effects are the opposite. 8. See Figure 1. The equilibrium price of the commodity is P,=OC and the equilibrium quantity is Q.OB in Figure 1. -89-gg Figue2 Fons9. Ifthe supply curve of the commodity in Figure 1 referred to a cartel of exporters acting as a monopolist, P,=OF and Q.=OA (see Figure 1). 10. Py is higher and Q, smaller when exporters behave as a monopolist. la. ‘The monopolist should charge P=! Appendix A9.2. 4 in the domestic market and P2=$3 in Figure 9-5 in This represents the best, or optimal distribution of sales between the two markets because any other distribution of sales in the two markets gives less revenue. 12. See Figure 2. To the left of point A, the domestic firm faces higher long-run average costs of production (LACp) than the foreign firm (LAC;). To the right of point A the opposite is the case. a. 14, App.1 App.2. App.3. If the entries in the top left-hand corner of Table 9-5 were changed to +10, +10, then both Boeing and Airbus would produce the aircraft without any subsidy, and so no strategic trade and industrial policy would be needed in the U.S. or Europe. If the entries in the top left-hand comer of Table 9-5 were changed to +5, +0, then both Boeing and Airbus would produce the aircraft without any subsidy, and so no strategic trade and industrial policy would be needed in the U.S. or Europe. ‘Note that even though Airbus only breaks even, in economics we include a normal retum ‘on investment as part of costs. Thus, Airbus would remain in business because it would eam a normal retum on investment. If the entries in the top lefi-hand corner of Table 9-5 were changed to +5, -10, then both Boeing produces and Airbus does not produce without any subsidy. With a subsidy of at least $10 million per year, however, Airbus would enter the market and lead to a loss of $100 million for Boeing unless the U.S. government would provide a subsidy of at least $5 million per year to Boeing. ‘The answers to parts (a) and (b) are presented in Appendix A9.3. . See Figure 3 on page 90. In order to maximize to maximize total profits the domestic monopolist practicing international price discrimination should sell at the price of Py=$20 in the domestic market and at the price of Pj=$15 in the foreign market, By imposing a 100% tax on the production of commodity X and giving it as a subsidy to producers of commodity Y. 91.Multiple-choice Questions: 1. An import quota: increases the domestic price of the imported commodity reduces domestic consumption increases domestic production 'd. all of the above pose 2. An increase in the demand of the imported commodity subject to a given import quota: a. reduces the domestic quantity demanded of the commodity *b. increases the domestic production of the commodity ¢. reduces the domestic price of the commodity 4. reduces the producers’ surplus 3. Adjustment to any shift in the domestic demand or supply of an importable commodity ocet a. in domestic price with an import quota b. in the quantity of imports with a tariff ¢. through the market mechanism with an import tariff but not with an import quota *d.all of the above 4, An international cartel refers to: a. dumping *b. an organization of exporters ¢. an international commodity agreement . voluntary export restraints 5. The temporary sale of a commodity at below cost or at a lower price abroad in order to drive foreign producers out of business is called: *a, predatory dumping b. sporadic dumping ©. continuous dumping 4. voluntary export restraints -92-6. The type of dumping which would justify antidumping measures by the country subject to the dumping is: *a, predatory dumping b. sporadic dumping €. continuous dumping 4. all of the above 7. A fallacious argument for protection is: a. the infant industry argument b. protection for national defense *c, the scientific tariff 4. to correct domestic distortions 8, Which of the following is true with respect to the infant-industry argument for protection? a. it refers to temporary protection to establish a domestic industry . to be valid, the return to the grown-up industry must be sufficiently high also to repay for the higher prices paid by domestic consumers of the commodity during the infancy period ¢._ is inferior to an equivalent production subsidy to the infant industry 4. all of the above 9. Which of the following is false with respect to strategic trade policy? a. it postulates that a nation can gain by an activist trade policy *b. it is practiced to some extent by most industrial nations ¢. ittcan easily be carried out d._all of the above 10. Industrial policy refers to: a. an activist policy by the government of an industrial country to stimulate the development ofan industry b. the granting of a subsidy to a domestic industry to stimulate the development of an industry c. the granting of a subsidy to a domestic industry to counter a foreign subsidy *4. all of the above 11. Game theory refers to: ‘ta, a method of choosing the optimal strategy in conflict situations b. the granting of a subsidy to correct a domestic distortion ¢. the theory of tariff protection d._ none of the above -93-12, Trade protection in the United States is usually provided to: a. low-wage workers b. well-organized industries with large employment c. industries producing consumer products 4. all of the above 13, The most-favored-nation principle refers to: a, extension to all trade partners of any reciprocal tariff reduction negotiated by the U.S. with any of its trade partners b, multilateral trade negotiation ¢. the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 4. the International Trade Organization 14, On which of the following principles does GATT rest? a. nondiscrimination b. elimination of nontariff barriers . consultation among nations in solving trade disputes “4, all of the above 15. Which of the following was not negotiated under the Uruguay Round? a. reduction of tariffs on industrial goods . replacement of quotas with