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ChooKokLinandAnothervTheManagementCorp
StrataTitlePlanNo2405
[2005]4SLR175[2005]SGHC144
SuitNo:

DA20/2004

DecisionDate: 11Aug2005
Court:

HighCourt

Coram:

JudithPrakashJ

Counsel:

DavinderSinghSCandAdrianTan(DrewandNapierLLC)fortheappellants,JimmyYap
(JimmyYapandCo)fortherespondent

SubjectArea/Catchwords
Land

Judgment
11August2005
JudithPrakashJ:

Judgmentreserved.

Introduction
1ThisisanappealagainsttheorderofDistrictJudgeLowLyeFongKathrynthattheappellants(defendants
intheactionbelow)removetheunauthorisedworksatNo3,OxfordRoad#0104and#0105,KentishLodge,
Singapore(theunits)andreinstatetheunitstotheiroriginalconditionwithinfourmonthsfromthedateofthe
order.Theappellants,MrChooKokLinandMdmIreneWee,arehusbandandwifeandaretheregistered
proprietorsoftheunits.
2TheunitsareadjoiningunitsinthecondominiumdevelopmentknownasKentishLodge.Therespondentis
ManagementCorporationStrataTitlePlanNo2405(theMCST)formedtomanageKentishLodge.
3TheunitsarelocatedonthegroundfloorofKentishLodge.Whenthecondominiumwasconstructed,each
oftheunitscontainedtwouncoveredareas,vistheterraceandtheairwell.Theseareaswerecommonly
describedasprivateenclosedspaceorPESareas.ThePESareasarecomprisedwithinthestratatitlelotsof
theunitsandconsequentlyaretheprivatepropertyoftheappellants.Theappellantserectedroofcoveringsover
theterraceandairwellareas,installedwindowsintheterraceareaanderectedairconditioningunitsovertheair
wellareaandaplanterarea.
4TheMCSTtookoutanactionagainsttheappellantstoobtainamandatoryinjunctionrequiringthemto
removetheseadditionalworks.Thedistrictjudgeheldthat:
(a)thewindowsintheterraceareabreachedtheMCSTsbylaws11and12
(b)theairconditioningunitsbreachedtheMCSTsbylaw11
(c)theroofcoveringsovertheterraceandairwellareasamountedtoexclusiveuseofcommonpropertyand
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(d)shewasjustifiedinorderingamandatoryinjunctionagainsttheappellantsinthetermsrequestedbythe
MCST.
Theappellantshadmadeacounterclaiminthecourtbelow.Thiswasdismissedbythetrialjudgebut,atthe
hearingoftheappeal,theappellantsindicatedthattheywerenolongerpursuingtheircounterclaimduetoa
changeinthelaw.
5Thelegalframeworkinwhichthisactionwasadjudgedandmustbeconsideredbymeistheframework
establishedbytheprovisionsoftheLandTitles(Strata)Act(Cap158,1999RevEd)(theAct)asthose
provisionswerewordedatthematerialtimes,ie,in1999and2000.Someofthesectionswhichthedistrictjudge
consideredandwhichIalsohavetodealwithhavesincebeenamended.Wherethesesectionsarequoted
below,theversionsquotedarethosecurrentatthematerialtimes.
Thebackground
6Theappellantsboughttheunitsin1998fromthedeveloperofthecondominium,KentishGreenPteLtd
(thedeveloper).Thecondominiumcontained75unitsinastructurethatwaspartlysevenstoreysinheightand
partlyfourstoreysinheight.InAugust1998,theauthoritiesissuedthetemporaryoccupationpermitforthe
condominiumand,twomonthslater,theappellantsmovedintotheunits.
7Accordingtotheappellants,theirinitialintentionwastousethePESareasasagarden.Asmoreandmore
residentsbeganmovingintoKentishLodge,however,litterstartingfallingintothePESareas.Amongtheitems
thatfellwerearustyknife,cigarettebutts,constructiondebrisandwomensunderclothing.Theappellantsspoke
tothedevelopersrepresentative,oneMarkLim,abouttheproblembutitdidnotabate.Theappellantsthen
decidedthatforsafetyreasonstheyshouldcoverthePESareas.
8On9March1999,MrChoowrotetothedeveloperandaskedforpermissiontohavetheterracearea
coveredwithareinforcedconcreteroofforsafetyandsecurityreasons.Thedeveloperrepliedtwoweekslater
statingthatitwascurrentlymanagingtheestateasacustodianpendingtheformationoftheMCST.Assuch,
thedeveloperconsideredthatitdidnot
havetheauthoritytograntproperapprovalfortheappellantsproposedworks.Itfurtheradvisedtheappellants
thattheMCSTwhenformedwouldbeabletorequireresidentswhohadalreadyerectedsuchroofstoremove
themiftheMCSTfoundtheroofstobemarringtheaestheticsoftheestate.Theletterwentontosaythatifthe
appellantsdecidedtoproceedwiththeroofingworksandtaketheriskofbeingrequiredtoremovethemlater,
theyshouldconsulttheUrbanRedevelopmentAuthority(URA)andthePublicWorksDepartmentsBuilding
ControlDivisionforthenecessaryapprovalsbeforeputtingupanyadditionalstructuresasthesamewould
deviatefromtheapprovedbuildingplans.
9Thereafter,therewerediscussionsbetweenMrChooandMrLimonwhethertherewasatypeofroofing
thatmightnotrequireapermitfromthebuildingauthority.Around10April1999,MrChoodecidedtouse
lightweightmaterialforhisroofsinsteadofreinforcedconcreteandinformedthedeveloperaccordingly.
Thereafter,MrLimissuedpassestotheappellantscontractorstoenterthepremisesofthecondominiumandto
putuptheroofsovertheterrace.InlateMay1999,thedeveloperwroteagaintotheappellantsreiteratingits
inabilitytoeitherapproveordisapproveoftheworksdonebutstatingthattheappellantsshouldensurethatthe
workswereapprovedbytherelevantauthorities.Theappellantstooknostepsatthatstagetogetsuchapproval.
10Subsequently,theappellantsinstalledaroofovertheairwellarea.Intheprocessofthiswork,theyhadto
movetheirairconditioningcompressorsfromthegroundfloorandtheythenplacedthetwocompressorsabove
theroofbyaffixingthemontotheexternalwallofthecondominium.Itshouldalsobenotedthatapartfrom
erectingtheroofs,theappellantsaffixedwindowswithintheopeningsintheparapetwallsthatborderedthe
terracesoftheunits.Allthiswasdonein1999.Subsequently,inSeptember2000,theappellantsaffixedtwo
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additionalcompressorsontotheexteriorwallofthecondominium.
11TheMCSTwasconstitutedasabodycorporateundertheActon7April2000pursuanttos33(1)ofthe
Actwhereunderthesubsidiaryproprietorsofthelotsinthesubdividedbuildingcomprisedinastratatitleplan
becomeabodycorporateupontheregistrationofthestratatitleplanbytheRegistrarofDeedsunders9ofthe
Act.ThefirstannualgeneralmeetingoftheMCSTwasheldon14January2001andthefirstmanagement
council(thecouncil)waselectedatthatmeeting.
12InMay2001,MrChoowrotetothecouncilaskingforitsapprovaloftheroofovertheterrace.Heexplained
thattheroofhadbeenerectedbeforetheformationoftheMCSTforsafetyreasonsasthedeveloperhadnot
beenabletostopthelitterproblembyaskingtheresidentsnottolitter.InJuly2001,theMCSTinformed
MrChoothattheroofingattheterraceandtheinstallationofadditionalcompressorshadnotbeenapproved
becausethesemattershadaffectedtheuniformityoftheestatesfaade.Moreover,thecompressorswere
causinginconveniencetotheotherresidents.Thecouncilrequestedtheappellantstoremovetheunauthorised
workswithin21days.
13Theappellantsdidnotremovetheirworks.Subsequently,MrChoometthecouncilpersonallytoexplainhis
problemwithwhathedescribedaskillerlitter.AccordingtoMrChoo,afterhehadgivenhisexplanation,the
chairmanoftheMCST,oneMrWantoldhimthatthecouncilunanimouslyapprovedtheroofs.On19November
2001,theMCSTwrotetoMrChoostatingthatithadwrittentotherelevantauthoritiesfortheirconfirmationon
theirauthorisationoftheerectedinstallation.Theletterwentontosayasstatedtoyouatourmeeting,ouronly
