Le Pére Henri Barré (1905 - 1968) Le 12 mai 1968 s’est éteint subitement a Chevilly prés de Paris le Pére Henri Barré. Mort prématurée : il n’avait pas encore 63 ans. Mort qu'il ne prévoyait guére : dans chacune de ses lettres il me rassurait sur sa santé et dans presque toutes il me faisait part de ses travaux et de ses projets, notamment pour cette histoire du samedi marial, qui sera sa dernigre ceuvre et restera une ceuvre maitresse, tellement le domaine est touffu. Il était né le 17 octobre 1905 & Argentan, dans cette Normandie a laquelle il restait trés attaché. Dés 1918 il sera au Petit Séminaire de Séez, ot il approfondira sa piété a l’égard de Notre Dame dans une chapelle qu'il aimait @ visiter, car consacrée a I’Immaculée peu apres la définition. Aprés un an de Grand Séminaire, il entre en 1924 comme novice chez les Péres du Saint-Esprit ; il y fera profession le 8 septembre 1925. Bientot il sera & Rome pour achever ses études de philosophie 4 la Grégorienne. It poursuivra ensuite pour la théologie. Il admirera tout particuliérement le Pére Filograssi, lequel aura une grande influence sur lui et l'orientera vers les études « positives », alors que le jeune religieux était naturellement porté a la spéculation, ce que manifeste son ouvrage sur la ‘Trinité qu’il fut si heureux de voir paraitre. Tout de suite aprés son doctorat en théologie (1932), il sera affecté a la formation des jeunes Spiritains 4 Chevilly. Il enseignera un an la morale, puis le dogme. C’est 18 que la guerre le prendra en 1939 ; la guerre qui se prolongera pour lui par tne intermi- nable captivité. Durant celle-ci, il est vrai, il se retrouvera professeur, dans cette espéce de séminaire qui put s’organiser dans son Oflag. Comme prétre il exercera alors une grosse action sur les captifs, j’ai pu moi-méme Je constater, Libéré en 1945, il reprendra ses cours de dogme a Chevilly, puis A partir de 1930 A Rome. Il y retrouve son cher Séminaire-Frangais. Tien deviendra méme le Recteur en 1953. La succession & prendre était jourde ; il s’en chargera avec tout son zéle pour le clergé ; aussi marqueta- til profondément nombre de séminaristes qui ont su le comprendre et il nouera des amitiés bien douces, dont une dans une direction inattendue.4 G, JOUASSARD Il rencontra par ailleurs des difficultés, dont sa santé éprouvera le contre- coup ; lui qui était robuste comme un chéne, il se mit A vaciller physique- ment. Si bien qu’en 1963, en plein concile, il obtiendra de quitter Rome. Il passera un an a Fribourg en Suisse et sera ensuite affecté au scolasticat de Chevilly. Mais l’enseignement était trop lourd pour Ini ; dés 1965 il sera mis a la retraite avec résidence sur place. Il pourra das lors se donner entiérement a ses travaux, faire de longues séances 4 la Bibliothéque Natio- nale pour compléter les fiches qu'il avait accumulées dans les bibliothéques romaines, trés spécialement 4 la Bibliothéque Vaticane ot il se sentait chez lui. C'est que de fait le Pére Barré était devenu un spécialiste entre-temps, spécialiste en théologie mariale, spécialiste pour le haut moyen Age, spécialiste en liturgie et homilétique anciennes. Que ne savait-il pas dans ces différents ordres et dans beaucoup d’autres ? Si on le langait sur une piste, il était intarissable, en mariologie notamment. C’est ce point-1A qui nous avait unis, a la session de Chartres en 1946 de la Société Francaise @Etudes mariales. Le Pére en était alors !’actif secrétaire et il épaulait de toutes ses forces le bon Pére Morineau. Quand, 4 mon corps défendant, je dus succéder A ce dernier, il fut le premier 4 me rassurer : chez nous @est le secrétaire qui fait tout ; le président n’a qu’a présider. En quoi il fut mauvais prophéte, il le reconnut Iui-méme ; mais je m’en voudrais de ne pas attester qu’il fit de son cOté un travail énorme et qu’en toutes circonstances j'ai pu m’appuyer complétement sur lui, jusqu’A ce que ses fonctions 4 Rome !’empéchérent de continuer. Méme alors il me garda son affection et son concours. Et c'est ainsi que j'ai pu me rendre compte de ce qu'il était comme homme, comme religieux, comme prétre, comme savant et théologien, et j’ajoute comme ami. Il est mort dans tout I’éclat deson talent, en pleine production littéraire, le meilleur de cette production allant 4 Notre Dame. « Ce perpétuel contact marial, m’écrivait-il le 28 octobre 1967, m’enchante et me fait du bien. Dulcis amor meus, disait le cher Alcuin. » Le 14 décembre il ajoutait : « Plus on se sent démuni, mieux ca vaut. Quand on se sait sans mérite, on peut tout attendre de la Miséricorde. » Lui se jugeait vraiment sans mérite ; la Miséricorde, pate accueilli : Marie, la Trinité Sainte. Maintenant il contemple et il adore. G. Jouassarp. Le P. Barré n’avait pas eu le souci de dresser la liste de ses publications, C’est grace au concours de ses amis et des directeurs des principales Revues auxquelles ila collaboré habituellement que 1a bibliographie qui suit a pu @tre établie ; n'y figurent pas les nombreux articles ou notices bibliographiques que le P, Barré a publiés dans le bulletin du Séminaixe frangais de Rome Echos de Santa-Chiare,1937 1938 1939 1942 1944 1949 1950 1951 1952 Bibliographie du Pére Henri Barré Marie Reine du monde. — Bulletin de la Socidié frangaise d'études mariales, 3° année, p. 19-91. De la souveraineté de Maric. Rapport de Théologie morale — Souverainets de Marie. Congris marial national de Boulogne-sur-Mev 1938. Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1938, p. 149-173. La Royauté de Marie pendant les neuf premiers siécles. — Recherches de sciences religieuses, t, 29, p. 129-162 ; 303-334. La chair et Vesprit, dans Oflag VIII F. Foyer vetrouvé. Conférences, Paris, Alsatia (1942), P. 9-35. M, BreMonp et J. GaupEME’, avec la collaboration de H. Barng, P. HARDOUIN, P. DRovIN, J. VANDENESCH. L'Ermpive chvétion et ses destinges on Occident du xI° du xIUe sidcle. Essai sur les forces d’univer- salisme et de particulavisme dans l'Europe du moyen age, Travaux de VOflag VIII F. Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1044. — (Le P. H. Barré a rédigé les chapitres suivants : Ife partie, chapitre 1, La mentaliié chrétienne de Uhomme médidval, p. 9-22 ; Chapitre Ut Le penseur médiéval, p. 34-49 ; chapitre Iv, Le mouvement intellectuel, p. 50-66, Ile partie ; De'la chrétienté aux états modernes, chapitre 1V, section 1, L’Eglise, p. 324-339. La ctoyance & 1’Assomption corporelle en Occident de 750 & x150 environ. — Bulletin de la Société francaise d'études mariales, 7° aunée, :p. 63-123. Dossier complémentaire [sur I'Assomption]. — Bulletin de la Société Srangaise d'études mariales, 8° année, p. 33-70. La définition dogmatique du dogme de l’Assomption. — Bulletin de la Soacitté frangaise d’éiudes mariales, 8° année, p. 209-223. Possibilité de la définition du dogme de MAssomption. — Comple rendu du VI Congrés Marvial National. Rennes, 4-9 juillet 1950. Assomption de Notre-Dame, p. 153-177. Marie et l'Viglise. Du vénérable Bade & saint Albert le Grand, — Bulletin de la Société francaise d'études maviales, 9° année, p. 59-143. Le témoignage de saint Francois de Sales sur l'Assomption corporelle de Marie. — Marianum, t. 13, p. 292-305. Une priére d’Ekbert de Schénau au Saint Coeur de Marie. — Ephemerides mariologicae, t. 2, p. 409-423. Le « Planctus Mariae » attribué 4 saint Bernard. — Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique, t. 28, p. 243-266. Le consentement a I'Incarnation rédemptrice, La Vierge seule ou le Christ @abord ? — Mavianum, t. 14, p. 233-266,6 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 BIBLIOGRAPHIE DU PERE HENRI BARRE Saint Bernard, docteur marial. — Analecta Sacri Ordinis cisterciensis, t. 9, 1053 (Saini Bernard Théologien, Actes du congrés de Dijon, 15-19 septembre 1953), P- 92-113. Dans la Iumiére de saint Bernard. — Lumen Vitae, t. 8, p. 175-183. Le « De quatuor virtutibus Mariae » et son auteur. — Ephemevides mario- logccae, t. 3, P. 231-244. CR : Denau Pierre-Thomas, Eve et Marie, Bouvines, 1950, 396 p.—- Marianum t. 15, P. 94-95. De Pie IX A Pie XII. L’enseignement des Papes sur l'Immaculée Concep- tion. — L'Immaculée Conception, Congrés marial de Lyon 1954, Lyon, 1954, P. 95-112. Spiritualité mariale du vénérable Pare Libermann. — Maria, Etudes sur la Sainte Vierge, publiées sous la direction d’Hubert du Manoir. Vol. IIT, Paris, Beauchesné, p. 379-401. Marie et l'figlise dans la pensée médiévale, — La Vie spivituelle, t. ox, n. 308, p. 124-141. Congrés marial de Lyon 29 juin 4 6 juillet 1954. — Marianum, t. 16, p. 378-379. Immaculée Conception et Assomption au xmr° siécle. — Virgo Immaculata, Acta congressus mariologici-maviant Romas 1954 celebrati. Vol. V, De Immaculata Conceptione in epocha introductoria scholasticae. Romae, Academia Mariana Internationalis, 1955, p. 151-180. Le « mystire » d’Eve a la fin de l'époque patristique en Occident. — Bulletin de la Société frangaise d'études mariales, t. 13, p. 61-97. La nouvelle Hive dans la pensée médiévale, d’Ambroise Autpert au pseudo- Albert, — Bulletin de ia Société frangaise d'études mariales, aunée 14, Dp. 1-26. La féte mariale du 18 décembre & Bénévent au vue sitcle. — Ephemerides mariologicae, t. 6, p. 451-461. A la Société frangaise d'études mariales (Angers 13-15 septembre 1955). — Marvianum, t. 18, p. 133-134. Société frangaise d’études mariales (Besangon 4-6 septembre 1956). — Marianum, t. 18, p. 49-420. CR : Maria-Eeclesia, Regina et Mirabilis, Abadia di Montserrat, 1956, 178 p. — Marianum, t. 18, p. 426-428. Le sermon « Exhortatut » est-il de saint Idefonse ? — Revue bénédictine, +. 67, p. 10-33. La lettre du pseudo-Jéréme sur 1’ Assomption est-elle antérieure & Paschase Radbert ? — Revue’ bénédictine, t. 68, p. 203-225. Deux sermons du x1 sitcle pour la #€te de la Conception. — Sciences ecolésiastiques, t. 10, p. 341-359- Texts Mariologici selecti a saeculo vi ad saeculum vil, — Facultas theologica « Marianum », Roma, 1958-1959, 97 p. (ad usum auditorum), «La Nouvelle Eve» a la Société Frangaise d'études mariales, Chevilly, ra-r4 septembre 1957. — Ephemerides mariologicae, t. 8, p. 313-316. La royauté de Marie au x1 siécle en Occident. — Maria et Ecclesia, Acta congressus mariologici-mariani im civitate Louvdes anno 1958 celebrati. Vol. V, Mariae potestas vegalis in Ecclesiam, Romae, Academia Mariana Internationalis, p. 93-119.BIBLIOGRAPHIE DU PERE HENRI BARRE 7 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 La matetnité spirituelle de Marie dans Ja pensée médiévale. — Bulletin de la Société francaise d'études maviales, 16° année, p, 87-118, Les premiéres priéres mariales de 1’Occident. — Marianum, t. 21, p. 128- 173. L’hymne acathiste en Occident. — Mavianum, t. 21, p. 291-297. L’homélie du pseudo-Albert sut Luc x1, 27 est-elle d’Odon de Morimond ? — Collectanea Ordinis Cisterciensium Reformatorum, t. 21, p. 121-129. Appunti raccolti alle lezioni di Patristica Mariana. — Facultas theologica « Marianum », Romae, 1959, 22 p. (Texte polycopié). CR : Cascante DAvirta Juan M., Doctrina mariana de S, Ildefonso de Toledo. Barcelona, 1958, 356 p. ~ Marianum, t. 21, p. 406-407, GéssANN M.-B., Die Verkiindigung an Maria im dogmatischen Versténdnis des Mittelalters, Munich, 1957, 303 p. — Marianum, t. 21, p. 407-409. Prigres mariales du x° siécle. — Ephemerides mariologicas, t. 10, p. 195-221. Société d'études mariales (Blois, 9-12 septembre 1959) : Ta Maternité spiri- tuelle de Marie, — Ephemerides mariologicae, t. 10, D. 133-134. CR : ScuerrczvK Leo, Das Mariengeheimnis in Frommigkeit und Lehre der Karolingerzeit, Leipzig, 1959, XXIV-530 p. — Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, t. 55, B. 551-353. Autonr de I'hymne acathiste. — Marianum, t. 23, p. 98-105. Lhomiliaire carolingien de Mondsee. — Revue bénddictine, t. 71, p- 71-107. CR : GormAN John C., William of Newburgh’s + Explanatio sacri epithalamii in matrem Sponsi», A Commentary on the « Canticle of Canticles» (rath Cent.). Fribourg, 1960, X-370 p. — Marianwm, t. 23, p. 351-353. Les Homéliaires carolingiens de I’Ficole d’Auxerre. Authenticité. Inven- taire. Tableaux comparatifs. Initia. — Studie Testi, n° 225. Cittd del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolicae Vaticana, x-358 p. apport marial de l'Orient & V’Occident de saint Ambroise & saint Anselme, — Bulletin de la Société francaise d'études mariales, 19° année, P. 27-89. Prigres anciennes de l’Occident A la Mére du Sauveur. Des origines & saint Anselme, — Paris, Lethiellenx, 1963, x-360 p. et 1 pl. Sermons matials inédits « in Natali Domini », — Marianum, t. 25, p. 39-93- L/ceuvre mariale de saint Gérard de Csan4d. — Marianum, t. 25, p. 262- 296. Le sermon pseudo-augustinien App. 121. — Revue des études augusti- niennes, t. 9, p. 111-137. 1g meilleur prétre que je connaisse (le P, Bisson). — Bulletin des Anciens laves du Petit Séminaire de Séez, n° 32 (consacré au Jubilé d’Or du Petit Séminaire, 1913-1963), mai 1963, p. 21-27. CR : Rippercer Albert, Der Pseudo-Hieronymus Briefe IX « Cogitis me », Hin erster marianischer Traktat des Mittelalters von Paschasius Radbert. Fribourg, 1962, xtv-150 p.— Marianum, t. 25, p. 77-181. Saint Bernard et le « Salve Regina », — Marianum, t. 26, p. 208-216. Pro Fulberto. — Recherches de ihdologie anciewne et médiévale, t. 31, P. 324-330. Sermons marials de Bernon de Reichenau. — Ephemerides mariologicae, t. 14, p. 39-62.8 BIBLIOGRAPHIE DU PERE HENRI BARRE Un homéliaire bénéventain du x1¢ siécle (Vatican Lat. 4222). — Mélanges Eugene Tisserand, vol, 6. Studi e Testi n. 236, Cit’ del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, p. 89-119. CR : Grarvius Peregrine Maria, The «Corona gloriose Virginis Marie». An historical Study with some dcctrinsl Conclusions concerning our Lady’s Crown of five Psalms. Roma, 1964, 189 p.—- Marianum, t. 26, p. 485-488, 1965 « Trinité que j'adore... ». Perspectives théologiques. (‘Théologie, pastorale et spiritualité, recherches et synthéses, n. 15), Paris, Lethielleux, 208 p. ‘Textes marials inédits du x® siécle. — Marianum, t. 27, p. 3-71. 1966 L,'intercession de la Vierge aux débuts du Moyen Age occidental. — Bulle- tin de la Socité francaise a'études mariales, t. 23, D. 77-104. Corrections dans V’antiphonaire de Saint-Pierre. — Revue bénédictine, t. 76, p. 343-357- Ténigme du Mariale Magnum. — Ephemerides mariologicae, t. 16, 265-288. CR: Lumarré Joseph, Le Bréviaire de Ripoll, Paris BN lat, 742. Hetude sur sa composition et ses textes inédits, (Scripta et Documenta 14), Montserrat, 1965, 236 p. — Revue d’Histoive de I’ Eglise de France, t. 52, p. 156-158. 1967 Antiennes et répons de la Vierge. — Marianum, t. 29, p. 153-254. Le culte marial en Afrique aprés saint Augustin. — Revue des études augustiniennes, t. 13, p. 285-317. ‘Un plaidoyer monastique pour le samedi marial. — Revue bénédictine, t. 77, PB. 375-399. Exégise de Jean 19, 25-27 et développement doctrinal, — Maria in Sacra Scviptura, Acta Congressus mariologici-mariani in Republica Dominicana anno 1965 celebrati, Vol. V. De beata Virgine Maria in Evangelio S. Joannis et in Apocalypsi. Romae, Academia Mariana Internationalis, Pp. 161-170, CR : Gr&corre Reginald, Les Homéliaires du Moyen Age, Inventaire et analyse des manuscrits, Roma, 1966, viIt-266 p. — Revue des études augusti- niennes, t, 13, 1967, Pp. 412-413. 1968 A la recherche du Missel d’Aleuin. — Ephemerides liturgicae, t. 82, p. 3-44 (en collaboration avec Jean Deshussés). La Messe «Salve sancta parens» est-clle d'origine romaine ? — Marianum, +. 30, p. 1-25. Haymon d'Auxerre, — Dictionnaire de spiritualité, t. 7, fase. 44-45, col. 91-97. Héric d’Auxerre. — Dictionnaive de spivitualité, t, 7, fasc. 44-45, col. 282-285, Travaux & parattre Marie et I’ Esprit dans la Tradition occidentale jusqu’a saint Thomas d’Aquin (f 1274). — Bulletin de la Société jrangaise d'études mariates, 25° année, 1960. Homéliaires latins, — Distionnaire de spivitualité, t. 7, fase. 46-47, 1969. Homéliaires. — Lexikon der Marienkunde. Un statut d’Urbain I. — Marianum, t. 31, 1969. Origin of Marian Cult in the West — The Marian Eva (Chicago), t. 9, 1969. Samedis marials (ouvrage que le Pére Borré a achevé d’écrire aut printemps 1968),The Theory of Signs in St. Augustine’s De doctrina christiana® Augustine describes the subject matter of Books Two and ‘Three of De doctrina christiana by the phrases ‘ docirina signorum’ and‘ de signis”, In these two books he is concerned with the second part of the principles for understanding Scripture. (I. 1, t, 2) ‘The first part, which comprises Book One of the treatise, he calls‘ de vebus’. (I. 11. 2,17) ‘There Augustine summarizes the main doctrines of the faith and concludes that the primary principle by which interpretation of Scripture should be guided is the building of love of God and neighbor’. In Books Two and ‘Three he moves on from this general principle to more specific advice for handling the difficulties encountered in Scriptural exegesis. But before taking up * ‘This article is a revision of a chapter in‘ Semantics and Hermeneutics in Saint Angustine’s De Doctrina Christiana’, a dissertation presented by the author for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Vale University, 1967. 1. De docty. chr. 1. 1. 2, 1, XI 44, 15, IL. 1, 1, 3, and Xxxvi. 56, 45. References to De doctrina are to book, chapter, paragraph, and line (in that order) of the Corpus Christianorum edition of Josef Martin (Series Latina, XXXII, Turnhout : Brepols, 1962), The full reference will not be given when a certain passage is the stated topic of discussion or when the reference would differ only in paragraph and line from one immediately preceding it, I adhere to the following conventions in the use of Latin words : a) All Latin words will be italicized. b) When mentioned in an English sentence, a Latin word or phrase will be enclosed in single quotation marks. B. g., ‘ Res’ is a difficult term to translate. ©) When used in an English sentence, a Latin word or phrase will not be enclosed in quotation marks. E. g., A res can also be a sign. 4) When a Latin word, phrase, or clause occurs in parentheses to show what I am quoting or paraphrasing, it will be quoted exactly from the text ; but when used or mentioned in a sentence, if a noun, the nominative case will be given, if a verb, the present active infinitive will be given, 2, For a sound analysis of Book One see Gilbert Isracu, Le livre 19 du‘ De doctrina christiana' de saint Augustin, in Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, XXXIL (1956), pp. 289-330.10 B. DARRELL JACKSON these difficulties he states, in a few short paragraphs (II. 1, r-tv. 5), a theory of signs. Although this theory was proposed for a definite use and not for its own sake, it is nevertheless intrinsically interesting. Moreover, Augustine's use of this theory can be fully appreciated only if the theory itself is clearly understood. In this article I shall, therefore, interpret the theory of signs in De doctrina I. 1-5 apart from Augustine’s application of it. First, I shall carefully analyze the text. For clarification and ampli- fication of certain difficult and important points I shall refer to other parts of De doctrina, some of Augustine's other writings, and selected Latin writers. ‘wo of Augustine's early works will be most important — De dialectica, written in Milan while he was awaiting baptism in 387%, and De magisiro, written two years later. Of his later writings, De Trinitate will be useful. On the basis of this textual analysis I shall formulate Augustine's theory of signs. Then I shall move to a wider context. First, the possible background for Augustine’s theory will be considered. ‘The conclusion will be that only in logic were signs treated in the manner of Augustine’s treat- ment. To establish the extent of Augustine’s contact with the logical tradition I shall, in the second place, examine what he knows and professes to know about logic. With this as a basis I shall then compare Augustine’s theory of signs with the semantics of the two great logical systems of antiquity — the Aristotelian and the Stoic, My aim is not just to establish possible sources, but primarily to clarify Augustine’s position. Several scholars have dealt with the issues which I shall be considering. R,-A. Markus‘ and K. Kuypers® have examined Augustine’s theory of signs. H.-I. Marrou has looked at Augustine’s logic’, Several writers have studied Augustine’s relation to Stoic logic, especially with reference to De dialectica’. I find myself in only partial agreement with most of these authors. At some points their analysis of Augustine's logic and of Stoic logic lacks both historical accuracy and technical precision. 3. Retractationes I, vir (1, vr in Migne ; in general references to Augustine’s works are to Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum editions. Exceptions will be noted). This work, regarded as spurious by the Benedictine editors of Augustine, is now widely accepted as the De dialectica mentioned by Augustine in the Retr. For recent discussions of authenticity see H-I. Marrov, Saint Augustin et la fin de la Culture Antique, 4th edition including the Retvactatio published in 1949 (Paris : Hiditions E. de Boccard, 1958), pp. 576-8, and Jan Pinzorc, Das Sprachdenken der Stoa und Augustins Dialektik, in Classica et Mediaevalia, XXIII (1962), Pp. 149-151. 4. SE Augustine om Signs, in Phronesis, IL (1957), 60-83. 