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POLICY REPORT

Power Relations in Muslim Mindanao Autonomy: Parliamentary System and Role of LGUs
(Fourth of a Seven-Part Roundtable Discussion Series on Muslim Mindanao Autonomy)
INTRODUCTION
The matter of power relations and power sharing between the national or central
government and the Bangsamoro government under the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB) and the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) is already a contentious
issue in itself. However, the introduction of a parliamentary system of governance within
the envisioned Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BAR) vis-a-vis the role of the local
government units (LGUs) presents another equally contentious and controversial issue.
As discussed in the first RTD, the provision for intergovernmental relations could be the
appropriate approach towards resolving any dispute that might arise between the national
government and the Bangsamoro government. But the power relations between the
Bangsamoro parliament and the LGUs would warrant a deeper discussion to understand
more the internal dynamics of politics and governance within the Muslim Mindanao. Thus,
the main challenge for the Legislature is to determine the degree and extent of autonomy to
be given to the ground level. How substantive are the powers that it will give to the
Bangsamoro? Will it be more towards greater and more meaningful autonomy? As to the
parliamentary form of government, how will it fit into the existing system of the country?
In order to have a better understanding on power relations within the Muslim Mindanao,
the fourth RTD was held last July 20, 2015 by the Institute of Autonomy and Governance,
the Local Government Development Foundation (LOGODEF), the Senate Muslim Advocates
for Peace and Progress (SMAPP), and the Senate Economic Planning Office (SEPO). The
participants in the RTD were the officers and technical staff of the offices of the Senators
and the Senate Secretariat. The following are the highlights of the discussion:
SUMMARY OF PRESENTATIONS
Power Relations in Muslim Mindanao: History, Context and Issues
Speaker: Dr. Francisco Pancho Lara Jr., PhD
International Alerts Philippines Country Director
Dr. Lara shared the studies that he had done through the years on Muslim Mindanao about
power relationships in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The power
relations in Muslim Mindanao can accordingly be explained by discussing its history wherein
he made four propositions which may serve as helpful guidelines in this discussion.
Institutional Multiplicity and Integrity
The first proposition talks about the institutional multiplicity which refers to the ability of
individuals and organizations to place themselves in multiple institutional systems. The term
institutions have been used in the Northian sense which is basically the rule systems,
while the term multiplicity means that of able to strategically shift from one institutional
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universe to another depending on what particular situation demands. On the other hand,
the notion of institutional integrity means that the sorts of institutions that actually matter
are those that are indigenously designed or adopted which seemed to be more effective
than those rule systems that are brought from the outside and imposed on Muslim
Mindanao.
To give an example on the matter, Dr. Lara referred to a typical map drawn by one Muslim
Alima who was asked in a discussion about what rule systems he would follow. The Muslim
Alima accordingly stated that he would follow the rules of the government, rules of Islam,
rules of his clan, and the rules of rebels that he adhere or tactically appeal to. But if he were
to choose from among all the different institutions to deal with the problems of graft and
corruption or of developing livelihood, the Muslim Alima will choose his clan at the end of
the day and follow the behavior that his clan practices.
Dr. Lara pointed out that the problems with institutional multiplicity. First is that the
institutions or rule systems normally do not complement each other and sometimes they
clash with each other. For example, the rules of the state about practicing good governance
oftentimes clash with the rules of the clan which would give privilege first to relatives in
public office before anyone else. As for the rules of a rebel group when it says that a
member only fires his gun once a commander orders it, there is difficulty convincing the
combatants not to leave their formations whenever the clans of these combatants go to war
against another clan. This is not intrinsic only to Muslim Mindanao but this is true in the
Cordilleras too. In the same manner that the New Peoples Army had the difficulty of trying
to restrain its members from joining their tribes whenever there was a tribal war. As such,
some institutions trump other institutions in an institutional multiplicity arrangement.
Second, those institutions do not reproduce themselves. So when the World Bank talks
about institutional reform, the one essentially doing the reform are the agents of specific
institutions such as the clan leaders for clan institutions, and the ulamas and the ustadz for
the Islamic institutions in Muslim Mindanao. Depending on the strength of those agents, the
institutions that they represent will then dominate.
Third, there is a need to constantly identify which institution trumps the rest, knowing that
these are not always long term in nature. Oftentimes, in any transition, some institutions,
new institutions or rule systems may trump even clan rules.
Finally, any local politician or strongman in Muslim Mindanao needs to constantly appeal to
these various institutions. One needs to take into consideration the number of people in his
or her municipality who are involved in the informal economy, illegal gambling, smuggling or
illicit cross border trade like weapons such as in the Mamasapano case. But when one talks
about good governance and looks at the nature of state organizations or institutions , one
should have a mantra and a formula that basically only affects several sections of that entire
structure which will lead to a settlement. A case for instance is a mayor in Maguindanao
who makes it a habit to use blood money to settle rido which is being derived from the
Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) of his municipality. Certainly, the usage of IRA for blood
money will not pass the auditing procedures of the Commission on Audit (COA) and does
not follow the good governance rule. However, this action of the mayor does work in
stemming violence in the area. In this regard, following rules on access to incomes and state
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organizations as well as rules on governing transactions does not address the larger set of
issues. Thus, in this situation, good governance brings about bad conflict while bad
governance leads to no conflict.
The Strongman Rule
The second proposition is about the origins of the strongman rule. This discusses the notion
of cognatic kinship which is the singular difference between the evolution of Mindanao and
Muslim Mindanao. Cognatic kinship relations would mean that authority or kinship is not
only defined as blood relation but also an authority in a broader sense. Kinship in Mindanao
proceeds not only from the male but also from the female. From both sides of that kinship
relations, called bilineal nature, the local strongman would claim that it is he who is
responsible for the protection of his brother or sister. As such, a kin is someone whom he
has responsibility to protect and recognizes his authority.
Apart from being bilineal in nature, kinship is also segmentary in nature wherein the real
test or measure of a local man of prowess and strongman rule in Mindanao is not the
strongmans skills in wielding violence but in the ability of any local strongman to forge
alliances. This has been the case since the time of the Spanish and American colonization up
to the post-World War period wherein one cannot do away with appealing to various
institutions.
