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Figure 3.3: Failed casing. ‘There is one interesting observation in the pictures presented above, Both the production casing and the production tubing are collapsed. ‘There is clearance between the uncollapsed tubing and the collapsed casing, and the tubing should not collapse as it has a collapse pressure of $46 bar. The tubing collapse is believed due to high tension in a curved section of the hole, pushing the tubing strongly into one side of the casing Measurements of the failed casing and the casing joint above resulted in the following: ‘Table 3.1 Wall thickness measurements (Casing | Wall thickness (ram) 9-5/8" 124 collapsed 9-5/8" 4 above 4 For comparison, Table 3.2 provides manufacturers data for casings. Table 3.2: Manufacturers casing data (ref. 6). Casing Weighi(Ibsif)|Grade ‘| Wall Collapse ] thickness(mm) | rating(bar) 9518" 33.5 NBO 13.84 456 9-5/8" 47 N80 11.99 328 i} Its clear from the measurements that the failed casing is not a 53.5 Ibs/ft casing but a 47 Ibsift. For some reason a weaker joint of casing has been placed in the well. This has a collapse rating that is lower than the actual pressures the well has been exposed to. ‘The tally for the casing installation was also checked (ref. 7), and there were no indications of 247 Ibs/ft casing joint. 15 4. Analysis of production casing collapse on Snorre P2 It is not clear from the daily drilling reports what type of fluids are placed on both sides of the casing. We will in the following assume two scenatios ) Brine of 1.1 s.g. outside and brine of 1.1 s.g, inside ) Mud of 1.6 s.g outside and brine of 1.1 sg. inside. In the following both scenario will be considered, Which one applies must be determined by measurements of the fluids. 0 Production se j}— 516 Ese Coe ae) eed tl ta . {rascss¥| 2a ola] i srk Poppe femmes tr | ns oy am gna 0 956" te back @ 24% md 146" peo 20 010 Figure 4.1 Schematics of Snorre P2. 16 4.1 Pressure required to collapse casing Assume that the production casing has collapsed due to a leak in the PBR during a pressure test. The collapse depth was 700 m. The following data applies for the casing at this depth (ref. 6): Casing: 9-5/8 in. 180, 53.5 Ibs/ft Burst resistance: 546 bar Collapse resistance: 456 bar (derated to 385 bar, see App. A) Tensile strength: 553x10° daN’ Casing: 9-5/8 in. 80, 47 Ibs/ft weak joint Burstresistance: 473 bar Collapse resistance: 328 bar (derated to 316 bar, see App. A) Tensile strength: 483x10° daN’ Casing 13-3/8 in. 80, 53.5 Ibs/ft Burst resistance: $50 bar In the event of building up pressure in the B-annulus, the following limitations exists: Burst 13-3/8 in, $50 bar Collapse 9-5/8 in. 328 bar The 9-5/8 in. casing represents the weakest part of the B-annulus, Scenario a): With a 1.10 s.g. fluid density both inside and outside the casing string, there isa static balance. To collapse the casing, an externally applied pressure of 385 bar would be required to collapse the casing. The intended 53.5 Ibs/ft casing is therefore sufficiently strong. However, the 47 Ibs/ft casing joint has a collapse resistance of 316 bar. The well has been. pressure tested to 347 bar, but not from the outside. Under normal circumstances pressure testing should not collapse this. Altemative mechanisms will be discussed in the following. Scenario b): Behind the casing 1.60 s.g. mud is placed, whereas inside the casing a packer fluid of density 1.10 sg. is placed. The following static pressures exist: Outside: —_0.098{1.03x309+1.60(700-368) Inside: 0.098x1.10x700=75.5. bar Applying an inside pressure P, the following magnitude is reached at casing collapse: 316 bar = P + 83.2 bar - 75.5 bar 7 or: P= 308.3 bar If Muids are placed according to Scenario b), a lower applied pressure is required. 4.2. Pressure testing of PBL ‘After the installation of the production casing a number of pressure tests were conducted with poor results. Finally, one obtained a test that was considered acceptable. According to the daily drilling reports, the casing was tested to a maximum pressure of 347 bar. Since the casing is tested from the inside, it should not be subjected to a collapse loading. The pressure ‘was probably equal on both sides of the casing during the test. 4.3 Temperature induced B-annulus pressure During production the well is heated due to transport of warm reservoir fluid. Because the B- annulus represents a closed volume, a pressure increase due to fluid expansion can take place. This is called an isochoric process. ‘This problem is presented in Ref. 8, which derives an equation to estimate the pressure