5. Der Zeichen- und Wortbegriff im Denken Augustins (Amsterdam : N. V. Swets & Zeitlinger, 1934). 6. Saint Augustin, pp. 240-248, 7. PENBoRG of. cit. ; Georg Priicersporrren, Zu Bosthius, De Interp.... nebst Beobachtung zuy Geschichte dey Dialehtik bei den ROmern, in Wiener Studien, LVI (1953), 131-154; and Ulrich Ducnrow, Sprachverstdindnis und Biblisches Héren bei Augustin (Titbingen : J, C. B, Mohr, 1965), pp. 42-62.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 1 A. — THE THEORY oF sIGNs IN De doctrina christiana IL. 1. I-IV. 5. x. The definition of ‘ signum’ (I. u. 2 and IL. 1, 2) Augustine twice defines‘ signum ' in De doctrina : Definition 1 — « Signs are things which are used to signify something (... signa, res... quae ad significandum aliquid adhibentur. I. u. 2, 11 £.). » Definition 2 —« A sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon the senses (Signum est enim res practer speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem uenire,.... II. 1. 1, 5-7) 8. Both definitions are general. ‘The second is more elaborate than the first. Both say (a) that a sign is a ves and (b) that it bears a certain rela- tion to something else (aliud aliquid). I shall consider each of these points. A sign is aves. In Book One Augustine gives two meanings to the term ‘ves’. First, it refers properly to that which is not used to signify something else (guae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur, I. 1. 2, 2 £.), stich as wood, stone, cattle, and so on. Second, it refers improperly to anything whatsoever that is (I infer this from ‘ quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est’, 13f.)®. Anything not a res in the improper sense is nothing at all. In this latter sense ‘ves’ may be applied to such things as words and the stone which Jacob slept on, which in addition to being something also signify something (4-10). Clearly a sign, like everything else that exists, is a ves in this second and improper sense, for it must be if it is to signify, But a sign is a res only in the improper sense, for in addition to existing it signifies. A sign is a ves or thing which bears a certain relation to other things. Augustine says that things are learned by signs (res per signa discuntur, I. 11. 2, 1£.). It would appear that his term for the relation of signs to things is‘ signify’. So we have. (x) things learned by signs, and (2) signs signifying things. The second relation must, however, be inferred, for in the two defining chapters Augustine never says that signs signify ves. Rather he uses the vague terms ‘ aliquid’ and ‘ aliud aliquid’. In this he is similar to Cicero, who uses‘ quiddam ’ in his definition!®, Quintilian, on the other 8, From St. Aucusting : On Christian Doctrine, trans. by D. W. Robertson, Jx., copyright (c) 1958 by The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. (Indianapolis), reprinted by permission of the Liberal Arts Press Division of The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., POA: property ' translates Augustine's‘ proprie’ at I. 1. 2, 2. He gives no term for‘ improperly ’, Kuvpers, p. 78, calls them ‘ cine weitere und eine engere Bedeutung ’, with‘ engere ' corresponding to‘ proper *. 10, De inuentione I. XXX. 48,12 B. DARRELL JACKSON hand, does speak of alia res which are understood by signs!, The reason. the second relation can be inferred with res as the second term is that what is signified, the ‘ something else’, must be a res in at least the improper sense if it is to be anything at all. In De doctrina Augustine does not investigate further the logical qualities of this relation. In De magistro he had established that the relation of signifying can be reciprocal and reflexive, but it need not bel?. No more can be said about the something signified from these two chap- ters (I. mand II. 1. 1), except that all the examples given are of the signi- fication of rather concrete things : an animal by a track, a fire by smoke, emotion by a voice, advance or retreat by a trumpet (IL. 1.1, 7-11), More can be said, however, about the relation of signifying itself. Definition 2 includes specification of the mechanism of signifying. Although it does not use the word ‘ significare ’, it follows immediately upon Augustine’s statement that he will now consider signs not as they are but as they signify (r. 1, 3-3). This mechanism has two stages : (1) the sign is known as an impression upon the senses, and (2) causes something else to come into thinking. These two stages or aspects are duplicated by the definition given in De dialectica : «A sign is something that is (x) itself sensed and which (2) indicat something beyond itself to the mind (Signum est et quod se ipsum Sensui, et practer se aliquid animo ostendil. V. 9-10). » ‘The only difference is a trivial one. In De dialectica Augustine names the mind, whereas in De docirina he names what the mind does, namely, thinking (cogitatio). Quintilian speaks in the latter way when he says that a onpetov is that by which another thing is understood (intelligitur, V.1x. 9). Cicero's definition, on the other hand, is less anthropological in reference to the second stage, but is the same as Augustine's in the first. «A sign is something (1) apprehended by one of the senses which (2) signifies something that is seen to follow from it ». (Signum est quod sub sensum aliquem cadit et quiddam significat quod ex tpso profectum widetur,.... De inu. I. Xxx. 48)". 11, Imstitutio ovatoria V. 1x. 9. 12, Reciprocity is illustrated by‘ noun ' and‘ word ' which can signify each other, for‘ word’ is a noun and‘ noun 'isa word. (De mag. v.11) Reflexivity obtains in the case of‘ noun * which can refer to itself as well as to other nouns, (Vr. 18). 13. De dialectica witl be referred to by chapter and line of chapter of the Benedic- tine text reprinted in Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. XXXTI, columns, 1409-1420 (printed there with the title ‘ Principia Dialecticae’), A Erench translation of this incomplete treatise is found in vol. IV of Guvres Complétes de Saint Augustin (Paris : Libraire de Louis Vivés, 1873), pp. 52-68. 14. For the Latin or Greek text of most classical authors to whom I refer throughout the article I have used the editions in the Loeb Classical Library (London: Wm. Heinemann Ltd. and Cambridge : by permission of Harvard University Press, Cambridge). Exceptions are noted.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 13 Because of the generality of all of these definitions, I hesitate to call them‘ anthropological '. Indeed Augustine even speaks of the apprehen- sion of signs by animals. (IL. 1. 3, 9 ff.) Terms like ‘ cogitatio’ and ‘animus’ are, nevertheless, primarily anthropological terms. This should be expected, for Augustine's topic in Books Two and Three is a certain kind of signs in so far as men are concerned withit. (um. 3, 6-7) In any case, in addition to (x) the sign and (2) what is signified by it, Augustine's definition of ‘ signwm' includes within the signifying situation (3) the subject to whom the sign indicates something. Thus Markus concludes that for Augustine the relation of signifying is triadic!®, 2. § Signa naturalia et data’ (IL. x, 2-11, 3). After giving this very general description of signs, Augustine divides signs into two kinds, signa naturalia and signa data, ‘The former are those which without any intention or desie of signifying, make us aware of something beyond themselves, as smoke signifies fire, Tt does this without any will to signify (. . . sine woluntate alque ullo appetitu significandi .....Non.. . uolens significare ... . 11. 2, 12-15), Other examples of signa natwralia are the track of an animal and the facial expressions of an angry or sad person. Augustine says he will not discuss this kind of sign further. (22-24). Becatse it includes the divinely given signs contained in the Holy Scriptures, the other class is more important. (11. 3, 7-8) Signa data are . .. those which living creatures show to one another for the purpose of conveying, in so far as they are able, the motions of their spirits or something’ which they have sensed or understood. Nor is there any other reason for signifying, that is, for giving signs (significandi, id est signi dandi), except for bringing forth and transferring to another mind (animum) what is conceived in the mind of the person who gives the sign, (1. 3, 1-6)" Here the situation is more complex than in the definitions of ‘sign’. Now two subjects are involved, the sign-giver and the one to whom the sign is given, ‘This muchisclear. But there is disagreement in the secondary literature on the precise nature of signa data. ‘This disagreement focuses on the question of translation. ‘There is no problem with signa naturalia. ‘They may be named ‘ natural signs ’*. 15, MarKus, pp. 72f. 16, ROBERTSON, pp. 348, 17. Ibid,, p. 35, altered,4 B. DARRELL JACKSON Most translators call signa data‘ conventional signs "8. In a short but well documented article J. Engels has argued against this!” He correctly points out that what distinguishes these two kinds of signs is the presence or absence of will, intention. Natural signs are those which occur without intention of signifying (sine woluntate significandi, u. 3, 14). They merely happen. Signa data, on the other hand, are given. They occur because some one wills that they occur. Engels, therefore, prefers a literal translation of ‘ signa data’ as‘ given (donnés) signs #4 or even ‘intentionally given signs ™. Markus suggests an interesting way of looking at the contrast between natural and given signs. They are distinguished «.. . . according to whether the relation of dependence is between the sign and the object, or between the sign and the subject »9. Smoke is a sign of fire and depends upon fire since the latter causes it?4 Markus goes beyond Augustine, however, when he says that signa data depend upon the will of the sign- giver for their significance®®. At least he goes beyond these early chapters of Book Two. For all that Augustine says here is that signa data depend upon the will of the sign-giver for their occurrence, not for their meaning, Augustine does comment in other places on the place of will in meaning. In the etymological debates of antiquity the extreme positions were, on the one hand, that words are naturally suited to the things they signify and, on the other hand, that words are imposed arbitrarily, that is, by convention®®, When he wrote De dialectica Augustine took a middle position, regarding some words as having a natural rationale but con- sciously diverging from the Stoic view that all words have a natural origin. (vi. 3-5, 39-41, and 113-116) In his later writings he seems to move even farther away from the Stoic position. Of particular interest is a chapter in De doctyina II where Augustine says that certain letters and sounds mean one thing to the Latins, another to the Greeks, not because of nature but because each society has its own agreement and consent as to their significance (non natura, sed placito et consensione significandi, II. 18, Ibid., p. 34; J. F, Suaw (trans.), On Christian Doctrine, in Nicene and Post- Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol, II (New York : Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1887), P. 536; G. Compks and J, FaRces (trans), La Doctrine Chrétienne, in Cuvres de Saint Augustin (Bibliothéque Augustinienne, First Series, XI, Paris ; Desclée de Brouwer, 1949), p. 241. 19. La docivine du signe chet saint Augustin, in Studia Patvistica, vol. VI, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin : Akademie-Verlag, 1962), pp. 366-373. 20. Ibid., p. 37%. 21, Loc. 0 22, Tbid., p. 372. 23, MARKUS, p. 72. 24. Ibid., p. 73. 25, Loc. cit. 26, See AULUS GrILIUs, Nocles Atticae X. 1v, where the contrast is expressed by three sets of terms : Naturalia-positiua, naturalia-arbitravia, and pbcet-Gécel.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 15 XXIV. 37, 10-12 and ff)27. ‘Thus in De doctrina, at least, Augustine holds that an important class of signs (letters and sounds) has significance by convention. Although he does not here speak of the will, he obviously presupposes its presence in the agreement made within a society. We can say, therefore, that Augustine speaks of will with respect to both the occurrence and the significance of signs. Not willed Willed x) Occurrence —naturalia data (IL. 1. 241. 3) 2) Significance natura placitum et consensio (IL. xxrv. 37) Although will operates in both signa data and in consensio, it operates for different ends in each, namely, for occurrence and for significance, ‘To translate‘ data ’ by’ conventional ’ is to confuse these ends. In the early chapters of Book ‘Iwo now under consideration, Augustine is concerned only with occurrence. As Engels has noted, Augustine does not relate intentional giving and conventional significance, A relation can, however, be inferred from De docirina. ‘The most important type of signs given intentionally are words. (11. 4, tof. and 14-16) Now words and their constituent parts have their significance by convention. (II. XXIV. 37) Most intentionally given signs, therefore, are significant by convention. 3.‘ Signa data’ — the full scheme (II. u. 3) Data vero signa sunt, quae sibi quaeque uiuentia innicem dant ad demonstrandos, quantum possunt, motus animi sui uel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet. Nec ulla causa est nobis significandi, id est signi dandi, nisi ad depromendum et traiciendum in alterius animum id, quod animo gerit, qui signum dat, (II. 1, 3, 1-6)% T have already noted that the definition of ‘ signa data’ is more com- plex than the definition of‘ signwm’. ‘The added complexity comes first in there being both a sign-giver and a sign-receiver instead of just the latter. This indicates that in signa data Augustine takes up the topic of communication (communicant, 1m. 4, 2). Whereas the starting point in the definition of ‘ sign ’ is the sign, the starting point in the definition of ‘ given signs ’ is something which a living being wishes to show to another living being. In the movement from this something to its being shown Augustine sees several elements. But because he does not specify or elaborate on the nature of these elements, considerable use of other 27, See also De musica VI. 1x. 24 (Migue, PL 32) — wocabulis . . . placito enim, non natura imponuntur. 28, ENGELS, p. 372. 29. Quoted in translation, above pp. 13f.B. DARRELL JACKSON 16 snuenpsSo0 sonb wnsas mnudrs snuupaad apuoue ponb ungaon ‘ apsoa up (sneuzos won { gouos ponh wngsan winqaan | oinp30o 24 Da Qu) DIswaI9S "AK “ung aq (a) (oxozp) wnpuvorfiusys ponb P) anpBeyaqr -yp pny asda §—_agousguoo owirtn us ogaan us ponb “yppaooad wnqaen £ anpouay oun osds S1nuas snug = tunquon Amp oa (p) snuinssad zpsoa ponb wngaon tunusun auenuos ‘ snuij4o8 oueuo zr mms sypuaupnn ux + ofgnaoy $ saaon oxonSo0 “E-aop og (0) rep reqypaonb vyocyan (, oop nurs , uenuaup tpunp suits “0° tunusis nb aod -tuy ho Dstias jan yo ujeq) €-1 smndayy oujun pond ‘pe Ins tuinun smo “11 a20p og (a) (, wnusis , pinbyo pnyo sngisuas paadug (sea 8) jo “ugeq) Tr yo ounpiSoo ‘uiond ‘sevsas wnudis “I “aop aq (2) (s) (r) () (2) (1) veep ousis — ZIVTHE THEORY OF SIGNS 17 passages in De doctrina and in some of Augustine's other writings will be required for their interpretation. In partictlar I shall try to show that several passages summarized in the table above contain notions similar to and sometimes identical with those in De doctrina’s description of signa data. ‘The key elements of the latter description (ow b) as well as those of the definition of ‘ sign’ (row a) are included for convenient reference. ‘The other passages include an analogy for the manifestation in flesh of the Word (row c), the semantic scheme of De dialectica (row d), and an analogy for the Incarnation from De érinitate (row e). The justification for using the latter passage, which was written nearly twenty years after De doctrina II, is twofold. First, its notions and some of its terms are similar to the notions and terms of De doctrina, Second, the theme in De trinitate XV. x-x1 is the likeness of our words to the Word. ‘The same theme is found in De doctrina itself (c) and even earlier (De fide ef symbolo IIT. 3-4). Before turning to the texts I would make a general observation about them. All contain two kinds of notions, In the first pace, each contains something psychological. Augustine talks about the mind, sensation, knowledge, thought, ete. In the second place, each contains something semantic. Augustine deals with signs, words, signifying, etc, ‘The psy- chology and the semantics cannot be separated, although in De dialectica V semantics dominates and in De trinitale XV psychology dominates. In De doctrina II. 1-1 they are more evenly balanced. Vet the psychology appeats in order that a complete account may be given of signification by living beings, especially by men, The rubric of this book is ‘de signis ’ and the application of these early chapters to Scriptural hermeneutics makes use primarily of the properly semantic notions (signum, res, significatio)*, Hence I shall call the theory in IL, rv ‘ semantics ‘3 even though Augustine is concerned as well with what goes on in the mind of the signgiver and sign-receiver. (x) and (2) ‘Yhings and their apprehension Now I shall take up each of the elements mentioned in the description of signa daia. Communication starts with things which one living being wishes to show to another. I have placed this starting point — motus animi swi uel sensa aut intellecta — in the second column, Because 30. See, for example, IT, x. 15. 3-12 — the crucial definitions of signa propria and signa transiata, ILI. v1. 10-1X. 13 — the discussion of various attitudes toward figurative signs, and III, XXv. 34-36 — a discussion of the varicties of figurative signification, 31, ‘ Semantics ' may be defined briefly as the analysis of expressions and their signification, See Rudolf Caxnar, Introduction to Semantics (Cambridge ; Hatvard University Press, 1942), pp. of. 32, These numbers in parentheses correspond to the column numbers in the table,18 B. DARRELL JACKSON * sensa aut intellecta’ seems less ambiguous in meaning than ‘ motws animi’, I shall consider it first. In De doctrina and other writings Augus- tine uses variations of this pair of terms to designate two classes of objects according to the ways in which they are apprehended. This is implicit in two passages in De doctrina. Once Augustine speaks of the diverse goods which move men. Some pertain to the bodily senses, some to the understanding of the mind (.. . ad corporis sensum .. . ad animé intellegen- tiam pertinent, L. vit. 7, 4-6). He gives examples only of the former —sky, sun, earth, body. Then later, in Book Iwo, Augustine makes a similar division of divinely instituted docivinae in gentilibus into those which pertain to the sensus corporis, such as history and astronomy, and those which pertain to the ratio anim#, such as logic and arithmetic, (II, xxvi. 41, 4-5 and xxVvIMI-xxxvitI) The same distinction of objects according to mode of apprehension is found in other writings as well. In De dialectica a ves, which is what a sign designates, is said to be whatever is the object of understanding or sense perception or even of ignorance (Res est quidquid intelligituy wel sentitur uel latet. (V. 2-3) In De magistro Augustine makes a universal statement : All things which we perceive we perceive either by a sense of the body or by the mind. The former are called ‘ sensibilia’, the latter ‘intelligibilia ’. (XII. 39) Earlier in the book he gives examples of these two kinds of ves. Romulus, Rome, and a river are instances of sensibilia ; virtue is an instance of intelligibilia. (IV. 8 ad fin) T,ater (around 415) in the twelfth book of De Genes? ad littevam Augustine expanded this twofold scheme into a threefold scheme —~ bodily, spiritual, and intellectual vision. (XII. vr. I§-vo. 16)°* The expansion comes in the addition of spiritual vision which is the visualization of an absent body. In De doctrina, however, the more normal twofold scheme is found. In De Genesi Augustine gives several more examples of objects seen by intellectual vision: the mind itself, love, joy, peace, God. (XII. xxiv. 50) ‘Thus the ‘ sensa aut intellecta ' of De doctrina IL. 11. 3 (row b) seems to refer to things which are sensed and understood. The definition of “ sign ’ in IT. x. x (a) furnishes an example of this. First, the sign (or any other sensible or intelligible thing) has a being of its own. ‘Then it is apprehended by the senses (or by the mind in the case of an intelligible thing). ‘The analysis of ‘ sensa aut intellecta’ allows us therefore, to say something about both columns (1) and (2). In column (1) we have objects or, in Augustine's language, ves ; in column (2) we have the recep- tion or apprehension of those objects in two ways. In De trinitate XV (e) Augustine calls this reception ‘ scientia’, which comes about when we 33. For a full discussion of this see the unpublished Harvard dissertation by Gareth B. Martuews, An Interpretation and Critique of the Concept of the Inner Man in the Epistemology of St. Augustine, 1960, Ihave also made use of a translation of selections from De Genesi XII by Gareth and Mary Martmews in mimeograph form (undated).THE THEORY OF SIGNS 19 know a res (res quam scimus, x. 19). He does not use‘ scientia’ in De doctrina II. 1-1v, but it is interesting that he considers the study of Scripture to be at the level of scientia, and this latter is knowledge of various ves. (II. vit. 10, 13-30) The phrase‘ motus animi’ does not fit into this scheme easily. It can be interpreted in at least two ways on the basis of its use in De docirina. First, it refers to emotion, or perhaps attitude. Augustine uses it of wrath and sadness (II. 1. 