G.R. No.

204160

September 22, 2014

Spouses Michelle M. Noynay and Noel S. Noynay vs. Citihomes

Builder and Development, Inc.
Civil Law; Sales; Assignment of interests and rights. By virtue of the deed of
assignment, the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to
the obligations of the assignor and is bound by exactly the same conditions
as those which bound the assignor. The assignor becomes a complete
stranger to all the matters that have been conferred to the assignee.
FACTS: On December 29, 2004, Citihomes and Spouses Noynoy executed a
contract to sell covering the sale of a house and lot in San Jose, Del Monte,
Bulacan, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43469.
Under the terms of the contract, the price of the property was fixed at
915,895.00 with a downpayment of 183,179.00, and the remaining balance
to be paid in 120 equal instalments with an interest rate of 21%
commencing on February 8, 2005 and every 8 th day of the month thereafter.
Subsequently, Citihomes executed the Deed of Assignment of Claims and
Accounts (Assignment) in favor of United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
Under the said agreement, UCPB purchased from Citihomes various
accounts, including the account of spouses Noynay, for a consideration of
100,000,000.00. In turn, Citihomes assigned its rights, titles, interests, and
participation in various contracts to sell with its buyers to UCPB.
In February of 2007, Spouses Noynay allegedly started to default in their
payments.
Months later, Citihomes decided to declare sps. Noynay
delinquent and to cancel the contract considering that nine months of
agreed amortizations were left unpaid. On December 8, 2007, the notarized
Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of the Contract to Sell dated
November 21, 2007, was received by Sps. Noynay. They were given 30 days
within which to pay the arrears and failure to do so would authorize
Citihomes to consider the contract as cancelled.
On June 15, 2009, Citihomes sent its final demand letter asking Sps Noynay
to vacate the premises due to their continued failure to pay the arrears.
Sps. Noynay did not heed the demand, forcing Citihomes to file the
complaint for unlawful detainer before the MTCC. The MTCC dismissed the
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action. It considered the
annotation in the certificate of title, which was dated prior to the filing of
the complaint, which showed that Citihomes has executed the Assignment
in favor of UCPB, as having the legal effect of divesting Citihomes of its
interest and right over the subject property. On appeal, the RTC reversed
the decision of the MTCC. The RTC explained that the assignment was

limited only to the instalment accounts receivables due from Sps. Noynay
and did not include the transfer of title or ownership over the property. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that Citihomes still has a right
and interest over the property in its capacity as the registered owner.
ISSUE: Whether or not Citihomes has a cause of action for ejectment
against Spouses Noynay.
HELD: NEGATIVE. The ruling of the MTCC has legal and factual bases.
Evident from the tenor of the agreement was the intent on the part of
Citihomes, as assignor, to assign all of its rights and benefits in favor of
UCPB for a consideration of 100,000,000.00. Indeed, the assignment was
more than as assignment of credit. By virtue of the deed of assignment, the
assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of
the assignor and is bound by exactly the same conditions as those which
bound the assignor. The assignor becomes a complete stranger to all the
matters that have been conferred to the assignee. Undoubtedly, Citihomes
had no cause of action against Sps. Noynay.

G.R. No. 204369

September 17, 2014

ENRIQUETA M. LOCSIN vs. BERNARDO HIZON, CARLOS HIZON,

SPS. JOSE MANUEL & LOURDES GUEVARRA
Civil law; Sales; Innocent purchaser for value; Mirror doctrine. An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another withour notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full
and fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of
another persons claim. Under the mirror doctrine which echoes the
doctrinal rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore is in no way
obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.
FACTS: Enriqueta M. Locsin (Locsin) was the registered owner of a 760sq.m. lot covered by TCT No. 235094, located at Brgy. Holy Spirit, Capitol,
Quezon City. In 1992. She filed as ejectment case, Civil Case No. 38-6633
against one Billy Aceron (Aceron) MTC of Quezon City to recover possession
over the land in issue.
Eventually, the two entered a compromise
agreement, which the MTC approved.
Locsin later went to the United States without knowing whether
Aceron has complied with his part of the bargain under the compromise
agreement. In 1994, after discovering that her copy of TCT No. 235094 was