However, alliances are also combined with the skill to wage war or the ability to foment
violence, resulting to the thin line between the notions of power, and legitimacy and
authority in Muslim Mindanao. Lastly, is the ability to extend that authority across the Sulu
Sea through the centuries and now, across to other ghettoes in the Philippines. Thus,
wherever there are Muslim populations in the different areas in the Philippines, the rules of
the clan, and the notions of authority and power extend to those places, which are the
significant qualities that privilege the clan.
A look at the history of rebel groups such as that of Nur Misuari and the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), and the sort of tribal connections between the Tausug and the
Sama as well as the power of the Kiram, Tan, Loong, Salapuddin, Mastura, Sinsuat,
Ampatuan, Datumanong, Abbas, Alonto, Lucman, Dimaporo, Adiong and Mutilan clans, that
of Hashim Salamat, Al Haj Murad and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the
Maguindanaoan Muslim, the Pundato MNLF reformist group and the Bravo of the MILF, and
the Maranaos, one needs to be able to understand how different clans influence the
actions, ideologies and politics of rebel groups. One has to see a rebel group that is totally
independent of clan dynamics, even the current rebel group which may, in the future, hold
the reigns of devolved political authority in the Bangsamoro.
Clan dynamics remain significant as they determine inheritance rules, they observe rules in
allocating the use of land, they provide protection to members, they often demand rebel
members to join them whenever a rido erupts, they deliver the votes to the candidates that
are either clan members or supported by the clan. Moreover, they are distinguished by their
level of engagement in the legal economy, providing capital and mediating when conflicts
arise, and their networks extend beyond Muslim Mindanao.

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An example of a typical clan imprint on the ARMM government in 2009 or just before the
Maguindanao massacre is the one clan that almost held near total or absolute control of the
entire ARMM machinery or the province of Maguindanao, if not the Muslim Mindanao. In
this case, clan institutions trump all other institutions including constituti onal rules, local
governments, rules on devolution, rebel rule systems, including international rules and
agreements imposed by aid givers and even Islamic rule systems. In fact, one new criterion
for becoming a local strongman in Mindanao is ones closeness to Official Development
Assistance (ODA) sources, that of having the ability to attend embassy dinners and
gatherings and to use those connections to privilege the strongmans region or clan.
The Role of Local Elites
The third proposition talks about the role of local elites. There are several developments
which are critical in the strength of local elites. First, the shift in the post-Cory Aquino
administration that makes national elites more beholden to local elites which brought about
the notion of solid votebanking. Moreover, new terms for electoral competition were
subsequently made famous wherein one million votes determined the credibility of an
electoral victory for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2004. Thus, the ability of regions to function
as solid votebanks has become stronger because, technically, the ARMM and its votebanks
can change the outcomes of national political contests. And as clearly shown in 2009, the
political sentiment shifted in favor of the subnational warlord in relation to the national
leader exemplified by that famous meeting in Malacaang between the President, her allies
and Mangudadatu where he was prevailed upon not to run in the elections because he will
just get killed.
Second, the Local Government Code and its concomitant internal revenue allotments fed
the coffers of local warlords and institutionalized the soft budget constraint in Muslim
Mindanao, which resulted in getting ones regular share of IRA whether or not taxes are
collected in Muslim Mindanao. Prior to 2004, the warlords have extended the reach of their
influence and were harnessed to fight separatist and communist. The outsourcing of
violence reached new heights under the administration of President Macapagal-Arroyo and
guns were used against competing Moro elites. However, as shown in the case of
Ampatuan, extreme personalistic rule can lead eventually to a collapse of power.
Lastly, the local elites have gained further legitimacy through their links to supranational
crime networks and to the ODA. Accordingly, successful rule requires simultaneous and
calibrated identification wherein local elites had ODA connections on one hand and strong
connections to the triad on the other hand.
Presence of Ungoverned Spaces
The fourth proposition is about the presence of ungoverned spaces and how they influence
Muslim Mindanao. These ungoverned spaces pertain to the informal economies which are
simply alternative economic systems that served as determination of the weakness of the
political, administrative, and social reach of the state. However, informal economies also
function as a social network that provides coping mechanisms for people who are poor or
powerless.
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With the big size of the informal sector particularly in the ARMM, it has been argued that if
one wants to study the economic development in Mindanao, he or she has to study its
illegal economy and not the formal economy. Most of the incomes come from the informal
sector since nearly 80 percent of the total employment in the ARMM is informal in nature.
Informal economies in Mindanao take on the form of businesses. Some of them are illicit
cross border trade in the Sulu seas of which poor, rural women are mostly involved. Some of
them are related to illicit drugs and kidnap for ransom. Some of them pertain to informal
credit. But not all of those informal economies are pernicious. One good example of an
informal economy in Mindanao is the habal-habal which seats eight persons on one
motorbike.
Informal economy has been likened to a shadow economy which is also the term used for
illegal, illicit, underground, gray, black, hidden, and alternative economy. One major aspect
in power relations in Mindanao that is often ignored is the role played by the shadow
economies. According to Dr. Lara, he would prefer to use shadow since it is not value-laden
and that he would look at shadow economies as an arena for legitimacy construction in the
creation of inclusive political settlements. Why do people in Muslim Mindanao continuously
reward and perpetually elect incompetent, dangerous, violent, and corrupt public officials?
It is because of the arrangement that is fostered by the current situation where all internal
revenue allotments are practically captured 100 percent by local town officials but they
ignore the operations of shadow economies. Thus, such officials will continue to be elected
so long as they do not touch the shadow economies.
To a certain extent, the problem that will be faced by the new batch of Bangsamoro
leadership is how it will deal with Mindanaos shadow economies and its local strongmen.
Obviously, the new batch of Bangsamoro leadership cannot deal with these in a one-sizefits-all type of approach. The point is to be able to hit hard and to hit viciously against the
pernicious aspects of that shadow economy. But the treatment of the other aspects of that
economy like secondary land markets, for example, informal land markets, informal credit
or illicit cross border trade should be done in a different manner from that of hitting back at
kidnap-for-ransom and other criminal activities.
Moreover, shadow economies have been the cause of more violent conflicts in the ARMM,
not rebellion or crime. Although shadow economies may have the most number of
incidence through horizontal conflict, more people however die from rebellion which is a
vertical conflict. Hence, this is the strongest assertion and argument one can make, that is to
retire immediately the MILF and other rebel groups.
