NOEL EPHRAIM R.

ANTIGUA
Cases in Criminal Procedure

Bachelor of Laws III

People vs. Ocimar
GR No. 94555

Facts:
Eduardo Ocimar and Alexander mendoza, together with Alfonso Bermudez, Alberto
Cruz, Venzio Cruz, and John Doe alias "BUNSO" were charged in the court a quo for

violation of P.D. 532, otherwise known as the "Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law
of 1974, On July 7,1987, Alfonso Bermudez was finally brought before the court. He
was accordingly arraigned and with the assistance likewise of counsel de oficio, he
entered a plea of "Guilty".
On October 28,1987, the prosecuting Fiscal moved for the discharge of
accused Bermudez to be utilized as state witness. Ocimar contends that no accused
in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not
one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty.
Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is
equally guilty as the others.
Issue:
Whether or not a co-conspirator can satisfy the requisite of appearing not to
be the most guilty.
Held:
A co-conspirator can qualify as a state witness and can satisfy therequisite of
appearing not to be the most guilty.
As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without
having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even
assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. By "most guilty", it means the highest degree of culpability in terms
of participation in the commission of the offense, and not necessarily the severity of
the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by
reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if we take into account
his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense.

People vs. CA and Inspector Joe Pring

223 SCRA 475
Facts:
Wenceslao Espino jr, alias Joe Pring is charged with kidnapping in the RTC of Bulacan.
During the investigation and trial, one Nonilo Arile, a policeman and co-principal, testified
against him.
After a motion to discharge Arile was filed by the prosecution to testify gainst Pring,
Ariles affidavit was given to the defense counsel of Pring. Based on this events, the court
ordered the discharge of Arile.
Pring questioned such procedure, arguing that the discharge was invalid due to the
want of hearing. According to Pring, Arile should testify in the witness stand subject to cross
examination.
Issue:
Whether or not hearing constitutes personal testimony and not the affidavit.
Held:
Hearing means only the opportunity to read what the witness will say and the
opportunity to object. The prosecutor has submitted the sworn statement of accused Arile
and its evidence showing that the conditions for discharge have been met. Neither can it be
denied that the defense was able to oppose the motion to discharge Arile. With both
litigants able to present their side, the lack of actual hearing was not fatal enough to
undermine the courts ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed under
Sections 17, Rule 119 were satisfied.

Rosales vs. CA
215 SCRA 102
Facts:
An Information was filed before RTC of Lucena City charging Eduardo Rosales,
together with Crisanto Bautista and private respondents Nelson Exconde and Ronilo
Aonuevo for the murder of Marcial Punzalan, an ex-Mayor of San Antonio and Tiaong
towns in Quezon Province, and his leader, Demetrio Ramos. In the trial of the case, the
prosecution presented Eduardo Rosales and then Crisanto Bautista as witnesses before
moving for their discharge. Admittedly, their testimonies led to the identification of the
alleged masterminds of the slayings, which included prominent local political leaders like
ex-Mayor Ananiano Wagan of San Antonio and ex-Mayor Francisco Escueta of Tiaong as
well as two (2) barangay captains, and to the filing of an information against the four. The
trial court granted the discharge of Rosales but deferred action on the motion to discharged
Bautista pending resolution of this case. Private respondents pleaded for the
reconsideration of Rosales' discharge by the same was denied. Upon petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, however, the order of discharge was recalled as the appellate
court found no plausible reason for the discharge of Rosales after he admitted his guilt in
the course of his testimony. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals and its Resolution denying reconsideration.
Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in annulling the discharge of the accused?
Held:
NO. At the time of Rosales' discharge, the corresponding Information against the
alleged masterminds had not yet been filed. His testimony, if ever, was then to be a future
undertaking on his part, and the successful prosecution of those responsible for the
dastardly acts would hinge solely on his testimony as a state witness. As such, his discharge
satisfied the intent of Sec. 9 of Rule 119 that one or more discharged accused "may be
witnesses for the State" and was therefore in accord with law. The rule is that the discharge
of an accused is left to the sound discretion of the lower court, which has the exclusive
responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the Rules are met. While it is the
usual practice of the prosecution to present the accused who turns state witness only after
his discharge, the trial court may nevertheless sanction his discharge after his testimony if
circumstances so warrant. In this case, the imminent risk to his life justified the deviation
from the normal course of procedure as a measure to protect him while at the same time
ensuring his undaunted cooperation with the prosecution. Indeed, as is explicit from the
Rule, as long as the motion for discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness is
filed before the prosecution rests, the trial court should, if warranted, grant it. Once a
discharge is effected, any subsequent showing that not all the five (5) requirements
outlined in Sec. 9 of Rule 119 were actually fulfilled cannot adversely affect the legal
consequences of such discharge which, under Sec. 10 of the Same Rule, operates as an
acquittal of the accused thus discharged and shall forever be a bar to his prosecution for
the same offense. The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it annulled and
set aside the order for the discharge of the accused Eduardo Rosales there being no
showing that he actually failed or refused to testify against his co-conspirators.

Bernardo vs. CA
278 SCRA 782
Facts:
Herein petitioner Paz Bernardo is charged with violation of BP No. 22 in the RTC of
Quezon City.
During the course of the trial and after the prosecution rested its case, the defense
counsel, instead of presenting witnesses, moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence,
which was denied by the judge.
Despite such denial of his motion for leave, defense counsel filed its demurrer to
evidence, by reason of which the judge pronounced the defense to have waived its right to
present evidence.
As such, defense filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus on the
ground that said RTC judge abused his discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC judge acted with abuse of discretion in pronouncing that defense
has wiaved its right to present evidence after filing demurrer to evidence without leave of
court.
Held:
No.
Once prior leave is denied and accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion
to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The
only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented
by the prosecution. And unless there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence may
not be disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction may still be elevated by the accused
to the appellate court.