2, 20), of that which is expressed by untransla- table interjections (x. 16, 15), and of charity and cupidity (ITT. x. 16, 32- 35). In this usage he follows Varro, who calls fear ‘ a certain motion of the mind '*4, Taken in this sense ‘ motus animi’ belongs in column (2), although in a peculiar way. It is not the apprehension of an external thing (hence it does not belong in column 1), but originates in the mind. Vet it is similar to this apprehension in that it may be a kind of raw datum — something immediately known and as yet unreflected upon. A second way of interpreting ‘ motus animi’ has less obvious grounding in Augustine but presents an interesting possibility, In the discussion of the role of consent in language, Augustine says that the same sound moves men’s minds diversely (animos mouent .. . diverse), for they understand it in accordance with the convention of their own society. (II. XXIV. 37, 15-20) Although the association with understanding (intellegit) might lead us to place this movement of the mind in column (2), a passage in Seneca suggests that ‘ motus animi’ may also belong in column (3). Seneca uses ‘ motus animorum’ to explicate the Stoic doctrine of the nexrov’®, He says there are bodies which we see and sounds which we speak. In addition there are certain motions of minds which declare or mean something about bodies (corporum ; de corpore). I do not wish to discuss the lekton at the moment, — It is sufficient to note that it involves more than apprehension. ‘There is a certain reflection, an attending to what has been apprehended, and this, as will be seen, belongs at the next stage (column 3) in Augustine’s scheme. (3) Conception Moving to that next stage, there may be some question whether it is really distinguishable in De doctrina II. 1m. 3. I have isolated‘ id, quod animo gerit". "This, Augustine says, is brought forth and transferred to another mind by giving sigus. (4-6) But nothing in the passage distin- 34. De lingua Latina VI. 48. 35. Epistulae Morales x17. 13. For discussions of this passage see William and Martha Kwatarz, The Development of Logic (Oxford : At the Clarendon Press, 1962), P. 141, and Benson Matus, Stoic Logic (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1961 ; ust printing, 1953), pp. 11.20 B. DARRELL JACKSON guishes it from the things which living creatures show by signs — the motion of the mind or things which are sensed or understood. On the basis of the passages in De doctrina cited in rows (a) and (c) it can, however, be set apart from these apprehended things. In I. xi. 12 Augustine uses the same phrase, changing only the person and number of the verb — “id quod animo gerimus’. (2{.) He names this begetting or conceiving in the mind ‘ cogitatio’. Now ‘ cogitatio’ occurs in II, 1. 1 as the name for a stage distinct from the apprehension of species via the senses. In this stage the mind recognizes that the sign whose species is apprehended signifies something else. It is conception distinct from reception. ‘ That which the sign-giver conceives in his mind ’ must refer to this conception and is, therefore, distinct from the apprehension of sensibles and intelli- gibles (1 and 2). To explicate‘ cogitatio’ requires examination of both earlier and later texts, namely, De dialectica and De trinitate. Both will help fill out the scheme in terms of the two kinds of objects known. In De trinitate XV (row c) Augustine retains several of the terms of De doctrina I. xm — © cogitatio .. ., werbum est quod in corde dicimus ’. (x. 19) ‘This word which is spoken in the heart in conception is begotten of knowledge (gignitur de scientia, x1. 20), which I have placed in column (2). Doubtless Augustine achieved greater clarity and depth in the psychology of De trinitate than in the psychology of De doctrina. But the use of the same terms, for the same reason (to illustrate the Incarnation), and in the same sequence (reception then conception) justifies cautious reference to the later work for illumi- nation of the earlier. Reference to De dialectica, because it is an earlier work and is explicitly semantic in content, requires less caution. In De trinitate XI. mt. 6 Augustine states what he means by ‘ cogitatio’. Tt consists in the union of memory, internal vision, and will. ‘This trinity of the inner man is suggested to Augustine by a trinity of the outer man — the union of the res which is seen, the eye, and the attention of the mind (animi intentio) which holds the eye upon the thing which is seen. (De tin, XI. ut, 2)8° The difference between outer and inner vision lies in what each sees. ‘The eye of the body sees the species of a body which is outside it ; the eye of the mind sees the species which by the medium of the bodily eye has been impressed upon memory. In ail of this Augustine distinguishes four species which are born step by step in knowing and conceiving. From the species of the body comes one in the sense (eye). From this latter comes the species in the memory. And when the mind’s eye is turned on this species by the will, there is born a fourth species in the one who conceives (cogitantis, XI. 1x, 16). These four might be called in turn ‘ outward appearance of a body ’,‘ impression on the eye ’, received or retained image ’, and‘ the image attended to’. ‘The species named in De doctrina U1. 1. x (a) would seem to be the second. ‘The important thing 36. For the text of De irinitate I have used the edition of Imis Arras, Obyas de San Agustin, Vol. V (Madrid : Biblioteca de Autores Christianos, 2nd edu., 1956).THE THEORY OF SIGNS ar to note is that it and the species of De trinitate both have their origin from a body, an object which is apprehended by the senses. Hence we have an account of the cogitatio of sensa. For an account of the cogitatio of iniellecta I shall turn to De dialectica (rowc). It considers only one sort of intelligible and one that is apprehen- ded in connection with a sensible, namely, a word. But this makes it especially relevant to De doctrina christiana, where Augustine concentrates on the words of Scripture. Indeed, the question of the cogitatio of intellecta is central to De docirina II and III, where Augustine gives precepts for the understanding (intellegere) of Scripture. In the fifth chapter of De dialectica Augustine formulates a fourfold semantic scheme, He defines and discusses the uevbum, the res, the dicibile, and the dictio. Ares, as we have already seen, is something which may be sensed, or understood (v. 2-3). A werbwm is a sign of a res, and when spoken it can be understood by the hearer (. . . ad audiente possit intellegi, a loquente prolatum, v. 1-2). Hence a word would seem to be ares which is both sensed (heard) and understood. As res it belongs in column (x) ; as sensed and understood, in column (2). With the dicibile Augus- tin moves to the next stage : What the mind rather than the ear gains from the word and is contained in the mind itself is called the” dicibile’. .. . What I have called ‘ dicibile ’ is, in a sense, the word, yet it is not the uttered or written word but what is understood in the word and held in the mind. (v. 50-52, 60-62):" When he speaks of what is understood in the word, Augustine seems to be at the step which I have called ‘ reception’ or ‘ apprehension’, for it is a matter of understanding the meaning of the word, But when he says that the dictbile is held or contained in the mind, he seems to be referring to conception. ‘This is not immediately clear from the material just quoted, which concerns the reception of a word. In a passage concerning the speaking of a word, however, Augustine says that words in the mind before utterance (ante uocem) are dicibilia. (v.73f.) ‘Then when uttered (prorupe- runt in uocem) they are dictiones. (v. 74-76) This contrast between inner word and outer word corresponds to the contrast between the conceived word and the word which sounds in De doctrina I (c) and De tvinitate XV (). Hence it seems appropriate to place the dicibile at the stage of cogitatio' And because in hearing a word the dicibile arises after the word is understood, it also seems correct to say that the dictbile received in communication is one instance of the conceiving of intellecta. The dicibile is somehow the content of cogitatio. It is not merely psychologi- cal ; it is not one of the things external to the mind which are sensed or 37. Quidquid autem ex nerbo non auris, sed animus sentit, et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, dicibile uocatur Quod dixi dicibile, uerbum est ; nec tamen uerbum, sed quod in uerbo intelligitur et in animo continetur, significat,22 B. DARRELL JACKSON understood. It seems to be an intermediate entity which is central to communication. Why it is central will be seen in the discussion of signi- fying, the next stage in Augustine’s scheme for signa data. (4) Signifying There can be no doubt that signifying is explicitly mentioned in De docirina II. 1. 3. Augustine makes it equivalent to giving signs (signifi- candi, id est signi dandi, 4) and says that signs are given only in order to communicate. He probably presents this activity more explicitly than apprehension and conception because he intends to make frequent use of the notion of signification in the rest of Books Two and Three. In any case, whatever his intention, he does in fact apply the properly semantic notions of sign, thing, and signification to hermeneutics ; of the psycholo- gical notions, on the other hand, he retains only understanding. I do not mean to imply that signifying is non-psychological, for, as we have seen in the previous section, the distinctive feature of signa data is the presence of will. Nevertheless, throughout Books Two and ‘Three Augustine almost always talks about signification (significatio, Il. xm. 18, 34, III. xxv. 36, 24 and 34), rather than the more personal signifying (significands). This may be because in those books he is considering the signs of Scripture, which confront us apart from any speaker. When approached with the sign as starting point, signification is usually seen as a two-termed relation between a sign and what it designates. In De dialectica Augustine says that a word is a sign of a thing (vei signum, V. 1). In De doctyina he is more indefinite, replacing ‘yes’ by‘ aliquid’ in his definitions of ‘ sign. Later in Book ‘Iwo, however, he will use ‘ ves ’ again as the designatum of a sign. (IT. x. 13) One writer has said that Augustine's semantics does not go beyond this dyadic scheme of signum and res*®. On the basis of my analysis of the texts in this section, I maintain instead that Augustine has a threefold semantic scheme. ‘Thus I agree with Markus, as far as he goes, He sees 38. See above pp. r1f. 39. DucuRow, Sprachversténdnis, p. 47 and n. 73, According to Duchrow Augustine is following the common reduction of Stoic semantics from a threefold to a twofold scheme. Duchrow cites Sewzca, Ep. Mor. 89. 17, as an example of this, but he is mistaken, For the werba-significationes classification of this passage instead of being a «reduction » of Stoic semantics is good Stoic doctrine. It corres- ponds to the Stoic division of the subject matter of dialectic into expressions and things signified. ‘The latter are not external res, as Duchrow implies, but Aexrd. See Diogenes Laxrrrus, VII, 43 and 63ff., and below, pp. 4of. The Stoies introduced their threefold scheme at another point and Seneca retains it, (Ep. Mor. 117. 13, discussed above, p. 19). 40. MaRKuS, pp. 71f,THE THEORY OF SIGNS 23 the third element as the sign-giver or receiver, and it is something connec- ted with each. It has appeared in the discussion of cogitatio. ‘Augustine says that what is transferred from one mind to another is that which is conceived in the mind of the sign-giver. From parallels with other passages (c and e) I have concluded that this latter is cogitatio. In De trinitate Augustine says that words are signs of the things which we conceive (uoces in sermone nostro earum quas cogitamus signa sint rerum. XV. x 19 ad fin). And in De dialectica, even though he gives the dyadic relation (uerbum as rei signum), he also develops the notion of the dictio. “This latter is a word which is spoken not for its own sake but in order to signify something else (. . . propter aliud aliquod significandum, v. 52-84). ‘An apparently equivalent way of stating this is to say that the dictio is a union of werbum and dicibile. (v. 62-64) ‘These texts suggest that in some sense a sign signifies a dicibile. It may be better, however, to say that a sign expresses a dicibile. ‘This way of putting it fits the context of commu- nicating better. Earlier I noted that the dicibile is one sort of content of cogitatio, but is neither cogifatio itself nor some external res. Now the importance of this can be seen. Only something of this sort could be truly communica- ted by signs. Obviously the thing designated is not transferred to the other mind, for the sign-giver usually does not have it in him to transfer, Nor is the conceiving transferred, for it is a property of the mind of the sign-giver, unique to him. It is not thinking that is transferred, but the thinking of something, ‘This something would seem to be the dicibile, which may now be translated as ‘ that which is meant’ or simply * meaning "42, Although consistent with what Augustine says, this last paragraph does go beyond the texts I have examined. But these texts do suggest that within the signifying situation Augustine sees not only the sign and the thing signified but also the meaning conceived by the sign-giver and expressed in the sign. Still it is not at all clear how meaning thus descri- bed fits into the semantic scheme. ‘This can be somewhat clarified by turning to the final phase of communicating, the completion of the transfer to the other mind. (5) ‘The other mind De doctrina IL. 11. 3 (row b) represents this stage only briefly by the phrase® iraiciendum in alierius anima’ (gf) In I. xm. t2 (c) Augustine 4, Above, p. 21. 42. At least two writers think that ' dicibile ’ is Augustine's attempt to translate xo kexcOv. Kwutarat, p, 188, and Ducunow, p. 53. Kueale regards‘ what is meant’ as the most literal translation of Aextov (p. 149).24 B, DARRELL JACKSON expands it to include the means by which the transfer of what we bear in the mind occurs. It reaches the mind of the listener through his ears (in audientis animum per aures carneas inlabatur, 3), that is, by means of one of the senses. Now this sequence of sign and the perceiving of the sign by a sense of the body is the same sequence as is found in the basic definition of ‘ sign’ in IL. r. x (a). Hence the giving of a sign to another person begins anew the process we have described under colttmns (1)-(3). A thing is apprehended and cogitated by one mind. ‘Then by the giving of a sign of the thing, the same thing may be apprehended and cogitated by another mind, Tn effect, then, columns (4) and (5) may be explicated by columns (z)-(3). The first stage in the transfer to another mind is the reception of the given sign by a bodily sense. In De trinitate XV (e) Augustine calls this stage’ knowledge of the thing '. Now the thing we are considering is also asign. I have found two passages where Augustine clearly states what it is to know a sign. In De magistro he says that we do not have knowledge of a sign so long as we do not know of what it is asign(... signi... noti- liam, qua caremus profecto, quamdiu cuius signum est ignoramus, X. 34). Again in De trinitate he says that no sign is known perfectly unless it is known of what thing it is the sign (Neque ullum perfecte signum noscitur, nist cuius rei signum sit cognoscatur. X. 1. 2 ad init.) Hence a sign is not known just by sensing it ; it must also be understood (intellegam, intelle- gere, X.1. 2ad fin.). And this occurs when the thing which the sign signi- fies is known and attended to apart from the sign in cogitatio. ‘This stage is reached with certainty when, upon perceiving a sign, say a word, we know what the writer meant by it (... uspiam forte id (sc. a word] legam, et quid scriptor senserit, nesciam. loc, cit). ‘Phe sign-receiver then has in mind what the sign-giver had in mind to express by the sign. He knows both what the sign expresses and what it designates, ‘Thus that which the sign expresses (meaning, dicibile) would seem to aid the sign-receiver in knowing what the sign designates (object, 72s). Unfortunately Augustine did not complete enough of De dialectica to get to a fuller discussion of the dicibile. And in the semantics of De docirina he does not discuss anything like it. ‘There he merely mentions the activity (cogitatio) by which meaning is conceived. In the application to herme- neutics he does occasionally refer to the meaning conceived by a writer 43. Augustine does not say why this is intellectual knowledge and not sensible knowledge. Two reasons why this is so may be offered. The first is found explicitly in Augustine ; the second, as I have put it, is not. (r) In so far as to understand a sign is to know what the sign-giver intended to express by it, it involves the apptehension, through the sign, of the mind of the sign-giver. According to Augustine mind (mens, which is equivalent to ' animus’, De trin. XV. 1. 1) is an intelligible which may be ‘ seen’ only by intellectual vision, (De Gen. ad lilt. XII. X. 21 and xxrv, 50). (2) Understanding a sign involves seeing a relation between two things, the sign and the designated object. Even if the object is a body, too (the sign is always corporeal), the relation between the two — signifies — is not a corporeal thing (sensible), and thus is intelligible.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 25 (sensu soriptoris, IL. xxz. 18, 35 and sensu auctoris, xm. 19, 4) and often to the meaning expressed linguistically, that is, the meaning of a sentence or word (sententiam de illis uerbis, II. xxvu. 38, 8)*4. But he does not specify how this functions in understanding what thing a sign designates. His applied semantics is really concerned only with the sign-designatum relation, for in interpreting Scripture the important thing is to move from the sign to the thing which it designates. ‘Thus while Augustine’s semantics involves a triadic relation between sign, meaning, and thing, only the dyadic relation between sign and thing seems to have ever been worked out. ‘We may conjecture, however, that Augustine would have been sympa- thetic with some such account as this : The meaning conceived by the sign- giver determines the choice of signs by which to designate what is being attended to in the sign-giver’s knowledge. That is, the way in which we conceive that object which we know, determines the way in which we will try to call it to the attention of another. (Some such relation between what is conceived and what is expressed is suggested by Augustine's use of ‘ uerbum ’ to designate both)45, ‘his is seen most clearly when we desig- nate the same thing in different ways. To take a modern example, the same point in space would be designated by the expressions‘ the point of the intersection of a and b ’ and‘ the point of the intersection of b and c* where a, b, and c are straight lines which connect the corners of a triangle with the midpoints of the opposite sides, Each expression designates the same thing, but in a different way. ‘The same point is thought of, but in a different way. And the way it is thought of determines the way in which it is designated, that is, which signs are chosen to designate it. By attending to these signs as signs the reader or hearer understands what the writer or speaker is thinking of. If the point thought of is expressed by the first expression, the hearer reaches it in his thought by thinking of lines a and b as described. If the second expression is used, then a different set of lines guides the hearer to the same point. Hence the way in which the point is conceived determines the way in which it is designated and known. In the example a knowledge of English and of elementary plane geome- try would enable the reader to understand what either sign designates. Normally, however, what we conceive cannot be so unambiguously expres- sed asin geometry. So itis often more difficult to choose signs which desig- nate what we intend to designate. Augustine deals with this problem, 44. See also II, xu. 17, 12, XII, 19, t and 9, Xu, 20, 40, 50 and 58, and xy. 22, af, and 26, Augustine does not define ' sensus’ or ' sententia’” anywhere in De doctrina. 45. Especially in De trin, KV. X-xI (e), but also in De docty, where ‘ uerbum’ is used once in the inner sense (c) and passim in the outer sense. 46. Gottlob Frncx, Ucher Sinn und Bedeutung, trans. by Herbert Farcy, as On Sonse and Nominatum, in Fuxcr, and Wilfrid SELLARS (eds,), Readings in Philoso- Phical Analysis (New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), p. 86,26 B. DARRELL JACKSON without making these distinctions, in Books Two and Three of De doctrina christiana, He talks about what the author means (quid semserit ille, qui scripsit) and the meaning of the words (sententiam de illis uerbis) and how these may differ, especially in the case of ambiguous words. (III. xxvit. 