concernisthattherenovationinquestionisnotinanywayillegalorinviolationofexistinglaws.Theappellants
readthislettertomeanthattheMCSTapprovedoftheirworksaslongastheauthoritieshadauthorisedorwould
authorisethesame.
14On11December2001,theMCSTinformedtheappellantsthattheURAhadaskedittoadvisethe
appellantstoapplyformallyfortheretentionoftheirroofs.TheletteralsoaskedtheappellantstokeeptheMCST
updatedontheprogressoftheirapplication.Inafurtherlettertotheappellantsdated20December2001,the
MCSTstatedthatthecouncilhadnoobjectionstotheappellantsinstallationsatthePESareasaslongasthere
wasnobreachofrulesandregulationsoftheURA.TheappellantsdidnotapplyfortheURAsauthorisationof
theworks.MrChoospositionwasthathehadnotreceivedtheMCSTsletterinDecember2001anddidnotget
ituntilheaskedaboutitinJuly2002.InAugust2002,theMCSTwroteagaintoMrChooexplainingthe
procedureforundeliveredmailandendedbysayingthatthatthecouncilhadexpressednoobjectionto
MrChoosworksprovidedheregularisedthemwiththeauthorities.MrChoothenproceededtoengagean
architecttoprepareplansforsubmissiontotheURA.
15On21November2002,theURAinformedtheappellantsthattheirinspectionoftheunitshowedthatthe
appellantshadcoveredtheopenterraceareaandconverteditintopartoftheirlivingarea.Thecoveringofthe
openterraceconstituteddevelopmentunders3ofthePlanningAct(Cap232,1998RevEd)andplanning
permissionwasrequiredforthis.Theappellantswereaskedtosubmitaplanningapplicationtoretainthe
unauthorisedstructuresothattheURAcouldconsiderit.Theappellantstheninstructedtheirarchitecttoprepare
andsubmitthenecessaryformwithinthedeadlineofonemonthspecifiedbytheURA.Theformrequiredthe
endorsementoftheMCSTbut,totheappellantssurprise,theMCSTrefusedtoendorseit.On12December
2002,theMCSTterselyinformedtheappellantsthat,afterconsultationwithitslegaladviser,theMCSTrejected
theappellantsapplication.Noreasonsweregiven.
16On9January2003,theMCSTslawyersissuedtheappellantswithaletterofdemandcallingforthe
removalofallunauthorisedworks.TheMCSTslawyersalsoissueddemandlettersagainstthesubsidiary
proprietorsoftwoothergroundfloorunitswhohadalsoputuproofsovertheirterraces.Theappellantsrefusedto
removetheworksandtheactioninthedistrictcourtwasstartedon17January2003.
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Theissues
17Thisappealinvolvesthefollowingworksandareas:
(a)theroofsattheterraceareas
(b)thewindowsintheopeningsalongthecommonparapetwallattheterraceareas
(c)theroofsattheairwellareas
(d)theairconditioningcompressorsontheexternalwallattheairwellareaand
(e)theairconditioningcompressorsontheexternalwallattheexternallandscape/planterarea.
Theappellantsusedthecompendioustermstructurestocoveralloftheaboveitemsbuttherespondent
submittedthatthetrialjudgesdecisionhastobeexaminedwithregardtoeachoftheitemsassomeofthe
criticismsmadebytheappellantsofthejudgmentmaynotbeapplicabletoallofthestructures.Iagreethatit
doesnotaidclarityofanalysistoalwaysrefertotheworksinquestionbyonetermalthough,forconvenience,
thecompendioustermmaybeusedfromtimetotime.AsIdealwiththearguments,Iwillindicatewhetherandto
whatextenttheargumentconcernedisnotrelevanttoanyofthestructures.
18Theissuesintheappealareasfollows:
(a)Whether,inlaw,theMCSTsbylawsderivedfromtheFirstScheduletotheActapplytothoseofthe
structuresthatwereerectedbeforetheconstitutionoftheMCST.
(b)Ifissue(a)isansweredinthenegative,whetherbylaws11and12couldhavebeenbreachedbyactions
takenbeforetheycameintoeffect.
(c)Ifissue(b)isansweredintheaffirmative,whethertheinstallationofthewindowsintheterraceandthe
compressorsovertheplanterareabreachedbylaws11and12.
(d)Whetherinlawtheerectionofroofsovertheterracesandtheairwellareasamountedtoexclusiveuseof
thecommonpropertybytheappellants.
(e)Whethertheappellantsbreachedanybylawswhentheyinstalledairconditioningcompressorsin
September2000.
(f)Ifanyofthefactswarrantthecontinuationofthemandatoryinjunctionorder.
Dothebylawsapplyretrospectively?
19ApartfromthecompressorsinstalledinSeptember2000(thenewcompressors),allofthestructures
complainedofhadbeenerectedorinstalledbeforetheMCSTwasconstituted.Theappellantsmaincontention
wasthatthebylawsonlycameintoforcewhentheMCSTwasconstituted.Accordingly,sincetherewereno
suchrulesinforceatthematerialtime,theappellantsactionsinerectingthestructurescouldnot,inlaw,have
constitutedbreachesofthebylaws.Whentheappellantsmadethisargumentbeforethedistrictjudge,they
reliedonStrataTitleinSingaporeandMalaysia(ButterworthsAsia,2ndEd,2001)byTeoKeangSoodinwhich
thelearnedauthorhadstated(atp269)thatthebylawsofamanagementcorporationwouldonlybindparties
fromthedateofincorporationofthemanagementcorporation.ProfTeohadcitedMCSTPlanNo1378vChenEe
Yueh[1994]1SLR463(ChenEeYueh)asauthorityforthatproposition.
20ThedistrictjudgedistinguishedChenEeYuehonthebasisthatitdealtwithabuildingthathadbeenbuiltin
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the1970sandthathadonlybeenbroughtundertheprovisionsoftheActin1988.Thus,whenthebuildingwas
completeditwasnotenvisagedbythelesseesoftheunitsthatitwouldbebroughtundertheprovisionsofthe
ActandthatthebylawsintheFirstScheduletotheActwouldapplytothem.Thepresentcasewasquite
differentinthattheappellantsknewthatthecondominiumwastobebroughtundertheprovisionsoftheActupon
theregistrationofthestratatitleplanandthatthebylawswouldapplyupontheconstitutionoftheMCST.Whilst
thejudgedidnotgosofarastoholdthatthebylawswereinforcebeforeApril2000,shedecidedthatitwasnot
opentotheappellantstomaketheargumentthattheywerenotapplicablebecausetheappellantshadstated
thattheywouldapplytotheMCSTforapprovalonceitwasconstituted.Accordingly,itwasnotrightforthe
appellantstosubsequentlyclaimthattheydidnotneedtheMCSTsapprovalforthestructures.Inmyjudgment,
therewasnobasisfortheappellantsargumenttobedisregarded.Theappellantsstatementthattheyintended
toapplytotheMCSTforpermissiononceitwasconstitutedwasinitselfofnolegaleffect.Thestatementsmade
bytheappellantsdidnotandcouldnotchangethelegalpositioninanyway,muchlessinfluencetheMCSTs
laterconduct.Noneoftheingredientsneededtoconstituteanestoppelexistedinthiscase.
21Thelegalpositionwithregardtothedatewhenthebylawsbecamebindingontheappellantsandtheother
ownersofunitsinKentishLodgemustbedeterminedbyreferencetothelegalschemeestablishedbytheAct.
Thebindingeffectofthebylawsisestablishedbys41oftheAct.Therelevantprovisionsofthissectionread:
(1)Everysubdividedbuildingshowninastratatitleplanshallberegulatedbybylawswhichshallprovideforthe
control,management,administration,useandenjoymentofthelotsandthecommonproperty.
(2)ThebylawsshallincludethebylawssetoutintheFirstSchedulewhichshallnotbeamendedorrevokedby
themanagementcorporation.
(3)
(4)WithoutlimitingtheoperationofanyotherprovisionofthisAct,thebylawsforthetimebeinginforcebindthe
managementcorporationandthesubsidiaryproprietorsandanymortgageeinpossession(whetherbyhimselfor
anyotherperson),orlesseeoroccupier,ofalotorpartthereoftothesameextentasifthebylawshadbeen
containedinproperlyexecutedagreementsonthepartof