As a final note, Dr. Lara warned about the rise of transition-induced violence since not all
violence in Mindanao comes from rebellion and that wars will eventually make states. He
thus said that the following three problems need to be completely addressed: not all
political issues will be addressed by any rule system; counter-productiveness rule systems
may create new problems; and potential blowbacks wherein the implementation of new
rule systems such as the proposed BBL may create conditions for further turbulence.
However, he averred that one should not withdraw from developing or supplementing rule
systems considering that any rule system is imperfect and it will always face these sorts of
problems.
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Power Relations in Muslim Mindanao: Implications on Governance


Speaker: Datu Zamzamin Ampatuan
Municipal Mayor of Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao
Mayor Ampatuan indicated that he would put forth in the discussion the practical
perspective of what governance and the autonomy issue will bring in to effectively address
the real needs of the people in the local communities anchored on a summary report on
local governance study from the Solomon Islands.
Local Governance vis--vis National Governance
According to the local governance study in the Solomon Islands, the modern governance
system has long been considered a threat to traditional governance structures and authority
and that there is much dissatisfaction over having handed top-down approaches. Because of
this top-down approach, village people tend to see their role as receivers of nationalism
rather than builders of a nation state. The government has become a creator and producer
of services while people see themselves simply as consumers. The recent ethnic tension that
ravaged the countrys economy is only one example of peoples longstanding dissatisfaction
with governance arrangements, service delivery and resource allocation.
At the community level, key governance issues include: concern over the erosion of
traditional government structures and authority; confusion over the conflicts interplay
within systems; lack of participation in decision-making; lack of proper development policies
and issues affecting village life; and poor service delivery. Village youth who believe their
views are not being heard by decision makers and/or marginalized by modern governance
processes were instrumental in initiating and perpetuating the recent conflict.
At the national level, major governance issues are: poor leadership; weak leadership;
corruption; inadequate service delivery; and lack of participation in decision-making
processes. Some of these issues have existed since colonial times. This whole situation in
the Solomon Islands greatly reflects what is now happening in Muslim Mindanao.
Governance Mechanisms Among National/Central, Local and Regional Governments
In taking a critical look at the Philippines governance mechanisms that define the
relationship between a national/central government and the local government units, and
that which is in between them such as the regional government, in this case the ARMM or
the envisioned Bangsamoro government, there are two operating laws that need to be
reviewed. These are Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Republic Act No. 9054 or the Organic Act for the ARMM. The review should result to a
proposal for a new law which should be better than the previous two and would achieve its
goals of giving true autonomy to the region.
However, there seems to be impatience and pressure mounting to pass a new law not only
from the executive branch but also from the MILF as well as from the international
community, be it the Bangsamoro Basic Law or the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region. Accordingly, the Senates approach seems to be more introspective as
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there is a strong call for more time to craft an alternative law. The senators might still want
to take into account more challenging perspective such as the Solomon Islands case study
with the following pointers to consider: (1) address the concern over the erosion of
traditional structures and authority; (2) clear out confusion over the complex interplay
between levels of governance; (3) promote broader participation in decision-making; and
(4) firm up development policies on issues that affect the life of people of Mindanao and
enhance delivery of basic services.
The Rajah Buayan Experience: Key Issues and Concerns
As a sixth class municipality in Maguindanao, Rajah Buayan is an underdeveloped locality
which is a desperate place to live in. Its ordinary citizens would not care about the complex
myriad of principles and theories that the government or experts may want to use to come
up with an appropriate law neither would they care about the constitutionality of the
legislation that Congress will be crafting.
As first-term mayor who is now on his second year in office, Mayor Ampatuan noted some
key issues and concerns that his town mates find very important in functional governance.
First concern is accessibility. The locality is close to the Liguasan Marsh and this is an area
where flooding normally occurs. When there is flood, there is no access to different places
in the vicinity. Thus, roads and bridges that are not only passable but are also safe and
smooth for people to travel need to be constructed therein.
Second concern is peace and security. The lives of people are at stake as their properties
and honor are being lost. Hence, there should be peace and security which is carried out by
well-trained, disciplined, cause-oriented and patriotic law enforcers.
Third concern is land tenure. It can be noted that ever since the Tripoli Agreement, the issue
on land tenure has been left out. It can be further noted that the key causes of conflict are
on the issue of land ownership and conflicting claims. The people thus need support for land
tenure such as the titling of their lands or documenting their claims. Addressing this support
for land tenure would probably address 50 percent of the problem.
Fourth concern is the rule of law and justice. Violence is everywhere and has become
mainstream. As people are killed, their cases are just simply forgotten about. Seemingly,
there is nobody in charge. As such, there is so much injustice in the locality.
Fifth concern is education. There is a total breakdown of the educational system in the
locality. The quality of instruction is lost. School buildings lose their meaning when there i s
no competence or quality of the teaching force.
Sixth concern is productivity and self-sufficiency. Mendicant culture is apparently being
promoted in the locality just like what the Bengalese people had experienced. When
Bangladesh had a famine, the people were being fed all day out wherein they became too
dependent on the relief given to them. As a result, they had forgotten that there is a better
way of seeking for a living and not just opening ones palms asking for someone else for
food. Hence, there is a need to promote productivity, entrepreneurship, self-reliance, and
self-sufficiency.
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Seventh concern is potable water. This is a very basic need. The people in the locality before
learned how to clean their water by maintaining a jar and from there, a supply of potable
water can be had. However, people now have forgotten even the old technology of
cleansing their water for drinking. As such, there is a need to ensure health and sanitation.
Final key concern is disaster and natural calamities. There has to be enough safety,
protection and preparedness of the people from disaster and other natural calamities.
The Issues on the Levels of Governance
The following questions are being posed as to which level of governance should the
aforementioned key issues and concerns be addressed: Are these matters charged against
the account of the national government or should they be charged to the Bangsamoro
government under the proposed BBL? If these are to be under the BBL, how would the
Bangsamoro government address them, through the Local Government Code? Is the Local
Government Code adequate enough to properly empower the LGUs to address those issues
and concerns? Or is the current Organic Act for the ARMM sufficient to address the basic
issues of governance? Would there be a need to clarify the empowerment of LGUs in the
proposed BBL such that there should be additional provisions that they become part of the
BBL or the alternative autonomy law?