increase due to temperature by adding free thermal expansion of a fluid volume and to compress the same fluid back to initial volume. The equation is. AP AT, 20 FAG+n)-(G +n) 20 ‘where: = heat expansion coefficient fluid compressibility tatic temp. top of annulus static temp. bottom of annulus production temp. top of annulus roduction temp. bottom of annulus ‘We will use the equation above to back-calculate the average temperature increase required to collapse the casing, assuming fluid data for water. Inserting the numbers for the weak casing joint, using scenario a): 316bar = +220 2x10 Aly, =63.2°C ‘The temperature of the produced oil is about 48 °C. From this evaluation it is not likely that the temperature expansion alone caused the collapse of the production casing. Appendix B presents the results of temperature modeling of the case. Here itis concluded that a pressure increase in the order of 150 - 220 bar is expected due to heating of the closed ‘annulus behind the production casing. If we assume case a) of section 4.1, an additional pressure of 96 -166 bar would be required to collapse the casing. As discussed in the following, a backpressure of this magnitude is possible from the casing tests. 18 44° Reservoir communication due to cement failure In the following we will investigate the magnitude of pressure that arise if (hypothetically) gas has leaked from the reservoir and filled the B-annulus. Maximum pore pressure (from ref. 3) is 395 bar at 2639 mTVD. Assuming that the reservoir fluid is oil of 0.76 s.g. density, this will leave a pressure at 700 m of: 395 ~ 0.098x0.76(2346-700)) = 272 bar ‘This pressure is still below the collapse pressure. However, ifa column of gas were placed behind the production casing, a higher pressure arises. Assuming methane gas of density 0.085 s.g, the pressure would be: 395 ~ 0.098x0.085(2346-700)) = 381 bar with an inside pressure of 75 bar the collapse load is 306 bar, close to the collapse pressure. In the unlikely event of communication with the reservoir throughout the entire outside of the ceasing string, this could have collapsed the 47 Ibs/ft casing, but not the intended $3.5 Ibs/ft string. 4,5 What actually happened? A likely scenario. Itis difficult to precisely explain the various events that led to the failure due to lack of data We will in the following present an explanation that at least makes sense. During installation of the tieback production casing the pressure test was repeated a number of times. If we assume that a small leakage occurred across the PBR, a pressure was built up ‘behind the casing. At the last pressure test this was sufficiently high to provide acceptance. If this is correct, the casing was not integrity tested, as the pressures were identical on both sides, of the casing string, It is also possible that the test pressure was trapped behind the casing. The seals of the PBR could act as a one-way valve. During production, pressure increase due to temperature expansion led to collapse of the weak casing joint. Again, this is not an assessment what actually happened, only a likely scenario. If this is correct, well P2 has actually been produced with questionable pressure integrity. 19 4.6 Discussion and recommendations The planned 53.5 tbs/ft casing is sufficiently strong as production casing on well P2. However, one joint of 47 Ibs/ft was placed in the production string. It is this joint that collapsed. We have not discovered how this weaker joint got into the well, as itis not recorded in any of the reports we have studied. The problem was discovered during analysis of the collapsed casing at the laboratories at Hogskolen i Stavanger. ‘This misplaced weak casing joint is the main reason for the well problems at well P2. There are however other factors that will be discussed below. During installation of the tieback production casing a number of attempts were made to pressure test the casing. Finally an (marginal?) acceptable test was performed, and the well ‘was completed for production. ‘After the casing collapse it was decided to replace it. The casing was perforated to relieve the outside pressure. It is not fully understood how the gas got behind the casing, It could come from several sources as the reservoir fluid or from the annulus. If this is the case there must bea leak in the system. We will not speculate in this, but we may conclude that the production casing on well P2 had a marginal integrity. 