Inexistent Cases

People vs Medenilla

Lawyer was guilty of contempt for citing an inexistent circular in his pleadings.

Monticalbo vs Judge Maraya

Judge reprimanded for citing an inexistent case.

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LORETO
MEDENILLA y DORIA, accused-appellant. [G. R. No. 131638-39. July 12,
2001]

R E S O LUTIO N
KAPUNAN, J.:

In our Decision in the instant case, promulgated on March 26, 2001, wherein we
found Loreta Medenilla y Doria guilty of violating, Sections 15 and 16 of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, we directed
counsel for the convict to comment on why he should not be cited in contempt for
anchoring the defense of his client on an alleged Supreme Court circular which, in
reality, was never issued by this Court. Thus, we ordered:
[1]

[2]

Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is hereby ordered to explain within ten
(10) days why he should not be cited in contempt for citing an inexistent circular in
his pleadings.
[3]

In compliance with our directive, Atty. Arias submitted his Comment on 16 April
2001. He explained that the theory of the defense regarding the purity of
the shabu seized from his client actually came from the forensic chemist witness,
Police Senior Inspector Julieta T. de Villa, who informed him prior to her examination
on the witness stand that she received a circular, some time after she tested
the shabu obtained from the convict, which required her office to conduct quantitative
and qualitative tests of all seized illegal drugs to determine the nature of the substance
[4]

as well as its weight and purity. With this information, Atty. Arias claimed that he
immediately assumed that the circular was issued by the Supreme Court and, as such,
he used this alleged circular to seek the acquittal or, at least, the reduction of the
penalty imposed on his client. Thus, in his arguments before the lower court and in his
pleadings before this Court, he contended that the drugs seized from his client should
be allowed to undergo a quantitative test, aside from the qualitative test already
conducted, in compliance with the alleged circular.After this Court pointed out his
infraction for citing a non- existent circular, Atty. Arias now asserts that he had no
knowledge that the alleged circular did not actually exist and that it was not his
intention to mislead the Court. He further justified his citation of a non-existent
circular by claiming that his inadvertence was only moved by his eagerness to provide
his client with the best defense. Thus, he begs the indulgence of the Court and extends
his profoundest apologies for his infraction.
We find Atty. Arias guilty of contempt.
A lawyer owes it to the court and his client to be adequately versed on both the
factual and legal aspects of his client's case. For a lawyer to do otherwise would be a
disservice to the court and his client and a discredit to his brethren in the bar. Thus, it
is the bounden duty of a lawyer to be knowledgeable of the legal provisions upon
which he will base the case of his client. Furthermore, due to the duty he owes to the
court to always observe candor, fairness and good faith, a lawyer is held accountable
for the veracity of the legal provisions upon which he anchors his arguments.
[5]

[6]

In the present case, Atty. Arias was evidently remiss in his duties towards his
client and this Court. We find it hard to believe that Atty. Arias was not aware that a
circular regarding the requirement of conducting qualitative and quantitative tests of
seized illegal drugs does not exist. We cannot fathom his excuse that he merely relied
on the assertion given to him "off the record" by the forensic chemist witness
regarding the alleged circular and, from there, made a leap of faith and anchored the
life and case of his client on such an unfounded assertion. This kind of conduct is
undeniably contradictory to the training of a lawyer which is to always verify the
validity of the legal provisions which he will use in his case. Thus, we cannot accept
the excuse offered by Atty. Arias that he was misled by the claim of the forensic
chemist witness that a circular requiring qualitative and quantitative tests of seized
illegal drugs was issued by this Court. It is our view that Atty. Arias deliberately tried
to mislead the trial court and this Court into believing the existence of such alleged
circular.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Marcelino P. Arias is hereby declared

guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10) days from notice
hereof a fine in the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely by the
Court.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONINO MONTICALBO,

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197

Complainant,

[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ]

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

JUDGE CRESCENTE F.
MARAYA, JR.,

Regional Trial Court,

Promulgated:

Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte,

Respondent.

April 13, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September 24,
2008 filed by complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge
Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Calubian,Leyte, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave
abuse of authority thru false representation.[1]

Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a

sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before
the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte(MCTC).[2]

The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on
the ground that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to
prosecute the case.[3] The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of
complainant Monticalbo for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. For said reason,
he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the court.[4]

Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-89.
[5]
He then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal,
which was granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008.[6]

In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having
been filed out of time. He stated that:

Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied

to govern the proceedings of this case, a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Being a prohibited
pleading, it will not suspend the period of appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA
G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd Division). Since the appealed
Order was received by counsel for the defendants-appellants
on February 13, 2008, the notice of appeal, not a motion for
reconsideration, should have been filed within a period of 15 days
which lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal was
filed on March 31, 2008, the appeal was, therefore, filed out of
time and the appealed Order has become final and executory. The
lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment (Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347). [7]

Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent

judge: (1) respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in the
said case exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and
corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his
questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from
plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then
Sheriff of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the
Board and President of the said cooperative.[8]Complainant further avers that he
personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo
and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial
court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6,
2008 and September 10, 2008.[9]

In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent

judge refutes all the accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains
that he decided to dismiss complainants appeal because it was filed out of time
under the Rules on Summary Procedure. This decision was made in the exercise of
the appellate jurisdiction of the MCTC and of his sound discretion. [10] Secondly, he
argues that complainants accusation of bad faith and corruption is baseless and that
the complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his counsel, in
an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the appeal in the
case.[11] Lastly, respondent denies having participated in any drinking spree with his
staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his doctor from drinking
alcoholic beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because
he has to refrain from eating in public eateries for security reasons.[12]

The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter

and referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station,
for raffle among the justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation.
[13]

On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and
Recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be

ABSOLVED from the charge of grave misconduct and
corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case by the
respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount
to a misrepresentation and therefore reflect poorly on his
esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is
therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND
STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more
severely dealt with.[14]

The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice.

Grave Misconduct and Bribery

In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents

actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[15] In the absence of such proof, the decision or
order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent
judge.[16] This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,[17] where the
Court explained:
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can
be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every
error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his
duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad
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faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and

absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the
law can find refuge.[18]

In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or

partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just
because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant.
[19]
What constitutes bad faith has been expounded on in the case of Sampiano v.
Judge Indar:[20]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or illwill for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage.[21]

Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust

judgment or order, one must be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust
and that it was issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the aggrieved
party.[22] Well-established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden
of proof rests on the complainant, who must be able to support and prove by
substantial evidence his accusations against respondent. [23] Substantial evidence,
the quantum of proof required in administrative cases, is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[24] Failure of the complainant to substantiate his claims will lead to the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit because, in the absence

of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly performed
his duties will prevail.[25]

In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to
buttress his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent
who, if complainant is to be believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in
drinking sprees with court employees during office hours. Contrary to
complainants statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was
attending to his cases during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking
sessions.

Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion
and speculation cannot be given credence.[26] Complainant miserably failed to
substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged
hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint. Consequently, this Court has no
other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit.

Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or
omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the
peoples faith in the judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent court
employee against any groundless accusation or administrative charge which has no
basis in fact or law.[27] As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case
of Francisco v. Leyva,[28]
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing
discipline upon employees of the Judiciary. At the same time,
however, neither will we hesitate to shield the same employees
9

from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than

promote the orderly administration of justice.[29]

Gross Ignorance of the Law

Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be
shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
bad faith.[30] In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption.[31]

Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his
counterclaim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules
on Summary Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading and will not toll the running of the period to appeal. To support
his argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00 limit
set in the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Complainant is mistaken.

A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure clearly

shows that complainants claim is covered by the said rule which reads:
Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

10

A. Civil Cases
xxx
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where
the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not
exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
or Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in
Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of interest and costs.

Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as
amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed the
ceiling at P100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in charging that
respondents knowledge of law fell so short and that he was remiss in his obligation
to be familiar with the law which even law students these days know such x x x.[32]

For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to choose his words carefully
and refrain from hurling insults at respondent judge especially if, as in this
instance, he is obviously mistaken in his reading of the law. His use of insulting
language and unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer to accord due
respect to the courts. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires
that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge
erred in issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts,
no matter how erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith. [33] A judge is not
required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the judicial
office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
administration of justice can be infallible.[34] As a matter of policy, a judge cannot
be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown

11

that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper
considerations.[35]

The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher

courts. The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to
the other judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it complementary or
supplementary to such actions.[36] With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v.
Abesamis[37] is instructive:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a
Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary
remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a
motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary
in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power
or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a
petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

12

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary

proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to
and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of
the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality,
that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. [38]

Citation of non-existent case

The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a nonexistent case Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No.
85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 in his questioned Order.
A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, CA
G.R. And, it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the Court of
Appeals. This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and
integrity expected of those occupying respondents judicial position. A judge must
be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. [39] The Code of
Judicial Conduct also demands that he be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence.[40]
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof
that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to
observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official
duties.[41] As such, he should always strive to live up to the strict standards of
13

competence, integrity and diligence in public service necessary for one in his
position.[42] The case of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: A
judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in
a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity, in a
judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.[43]

I
t is important to note that respondent did not offer any explanation for the
incorrect citation of the said case in his Comment to the complaint against him. He
should be admonished for his failure to address this issue, especially as it pertains
to the proper execution of his office.

Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has been
reported to have committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him leniency.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and Corruption is

hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge
is ADMONISHED to observe due care in the performance of his functions and
duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

14