Taking as an example the issue on safe and smooth travel through roads and bridges, how is
this currently being addressed? Who is doing this and that? It is of general knowledge that
major roads such as national highways linking one province or region to another should be
under the care of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as these are
national highways. On the other hand, roads that connect municipalities to one another
would be taken care of by the provincial government. Moreover, roads connecting
barangays would be the responsibility of the municipal governments while small roads
within the barangays are taken care of by the barangay government.
More questions need to be asked. Is the abovementioned arrangement needed to be
defined more in the Local Government Code or should it be defined in the autonomy law?
Or could this just be undertaken as simple executive arrangement that can be taken care of
by that concerned level of governance? Should the national government take care of
barangay roads noting that mayors would go to senators asking for the construction of a
barangay road or even a repair of barangay facilities ? Moreover, in the allocation of budgets
of resources, how will they be arranged in terms of road construction and road
maintenance?
These are all the questions and issues that seem simple but would probably require a clearcut policy of interplay of governance in order to operate more efficiently. The same
confusion and overlap can be seen in the issue of peace and security. Questions like who will
be in charge, whether it will be the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and who should assist who in terms of law enforcement and
maintenance of law and order? But the reality is that crimes such as murder, robbery, and
cattle rustling are rampant and the police forces are not capable, has no motivation,
disorganized, or they simply lack the discipline to run after criminals. Arms do rule
everywhere in rural areas. As such, on many occasions the AFP through the Philippine Army
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conducts law enforcement functions instead of the PNP. The Philippine Army is perceived to
be more effective to run after heavily armed cattle rustlers or drug syndicates.
In Rajah Buayan, this problem of law enforcement was solved by coordinating with the local
command of the MILF and the Philippine Army. However, some problems still persists on
loose arms causing insecurity to the populace wherein local strongmen are able to enforce
their will through intimidation. Even the enforcement of religious laws is being done by
armed men. As such, there are so many conflicts or rido which generally disrupt lives and
the economy in the area.
In this regard, the current legal structure on addressing peace and security under the Local
Government Code is that the local chief executives are the ones tasked to supervise police
operations although they do not have administrative control over police officers. In actual
practice, many local chief executives are being overpowered by higher authorities in the
choice of police officers to be assigned in their respective areas. However, giving them the
administrative control over police officers, many mayors would consider their police officers
as their private guards and subject them to obey their whims and caprices.
Thus, key examples on how the levels of governance interplay and sometimes dysfunction
should be taken into consideration. How relationships can be redefined by a new law and
how this would take on the real issues on the ground should likewise be considered. The
review process on these matters would probably take long and the resulting law that would
come out of it might still be subjective to various concerns.
As key guide for the crafting of the legislation, Mayor Ampatuan suggested to take on the
four-way test which Rotarians adhere to. First, if the law is passed, is it the truth? Will it
address the realities? Second, is it fair to all concerned: the Muslims, the Christians and the
Indigenous Peoples? Is it also fair to the national interest? Third, will the new build goodwill
or will it create another war? Will it break relationships between Muslims and Christians and
will they be fighting again for a piece of territory? Fourth, will it be beneficial to all Filipinos?
Reconfiguring Power Relations and Structures in Muslim Mindanao
Speaker: Atty. Naguib Sinarimbo
Former Executive Secretary of the ARMM
Atty. Sinarimbo stated that the issue of reconfiguring power relations and structures in
Muslim Mindanao is part of the discussions relating to power relations in the proposed
Bangsamoro. For his presentation, he drew some of the agreements between the MILF and
the government along with the provisions of the proposed BBL and some practical
experiences from the ARMM as well as from the LGUs therein. He noted that the essence of
the CAB and what is supposed to be reflected in the proposed BBL is encapsulated in
paragraph 3. He further noted that the CAB is essentially a self-determination document
and what would have to be reflected therefore in the BBL would be the aspiration for selfgovernance. He identified three power and structural relations in the proposed Bangsamoro
that need to be carefully examined: (1) Bangsamoro governmentCentral government
relations; (2) Bangsamoro governmentLGUs relations within the Bangsamoro or the
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ARMM; (3) power and structural relations among the Bangsamoros (revolutionary groups,
political parties or groups, and clan politics).
Bangsamoro GovernmentCentral Government Relations
Paragraph 1, item 1 of the Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro states that the parties
agree that the status quo is unacceptable and the Bangsamoro shall be established to
replace the ARMM. There is mutual recognition that the current status in terms of the
totality of the relations between the central government and the Bangsamoro cannot be
sustained due to historical antecedence of how the relationship between the Philippine
state and the Bangsamoro evolved. Hence, the current status needs to be changed.
Key principles and provisions in the agreements as well as in the proposed BBL attempt to
redefine the unacceptable relation between the central government and the Bangsamoro.
One principle that is being sought is a new relationship which is the establishment of an
asymmetric relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro government.
In examining the current relationship as framed under the Organic Act for the ARMM
wherein there is a government in Manila and a regional government in the ARMM, it would
be noted that there is no real or even fiscal autonomy. This is exemplified by the fact that in
the 23-year history of the regional government, not a single governor in the ARMM became
governor without the endorsement of Malacaang Palace. The election of who would lead
the regional government is always dictated upon by the central government. As such,
ARMM leaders are being elected by the central government for the Bangsamoro people.
A lot of problems would arise from such relationship like the issue of accountability wherein
an ARMM leader does not have to please his or her constituencies to become governor. The
ARMM governor would prefer being in Manila drinking coffee in the corridors of power
rather than attending to the needs of the constituents since elections anyway are not
determined by the votes of the people but by the endorsement of the powers that be in
Manila. This type of relationship is reminiscent of the Spanish colonial times where the
Spaniard government in Manila would always influence the interplay of leadership in the
Moro areas. For instance, Sultan Kudarat II had arrived in the Zamboanga Peninsula for the
Sultanate of Maguindanao but the Spaniards supported Datu Dakula who was in the
Zamboanga Peninsula.
In this regard, Article VI on Intergovernmental Relations Mechanism under the proposed
BBL is an important provision that will have an impact in the proposal for the establishment
of an asymmetric relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro
government.
Another principle is the parity of esteem which is patterned from the Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland allowing its citizen to choose to carry a Northern Ireland
passport independent from a British passport. In the case of the Bangsamoro, there is no
assertion that the Bangsamoro people can carry an independent passport apart from that of
the Philippine Republic. However, there is just an assertion that there has to be in the
relationship between the central government and the Bangsamoro government which will
recognize the Bangsamoro identity as well as accord it with respect.