38) Augustine's solution to this problem goes beyond semantic analysis. In particular it relies heavily on the dogmas of faith and the precepts of love set forth in Book One. Before summarizing the scheme for signa data it is necessary to consider two further refinements which Augustine makes in chapters 1m and rv of Book Two. 4. The signs peculiar to each of the human senses (II. ut. 4) Moving to the next chapter, we find Augustine continuing his division of the class of signs. ‘The signs which men give to each other pertain to each of the senses, Although most are given to sight and hearing, Augustine gives examples for each of the five senses. x) Sight — a nod, gestures, military banners and standards. (3-10). 2) Smell — the odor of the ointment with which our Lord’s feet were anointed. (16f) 3) Taste — the taste of the sacrament of His body and blood. (r7f) 4) Touch — the woman's touching of the hem of His garment. (18-20) 5) Hearing — words, sounds made by musical instruments. (r0-13) More signs are given to the ears than to the other senses and most of the signs heard are words. This is the first mention of uerba in Book Two. In Book One they were said to be things whose only use is for signifying. (I. 11. 2, 8-11) Now Augustine, from among all the signs given by men, chooses to concentrate on words. He gives two reasons for this choice. First, as a matter of fact words have become the most important way in which men signify for the purpose of communicating what they conceive in their mind. (14-16) Secondly, words are intrinsically superior to other kinds of signs, for by means of words any other sign can be explicated (enuntiare) but not vice versa. (22-23) A third reason, not given by Augustine, is that in Books Two and Three he will be dealing with the words (actually signs of words) of Scripture. Hence Augustine’s theory of signs is mainly a theory of the meaning of words, It focuses on linguistic signs. It is not applied exclusively in linguistic contexts, however, for in one of the most concentrated uses of the theory of signs Augustine sets forth the proper religious attitude toward the ritual observances of the Jews, the idols of the pagans, and the Christian sacraments. (III. v. 91x. 13) His theory is sufficiently comprehensive for such wide application,THE THEORY OF SIGNS 27 5. Letters and the diversity of languages (IL. wv. 5) In the final chapter on the theory of signs Augustine further specifies the signs which he will for the most part treat, and he begins to examine the problematic with which hermeneutics must deal. Because sound passes away quickly, men have supplemented spoken words with signs of a more enduring nature. These are letters, which are signs of words (per litteras signa uerborum, 2f.). This brings about a change in the sense which receives words. Now the eyes not the ears receive words, or rather receive signs which stand for them. (3-4) Augustine had already worked this out in greater detail in De dialectica v. 17-31. and he makes no changes in the earlier view. Moreover, he retains the same view later in De trinitate. (KV. x. 19 ad fin.) ‘The important thing to notice here is that, according to Augustine, in the case of a large class of linguistic signs, namely, written words, there are two stages of signifying : (1) written ‘ words’ signify spoken words, and (2) spoken words signify things. ‘The second thing which this short chapter establishes is that the diver- sity in words used among the various peoples is the result of sin. (4-6) This sin is pride and the tower of Babel is a sign of it (superbiae stgnum, 6-8). Ulrich Duchrow has shown that in some early writings Augustine went even further4’. In De Genesi contra Manichaeos Il, 5 he says that the fall made necessary signs themselves, not just the diversity of signs. Prior to the fall men knew God inwardly. After the fall man had to be revived by external means, including words. In De musica VI. 4x Augustine further states that God has limited the domination of one man by another by allowing only indirect communication between men, that is, communica- tion through signs. But in De doctyina christiana Augustine attributes to sin only the diversity of languages, not language as such. ‘This diversity is, however, enough of a problem. It, along with other problems confron- ted in interpreting signs, is examined in the greater part of Book Two and in Book Three. 6. Summary In the first four chapters of De doctrina christiana IL Augustine defines, classifies, and mentions all sorts of signs. He ranges from the track of an animal to the letters of the alphabet. Hence his theory of signs is general. But he is particularly interested in those signs whose occurrence involves the presence of volition. Within this class of signs he has two emphases which indicate the intended field of application of his theory. The first 47.‘ Signum’ und‘ superbia’ beim jungen Augustin (386-390), in Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes, VII (1961), pp. 369-372.28 B. DARRELL JACKSON emphasis is anthropological, He says that he will discuss intentionally given signs in so far as men are concerned with them. Even the psycho- logy of the more general definition of ‘ sign ’ (II. 1. 1) is an anthropological psychology. ‘The second emphasis is linguistic. The most important signs used by men are spoken and written words. Clearly Augustine has suited his theory to the consideration of Holy Scripture. For the signs of Scripture are intentionally given by God, presented to us by men (at. 3, 7-9), and set forth in language (ab una lingua profecta, v. 6, 24.) Because Augustine eventually states his anthropological and linguistic interests, I have treated his more abstract description of signa data largely in terms of these interests, In that description I have distin- guished the following elements, some properly psychological, others properly semantic. (x) Things or objects — ‘These are called ‘ things’ in the widest use of that term in Book One. ‘The class of things includes everything what- soever that is, including signs. And it may be exhaustively divided into those things which are sensibles, and those which are intelligibles. (2) Apprehension of things — For men this occurs in two ways, by sense and by understanding. Sensible things may be apprehended by any of the five senses. There does not seem to be a corresponding multiplicity in the apprehension of intelligibles. When: things are apprehended in either of these two ways they are said to be known. (3) Conception — Here there is an attending to what is known. In the case of sensibles, this attention gives rise to a species or image. In the case of intelligibles, I have singled out a type especially relevant to Augustine’s linguistic focus. Here attention gives rise to a dicibile or meaning when a word is understood. (4) Signifying — Just as the will contributes to the conception of a meaning by holding the mind’s attention upon what it knows, so it contri- butes to signifying by deciding that signs should be given. ‘The signs thus occurring designate things which are known by the sign-giver and express what he has conceived about those things. Here the major semantic notions are involved, but they are separable from psychological notions only by abstraction. (5) Communication to another mind — ‘This begins another cycle of knowing and conceiving with signs as the objects of apprehension both by sense and intellect. Ideally both the meaning expressed and the object designated are made known to the sign-receiver by means of the sign. But this does not always occur. It is crucial in trying to understand words which designate ambiguously. Although Augustine does not say so, obviously the interpreter of Scripture stands at this fifth stage. He reads the signs in Scripture, attempting to learn what things they refer to. It is not always enough to know what the words usually designate, so some way of determining what their author meant for them to designate must be found. Book One has already given the primary method for determiningTHE THEORY OF SIGNS 29 this ; All writers of Scripture conceive of God in a certain way, thatis, as the one object to be loved for its own sake. (I. xxxv-xL) In Books ‘Iwo and Three Augustine will devise other means, for example, examination of context. B,. — THE BACKGROUND OF AUGUSTINE'S THEORY OF SIGNS Already several Latin authors have been found useful in interpreting the theory of signs in De doctrina christiana, ‘These come from different fields. Cicero and Quintilian represent rhetoric, at least in the works of theirs cited. Varro, although a man of wide learning, writes as a grammarian in De lingua Latina, one of his two surviving works. And Seneca is a philosopher. In this section I shall make a brief inquiry into the place of signs in rhetoric, grammer, and logic, as well as in Christian writings. I shall argue that logic is the only field in which signs were pazt of a linguistic theory of meaning. 1. Seripture and Christian authors The Greek word for‘ sign ', onpetov, occurs often in the Septuagint and the New ‘Testament. It seems to have been consistently rendered « signum’ in the Old Latin translations. For example, circumcision is a signum testamenti inter me et wos (Gen. 17 : 11) and Jesus speaks of the signum Ionae to those who seek a sign (Luke 1x : 29-30)". By the time he wrote De docirina Augustine was aware of these occurrences. He quotes Genesis 17 : x1 in Contra Adimantum 16, which was written before De doctrina. Scriptural usage of ‘ signum’ does not, however, seem to pro- vide a basis for regarding its own words as signs. It utilizes the term in basically two other ways : (1) of distinguishing marks or indications such as circumcision (Gen. 17 ; 11) and swaddling clothes (Luke 2 : 12), and (2) of miracles or wonders such as the Egyptian plagues (Ex. 7 : 3) and healing (Acts 4 : x6). 48. MARROU, p. 16, says that in his reflection on language, signs, and meaning Augustine is mainly a grammerian, though sometimes the logician comes through. Kuvypurs, on the other hand, states that Augustine learned the meaning of the sign-significate distinction from the ars dialectica uot from rhetoric, (p. 13) MaRxus, PP. 60, 648, argues that in the linguistic application of the notion of sign Augustine went beyond even the logicians, I shall consider his view in part D below. 49. Velus Latina, vol. 2, Genesis, ed. Bonifatius Frscumr (Freiberg : Herder, 1951-1954), P. 188. a 50. Itala : Das Neue Testament in Altlateinischer Wherlieferung, II. Tucas- Evangelium, ed. Adolf Jéxtcune (Berlin : Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1954), D. 134, and B. W. Muncey, The New Testament Text of Saint Ambrose (Cambridge : At the University Press, 1959), p. 33. For other instances in the New Testament see Jétacume IIT, pp. 18 and 232 I, p. 112 ; and IV, pp. 14, 19, and 40.30 B. DARRELL JACKSON Hicclesiastical writers earlier than Augustine continued to use ‘ sign’ principally of non-linguistic entities. In his commentary on John, Origen applies cnpetov to the star in the east®, to the descent of the Spirit upon Jesus®?, to Jesus'good cheer®4, and to the works of Jesus®5, In his commentary on Matthew, he uses the Scriptural phrase onpeta Kai tépatas®. Similar usage is found in Latin authors. Commenting on Isaiah 7 : 14, ‘Tertullian says that a sign would not be from God unless it were a novel and prodigious thing (. . . nisi nowitas aliqua monstruosa, iam signum non fuisset)5". Here he is using‘ sign’ in the second of the Scriptural senses. In another passage he uses it in the first Scriptural sense of the flowering of trees as a signum of summer and of wars as signa of the coming of the Kingdom of God®. Frequently ‘ sign ’ was used of an Old Testament event as a figure or type of a New Testament event, as in Ambrose and Tyconius®®. ‘The latter also speaks of Esau and Jacob as signs, and of numbers as well®. I have found only one instance of ‘ sign’ applied to a linguistic entity in a Church author prior to Augustine. Origen says that Jesus’ having said ‘ Take these things hence’, when he purged the temple, is a onustov Badbtepov™, There may be similar passages elsewhere in Origen and others, but a linguistic application of signlanguage would seem to be the exception in eccle- siastical writers. 2. Rhetoric In rhetoric signs were a class of argument. Aristotle is basic here. . .. the materials of Enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs (eixétov kal onpisiov), which we can see must correspond respectively with the Propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A Probability is a thing that usually happens ; . . 5%. Markus, pp. 63f. 52, ORIGENES, Com. In Tohan. evang., I. XXv1, 24. GCS, Bd 4, Der Johanneskom- mentar, ed. Exwin Preuschen (Leipzig : J. C. Hinrichs, 1903), p. 32, line 33. 53. XIIT. 11x. 58, p. 290, lines 1-2. 54. X. xu, x1, p. 183, lines 1-3. 55. X. Xtvt. 30, p. 224, lines rf, 56, ORIGENES, Com, in Math, evang., XIII. 22, GCS, Bd 10, Matthdus-erklarung, ed. Erich Klosterman (Leipzig : Hinrichs, 1935), p. 240, line 25 ; XVIL. tr, p. 577, lines 25 £., and XVII, x1, p. 612, lines 20f. 57- Aduersus Marcionem XII. xu. 4. Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, I, ed. A, Krovmann (Turnhout : Brepols, 1954). 58. Adu, Mare, IV. xxxrx. 16. In this passage he also uses‘ res’. 59. AMBROSE, Expositio Euangelii secundam Lucam VII, 96-97. ‘IycoNrus, Liber Regularum IV, ed. F, D, Burxirt in Texts and Studies, vol. III, no, 1 (Cambridge, 1894), p. 47, line 30, 60, III, p, 29, lines of., and V, p, 64, lines 28-30. 61, Comm. on John X. Exrv. 6, p. 196, lines 5f. 62. Rhetorica I. 2, 1357% 32-35. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard MCKKon (New York : Random House, 1941). p. 1332.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 31 He goes on to distinguish between fallible and infallible signs (texunpia) both in his Rhetoric and in the Prior Analytics®®. In fact a onpetov is probable ; only a texpyiptov is irrefutable. An example of the former is the argument that a man has fever becatse he is breathing hard. An example of the latter is the argument that a man is ill because he has fever®!, Aristotle's relating of this to his syllogistic®® need not concern us, since none of his rhetorical successors had his logical acumen or interest. It plainly shows, however, that‘ sign ' was used by him in an inferential sense Cicero and Quintilian follow Aristotle but place inferential sign theory in a more explicitly forensic context®*, Quintilian gives an example of such a sign and how it should be treated. Bloodstains on clothing may lead us to infer that the one who wore them has committed a murder. But since he may have just had a bleeding nose, further evi- dence (testimonium), such as being the enemy of the victim or having threatened him, is required for what is suspected to be made certain®’. In all of these definitions and examples there is no concern with words. The meaning of events and how these events can be used to establish a point are the concerns. Vet rhetoric cultivated words and their proper and orate use. So a focus on language was quite in character for a rhetor such as Augustine. Indeed if rhetors had followed the best of Cicero, as Atigustine does in De doctrina IV, instead of the worst, (namely, De inuentione), they would have found that the man of perfect eloquence should study, along with other logical topics, the force of words (wis uerborum), that is, their ability to signify™. ‘Thus Cicero recommends semantic study, but not under the rubric * signs ’. 3. Grammar Perhaps even more than thetors, the grammatici concentrated on words, But so far as I can determine, they did not call them’ signs’. In the basic and influential handbooks of Dionysius Thrax and Aelius Dona- tus the term ‘ sign’ does not even occur®, Nevertheless, in both of them the language of signifying is used in the process of defining various grammatical terms. Dionysius, for example, defines a proper noun 63. II. xxvIt, 70% 2ff. 64. Rhet. 1357 13-20. 65. An. Pr. 708 11-39. 66. De inw. I. xxx. 48 and xrart, Br ; Inst, or. V. 1x. 1-16, 67. Inst, or, V. 1x, 8-11, 68. Ovator 115. 69, Dionvstus ‘Turax, Téyyn ypounotih, ed. Gustav Umrrc (Leipzig : B. G, Teubner, 1884), Dowatus, Avs Minor aud Ars Grammatica, ed. H. Kun, in Grammatici Latini, vol, IV (Leipzig, 1864. Reprinted by Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1962), pp. 335-402. Dionysius is 1st century B.C, ; Donatus is 4th century A. D.32 B. DARRELL JACKSON as a noun which signifies a particular substance (10 tiv iS{av obotav ompatvov)??. And Donatus says that a noun is a part of speech which signifies (significans) with the case a person or a thing specifically or generally’!. Neither of these grammarians reflect upon this signifying. Varro, who is far from being merely a grammaticus, not only uses the language of signifying in his grammatical work, De lingua Latina, but also reflects theoretically, though briefly, upon signification, In an argument against etymological regularity he says, .., Lask whether by a‘ word ’ they mean the spoken word (wocem) which consists of syllables, that word which we hear, or that which the spoken word indicates, which we understand (quod ea significat, quam intellegimus), or both?, Moreover, he gives an etymology of ' signum’. He says that signs are so called because they indicate something (aliguid significent)", But this etymology occurs in the context of a discussion of the signs of the zodiac. Only in this sense and in the sense of ‘ symptoms ’ observed by physicians does Varro use' signum ’ in what survives of De lingua Latina”, Hence it would seem that grammarians did not have a linguistic theory of signs?’. Their work presupposed semantics but only occasionally were semantical issues dealt with. ‘The well educated non-specialist such as Aulus Gellius, reflecting a grammatical and a rhetorical education, might ask often about the wis or significatio of words”? but rarely if ever about significatio itself. 4. Logic Of the disciplines concerned with words only logic or, as it was usually named in Latin, dialectica remains to be examined. And it is in logic that 70. Teyyn ch. 12, Un1aG, p. 36, lines 6-7, Note that be uses the participle x6 onatvov, which can sometimes be translated as‘ sign’. It does not seem to be appropriate to do so here. The Latin grammarians who followed Dionysius translated it either by the verb’ significat ' or the participle’ significans ’, (UHLIG, PP. 24, 34, and 4o). Tt is doubtful that Augustine read any but Latin grammars, although in De wititati credendi vir, 17 he mentions Cornutus, who wrote in Greek, as well as the Latin-writing Asper and Donatus. 71. Avs minor, Kutt, IV, p. 355, lines 5f. 72. V. 3. and 4; VI. $2; VIL. 12, 80, 93, and 107; VIII. 11, 27, and 80. 73. De ting. Lat. VII. 40, trans. by Roland G, Kent in the Loeb Classical Library nos, 333-4, (London and Cambridge, 1938), p. 403. See also IX. 37 —‘ vox quae significawit’ and‘ ves quae designetur ’, and V. 2 — nepi onpatvopévav. ‘74. VIE. 14. 75. VIL. 50, 73-74 ; IX. 24; and X. 46. 76. I have not made a thorough search of the grammatical commentaries. A cursory examination of the fourth century commentaries of Donatus on Terence and of Servins on Virgil revealed no linguistic use of ' signum ’, 77. Noctes Alticae IV. 1x, II, x1x, VI, xvi, X. xxrx, XI, xtv, XIII. ut and xvu. ond XVII. xm,THE THEORY OF SIGNS 33 a linguistic theory of signs is found. In both of the major logical systems of antiquity, the Peripatetic and the Stoic, ‘ sign ’ occuts in semantic contexts. Aristotle gives his explicit semantic scheme in the opening chapters of De interpretatione™. There 16 onpstov, onpaiver, and onpovth are used in connection with words. As to Stoic semantics there are two primary accounts which give us our best, albeit secondhand, knowledge of Stoic logic. In Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers and Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Mathematicians we find accounts of Stoic semantics and theory of language. The former does not use‘ sign ’ but the latter does in connection with the same doc- trines. In part D of this article I shall examine both Aristotle and the Stoics and compare them with Augustine on the theory of signs. But first we must ask : What connection did Augustine have with the logical tradition ? He received the traditional grammatical and rhetorical education and was a teacher of rhetoric until his conversion. ‘This literary education found little place for logic, which was the concern of the philosophical few, Only grammar and rhetoric were really studied in the schools of the empire®®. And the rhetors did not follow the recommen- dation of the orator par excellence that they learn either the logic of Aristotle or of Chrysippus®. In the following section I shall show that Augustine, unlike most rhetors, may have taken Cicero seriously. If he did, there is good reason to compare his semantics with those of Aristotle and Chrysippus. C. — AUGUSTINE’s KNOWLEDGE OF LOGIC ‘The most comprehensive attempt at judging the character and extent of Augustine's knowledge of logic has been made by Marrow. He shows that Augustine turned to logic only after his formal education was comple- ted and under the influence of his newfound philosophical vocation®. ‘This was part of his study of all of the liberal arts. (Conf IV. xvi) Appa- rently it consisted mainly of a reading of Varro's Disciplinarum libri, which included a De dialectica. Augustine took this program of self- education seriously*, Soon after his'conversion he prescribed a study of all of the seven liberal arts as part of the way to attain happiness through 78. I. M, BocHENSK!, Ancient Formal Logic (Amsterdam : North Holland Printing Company, 2nd printing, 1957), p. 29. 