Many philosophers have developed theories of knowledge to counter the

disquieting conclusion that we are unable to know ordinary propositions. In this

paper, I will outline Robert Nozicks argument against the skeptical hypothesis and
respond to a criticism against his theory.
The general outline of a skeptical argument is as follows:
P1: I dont know that Im not a brain in a vat (BIV).
P2: If I dont know that Im not a BIV, then I dont know that I am now looking at the
computer screen (or any other ordinary proposition that we typically take for
granted).
C: I dont know that I am now looking at the computer screen.
Nozick begins his argument by outlining and revising the justified true belief
theory of knowledge The traditional account of knowledge is that a subject (S)
knows a proposition (p) if and only if:
1) p is true.
2) S believes that p.
3) S is justified in believing that p.
During the course of his argument, Nozick replaces the third condition for
knowledge with two new conditions. Beliefs that satisfy all of the new conditions are
knowledge and are said to track the truth.
Nozicks first new condition for knowledge is that if p werent true, then S
wouldnt believe that p (255). It is much easier to consider Nozicks conditions in
the scope of possible worlds. Briefly, possible worlds ask the reader to imagine a
world in which certain aspects of the external environment have changed.
Specifically, the things that change are usually ones relevant to the proposition in
question. In close possible worlds, the proposition in question is not changed, and
very little else in the world is changed. In far possible worlds, things are entirely
unlike our current world in ways relevant to the proposition.
We can now analyze Nozicks first condition on knowledge. In all closest possible
worlds where p is false, S no longer believes p. Nozick introduces this condition
attempting to avoid Gettier counterexamples, where S supposedly has knowledge
when it is merely a result of luck. Under his new condition, for example, if Smith did
not have ten coins in his pocket, then p, the man who will get the job will have ten
coins in his pocket, is false. However, he would continue believing p because his
evidence is based on the ten coins in Jones pocket.
Nozicks second conditional, on the other hand, states that if p were true, then
S would believe that p (257). In all closest possible worlds, if P is true, then S does
believe p. Together, if the first and second conditionals are satisfied, then a belief is
knowledge because it tracks the truth. When applied to the BIV scenario, S actually
does not know that he is not a BIV. S would not believe that Im a BIV even if Im
a BIV were in fact true. This is because the external world would appear exactly the
same as it would appear if we were not a BIV. It appears thus far that Nozicks truth

tracking theory actually supports the skeptical hypothesis. However, even though
he accepts premise one of the argument, he rejects premise two. That is, Nozick
accepts that even though we may be a BIV, we can still explain how [commonsense] knowledge is possible (262).
Nozick shows that the conclusion of the skeptical argument is wrong by
explaining that If I dont know that Im not a BIV, then I dont know that I am here
now staring at the computer screen is a false premise. Namely, he denies the
consequent of this conditional and shows that we do know that I am here now
staring at the computer screen. He does so by appealing to his theory of
knowledge, complete with his two new conditional requirements. First, the
proposition is true because I really am here staring at the computer screen.
Secondly, I believe this proposition. Thirdly, in all nearby worlds in which this
proposition is true, would I still believe the proposition? In these nearby worlds, I do
have the computer in front of me, but it rains a few drops more in this world
(nothing of consequence has changed). Thus, I would still believe the proposition. In
all nearby worlds in which this proposition is false, I perhaps broke my laptop, and
so I am using my notebook to write my essay instead of using my laptop. I am no
longer staring at my screen, so I would no longer believe the proposition because,
based on my perception, I no longer see a laptop in front of me. Since all of the
conditions of Nozicks theory of knowledge are satisfied, we do know that I am now
staring at the computer screen. Thus, the consequent of the conditional is false,
therefore rendering premise two (and also the conclusion) of the skeptical argument
false. Overall, Nozick has shown that we can accept ordinary propositions of
knowledge, but we cannot know that we are not BIVs.
I now consider an objection to Nozicks theory of knowledge and then revise
Nozicks original theory of knowledge to accommodate the objection.
Nozicks theory of knowledge is committed to upholding the sensitivity principle;
that is, if p were false in nearby worlds, then S would not believe p. However, this
principle rules out a fairly substantial class of knowledge. Consider the following
counterexample:
I know that Barack Obama is the U.S. President based on evidence from the
news. However, this belief is not sensitive. If Barack Obama were no longer
president because he suddenly collapsed from a stroke and died, I would still
believe that he was president. Much of our knowledge is of this sort: knowledge that
is obtained through past testimony or evidence. This entire class of knowledge
seems rendered mere belief under the new analysis. One could also say that it loses
its knowledge status for a finite period of time until one obtains new evidence. In
either case, knowledge seems severely limited and perhaps only limited to our
current sensory experiences.
This dilemma can be partly solved by adjusting the sensitivity principle. For
example, we could adjust the sensitivity principle to say the following: if p were
false, then S would cease to believe p within some time interval. This time interval
may be ambiguous and context-specific. This solves the counterexample because,

presumably, S would hear the news that the president died within a few days. This
preserves knowledge because the new evidence would cause S to stop believing p.
In spite of this adjustment, there still appear to be situations where new
evidence never materializes or situations where we do not constantly recheck past
actions. For example, if I go to dinner tonight and leave a twenty dollar tip on the
table for my waitress, I am not going to constantly go back and verify that I did
leave a twenty dollar tip on the table. Thus, no matter what length of time passes, if
p were false, I would still believe p. It looks as though I do not know that I put the
twenty dollar tip on the table.
I will submit to the counterexample and acknowledge I do not actually know I left
a twenty dollar tip for my waitress after I left the restaurant. My belief is not
sensitive. Knowledge should be characterized as extremely exclusive. Thus, most
things that I know through memory are merely strongly justified beliefs. This also
seems to coincide with our intuitions about how memory relates to knowledge. Just
as memory fades over time, so, too, does our knowledge. As time goes on, we
become more hesitant to say that we know something. The prior evidence I obtain
decreases in value over time, perhaps because of present events influencing and
distorting past perspectives. The new adjustment to sensitivity fits into this model
because it accounts for a period of time where I can still salvage knowledge. Thus,
after I leave the restaurant, I know that I left the tip on the table for a finite amount
of time. As time goes on, my evidence decreases in value, until it eventually falls
past the mark of what is required for knowledge.
Ultimately, the new sensitivity principle still refutes the skeptical argument. The
new sensitivity principle simply states if p were false, then S would cease to
believe p within some time interval. The change in the sensitivity principle does
not affect the original claims that one, we dont know that we arent BIVs, and two, I
do know that I am staring at my computer screen. One is true because if p were
false, we would not cease to believe p within some time interval because new
counterevidence would never come to light. Two is essentially unaffected because
one would stop believing p immediately after perceiving the lack of p; in other
words, no time allowance is even necessary. Thus, the skeptical hypothesis is still
false.

Bibliography:
Nozick, Robert. Knowledge and Skepticism. N.p.: Blackwell, 2008. Print.