tariffs ¢. reduction of subsidies on industrial products and on agricultural exports 4, liberalization in trade in most services -94-CHAPTER 10 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: CUSTOMS UNIONS AND FREE TRADE AREAS OUTLINE 10.1. Introduction 10.2 Trade-Creating Customs Unions 10.2a Trade Creation 10.2b Illustration of a Trade-Creating Customs Union 10.3 Trade-Diverting Customs Unions 10.3a Trade Diversion 10.3b Illustration of a Trade-Diverting Customs Union 10.4 The Theory of the Second Best and Other Static Welfare Effects 10.4a The Theory of the Second Best 10.46 Conditions More Likely to Lead to Increased Welfare 10.4¢ Other Static Welfare Effects of Customs Unions 10.5 Dynamic Benefits of Customs Unions *10.6 History of Attempts at Economic Integration 10.6a The European Union Case Study 10-1: Economic Profile of the EU, NAFTA, and Japan Case Study 10-2: Gains from the Single EU Market 10.66 The European Free Trade Association 10.6c U.S. Free Trade Agreements and North American Free Trade Agreement Case Study 10-3: Macroeconomic Estimates of Mexico's Gains from NAFTA, 10.6d_Attempts at Economic Integration Among Developing Nations Case Study 10-4: Economic Profile of Mercosur ‘Case Study 10-5: Changes in Trade Patterns with Economic Integration 3444 10.6e Economic Integration in Central, Eastern Europe & Former Soviet Republics Case Study 10-6: Per Capita Income of Transition Economies Appendix: A10.1 General Equilibrium Analysis of Static Effects of a Trade-Diverting Customs Union ‘A10.2 Postwar Chronology of Regionalism * Core Section Key Terms Economic integration Variable import levies Preferential trade arrangements European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Free-trade area Trade deflection Customs union North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ‘Common market Southemn Common Market (Mercosur) Economic union Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) Duty-free zones State trading companies Trade creation Bilateral agreements Trade diversion Bulk purchasing Trade-diverting customs union Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) Theory of the second best New Independent States (NIS) Tariff factories Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) European Union (EU) Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) Baltic States Free Trade Area (BAFTA) -95-Lecture Guide: 1. This is not a core chapter and I would skip it except for section 6. Section 6 is an important section and can be regarded as an extension of Chapter 9, which is a core chapter. Section 6 deals with a very important set of current events. 2. Section 6 is a long section and may require two classes to be adequately presented. I would cover subsections a-d in one class and subsection ¢ as well as both case studies in the second class. Case Studies 10-1 to 10-6 can be used for a very stimulating class discussion. 3. While section 6 can be presented without covering the material in sections 1-5, some terms discussed in sections 1-5 (such as trade creation and trade diversion) need to be defined. 4. In a one-year course in international economics, I would cover the entire chapter. I would then cover sections 10-1 to 10-3 in one class and sections 10-4 and 10-5 in the second class. In the first class, the most important aspect would be the presentation and clear explanation of Figures 10-1 and 10-2. Answers to Problems: 1. If Nation A imposes a 100 percent ad valorem tariff on imports of commodity X from Nation B and Nation C, Nation A will produce commodity X domestically because the domestic price of commodity X is $10 as compared with the tariff-inclusive price of $16 if Nation A imported commodity X from Nation B and $12 if Nation A imported commodity X from nation C. 2. a, If Nation A forms a customs union with Nation B, Nation A will import commodity X from Nation B at the price of $8 instead of producing it itself at $10 or importing it from Nation C at the tariff-inclusive price of $12. . When Nation A forms a customs union with Nation B this would be a trade-creating customs union because it replaces domestic production of commodity X at Px=810 with tariff-free imports of commodity X from Nation B at Px=$8, 3. If Nation A imposes a 50 percent ad valorem tariff on imports of commodity X from Nation B and Nation C, Nation A will import commodity X from nation C at the tariff-inclusive price of $9 instead of producing commodity X itself or importing it from Nation B at the tariff-inclusive price of $12. 4. a. If Nation A forms a customs union with Nation B, Nation A will import commodity X from Nation B at the price of $8 instead of importing it from Nation C at the tariff- inclusive price of $9. -96-b. When Nation A forms a customs union with Nation B this would be a trade-diverting customs union because it replaces lower-price imports of commodity X of $6 (from the point of view of Nation A as a whole) with higher priced imports of commodity X from Nation B at $8, Specifically, Nation A's importers do not import commodity X from Nation C because the tariff-inclusive price of commodity X from Nation C is $9 as compared with the no- tariff price of $8 for imports of commodity X from Nation B. However, since the government of Nation A collects the $3 tariff per unit on imports of commodity X from Nation C, the net effective price for imports of commodity X_ from Nation C is really $6 for Nation A as a whole. 5. See Figure 10-1 in the text. Any figure similar to Figure 10-1 in the text would do. 6. The welfare gains that Nation 2 receives from joining Nation 1 to form a customs union is given by the sum of the areas of triangles CJM and BHN in Figure 10-1 in the text. Any similar figure and sum of corresponding triangles would, of course, be adequate. 