DIGESTED CASES OF RULES OF CONSTRCUTION

JDAndalecio
1. Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum
A. CYNTHIA S. BOLOS vs. DANILO T. BOLOS G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010
Penned by: J. Mendoza
Facts:
RTC granted the petition to declare null and void the marriage of herein litigants on the
ground of psychological incapacity of both parties. Respondent filed a notice to appeal and a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court on the ground that he failed to file
the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. A
fortiori the court declares its decision regarding the marriage final and executory. Thereafter, he
filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 prating to annul the decisions of RTC asserting that it
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The CA granted
the petition and reversed the decision of RTC on the ground that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this
case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before
the Family Code took effect. The petitioner filed a motion of reconsideration but was denied,
hence this petition for certiorari under rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
Decision:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. A cardinal rule in statutory
construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. Wherefore, the petition is denied.

2. Dura Lex Sed Lex

A. OBIASCA vs. BASALLOTE G.R. No. 176707 February 17, 2010
Penned by: J.Corona
Facts:
Herein respondent was appointed to the position of Administrative Officer II, of DepEd,
Tabaco National High School in Albay by the City Schools Division Superintendent. In the
following month, she was informed that her appointment could not be forwarded to the Civil
Service Commission and was advised instead to return to her former teaching position, which
she did. The new City Schools Division Superintendent, however, appointed herein petitioner to
the same position of Administrative Officer II. The appointment was sent to and was properly
attested by the CSC. Upon learning this, respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman. In its decision, the City Schools Division Superintendent and the school
principal was held administratively liable and was suspended for 3 months. Respondent
elevated the matter to CSC and approved her appointment and recalled the approval of
petitioners appointment. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in CA who denied
such petition for the appointment was made effective when the respondent accepted the
appointment and assumed its duties and responsibilities. Being qualified therein, respondent
already holds the office by virtue of appointment and any other appointment to that office is null
and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible
officials) to submit respondents appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance
made her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
Decision:
The court found out that the appointment paper of the respondent was wrongfully not
submitted by the proper persons to the CSC for attestation. The alleged failure of respondent to
have her PDF duly signed by Gonzales was not a valid reason because the PDF was not
even required for the attestation of respondents appointment by the CSC. More so, that CSC
resolution dated November 29, 2005 recalling petitioners appointment and approving that of
respondent has long become final and executor under Sections 16 and 18, Rule VI of the
Omnibus Rules. Petitioners failure to do this constitutes a valid waiver of her rights thereto.
Substantially, Section 12, Book V of EO 292 amended Section 9(h) of PD 807 by deleting the
requirement that all appointments subject to CSC approval be submitted to it within 30 days,
and it being lifted and amended, is already abandoned. Accordingly, petitioners subsequent
appointment was void. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. Petition is
denied.

B. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ G.R. No. 202242 vs.JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL et al. July 17,
2012
Penned by: J. Mendoza
Facts:
The unexpected departure of chief justice Corona moved the JBC to meet urgently to be
able to recommend a name and thereby filling the Chief Justice Position. Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr are representing the congress in JBC
pursuant to the demands of the constitution of a congressional representative. Petitioner
assailed this since the constitution expressly provides that there must only be a representative
from the congress Article VIII, Section 8 and that the two congressmen cannot both represent
the senate and vote therein. JBC admits that such has been the practice for 18 years founded
on the understanding that under the constitution, the word congress means the senate and the
HR; the Senate is not the Congress or the HR the Congress but the two of them constitutes the
congress, hence, it must be understood that as a bicameral, the congress is to be represented
by two representatives coming from both houses. JBC questioned the locus standi of the
petitioner but the court assumes its power of judicial review due to expediency and
constitutional importance of the issue.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1) member of Congress to sit
in the JBC?
2. Whether or not the practice of having two (2) representatives from each house of
Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by the Constitution?
Decision:
Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
It can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. , the use of the singular
letter "a" preceding "representative of Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in
mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. One of the
primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. The petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and
Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.