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As regards the issue of power sharing agreement which is a different kind of arrangement
that is currently in the ARMM or in the LGUs, there is actually no real power sharing based
on the consistent ruling of the Supreme Court through the historical jurisprudence from
Limbona vs. Mangelin all the way to Kida vs. Senate. There is just a decentralization of
power which in the end, still belongs to Congress. As a consequence, whatever legislation
that would come out of the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly could be changed any
time by Congress. What has been supposedly a transferred power or power given, it could
be taken back as what had happened in several cases in the ARMM. In essence, this is not
power sharing since the central government is not actually giving up its powers but just
retaining them.
The annex on power sharing in the CAB provides for the interplay of reserve, exclusive and
concurrent powers. There are exclusive powers that are retained by the central government
which the Bangsamoro parliament would not have anything to do with such powers. But
there are exclusive powers that are supposed to be given to the Bangsamoro and for which
the central government is not supposed to interfere with. There are concurrent powers in
between where initially there is a definition of what powers would pertain to the
Bangsamoro and what would pertain to the central government.
In the current setup of the ARMM as well as in the case of the LGUs, there is no clear
delineation of the boundaries of such powers and so they almost always overlap with each
other. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland apparently provides for the
delineation of such powers together with the mechanisms by which they are put into
operation.
In the case of the United Kingdom, the UK Parliament is supreme because it is not subject to
constitution since the UK does not have a constitution. The exercise of the powers of the UK
Parliament is thus absolute. The Philippines, on the other hand, has a constitution which
limits the exercise of powers even that of Congress. The UK Parliament has, however in a
sense, allowed a doctrine of auto-limitation with respect to the exercise of its powers under
the Sewel Convention which acknowledges the powers that were already devolved to
Scotland and the Northern Ireland. The UK Parliament would not pass any legislation with
respect to the exercise of these powers. However, it could only pass a legislation if the
Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly would pass a motion to allow the
passage of such legislation.
Correspondingly, a parallel doctrine in the Philippines can be cited in the case of Taada vs.
Angara where the general agreement on tariffs and trade of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) was put into question in the Supreme Court. Then Senator Taada and his colleagues
maintained that due to the accession of the Philippine government to the GATT-WTO, this
actually reduced the powers of Congress to legislate on areas that have been agreed in the
GATT and the WTO which in a sense limited the powers of Congress to enact legislation for
the interest of the Filipino people. The Supreme Court however said that sovereignty is not
really absolute because it can be limited by agreements that country enter into. Therefore,
it is not the agreement that limits the powers of Congress but it is actually Congress that has
limited itself so that the country can still comply with the agreements. In addition to this,
there are also certain limitations on the plenary powers of Congress that are inherent under
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the Constitution. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the context of how the


agreement envisions a new relationship between the central government and the
Bangsamoro government.
The institutionalization of intergovernmental relations (IGR) mechanisms is another key
principle with its two important objectives: First, it allows the evolution of the relationship
between the central government and the Bangsamoro government in the future; and
second, it provides a new channel for advocacy for the right to self-determination of the
Bangsamoro which does not resort to violence but will improve the relationship between
the central government and the Bangsamoro government. This IGR mechanism would be
able to continue the negotiations beyond the life of the peace panels and into the
Bangsamoro as it avoids the pitfall of previous agreements which eventually led back to war.
This time around, such mechanism is being provided in the proposed BBL for a continuing
negotiation between the parties including a provision that would redefine the relationship
between the parliamentary system and the institution of the Wali.
In the parliamentary system, the division of the Bangsamoro territory into districts and a
single-member representation in the parliament are being proposed. The proposal for
parliamentary districts is being advocated so that the elections in the Bangsamoro can be
insulated from the influence of the central government. The driving principle for the
elections under a parliamentary system is to make it difficult for the central government to
dictate on who would be the chief minister of the Bangsamoro because there is no election
for a regional governor who will be directly voted upon by the people. This ensures that it is
the people that decide who becomes the representatives in the parliament. In turn, the
election of the chief minister is dictated upon by who wins more seats in the districts and in
the party representation.
The proposed single-member district representation, on the other hand, is to limit the
election to just one representative as opposed to the three representatives currently being
elected under the ARMM. This proposal intends to elect a representative who will best
represent the interest of the community. Thus, there will be a direct relation between the
voters and their representative in the parliament. Another reason for scrapping the election
of three representatives in each district is because this would reinforce old politics in the
ARMM where three or four political clans can conspire in a district. For instance, in the
municipalities of Sultan Kudarat, Parang, Matanog, Buldon and Barira, an alliance of three
powerful political clans can dictate the outcome of the elections there.
The proposal for the institution of the Wali is to insulate the Bangsamoro parliament from
the influence of the central government. If there is no provision for Wali, there would be an
assertion of the supervision power of the president in the event that there is a vote of no
confidence as the president would call for elections while in the meantime he or she
determines who would probably become the new chief minister. In this case, the institution
of the Wali would ensure that the decision making process is confined to the Bangsamoro
and not dictated by the central government.
Another principle being proposed is the entrenchment clause which underscores the
importance that the resulting law is the product of the agreement between the parties. This
proposal will make sure that the agreement stays and that the resulting law remains
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reflective of the agreement of the parties because Congress with its plenary power can
always change the Basic Law. If the Basic Law is changed unilaterally by one party without
the participation of the other, then the agreement between the parties is violated. This is
where the entrenchment clause finds its purpose: to ensure that neither of the parties can
change the agreement unless mutually agreed upon. Thus, in the draft BBL, there is a
provision for a Congress Bangsamoro Parliament Forum that would propose amendments to
the Basic Law.
Bangsamoro GovernmentLocal Government Units Relations
In accordance with the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, it provides that the
provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays and geographic areas within its territory shall be
the constituent units of the Bangsamoro. The authority to regulate on its own responsibility
the affairs of the constituent units is being guaranteed within the limit of the proposed BBL.
The privileges already enjoyed by the LGUs under an existing law shall not be diminished
unless otherwise altered, modified or reformed for good governance pursuant to the
provisions of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code.
