Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
10
JAYSON ABABA
Angeles vs. Maglaya
Facts:
Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the
deceased in his first wife. Respondent seeks administration of the estate of
the deceased but opposed by the surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that the
respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the
administratrix.
Ruling:
No, respondent is not illegitimate.
Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.G.R. No.
166520
March 14, 2008
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals and the court a quo both grievously
erred in denying petitioners' plea to be given primacy in the administration
of their father's estate.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted
provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The
preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin
refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of aspecial
administrator, as theappointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion
of the court, and is not appealable.
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special
administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was
what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires
nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the
appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure
of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed
commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still
appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has
been brought about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its
appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was
unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the
income of Gerardo's estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of
the fact that Gerardo's estate had no income. This defense is clearly
specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma's non-compliance.
If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should have simply
filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the
court's orders.
FACTS: Spouses Cristina and Federico Suntay died intestate and their only
son, Emilio I, predeceased them. When Cristina died, she was survived by
her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner
Emilio III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot
three children, including herein respondent, Isabel. Emilio I's marriage to
Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two different women.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was
a mere baby by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged
natural child of Emilio I.
Consequently, because of the annulment of marriage of Emilio I and their
mother, respondent and her siblings, lived separately from their father and
paternal grandparents. Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse,
Cristina, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
Respondent Isabel filed
administration in her favor.
petition
for
the
issuance
of
letters
of
Federico filed his opposition stating that being the surviving spouse of
Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from
their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of
heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children
of his son namely: Emilio III and Nenita; that he is better situated to protect
the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife, he
was already the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the
probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated
(sic); and that Isabel's allegation that some of the properties are in the
hands of usurpers is untrue.
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings
amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation, nominating his adopted son, Emilio
III, as administrator of the decedent's estate on his behalf, in the event he
would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of
administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III's Motion for Leave to
Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed
his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in
his grandfather's opposition, alleging thatFederico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate.
In the course of the proceedings Federico died.
After hearing the testimonies and evidence of both party, the trial court
rendered a decision, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator
of decedent Cristina's intestate estate.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to
Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate
of the decedent, Cristina. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Article 992 Of The Civil Code applies in the appointment of
an administrator of the estate Under Section 6 Of Rule 78 of the Rules Of
Court.
RULING:Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or
if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held
that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial
court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Emilio III of their grandmother's, Cristina's, estate.
The case of Uy v. Court of Appeals upheld the appointment by the trial court
of a co-administration between the decedent's son and the decedent's
brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent's estate. In the same
vein, in Delgado Vda. deDe la Rosa v. Heirs of MarcianaRustiaVda. deDamia,
it upheld that in the appointment of an administrator, the principal
FACTS: Enrique Hinlo died intestate. His heirs filed a petition for letters of
administration of his estate in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Ceferina,
widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as special administratrix of
Enrique's estate. Petitioners Nancy and Remo were appointed as coadministrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and
could no longer effectively perform her duties as special administratrix.
Respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique and heir to his
estate by virtue of representation, filed a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration in his favor and an urgent motion for the removal of
Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but denied by the RTC. Petitioners
filed a notice of appeal which the RTC likewise denied. It ruled that
petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the orders were interlocutory and
not subject to appeal and it was also filed beyond the prescribed period.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it. Hence,
this petition.
From the time petitioners received the order denying their motion for
reconsideration, they had 30 days to file their notice of appeal and record on
appeal. The Court ruled that the appeal was made on time.
where the decedent had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to June 18,
1925.
Taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of
estates, and the fact that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate
had knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's death, and instituted the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate in the Court of First
Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it, which
was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of
jurisdiction, the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not
instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the Court of First
Instance of Manila, until after three years had elapsed, and applying the
provisions of section 49 of theCode of Civil Procedure by analogy, we declare
the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise
would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep
the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either testate or
intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of the
heirs and legatees. Even in the case of the summary settlement of an estate
under section 598, as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil Procedure
limits the time within which a creditor may file his claim to two years after
the settlement and distribution of the estate.
