IN RE APPLICATION OF MAX SHOOP FOR ADMISSION TO

PRACTICE LAW,
November 29, 1920, 41 Phil. 213
FACTS:
Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4
of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law.
It was shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the
highest court of the State of New York. The said rule requires that: New York State
by comity confers the privilege of admission without examination under similar
circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. The rule of
New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without examination in the
discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases. Provided that the applicant also
practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state
or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia. The applicant
practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles
of the English Common Law.
ISSUE:
WON Max Shoop can practice law in the Philippines
HOLDING:
Yes he can practice Law in the Philippines
HELD:
The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't.
Established by the Congress In interpreting and applying the written laws of this
jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the
written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American
cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the
Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases
where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions.
The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its present day form
of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.- New York permits
conferring privileges on Attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippines similar to
those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY rule; doesnt
establish a precedent with respect to future Applications

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS MILTON

SPRINGER
April 1, 1927, G.R. No. L-26979
FACTS:
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the
Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting
power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the GovernorGeneral, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which
divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC.
The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the GovernorGeneral who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered
the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO
was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as
well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the
Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors
of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was
filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of
NCC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect
the Board Members of NCC.
HELD:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it
has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons
to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and
controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress
into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint
members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court
however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature
may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the
appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch
this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch

FERDINAND MARCOS, ET. AL. VS. HONORABLE RAUL

MANGLAPUS
September 15, 1989, G.R. No. 88211
FACTS:
After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People Power
Revolution, he and his family was forced into exile. Now in his deathbed, the former
President has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Aquino, considering the dire consequences on the nation on the return at a time
when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions, stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
ISSUE:
Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers
enumerated under scope of the Executive are concerned.
HELD:
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise of the specific
powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of the executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot
be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Having sword to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their
welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for
common good. The State, through the Government, is not precluded from taking
pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct.

IN RE CUNANAN
March 18, 1954, 94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in
1952. The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations
from 1946 up to and including 1955. Section 1 provided the following passing
marks:
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%. Section 2
of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades
shall be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar
examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
HELD:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being
embraced in the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the Bar
Flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing,
thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not
stationary. As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional,
while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was
stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the
bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that
this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on
the petitions of the said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on
who can practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

The Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law was
passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of a petitioner.

JOSE ANGARA VS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO

YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, AND DIONISIO MAYOR
July 15, 1936, G.R. No. L-45081
FACTS: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara
was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15,
1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled,
passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of
Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date
as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications
of
members
of
the
NA,
notwithstanding
the
previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued
back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance
of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition
from the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the election protest.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with
specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.