It became a problem in the negotiation on how to deal with the issue of the LGUs because
there is the Local Government Code of 1991 that practically empowered the local chief
executives and the LGUs in the country, including the ARMM. There was a dilemma on how
to reconcile the LGUs in the Bangsamoro since many provisions in the original ARMM
Organic Law were not reflected in the Local Government Code of 1991 thereby giving rise to
a situation where substantial powers were devolved to the LGUs but at the same time
limiting devolution of these powers to the ARMM itself.
Because of the two-tiered devolution, some LGUs felt that the ARMM is simply another tier
of the bureaucracy which in effect hampered the exercise of the autonomy granted to them.
To solve this, it was proposed during the negotiations to empower the Bangsamoro regional
government so that it can, in turn, give more to the LGUs in its jurisdiction. The key principle
pertaining to the relationship between the Bangsamoro regional government and the LGUs
is that the LGUs are constituent units of the Bangsamoro. As such, the regulation of the
powers would have to be transferred to the Bangsamoro regional government on the
assumption that more powers should be given to it so that it can effectively devolve further
powers to the LGUs.
To exemplify this, the power of supervision of the President over the LGUs in the
Bangsamoro found in the original ARMM Organic Law as exercised through the regional
government is not included in the proposed BBL so as to insulate the relationship of the
LGUs and the Bangsamoro government to afford greater flexibility in evolving new relations
between these parties. Under the power sharing agreement, the Bangsamoro government
subsumes the powers concerning the LGUs as constituent units. This power is not derived
from the supervision power of the President under the ARMM Organic Act and is a different
arrangement under the proposed BBL. The proposed BBL also attempts to evolve a new
relation on the internal revenue allocation between the Bangsamoro government and the
LGUs.

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Currently, two laws govern the LGUs in the ARMM: the Local Government Code of 1991 and
the Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25. Due to the problem of uncertainty and lack of
clarity in terms of what powers are given to the ARMM and what is retained by the Central
Government, an overlap occurs in terms of application between these two laws. This
confusion gives rise to situations where the LGUs created by the legislative assembly of the
ARMM do not qualify for the IRA as set by the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
ARMM, in turn, does not have any funds to give to the newly-created LGUs.
As of the moment, the IRA is being received by the LGUs from the central government while
the ARMM from the allocation of Congress. The LGUs therefore feel that they do not have
accountability to the ARMM. Between these groups, there is no attempt to complement
each other because there is no incentive for complementation. With respect to other
sources of revenue, particularly from taxes and other resources, there is a provision that
provides for revenue sharing derived from the same to all LGUs in the ARMM. Thus, the
creation of the Council of Leaders as well as other fora for intergovernmental relations
between the Bangsamoro government and the LGUs has been proposed. Such proposal will
also enable the LGUs to participate in the election for proper representation in the
parliament wherein the alignment of development priorities and their respective funding
would be considered.
Public order and community policing are also key issues in the Bangsamoro areas. In the
proposed BBL, a shift is being proposed from the regular policing to one that is communitybased. This implies that communities will not only be represented in the Peace and Order
Council but will also participate in the new board to be created where priorities for policing
are identified and set. As such, the board will identify the priorities and the budgetary
requirements for the same and at the end of the year, an evaluation of whether the target
set was achieved will be done. This way, simple problems in the communities can be easily
addressed by community policing while the more complex problems can be relegated to the
national police headquarters in Camp Crame.
Power and Structural Relations among the Bangsamoro (Revolutionary Groups, Political
Parties or Groups, and Clan Politics)
The third relationship entails the power relations between the revolutionary groups,
political parties and clans in the Bangsamoro which need to be carefully examined. The key
principle is that in the agreement of the parties, there is a commitment to have an electoral
system suitable to the parliamentary system of government where there is direct
accountability to the constituents and where power is not drawn from the power centers in
Manila which thereby dispenses with the common practice of seeking the endorsement of
Malacaang.
There are different kinds of representation presented in the Bangsamoro parliament and
these are district representation, party representatives , and sectoral representation. Some
of the sectors cannot compete in an election resulting to their lack of representation and
the corresponding allocation of seats in the parliament for them to raise their concerns. A
lot of people from the Bangsamoro can be excluded if pure democracy will be implemented.
A balance between district representation and stronger political parties should be sought. A
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strong political party implies less control by the traditional elites in the Bangsamoro, which
is prevalent in the regular district representation type of elections.
In summary, these three relationships which are aligned with the provisions of the proposed
BBL are the attempts to reconfigure the power and structural relations in the Bangsamoro.
The principal objective is the significant expression of right to self-determination in the new
relationship between the Bangsamoro government and the central government. Second is
the democratic space in evolving new power relations among the Bangsamoro with minimal
to no interference from the central government. The importance of this is that when the
central government continues to meddle and appoint leaders for the Bangsamoro
government, people will not be accountable in the election of their leaders but to the
central government itself.
Parliamentary Systems: International Experiences
Speaker: Dr. Paul Hutchcroft
Expert on Government and Politics in Asia Pacific
Dr. Hutchcroft, a scholar of comparative politics and Southeast Asian politics who has
written extensively on Philippine politics and political economy, has examined issues on
state formation and territorial politics, the politics of patronage, political reform and
democratic quality, state-society relations, structures of governance, and corruption which
enabled him to comparatively discuss parliamentary systems in the international field.
He thus went through the elements that surround political reforms. One of which is the
choice of representational structure which could be parliamentary or president in form, or a
mix of both. In the said mix, the president can sometimes be more powerful than the prime
minister or vice-versa. An example of which are the French and South Korean systems
where the presidents are more powerful than the prime ministers while in Germany, the
chancellor which is an equivalent of a prime minster is more powerful than the president. In
the same light, presidential systems can also either be in a unitary or federal form. The
Philippines and Indonesia exhibit a unitary presidential system while federal systems include
the likes of Brazil and the United States of America.
The second element is electoral system which can be found in many forms. There is the
distinction among plurality system which is common in the Philippines, proportional
representation which is exercised in many parts of the world, and preferential system as
implemented in Australia and other parts of the world.
The third element is the whole range of central-local relations wherein a federal or
presidential system can either have a more centralized or decentralized form or vice versa.
Parliamentary system can also be unitary or federal in form. A parliamentary federal system
can be likened to Australia, Canada, and India while parliamentary unitary system includes
the likes of Japan and Thailand. A mix of these is best exhibited by Germany which is a
federal form of government with a very strong chancellor while France and South Korea are
unitary in form and strong on the president and prime minister.