7. See Figure 10-2 in the text. Any figure similar to Figure 10-2 in the text would do. 8. ‘The welfare loss that Nation 2 receives from joining Nation 1 to form a customs union is given by CJJ+B'HH™- MNH'J=$11.25 in Figure 10-2 in the text. Any similar figure and sum of corresponding triangles minus the area of corresponding rectangle would, of course, be adequate. 9. See Figure | and compare it to Figure 10-2. 10. The net gain from the trade-diverting customs union shown in Figure 1 is given by CU4B'HH-MJH'N. As contrasted with the case in Figure 10-2, however, the sum of the areas of the two triangles (measuring gains) is greater than the arca the rectangle (measuring the loss). Thus, the nation would now gain from the formation of a custom union. Had we drawn the figure on graph paper, we would have been able to measure the net gain in ‘monetary terms also. 11. A trade-diverting customs union is more likely to lead to a welfare gain of a member nation (1) the smaller is the relative inefficiency of nation 3 with respect to nation 1, (2) the higher is the level of the tariff, and (3) the more elastic are Dx and Sx in nation 2. These can seen by comparing Figure 10-2 in the text with Figure 1 on the next page. 12. See Figure 2. The formation of the customs union has no effect. 13, NAFTA created much more controversy because the very low wages in Mexico led to great fears of large job losses in the U. 14, The possible cost to the U.S. from EU92 arose from the increased efficiency and competitiveness of the E.U. The benefit arose because a more rapid growth in the EU spills into a greater demand for American products, which benefits the U. S. App. Compare points B' and H' in Figure 10-3 with the corresponding points in Figure 3. 97+Fores 98le-choice 1. Which of the following statements is correct? *a. Ina customs union, member nations apply a uniform external tariff b. ina free-trade area, member nations harmonize their monetary and fiscal policies ¢. within a customs union there is unrestricted factor movement da customs union is a higher form of economic integration than a common market 2. A customs union that allows for the free movement of labor and capital among its member nations is called a: a. preferential trade arrangement b. free-trade area *c. common market 4. all of the above 3. A trade-creating customs union is one where: a. lower-cost imports from outside the customs union are replaced by higher-cost imports from a union member +b, some domestic production in a member nation is replaced by lower-cost imports from another member nation ¢. trade among members increases but trade with nonmembers decreases 4. trade among members decreases while trade with nonmembers increases 4, A trade-diverting customs union: a. increases trade among union members and with nonmember nations b. reduces trade among union members and with nonmember nations *c. increases trade among members but reduces trade with non-members d. reduces trade among union members but increases it with nonmembers 5. A trade-diverting customs union results in: a. trade diversion only . trade creation only +c, both trade creation and trade diversion d. we cannot say -99-6. The formation of a trade-creating customs union where all economic resources of member nations are fully employed before and after the formation of the customs union leads to an: a. increase in the welfare of member and nonmember nations . increase in the welfare of member nations only . increase in the welfare of nonmember nations only d._ increase or decrease in the welfare of member and nonmember nations 7. A trade-diverting customs union: a. increases the welfare of member and nonmember nations b. reduces the welfare of member and nonmember nations c. increases the welfare of member nations but reduces that of nonmembers *d, reduces the welfare of nonmembers and may increase or reduce that of members 8. A trade-diverting customs union is more likely to lead to trade creation: a. the lower are the pre-union trade barriers of the member countries *b. the lower are the customs union's barriers on trade with the rest of the world ¢. the smaller is the number of countries forming the customs union and the smaller their size d. the more complementary rather than competitive are the economies of the nations forming the customs union 9. The theory of customs union is a special case of the theory of: a. effective protection *b. the second best ¢. the product cycle d. comparative advantage 10. Which is not a dynamic benefit from the formation of a customs union? a. increased competition, b. economies of scale c. stimulus to investment 4, trade creation 11. The formation of the EU resulted in: a. trade creation in industrial and agricultural products b. trade diversion in industrial and agricultural products *c. trade creation in industrial products and trade diversion in agricultural products 4. trade diversion in industrial products and trade creation in agricultural products -100-12. 13. 14. 15, ‘The benefit that the United States is likely to receive from NAFTA: a. increasing competition in product and resource markets greater technical innovation ¢._ improvements in its terms of trade d. all of the above The benefit that Mexico is likely to receive from NAFTA: a. greater export-led growth b. encouraging the retum of flight capital ¢. more rapid structural change *d_ all of the above Which is a stumbling block to successful economic integration among groups of developing nations? a. benefits are not evenly distributed among nations b, many developing nations are not willing to relinquish part of their newly-acquired sovereignty to a supranational community body, as required for successful economic integration ¢. the complementary nature of their economies and competition for the same world markets for their agricultural exports 4. all of the above . The formation of a free trade area among the countries of Eastern Europe is advocated in order to: a. restore trade trading *b. retain the traditional trade links that can be justified on market principles ¢. reduce the need for structural change 