G.R. No. L-24098
November 18, 1967
BUENAVENTURA BELAMALA vs. MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator
FACTS: The claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in
Criminal Case No. 1922 filed before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
BOHOL, against the same Mauricio Polinar above mentioned and against
other accused, for Frustrated Murder; The administrator Marcelino Polinar is
one of the legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar now
deceased;
On May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed in the
Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar, et al, and
when said case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol, the
Information on said Criminal Case No. 1922 was filed on March 12, 1955;
On June 18, 1956, the accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed .
However on July 27, 1956, while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was
pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and that there was no Notice
or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in said Criminal Case No. 1922, has
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, in toto, and said
decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958; but
said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956.
ISSUE: Whether the civil liability of an accused of physical injuries who dies
before final judgment, is extinguished by his demise, to the extent of barring
any claim therefor against his estate.
RULING: We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been
extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of
1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the
Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil
Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action,
still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code,
that imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs,
because the latter acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of
the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of
the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of
the offender's estate.
The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim should
have been prosecuted by separate action against the administrator, as
permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87, since the claim is patently
one "to recover damages for an injury to person or property" (Rule 87, sec.
1). Belamala's action can not be enforced by filing a claim against the estate
under Rule 86, because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to
those for funeral expenses, expenses for last sickness, judgments for money
and "claims against the decedent, arising fromcontract, express or implied;"
and this last category (the other three being inapposite) includes only "all
purely personal obligations other than those which have their source
in delict or tort" (Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 189-194) and
Belamala's damages manifestly have a tortious origin. To this effect was our
ruling in Aguas vs. Llemos, L-18107, Aug. 30, 1962.
G.R. NO. 159130, August 22, 2008
ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONESv.
LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ
FACTS: Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for the
allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased's
daughters. opposed Ruby's petition. She alleged that Ruby understated the
value of their late mother's estate and acted with "unconscionable bad faith"
in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic will
be disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special
Administrator of the estate of her late mother, praying that the Prudential
Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be appointed as Interim Special
Administrator. The trial court granted the motion but designated Jose V.
Ferro (Senior Vice-President and Trust Officer, Trust Banking Group of the
Philippines National Bank) as the Special Administrator. Ferro, however,
declined the appointment.
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special
Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his
oath of office, and started the administration of the estate. On January 8,
2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrator's Final Report for the
approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a commission of
P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate
under his administration.
The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that
they be granted an opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and
receipts mentioned in the statement of income and disbursements. They
likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones' claim for commission
and that he be ordered to refund the sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.
On February 21, 2002, the respondents filed an audit request with the trial
court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting that the audit be done by
an independent auditor at the expense of the estate. The trial court granted
the request for audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co.
to conduct the audit.
The respondents moved for the reconsideration, alleging that in view of the
partition of the estate there was no more need for a special administrator.
They also clarified that they were not asking for an external audit; they
merely wanted to be allowed to examine the receipts, vouchers, bank
statements, and other documents in support of the Special Administrator's
Final Report and to examine the Special Administrator under oath.
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus which assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002
which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the
Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment. The trial court,
however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on May
23, 2002 on the ground of forum shopping. Respondents' motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Respondents filed a petition for mandamus before the CA claiming that the
trial court unlawfully refused to comply with its ministerial duty to approve
their seasonably-perfected appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had neither the power nor the authority to deny the appeal on the
ground of forum shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial
court to dismiss an appeal, either motuproprio or on motion, may be
exercised only if the appeal was taken out of time or if the appellate court
docket and other fees were not paid within the reglementary period.
The petitioner faults the appellate court for refusing to resolve the forum
shopping issue in its Decision of February 11, 2003 and the Resolution of
July 17, 2003, thereby deciding the case in a way not in accord with law or
with applicable decisions of this Court. On the matter of forum shopping, the
appellate court simply stated in its decision that "In view of the fact that
respondent Judge had no power to disallow the appeal on the ground of
forum shopping, we deem it unnecessary to discuss whether or not
petitioners committed forum shopping." Neither did the appellate court pass
upon the issue of forum shopping in its ruling on the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, stating that forum shopping should be resolved either in the
respondent's appeal or in their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals err in not dismissing the respondents'
petition for mandamus on the ground of forum shopping?