(a)themanagementcorporationwitheachsubsidiaryproprietor,mortgagee,lessee
andoccupierofalotorpartthereof,respectivelyand
(b)eachsubsidiaryproprietor,mortgagee,lesseeandoccupierofalotorpart
thereofwiththesubsidiaryproprietor,mortgagee,lesseeoroccupieroftheotherlotsin
thesameparcel,
toobserveandcomplywithallthebylaws.
22TheActisspecificastowhatthebylawsaresupposedtoregulateandwhomtheyaresupposedtobind:
thebylawsregulatetheadministrationofasubdividedbuildingshowninastratatitleplanandtheybindthree
typesofpersons.Thefirsttwoarethemanagementcorporationandeachsubsidiaryproprietor,andthethirdis
themortgageeinpossessionorlesseeoroccupierofalotieapartywhooccupiesorpossessesalotbyreason
ofanarrangementwiththerelevantsubsidiaryproprietor.Forpresentpurposes,sincethethirdcategoryof
personsderivetheirrightsfromthesubsidiaryproprietors,theystandinthesamepositionassubsidiary
proprietorsforthepurposesofthisdiscussionandneednotbedealtwithseparately.
23Sincethebylawsarestatutorilyconstitutedcontractsbetweenthemanagementcorporationandthe
subsidiaryproprietorsandbetweenthesubsidiaryproprietorsinterse,itwouldappearlogicaltoholdthattheby
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lawscannottakeeffectuntilthesepersonscomeintoexistence.Theappellantsargumenttothiseffectcannot,
inmyview,begainsaid.ThisargumentisfortifiedbythefactthattheprovisionsoftheActmakeitveryclear
whenthemanagementcorporationcomesintoexistenceandwhenpersonswhohavepurchasedunitsina
developmentcanbeconsideredtobesubsidiaryproprietorsofasubdividedbuilding.Theverytermsubdivided
buildingcanonlybeappliedfromaspecifiedtime.
24TheActappliesfromthetimeanowneroflanddecidestoconstructadevelopmentonhisproperty
containingseparateunitswhichhewishestosellindependentlyofeachotherandtodisparatepersons.Inorder
forthisdevelopertopassagoodtitletotheindividualunits,thelandandbuildingwillhavetobesubdividedin
accordancewiththeprovisionsoftheAct.Unders7(1),thedevelopermaynotsellanyunitinanydevelopment
intendedforstratasubdivisionuntilascheduleofstrataunitshasbeenfiledwithandacceptedbythe
CommissionerofBuildings.Whenthisisdone,salesmaybegineventhoughthedevelopmenthasnotbeen
completed,butpersonsbuyingunitsfromthedeveloperwillnotatthatstageberegardedassubsidiary
proprietorsoftheirunits.
25Oncompletionofthedevelopment,astratatitleplanhastobelodgedforregistration.Unders9(1),the
stratatitleplanisdeemedtoberegisteredwhenithasbeensignedandsealedbytheRegistrarofTitles(the
Registrar)andhasbeenmarkedwiththeserialnumberofthestratatitleplanregister.Thisregistrationhasa
numberofimportanteffects.First,itisonlywhenthestratatitleplanhasbeenapprovedthatthedevelopment
canbecalledasubdividedbuildingasthattermisusedintheAct.Secondly,bys9(3),itisonlyuponthe
registrationofastratatitleplanthatthesubsidiaryproprietorisdeemedtobetheproprietorofhislotandofhis
shareofthecommonproperty.Thirdly,itisuponregistrationthatthemanagementcorporationofthe
developmentcomesintoexistence.Unders33(1),thesubsidiaryproprietorsfromtimetotimeofthelotsinthe
subdividedbuildingcomprisedinastratatitleplanconstituteabodycorporateonlyuponregistrationofthatstrata
titleplan.
26Oncethestratatitleplanisregistered,theRegistrarwillissueasubsidiarystratacertificateoftitleforeach
lotshownonthestratatitleplan.Eachsuchtitleisregisteredinthesubsidiarystratalandregisterwhichis
preparedandmaintainedbytheRegistrar.Further,onregistrationofthestratatitleplan,theRegistrarshallenter
amemorialinthelandregisteronthevolumeandfoliooftheparceltotheeffectthatasubsidiarystrataland
registerhasbeencreated.Thisleadstothefourtheffectofregistrationofthestratatitleplanwhichisthat
thereuponthecommonpropertywillbeheldbythesubsidiaryproprietorsastenantsincommonproportionalto
theirrespectivesharevaluesandforthesametermandtenureastheirrespectivelotsareheldbythem(s13(1)).
Thecommonpropertythusisvestedinthesubsidiaryproprietorsandnotinthemanagementcorporation.Once
thesubsidiarystratatitlecertificateoftitleforeachlothasbeenissued,apurchaserofalotcanberegisteredas
thesubsidiaryproprietorofthatlotandhisshareofthecommonproperty.
27Oncethestratatitleplanisregisteredtherefore,alltheingredientsnecessaryfortheoperationoftheby
lawswillexist:therewillbeasubdividedbuildingwhichwillbemanagedbyanextantmanagementcorporation
andoccupiedbysubsidiaryproprietorsorpersonsderivingrightsfromthem.Thesepersonswouldallbebound
bythebylawsforthetimebeinginforceasprovidedins41(4).Thiswouldmeanthatthebylawscouldnot
bindanyonebeforethemanagementcorporationcameintoexistenceandbeforethepurchasersoftheunitswere
entitledtobetermedsubsidiaryproprietors.Thetermsofthestatutorycontractmight,dependingonthe
languageused,indicatethatitwasintendedtohaveretrospectiveeffect.Astheappellantscontended,however,
theuseofthewordsforthetimebeinginforcemakeitclearthatthestatutorycontractcreatedbys41(4)
operatesprospectivelyonly.Additionally,thebylawsimposepenalsanctionsforinfringementandpenal
provisionsarenotappliedretrospectivelyunlessthereisveryclearlanguagetothateffect.
28Thus,inmyjudgment,thebylawsinthiscasewouldonlyhavetakeneffecton7April2000whenthe
stratatitleplanforKentishLodgewasregisteredandtheMCSTcameintoexistence.Thisinterpretationofthe
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ActisonethatisalsoespousedbyProfTeoinhisbook.Thisinterpretationalsoaccordswithcommonsenseas
thetwobylawsallegedtohavebeenbreachedarebylawsthatprovidethatsubsidiaryproprietorsmustobtain
theapprovaloftheMCSTbeforecarryingoutthetypesofworksspecifiedinthosebylaws.Theappellantswere
notsubsidiaryproprietorswhentheydidtheworksandtherewasnoMCSTtowhomtheycouldhaveappliedfor
approval.
29Theforegoingdoesnotmeanthatpriorto7April2000theappellantsorotherpurchasersofunitsinKentish
Lodgewereentirelyfreetodowhatevertheylikedwiththeirunits.Inthesaleandpurchaseagreementthatthe
appellantsmadewiththedeveloper,therewasaclause(cl21)thatboundtheappellantstocomplywiththe
restrictionsinScheduleAtothesaleagreementfromthedatetheytookpossessionoftheunitsuntiltheMCST
tookovermanagementofthecondominium.ScheduleAcontainedrestrictionsthatweresimilartothebylaws
setoutintheFirstScheduleoftheAct.Inparticular,cl2(m)ofScheduleAprovidedthatthepurchaserwasnot
tomark,paint,drivenailsorscrewsorthelikeinto,orotherwisedamageordefaceanystructurethatformspart
ofthecommonpropertywithouttheapprovalinwritingofthe[developer].Thedevelopercould,therefore,have
forbiddentheappellantstocarryoutanyerectionsorinstallationsthatwouldhavedamagedordefacedthe
commonproperty.Whenthedeveloperreceivedtheappellantsrequestforapprovaloftheirintendedworks,the
developerchosetositonthefenceanddeclineeithertoapproveorspecificallydisapprovetheworks.Ifthe
developerhadrejectedtheworksoutright,theappellantswouldnotbeintheirpresentposition.Inanycase,even
iftheappellantswereinbreachofcontractbecausetheydidnotgetspecificapprovalfromthedeveloperbefore
proceedingwiththeirworks,thatbreachcouldonlybeactedonbythedeveloperandtheMCSTcouldnothave
reliedonitinitsactionbeforethedistrictjudge.Breachoftheappellantscontractualobligationsunderthesale
andpurchaseagreementcouldnotbeconsideredbreachofthebylawsasthosewerenotinforceatthetimethe
actsconstitutingthebreachtookplace.
30Theconclusiononthisissueis,therefore,thatnobreachofthebylawsoccurredwhentheappellantsdid
theirworksin1999.TheworksdonebytheappellantsinSeptember2000havetobeconsideredseparately.By
thenthebylawswereinforceeventhoughtheMCSThadnotyethelditsfirstmeetingandiftheappellants