4. none of the above -101-CHAPTER 11 INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OUTLINE 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Importance of Trade to Development 11.2a Trade Theory and Economic Development Case Study 11-1: The East Asian Miracle of Growth and Trade Case Study 11-2: The Crisis in High-Performance Asian Economies (HPAEs) 11.2b Trade as an Engine of Growth 11.2c. The Contributions of Trade to Development 11.24. International Trade and Endogenous Growth Theory 11.3. The Terms of Trade and Economic Development 11.3a The Various Terms of Trade Case Study 11-3: Change in Commodity Prices Over Time 11.3b Alleged Reasons for Deterioration in the Commodity Terms of Trade 11.3¢ Historical Movement in the Commodity and Income Terms of Trade 11.4 Export instability and Economic Development 11.4 Causes and Effects of Export Instability 11.4b Measurements of Export Instability and its Effect on Development 11.4c International Commodity Agreements 11.5. Import Substitution versus Export Orientation 11.5a Development Through Import Substitution Versus Exports 11.5b The Experience with Import Substitution 11.5c Recent Trade Liberalization and Growth in Developing Countries Case Study 11-4: The Growth of Rich Countries, Globalizers and Non-Globalizers 11.6 Current Problems Facing Developing Countries Case Study 11-5: Manufactures in Total Exports of Selected Developing Countries 11.6a Poverty in Developing Countries 11.6b The Foreign Debt Problem of Developing Countries Case Study 11-6: The Foreign Debt Burden of Developing Countries 11.6c Trade Problems of Developing Countries Case Study 11-7: Globalization and Poverty Appendix: Income Inequalities by Traditional and Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP) Measures -102-Terms Regions of recent settlement Engine of growth Vent for surplus Endogenous growth theory High-performance Asian economies (HPAEs) Commodity, or net barter, terms of trade Income terms of trade Single factoral terms of trade Double factoral terms of trade Export instability Marketing boards Intemational commodity agreements Lecture Guide: Buffer stocks Export controls Purchase contracts, Import substitution industrialization (ISI) Export-oriented industrialization Foreign debt Newly industrialized economies (NIEs) Export pessimism ‘New International Economic order (NIEO) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 1. This is not a core chapter and I would skip it, except for section 6. 2. If covered this chapter, I would present two sections in each of three lectures. Answer to Problems: 1. International trade could retard development by: (1) keeping the nation in primary production; (2) leading the nation to adopt excessive capital-intensive production techniques; (3) increasing the propensity to consume, thus reducing the nation’s savings rate; (4) leading to foreign exploitation of natural resources; 2. Each of the criticisms that intemational trade can retard development given in the answer to problem I can by countered as follows: (1) As the availability of capital and technology increases, the nation can begin to export manufactured goods; (2) through appropriate taxes and subsidies the nation can avoid the use of excessive capital- intensive production techniques; (3) increased taxation can increase the rate of public savings; (4) taxation and regulation can reduce or eliminate foreign exploitation; 3. An improvement in the technology of primary production results in a shift in the nation’s transformation curve from YX; to YX in Figure 1 ‘An improvement in the technology of primary production is likely to lead to deterioration in the terms of trade as the developing nation exports more primary commodities. 5. A vent for surplus can be shown by a movement from point A inside the nation’s production frontier without trade to point A’ on the higher production frontier with growth and trade in Figure 2 on the previous page. -103-yh wy % % x Feet Yh % A A ° % mx Figue2 Pk10. i. 12. 13. 15. a. The nation's commodity terms of trade would be 91.7. b. The nation’s income terms of trade would be 119.2. ¢. The nation's single factoral terms of trade would be 128.4. The nation of problem 6 will be better off in 2000 as compared with 1980 because its income and single factoral terms of trade rose. Figure 7-6 in the text shows how deteriorating terms of trade resulting from growth can make a nation worse off after trade than before. This was called immiserizing growth in Chapter 7. Figure 3 on the previous page shows that when the supply of a commodity increases, its equilibrium price will fall by a greater amount, the more price inelastic is the demand curve for the commodity, Figure 4 on the next page shows that with a negatively inclined demand curve and a positively inclined supply curve, producers’ earnings fluctuate more with a shift in demand (Panel a) than with a shift in supply (Panel b). Figure 5 shows how a buffer stock could either lead to an unmanageable stock of the commodity or to the running out of the commodity. Specifically, if the buffer stock authority sets price above the long-run equilibrium price of the commodity, it will face an unmanageable stock of the commodity. On the other hand, if the buffer stock authority sets price below the long-run equilibrium level, then the buffer stock authority will run out of the commodity. A New Intemational Economic Order (NIEO) has not been established because industrial countries did not want to give up control over the present system and pay the economic costs of reforming it along the lines demanded by developing countries. The establishment of a NIEO is no longer a hotly debated topic because developed countries faced serious problems of their own during the 1980s and early 1990s in the form of slow growth and high unemployment. The NIEO was replaced by concerns about globalization in the 1990s, The Uruguay Round benefited developing countries by