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In the case of the Philippines, Dr. Hutchcroft focused on the intersection of the type of
representational system which can either be presidential or parliamentary and electoral
system. Under the electoral system, the focus is on plurality versus a proportional
representation system.
A presidential system has three basic features namely: (1) the Executive is headed by a
popular elected president; (2) the terms of the president and legislators are fixed and not
subject to mutual confidence; and (3) the president names and directs the cabinet and has
some constitutionally-granted lawmaking authority. On the other hand, a parliamentary
system has two basic features namely: (1) the Executive authority arises out of the
Legislative Assembly; and (2) the Executive is at all times subject to potential dismissal via a
vote of no confidence by a majority of the Legislative Assembly. Moreover, a parliamentary
system needs strong political parties but does not readily create those parties unto itself.
In citing Heidelberg University Prof. Aurel Croissants paper, Dr. Hutchcroft noted the
importance of political parties for the proper functioning of any democratic regime, its
contribution in the forming of a government, and its contribution to the fortune of
parliamentary majorities. A smooth Executive-Parliamentary relation is best attributed to a
moderately disciplined and consolidated party system. A parliamentary system without a
coherent party system cannot have majorities, and majorities are essential to form the
Executive. Cohesion within parties will create unstable political majorities. An unstable
political majority will coerce the Executive to resort to bilateral bargaining or pork barrel
to keep the coalition in place. Essentially, parties are critical to the functioning of
democracy. A parliamentary system has to rely on the party system to sustain and maintain
balance in the government. A parliamentary system without corresponding parties are likely
to lead to cronyism, short-term policy planning, ad hoc coalitions by the government, and
deficient orientation to collective goods. However, in the case of the Philippines, there is a
need to establish a consolidated party system if plans are to shift from the presidential to a
parliamentary system.
According to Filipino political scientist Nathan Quimpo, a Philippine political party is best
described as a convenient vehicle of patronage that can be set up, merged with others, split,
reconstituted, regurgitated, resurrected, renamed, repackaged, recycled, refurbished,
buffed up, or flushed down in the toilet at any time. A shift from the presidential to a
parliamentary form of government should be done through a closed-list proportional
representation which is a gold standard among political science.
A closed-list proportional representation can be found in Japan and South Korea wherein
district representatives are retained but also have some significant portion of the Legislature
elected by proportional representation. The basic approach of a proportional representation
is when legislators are elected in multi-member districts and the number of seats that a
party wins in an election is proportional to the amount of its support among the voters. If
there is a 10-member district and Party A wins 50 percent of the vote, Party A will receive
five of the ten seats. If Party B gets 30 percent of the vote, Party B will get three seats, and
so on. In a closed-list system, the party fixes the order in which the candidates are listed and
elected, and the voters simply cast a vote for the party as a whole. Voters cannot indicate
their preference for any candidates on the list, but must accept the list in the order
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presented by the party. Winning candidates are selected in the exact order they appear on
the original list. This is to instill a strong level of party discipline.
An open-list proportional system, on the other hand, is best exemplified by Indonesia
wherein voters go to the polls and have a choice of whether they vote for a party or
candidate. However, such system shifted the focus from the party-centered system to a
candidate-centered system which deepened the degree of patronage and the amount of
money that flows at election time. Moreover, legislators are no longer working as a party
but as individual candidates focusing on getting the projects down to their respective
districts.
In the case of the proposed BBL, it envisages a culmination of single-member district
plurality and proportional representation with some hope of building up political parties at
the same time. In summary, he underscored the need to look at the nature of any electoral
system for the Bangsamoro to determine the best suited sys tem to a parliamentary
system.
OPEN FORUM AND DISCUSSIONS
Question: Assuming that the proposed BBL is approved in this Congress and that a case is
filed before the Supreme Court (SC) relative to its constitutionality, will the SC honor the
BBL or will it be restricted by auto-limitation as mentioned by Atty. Sinarimbo? On the
legislative supremacy in the United Kingdom, is it correct to say that legislative supremacy
implies that political sovereignty as well as legal sovereignty both resides in the
parliament? Considering that the Philippines has a presidential system with legal
sovereignty but no political sovereignty, does it imply that there is no legislative
supremacy? The Philippines has a written Constitution while England does not have but is
armed with legislative supremacy and the power to adjust and modify the rules anytime it
wishes to. Does this mean that the power still belongs to the Congress and it can renege
on that anytime?
Atty. Sinarimbo: The SC is bound by the terms of the agreement entered into between the
MILF and the government. It will have the opportunity to set and evolve a new kind of
jurisprudence with respect to autonomy in the country. It has been very, very conservative
in the assertion that autonomy will still be subjected to the policies and the laws of the
national government which will help sustain the constitutionality of the agreement. The
Philippine Constitution recognizes the granting of greater autonomy to the ARMM. With
respect to recognizing the doctrine of auto-limitation in the BBL, a general welfare clause in
Section 18 of the Constitution states that additional powers beyond the listing are granted
to the Bangsamoro. Should this be the argument of the SC, the Philippines will be setting a
new direction in the interpretation of autonomy and self-determination in the Philippine
context.
In the UK context, the power of the parliament is plenary. It is absolute and not restricted by
a constitution because it is a common-law country. However, there are inherent limitations
such as agreements entered into by the UK like the Sewel Convention which, if deemed
necessary, will have to seek the approval of the Scottish or Northern Ireland Parliament as
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part of its obligation. This type of inherent limitation can be adopted by the Philippines in
the case of the BBL by respecting the agreement of the parties and with the Congress, by its
own accord, limiting itself to serve the best interest of the country.
Dr. Hutchcroft: The UK has that extraordinary centralization of power within its parliament
in the 17th century while the US was left with the older system called the Theodore Polity
focusing on checks and balances. Historically, the Westminster system is not set up to have
those checks and balances rather much more power residing within one body.
On the issue of filing a case with the SC, two key issues need to be clarified and that is the
suitability of having a parliamentary system within what is overall a presidential system and
whether a closed-list proportional representation system is possible. If not mistaken, the
Philippine Constitution provides that when a voter goes into the voting booth, the vote is for
a person and not for a party, with the exception of the partylist system. If the SC is lenient
on the issue of parliamentary but strict constructionist on the issue of closed-list
proportional system, the result is an open-list proportional representation system which
does nothing to discipline and strengthen political parties.