wantedtodoworkthathad,accordingtothebylaws,tobepreapprovedbytheMCST,thentheappellants
shouldhavegotsuchapprovalbeforestartingwork.IwillconsiderlaterinthisjudgmentwhethertheSeptember
2000worksbreachedanybylaw.
Weretheappellantsinbreachofthebylawsafterthesamecameintoforce?
31TheMCSTcontendedbeforethedistrictjudgethattheappellantsbreachesofthebylawswerecontinuing
breachessothateveninrespectofthestructuresinstalledbeforetheMCSTcameintoexistence,oncethere
wasanMCST,aslongasthosestructuresremainedinexistenceandcontinuedtoaffectthecommonproperty,
theappellantsneededtheMCSTsapprovaltoretainthem.Withoutsuchapproval,theappellantswouldbein
breachofthebylaws.Thisargumentwasrenewedbeforeme.
32Thebylawsinquestion,bylaws11and12,provideasfollows:
Damagetocommonproperty.
11.Asubsidiaryproprietororoccupierofalotshallnotmark,paint,drivenailsorscrewsorthelikeinto,or
otherwisedamageordeface,anystructurethatformspartofthecommonpropertywithouttheapprovalinwriting
ofthemanagementcorporation,butthisbylawshallnotpreventasubsidiaryproprietororpersonauthorisedby
himfrominstalling
(a)anylockingorothersafetydevicefortheprotectionofhislotagainstintrudersor
(b)anyscreenorotherdevicetoprevententryofanimalsorinsectsuponhislot.
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Permissiontocarryoutalterations.
12.Asubsidiaryproprietororoccupiershallnotmakeanyalterationtothewindowsinstalledintheexternalwalls
ofthesubdividedbuildingwithouthavingobtainedtheapprovalinwritingofthemanagementcorporation.
33Referringtobylaw11,theMCSTpointedoutthatitprohibitedanyactivitythatwoulddamageordefacethe
commonproperty.Itarguedthatifthestructureshaddamagedthecommonproperty,thatdamagewouldnot
ceasetoexistsimplybecausethestructureswereerectedbeforetheMCSTcameintoexistence.Secondly,the
dictionarymeaningofdefaceisspoiltheappearanceofsosimilarlyifthestructuresdospoiltheappearance
ofthecommonproperty,thedefacementwouldnotceasetoexistsimplybecausethestructureswereerected
beforetheMCSTwasformed.Therefore,aslongasthedamagetoordefacingofthecommonproperty
continuedtoexist,theMCSTwhenconstitutedwasentitledtoenforcethebylawsbyseekingredressunder
s41(14)(a)whichgavetheMCSTpowertoapplytocourtforanordertoenforcetheperformanceoforrestrain
thebreachofanybylaw.
34Lookingatthebylawsinquestion,Idonotacceptthattheycanbeinterpretedinthemannerarguedforby
theMCST.Bylaw11providesthatthesubsidiaryproprietorshallnotmark,paint,drivenailsorscrewsorthe
likeinto,orotherwisedamageordefaceanypartofthecommonpropertywithouttheapprovaloftheMCST.To
methislanguageplainlymeansthatatthetimethesubsidiaryproprietorintendstodoanyoftheactions
described,theremustbeanMCSTinexistencetowhomhecanapplyforapproval.IfthereisnoMCST,thenthe
bylawcannotapply.Further,thebylawcontemplatestheperformanceofspecificactionswhichhaveadefined
lifespan.Whenonemarksorpaintsastructureordrivesanailorscrewintoit,thatactionstartsatonemoment
intimeandendsatanothermomentintime.Theactionisthencompleted.Iftheactionisstartedandcompleted
atatimewhenthereisnoMCST,thenthetakingoftheactionisnotabreachofthebylaws.Bythetimetheby
lawscomeintoeffecttheactionisnolongertakingplaceandthereforecannotfallwithintheirpurview.Inby
law11,thewordsorotherwisedamageordefacearenotintendedtodealwithorimplycontinuingdamageor
defacement.Whattheyareintendedtodoisprovideacatchalldescriptionofsimilarforbiddenactions.Theby
lawisspecifyingcertaintypesofactionsthatmaydamageordefacethecommonpropertyandthenusinga
generalphraseinordertoforbidanyothertypeofactionthatmighthavethesameconsequenceofdamagingor
defacingthecommonproperty.
35Asregardsbylaw12,thelanguageindicatesevenmoreclearlythatwhatiscontemplatedisanactionthat
takesplaceaftertheMCSTcomesintoexistencebecauseitsaysthatthesubsidiaryproprietorshallnotmake
anyalterationinthewindowswithouttheMCSTsapproval.Thisbylawisnotreferringtoactionstakenbefore
theMCSTwasconstituted.Thewordsshallnotmakecannotbeconstruedtomeanshallnotcontinuetohave
alteredwindows.
36AsIhavefoundthatneitherbylaw11norbylaw12contemplatesthatanactiontakenandcompleted
beforeitcameintoforcewouldconstituteacontinuingbreachofthebylawwhenitbecameeffective,ie,on
7April2000,theMCSThadnocaseagainsttheappellantsforbreachofthosebylawsinrespectofthe
structureserectedbefore7April2000evenassumingthatthebylawswerebreachedbytheinstallationofthe
structures.Itisnot,therefore,necessarytoconsiderwhethertheerectionofthosestructuresdidinfact
constituteabreachofthosetwobylaws.InowgoontoconsiderthealternativebasisonwhichtheMCSTputits
case.
Didtheerectionoftheroofsovertheterraceandlandscapeareasamounttoexclusiveuseofcommon
property?
37EachdeveloperbuildingadevelopmentinSingaporehastoconformwiththeoverallgrossfloorarea
(usuallyreferredtoasGFA)forthatdevelopmentasspecifiedbytheURA.Asstatedbythejudge,theGFAof
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eachdevelopmentisdeterminedbytheapprovedGrossPlotRatio(GPR)forthelandonwhichitis
constructed.TheGPRisapprovedbythechiefplannerinaccordancewiththemasterplananditdeterminesthe
landpremiumorthedevelopmentchargepayablebythedeveloper.Basedonthatfee,theURAwillpermitthe
developertodevelopthesiteuptoalimitandthatlimitisthemaximumpermissibleGFA.OncetheGFAhas
beenascertained,theareaoftheconstructeddevelopmentcannotexceedtheGFA.Ifitdoes,additional
premiumwillbepayabletotheauthorities.
38InthecaseofKentishLodge,thefloorareaofthecondominiumonitscompletionwasonly1.63mshortof
theapprovedGFA.WhentheappellantscoveredtheirPESareas,thecoveredareashadtobeincludedaspart
oftheGFAofthecondominiumandthismeantthatthecondominiumsgrossfloorareaexceededitsapproved
GFA.The1.63mleftoveroncompletionoftheconstructionofKentishLodgewascompletelyconsumedby
reasonoftheappellantsactionsandanadditionalGFAof52.53mwasgenerated.TheMCSTtookissuewith
thisalthoughtheevidencewasthattheGFAofthecondominiumcouldbeincreasedtocovertheadditionalfloor
areacreatedbytheerectionoftheappellantsroofs,iftheappellantswerewillingtopaytheadditional
developmentcharge,andtheappellantshadindicatedsuchwillingness.
39ThepositiontakenbytheMCSTwasthattheGFAofthedevelopmentorratherthe1.63moftheGFAthat
hadnotbeenuseduponcompletionofthecondominium(referredtoastheunconsumedGFA)wascommon
property.Thiscommonpropertywouldbeaffectedbytheappellantsapplicationtotheauthoritiestoregularise
theirstructuresandtherefore,unders41(8)oftheAct,aunanimousresolutionwouldhavetobepassedbythe
subsidiaryproprietorsbeforetheMCSTcouldendorsetheappellantsapplicationtotheauthorities.Sinceno
suchresolutionhadbeenpasseditwasnotpossibletoendorsesuchapplicationand,followingtherefrom,it
wouldnotbepossibletoregularisetheunsatisfactorypositioncreatedbytheappellantserectionofunauthorised
roofs.
40TheabovepositionwasnotexpresslypleadedbytheMCST.InrelationtotheGFA,theallegationsofthe
MCSTappearedatpara6oftheStatementofClaimwhichstatedthat:
The[appellants]areinbreachofURAregulationsonErectionofshedtocoverover[sic]PrivateEnclosed
Space(PES)Areas.UncoveredPESareasarenotcomputedaspartoftheoverallGrossFloorArea(GFA)for
theDevelopment.ThesubsequentcoveringofopenPESareaswillthusgenerateadditionalGFA.Thecovering
ofPESwithoutplanningpermissionisalsoanoffenceunderSection3ofthePlanningAct,Cap.[sic]
Particulars
ThecoveredPrivateEnclosedSpace(balcony)haveincreasedthe[appellants]GrossFloorArea(GFA)by
54.16sqmeters(583sqfeet).Thiscoveredareaisnowusedbythe[appellants]aspartoftheirLivingRoom,
sinceMarch1999.