missing, Locsin filed a petition for administrative reconstruction in order to

secure a new one, TCT No. RT-97467. Sometime in early 2002, she
discovered that one Marylou Bolos (Bolos) had TCT no. RT-97467 cancelled
in 1999 and then secured a new one, TCT No. N-200074, in her favour by
registering a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 3, 1979, allegedly
executed by Locsin with the Registry of Deeds. Bolos later sold the subject
lot to Bernardo Hizon (Bernardo) for Php 1.5 million, but it was titled under
the name of his son Carlos Hozon (Carlos) on August 12, 1999. Bernardo
claiming to be the owner of the property filed a motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution for the enforcement of the court-approved compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. 38-6633.
Locsin, through counsel, requested Carlos for the return of the
property since her signature in the purported Deed of Sale in favour of
Bolos was a forgery. Carlos denied Locsins request, claiming that he was
unaware of any defect or flaw in Bolos title and he is, thus, an innocent
purchaser for value and good faith. Locsin later learned that Carlos had
already sold the property for PhP 1.5 million to his sister and her husband,
herein respondents Lourdes and Jose Manuel Guevarra, who, as early as
May 24, 2002, had a new certificate of title, TCT No. N-237083, issued in
their names. The Sps. Guevara then immediatelt mortgaged the said
property to secure a PhP 2.5 million loan/credit facility with Damar Credit
Corporation (DCC).
Locsin filed an action for reconveyance, annulment of TCT No. N237083, the cancellation of the mortgage lien annotated thereon, and
damages, against Bolos, Bernardo, Carlos, the Sps. Guevara, DCC, and the
Register of Deeds. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that Beranrdo,
Carlos and the Sps. Guevara were purchasers in good faith. The CA
affirmed the RTCs finding that the respondents are innocent purchasers for
value. Accordingly, C ruled that Locsin can no longer recover the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are innocent purchasers for value.
HELD: NEGATIVE. An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another withour notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase
or before receiving any notice of another persons claim.
Under the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal rule that every
person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued therefore is in no way obliged to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. However, as an
exception to the rule, the presence of anything which excites or arouses
suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate an
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of the said

certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated
an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence,
does not merit the protection of the law.
Bolos certificate was concededly free from liens and encumbrances
on its face. However, the failure of Carlos and the Spouses Guevara to
exercise the necessary level of caution in light of the factual milieu
surrounding the sequence of transfers from Bolos to respondents bars the
application of the mirror doctrine and inspires the Courts concurrence with
petitioners proposition.

G.R. No. 193652

August 5, 2014

Infant JULIA YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MARIA

CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY
D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO
Civil Law; Family Code; Parental Authority. Writ of Amparo. Since it is
extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents
and purposes, has been legally considered as a ward of the State, the
Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. The privilege of a writ of amparo
is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings or enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the
perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee
or a private individual.
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had an amorous
relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and
eventually became pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of
marriage. Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an
abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete her pregnancy. To avoid
placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a
second illegitimate son she intended to have the child adopted through Sun
and Moon Home for Children in Paranaque City which shouldered her
expenses when she gave birth on July 26, 2009 to baby Julian. Christina
voluntarily surrendered baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment to the DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without
knowing of the birth of his son. Christina disclosed to the family of
Marcelino the circumstances surrounding baby Julian. After the emotional
revelation, they avowed to help her recover and raise the baby.

On November 27, 2009, Baby Julian was certified as Legally

Available for Adoption by the DSWD and was matched with the spouses
Vergel and Filomina Medina. On May 5, 2010, Christina had a change of
mind and asked the DSWD for the suspension of baby Julians adoption
proceedings.
However, the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally
available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three
months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which
terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward
of the State.
The DSWD Assistant Secretary said that the Department was no
longer in the position to stop the adoption process. This prompted Christina
to file a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo before the RTC of
Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from the officials of
the DSWD. The RTC issued a Writ of Amparo commanding the respondentsofficials of DSWD to produce the body of Baby Julian. Respondents
complied with the writ and filed their Return praying that the petition be
denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating to a
biological parents custodial rights over her child. After the hearing, the
RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of writ of amparo without prejudice
to the filing of a separate action in court holding that Christina availed of
the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for a Writ of Amparo is the proper recourse for
obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child.
HELD: NEGATIVE. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights
over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered
as a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. The
privilege of a writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extrajudicial killings or enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature,
regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically
to protect and guaranty the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life. In this case, Christina
is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the
child and contesting custody over him.