79. H-I, Marrov, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. by G. Lamb (New York : ‘The New American Library, 1964), p. 383. 80, MarRou, Sain’ Augustin, p. 111, 81. Oratory XXXIt. 113-XXXTU. 117. 82. Marrow, Saint Augustin, pp. 112-115. Ss. Ibid., p. 113. See Aimé Sortenac, Dovographies et manuels dans le formation philosphiqus de Saint Augustin, in Recherches Augustiniennes I (Paris, 1958), p. 148.34 B, DARRELL JACKSON wisdom®’. But what Augustine himself achieved was another matter. According to Marrou only in dialectica did Augustine make significant advance®* and even then his logic remains elementary, non-technical, eristic, and lacking in rigor’?. ‘This judgment of Marrou’s is based, however, on only part of the relevant evidence. He does not consider, for example, the semantics of De doctrina christiana and the discussion of the disputationis disciplina found in Book ‘Two of the same treatise. In what follows I shall examine, in the order of their writing, the main passages in which Augustine talks about logic explicitly. I shall seek to establish how much and what kind (Peripatetic or Stoic) of logic he professes to know. Confessiones IV. xvr. 28 (Written A. D. 399-400 but concerning events ca. 374) Augustine's first contact with technical logic was his reading of Aris- totle’s Categories (Aristotelica . . . decem categorias)®. He read it on his own when he was twenty years old in, it is generally agreed, the translation of Marius Victorinus®®, This translation must have had fairly wide circulation, since Augustine’s former rhetoric teacher and others in Carthage often discussed the Categories. It is the only logic book mentioned by title in the writings of Augustine which I have surveyed. He gives an accurate account of the ten categories here. Later he would put his knowledge of them to good use in Book Five of De trinitate™. In the Confessions he only lamented the futility of his newfound knowledge because he did not then know whence came what was true and certain in it. (IV. xvz. 30) Contra Academicos III, x1. 29 (A. D. 386) Arguing against Academic scepticism Augustine uses true things which he says he learned from dialectica. Indeed, in this first treatise written after his conversion he could say that he knew more about dialectic than about any other part of philosophy (namely, physics or ethics, IIT. x. 23 85. De ordine II, Marrou, pp. 174-179. 86. MARROU, pp. 237-275. 87. Ibid., pp. 240-8. 88. All statements in part C will be based on the text cited at the beginning (here Conf, IV. xvi, 28) unless otherwise indicated. 8. Pierre Courcursm, Les Leitres Grecques en Occident de Macrobe & Cassiodora (Paris : Bditions E. de Boccard, 1943), p. 156. go. It is mainly metaphysical, but was regarded as logical by the editors of Aristotle and subsequently in antiquity and the middle ages. KNUALE, p. 25. Qf. Discussed by Paul Henry, Saint Augustine on Personality (New York : Macmillan, 1960), pp. of.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 35 and x11, 27)®, When asked in the dialogue to enumerate some of the truths of dialectic Augustine shows some knowledge of propositional, that is to say Stoic, logic®. First, he lists several propositiones which are true. All have the form which the Stoics called ‘ non-simple propositions’. In modern terminology these are ‘ molecular propositions ’ ; in traditional termi- nology, ‘ hypothetical propositions’. ‘The three basic connectives are Tepresented. x) Implication. The Stoic ovvmppévov. ‘ If there are four elements in the world, there are not five '. (S¢...,nom....) (pO ~q). 2) Conjunction. The Stoic ovjinendeypévov. ‘ The same soul cannot both die and be immortal’. (Non...et...eb....)-~(p&q). 3) Disjunction. The Stoic d:ebevypévov, exclusive disjunction. (a) * We are now either awake or asleep’. (Aut... aut...) (pV q), and another, (b)‘ What I seem to see is either body or not body ’. A better one of this form is in X. 23 : ‘ There is one world or not one’. (Aut... autnon....)(p V ~ p). Augustine knows the technical terms for statements containing these connectives, He does not name the second, but he calls the first ‘ propo- sitions per conexionem ' and the third‘ propositions per disiunctionem *. At IIL. x. 23 the latter are ‘ disiuncta' and ‘ disiunctiones’, These were apparently the standard translations of the Stoic covnpuévov and Stetevypévov, OF all the propositions given by Augustine here, only the two in (3) (b) are true by formal necessity. Augustine probably thought all were formally necessary, for he regards them all as equally true. They could easily be given formal necessity (for instance, in the conjunctive statement by changing‘ be immortal ' to‘ not die’), Then Augustine indicates knowledge of two of the five Stoic undemon- strated arguments". He gives them in the form of metalogical statements. ‘This is one of the three ways in which the Stoics presented them, the other two being as arguments (Avot) with actual propositions and as moods (cpénot, oxnpara) with ordinal numerals standing as propositional 92. For Contra Academicos and De ordine (which is cousidered next) I have used the edition of William M. Green (Stromata Patristica et Mediaevalia, and fasc., Antwerp ; Spectrum, 1956). 93. Aristotelian logic, on the other hand, is a logic of classes, MATES, pp. 2f In my remarks about Stoic logic I shall often refer to the excellent accounts of Mates and Kneale as well as to some of the primary sources. 94. The primary sources for our knowledge of these are DIOGENES LARRIIUS, Lives VII. 71-74 and Sextus Empivicus, Aduersus Mathematicos VIII, ro8ff, See Maras, pp. jaf, and Kwxary, pp. 1478. 95. Aurus Gexirus, Ait, Noct, XVI, vir. 9 and 12, 96. See Mats, pp, 67-74. On p, 68 he gives a list of the many sources for our knowledge of these arguments. Diogenes Laertius lists all five. (VII. 80-81) The undemonstrated arguments functioned as axioms in the Stoics’ system of deduction,36 B. DARRELL JACKSON variables®”. Here are Augustine's statements with parallels from Sextus Empiricus and Cicero. ‘Type 1 undemonstrated argument (pO a; p;.". 4) Ur Augustine. ‘ If, of any of the conditional statements which I have just mentioned, the antecedent be assumed, it necessarily involves the truth of the dependent part’. (si... quae pey conexionem . . . pars antecedens assurnpta fuerit, irahere necessario id, quod annexum est) Sextus. ‘ A type 1 undemonstrated argument is that which is made up of a conditional and its antecedent, and which has the consequent of the conditional for a conclusion. Cicero, ‘ The first form of conclusion is when assuming the first, that which is connected with it follows’. (cum primum assumpseris, consequituy id quod annexum est primum conclusionis modum ... . )* ‘Type 5 undemonstrated argument (p V qi~p;.- 4) Us Augustine. ‘The propositions involving contrariety or disjunction (repugnantiam wel disiunctionem [apparently p V ~~ p and p V qj) .. - are of this nature. When either one or many parts are taken away, there remains something which is made certain by the removal ( .. . cum auferuntur cetera, siue unum siue plura sint, restet aliquid, quod eorum ablatione firmetur). Augustine’s metalogical statement of Us is not as technical as his state- ment of Uz, for the latter contains the technical terms‘ conexio’,* ante- cedens’, ‘ assumpta’, and‘ annexum’. ‘The statement of Us does, however, have the added touch of allowing for more than two disjuncts. De ordine II. xu. 38 (386) Placed in the course of studies for the attainment of wisdom, dialectica is here given high praise as the disciplina disciplinarum, but is given little technical content. Augustine praises it because it is reason’s classification, noting, and arranging of its own ressources, It guards against error, tea- ches how to teach and learn (docere . . . discere), and knows whatit is to know (scit scire). ‘The only technical functions indicated for dialectica here are definition, division, and synthesis (definiendo, distribuendo, colligendo). Under the name of disciplina disputandé it is for similar functions called not just‘ true ’ but‘ truth ’ in the Soliloquies (II, x1. 21). De dialectica (386-7) Scholars disagree on the quality of the logic found in this work. Marrow says it is banal and elementary!°. Duchrow disagrees with him’. But 97. See Sextus, AM VIII. 224 and 227 for all three ways. 98. Adu. Math. VIII. 224. Trans. by MATES, p. 99. 99. Topica XIII. 54. Too, MARROU, p. 578. ror, DUCHROW, Sprachuerstiindnis, p. 42.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 37 there is wide agreement that, whatever its quality, it is deeply influenced by Stoic logic. I shall examine De dialectica on four matters : (1) its notion of dialectic, (2) its classification of words, (3) its scope, and (4) its doctrine of words. ‘The treatise begins,‘ Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia ’. (1.1) The first thing to note is that Augustine chooses the Stoic name for formal logic, ‘ dialectica '!, For Aristotle dialectic was merely a special kind of reasoning, namely, that based on generally accepted premisses!"8, It was probably not Augustine himself, however, who made the choice between Aristotle and the Stoics. ‘ Dialectica’ was already the name used by Cicero! and Varrol5, His definition appears to be a combination of the Stoic definitions of rhetoric and dialectic. Rhetoric is the science of speaking well (émotipnv... eb déyetv) and dialectic that of discussing correctly (6p0a¢ SiaAtyecOar)2°%. Angustine’s ‘ scientia ’ corresponds to mommy, his‘ dispudandi ’ to Biadéyeodor, and his‘ bene ', corresponding to ed in the definition of rhetoric, replaces pQd¢ in the definition of dialectic. Again he is following earlier writers, although apparently none of the latter had used precisely Augustine’s terms!7, ‘The second thing to note is that dialectic is concerned with disputing. This notion of disputation was important in the early dialogues and continued to be Augustine’s basic way of thinking of logic. Marrou thinks that this repre- sents a truncation of dialectic!®. But it is faithful to Stoic definitions. Moreover, as will be seen, it does not limit logic to a theory of debate. De dialectica gives dialectic a far larger scope than that. Immediately following his definition Augustine says that we dispute with words. He then classifies words : x) Simple — occur alone and signify one thing, e. g., 2) Conjoint — two or more words occurring together. a) Not a sentence, e. g.,‘ with haste the man toward the moun- tain’. (1) b) Sentences 1) Express intention of the the will — wishes, commands, curses. m1) ‘True or false a) - Simple, e. g.,‘ Every man walks *. (111) B) - Complex, e. g.,‘ If he walks, he moves ’. * man’. (2) 102, DIOGENES LazRtrus, Lives VIL. 41. 103. Topica I. 1. 104. CICERO, Topica XII, 53, Or. XXXII. 113. 105, PFIIGERSDORFEBR, p. 137. 106, DIoGENuS LarRtrus, VII. 42. 107, Quintilian calls rhetoric ‘ bene dicendi scientia’, (Inst. or, IL, Xv, 34) Cicero calls dialectic‘ ars bene disserendi ’. (De or. LI, XXXVI, 157). 108, Contra Ac. I. t, 4, ITT. xm, 29 and X. 44. 10g. MARROW, p. It n. 3.38 B. DARRELL JACKSON Duchrow sees in this the Stoic classification of Aexré®, There are striking similarities™, but there is one important difference. Augustine is classi- fying uerba (Stoic gdvar) not dicibilia (Stoic AeKté). This is a subtle difference, since it is words that express meanings. In this respect Augustine's classification is closer to Aristotle than to the Stoics!, Another divergence from the Stoics is the inclusion of the Aristotelian universal affirmative proposition (m1, a). ‘The Stoics apparently took no account of such propositions", ‘This classification of words gives Augustine the scope of dialectic (tv). A section called‘ de loquendo’ deals with simple words. De eloguendo treats of non-truth-claiming sentences. De proloquendo treats of simple truth-claiming sentences. And de proloquiorwm summa deals with complex truth-claiming sentences, especially with reasoning from them (he gives two Uz arguments as examples, m1. 8-21). ‘This is a comprehen- sive scheme, capable of covering most of the topics of ancient formal logic. Tt does not limit dialectic to a theory of debate. Martianus Capella, probably a younger contemporary of Augustine, adopted the same scheme for his De dialectica4. Capella treated these issues in a basic if elementary fashion. For example, under the fourth rubric he gives both Aristotle's basic syllogistic and the Stoic undemonstrated arguments!5, Augustine did not get past de loguendo in his treatise, but from what we learn in other of his works, it would not seem that he quit because of lack of knowledge. Under de loguendo Augustine did develop a semantic scheme (ch. v), as we haveseen. He also took took up etymology (v1) in anon-Stoic spirit™!8, considered the way words move men to apprehend things (vm), and the impediments to this — obscurity and ambiguity (vm-x). Chapters vi-x are more relevant to the remainder of Books Two and Three of De doctrina than to the theory of signs as such. Hence I shall not discuss them here. tro, DucsRow, p. 43. rir, Sextus Empreicus, VIII. 70-74, 93 and Drocengs LAgRrivs, VII. 63-75. See Matus, p. 16, for a summary statement of the Stoic classification of Aexré.. 112, ARISTOTLE, De interp. u-v, where Aristotle speaks of nouns, verbs, and simple and complex sentences. See BOCHENSET, pp. 28 and 85, on both the Aristotelian and the Stoic scheme. It is probable that the Stoics are dependent upon Aristotle at this point, 113. Maes, p, 32, and KNears, p. 146. 114, Book IV of De Nupiiis Philologiae ot Mercuri, ‘This parallel with Capella, who, acknowledges the importance of Varro for dialectic (335 in the edu. by Adolf Dick, Leipzig, Teubner, 1925), has been seen as proof of Augustine's dependence upon Varro’s De dialectica, (DUCHROW, p. 42, 0. 47) PFILIGERS- DOREER, on the contrary, says the scheme comes from a post-Varronian Stoic school tradition, (p. 144) Such issues seem to me quite impossible to decide because of the loss of (a) Varro's De dial. and (b) virtually all Stoic logical writings, 115, DICK, 406-420. 116, See DucHrow, p. 56,THE THEORY OF SIGNS 39 De doctrina christiana IL. xxxx. 48-xxxrx. 39 (396-7) So far I have considered, with one exception, works written by Augustine as a new convert to Christianity. And the exception, Confes- sions IV. xvt, although written later, concerns a petiod prior to ‘Augustine's conversion. But the author of De doctrina had been a priest for six years and had recently been made bishop of Hippo. Moreover, his task in De doctrina was to formulate a Scriptural hermeneutics. Precisely in this context, however, is to be found Augustine’s most sophisticated account of deductive logic. ‘The disputationas disci plina finds a prominent place among the divinely instituted doctrinae in gentilibus which Augustine recommends to the use of the exegete, By calling this discipline ‘ divinely instituted ’ Augustine means that its doctrines are discovered by men, not instituted by them. He thus believes that logic deals with notions intrin- sic to reality rather than with merely conventional or arbitrary notions. He mentions the following points. He distinguishes clearly between truth and validity, ueritas sententia- rum and ueritas conexionum (49, 20f. ; §0, 24-6 ; 52, 1-2). An inference may be validly carried out upon true or false propositions. (49, 33-35) Hence the rules of validity may be learned in schools outside the Church, but the truth of propositions is to be discovered in the holy books of the Church. (36-38) He gives the Stoic type 2 undemonstrated argument in two formse First, metalogically, « When a consequent is false, it is necessary that the antecedent upon which it is based be false also (Cum falsum est, quod consequitur, necesse est, ut falswm sit, quod praccedit. 50, 9-20) 7, ‘The Stoics did not usually use‘ true ' or ‘ false’ in their metalogical state- ments of the undemonstrateds, but occasionally they did. (Sextus, VIII. 228) Second, Augustine gives two actual arguments (50, 20-22 and 5r, aq) 1)‘ If there is no resurrection of the dead, neither was Christ resurrected. ~po~gd Christ was resurrected. q Therefore, there is a resurrection of the dead ’. P 2) ‘ Ifa snail is an animal, it has a voice. pod A snail has no voice. ~4q ‘Therefore, a snail is not an animal ’. ~pD I give both because only the second is an instance of the simple undemons- trated. ‘The first is really a non-simple argument which requires analysis, that is, some additional steps, to reduce it to proof by the simple unde- 117, ROBERTSON, p. 68,40 B. DARRELL JACKSON monstrateds"8, It is doubtful that Augustine recognized any difference between (z) and (2), since he states this rule (regula, 50, 12 and 24) in terms of falsity not negation. In addition to this valid argument form he gives as an invalid form of inference denying the ancedent (p O q,~ p, no conclusion). (51, 14-25) All examples of arguments in these chapters involve the Stoic conditional propositions. Other logical doctrines in these chapters : Validly deduced conclusions have the same truth value as the premisses upon which they are based have. (52, 8-9) ‘There are two kinds of falsehood : (1) the false that is impossible (~ p. & ~ © p), and (2) the false that is possible (~ p & © p, 53, T4-16). Logic includes the science of definition, division, and partition. (53, rf.) Contra Cresconium grammaticum partis Donati I (406) In this work Augustine elaborates upon dialectica as skill in disputing (xmt. 16, x1v. 17), by which he means distinguishing the true from the false (uerum discernit a falso, xv. 19 ; XX. 25 and II. 1. 3). The chief importance of this work for our purposes is twofold. First, Augustine says that the Stoics and especially Chrysippus (the greatest Stoic logician) excell all others in dialectic, and he mentions libré Stoicorum which teach how to dispute dialectically (xrx. 24). Second, Augustine defends himself against the charge of Cresconius that he is a homo dialecticus (x11. 16), not by denying it but by establishing the legitimacy of dialectic for the Christian. “He does this first by showing that dialectic may be applied to true or to false propositions and hence is neutral. More important, he argues that both Paul and Christ were dialectici, because they disputed skillfully with Stoics, Epicureans, and Jews. (x1v. 17, XVII. 21-22) Summary Judging from these texts, we can say that Augustine had more than a passing acquaintance with logic. It was certainly not a major concern of his, for these few texts contain most of the discussions of formal logic to be found in Augustine’s vast writings. Vet at some time in his career he must have read, in addition to Aristotle's Categories, some of the libri Stoicorwm which he mentions, for he usually gives propositions in the Stoic rather than the Aristotelian form and his theory of deduction is exclusively Stoic. In addition, his classification of words and delineation of a seman- 318, See KNRALE, pp. 163-176, and Ma'tss, pp. 77-82. Most of the theorems used by the Stoics for analysis have been lost, Kneale gives a highly plausible recons- truction of this aspect of Stoic deduction theory, The first argument above could be proved by U2 with the assumption of the equivalence p= ~ ~ p. See KNEALE, p. 168, for the latter,THE THEORY OF SIGNS 4 tic schema show marked Stoic influence. Because no Stoic logical wri- tings survive, a judgment as to what Augustine read can only be conjec- tured, There were numerous Stoic handbooks (eicayeyat)4® and Augustine may have read one or more, such as the Commenterium de proloquiis of 1, Aelius Stilo, As to the five undemonstrated argu- ments, they were well known in antiquity! Augustine could have learned them from Cicero!®2, In the light of the Stoic character of his logic it is at first glance puzzling why in De ciuitate Dei VIII. 7 Augustine says that he prefers Platonic to Stoic logic. He may be mistaken about which logic is whose. Indeed, in VIII. 4 he mistakenly attributes to Plato the Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics!®8. A more likely explanation is that in this passage (VIII. 7) Augustine is using‘ dialectica ’ in reference not to logic ‘but to what is more accurately termed ‘ epistemology ’ (he mentions the Stoic epistemological doctrine that the mind gets its notions, Evvowa, through the senses), and Augustine was assuredly a Platonist on epistemology. D. — Comparison OF AUGUSTINE'S THEORY OF SIGNS WITH ARISTOTELIAN AND STOIC SEMANTICS In this final section I shall continue the examination of Augustine’s theory of signs in the context of ancient thought, I have argued that the theory which I have explicated in section A has its major background in the logical writings of Aristotle and the Stoics. ‘That this background is a direct source of Augustine's theory is made plausible by the evidence that he had studied both Aristotle and some Stoic books of logic. There is no evidence on what he might have read of Stoic logic, but his knowledge of the latter is extensive enough to allow the conjecture that he did have contact with Stoic logic. In this section the question of sources will be raised, Mainly, however, I wish to compare Augustine’s theory of signs with the work of the two great schools of ancient logic. 1. ARISTOTLE Categories Augustine read the Categories in a translation by Marius Victorinus, as noted earlier4, Victorinus was a Neoplatonist and his interest in the 119, AuruS Gxrzqus, Noch, Att, XVI, vil, 1; Matus, p. 8 120, Noot, Ait, XVI. vim, 2. 121, See above, 2. 96, 122, Topica XII. 52-XIIL. 37. 123. Augustine was not alone in making such errors, See, for example, Cicero's assignment of Stoic doctrines to Aristotle and Theophrastus, | (De inus, I. XXxv. 6r), 124. See above, p. 34.42 B. DARRELL JACKSON Categories reflects this, for Porphyry had made it the logic textbook for Neoplatonism by his immensely influential Eloay@yi to and commentary on it, Victorinus also translated Porphyry’s Eisagoge, but Augustine does not seem to have read it!#5. Although none of Victorinus’ transla- tions survive (he also did Aristotle’s De interpretatione!**), we can have some idea of the language he used ; for he is apparently the source of the fixed terminology of Latin Aristotelian logic which is found in Martianus Capella and Boethius!®”. Since Boethius knew Victorinus’ translations", his own translations may be regarded as something of a witness to Victo- tinus’ language. This must be qualified, however, by the fact that Boethius frequently criticizes the choice of words Victorinus makes! The Categories contains little of semantic interest. There are two things to note. First, in chapter 1 Aristotle gives definitions of ‘ uni- vocal ’ and ‘ equivocal ’, which Augustine follows early. According to Aristotle things are univocally named when they have the same name used. with the same definition ; things are equivocally named when a common name is used with different definitions. According to Augustine, « Those things with a common name and definition are univocally named. ‘Those things with a common name but requiring different definitions are equivocally named». (De dial. 1x. 49-81) In De doctrina, however, Augustine uses neither ‘ univocal’ nor ‘ equivocal’. Second, in the important passage introducing the ten categories Aristotle says that each uncombined expression signifies either a substance or quantity or etc. (tay Katd pndepiav ovupmroKty Agyopévav Exaotov 7tor odoiav onpatver i xoodv # ... 4 18 25-28) ‘This only presupposes semantics, but Boethius, who translates onpaiver as‘ significat 18, reflects in his commentary that the Categories treats names of first imposition (those that signify res), rather than names of second imposition (those that signify other nomina)}8. Although Augustine developed a similar distinction in De magistro (vi. 19-20), it is unlikely that the Categories stimulated him to do this. In the Confessions IV. xvt 28 summary of the Categories passage just cited he does not use‘ significare ’ at all. 125, COURCELLE, pp. 163-176, does not mention it among the several works of Porphyry which Augustine did read. Nor does Augustine appear to have read Plotinus’ Tepi Sikexrixfic. Enneads I. 3. Paul Henry, Plotin et POcoident, (Louvain : Spicilegium, 1934), pp. 224f., does not list it among the quotations, paraphrases, or allusions to Plotinus in Augustine. Plotinus regards dialectic as the way of ascent to the Good. He expresses disdain for the concerns of formal logic. “The only technical content of his dialectic is Platonic Btatpects. 126, KNEALK, p. 187. 127, PHIAGERSDOREFER, pp. 133-5. 128, He wrote a commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge based on Victorinus’ translation of the latter. ‘This is in Migne, Pr, 64, cols. 9-70. 129. See COURCELLE, pp. 264f,, for specific instances. 130. Pr 64, col. T80A. 33%, Ph 64, 159C.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 43 De interpretatione Victorinus translated De interpretatione and at least two scholars have said that Augustine read it'®*, Although the evidence they cite for this has rightly been disputed!*%, the theory of signs in Augustine’s De doctrina chvistiana does bear striking similarity to the semantic scheme in the first chapter of Aristotle's De interpretatione™4, Spoken words are the symbols of expetiences of the soul and written words are the symbols of spoken words (... 4 &v tf gwvil tov av tf Yori nadnudtov couBoRa, Kal ta ypupoueva tov bv 7 gavi). Just as all men do not have the same written words, so they do not have the same ken words. But the experiences of the soul of which the Jatter are e signs (onpieta) are the same for all, as are the objects (npiyyata) of which the experiences of the soul are likenesses. (1 16% 4-8) ‘The following shows the terminological similarity of Augustine's scheme to Aristotle's : Aristotle ‘ypéjporce > goval ———> &v ti yoxt] ———> xpdypore (odp fora) (ovpBora, rabnpdétov onpeta) (Spordpara) Boethius'35 litterae > uoces ———> in anima passionum ———> res (notae) (notae) (similitudines) Augustine lilterae ———>» uoces, uerba —> motus animi etc. (signa) (demonstrare) (signa) res At the first stage there is complete agreement. Written words or letters are signs or symbols of spoken words. Both are symbols of something else for Aristotle. He apparently uses obpBorov and onpsiov synonomously, since spoken words are called by both terms. Boethius hhas translated both as‘ nota’, which is good Latin usage for the idea 132, Gustave Comps, Saint Augustin et la culture classique (Paris : Libraire Plon, 1927), pp. 14f,, cites De ciu. Dei VIII. 12 and IX. 4 as evidence. P. Arsanrc, L’évolu- tion intellectuelle de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1918), p. 232, cites only Conf, IV. xv, 133, COURCELIE, p. 156, n. 7, and MARROU, p. 34, 1. 7. 134, According to BOCHENSKT, p, 29, Aristotle has a far more complex semantics than the one in De interp., but it is scattered throughout the Physics and Metaphysics and is involved in Aristotle's ontology and epistemology. It does not seem appropriate to investigate it in this study. 135. PE 64, col. 297A.44 B, DARRELL JACKSON expressed by cipfokov!8*. He continues this throughout his translation of De interpretatione whenever otpPodov and cnpetov are used semanti- cally rather than in the sense of ‘ proof’ or ‘ evidence ‘197, Thus if Augustine had read the work in a similar translation, he might not have picked up a linguistic usage of‘ signwm ’ from it. Vet for Augustine the thing is more important than the word chosen to designate it!’ ; moreover, there is some indication that he regarded ‘ noéa’ and ‘ signum’ as syno- nymous!89, From this point the similarity requires greater qualification. First, Augustine does not say explicitly that words are signs of movements of the soul. Rather he says they are used by living beings to indicate or express, among other things, movements of the mind. Second, he does not see a relation of likeness between the mind and things as does Aristotle. Rather he says men seek likeness between signs and things. (II. xxv. 38, I5-19) And since there are all sorts of similarity, consent among men is required even for such signs. Third, because Augustine does not see a likeness between res and the mind, he does not see the designation of ves by signs as taking place through the natural mediation of the mind, though he does see it in unity with the mind (the dictio as a union of uerbum and dicibile). This is not, however, a great difference, and when Boethits comments on this passage in De interpretatione he develops notions similar to Augustine’s. He regards the animae passio as under- standing and says the spoken word signifies both the understanding of the thing and the thing itself#0. This is close to Augustine's language about the expression of a dicibile and the designation of a ves. Whatever the textual relation between De doctrina and De interpretatione it seems safe to say that both authors were thinking in very similar ways about the problem of signification. It should be noted finally that Aristotle continues to use onpetov and ovpBohov as well as onpaivetw and onpavtKi in De interpretatione. ‘They are applied to the definition of‘ noun ’,‘ verb ’, and‘ sentence ’, that is to say, linguistically. (2-4) On the other hand, the anthropo- logical focus, which we have seen in Augustine, is not as pronounced in De interpretatione. 136. CrcHRo, Topica VIII. 35. 137. 2, 16% 28 at Pr, 64, 303C ; 3, 16> rx at 306B ; but ‘ signum ’ for' proof’ r, 16° 17 at 300D. 138. See, for example, Contra Ac, II, x1, 25 where Licentius says to Augustine, «I have indeed often heard you say that it is a disgrace for disputants to haggle about words when no difference about the subject matter remains....% ‘Trans. by J. J. O'MEara, in Ancient Christian Writers, no. 12 (Westminster : The Newman Press, 1950), p. or. See MARROW, pp. 243, 0. 2 and 349, u. 3 for other similar passages in Angustine. 139. De doctr. chr. uses the former at II, xx, 30, 1x and the latter at xxi. 33, 32 of the same things but not of words, 140. Vox enim etiam intellectum vei significal, et ipsam rem, PL 64, 297,THE THEORY OF SIGNS 45 2, Stoics ‘There is a twofold textual problem involved in studying the relation of Augustine to Stoic semantics. In the first place, only secondhand accounts of the Stoic logicians —- Zeno, Cleanthes, and the great Chry- sippus — have come down to us. Notions of immense subtlety, such as the doctrine of the ekfon, can be known only through the often confused! and sometimes dishonest accounts of others, The later Stoa is much better known, but it had little interest in logic. In the second place, there are no surviving Latin discussions or translations of Stoic logical writings comparable to Boethius’ discussions and translations of Aristotle's logical works. At least there are none for Stoic semantics. Although the Stoic propositional calculus was relatively well known, only scattered passages in Varro and Seneca are helpful for determining the Latin vocabulary of Stoic semantics. Pinborg has taken Augustine's De dialec- tica as a prime witness to this vocabulary. Since I intend to compare ‘Augustine to the Stoics, this course is not open to me. I shall have to rely mainly on the Greek accounts of Diogenes Ijaertius and Sextus Empiricus. Diogenes Laertius, Lives VIL In his life of Zeno, Diogenes gives a general account of all Stoic doctrines. (VII. 38) ‘The paragraphs on logic include results of his own research (41-48) as well as a quotation verbatim of Diocles Magnes (49-83), a scholar of the first century B. C4, ‘The term‘ sign ’, either as tO onpetov or 26 anpiaivov, does not occur here, But notions are explained which, according to Sextus, do involve sign-language. "The first thing I wish to call attention to in Diogenes is the division of logic (41-43). tO LoyiKdv a ‘ SraAeKticy pntopikh, epi THs oovis mept TOV oNnpawopévav Seneca gives exactly the same division M4, rationalis pars x, .é SiarextiKy, prtopiKh va Z “ uerda significationes x41, See Mares, pp. r2f. 142, See KNEADE, p. 142. 143. MATHS, p. 9. 144. Ep. Mor, 89. 17.46 B. DARRELL JACKSON ‘The important thing here is that the notion of meaning is central to the Stoic conception of logic. Chrysippus apparently stated the govi- onpavopévov division even more ‘ semantically ’. He said that the subjects of dialectic are things signifying and things signified (mept onpatvovta kai onpatvopeva, VII. 62). By the latter Chrysippus meant Aextd. I shall consider the doctrine of the lekton in connection with Sextus’ account. Under the rubric of ‘ things signifying ’ the Stoics considered gramma- tical subjects. Here they presuppose a theory of meaning in the same manner as the grammarians discussed earlier!4® ; they defined parts of speech by what they signify. A common noun (npoonyopta), for instance, is a part of a sentence signifying a common quality (onpaivov Kowlhyv novérnta, VII. 58). Proper nouns and verbs (Svopa, pf\ia) are defined in a similar way. Although Augustine uses terms that could and some- times do correspond to dvoua, mpoonyopia, and Pfpol%, he appears to have adopted as a technical term only the Stoic Adyoc (sentence or statement) as A4E1¢ onpavery (significant utterance). (VII. 57) ‘This he called by the name ‘ dictio’, the word which proceeds in order to signify something!”, Sextus Empiricus, Aduersus Mathematicos VIIL Sextus gives a brief statement of the Stoic semantic schema in his discussion of where truth and falsity may be located. (VIII. rz-13) ‘There are three options : in the thing signified (c@ onpaivopéve), in the sound (tf povf}), and in the motion of the mind (tfj xuvfjost tc Stavolac). Sextus thinks that the third option is a scholar’s invention. He assigns it to no thinker. It apparently is something subjective! and thus is not the molus awimorum of Seneca, although it could be Augustine’s motus animi in so fat as the latter is an emotion or attitude. The second view was held by Epicurus and by Strato, the successor of Theophrastus as head of Aristotie’s school. As on many other issues, the Stoics disa- greed with the Epicureans. According to Sextus the Stoics take the first option, In so far as Augustine does not distinguish between a sentence as a linguistic entity and its meaning, he seems to agree with the Epicureans and Peripatetics on what it is that is true or false!4®, However, leaving aside the sign-giver or receiver, Augustine’s semantic schema is (definitely in De dialectica and probably in De doctrina) that of 145. Dionysius Thrax is said to have been influenced by the Stoies, KNEALE, B. 143. 146, ' Nomen ' for the first,‘ uosabulum ’ for the second, and‘ weybum ' for the third ; see De dial. I. r4f. and 22-24, VI. 17 and 31, VIL, 33, and De mag. V. 16, 147. De dial. V. 52-54 and 62-64, 148. See the refutation of the view at VIII. 137-139. 149. De dial, II. 12-18.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 47 the Stoics, not of the Epicureans, for the Epicureans admit only the sign and the thing signified. According to Sextus this is the Stoic schema : ‘The Stoics say that three things are linked together, that which is signi- fied, that which signifies, and the object (to t¢ onpaivopevov Kal 7d anpatvoy kai 70 twyxdvov) ; of these that which signifies is speech (gaviv), as for example, “ Dion ’, that which is signified is the thing itself which is revealed by it and which we apprehend as subsisting with our thought but the barbarians do not understand, although they hear the spoken word, while the object is that which exists outside, as for example, Dion himself, Of these two are corporeal, that is, speech and the object, while one is incorporeal, that is, the thing which is signified, Le. the Jezton, which is true or false, ‘The basic correspondence with Augustine’s semantic schema is of 10 onpaivov with the signum, 0 teyyavov with the res, and td onpatvs- Hevov or 70 AeKtov with the dicibile and notions associated with the latter in De doctrina christiana. I shall now say some things about each of these three pairs. ‘The Stoic sign’ is here plainly a linguistic entity, ‘The name‘ Dion’ is given as an example. Augustine's theory is also linguistic, at least in emphasis. Another emphasis of Augustine's, the anthropological, is not quite as explicit in this passage, but it is present in such terms as 6uavola and the discussion of the barbarians’ failure to understand, ‘The Stoic object (td wyxévov) is always a body. Augustine uses ‘ ves’ more broadly than this, making it applicable in a wide sense to anything that is. Even when he is thinking of a res as what is designated by a sign, he conceives of it as either sensible or intelligible (De dial. V. af), that is, as either corporeal or incorporeal. In this Augustine is a Platonist and not a Stoic, "The Stoic lekton has several characteristics in common with Augustine's dicibile : I) Both the Jekion and the dicibile are explicated by the notion of understanding. The lekton is what the barbarians do not understand (éxaiovot) when they hear a Greek word. The dicibile is what is under- stood in a word and conceived by the mind. 2) Both the Jekton and the dicibile are made known by signs. The lekton is revealed (SnAobpevov) by asign. Things understood (itellecta), among which are dicibilia, are shown (demonstrandos) by giving signs. 150, VII, 11-22, Trans, by KNEALE, p. 140, quoted by permission of the Clarendon Press, Oxford, Actually, only a part of the class of Jeséa, namely, the d€dpara, are true or false. 151. I believe that 76 onpatvov has almost lost its participiel flavor and has here become a nominal technical term, unlike the usage in Dionysius Thrax. See above a, 70,48 B. DARRELL JACKSON 3) Both are explicated by psychological notions. ‘he Jekion subsists with our thought (Stavoia). ‘The dicibile is held in the mind (animus) ; it is attended to by thought (cogitatio). 4) The only type of sign by which either is expressed is linguistic. ‘The lekton is signified by sound (fj govh). The dicibile is understood in a word and comes forth in union with a word as a dictio. The last assertion requires reference to other texts, for the passage in Sextus cited above speaks only of sound and not of language or discourse, even though it gives a proper name as an example of a sound. ‘There are several such texts. Later in the same work Sextus says that the lekton is that which subsists in conformity with a rational presentation (Aoytkiv gavtaciay) and such a presentation is one that can be conveyed by discourse (A6yq)", When one speaks (tO Aéyew), we learn from Diogenes, one docs more than utter sounds (mpogépovtat ... at pawvat) ; one expresses Aexré!48, And Seneca’s explication of the sigwificationes- uerba distinction shows awareness of the connection of lekta with discourse. He says that there are things which are said and the words in which they are said (res quae dicuntuy et uocabula quibus dicuntur)4, In another passage Seneca translates 1d AgKtév by ‘ dictum 55, In both Greek and Latin, therefore, the choice of technical terms reflects the linguistic foctis of Stoic semantics, Just as AeKtév seems to be derived from Agysw, so ‘ dictum’ and Augustine's ‘ dicibile’ and ‘ dictio’ seem to be derived from ‘ décere ’. Markus has argued that the originality of Augustine’s theory of signs lies in its use as a theory of language!®*. But the texts which I have been citing show that the Stoics did speak of signs in their theory of the meaning of linguistic expressions. Only if one insists that td cnuatvov does not denote a sign, can one say that the Stoics did not apply a theory of signs to language. ‘They used the more common td onpstov non- linguistically in their elaborate theory of inference!S’. It is not clear how these two terms for‘ sign’ are related’, but Augustine's ‘ signwm’ has something of the connotation of both. On the one hand, he uses « signum ’ non-linguistically in his general definition of ‘ signum’, in the examples which he gives for signa naturalia, and in some of the examples for signa daial®, He even uses one of the stock examples from Stoic inferential theory — smoke as a sign of fire!®°, On the other hand, 152. VIII. 70. See Matus, pp. 156. 153. Lives VII. 57. 154. Ep. Mor. 89. 17. 155. 117. 13 ; KNEADE, p. r41. 156. MARKUS, pp. 60-65, 157, Adu. Math, VILL. x4off. 158, See KNEALE, pp. 141f., and Matus, pp. raf. 159. De doctr, Il, x. 1-2 and U1. 4. 160. De docty. II. 1.1, 8 and 2, 148, See Adu. Math, VIII. 152. Also compare IL. 1. 2, 18-22 with AM VIII. 173.THE THEORY OF SIGNS 49 he uses ‘ signum ' linguistically, that is, of spoken and written words. ‘Thus, instead of being novel, Augustine’s use of ‘ sign’ seems to be in agreement with the Stoic tradition. It might be more correct to say that Augustine is original among Latin authors in calling words‘ signs ’. Cicero, Varro, and Quintilian do not seem to use‘ signum' in this way. It is not used at all in two Latin handbooks of logic which survive from Augustine’s period and earlier — Capella’s De dialectica and the Peri hermeneias attributed to Apuleius!6, But there would seem to be a more important originality in Augustine than this. It consists, I suggest, in the application of traditional sign- theory and sign-language to a new task, the interpretation of Scripture. Briefly Augustine’s application consists in using the technical terms of semantics to make distinctions and definitions which delineate clearly the problems faced by the interpreter of Scripture!