20 5. Summary of review and Recommendation For the failed tieback casing on well P2 the following conclusions can be drawn: ‘The production casing on Snorre A2 failed because a weaker casing joint was placed in the production casing string. The well was exposed to pressures higher than the collapse rating of this weaker casing. The reason for 2 collapse loading on the string is uncertain, but it is believed to be due to a combination of trapped pressure from leakage and pressure testing, and thermal expansion behind the casing string. Pressure testing of the production casing was unsuccessful a number of times. The reporting of these tests were poor, in particular volumetric information was missing. Also completion fluid densities are poorly reported. Statoils Casing design Manual is comprehensive and reflects the technical level of modem wells. A revision will improve the manual. On the more general level the incident uncovered a lack of quality control both for the equipment and for the executed operations. The quality control relates to the risk assessment. 6. Recommendations Statoils casing design manual should be revised and rewritten. In particular one should shift focus from advanced software to personnel competence (ref. section 2.2 of this report). Establishment of relevant design criteria is essential. ‘The quality control of equipment should be reviewed to search for improvements. Reporting of drilling and well operations should also be improved. For this particular well failure: Improve the daily drilling reporting. -Report pressures, volumes and temperatures consistently. -Review casing test procedures. If the pressure testis questionable, consider pulling/replacing the string. Nomenclature POOH pull out of hole MT ‘metric tons PBR polished bore receptable RT running tool RIH run in hole OBM oil based mud TRSCSSSV tubing safety valve 2 References 1. Statoil Casing Design Manual, WR0445, Version 2, 2002. 2. Evaluation of the Well Design on Kristin. Study performed for Statoil by Rock-Well Consultants, March 2003, 3. Snorre TLP Well Programme 34/7-P2 4, Granskning - Gass i boremodul Snorre A - RUH 236045 Dato 21.09.2003 5. Daily Drilling Reports for Snorre P2. 6. Drilling Data Handbook. Institut Francais du Petrole, Sixth edition, 1991. ISBN 2- 7108-0600-2. 7, Pipe Tally and Connections Tests for Well P2 on Snorre. Weatherford Norge. 8. B.S.Aadnoy: Modem Well Design, AA Balkema, Rotterdam/Brookfield/1996. ISBN 90 5410 633 6. Appendix A: Laboratory Investigation of Failed Casing Al. Collapse limit ‘The 9-5/8" (244.5 mm) production casing collapsed at 704-716 m TVD and we use 710 m TVD as our calculation value. The production casing was made up of 53.5 Ibs/ft (79.62 kg/m) 80 pipe, while the recovered collapsed casing joint tured out to be 47 Ibs/f (69,94 kg/m) pipe. The casing string in question terminated in a PBR located at 1790 m TVD. The fluid ‘gradient inside the tieback string was 1.1 SG. Pressure at the end of the tieback string = (0.0981)(1.1)(1790) = 193 bar Cross-sectional area of 9-5/8” 53.54 casing 3.14159/4)(0.2445" — 0.2168") = 0.01004 m? Axial load at 710 m TVD = (9.80665)(79.62)(1080) — (193)(10°)(0.01004) = 649.5 KN = 66.2 tonnes Cross-sectional area of collapsed 9-5/8” 474 casing (3.14159/4)(0.2445" — 0.205%) = 0.008765 m> Axial stress in collapsed casing joint = (649.5)(10°/0.008765 = 74.10 MPa = 741 bar Pressure inside collapsed casing joint = (0.0981)(1.1(710) = 76.6 bar ‘Using the API biaxial collapse formulation, calculate collapse pressure = 385 bar. The collapse mode is termed plastic collapse. This value of collapse pressure is calculated without applying any design factor. ‘The collapse pressure depends upon axial stress and internal pressure. In the following we define as the base case the situation of zero axial stress and zero inside pressure. The following collapse pressures are obtained for combinations of axial stress and inside pressure: ‘Axial stress, bar Taside pressure, bar _ | Collapse pressure, bar [Biaxial derating, % 742 766 385 17 0 76.6 397 121 TaD 0 316 96 0 0 328 100 ‘Table Al: Collapse pressures for 9-5/8” 47 Ibs/ft production easing ‘The comparison shows that axial tension decreases the collapse resistance by 12 bar for both the cases of elevated inside pressure and zero inside pressure. It is also seen that inside pressure of about 77 bar increases the collapse limit by 69 bar for both the cases elevated axial tension and zero axial tension. A2, Lab investigation ‘The lab received three pipe specimens marked with X, Y, and Z. The lengths of the recovered pipes ranged from 80-100 cm. Using a calibrated digital caliper, eight wall-thickness ‘measurements were taken 45 degrees apart around the circumference (measurements 1 through 8). Rust and irregularities