G.R. No. 176492

October 20, 2014

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO

Civil Law

FACTS: In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato

and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property
situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot covered by
TCT No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996, their marriage was declared void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no more reason to
maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for
partition, but the latter refused. Thus on January 29, 2003, nonato filed a
complaint for partition before the MTCC of Bacolod City.
Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject
property has already been sold to their children Joseph Raymond and
Joseph Leo. The Bacolod MTCC rendered a decision applying Article 129 of
the Family Code. The trial court ordered the conjugal property of the
former spouses Leonardo and Marietta Nonato, a house and lot covered by
TCT No. T-140361 which was their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the
defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Nonato appealed. The RTC reversed
the order of the MTCC and ruled to equitably partition the subject house
and lot. On appeal to the CA, the appellate court held that although the
RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article
147, it correctly ordered the equitable partition of the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property shall be partitioned equitably between
the former spouses.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. During the marriage of Leonardo and Marietta their
property relations was governed by conjugal partnership regime. Although
Article 129 of the Family Code provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of conjugal property regime, Article 147 specifically covers the
effects of void marriages on the spouses property relations. The particular
kind of co-ownership provide under Article 147 applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit
of marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed
on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with each
other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses
through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. The former
spouses both agreed that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their join efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by

them in equal shares. The claim of Barrido that the subject property has
been sold to their children was not given merit for aside from the fact that
the property is still registered under the spouses name, the purported deed
of sale was not notarized therefore not in a public instrument and thus is
inadmissible in evidence. Therefore the subject property is still owned in
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance
with the rules on co-ownership.
G.R. 163654

October 8, 2014

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT

Civil Law. Contract. Damages. The relationship between the credit card
issuer and the credit card holder is a contractual one that is governed by
the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such
terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. In case of
breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to
have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
FACTS: Armovit, then a depositor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands ws
issued by BPI Express Credit a pre-approved BPI Express Credit Card in
1989 with a credit limit of P20,000.00 that was to expire at the end of
March 1993. On November 21, 1992, she treated her British friends from
Hong Kong to lunch at Marios Restaurant at the Ortigas Center in Pasig.
As the host, she handed to the waiter her credit card to settle the bill, but
the waiter soon returned to inform her that her credit card had been
cancelled upon verification with BPI Express Credit and would not be
honored. Inasmuch as she was relying on her credit card because she did
not carry enough cash that day, her guests were made to share the bill to
her extreme embarrassment.
Upon verification with the BPI Express Credit, Armovit learned that
her credit card had been summarily cancelled for failure to pay her
outstanding obligations. BPI Espress Credit claimed that it had sent
Armovit a telegraphic message on March 19, 1992 requesting her to pay
her arrears for three consecutive months, and that she did not comply with
the request, causing it to temporaaily suspend her credit card effective
March 31, 1992. It further claimed that she had been notified of the
suspension and cautioned to refrain from using the credit card to avoid
inconvenience or embarrassment, and that while the obligation was settled
by April 1992 she failed to sublit the required application form in order to
reactivate her credit card privileges.
Armovit sued BPI Express Credit for damages in the RTC, insisting
that she had been a credit card holder in good standing, and that she did

not have any unpaid bills at the time of the incident. The RTC found BPI
Express Credit guilty of negligence and bad faith and ordered it ot pay
Armovit moral damages of P100,000.00; exemplary damages and attorneys
fees each in the amount of P10,000.00; and the costs of suit. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of Armovit.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The relationship between the credit card issuer
and the credit card holder is a contractual one that is governed by the terms
and conditions found in the card membership agreement. Such terms and
conditions constitute the law between the parties. In case of breach, moral
damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity. However, conscious and intentional design need not always be
present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith. Hence, bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of the
Civil Code includes gross negligence.
The terms and conditions governing the issuance and use of the BPI
credit card printed on the credit card application form spelled out the terms
and conditions of the contract between and BPI Express Credit and its card
holders, including Armovit. Such terms and conditions determined the
rights and obligations between the parties. Yet, a review of such terms and
conditions did not reveal that Armovit needed to submit her new application
as the antecedent condition for her credit card to be taken out of the list of
suspended cards. Bereft of the clear basis to continue with the suspension
of the credit card privileges of Armovit, BPI Express Credit acted in wanton
disregard of its contractual obligations with her.
Thus, the CA rightly sustained the award of P100,000.00 as moral
damages. To the Court, the amount was fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. Similarly the award of exemplary damages was warranted
under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code because BPI Express Credit acted
in a reckless and oppressive manner. Finally, with Armovit having been
forced to litigate in order to protect her rights and interests, she was
entitled to recover attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

G.R. No. 187240

October 15, 2014

CARLOS A. LORIA vs. LUDOLFO P. MUNOZ, JR.