the reduction in trade protectionism on agricultural products and labor-intensive commodities. Although protectionism will be reduced, it will still remain relatively high in these products. Immiserizing growth does not seem to have occurred in most globalizing developing countries despite some deterioration in their terms of trade because the volume of trade and their income terms of trade have increased substantially over the past three decades. Rich nations should forgive all of the foreign debt of the poorest developing countries because it is impossible for them to repay it or even service it. This, however, might encourage the poorest nations to continue to borrow and even use borrowed funds unwisely knowing that eventually their foreign debt might be forgiven. -105-Figure 4 Panels) Fre (Pane) Figure 106According to traditional trade theory, a developing nation should export the commodity: a. ofits comparative advantage b. that it can produce relatively more efficiently c. intensive in the nation’s relatively abundant factor *d, all of the above Which of the following is false with respect to traditional trade theory? it can incorporate changes in factor endowments and technology . it leads to the best allocation of resources at any point in time it is a dynamic theory it is based on comparative advantage According to Nurkse, international trade was an engine of growth for: +a. the regions of recent settlements during the 19th century b. regions of recent settlements during the 20th century ¢. developed nations during the 19th century d. developed nations during the 20th century Trade cannot be an engine of growth for today's developing nations because: a. the income elasticity for many of their exports is less than 1 b. the development of synthetic substitutes technical advances reduced the raw-material content of many products *d. all of the above If the price of a nation’s exports and imports both rise, the nation's commodity terms of trade: a. improve b. deteriorate ¢. remain unchanged +d. any of the above The nation's commodity terms of trade times the productivity index in its export sector gives the nation's: a, income terms of trade b. double factoral terms of trade *c, single factoral terms of trade 4. barter terms of trade -107-10. i. ‘When a nation’s commodity terms of trade deteriorate and its single factoral terms of trade improve, the nation’s welfare: a. falls *b. rises ¢. remains unchanged 4. any of the above Developing nations often experience wildly fluctuating export prices for their primary products because of: a. inelastic and stable demand and supply b. elastic and unstable demand and supply *c. inelastic and unstable demand and supply 4. elastic and stable demand and supply . MacBean found that the export instability faced by developing nations was: *a. not very large and did not seriously interfere with development b. very large and seriously interfered with development c. very large but did not seriously interfere with development d. not very large but seriously interfered with development Supporting the price of a commodity by buying it when its price is low is: a. a buffer stock b. a purchase contract an export control dd. amarketing board ‘The policy of import substitution was most vigorously followed by: a. large developing nations during the 1970's *b. large developing nations during the 1960's ¢. small developing nations during the 1970's d. small developing nations during the 1960's -108-12, What is the advantage of a policy of import substitution? a. setting up an industry to replace imports minimizes risk of failure because the market for the product already exists in the nation as evidenced by the nation's imports of the commodity b. It is easier for developing nations to protect their domestic market against foreign competition than to force developed nations to lower their trade barriers against their ‘manufactured exports c. foreign firms are induced to establish tariff factories to overcome the tariff wall of developing nations +4. all of the above. 13. Which are is not an advantage of export-oriented industrialization? a. It overcomes the smaliness of the domestic market and allows developing nations to take advantage of economies of scale *b, domestic industries grow accustomed to protection and have an incentive to become more efficient ¢. production of manufactured goods for export requires and stimulates efficiency throughout the economy 4. the expansion of manufactured exports is not limited by the size of the domestic market 14. Those nations that liberalized trade during the past decade “a, grew faster than those that did not b. grew more slowly than those that did not , grew at about the same rate as those that did not, 4. any of the above 15, Which of the following is not part of the demand for a NIEO? a. the establishment of international commodity agreements +b, preferential access for the manufactured exports of developed nations c, removal of the agricultural trade barriers in developed nations d. increasing the yearly flow of foreign aid to developing nations -109-CHAPTER 12 INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE MOVEMENTS AND. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS OUTLINE 12.1 Introduction 12.2 Some Data on Intemational Capital Flows Case Study 12-1: Fluctuation of Foreign Direct Investment Flows to the United States. 