41Inthecourtbelow,theappellantssubmittedthattheMCSThadnotpleadedtheircauseofactionasbeing
foundedonthegenerationofadditionalGFA.Thedistrictjudgedismissedthisargumentasshenotedthatin
para42oftheirAmendedReplyandDefencetoCounterclaimtheMCSThadpleadedthatitwouldhavetocallfor
anextraordinarygeneralmeetingtoobtainunanimousconsentfromthegeneralbodypresentatthemeeting.She
thereforeconsideredthattheissuehadbeensufficientlypleaded.ShethenconsideredthecaseofMCSTPlan
No1375vHanSoonJuan[2004]SGDC204whereDistrictJudgeWongPeckhadheldthatwrittenpermission
foradevelopment(thatincludestheapprovedGFA/GPR)accruedtothelandandnottotheowners.Thejudge
agreedwiththatobservationandwentontoholdthatastheGFAaccruedtothelanditwasarightthatwas
attachedtothelandthathadbeenfixedandpaidforbythedeveloperand,sincethelandwascommonproperty,
GFAwouldalsobecommonproperty.Thejudgesholdingsonthisissuecanbesummarisedasfollows:
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(a)thatGFAformedpartofthecommonpropertyofKentishLodge
(b)thatbyerectingtheroofsovertheterraceandlandscapeareas,theappellantshadgeneratedGFA
(c)therebytheappellantshadclaimedexclusiveuseoverthecommonpropertyand
(d)thereforetheappellantsrequiredtheunanimousconsentofthesubsidiaryproprietors,pursuanttos41(8)of
theAct,forthecreationofabylawtoconferonthemtheexclusiveuseandenjoymentoftheGFA.
At[110]ofherjudgment,thedistrictjudgesaidthatsheagreedwiththeMCSTthattheutilisationofGFA
affectedthelandofthecondominiumandtoallowtheappellantstoutilisetheGFAwouldamounttoconferringon
themexclusiveuseandenjoymentor,attheveryleast,specialprivilegesinrespectofthecommonproperty.On
thisbasis,theroofsoverthelandscape/airwellareaswouldfallwithins41(8)oftheAct.Thisfindingwasoneof
theingredientsthatledthedistrictjudgetograntthemandatoryorderfortheremovaloftheroofssoughtbythe
MCST.
42Ishouldstateherethatunders41(8)oftheAct,amanagementcorporationmaypursuanttoaunanimous
resolutionofthesubsidiaryproprietorsmakeabylawinrespectofanylotconferringonasubsidiaryproprietor
theexclusiveuseandenjoymentoforspecialprivilegesinrespectofthecommonpropertyoranypartthereof
uponsuchtermsandconditionsasmaybespecifiedinthebylaw.Theissueherethereforeiswhetherthe
unconsumedGFAofadevelopmentiscommonpropertysuchthatanyindividualsubsidiaryproprietorwho
wishestoundertakeworksonhisunitthatwouldresultintheGFAbeingtotallyconsumedand/orthecreationof
additionalfloorareaforthedevelopmentwouldberequiredbytheActtoobtainanewbylawtothateffect
approvedbytheunanimousresolutionof
allthesubsidiaryproprietors.
43TheappellantssubmittedthatthejudgesreasoningthatunconsumedGFAconstitutedcommonproperty
wasinconsistentwiththeActwhichdefinescommonpropertyasfollows(ins3):
commonproperty
(a)inrelationtosubdividedbuildingsinanapprovedplanbearingthetitleofcondominiumandissuedbythe
relevantauthority,meanssomuchofthelandforthetimebeingnotcomprisedinanylotshowninastratatitle
planorinanypartsofanybuildingunit(partiallyerectedortobeerected)intendedtobeincludedaslotsina
stratatitleplantobelodgedwiththeRegistrarafterstratasubdivisionofthebuildingunithasbeenapprovedby
therelevantauthority