RULING: NO.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who "repetitively availed of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another." It is directly addressed and prohibited under Section 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and is signaled by the presence of the
in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 and private respondent can again raise the same in
the appeal from the order dated April 3, 2002, where the issue should be
properly resolved." To the appellate court - faced with the task of ruling on a
petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to allow the respondents'
appeal - forum shopping was not an issue material to whether the trial court
should or should not be compelled; what was material are the requisite filing
of a notice of appeal and record on appeal, and the question of whether
these have been satisfied. We cannot find fault with this reasoning as the
forum shopping issue - i.e., whether there was abuse of court processes in
the respondents' use of two recourses to assail the same trial court order has specific pertinence and relevance in the sufficiency and merits of the
recourses the respondents took.
G.R. No. 146989
February 7, 2007
MELENCIO GABRIELvs.
NELSON BILON
FACTS: Respondents filed their separate complaints for illegal dismissal,
illegal deductions, and separation pay against petitioner with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). These were consolidated and docketed
as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-07420-95. On December 15, 1995, the
complaint was amended, impleading as party respondent the Bacoor
Transport Service Cooperative, Inc., as both parties are members of the
cooperative.
Respondents alleged that they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney,
driving their respective units bearing under a boundary system of P400 per
day, plying Baclaran to Divisoria via Tondo, and vice versa driving five days a
week, with average daily earnings of P400; That they were required/forced
to pay additional P55.00 per day for the following: a) P20.00 police
protection; b) P20.00 washing; c) P10.00 deposit; and [d)] P5.00 garage
fees; That there is no law providing the operator to require the drivers to
pay police protection, deposit, washing, and garage fees That on April 30,
1995, petitioner told them not to drive anymore, and when they went to the
garage to report for work the next day, they were not given a unit to drive;
and That the boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys are considered regular
employees of the jeepney operators. Being such, they are entitled to security
of tenure. Petitioner, however, dismissed them without factual and legal
basis, and without due process.
RULING: YES. The Court considers the service of copy of the decision of the
labor arbiter to have been validly made on May 28, 1997 when it was
received through registered mail. As correctly pointed out by petitioners
wife, service of a copy of the decision could not have been validly effected on
April 18, 1997 because petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997.
Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:
SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. (a) Notices or
summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served
on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or authorized public
officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail;
Provided, That where a party is represented by counsel or authorized
representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized
representative; Provided further, That in cases of decision and final
awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel
.
For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be
counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of
record.
(b) The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order, resolution
or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days from date of service
thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name, the names of the persons
served and the date of receipt which return shall be immediately attached
and shall form part of the records of the case. If no service was effected, the
serving officer shall state the reason therefore in the return.
Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the NLRC
Rules of Procedure states that: "[s]ervice of the papers may be made by
delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his
office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is
found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by
leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the
evening, at the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a person of
sufficient age and discretion then residing therein."
The foregoing provisions contemplate a situation wherein the party to the
action is alive upon the delivery of a copy of the tribunals decision. In the
present case, however, petitioner died before a copy of the labor arbiters
decision was served upon him. Hence, the above provisions do not apply. As
aptly stated by the NLRC:
In the case at bar, respondent Melencio Gabriel was not represented by
counsel during the pendency of the case. A decision was rendered by the
Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while Mr. Gabriel passed away on
April 4, 1997, without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime. The
decision was only served on April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to
receive the same. His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically
substitute themselves as party respondents. Thus, when the bailiff tendered
a copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive them.
The requirement of leaving a copy at the partys residence is not applicable
in the instant case because this presupposes that the party is still living and
is not just available to receive the decision.
The preceding considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not become
final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to party
respondent. Thus, the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5, 1997
after receipt of a copy of the decision via registered mail on May 28, 1997
was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 223 of
the Labor Code.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA
FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and was
subsequently convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction he died at the
NationalBilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest . The Supreme Court
in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists
that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for
the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction
is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In
support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation
in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from the rule established
was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can
be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently,
the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal
action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al.10 departed
from this long-established principle of law. In this case:
accusedSendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiegos death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of
his conviction.This court in an unprecedented move resolved to
dismiss Sendaydiegos appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear
that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal
action already extinguished.