12.3 Motives for International Capital Flows 12.3a Motives for International Portfolio Investments 12.3b Motives for Direct Foreign Investments to the United States Case Study 12-2: The Stock of Foreign Direct Investments Around the World 12.4 Welfare Effects of International Capital Flows 12.4a Effects on the Investing and Host Countries 12.4b Other Effects on the Investing and Host Countries 12.5 Multinational Corporations 12.5a Reasons for the Existence of Multinational Corporations Case Study 12-3: The World's Largest Multinational Industrial Corporations 12.5b Problems Created by Multinational Corporations in the Home Country Case Study 12-4: Employment of U.S. MNCs Abroad 12.5 Problems Created by Multinational Corporations in the Host Country 12.6 Motives for and Welfare Effects of Intemational Labor Migration 12.6a Motives for International Labor Migration 12.6b Welfare Effects of International Labor Migration 12.6 Other Welfare Effects of International Labor Migration Case Study 12-5: British and Soviet Brain Drain Is U.S. Brain Gain Case Study 12-6: U.S. Immigration and Debate Over Immigration Policy Appendix: The Transfer Problem Terms Portfolio investments Vertical integration Direct investments Multinational corporations (MNCs) Portfolio theory Transfer pricing Risk diversification Brain drain Horizontal integration -110-Lecture Guide: ‘This is not a core chapter and I would skip it except for section 5 on multinational corporations and section 6 on immigration. Otherwise, I would present two sections in each of three classes. Answer to Problems: 1. See Figure 1. In Figure 1, the outflow of capital is shown by the leftward and upward shift of the Sx curve to x. This increases the return on capital until it is equal to that in the host or receiving country. 2, See Figure 2. In Figure 2, the outflow of capital is shown by the rightward and downward shift of the Sx curve to S'x. This reduces the return on capital until it is equal to that in the investing country. 3. The data to update Table 12-1 is found in the July issue of the most recent year of the Survey of Current Business. 4. The data to update Table 12-2 is found in the July issue of the most recent year of the Survey of Current Business. 5. The data to update Table 12-3 is found in the July issue of the most recent year of the Survey of Current Business. 6. The data to update Table 12-4 is found in the July issue of the most recent year of the ‘Survey of Current Business. 7. The Statement is true. The profitability of a portfolio is equal to the weighted average of the yield of the securities included in the portfolio. Therefore, the profitability of a portfolio of many securities can never exceed the yield of the highest-yield security in the portfolio. The second part of the statement is also true if the portfolio includes securities for which yields are inversely correlated over time. 8. See Figure 3 ‘The gain of the investing country is EGR. 9. See Figure 4, ‘The gain of the host or receiving country is ERM. 10. The general principle that can be deduced from the answers to the previous two problems and from Figure 12-1 is that the nation with the more rapidly declining VMPX curve gains more. With the VMPx curves declining at equal rates, both nations gain equal amounts. “lleey11. The rate of return on US. direct investment in developing nations often exceeds the rate of retum on investment on it investments in developed nations because of relative scarcity of capital and technology and lower wage rates in developing than in developed nations. 12. US. labor generally opposes U.S. investments abroad because they reduce the K/L ratio and the productivity and wages of labor in the United States, 13, An inflow of foreign capital leads to an increase in the K/L ratio and in the productivity and ‘wages of labor or employment in developing nations. 14, The data to update Table 12-6 are found in the World Investment Report published yearly by the United Nations for the most recent year. App. See Table 1. Table 1 (a) By ter a Year Petroleum Price OPEC Exports OPEC Imports US Petroleum Imports (U8 $/barrel) (bill. $) (bil. $) (bill. $) 1973 2.70 39.0 20.1 1.6 1974 9.76 119.3 32.1 26-1 1975 10.72 109.8 51.3 26.5 1976 11.51 133.0 62.2 34.1 1977 12.40 146.0 83.8 44.2 1978 12.70 341.9 94.9 41.6 1979 16.97 208-0 101.6 58.6 1980 28.67 294.2 133.2 76.9 Source: International Financial Statistics, 1981 Yearbook. Petroleum prices refer to Saudi Arabian prices -113-Multiple-choice Questions: 1. Portfolio investments refer primarily to: a. direct investments *b. bonds c. liquid assets d. short-term assets 2. Direct investments usually involve the transfer of: a. capital b. technology ©. management *d. all of the above 3. Which of the following is not true with regard to direct investments? a. US. direct investments abroad and foreign direct investments in the U.S. grew very rapidly from 1950 to 2001 b. the amount of U.S. direct investments abroad is similar to the amount of foreign direct investments in the U.S *c. USS. direct investments in Canada are higher than in Europe 4. US. private holdings of foreign long-term securities grew very rapidly from 1950 to 2001 4, Two-way international capital flows can be explained by the desire to: a. eam higher yields abroad b. avoid tarifis *c, diversify risks 4. all of the above 5. Portfolio theory tells us that by investing in securities with yields that are inversely related over time: a. a given yield can be obtained at a smaller risk b. a higher yield can be obtained for the same level of risk c. a two-way capital flow may be required to achieve a balanced portfolio 4. all of the above -14-10. Ml. ‘The reason the residents of a nation do not borrow from other nations and themselves undertake real investments in their own nation is that: *a. multinationals want to retain control over their own technology b. banks do not want to lend to foreigners ¢. vertical integration is not possible for foreigners 4. multinationals want to avoid horizontal integration Which is not a reason for private foreign direct investments? a. horizontal and vertical integration b. to maximize profits and diversify risks *c, to stimulate development to avoid tariffs Which of the following is not a beneficial effect of direct investments on the investing country? a. the transfer of technology higher profits ¢. risk diversification 4. avoids the possible loss of export markets Foreign direct investment benefits the host nation because it: increases the K/L