(c)Unlessotherwisedescribedspecificallyascomprisedinanylotinastratatitleplanandshownascapableof
beingcomprisedinsuchlot,includes

(i)foundations,columns,beams,supports,walls,roofs,lobbies,corridors,stairs,
stairways,fireescapes,entrancesandexitsofthebuildingandwindowsinstalledin
theexternalwallsofthebuilding
(ii)carparks,recreationalorcommunityfacilities,gardens,parkingareas,roofs,
storagespacesandroomsapprovedbytherelevantauthorityfortheuseofa
managementcorporationanditsmembers
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(iii)centralandappurtenantinstallationsforservicessuchaspower,light,gas,hot
andcoldwater,heating,refrigeration,airconditioningandincinerators
(iv)escalators,lifts,tanks,pumps,motors,fans,compressors,ducts,andingeneral
allapparatusandinstallationsexistingforcommonuse
(v)waterpipes,drainagepipes,seweragepipes,gaspipesandelectricalcableswhich
serve2ormorelots
(vi)allfacilitiesdescribedascommonpropertyinanyplanapprovedbytherelevant
authorityforacondominiumdevelopmentandallfacilitieswhichmaybeshownina
legendofastratatitleplanascommonpropertyand
(vii)allotherpartsofthelandnotcomprisedinanylotnecessaryorconvenienttothe
existenceandmaintenanceandforthereasonablecommonuseandsafetyofthe
commonproperty.
TheyarguedthattheActdoesnotsaythatGFA,unconsumedorotherwise,iscommonproperty.Theitems
includedunderthedefinitionofcommonpropertywerealltangible:waterpipes,lifts,staircases,etc.Nonerelated
tointangiblessuchasGFAandunconsumedGFA.
44Whileitistruethattheitemsmentionedinthedefinitionaretangibleitems,thatdoesnotmeanthat
intangiblerightscannotformpartofthelandandthusbepartofthecommonproperty.InFrontfieldInvestment
Holding(Pte)LtdvMCSTNo938[2001]3SLR627,Iheldthataneasementoverthelandofathirdpartywould
alsobepartofthecommonpropertyofacondominium.Thatholdingwasbasedonthedefinitionoflandinthe
Actwhichmadeitclearthatproprietorshipoflandincludesnaturalrightstoair,light,waterandsupportandthe
rightofaccesstoanyhighwayonwhichthelandabuts.Aneasementisnottangibleandyetithaslongbeen
recognisedbythecommonlawasbeingpartofaparcelofrightswhichapurchaseracquireswhenhepurchases
aparceloflandwhichenjoysaneasementoveranadjacentparcel.
45Despitemyrecognitionthatland,andtherefore,commonproperty,canincludeintangiblerights,Idonot
thinkthatunconsumedGFAiscapableofconstitutingland.Firstofall,thecommonlawdoesnotrecognisethe
conceptofGFA.Itisnotsomethingthathasgrownoutnaturallyfromtheownershipanduseofland.GFAisa
conceptthathasbeeninventedbytheplanningauthoritiesinordertocontrolandadministertheusageoflandin
accordancewiththecurrentlyprevailingpolicyappliedbysuchauthorities.Secondly,toanextent,theGFAofa
developmentisdeterminedbytheamountofdevelopmentchargethatadeveloperispreparedtopay,althoughof
course,theremaybeguidelinesastothemaximumpermissibleGFAinanyparticularcase.AllIampointingout
isthatthereisnopredesignatedGFAforanyparticularplotbywhichImeanaGFAwhichhastobeassignedto
thatplotregardlessofthesizeoftheGFAappliedforbythedeveloperandtheamountthatthedeveloperis
willingtopay.Asatoolofplanningpolicy,theGFAdoesnothaveaninherentconnectionwithanyparticularplot.
ItisacreatureofacompletelydifferentnaturefromaneasementwhichtheActitselfdescribesasanatural
right.Thirdly,theActitselfhasnotstatutorilyincludedGFAinthedefinitionoflandforthepurposesoftheAct.
46AsunconsumedGFAcannotbeland,afortioriitcannotbecommonproperty.Itisofinterestthatthe
URArecognisesthis.Inthecourtbelow,theevidencegivenbyMrGreigwhowascalledasarepresentativeof
theURAwasthattotheURA,GFAandcommonpropertyweretwoseparateissues.MrGreiggavethisevidence
whenhewasaskedwhethertheURAsrequirementthatamanagementcouncilshouldendorseasubsidiary
proprietorsapplicationforregularisationofstructuresthathadbeenerectedwithoutproperauthorityalways
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appliedtocondominiumunits.MrGreigagreedthatthisrequirementwasonlyimposedwhentheapplication
involvedcommonproperty.Hethenconfirmedthat,inthisconnection,whethertheapplicationinvolvedGFAand
whetheritinvolvedcommonpropertyweretwoseparateissues.
47IamalsoimpressedbythereasoningofDistrictJudgeWongPeckinMSCTPlanNo1375vHanSoon
Juan(supra[41]).Shesaid:
25IthasbeenstatedinURAsletterdated10June2002thatGFAaccruestothelandandnottotheowners.
Iacceptthisposition.ItfollowsthatGFAdoesnotbelongtothedefendantsnortheplaintiffs.Assuch,Idonot
findtheplaintiffsclaimtotheGFAofLot2062onwhichFlynnParkstandsontobevalid.GFAandGrossPlot
RatioarewithinthepurviewofURAforplanningpurposes.Toputitsimply,theyareplanningguidelinesthatlimit
theextenttowhichthelandcanbebuiltup.Havingsaidthat,itisalsoURAwhichensurescomplianceby
enforcingtheseguidelines.Itisthelegalownerofthelandwhohasthedutytoensurethathedoesnotrunfoul
oftheseguidelines.Inthisinstance,itisthecollectiveresponsibilityofallthesubsidiaryproprietorsofLot2062
toensurethattheseguidelinesaremet.
26Itisthereforeerroneousoftheplaintiffscounseltoarguethatinthealternative,theGFAbelongedtothe
subsidiaryproprietorscollectivelyinundividedshares.GFAdoesnotbelongtoanyoneorcanbeownedby
anyone.Tome,itisapparentthatbothcounsels[sic]havemistakenlylikenedGFAtothatof[sic]sharevalues
intheland.Commonpropertyisheldbyallthesubsidiaryproprietorsastenantsincommonproportionaltotheir
respectivesharevalues.TheirrespectivesharesarestatedintheSubsidiaryStrataCertificatesofTitle(SSCTs)
issuedbytheRegistrarofTitles.SSCTsareessentiallytitleownershipdocumentsthatalsoshowthe
encumbrancesaffectingthestratalots.ASSCTshowsthenameofthesubsidiaryproprietorforacertainstrata
lotandthesharevalueinthecommonpropertyheldbythissubsidiaryproprietor.GFAandGPRcannotbe
ownedbyanysubsidiaryproprietoranddonotformpartofthecommonproperty.Beingplanningguidelineswhich
donotreflectordeterminetitleownership,theyarenotreflectedintheSSCTnoraretheyincludedinthe
definitionofcommonpropertyins3oftheAct.
Withrespect,IagreethatGFAdoesnotbelongtoanyoneandisnotarightofsuchanaturethatitiscapableof
beingownedbyanyone.Astheappellantssubmitted,GFAissimplyanadministrativetool.Assuch,itwas
solelyuptotheURAtoincreaseordecreasetheGFAforanyparticularparceloflandandtodecidewhatitwould
doifconstructiononthelandresultedinitbeingbuiltupbeyondtheGFA.
48SincetheGFAcannotbecommonproperty,s41(8)oftheActcallingforaunanimousresolutiontosupport
exclusiveuseofthecommonpropertywouldnothaveappliedinrelationtotheerectionoftheroofsoverthe
appellantsPESareas.
49Inpassing,Imentionthat,duetothepassingoftheBuildingMaintenanceandStrataManagementAct
2004(No47of2004),thesituationhasnowchanged.Section37ofthatActprovides:
(1)Exceptpursuanttoanauthoritygrantedundersubsection(2),nosubsidiaryproprietorofalotthatis
comprisedinastratatitleplanshalleffectanyimprovementinoruponhislotforhisbenefitwhichincreasesoris
likelytoincreasethefloorareaofthelandandbuildingcomprisedinthestratatitleplan.
(2)Amanagementcorporationmay,attherequestofasubsidiaryproprietorofanylotcomprisedinitsstratatitle
plananduponsuchtermsasitconsidersappropriate,by90%resolution,authorisethesubsidiaryproprietorto
effectanyimprovementinoruponhislotreferredtoinsubsection(1).
Thus,underthepresentregime,thesubsidiaryproprietorswhowishtocovertheirPESareaswouldrequirethe
authorisationoftheMCSTsupportedbyaresolutionof90%ofthesubsidiaryproprietorsinordertodoso.