3. Ratio Legis
A. ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMELEC et al. G.R. No. 207857, July 8, 2014
Penned by: J. Reyes
Facts:
Herein petitioner had been elected and had served as a member of the Sanggunian,
Second District, Province of Camarines Sur from 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010. On October
12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716,8 which reapportioned the
legislative districts in Camarines Sur and thereby 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old
Second District to form the present Third District. In 2010 election, Naval once again won as
among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013 and thereafter filed
COC for the same office that year. Private respondent is also a candidate for the office, invoking
Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), he filed before the COMELEC a Verified
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited
that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as
a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. Allowing
Naval to run as a Sanggunianmember for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term
limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC. In response, petitioner claims that the office
he is running from is a new district created by RA 9716 and by reckoning, it will only be his 2nd
time to run for the position. In its relution, the COMELEC denied Navals COC on the ground
that the same people who elected him in the past are the same people who will be voting in the
district, this dictates his service from 2004-2013 to the same people, by reckoning is already 3
consecutive terms. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the provincial board members election to the same position for the third
and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed district, a violation of the three-term
limit rule.
Decision:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose." The framers of the constitution wants to avoid the necessary evil of allowing the
power to reside in one person alone for a long period of time, thats why it zealously guards the
three-term limit rule. From the apportionment of the district only leaves the second district
renamed. Hence, the district which elected the petitioner for the third and fourth time is the
same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. "

4. Ejusdem Generis
A. David vs. Macasio, G.R. No. 195466 July 2, 2014
Penned by: J. Brion
Facts:
Macasio filed before the LA a complaint7 against petitioner Ariel L. David, doing business
under the name and style "Yiels Hog Dealer," for non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay and
13th month pay. Herein petitioner argues that Macasios wprk under him is task-based and is
therefore not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay pursuant to the provisions
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Labor Code. LA dismissed Macasios
complaint for lack of merit. The LA gave credence to Davids claim that he engaged Macasio on
"pakyaw" or task basis on the following grounds: (1) Macasio received the fixed amount
of P700.00 for every work done, regardless of the number of hours that he spent in completing
the task and of the volume or number of hogs that he had to chop per engagement; (2) Macasio
usually worked for only four hours, beginning from 10:00 p.m. up to 2:00 a.m. of the following
day; and (3) the P700.00 fixed wage far exceeds the then prevailing daily minimum wage
of P382.00. NLRC affirmed this decision and denied the motion for reconsideration of herein
respondent. The CA agreed that Macasio is a task-based worker, however, it ruled that he is
nevertheless entitled to holiday, SIL and 13th month pay. This petition is filed after
reconsideration from CA was not sustained.
Issue:
Whether or not a tasked-based worker is entitled on holiday, SIL and 13th month pay.
Decision:
The pertinent portion of Article 94 of the Labor Code and its corresponding provision in
the IRR47 reads:
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular
holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than (10) workers
SECTION 1. Coverage. This Rule shall apply to all employees except:
(e)Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis,
or those who are paid a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in
the performance thereof.
Applying the rule on ejusdem generis the court saw that in determining whether workers
engaged on "pakyaw" or task basis" is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or
absence) of employer supervision as regards the workers time and performance is the key: if
the worker is simply engaged on pakyaw or task basis, then the general rule is that he is entitled
to a holiday pay and SIL pay but if he is also a field personnel, then he is excluded therefrom. A
partial grant of the petition regarding 13th month pay is hereby declared.

5. Expression Unius, Est Exclusio Alterius

A. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION vs. SIBAL et al. G.R. No.173587 July 15, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
pharmaceutical products. Thereafter, Roche Philippines, Inc. purchased Syntex and took over
from Zuellig the distribution of Syntex products. Consequently, Zuellig closed its Syntex Division
and terminated the services of respondents due to redundancy. They were properly notified of
their termination6 and were paid their respective separation pay. Controversy arose when
respondents filed before the NLRC complaints payment of retirement gratuity and monetary
equivalent of their unused sick leave on top of the separation pay already given them.
Respondents claimed that they are still entitled to retirement benefits and that their receipt of
separation pay and execution of Release and Quitclaim do not preclude pursuing such claim.
The labor arbiter dismissed their complaint on the ground that employees whose separation
from employment was by reason of redundancy are not entitled to the monetary. When the case
reached the CA, it was given a different ruling; hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents could avail both the redundancy pay and retirement benefits under
the terms and conditions of the CBA and the retirement and gratuity plan
Decision:
The CBA does not allow recovery of both separation pay and retirement gratuity. Section
2 of Article XIV explicitly states that any payment of retirement gratuity shall be chargeable
against separation pay. Clearly, respondents cannot have both retirement gratuity and
separation pay, as selecting one will preclude recovery of the other. To illustrate the mechanics
of how Section 2 of Article XIV bars double recovery, if the employees choose to retire,
whatever amount they will receive as retirement gratuity will be charged against the separation
pay they would have received had their separation from employment been for a cause which
would entitle them to severance pay. In short, Sections 1 and 3 clearly spell out the difference in
the treatment of employees who retired as provided in Section 1 and those who were
constrained to leave the company due to any of the causes enumerated in Section 3. Such
difference in the treatment, as well as in the corresponding pay or gratuity, indicates the parties
intention to exclude retired employees from receiving separation pay and vice versa. A contrary
construction would distort the clear intent of the parties and render useless the classification
specifically spelled out in the CBA.

6. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, G.R. No. 188315
August 25, 2010
Facts:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is
married to respondent, who was working abroad for six (6) years. Respondent came home in
1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m.
to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week. AAA was 9 years old when she started being molested and
raped; she was being raped 3 times a week every 9: 30 in the evening. When AAA is 14 years
old, she refused to go home after being raped by respondent. Instead she stayed with her
friends house with whom she divulge everything that respondent was doing to her. In 2002,
AAA filed a complaint against respondent and underwent medical examination. In his defense,
respondent admitted that he is a strict father to AAA but denied that he raped her. RTC found
respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt for 181 counts of rape. When the case reached the
CA, the same found respondent guilty of only 2 counts of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not an adopting parent is not included within the purview of qualifying
relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
Decision:
The respondent cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the
amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the
category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since
his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate
that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he
exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death
penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
7659, since he does not fit into that category. according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the
correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of
relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the
maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent
or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted
that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal
relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is
a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either
by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian).
Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is
not the "guardian" contemplated by law.

B. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO, et al., G.R. Nos.
166948-59, August 29, 2012
Facts:
AFP-RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed
of sale that showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a
discounted purchase price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while
the second would be held by the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of
sale in securing titles in the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, to enable the AFP-RSBS to
draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes. On this regard,
the Blue Ribbon Committee recommended a criminal case against the president and other
officers of AFP-RSBS which was done against respondents for falsification of documents. In
their defense, respondents filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. The latter granted the
motions and ordered the remand of the records to the proper courts, hence, this petition by the
People of the Philippines, challenging such order.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over
offenses involving the heads of the legal departments of government-owned and controlled
corporations
Decision:
In the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, a proper construction may be had by considering the
company of words in which the term or phrase in question is founded or with which it is
associated. the enumeration of the officials in each of the categories in Section 4(a)(1) should
be understood to refer to a range of positions within a government corporation. By the variety of
the functions they perform, the "presidents, directors or trustees, or managers" cannot be taken
to refer only to those who exercise "overall" control and supervision of such corporations. Since
"managers" definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as
presidents, they belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above,
has charge of a corporations "divisions or departments. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision dated February 12, 2004 and resolution
dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and 26826-31, and DIRECTS the
Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases.

7. CASUS OMISSUS
A. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. et al., G.R. No.
139930 June 26, 2012.
Facts:
On April 25, 1977 respondents incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.
(UNICOM)1 with an authorized capital stock of P100 million divided into one million shares with
a par value of P100 per share and in 1979, the Board of Directors of the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) authorized the Administrator of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund
(CII Fund), to invest not more than P500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the
benefit of the coconut farmers. On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors
approved another amendment to UNICOMs capitalization. This increased its authorized capital
stock to one billion shares. About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 30196
against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPBs investment in
UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since UNICOM had a
capitalization of only P5 million and it had no track record of operation. later or on March 15,
1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum, stating that although it
found sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action
has already prescribed.
Issue:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents alleged violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed
Decision:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. What is questioned here
is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by
the simple expedient of suppressing their documentations. What is rather involved here is
UCPBs investment in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned by respondent
Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos crony, hence, the computation must fall from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law. The last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on
February 8, 1990, about four years after martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the
investment it now questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining
period of prescription run its course before bringing the proper action. The Court therefore
AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated May 14, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that
dismissed on the ground of prescription

B. MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS,

ILOCOS NORTE, G.R. No. 169435, February 27, 2008.
Facts:
Marcos claims Nueva Era as its own territory after Sangguniang Bayan passed
Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution Claiming an Area which is an
Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the
Province of Ilocos Norte.
Issue:
Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of
Nueva Era
Decision:
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are
named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said
municipality and constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries: Since only the barangays of Dingras are
enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded. Under
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion
of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate,
everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect.
This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural
workings of the human mind. Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to
become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the
terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be
extended to other matters.The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not
have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva
Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos
shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds
support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.