Civil Law. Unjust enrichment. No person should unjustly enrich himself or

herself at the expense of another.
FACTS: Ludolfo P. Munoz, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Carlos A. Loria with the RtC of Legaspi City. In his
complaint, Munoz alleged that he has been engaged in construction under
the name, Ludolfo P. Munoz, Jr. Construction. In August 2000 Loria
invited Munoz to advance P2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a
P50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan. Loria represented
that he would make arrangements such that Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest
Construction and Development Corporation, would turn out to be the lowest
bidder for the project. Elizalde Co would pay P8,000,000.00 to ensure the
projects award to Sunwest.
After the award to Sunwest, it would
subcontract 20% or P10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Munoz. Since
Munoz had known Loria for five years, Munoz accepted Lorias proposal.
The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco rivers in
Guinobatan was subjected to public bidding. The project was awarded to
the lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation.
Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco
rivers without subcontracting Munoz. With the project allegedly finished,
Munoz demanded Loria to return his P2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did
not return the money.
The trial court ordered Loria to return the P2,000,000.00 to Munoz
since no part of the project was subcontracted to Munoz. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Considering that Munoz did not
benefit fro paying Loria 2,000,000.00, the appellate court ruled that Loria
must return the money to Munoz under the principle of unjust enrichment.
ISSUE: Whether Loria is liable for 2,000,000.00 to Munoz.
HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE.
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, every person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of teh latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. He principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a
person must have been benefited without a real or valid basis or
justification. Second, the benefit was derived at anothers expense or
damage.

In this case, Loria received 2,000,000.00 from Munoz for a

subcontract of a government project. However, contrary to the parties
agreement, Munoz was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless,
Loria retained the 2,000,000.00. thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He
retained Munoz money without valid basis or justification. Under Article
22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria must return the 2,000,000.00
to Munoz.
G.R. No. 176020

September 29, 2014

HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, namely, ANITA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ,

SONIA J. TOLENTINO, and RODEERICK JULAO vs. SPOUSES
ALEJANDRO and MORENITA DE JESUS
Civil Law. Property. Action to recover property. In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of
his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.
FACTS: On March 2, 1999, petitioners Anita Julao Vda. De Enriquez, Sonia
J. Tolentino and Roderick Julao, representing themselves to be the heirs of
Telesforo filed before the RTC of Baguio City a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession of Real Property against respondent spouses. Petitoners alleged
that thye are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter of a parcel
of land located at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, covered by OCT No. P-2446,
that the subject property originated from TSA No. V-2132; that respondent
spouses house encroached on 70 square meters of the subject property;
that on August 4, 1998, petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent
spouses asking them to return the subject property; that respondent spuses
refused to accede to the demand, insisting that they acquired the subject
property from petitioners brother, Solito, by virtue of a Deed of Transfer of
Rights wherein Solito expressly transferred in favour of respondent spouses
his hereditary share in the parcel of land covered by TSA No. V-6667; that
TSA No. V-6667 was rejected by the DENR; and that respondent spouses
have no valid claim over the subject property because it is covered by a
separate application, TSA No. V-2132. Petitioners disputed the validity of
the Deed of Transfer of Rights executed by Solito. They presented evidence
to show that Telesforo submitted two applications, TSA No. V-2132 and TSA
No. V-6667. The first one TSA N. V-2132 resulted in the issuance of OCT
No. P-2446 in favour of heirs of Telesforo, while the second one, TSA No. V6667, was dropped from the records.
To refute the evidence presented by petitioners, respondent spouses
presented two letters from the DENR: (1) a letter dated April 27, 1999
stating that it can be concluded that TSA Np. V-2132 and TSA No. V-6667
referred to one and the same application covering one and the same lot;

and (2) a letter dated September 30, 1998 stating that the land applied for
with assigned number TSA No. V-2132 was renumbered as TSA No. V-6667.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. The CA reversed the
decision of the trial court and found the complaint dismissible on two
grounds: (1) failure on the part of the petitioners to identify the property
sought to be recovered, and (2) lack of jurisdiction. The CA noted that
petitioners failed to pinpoint the property sought to be recovered. In fact,
they did not submit any survey plan to show that respondent spouses
actually encroached on petitioners property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners failed to prove the property in
question.
HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. In an action to recover, the property must be
properly identified. Article 434 of teh Civil Code states that [i]n an action
to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim. The
plaintiff, therefore, is duty bound to clearly identify the land sought to be
recovered, in accordance with the title on which he anchors his right of
ownership. It bears stressing that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the
identity of the property claimed is fatal to his case.
In this case, the petitioners failed to identify the property they seek to
recover as they failed to describe the location, the area, as well as the
boundaries thereof. No survey plan was presented by petitioners to prove
that respondent spouses actually encroached upon the 70-sqaure meter
portion of the petitioners property. Failing to prove their allegation,
petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in their Complaint.
Respondent spouses filed their Answer contending that they are the
true and lawful owners of the subject property