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TheairconditioningcompressorsinstalledinSeptember2000
50InSeptember2000,theappellantsinstalledthenewcompressorsontheexternalwallofthebuildingabove
thelandscape/airwellarea.Asatthattime,theappellantswereboundbythebylaws.TheMCSTwasthenin
existencebuthadnothaditsfirstmeetingyetandtheappellantscarriedouttheworkwithoutwaitingtoseekits
approval.Thejudgefound(at[73]ofherjudgment)thatthesecompressorsabovetheairwellwereinstalled,at
leastpartially,ontoexternalwallsthatformedpartofthecommonproperty.Sheheldthattheappellantswere
clearlyinbreachofbylaw11inthisregard.Althoughshedidnotstatethisspecificallyinherjudgmentinrelation
tothenewcompressors,shemusthaveconsideredthattheactofinstallingthenewcompressorswouldhave
damagedordefacedthecommonpropertybecausenailsorscrewsorthelikewouldhavehadtobedriveninto
thewallinordertoeffecttheinstallation.
51Theappellantssubmittedthatitwasnotpleadedthatthenewcompressorswereoncommonproperty.
Secondly,itwasnotpleadedthatthenewcompressorswereinbreachofanybylaw.Theonlypleadingwasthat
atpara5oftheStatementofClaimwhichsimplyallegedthattheappellantshadinstalledadditionalcompressors
on8September2000withoutthepriorapprovalofthedeveloperwhowasthenmanagingthecondominium.
Thirdly,bythispleading,theMCSThadadmittedthatthedeveloperwasmanagingthecondominiumonits
behalf.Byaletterdated8September2000signedbyMarkLimthenactingonbehalfoftheMCST,the
appellantswereadvisedthatthecouncilwhenformedwouldreservetherighttorequiretheappellantstoundothe
installationworksshouldtheybefoundtobevisuallyobstructiveandjarring.Tothis,theappellantshadreplied
thesamedaystatingthatMrLimhadinspectedbothunitsandhadverballyinformedMrChoothathewasquite
satisfied.AssuchMrChoowassurprisedtoreceivetheletterstatingthecontrary.Iftherewasanyobjection,
MrChooaskedtobeinformedofthesamewithinaweek.Therewasnoresponseandtheappellantssubmitted
thattheMCSThadnotmaintainedtheobjection.Inanyevent,theMCSTsobjectionwasnotthatthese
compressorswereplacedoncommonpropertynorthattheybreachedbylaws11,12or13.Itwassimplythat
theappellantshadcarriedoutrenovationswithoutpriorpermission.Theappellantsalsosubmittedthatthe
StatementofClaimdidnotcontainanyprayerforreliefinrespectofthenewcompressors.
52Dealingwiththelastpointfirst,thispointhasbeentakeninerroraspara(a)(iv)ofthereliefsprayedforin
theStatementofClaimspecificallymentionedallfourairconditioningcompressorsasbeingunauthorised
additionswhichtheappellantsshouldremove.Asregardstheargumentthatitwasnotexpresslypleadedthatthe
installationofthenewcompressorsbreachedbylaw11,theMCSTwouldhavehadnogroundtocomplainabout
theerectionofthecompressorswithoutthedevelopersconsenthadsuchconsent(onthebasisthatthe
developerwasthentheMCSTsrepresentative)notbeenrequiredunderbylaw11.Suchconsentwouldonlybe
requiredwhentheinstallationworknecessitatednailsorscrewsbeingdrivenintothecommonpropertyorother
actionsbeingtakenthatwouldotherwisedamageordefacepartofit.Inmyview,theappellantswouldnothave
beenembarrassedbythewayinwhichpara5oftheAmendedStatementofClaimwaspleadedandwouldhave
knownthesubstanceoftheallegationbeingmade.
53Lookingatthecorrespondencealso,itdoesmakeclearthattheMCSTsapprovalwasrequiredforthe
additions.Intheletterof8September2000signedbyMrLimonbehalfoftheMCST,MrChoowasremindedthat
managementsapprovalhadtobesoughtbeforerenovationworkswerecarriedoutandthatthecouncilreserved
therighttorequiretheappellantstoundotherenovationworksifthesamewerevisuallyobstructiveandjarring.
MrChoosreplyof8September2000saiditwasanoversightonthepartoftheappellantsnottohaveinformed
theMCSTpriortoeffectingtheinstallations.AlthoughtheMCSTdidnotrespondtothisletterwithinaweekas
requestedbyMrChoo,itdidrespondbyaletterof25September2000signedbyoneAngieWu.Thatletter
statedthatasthedeveloperwasmanagingthecondominiumontrustfortheMCST,MrChoosapplicationfor
additions/alterationworkscouldnotbeapprovedatthatstage.Hewasaskedtoforwardhisapplicationtothe
MCSTuponformationofthecouncil.TheletterrepeatedthattheMCSTmightrequiretheappellantstoremove
theinstallationafterittookoverdirectmanagementfromthedeveloper.Onceagain,theonlyreasonthatitcould
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havebeenstatedthattheMCSThadsucharightwasthatbylaw11prohibitedworkbeingdonewithoutits
authorisationwheresuchworkwoulddamageordefacethecommonproperty.Inthisregard,Ithinkthatthe
appellantsargumentsthattheissueastowhethertheinstallationofthenewcompressorswasabreachofthe
bylawswasnotbeforethedistrictcourtarenotwellfounded.
54Thedistrictjudgeheardagreatdealofevidenceonthewaythatthevariousstructureswereerectedand
theareaswheretheywereinstalled.Ifindnobasisonwhichtodisturbherfindingthatthenewcompressorswere
partiallyinstalledinwallsthatformedpartofthecommonpropertyofthecondominiumandthatbysoinstalling
them,theappellantswereinbreachofthebylaws.Thenextissueiswhetherthismeansthatthemandatory
injunctiongrantedbythedistrictcourtshould,insofarasthenewcompressorsareconcerned,bemaintained.
Shouldthemandatoryinjunctionbecontinuedinrespectofthenewcompressorsalone?
55ThelawinSingaporeasestablishedbythecasesofChenEeYuehandTayTuanKiatvPritnamSingh
Brar[1986]SLR290(TayTuanKiat)isthatevenwherethereisanencroachmentbyonelandowneronthe
propertyofanotherorasubsidiaryproprietorhaserectedstructureswithoutthepermissionofthemanagement
corporation,amandatoryinjunctionwillnotnecessarilybeissuedtoforcetheremovalofthestructuresorend
theencroachment.InTayTuanKat,theHighCourtfoundthatthedefendantswallhadencroacheduponthe
plaintiffsproperty.Nevertheless,LPTheanJ(ashethenwas)ruledthattherelieftheplaintiffsaskedfor,
namelythatthedefendantpulldownandremovethewall,shouldnotbegrantedasthiswouldnotbeafairresult.
JusticeTheansreasoningwas(at[9]and[10]):
9Inmyview,ifthemandatoryinjunctionaskedforbytheplaintiffsisgrantedtheobligationimposedon
thedefendantisextremelyonerousandisoutofallproportiontothebenefittobegainedbytheplaintiffs.Inmy
view,itwillnotproduceafairresult.InCharringtonvSimons&Co[1970]1WLR725BuckleyJinconsidering
thegrantofamandatoryinjunctionsaid,atp730:

Whereamandatoryorderissoughtthecourtmustconsiderwhetherinthe
circumstancesastheyexistafterthebreachamandatoryorder,andifso,whatkindof
mandatoryorder,willproduceafairresult.Inthisconnectionthecourtmust,inmy
judgment,takeintoconsiderationamongstotherrelevantcircumstancesthebenefit
whichtheorderwillconferontheplaintiffandthedetrimentwhichitwillcausethe
defendant.Aplaintiffshouldnot,ofcourse,bedeprivedofrelieftowhichheisjustly
entitledmerelybecauseitwillbedisadvantageoustothedefendant.Ontheotherhand,
heshouldnotbepermittedtoinsistonaformofreliefwhichconfernoappreciable
benefitonhimselfandwillbemateriallydetrimentaltothedefendant.
10Theconceptoffairresultasoneofthecriteriaindeterminingthegrantofamandatoryinjunctionwas
acceptedbyMegarryJinShepherdHomesvSandham[1971]ChD340wherehesaid,atp351:

Second,althoughitmaynotbepossibletostateinanycomprehensivewaythegrounds
uponwhichthecourtwillrefusetograntamandatoryinjunctioninsuchcasesatthe
trial,theyatleastincludethetrivialityofthedamagetotheplaintiffandtheexistence
ofadisproportionbetweenthedetrimentthattheinjunctionwouldinflictonthe
defendantandthebenefitthatitwouldconferontheplaintiff.Thebasicconceptisthat
ofproducingafairresult,andthisinvolvestheexerciseofajudicialdiscretion.
56ThisconceptofbalancingthebenefitsandburdensinordertoproduceafairresultwasechoedbyChao
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HickTinJ(ashethenwas)inChenEeYueh.Inthatcase,thesubsidiaryproprietorhadbreachedthebylawsby
installingwindowsinherbalconywithouttheconsentofthemanagementcorporationbutChaoJruledthatshe
shouldnotbeorderedtoremovethewindowsbecausetheharmtoheroutweighedanybenefittothe
managementcorporationsinceothersubsidiaryproprietorshaderectedsimilarwindowswhichcouldnotbe
orderedtoberemoved.Healsostated,havingreviewedcertainauthoritiesthatthecourtwillgrantamandatory
injunctiontoredressabreachofanegativecovenant,thebreachofwhichisalreadyaccomplished(asinChen
EeYuehandthepresentinstance)unless:
(a)theplaintiffsownconductwouldmakeitunjusttodosoor
(b)thebreachwastrivialorhadcausednodamageornoappreciabledamagetotheplaintiffandamandatory
injunctionwouldimposesubstantialhardshiponthedefendantwithnocounterbalancingbenefittotheplaintiff.
57Thedistrictjudgeawardedamandatoryinjunctiontocompeltheappellantstoremoveallofthestructures.I
havereversedherdecisioninrelationtoallstructuresinstalledbeforeApril2000asIhavefoundthatthebylaws
didnotapplybeforethatdate.Accordingly,theconsiderationsthatthedistrictjudgehadtoweighindeciding
whethertograntthemandatoryinjunctionbelowarequitedifferentfromtheconsiderationsthatIhavetobalance
now.Asignificantfactornowisthattheinjunctionifcontinuedwouldaffectonlytwo,comparativelyminor,
structures,whilstthemajorunauthorisedstructureswouldremaininplace.ThemaincomplaintthattheMCST
hadregardingtheappellantsworkswasthecoveringoverofthePESareas.Thecomplaintsaboutallfourair
conditioningcompressorswereminorincomparison.Nowthatonlytwocompressorsremaininissue,the
questionofthetrivialityofthedamagethatwouldbecausedtotheMCSTshouldtheappellantsbeallowedto
retainthesecompressorsloomslargeinmymind.InoteherethatalthoughtheMCSThadcomplainedofheat
beingemittedbythenewcompressors,thedistrictjudgefoundthattherewasnodirectevidenceofannoyance
causedtotheothersubsidiaryproprietorsbyreasonoftheinstallationofthesecompressors.Sheexpressly
statedthattheMCSThadfailedtodischargeitsburdenofproofinthisregard.
58ThenextsignificantfactoristhebehaviouroftheMCST.InJuly2001,theMCSTwrotetotheappellants
andtoldthemthatthestructuresshouldberemovedbecausetheyaffectedtheuniformityofthefaadeand
causedinconveniencetotheotherresidents.On1November2001,MrChoometthemanagementcouncilto
discusstheissue.MrChoosevidencewasthathewastheninformedbythechairmanofthecouncilthatthe
councilapprovedthecoveringofthePESareasforsafetyreasonsbutthattheappellantshadtomakean
applicationtotheURAfortheauthoritiesapprovalofthesame.MrChoosevidencewassupportedbythatof
oneMsEvelynZeng,anemployeeoftheMCSTsmanagingagentwhotestifiedthatbythattimetheonly
concerntheMCSThadwasthatthestructuresdidnotinfringetheURAsregulationsandtheMCSTsbylaws.
Shealsotestifiedthatby19November2001theMCSTwouldhaveknownifthestructureshadencroachedon
thecommonpropertyandwhethertheyhadbreachedanybylaws.Onthesameday,theMCSTwroteto
MrChootellinghimthatithadwrittentotheauthoritiesenquiringaboutthestructuresandstatingthatas
MrChoohadbeeninformedatthemeeting,theMCSTsonlyconcernwasthattherenovationinquestionwasnot
inanywayillegalorinviolationofanyexistinglaw.ThematterwasresolvedwhentheURAreplied.On
11December2001,theMCSTwrotetoMrChoostatingthattheURAwantedittoadvisetheappellantsto
formallyapplyfortheretentionoftheirroofstoregularisetheprocessoftheinstallation.Theappellantswere
askedtoproceedwiththeformalapplicationandthenforwardcopiesofthesametotheMCSTforitsfile.On
20December2001,theMCSTwroteafurtherletterstatingtheCouncilhavenoobjectionstoyouradditional
installationerectedatprivateenclosedspaceareaaslongasthereisnobreachofrulesandregulationsofthe
URA.InAugust2002,theMCSTsmanagingagentwrotealettertoMrChoostatingthatithadconfirmedwith
thecouncilthatthecouncilexpressednoobjectionsregardingtheappellantsinstallationsprovidedthatthese
wereregularisedwiththeauthorities.
59Thus,fromNovember2001rightuptoAugust2002,theMCSThadnodifficultywithanyofthestructures
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erectedbytheappellantsincludingthenewcompressors.Whentheappellantsfinallytookaction,however,to
regularisethestructuresandaskedtheMCSTtoendorsetheapplicationform,itrefused.Thatrefusalprevented
thesubmissionoftheformtotheURA.Theappellantspositionbothbeforethedistrictjudgeandintheappeal
wasthatthatreversaloftheMCSTspositionwasbasedonpersonalanimositybetweenthechairmanandvice
chairmanofthemanagementcouncilandMrChoo.Thedistrictjudgedidnotacceptthisargument.Forpresent
purposes,however,IdonotthinkthatIneedtogointoanddiscussthefindingsonthisissue.Theimportant
thingisthattheevidencedidshowthatuptoAugust2002,theMCSTdidnotconsiderthatitwouldsufferany
damagebyallowingthestructurestoremainaslongasallthelegalformalitieswerecompliedwith.Obviously,
therefore,itdidnotconsiderthattheappearanceoradministrationofthecondominiumortheconvenienceofthe
othersubsidiaryproprietorshadbeenadverselyaffectedbytheexistenceofthestructuresincludingthenew
compressors.Thesecircumstancesleadmetoinferthatthecontinuationofthemandatoryinjunctioninrespect
ofthecompressorswouldbringnobenefittoeithertheothersubsidiaryproprietorsortheMCSTitself.Itwasalso
EvelynZengsevidencethattheMCSThadnothingtogainfromtheremovalofthestructures.
60Ontheotherhand,Irecognisethatthereislittleharmthattheappellantswouldsufferifthenew
compressorshadtoberemoved.Theywouldhavetofindsomeotherwayofcoolingtheareasservedbythese
compressorsbutthecostofdoingthiswouldnotbeverygreat.Theysubmittedthattheirrenovationshadcost
them$50,000andthatthismoneywouldbethrownawayiftheyhadtoremovethem.Thatfigurerelatedtothe
roofsandthewindowsandevenifitincludedthecostofinstallingthenewcompressors,Iwouldbesurprisedif
thatcostamountedtomuchmorethan10%ofthetotalfigure.Therewasalsoevidencethatanumberofother
compressorshadbeenerectedbyvarioussubsidiaryproprietorseithercompletelyorpartiallyoncommon
property.These,togetherwiththeearliercompressorsinstalledbytheappellantswhichthedistrictjudgefoundto
havebeeninstalledentirelyoncommonproperty,willremaininplaceevenifthenewcompressorsareremoved.
61BalancingallthecircumstancesasbestIcan,IdonotthinkitwouldbeafairresultifIweretoorderthat
themandatoryinjunctionshouldremaininplaceinrelationtothenewcompressors.
Conclusion
62Intheresultthisappealisallowedandtheordersmadebelowaresetaside.Iwillhearthepartiesoncosts.
Appealallowed.
ReportedbyAngChingPin.

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