ration . increases the productivity of labor c. increases per capita income *d. all of the above ULS. labor generally a. opposes U.S. investments abroad b. favors U.S. investments abroad c. is indifferent to U.S. investments abroad 4. we cannot say without additional information Labor in developing countries generally a. opposes an inflow of foreign direct investments from abroad *b. favors an inflow of foreign direct investments from abroad c. is indifferent to foreign direct investments from abroad d. we cannot say without additional information -115-12. Owners of capital in developing countries generally a. oppose an inflow of foreign direct investments from abroad favor an inflow of foreign direct investments from abroad are indifferent to foreign direct investments from abroad we cannot say without additional information pes 13. The basic reason for the existence of MNC is the: *a, competitive advantage of a global network of production and distribution. b. incentives provided by the investing nation ¢. incentives provided by the host nation 4. imperfections of international capital markets 14, Transfer pricing refers to: a. risk diversification b. the pricing of the technology transferred *c. the artificial overpricing of components shipped to an affiliate in a higher tax nation 4. portfolio theory 15, The brain drain refers to the transfer of: a, technology from developed to developing nations b._ skilled labor and professionals from developed to developing nations c. unskilled labor from developing to developed nations ‘*d. skilled labor and professionals from less advanced to more advanced nations -116-ADDITIONAL ESSAYS AND PROBLEMS FOR PART TWO 1. From the following figure, in which De and Sc refer, respectively to the domestic demand and supply curves of cloth, and S, and S,-, refer, respectively, to the world supply curve of cloth under free trade and with a 50% import tariff imposed by the nation on the importation of cloth, determine: 7 0 wm 0 Mw 0 1 110 1m 1m WC @) the consumption, production effect, and the trade effect of the tariff. (©) the reduction in consumer surplus, the increase in producer surplus or rent, the tariff Tevenue, and the protection cost or deadweight loss to the economy as a result of the tariff. Answ. (a) The consumption effect is equal to BR=-20c; the production effect is equal to GN=20C; therefore, the trade effect is equal to -(BR+GN)=-40c. (b) The reduction in consumer surplus is FIHB=$90; the increase in producer surplus is FIMG=$30; the revenue effect is NMHR=$40; the protection cost or deadweight loss to the economy is equal to the sum of the area of triangles GMN and BHR or $20, “1172. (a) Explain why and under what conditions the infant-industry argument for an import tariff is valid. (b) How must this argument be qualified? Answ. (a) The infant-industry argument for tariffs is generally valid, especially for less developed countries (LDCs). It holds that an LDC may have a potential comparative advantage in a particular commodity, say textiles, but that because its initial production costs are too high (due to lack of know-how and the initial small level of output), this industry cannot be established or grow in the LDC in the face of foreign competition. An import tariff is then justified to help the LDC establish the industry and protect it during its “infancy,” until the industry has grown in size and efficiency and is able to meet foreign competition. At that time, the tariff is to be removed. (b) In order for the infant-industry argument to be valid, not only must the tariff eventually be removed and the "grown up" industry be able to compete with foreign firms without protection, but the extra return in the industry (after the removal of the protection) must be high enough to justify the costs involved during the period of protection. These costs arise because the commodity is produced domestically rather than imported for less. It may also be difficult to determine which industry or potential industry qualifies for this treatment, and to eventually remove the tariff once it is imposed. Economists also agree that what a tariff can do here, a direct subsidy to the infant industry can do better. This is because a subsidy can be varied so as to provide the infant industry with the same degree of protection as an equivalent import tariff but without distorting relative prices and domestic consumption. However, a subsidy requires revenue, rather than generating it as the tariff does. 3. (@ How can strategic trade policy justify trade protection? (b) What difficulties arise in carrying out a strategic trade policy? Answ. (a) According to strategic trade policy, a nation can create a comparative advantage through temporary trade protection in such fields as semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, and other industries that are deemed crucial to future growth in the nation. These high-technology industries are subject to high risks, require large-scale production to achieve economies of scale and give rise to extensive external economies ‘when successful. Strategic trade policy suggests that by encouraging such industries, the nation can enhance its future growth prospects. This is similar to the infant-industry argument in developing nations, except that it is advanced for industrial nations to acquire a comparative advantage in crucial high-technology industries. Most nations do some of this. Indeed, some economists would go so far as to say that a great deal of the postwar industrial and technological success of Japan is due to its strategic industrial and trade policies. -118-(b) There are three serious difficulties in carrying out strategic trade policy. First, it is extremely difficult to pick winners (i.e., choose the industries that will provide large extemal economies in the future) and devise appropriate policies to successfully nurture them. Second, since most leading nations undertake strategic trade policies at the same time, their efforts are largely neutralized so that the potential benefits to each may be small. Third, when a country does achieve substantial success with strategic trade policy, this comes at the expense of other countries (ie., it is a beggar-thy- neighbor policy) and so other countries are likely to retaliate. Faced with all these practical difficulties, even supporters of strategic trade policy grudgingly acknowledge is still the best . 