The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiegos conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the
purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation
in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court)
ISSUE: Whether the civil case arising from ex delicto is extinguished
together with the criminal case upon the death of the accused
RULING: When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant
dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary
money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before
the estate of the deceased accused. Ordinary money claims referred to in
Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in the case of
Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiegos civil liability. What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86,14
are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex
delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property.
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be
filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last
illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of
this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1)
treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim
referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to
survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, the court rules: if the private offended party, upon extinction of
the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 11116 (1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as (amended) file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict
may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real
personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor
administrator17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87
the Rules of Court:
or
or
or
of
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator.No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Republic-Asahi then filed a complaint against JDS and SICI. It sought from
JDS payment representing the additional expenses they incurred for the
completion of the project using another contractor, and from JDS and SICI,
jointly and severally, payment of damages in accordance with the
performance bond, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
SICI then filed its answer, alleging that the Republic-Asahi money claims
against petitioner and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D.
Santos, Jr.
The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi against JDS and
SICI, on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of
its sole proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr. Hence, Republic-Asahi filed a Motion
for Reconsideration seeking reconsideration of the lower court's order
dismissing its complaint.
The lower court issued an Order, reconsidering and reinstating the order of
dismissal of the case against SICI. However, the case against defendant Jose
D. Santos, Jr. (deceased) remains undisturbed.
SICI filed its 'Memorandum for Bondsman/Defendant SICI (Re: Effect of
Death of defendant Jose D. Santos, Jr.)' reiterating its prayer for the
dismissal of Republic-Asahis complaint.
The lower court then issued the assailed Order reconsidering its Order dated
October 15, 1991, and ordered the case, insofar as SICI is concerned,
dismissed. Republic-Asahi filed its motion for reconsideration which was
opposed by SICI. The lower court denied Republic-Asahis motion for
reconsideration. Hence, case was elevated to CA.
The CA ruled that SICI's obligation under the surety agreement was not
extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, RepublicAsahi could still go after SICI for the bond.
The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in pronouncing
that the performance of the Contract in question had become impossible by
The CA ruled that performance of the contract was impossible, not because
of respondent's fault, but because of the fault of JDS Construction and Jose
D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their part to make satisfactory progress on the
project, which amounted to non-performance of the same Pursuant to the
Surety Contract, SICI is liable for the non-performance of said Contract on
the part of JDS Construction."
As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not
extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except
when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the
parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or
are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the court, which
is not then acting as a probate court.
"If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the
provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be
observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship."
"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made
against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has
not been fully collected."
"x xx. The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the
performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the
obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although the
contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal
obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is
said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly
and equally bound with the principal. x xx.
The court denied the petition and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children
Jenneth and Maria Jennifer, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac and not of Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to
be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration
to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings
of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo
and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common
residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City,
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las
Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether Elise is qualified to be appointed as administrator of the
estate of Eliseo.
RULING: There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either
party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and,
therefore, void ab initio.ar
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that
Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of
administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a
cause of action", it being her stated position that Corazon, by her evidence,
failed to establish her filiation vis - -vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in
fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles."
The trial court dismissed the petition on its finding that respondent failed to
prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco. Hence, respondent went
on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).
CA reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it
to appoint Corazon as administratrix of the estate of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco
M. Angeles therefore be appointed as administratrix of his estate.
RULING: The Court of Appeals erred in giving respondent presumptive
legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid
and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of legitimacy
under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis
therefor , i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage.
Respondent failed to present evidence of Franciscos marriage to Genoveva,
thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate
presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is
asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending
physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be
made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or
that of the mother of the newborn child. None of the evidence respondent
presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further,
RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco
and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of
Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment,
herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate
daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein
respondents legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latters marriage to
Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court
of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not
again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent
or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.