®*. Detailed appli- cation of an explicit semantics would seem to be an innovation in the history of Christian hermeneutics. In the only hermeneutical treatises prior to De doctrina which survive, De principiis IV and Liber regularum, Origen and Tyconius use the language of meaning and signifying! but neither reflect upon these semantic notions nor make systematic appli- cation of them. The clarity and sophistication gained by the use of semantics put Augustine in a better position to provide adequate solu- tions to the problems of Scriptural interpretation than he might otherwise have been in. Originality of this kind is appropriate to one of the greatest of the synthesizers of Christianity and classical culture. It is an instance of what Augustine so highly recommends in De doctrina christiana itself (II. 41-63) — the Christian's retaining of the liberal disciplines, in this case Aristotelian and Stoic logic, to be put to the use of truth (usui ueri- latis, IL. x1. 60, 15), in this case the interpretation of Holy Scripture. B. Darren. Jackson Queens College Charlotte, U.S.A. 161. APULUTUS, Opera Omnia, vol, 2, ed. G. F. Hirpesranp (Leipzig, 1842), 26sff, This second century A, D, work contains no semantics. Capella does have some semantics, but he uses‘ nomen’ and‘ res’ not‘ signum '. (DICK, 355-358). 162. ‘This is done in Books Two and Three of De doctrina, 163. ORIGEN, De principiis IV. 2-3 and Tvconrus, Liber vegularum IV (BURKITT, p. 36, lines t2f., p. 37, line rr, p. 53, line 8), V (p. 59, line 23), and VII (p. 71, line 7).Augustins Interpretation von Sapientia 11, 21 Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Schépfung fiihrt das Denken Augustin in ein Gewirr von Fragen, die allesamt in einer philosophisch selir diffe- renzierten, bisweilen geradezu paradoxen Auslegung des Anfangs der Genesis : In principio fecit Deus caclum et terram entwirrt und in eine cinheitliche Antwort zusammengefiihrt werden sollen!, Die philosophisch und theologisch relevantesten Fragen zielen auf die ontologische Voraus- setzung des Schaffens im Sein Gottes selbst : auf Gott als den Ort der Ideen, die er in sich als den Vorentwurf von Welt denkt ; auf den Grund, warum Gott die Welt schafft : weil er gut ist oder (and) weil er wollte : auf die Weise, wie er die Welt schafit : in einem zeitlichen oder zeitlosen Akt, der allererst Zeit als creatura mit-setzt ; Schépfung als zeitloser Akt aber impliziert, da8 Gottes Schaffen nicht doch wieder als ein quasizcit- licher « EntschluB » zu: denken sei, durch den er sein unwandelbares Sein affizieren wiirde. Die Reflexion auf das géttliche Schaffen kennzeichnet ferner dessen Autonomie als creatio ex oder de nihilo : auch die formlos- unbestimmte Materie also ist dem Schépfer nicht als Material vorgegeben, sondern selbst geschaffen, Das Nichts, aus dem der Schpfer schafit?, ist kein dem summe esse dei gegeniiberstehendes, quasi-existentes zweites Prinzip, es meint vielmehr das Noch-nicht-Sein des Seienden, welches einzig aus der Fiille des Seins, dem zeitlos anfangen lassenden Anfang (principium sine principio), spontan freigesetzt wird. Diesen schaffenden, Nichts in Etwas iiberfiihrenden Anfang oder Ursprang identifiziert Augustinus im Gefolge der patristischen Tradition mit der ‘ Weisheit ’, dem‘ Sohn ’, dem Wor. Wenn demnach in principio so viel wie in verbo heift, so ist das geschaffen Seiende, die Welt im ganzen, durch das unendliche Worr selbst worthaft verfaSt, daher sinnbestimmt, weil in 1. Vgl. hierfiir besonders Conf. XI, 3 if. XI, 13 ff. Civ, Dei XT, 4 ff. Gen. ad litt, Lt ff. 2. Zu de nihilo ; A, SoriGwac, Les Confessions, B.A. 14, Paris, 1962, 603 ff.52 W. BEIERWALTES der géttlichen Weisheit griindend, erkennbar und im endlichen Wort aussprechbar : die Worthaftigkeit des Seienden legt sich so im Erkennen des Menschen aus. Das Erkennen aber ist ein Element des intelligiblen Kreises, in dem die Welt als geschaffene in ihren schaffenden Grund zuriickaukehren imstande ist : durch den Schaffensakt Gottes der infor- matio unterworfen vollendet die Schépfung in der conversio ihr Wesen, im philosophischen sowohl als auch im soteriologischen Sinne. Augustins Interpretation des Satzes : Omnia in mensura et in numero et in pondere disposuisti (navto pétp@ Kai dpiwWud Kai otabud SiétaEac) aus dem Buche der Weisheit 11, 21 erweitert und prizisiert die umrissene Problematik®. Im Sinne Augustins erlautert dieser Satz den Modus der Konstitution und der Konstituiertheit von Welt durch Gott ; er doku- mentiert nicht eine blo formale, sondern eine qualitativ bestimmte, intelligible Ordnung (als Akt und Tatsache), in der auch die heilsgeschicht- liche Struktur der Welt als deren Offenheit fiir das Wirken der géttlichen Vorsehung und Gnade mitgegeben ist. Das Ziel der folgenden Uberlegungen ist es, die Funktion dieses Satzes im Schépfungs-Denken Augustins festzustellen und die philosophischen Implikationen seiner Auslegung sowohl von der Sache als auch von der platonischen ‘Tradition her zu explizieren. Mensura, numerus und pondus sind als allgemeine intelligible Konsti- tuentien des geschaffen Seienden zu begreifen. Sie sind die vom Creator gesetzten Strukturelemente einer in der Welt universal wirksamen Ordnung, die auch das Ungeordnete (Bise) trigt, es in ihr selbst integriert#, $0 daB das Ungeordnete oder Base lediglich als ein aufhebbarer Abweg vom Geordneten oder Guten gedacht werden muB. Das Ganze kann daher auch mitsamt seinem « linken ‘Teil » als vollkommen erschei- 3. Die Haupstellen : lib. arb. II, 20 ; Gen. o. Man. I, 16, 26 ; I, 31, 32; En. in Ps. CXVIL, s. 20, 2, 14; En. in Ps. CKINVI, 11, 24; ¢, Faust, XX, 7; XX, 6; mal. boni 215 23; De Trin, TIT, 9, 18 ; XI, 11, 18 ; Gen. ad litt. LV, 3 ff. V, 22, 43 3 Civ, Det V, 11; XI, 28, 30, 35 ; XII, 19, 20; Zn Joh. tr. 1, 13 (8. fin.). W.J. RocHE, Measure, Number and Weight in saint Augustine (The New Scholasticism, 15, 1941, 350-376), gibt eine textimimanente, aber dennoch instruktive Paraphrase der Sap. 11, 21 zitierenden Augustinus-Stellen, Abgesehen von einigen unspezifischen Hinweisen auf das Form-Materie-Problem und die stoisch-neuplatonische Stufung des Seienden in « Materie-Seele-Geist » (373 ff.) hat Roche daranf verzichtet, den wirkungsge- schichtlichen Standort Angustins zu bestimmen. —O. pu Roy erlautert die Bedeutung der Trias mensura-numerus-pondus fiir den trinitarischen Aspekt des Schopiungs- aktes und die trinitarische Struktur des Geschaffenen (L’intelligence de la foi en Ia Trinité selon Saint Augustin, Paris 1966, 279-281 ; 421-424). Zugleich macht er deutlich, daB die biblische Trias mensura-numerus-pondus — freilich gerade aufgrund ibres metaphysischen Vorbegriffs oder zumindest aufgrund modglicher philoso- phischer Sinnkongruenz beider — die Entfaltung der metaphysischen Trias modus- spocies-ordo (vgl. unten Anm, 7) ursiichlich bestimmte (280), 4. De ord, I, 18 : « Qui ordo atque dispositio, quia universitatis congruentiam ipsa distinctione custodit, fit ut mala etiam esse necesse sit. Ita quasi ex antithetis quodammodo, quod nobis etiam in oratione incundum est, id est ex contrariis, omnjum simul rerum pulchritudo figuratur »,AUGUSTINS INTERPRETATION VON SAPIENTIA 11,21 53 nen®, — Die Affinitat von mensura, numerus, pondus zur mathematischen Denkweise, die Seiendes auf mathematisch-ontologische Strukturen als letzte begriindende Elemente von Seiendem zurtickfiihrt, erweist — unter problemgeschichtlichem Aspekt —, daB Augustins Interpretation von Platons miindlicher Ijehre und deren neuplatonischer und neupythago- reischer Weiterentwicklung her aufgehellt werden kann®. I, Mensura Die ‘Trias ; mensura, numerus, pondus entspricht der ‘Trias : modus, species, ordo?. Beide erlautern sich gegenseitig. Da8 Seiendes nach MaB geordnet ist, heift demnach, daf sein Sein genau bestimmt, auf eine bestimmte ‘ Dimension ’ bemessen, als eindeutiges Etwas (Wesen) begrenzt und daher endlich ist. Das gesetzte MaB griindet im messenden, begrenzend-bestimmenden (terminare), selbst aber un-endlichen (infinitum) Akt des Creator. Er ist « héchstes Ma » (summa mensura’), jedoch nicht selbst wieder gemessenes, von Anderem bestimmtes MaB. Die Absolutheit des géttlichen Mafes : seine absolute Verschiedenheit zu jedem Bemessenen nimlich ist durch die paradoxe Aussage angezeigt, daB er « Ma ohne MaB » (mensura sine mensura)® sei, ausschlieBlich messendes, begriindendes, creativ setzendes MaB. Der Gedanke, da® Gott oder das schaffende erste Prinzip « MaB » von Allem sei, ist von Platon grundgelegt : das Gute, mit dem Binen identisch, ist als « weltzugewandtes » Prinzip Grurd und Ma® des Seienden insgesamt. Im polemischen Hinblick auf Protagoras kann der Gott « Mad aller Dinge » heiBen!, Als platonischer Reflex erscheint das Gute in einem Fragment des Aristoteles als « genauestes MaB x". — Die absolute Funktion des neuplatonischen Hinen ist in der christlichen ‘Theologie mit dem Selbstdenken des Nus identifiziert worden. Gott ist daher — wieder im Sinne des von Plotin verworfenen aristotelischen Entwurfes — erstes Prinzip und 2ugleich Denken seiner selbet und alles Zu-Schaffenden, Eine wesentliche Funktion des Einen aber ist, « nicht gemessenes MaB » (nétpov ob petpobpevov)® zu sein. Absolutes Ma ist das Eine als univer- sale Ursache und als Element (ototyetov) des Seienden. Dieser fiirs System konstitutive Gedanke wird bis in den spiten Neuplatonismus festgehalten und in der von Grund auf platonischen ‘Theologie des Ps.- 5. Soli, I, 1: ¢ deus, per quem universitas etiam cum sinistra parte perfecta est », 6. Grundlegend fiir diese Problematik sind H.J. KRAmur, Arete bei Platon und Avistoteles, Heidelberg 1959, Ders., Der Ursprung der Geistmelaphysik. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Platonismus zwischen Platon und Plotin, Amsterdam 1964. K, Garsmr, Platons wngeschriebene Lehre, Stuttgart 1963. 7. De nat, boni 3, 35 8,8. Hib. arb, TIT, 35, Civ. Dei V, 11 | XI, 28; Gen, litt, IV, 3, 7 (modus, species, quies ; terminare, formare, ordinare). Gen. c. Man. I, 16, 26. 9. Gen. litt. IV, 3, 8. ro, Leg. 716 C. Bir Platon vgl. Krawmr, Arete 396. 547 £. rz, Polit, fr. 2, p. 64 Ross : navrav yap axpipéotatov pétpov taya0dv tori. 12, PLOTIN, V, 5, 4,13 £.1, 8, 2, 5: wécpov mavtov Kal népac. Alles Gestaltete (el80¢, wopon) ist ¢gemessen» ; das Hine ist gestalt-los (dveiSeov), weil Nicht-Etwas, deshalb auch nicht « gemessen » ; VI, 7, 33, 16 ff.54 W. BEIERWALTES Dionysius Areopagita weiter entfaltet, um das géttliche Erwirken einer analogischen Seins-Struktur der Welt zu kennzeichnen"?, Mafi zu setzen oder an ihm teilhaben zu lassen ist aber auch im Wirken des Demiurgen oder der Gdtter tiberhaupt impliziert. « Durch sich selbst haben die Gdtter das Seiende hervorgebracht und nichts konnte zur Existenz kommen tind Ma8 und Ordnung erlangen ohne die Gétter ; durch ihre Macht naimlich vollendet sich alles, und alles ist geordnet und gemessen von den Géttern »™, Dem Ungeordneten bringt der Demiurg «Ma8, Ordnung und Grenze »'5, Der MaB setzende Akt des Demiurgen ist daher als «Ordnen » oder « Abgrenzen » (apopitew = terminare) gefaBt!s, Der Creator setzt in gleicher Weise wie der Demiurg — negativ — die Grenze (népac) eines jeden Etwas und dadurch — positiv — dessen je eigenes Wesen : Etwas als Bestimmtes, wesenhaft Begrenztes ; Grenze stiftet 50 Kigenheit und identifiziert vom Eigenen aus das Andere in seiner je eigenen Andersheit. Jedes Seiende aber muB, um diberhaupt zu sein und als es selbst identifizierbar zu sein, als begrenztes, bemessenes Etwas sich darstellen. Durch modus qua mensura ist daher Seiendes modicum'?, was die Konnotation des MaBvollen, GemaBigten (moderalum, modestum, modi- ficatwm'®) mit sich fiihrt. MaB-loses, Un-mabiges (immodicum = dnetpov), durch nicht sein sollendes Uber-ma8 (nimictas = omepBodt) Charakteri- siertes ist im eigentlichen Sinne nicht, Der neuplatonische Demiurg und der christliche Creator aber erwirken in gleicher Weise, da Seiendes 13. R, Roguus, L’univers dionysien, Paris 1954, 50 ff. 34, PRocLus, Elem, theal. 144 ; 126, 22-24 Dodds. 15. In Tim. I, 374, 27 Diehl : tic 88 wérpov abt napéyerar Kai tab Kal Spov ; dtAOv, dc 6 SNuLovpydc. Durch das Mab setzt er die Ordnung : in Tim. I, 37, 24345, 17, 55, 13 130, 24; 174, 19 (Vgl. auch IAmarrcHus, Myst, 17, 16 Parthey), Zur Trias KéAoc-copperpia-rékig: Theol. Plat. V, 20; 288, 30 £. Portus, Identitit von Mad, Gutheit und Ordnung ist konstitutiv fiir die Definition von « gut » und « schlecht, bose ¥: PROCLUS, Mal. 13, 12 ff. Boese : bonum mensura et lumen ; malum immen- suvatio. Bbd. 38. 51, 10 ff. Fiir Augustins Verhaltnis zu dieser platonischen ‘Tradition val. W. TREILER, Porphyrios und Augustin, x8 £., jetzt in: Forschungen sum Neupla- tonismus, Berlin 1966, 182 (wonach im folgenden zitiert wird), — Schon bei Philo ist die Idee im Geiste Gottes synonym mit einem apriorischen pétpov, tomog und sppaylc, durch die etSonoiettar Kai petpetear th vopeva (op. mundi 34 und 130). Mit der Terminologie von Sap. 11, 21 — als Interpretation von Dei, 25, 13-15 jedoch — nennt Philo, de somm, II 193 £, Gott otd0un Kal REtpov Kal dpryidg cov Shay. Der daraus resultierende Akt ist Gottes gerechtes Wirken: dhndéc 88 Kai Sixatov pétpov 7d tov HdvOV BiKutov Bedv OnoAaBeiv mévra jetpEty Kal graOpdcbar Kal dpwWyoic Kal népact Kai Spors thY TOV SAOV nEpLypdyat Pda. Auninvs, Isag. 163, 13 #, Hermann : die Idee ist in Beaug auf den Gott dessen + Gedanke » ; in Bezug auf die Materie : « MaB , Der Begriff von Idee als Gedanke Gottes ist die Voraussetzung daftir, daB der Akt des Demiurgen iiberhanpt als MaB-Setzen gedacht werden kana, 16, Procr.us, in Tim. I 55, 2. Theol, Plat. V, 20 ; 288, 31 ff. V 39: 333, 4 ff. 17. AUGUSTIN, nal. boni 21, 18. ebd, 22,AUGUSTINS INTERPRETATION VON SAPIENTIA 11,21 55 als Begrenztes, Bestimmtes, Bemessenes und daher Mafvolles sei. Das Mab-lose etwa im Sinne der augustinischen ungeformten Materie ist durch Mab zu formen. MaG-loses innerhalb des schon Geformten ist aufhebbares Akzidenz. —In den Begriffen népac, dnetpov und drepBodn ist wiederum die z.T. auf Platons Philebos zuriickgehende, durch Platons miindliche Lehre bis zur proklischen Trias népac-deinov-ptxtov hin entfaltete Tradition wirksam.9, GemaB dem ‘Theilerschen Arbeitssatz®? tragen die aus dem Bereich des spateren Neuplatonismus genannten Problem- aspekte zum Verstandnis Augustins Wesentliches bei, weil sie die vom griechischen Neuplatonismus her bedingte philosophische Substruktur des Augustinischen Denkens zum Vorschein bringen. 2, Numerus Die Zaht ist im Bereich des Sinnenfalligen und Intelligiblen der intelligible Grund dafiir, daB Seiendes iiberhaupt erkennbar und als das Eine vom Anderen unterscheidbar ist, In der Funktion des begrenzenden Unterscheidens hat die Zahl eine bestimmte Affinitat zum Ma®®, Erkennbar ist allein die klar umrissene Gestalt ; Zahl aber ist Grund fiir species und forma des Seienden. Wenn wir also species und forma des Seienden erkennen, so erkennen wit — auf Grund der allgemeinen zahlenhaften VerfaBtheit des Seienden — jeweils dessen Zabl, Zahl kann hier nicht nur als formallogischer Einheitswert oder als abstrakte Benennung eines Seienden verstanden werden, sie ist vielmehr als ein ontologischer, apriorischer, qualitativ bestimmender Grund von Seiendem zu begreifen : Die Verschiedenheit der Zahlen, ihre ontologisch gefaBte qualitative Differenz koustituiert die qualitative Differenz des Seienden selbst. Seiendes ist nur als Gestalt (forma, species) méglich. Gestalt aber ist durch das jedem Seienden immanente Wirken der Zahlen bedingt. Die Manifestation dieser rationalen Struktur oder der Geordnetheit des Seien- den aber ist dessen Schénheit (species, pulchritudo). Also ist auch Schénheit von der Zahl her zu begreifen ; sie weist sich so als ein ontolo- gischer Grundzug des Seienden aus, der die gittliche Weisheit zur Exschei- nung bringt (dei sapientia omnis pulchritudo formatur). Die Schénheit, weil Ordnung bedingende creativ gesetzte Zahl griindet in der absoluten Zahl ; im géttlichen Intellekt oder in 19. H.J, KrAmer, Avete, passim. 20, W. THenER, Porphyrios und Augustin, 164 : ¢ rscheint bei einem nachploti- nischen Neuplatoniker ein Lehrstiick, das nach Inhalt, Form und Zusammenhang sich mit einem solchen bei Augustin vergleichen 1a Mt, aber nicht oder nicht im selben Mafi mit einem bei Plotin, so darf es als porphyrisch gelten ». at. De lib, arb, II, 16, 42: ¢ formas habent (caelum ct terra) quia numeros habent, Adime illis hace, nihil erunt ». ebd, 44 : ¢si ergo quidquid mutabile aspexeris, vel sensu corporis, vel animi cousideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numerorum forma teneatur, qua detracta in nihil recidat... ». 22, Civ. Dei XL, 19 : « suis quisque numerus proprietatibus terminatur, ut nullus eorum par esse cuicumqne alteri possit »,56 W. BEIERWALTES der Weisheit des creatcr als dem Ort der Zahlen®, Diese sind Strukturele- mente seines unwandelbaren Seins und seiner Wahtheit ; sie sind unwan- delbar wie dieses Sein selbst. Wenn die Zahlen Grund von ordo, forma und pulchritudo des Seienden sind, wenn sie in der géttlichen Weisheit als deren unwandelbare Strukturelemente griinden, wenn die Weisheit als Wort aber zugleich Fiille der Formen (Ideen) ist und diese in der Schép- fung aktuiert, so sind die Zahlen mit eber diesen zeitlos in mente divina vorentworfenen Sinngestalten des geschaffen Seienden, den Ideen, identisch. Die Absolutheit der creativ setzenden Zahl zeigt Augustinus wie beim MaBbegriff durch numerus sine numero an. Der Creator ist zwar summus numerus**, jedoch nicht im Sinne einer denkbar héchsten Quantitat, die immer noch — als schlechte Unendlichkeit — iiberschreitbar ware, sondern als Zahl, die selbst nicht mehr gezahit werden kann, also nicht mehr durch Zahl einholbat ist : wahre Unendlichkeit. Diese Unendlichkeit (infinitas) mu8 — auf den ersten Blick paradoxerweise — als « bestimmt » oder « begrenzt » (finita) gedacht werden, sofern man anzunehmen hat, daG Gott seine eigene Unendlichkeit begreift, Begreifen aber immer (auch fiir Gott) mit Bestimmen (finire) identisch ist?’ So ist die wahre Unend- lichkeit Gottes fiir uns zwar unbegreiflich (ohne Grenze), weil nicht im Begriff bestimmbar, fiir ihn selbst aber ist sie « bestimmt », weil immer schon begriffen. In den Gedanken, da8 die creativen Zahlen im Geiste des Creator mit den Ideen identisch sind, macht sich Augustins Rezeption neupythago- reischer und neuplatonischer Philosopheme besonders deutlich. Mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit ist die Introductio arithmetica des Neupythagoreers Nikomachos von Gerasa fiir die Ausbildung des augustinischen Zahlbe- griffs wirksam geworden. Sie war in der Zeit Augustins in einer Uber- setzung des Apuleius zuginglich®®, Nach der prinzipiellen Uberlegung des Nikomachos griindet die Ordnung des Kosmos in den Zahlen, diese aber sind géttliche Denkstrukturen. Der hierfiir zentrale Abschnitt aus der Introductio kann geradezu als Kommentar des augustinischen Grund- gedankens fungieren : « Alles, was in kunstvoller Entfaltung durch Natur 23. Trin. VI, 10, rx, lib, arb, IT, rt, 30 : « incommutebilis veritas numerorum ... eius quasi cubile ac penetrale vel regio quaedam.,, habitaculum quoddam sedesque numerorum », Civ. Dei XU, 19. Gen, litt. IV, 4, 10 }6, 12, mus, VI, 17, 57. O.PERLER, Der Nus bei Plotin und das Verbum bei Augustinus als vorbildliche Ursache der Welt, Diss, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1931, 31 if. 24. Gen. lilt. TV, 4, 8. Gen, ¢, Man. I, 16, 26, En, in Ps, CKLVI, 12. 25. Zu dieser in ep. III, 2 und Civ, Dei XII, 19 exponierten Problematik vgl. P. Hapor, Numerus intelligibilis infinite orescit, in: Miscellanea André Combes, Rom, 1967, I, 181-rgr und W. THEILER, Augustin wnd Origenes, in: Augustinus, RIL, Festschrift PV. Capanaga, Madrid 1968, II, 427 26. A. Solignac hat als erster auf den Zusammenhang Augustins mit Nikomachos aufmetksam gemacht : Doxographies et manuels dans la formation philosophique de saint Augustin, Rech. Aug. 1 (1958), 113-148, bes. 133 ff, Apuleius’ eigene Schriften Waren Augustinus bekannt ; er zitiert z.B. aus De deo Socratis in Civ. Dei VITI 15, 18 ; 1X, 8, 16,AUGUSTINS INTERPRETATION VON SAPIENTIA 11,21 57 im Kosmos nach ‘Teil und Ganzen geordnet ist, scheint gema8 Zah! von der Vorsehung und dem das Ganze erwirkenden (schaffenden) Geiste unterschieden und geordnet worden zu sein, im Hinblick auf ein festste- hendes Urbild als Modell ; und dies, weil die Zabl im Denken des weltschaf- fenden Gottes vorherseiend ist, intelligibel und ganzlich materielos, das wahrhaft zeitlose Sein, so daB auf sie hin, wie auf eine kiinstlerische Idee, alles vollendet werde : Zeit, Bewegung, Himmel, die vielfaltigen Um- schwiinge »°”. — Die behauptete Identitat von Zahl und demitrgischer Idee, die die Ordnung des Kosmos stiftet, wird insbesondere durch Plotin in der Enneade VI 6 (« Uber die Zahlen ») differenziert begriindet, Der Ansatzpunkt der plotinischen Uberlegung ist die Explikation des votc- Begriffes. Dieser ist die dialektisch-zeitlos sich austragende Identitat von Denken und Sein. Das Sein des votc aber ist die durch Andersheit strukturierte, vielheitliche Einheit der Ideen, Wenn der vobdg sich also selbst denkt, so denkt er die Ideen als sein Sein, Die « wesenhaften Zahlen » (odo1dSy¢ GpWndc) aber haben fiir die Seinsstruktur der Ideen Prinzipcharakter. Sie begriinden die individuelle Einheit jeder Idee und ordnen das Gesamt der Ideen zu einem Kda}tog vontés. Sie lassen so in jeder Idee Grenze, Bestimmung (népac) als Grundzug der Idee erschei- nen. Indem sie das Wesen der Idee mitkonstituieren, unterscheiden sie sich fundamental von den abstraktiven, mathematischen Zahlen, (jova- S1xdg d.), die im Gezihlten keinen Sachverhalt anzeigen wollen, also gerade nicht ontologisch verstanden werden kénnen. Im Geist sind die wesenhaften Zahlen demnach nicht isoliert von ihrem Bezugs objekt, den Ideen, sondern selbst Geist wie die Ideen. Sowoh! die Tinheit des Ganzen (vobc) als auch die in der Selbstidentitat griindende Verschie- denheit des Einzelnen (Idee) : die Einheit im der Andersheit also, ist ihr Werk. Diese « Idealzahlen » werden durch den demiurgischen Akt des vobs zu Strukturelementen auch des sinnenfallig Seienden. « So ist denn wohl das Sein geeinte Zahl, das Seiende entfaltete Zahl, der Geist Zahl, die sich in sich selber bewegt, das Iebewesen Zahl, die die anderen umfaSt. Auch mu das Sein, da es ja, aus dem Einen entstanden, in demselben Sinne wie jenes Eins war, auch seinerseits Zahl sein ; deswegen hat man auch die Ideen Einheiten und Zahlen genannt. Und dies ist die wesenhafte Zahl ; von ihr ist zu unterscheiden die Zahl, die man monadisch nennt, ein Abbild von ihr. Die wesenhafte Zahl ist die, die in den Ideen gesehen wird und sie mit erzeugt, ihre oberste Stufe aber ist die Zahl, die im Sein ist, mit dem Sein zusammen und vor dem Seienden. Und in ihr hat das Seiende Fundament, Quelle, Wurzel und Urgrund », — Den Akt des 27. 