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*EN BANC.
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BAGONG
ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN
(BAYAN),
GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR
REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP
AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID
NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED
CITIZENS
FOR
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
(MCCCL),
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE),
KALIPUNAN
NG
DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE
WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG
MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE OF
CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH
ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEO
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TIVE
SECRETARTY
EDUARDO
ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL
GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL
DEFENSE
ACTING
SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO
PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
NORBERTO
GONZALES,
THE
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA),
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP),
THE ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC),
THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including
its intelligence and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, respondents.
G.R. No. 179157.October 5, 2010.*
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BAGONG
ALYANSANG
MAKABAYANSOUTHERN
TAGALOG (BAYANST), GABRIELAST, KATIPUNAN
NG
MGA
SAMAHYANG
MAGSASAKATIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (KASAMATK), MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS
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only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that
it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that
it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Same Same While transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or
is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases
involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigationcompelling
State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct
necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.While
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
299 SCRA 744 (1998), holds that transcendental public
importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in
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targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.
Same Same Same Same Distinguished from an asapplied
challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants,
a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction
that its very
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existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities A litigant cannot
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.A facial challenge is
likewise different from an asapplied challenge. Distinguished
from an asapplied challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of
the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities. Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the
subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully
mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on
either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Same Same Freedom of Expression The allowance of a facial
challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
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For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated
defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most important
guarantees of liberty under law. In this jurisdiction, the voidfor
vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has
been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal
statutes. In at least three cases, the Court brought the doctrine
into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the nonpayment
of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment
punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to
those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually
charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present case.
Same Same Same Human Security Act of 2007 (Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9372) Terrorism What Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech Before a charge for
terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the
key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand,
thus, given the presence of the first element, any attempt at
singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the
prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a
protected speech.From the definition of the crime of terrorism in
the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may
be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
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Terrorism Council
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<http://eur
ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_314/l_31420051130en00410045.pdf>
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and
its
recent
update
<http://eur
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2009:023:0037:01:EN:HTM> on the Council Common Position
(last visited August 13, 2010).
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<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleId=607149&publicationSubCategoryId=63>
(last
visited:
September 1, 2010).
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_______________
35Allied Broadcasting Center v. Republic, G.R. No. 91500, October 18,
1990, 190 SCRA 782.
36314 Phil. 131 244 SCRA 272 (1995).
37G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1989, 179 SCRA 287.
38De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17,
2010, 615 SCRA 666, citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113118 (1976)
and Regional Rail Reoganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138148 (1974).
39 561 U.S. [unpaginated] (2010). Volume 561 is still pending
completion.
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(1)
Unlawful
conduct.Whoever
knowingly
provides
material
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January 18, 2005, 449 SCRA 1, 10, citing Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc.
v. Republic, G.R. No. 91500, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 782.
44LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. I, p. 332 (3rd
ed. 2000), citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) and Ellis v.
Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
45Vide Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 111511, October 5,
1993, 227 SCRA 100, 117, stating that all powers are susceptible of
abuse. The mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the
grant of power[.]
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the
Laws
on
Illegal
and
Unlawful
Possession,
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grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases
is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an
in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct.
In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it
refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.63
The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations
by which a criminal statute may be challenged and
under
_______________
60Vide David v. MacapagalArroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489
SCRA 160, 239 Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, supra at p. 418,
note 35.
61Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 429.
62CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 4.
63 The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding
penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of
the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged. (People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009, 600
SCRA 476, 485).
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Petitions dismissed.
Notes.Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the
void for vagueness doctrine which holds that a law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, and like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all
its possible applications. (David vs. MacapagalArroyo, 489
SCRA 160 [2006])
The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate
vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet
constitutional due process demands a higher degree of
clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended.
(People vs. Bon, 506 SCRA 168 [2006])
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the
act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes. (Romualdez vs.
Commission on Elections, 553 SCRA 370 [2008])
The time has come to reconsider the statement in
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371 (2004), that
the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to freespeech cases and that they are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes
rooted in unyielding formalism and deprived of guidance
from basic constitutional tenets, that dicta disenchants the
rights of free people, diminishing as it does, the basic right
to due process. (Tinga, J., dissenting in Romualdez vs.
Commission on Elections, 553 SCRA 370 [2008])
o0o
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