caused by the band saw cutting process were removed prior to measuring using a hand file. Small samples were removed from the pipes using a ‘band saw for hardness testing and additional wall thickness measurements were made (measurements x1 and x2). Finally, two samples measuring 30 cm x 4 om were cut from the collapsed production casing (specimen Y) using a band saw and machined to obtain suitable tensile-test specimens. ‘The three pipe specimens are tabulated and shown below: Pipe X 78° 53.5 Ibs/ft L80 production casing a Pipe Y 9-5/8" 47 Ibsift L80 production casing (collapsed) [Pipe Z 5-1/2" 20 Ibs/ft L80 production tubing (collapsed) ‘Table A2: Description of pipe specimens Figure A1: Photo of pipe specimens Pipe X is the prescribed production casing and it did not collapse during the event. Pipe Y is the thin-walled casing joint that was installed by mistake and it collapsed. Pipe Z is the production tubing that was mechanically collapsed by the hydraulically collapsed production casing. Test [Length |Width]Area [Tensile |Tensile [Tensile |Min Spee (mm) |(mm) |(mm’) |load — [strength | strength | APT (KN) | (N/mm’) | (psi) tensile strength (ps) Alisa [469 [91.0 [686 [7540 [109349 [95000 [OK B [i905 [47 [95.0 [69.9 [736.1 [106753 [95.000 [OK ‘Table AG: Tensile strength measurements compared to API Spec SCT The yield strength of the 9-5/8” 47 Ibs/ft casing samples were determined using standard 0.2% offset from the initial straight-line portion of the stress-strain diagram. The yield strength values obiained in the pull-tests are in agreement with the specifications required by API: Test [Length [Width |Area [Yield [Yield [Yield |Min [Max [Spee (mm) |(mm) |(mm’)|load | strength | strength | API APL (KN) | (N/mm?) | (psi) yield yield strength | strength (psi) (si) | {a |ioa |4.69 910 [548 [602.3 [87352 [80000 [95000 [OK [B 19.5 4.87 |95.0__|57.0 600.2 87052__|80.000__|95000__| OK ‘Table A7: Yield strength measurements compared to API Spec SCT ‘The two test specimens failed as typical ductile materials, The material failed at angles approximately 45 degrees with the original surface of the specimen (shear failure). The test specimens after testing are shown in the following, Figure A2: Photo of pull-test specimens Appendix B: Temperature Induced Pressure Increase As described in section 4.3, a pressure increase can take place in the B-annulus due to fluid expansion. Also, in section 4.3 calculations are performed to show what change in average temperature that is required for causing collapse of the productions casing (assuming water in the B-annulus). The calculations show that it is not likely that the temperature effects alone could have caused the pressure build-up in the annulus, To quantify the contribution of the pressure increase caused by fluid expansion we have performed a more detailed analysis. Combining the general equation of state for fluid density with the temperature profiles in the well give a reasonable estimate of the temperature induced pressure increase. However, there are several uncertainties in the input parameters that prevent high accuracy of the pressure estimate, The following uncertainties must be considered: © Problem: Fluid density in B-annulus (1.6 s.g. or 1.1. Solution: Both scenarios covered 2)? * Problem: Accurate fluid properties of the well fluids (we are not in possession of PVT data for the well fluids) Solution: Calculations performed using several comparable fluids © Problem: Temperature profiles in B-annulus and in production casing Solution: Assumed linear temperature profiles using different boundary conditions The calculations were performed using an analytical equation of state forthe fluid (ref. SPE 47806). = etree nT ind pT P= Py Formula Equation of state The downhole pressure is then derived from a numerical integration of the density equation combined with the temperature profiles and applying a close-in pressure that prevents the fluid to expand, The following assumptions were made: ‘+ Bottomhole temperature (at packer depth) about 90-100 degrees C ‘© Temperature at the top of B-annulus approximately 45-60 degrees C (produced oil approx. 48 degrees C) Applying these boundary conditions results in a temperature induced pressure increase in the range of 150-220 bar. References: 1. Karstad, E. and Aadnay, B. S.: “Density Behavior of Drilling Fluids during High Pressure High Temperature Drilling Operations,” Paper SPE 47806 presented at the 1998 IADC/SPE Asia Pacific Drilling Technology, Jakarta, Indonesia (7-9 September 1998) pp. 227-237

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