Question: The proposed BBL was patterned after the peace agreement between the UK
parliament and Ireland. The agreement between the two groups was to amend their
respective unwritten constitutions and attune it to t he peace agreement agreed upon.
However, in the proposed BBL, the Office of the President through the OPAPP was the one
who negotiated with the MILF instead of the members of Congress. The agreement then
was to establish a Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) with two functions: (1) creation
of a law for the establishment of a new entity to be known as the Bangsamoro; and (2)
amend the Constitution to conform with the peace agreement embodied in the BBL.
Moreover, the proposed BBL will adopt a parliamentary system despite the presidential
system in the Philippines. How will the BBL fit in the presidential system of the
government? Will it not be a violation of the Constitution? Will Muslim Mindanao readily
adopt the voting system for a political party and not for p ersonalities as used to?
Atty. Sinarimbo: The agreement between the MILF and the government is not patterned
after the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. The BBL was based on the different
concepts and practical applications of principles of the peace agreements of other countries
including Irelands. Moreover, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOAAD) states that the Constitution should be amended first before the entrenchment of the
peace agreement. However, in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB),
the intention was not clear and no common ground with respect to the sequence of
implementing the agreement. According to the government, the flexibilities of the
Constitution will allow them to implement the agreement even without amending the
Constitution. All will be based on the 1997 agreement wherein the MILF will not raise
independence as an issue before the negotiation and that the government would not insist
on the Constitution as the framework for resolving the Bangsamoro question. Thus, the
compromise made by the parties is that the MILF need to examine the provisions and
overall framework of the basic law if it is indeed compliant with the agreement without
amending the Constitution. At this point, the best move is to respect the delineation of

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powers and let the SC rule on the issue of expression of self-determination and
accommodation of the law.
On the issue of presidential system versus a parliamentary system, the Constitution under
Section 18 of Article X provides that the government structure of the ARMM would consist
of an Executive and Legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative
of the constituent political units. However, there are provisions in the Constitution that do
not necessarily reflect the real intent or purpose. One of which is party representation
literally representing the parties and not the constituent political units. Another one
pertains to the hierarchy particularly of the barangay level which is not reflective of a
presidential or parliamentary system wherein the punong barangay and the council act as
one, merging the Executive and Legislative. The lupon, on the other hand, takes on the
role of the Judiciary performing judicial functions at the barangay level.
Question: In immediately retiring the MILF, does that mean retiring the BBL as well? What
role should the LGUs, ARMM and national government play with respect to the BBL? Are
LGUs given powers in the truest sense of devolution?
Dr. Lara: Retiring the MILF means ending the violent conflict between the MILF and the
government. An important factor to this would be the institutionalization of the CAB which
will serve as a guide to the future Bangsamoro government. Let us take into consideration
that we are now in transition and that for every transition, before things get better, they get
worse. The problem is that advocates presented the BBL with only its advantages. The
detractors, on the other hand, criticize it as if nothing good is going to come out of the law.
A nuanced middle road should be dealt with and the acceptance that things may get even
more difficult before things settle down.
Mayor Ampatuan: In practice, the interrelations of governance are not clear in terms of
responsibilities. Usually, governance remains at the national level despite the competency
of LGUs. It seems that the Philippines has yet to learn governance levels and its
corresponding functions. An example of which is the construction of school buildings and
barangay roads which is still under the watch of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) and the hiring of teachers under the Department of Education (DepEd) of
the national government.
Atty. Sinarimbo: The BBL provides only a framework in dealing with devolution issues and
not the details. However, the BBL hopes to enact a Local Government Code for the
Bangsamoro people.
Dean Bacani: The CAB is a political document reconfiguring the relationship between the
national, regional, between LGUs and among the Bangsamoro themselves. The BBL was
crafted to just lay the framework and later on let the parliament deal with interBangsamoro and other local relations. In terms of power relations, the regional Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) have articulated their hold over
the functions of the proposed Bangsamoro COMELEC and CSC. However, the focus should
be in trying to resolve problems such as the political violence in the Bangsamoro.
Resounding questions such as: (1) Does the CAB contain the aspirations of the MILF and are

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you agreeable to it?; (2) Do you agree with the realities mentioned in the proposal?; and (3)
Can the CAB be immediately implemented under our current political and legal framework?
Question: How will the relationship of the LGUs be handled in relation to the DILG-ARMM
and the national DILG?
Mayor Ampatuan: The DILG-ARMM functions like the rest of the regional offices. In terms
of access to some projects, the same problems encountered by other regional offices still
hold true. Any additional support may be directed to the national DILG. However, with the
current BBL proposal, some local officials fear that barriers may be created among LGUs,
municipalities, and the national DILG.
Dr. Hutchcroft: One probable goal of political reforms is to strengthen the middle levels,
which is called middle levelization. One of the paradoxes of decentralization is the
required effective central authority which can be aided by mid-level authority. This should
be treated as a capacity to improve governance and the number of levels all at the same
time.
Atty. Sinarimbo: Several problems surround intergovernmental relations between the
ARMM and the central government. One concern is the big chunk of ARMMs Personal
Services budget versus the non-devolution of programs. Programs are retained by the
central government and if implemented, have to go through DILG Region XII. However,
there are no municipal local government officers in the ARMM. In order to implement the
program, the ARMM has to enter into a memorandum of agreement with the DILG national
for transfer and said program becomes the highly avoided cash advance. Moreso, it
becomes an unliquidated amount for the DILG national if not properly implemented. Even
benefits for barangay officials are with the national DILG and not the DILG-ARMM.
Session Synthesis:
Prof. Ed Tayao
Executive Director, Local Government Development Foundation (LOGODEF)
In his synthesis of the discussion, Prof. Tayao underscored the need to revisit the Local
Government Code and the need for the proposed BBL to define regional relations. He also
emphasized that a parliamentary with the right electoral system can evolve real political and
more programmatic parties. He averred that the government could well start with the
enactment of a Political Party Reform Law. He also noted that as the government tends to
create smaller LGUs, it further promotes parochialism. Thus, he stressed the need to enact a
Political Dynasty Law and also look into the dynamics affecting political behavior.

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