4. (a) Why do you think that the United States supported economic integration in Europe after World War II? (©) What direct or indirect evidence can you give to conclude that U.S. support for economic integration in Europe did in fact result in the hope-for outcome? (©) What are the major economic disputes between the United States and Europe about these days? What dangers do they create? Answ. (a) The United States supported economic integration in Europe to foster and strengthen democratic systems in Europe after World War Il, resist communism, and to promote peaceful coexistence among European countries, especially Germany and France, which were once bitter enemies. (©) Evidence that U.S. support for economic integration in Europe achieved its goals is provided by the fact that the members of the European Union have strong democratic governments and economies, communist regimes have collapsed in Easter Europe and the Soviet Union, and Germany and France are so closely integrated economically that a future armed conflict between them is practically nil. (©) The major economic disputes between the United States and Europe (the European Union) today are about trade protection in agriculture and some services as well as, subsidies that the European Union provides to some of its industries, such as Airbus Industrie. These disputes could degenerate into trade wars that would harm both the European Union and the United States. -119-5. (a) Why did large developing nations generally follow a policy of import substitution as a strategy for growth during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s? Why was this not generally possible for small developing nations? (>) Why was the policy of import substitution generally a failure? (©) Why did developing nations that switched from a policy of import substitution to a policy of export promotion generally grow faster during the past decade? Answ. (a) Large developing nations generally followed a policy of import substitution during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1960s because their large domestic market allowed them to reap many of the benefits economies of scale in production even without intemational trade. On the other hand, small developing nations generally did not have the choice of industrializing through import substitution because their small domestic market would have made production costs unacceptably high. (b) The policy of import substitution was generally a failure even in large developing nations because once protection was granted to a domestic industry in order to encourage it establishment and growth, it becomes practically impossible to remove the protection. This led to inefficiencies and higher costs in the developing country even for unprotected industries that use the output of protected industries as intermediate products or inputs in their production processes. (©) The developing countries that switched from a policy of import substitution to export promotion generally grew faster than those developing countries that did not make that switch because production for export and international competition stimulated efficiency throughout the economy and resulted in domestic prices more closely reflecting the true opportunity costs of commodities and inputs. -120-6. One of the most significant international economic developments of the postwar period is the proliferation of multinational corporations (MNCs). These are firms that own, control or ‘manage production facilities in several countries. With regard to MNCs, explain (@) the reason for their existence; (b) some of the alleged problems that they create for the home country; (c) some of the alleged problems that they create for the host country. ‘Answ. (a) The basic reason for the existence of MNCs is the competitive advantage that they have over other forms of economic organization based on economies of scale in production, financing, research and development (R&D), and in gathering market information, resulting from a global network of production and distribution. Today, MNCs account for about 25% of world output, and the trade between the parent firms and their foreign affiliates accounts for about one-third of world trade in manufactured goods. (b) The most controversial of the alleged harmful effects of MNCs on the home country is the loss of domestic jobs resulting from foreign direct investments. However, it must be pointed out that the home country may have lost some of these jobs anyway to foreign competitors. A related problem stems from the export of advanced technology. Countering this harmful effect, however, is the tendency of MNCs to concentrate their R&D in the home country. Finally, easy accessibility of MNCs to the international capital market reduces the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. (©) Host countries have even more serious complaints against MNCs. First is the alleged domination by the MNC of the hosts’ economy. The largest MNCs have yearly sales greater than the GNP of all but a handful of nations. It is further alleged that MNCs absorb local savings and local entrepreneurial talent, use excessive K-intensive production techniques that are inappropriate for developing nations and do not train local labor. Most of these complaints are to some extent true especially for host LDCs and have led these nations to regulate foreign direct investments in order to mitigate the harmful effects and increase the possible benefits. -121-