Alcantara v. Reta, Jr.

G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001

Pardo, J.
FACTS:
Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or lessees of
the land owned by Reta. The land has been converted into a commercial center and
Reta is threatening to eject them. They claim that since they are legitimate tenants
or lessees of such land, they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in
accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517, the Urban Land
Reform Act. They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between
Reta and Ricardo Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio for being violative
of PD No. 1517. On the other hand, Reta claimed that the land is question is not
within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not proclaimed as an Urban Land
Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, among others, then filed complaint for the exercise
of the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court. However,
such complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the right of first refusal.
HELD:
No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ). In fact, petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority
requesting that said land be declared as an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have the
land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ.
PD No. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as ULRZ. Consequently, petitioners
cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said
decree, one must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more;
(2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided
continuously for the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall within the said
category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to
the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land
decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time.
Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and Roble.
Alcantara, on the other hand, failed to present evidence of a lease agreement other
than his testimony in court. Reta allowed Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees
for P186 from where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a
usufruct and not a lease. Roble was also allowed to construct his house on the land
because it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a
personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable
settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the

agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, Roble is not a legitimate
tenant as defined by PD No. 1517.
With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had verbal
agreements with them. This notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate
tenants who can exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517. From the
moment Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal lease
agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid
monthly, ceased to exist as there was termination of the lease.
In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first
refusal under PD No. 1517.
There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence,
even if the petitioners had the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow
the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or intended sale of the land has not
happened. PD No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to
a third party.

Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 114170, January 15, 1999
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. (MFI) and Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. (PCRI)
executed a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) wherein PCRI acceded to MFIs
request to redeem three of the seven lots foreclosed and won by the former in the
ensuing public auction. The MOU was conditioned upon the agreement that the
petitioner shall be given a right of way on the existing private road which forms part
of the area to be redeemed by private respondents. Later, PCRI filed an injunctive
suit against MFI alleging, inter alia, that the latter, in violation of the terms of the
MOU, refused to allow PCRI to make excavations on one side of the access road for
the installation of water. The trial court granted the petition for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On appeal, the CA set aside the assailed
order of the trial court; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. PCRI contends
that it is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction as
may be gleaned from the following provision in the MOU: The above cited lot, being
an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of
passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-ininterest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering private respondent to allow petitioner
to undertake excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water
pipes.
Held:
Yes. There is no question as to the meaning of the terms ingress and egress.
They give petitioner the right to use the private road as a means of entry into and
exit from its property on the northwestern side of the compound. The question
concerns the meaning of the phrase for whatever kind of passage. The trial court
read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make excavations on the
side of the access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word
passage does not, however, clearly and unmistakably convey a meaning that
includes a right to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of
the word, as defined in Websters Dictionary, is that it is the act or action of passing:
movement or transference from one place or point to another. Its legal meaning is
not different. It means, according to Blacks Law Dictionary, the act of passing;
transit; transition. To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes
requires the consideration of evidence showing the parties intention in using the
word which can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time, petitioner
cannot claim to have a clear and unmistakable right justifying the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have
observed caution and denied petitioners application for the preliminary writ.