1,65 12, 1-12 Hoche : méivra vd xara tezviKiy SéEoBov ond gbcemc bv cH ROon diateraypéva Kara Epos te Kal Oa palverar Kara dpOLdv bnd thh¢ mpovatac kai toB td 8a. Sryttovpyficavrog vob SiaxexpioBui te kal KeKOOUF odor BeBaLovWEVvoD 100 nupadelynatos olov Adyov npoxupeyuaros &k TOD Enéysw tov dpiewoVv mpov- nootiivra dy tf] Tod KoouOROLos OE00 Stavoig, vontdv abtoV HOvoV Kal navrdnaot dvdov, odctav pévzot thy Svtws TAY diBtov, iva npdc adtoV de AEYOV TexVEKdV dno teheoOl| td counavta TaOta, xpdvos, Kivnatc, obpavec, dotpa, &Eedryol mavtoiot. 28. VI, 6, 9, 29-30.58 W. BEIERWALTES Demiurgen, der die idealen Zahlen im Seienden wirksam werden 1a8t und dadurch das Seiende ordnet, differenziert der spatere Neuplatonismus durch die ‘Trias épipdg - SyKog - Sbvayic, Diese drei garantieten den intelligibel begriindeten « Zusammenhalt » (Beoudc, dvaroyia, ovvéxera) des Kosmos?9_ In diesem Zusammenhang kann nur darauf hingewiesen werden, daB der Versuch Plotins, das Sein des Geistes von der wesenhaften Zahl her zu verstehen, unter problemgeschichtlicher Riicksicht als spekulative Explikation bestimmter, wiederum auf Platons miindliche Lehre zuriick- gehender Philosopheme der Alteren Akademie zu interpretieren ist. Diese sind uns noch einigermafen greifbar in dem Xenokratischen Gottes- begriff : Gott ist vobg und povéc zugleich. In den Ideen als Zahlen denkt er sich selbst. Von diesem Gottesbegriff her ist eine Deutung des Aristote- lischen Gottes fegitim und sinnvoll, die dessen ‘ Denken seiner selbst ” nicht als einen zwar denknotwendigen aber leer-abstrakten AbschluB des Systems versteht, sondern es inhaltlich zu bestimmen vermag®!. Dieses so gefafte Selbstdenken des Aristotelischen Gottes wiederum ist maBge- bend geworden fiir die Struktur des Denkaktes, wie sie Plotin fiir den absoluten votg entwickelt hat®. So wird evident, da Plotin in der Konstitution des sich selbst denkenden Geistes von der Zahl her den Xenokratischen, Aristotelischen und neupythagoreischen Ansatz in eine neue, einheitliche Denkgestalt gefiigt hat, die die Tradition vollendet. Sie ist das philosophische Modell fiir den theologischen Creator-Begriff. 3. Pondus ‘ Schwergewicht ’ oder ‘ Schwerkraft’ meint die Intentionalitat (Sinngerichtetheit), die sowohl jedem sinnenfillig Seienden als auch dem menschlichen Begehrungsvermdgen, dem Willen oder der Liebe, auf einen ihm jeweils adaquat zubemessenen «Ort» (locus ; otaGpdc als ‘ Standpunkt’) hin gesetzhaft immanent wirkt#, ‘ Ort’ versteht sich als Stelle oder Funktion (officium4) im Gesamt des Seienden und des Strebens, die einem jeden gema% seinem Wesen zukommt. Ort also ist Wesens-Ort, den ein Seiendes einnimmt oder erreichen mu8, um sein im Wesen erméglichtes ‘Telos zu erfiillen 29. Vgl. Procyus, in Tim, I, 300, 14 ff, IL 21, 22 ff. 25, 1 ff, Theol. Plat. V, 20; 288, 50 ff, Platonischer Ausgangspunkt ist Tim. 32 A. Zum Snjtovpyixde dpwpdc : in Tim, I, 136, x9 #f. IL 33, 25. Ordnung und Zabl : Mal. 15, 4. 30. Vgl. hierzu die cinlenchtende Erérterung bei H.J. KRAMER, Geistmetaphysih, 292 ff, 31. KRAMER, Geistmetaphysih, 159 ff. Ders., Zur geschichilichen Stellung der avistotelischen Metaphysik, Kantstudien, 58 (1967), 313-354. 32, P. Hapon, Etre, vie, pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin, Les Sources de Plotin, Genf 1960, 112, Krdwer, Geisimetaphysik, 380 ff. 33. En, in Ps. XXIX, s, 2, ro : « Pondus est impetus quidam cuiusque rei velut conantis ad locum suum », Mafigeblich fiir die Problemgeschichte von pondus ist der Aristotelische Begriff des « natiirlichen Ortes » (olxetog t6mog), Phys. 212 b 33 ; 253 b 34. 34. C. Faust. XXI, 6.AUGUSTINS INTERPRETATION VON SAPIENTIA 11,21 59 Corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum ... ignis sursum tendit, deorsum lapis*®. In theologischer Metapher : Ecclesia tendit in caclum*®, Aus demselben Horizont heraus gedacht gilt fiir den Menschen : amor meus pondus meum*?, Die Liebe namlich ist das bewegende Element im Mens- chen, das ihn sich selbst auf Gott als dem ihm gemaBen Ort hin transzen- dieren 14Bt. Die ihm wesentliche Bewegung ist daher der Auistieg : ascendimus ascensiones in corde et cantamus canticum gradusm®, Wenn die durch die Schwerkraft getriebene Bewegung ihren Ort erreicht hat, kommt sie in ihm zur Ruhe (reguies nosiva locus noster®), Dadurch stellt sie die vom Creator intendierte, logisch und ontologisch begriindete und daher aktual auch zu ermdglichende Ordnung her, die gerade als parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispo~ sitio! vorgestellt wird. Sie griindet in dem « ewigen Gesetz » (lex aeterna), nach dem Gott die Welt Konstituiert hat, das jedem Seienden die ihm zukommende Wiirde (Seinsrang = dignitas = a&{a*) zubemessen hat. Wenn Ordnung die Integration alles in sich different Seienden in einen Zustand der Ruhe ist, so ist Un-Ruhe oder Bewegung auf ein noch zu erreichendes Telos hin in geringerem MaBe Ordnung als eben diese Beruhigt- heit, die alle denkbaren Bewegungen des Denkens und Strebens schon durchlaufen hat. Minus ordinata inquieta sunt : ordinantur et quiescunt®®, Fiir den Menschen heift dies, da8 Gott die beruhigende Ruhe der dem Menschen eigenen Unrwhe ist. Von seiner ontologischen Voraussetzung her kann deshalb der viel zitierte Satz nicht psychologisch miBdeutet werden : inguietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te*8, In Gott ruhend namlich ist der Mensch geordnet. Derjenige kosmologische, ethische, soziale und religidse Zustand der Welt aber, der die durch Gott begriindete oder erméglichte Gesetzhaftigkeit, Ordnung und Ruhe sich hat durch- setzen lassen, heiBt augustinisch Friede : pat omnium rerum tran- quillitas ordinis*, Dieser den Sinn von pondus auslegende Gedankenkomplex von locus, ordo, quies, lex und pax entspringt zumindest in seinen wesentlichen Komponenten dem ontologischen Grundrif des neuplatonischen ‘Taxis- 35. Conf. XIII, 9, 30. En. in Ps, XXIX, 8, 2, ro. 37. Con, XII, 9, Civ. Dei XI, 28 : « ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur ». 38. Conf. XIII, 9, 39. ebd. 40. Civ, Dei KIX, 13. 4t. Zu dieser Terminologie vgl. Tuutrun, Porphyrios und Augustin, 182 f. 42. Conj, XTII, 9, 43. Conj. 1, 1; Gen, litt, IV, 9, 16:4... ut illue feramur appetitu desiderii, quo cum perveniremus requiescamus, id est nihil amplius requiramus». 17, 29 : ¢in quodam quippe incommutabili bono requiescere debenmus, quod ille nobis est qui nos fecit., ipse sibi bonum est, quo beatus est », 18, 34. Civ. Dei XI, 31 : « ibi requies dei, qua requiescitur in deo ». 44. Civ, Dei KIX, 13. Zut Sache ; H. FUCHS, Augustin und der antike Friedens- gedanke, Berlin 1926,60 W. BEIERWALTES Gedankens*5, Dieser formt wesentlich die platonische Vorstellung von einem die Ungeordnetheit der Materie ordnenden Demiurgen aus. Der Demiurg schafit bestimmt-Seiendes als « Gestalt », er grenzt das Seiende voneinander ab und setzt so gemaB der jeweiligen « Wiirde » eines Seienden die Stufung des Seienden insgesamt fest. Diese Stufung aber ist mit der Gesetzlichkeit, Geordnetheit und Schénheit der Welt identisch. Wie mensura und numerus, so muB auch pondus in dem fiir das Seiende insgesamt konstitutiven Sinne dem Creator abgesprochen werden. Gott kann als Ursprung von pondus nur wieder pondus sine pondere sein**, Dies heiGt : er strebt nicht auf einen ihm gemafen Ort hin, in dem er sich allererst beruhigen kénnte ; er wird nicht, was er sein soll, sondern er ist, was er ist : das reine, unwandelbare Sein selbst. Seine « Schwer- kraft » ndmlich treibt ihn nicht iiber sich hinaus, sondern bleibt in ihm selbst konzentriert, da sie, als dem swmmum bonum wesenseigen, nicht von einem Anderen her finalisiert ist. Als solches, durch sich selbst bestimmtes, sich selbst gentigendes, reines Sein oder héchstes Gut ist Gott Ruhe in sich und Ruhe fiir alles Geschaffene zugleich. Die von ihm selbst im Seienden gesetzte Schwerkraft kommt in ihm als der univer- salen Ziel-Ursache zur Ruhe. Wie er selbst in «ewiger Ruhe », die als Denken intensivste, jedoch unwandelbare trinitarische Bewegtheit ist, den ewigen Sabbat feiernd reine Gliickseligkeit ist, so gibt er auch dem Seienden, welches das ihm vom Creator gesetzte Telos erreicht, an seiner eigenen Ruhe und Gliickseligkeit teil. « Et ubi requiescens nisi in seipso, quia beatus nonnisi seipso ? quando, nisi semper ?.., ac per hoc ipsa universitas creaturae, quae sex diebus consummata est, aliud habet in sua natura, aliud in ordine quo in Deo est, non sicut Deus, sed tamen ita ut ei quies propriae stabilitatis non sit, nisi in illius quiete qui nihil praeter se appetit, quo adepto requiescat. et ideo dum ipse manet in se, quidquid ex illo est retorquet ad se ; ut omnis creatura in se habeat naturae suae terminum, quo non sit quod ipse est ; in illo autem quietis locum, quo servet quod ipsa est »4”, Auch dieset Gedanke Augustins, der Sein und Funktion des christlichen Schépfers vom Begriff der Ruhe und Selbstgenugsamkeit her zu erhellen versucht, ist von charakteristisch neuplatonischen Implikationen bestimmt. Das Kine im Sinne Plotins oder des Proklos ist als die ermdg- lichende Fiille alles dessen, was «nach » ihm ist, das « Selbstgenug- samste ». Des Anderen bedarf es selbst nicht“® ; das Andere jedoch ist auf das Hine als auf seinen es erhaltenden und vollendenden Ziel-Grund 45. Hieriiber griindlich Tyner, Porphyrios und Augustin, 180 ff. 46. Gen, lit, TV, 4, 8 : ¢mensura autem sine mensura est, cui acquatur quod de illa est, nec aliunde ipsa est : numerus sine numero est, quo formantur omnia, nec formatur ipse : pondus sine pondere est, quo referuntur ut quiescant, quorum quies purum gaudium est, nec illud iam refertur ad alind », 47. Gen, litt, IV, 17, 30 u. 18, 34. 48. Vgl. Protin, VI, 9, 6,17 ff. : bei pév tkavdtatov dnévtov Kai abtapkéotutoy kai dvevéséorarov elvat (td év). SYRIAN, Met, 183, ro f. Kroll: xpdtictov kai abtapkéctatov. PLOTIN, I, 8, 2, 4; V, 5, 4, 16; IIL, 8, rx, 11; V, 6, 4, 1f£; VI, 9 6, 35. PRocius, in Parm. 723, 12.AUGUSTINS INTERPRETATION VON SAPIENTIA 11,21 6r hin strukturiert und bewegt. Weil das Kine der Ziel-Grund von allem Seienden ist, findet die in Dialektik und Askese sich vollziehende Bewe- gung menschlichen ‘Transzendierens in ihm seine Ruhe"®, Die Selbstge- nugsamkeit des Tiinen ist das in sich Werthafteste. $o besteht von ihm her als dem universalen Ma8 auch fiir jede ihm nachgeordnete Hyposta: die Forderung, da8 sie selbstgenugsam in sich selbst bleiben, in sich «rahen » solle und sich nicht « vielgeschaftig » ins Viele zerstreuen diirfe, da sie bei sich seiend immer auch in ihren Grund zentriert ist. In der bei sich seienden Ruhe und Selbstgenugsamkeit ist auch ihre Gliickseligkeit begriindet®, Jede Selbstentfremdung einer Hypostasis aber kommt einer Selbstdestruktion gleich. Die Augustinische Auslegung des Satzes Omnia in mensura et in numero et in pondere disposuisti zeigt also die Ordnung, die mathematisch-rationale Gesetzhaftigkeit, die gegliederte und gestufte Kinheit der Welt, durch die sie im eigentlichen Sinne wni-versum® ist, In der Harmonie des in ihr Differenten ndmlich besteht ihr « Heil », ihre «Schdnheit», ihr «Friede»®, Die Betrachtung hat sich von den einzelnen ordnenden Elementen MaB, Zahl und Schwerkraft jeweils auf deren schépferischen Ermig- lichungsgrund zuriickgewandt. Als zusammenwirkende, die Einheit der Welt mitkonstituierende rationale Krafte lassen sie miteinander das Wirken des Creator erscheinen : durch ihren unmittelbaren Verweis auf den Creator (artifex) weisen sie die Welt als eine sinnvoll entworfene und durch providentia geleitete aus®. Die Absicht der Augustinischen Auslegung ist eine durchaus theolo- gische, die Mittel aber, in denen sich diese Absicht artikuliert, sind genain philosophisch. Dadurch ist die Méglichkeit, da® in der Auslegung spezi fisch Christliches wirksam werde, eingeschrinkt, Der Exweis dieses spezifisch Christlichen : etwa der personalen Struktur des Creator, des spontan-freiheitlich setzenden creativen Aktes und des heilsgeschichtlichen. Grundzugs und eschatologischen Zieles der Schdpfung scheint auch eher am Leitfaden der Augustinischen Auslegung von Genesis 1, 1 méglich zu sein. Dabei ware jeweils zu fragen, ob das Christliche fiir den 2u explizierenden Gedanken lediglich einen akzidentellen Aspekt hinzubringt oder aber im Zuge einer wesentlichen Umformung des Philosophischen eine — ole es selbst nicht denkbare — neue Denkgestalt begriindet hat. Werner BEIERWALTES Wiirzburg 49. 1, 3, 4, 16: Hovylav dye. Riickkehr der Scele in die natpig : I, 6, 8, 16 ff. (Odysseusmotiv). VI, 9, 8, 22. 9, 13 (dvanateoda1). 8, 43 (avanavka). Zum Terminus vgl. PLAT. Resp, 532 E 3). Das Eine ist der mystische Ruheort oder Hafen (vottkdg oder natpixdg Gppog: Procrus in Pam. 1025, 33 ff. Cousin, rx71, 6. Theol. Plai, IV 16 ; 213, 10. in dlc. 44, 15 Westerink : yahivn. 50. Vgl. W. Bumawattus, Plotin, Uber Ewigheit und Zeit, Frankfurt 1967, 244. 248-252, 451, Gan, «. Man, 2, 31, 3 52. C, Faust. XT, 6, Civ, Dei V, 11. Gen, ¢, Man. I, 16, 26. In Ioh. I, 13. 53. Gon, Hill. V, 22, 43,La lacune de I’Epistula 177 de saint Augustin LEpistula 177 de saint Augustin, au cinquiéme paragraphe, comporte une lacune d’une ligne et demi. Al. Goldbacher, éditeur de !’Epistula 177, dans l’'apparat critique corres- pondant a la lacune, indique les hypothéses diverses avancées pour la combler : celle des Mautistes qui proposent Lue 12, 35 : sint lumbi vestri praecincti ; celle de Quesnel qui avance Eccli. 18, 30 : a voluptatibus tuis avertere ; une troisiéme qui cite Ex. 20, 17 : non concupisces. Lui-méme, Goldbacher ne se prononce pas (CSEL t. 44, p. 674). Sans doute, aucun des éditewrs na-t-il eu en mains au méme moment VEpistula 177 et le Sermo qui se trouve dans les fragments recueillis par Eugippius. La comparaison des deux textes montre leur parallélisme : r) méme rai- sonnement : nous avons regu des préceptes quti s’adressent 4 notre volonté ; nous devons prier pour avoir la grice d’accomplir les préceptes ; 1’Feri- ture enseigne les deux obligations ; 2) mémes exemples : intelligence, sagesse, continence (I’Epistula donne deux exemples supplémentaires) ; 3) pour chaque exemple, les mémes appuis bibliques sont fournis : pour TVintelligence Ps. 31, 9 et Ps. 118, 73 ; pour la sagesse, Ps. 93, 8 et Iac 1, 5; pour la continence, de part et d’autre Sap. 8, 21 enjoint de prier pour obtenir 1a continence ; quant au précepte de la continence, le sermon fournit le verset de la premiére Epitre a Timothée J Tim. 5, 22: Contine te ipsum. I parait trés probable qu’d) faille rétablir ce dernier texte pour combler la lacune de I'Epistula 177. I a l'avantage de renfermer le mot contine (terme que ne posséde aticun des trois autres versets proposés). La seconde partie de la lacune a été trés justement comblée par Gold- bacher qui a reproduit le fragment de phrase utilisé par Augustin déja deux fois dans l’'exposé : et tamen oratur, ut habeamus continentiam, ubi dicitur. Ce fragment, la premiére fois, renferme le mot intellectum, la seconde fois sapientiam ; il doit normalement renfermer le mot continen- tiam la troisitme fois. Il est donc tout a fait correct que les deux versets64, A.-M. LA BONNARDIERE scripturaires relatifs 4 1a continence renferment le mot Iui-méme (verbe (ou nom), ce qui est observé en J Tim, 5, 22 et Sap. 8, 21. UL faut d’ailleurs remarquer quele verset J Tim. 3, 22 est rare dans V’ceu- vre d’Augustin, On le retrouve en De gratia et libero arbitrio 4, 7. Avant le pélagianisme, Augustin cite I Tim. 5, 22» selon 1a legon te ipsum castum custodi dans trois textes du dossier donatiste (Contra Ep. Parm, III, 1 (2) ; Contra litt. Pet. IL, 106 (243) ; Contra Cresc. III, 36 (40), ici sous la plume de Cresconius. On peut done penser que le fragment de Sermon en question ici est d’une date proche de celle de l'Epistula 177 (416). Epistula 177, 5; CS.ELe 44, 673-4. Distinguenda est lex et gratia. Lex iubere novit, gratia invare, Nec lex iuberet, nisi esset voluntas, nec gratia iuvaret, si sat esset voluntas, Iubetur, ut habeamus intellectuim, ubi dicitur Nolite esse sicut equus et mulus, quibus ‘non est intellectus (Ps. 31, 9), et tamen oramus, ut habeamus intellectum, ubi dicitur : Da mihi inteliectum, uf discam mandata tua (Ps. 118, 73). — Iubetur ut habeamus sapientiam, ubi dicitur. Stulti aliquando sapite (Ps. 93, 8), et tamen oratur, ut habeamus sapientiam, ubi dicitur : Si quis aulem vestrum indiget sapientiam, postulel a Deo, qui dat omnibus affluenter et non inproperat, et dabilur ei (Iac 1, 5). — Iubetur ut habeamus continentiam, ubi dici- fee tena aie (ct tamen oratur, ut habeamus conti- nentiam, ubi dicitur) : Cum scivem, guia nemo potest esse continens, nisi Deus det, et hoc ipsum erat sapientiae scire, cuius essed hoc donum, adit Dominum et deprecatus sum illum (Sap, 8, 21). Postremo, ne nimium longum sit cuncta pereurrere, iubetur ut non faciamus malum, ubi dicitur : Declina a malo (Ps, 36, 274), et tamen oratur, ut non faciamus malum, ubi dicitur : Oramus autem ad Dominum, ne quid facialis mali (If Cor. 13,7). Iubetur, ut faciamus bonum, ubi dicitur : Declina a malo ef fac bonum (Ps. 36, 27), et tamen oratur, ut faciamus bonum, ubi dicitur : Non cessamus pra vobis orantes et postu- lantes (Col. 1, 9) ; atque inter cetera, quae illis orat, dicit : Ut ambuletis digne Deo in omne placitum, in omni opere et sermone bono (Cal. 1, to). Sicut ergo Sermo, Fragm, (ex Eug.) 4 ; PL. t. 39, ©1722 Ergo, fratres, quando praecipitur, agnoscite voluntatis arbitrium ; quando oratur quod praecipitur, agnoscite gra- tiae beneficium, Utrumque enim in Seripturis habes : et praecipitur, et oratur ; quod praecipitur, hoc oratur. Videte ' quod ico. Praecipitur ut intelligamus, Quomodo praecipitur ut intelligamus ? Nolite esse sicut equus et mulus, non habentes intellectum (Ps. 3, 9). Audisti quia iussum est ; pete, ut possis implere quod iussum est, Quomo- do, inquis, peto ? Andi Scripturam, Quid tibi iussum est ? Nolite esse sicut equus at mulus, non habentss intellectum. Quia iussum est, aguovisti voluntatem ; audi quia oratur, ut agnoscas gratiam. Da mihi intellectum, ut discam mandate tua (Ps, 118, 73). — Iussum est ut habeamus sapientiam : quia inssum est lego. ‘Ubi legis, inquit ? Audite : Qui insi- pientes estis in populo et stulti, aliquando sapite (Ps, 93, 8). Iam ille quid dicit ? Vides quomodo nobis praecepit Deus ut sapiamus. Ergo sapientia in nostra est potestate ? Iam dixi, praeceptum andivi, voluntatem cognovi : audi orationem, ut gratiam tu possis agnoscere, De sapientia igitur, quae iussa est nobis, audiamus quid dicat Apostolus Lacobus : Si quis autem vestrum indiget sapientia, postulet a Deo, qui dat omnibus affluenter (fac 1, 5). Iubetur nobis continentia. Ubi inbetur ? Apostolus ad Timotheum : Contine te ipsum (I Tim, 5, 22), Tussio est, praeceptio est, audiendum est, facien- dum est : sed nisi Deus adinvet, rema- emus. Conamur quidem facere volun- tate, et nititur aliquid voluntas ; non praesumat potestas, nisi adiuvetur infir-LA LACUNE DE L'EPISTULA 177 65 agnoscimus yoluntatem, cum haec prae- _mitas, Certe enim iussum est : Contine te cipiuntur, sic et ipse agnoscat gratiam, ipsum. Andi alium locum Scripturee : cum petuntur. Et cum scirem, inguit, quia nemo esse potest continens, nisi Deus det ; et hoo ipsum. eval sapientiae, scive cuius esset hoc donum. Bt quid, inquit, fect ? Adi Dominum et deprecatus sum (Sap. 8, 21), Quid opus est multa pereurrere, fratres mei ? Quidquid nobis iubetur, orandum est ut impleatur.., A-M, La Bonnarpriry Paris, Septembre 1968Pre-existence in Augustine’s Seventh Letter R.A. Markus, in his generally excellent contribution to the Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediacval Philosophy, remarks in passing that my attempts to show that the early Augustine thought of man as a “fallen soul” leave him “ unconvinced’? This, of cottrse, is his right. Indeed, in a volume destined for standard reference, he is more than justified in treating with suitable skepticism a view of Augustine that has till now remained untested by scholarly criticism. Vet the prestige of the Cambridge History inevitably lends his observation a weight, and promises it a diffusion and influence it might otherwise not have enjoyed. And if it be true that the early Augustine did in fact consider man as a “fallen soul” in the manner Plotinus had proposed, then the issue is too important to the student of Christian traditicn, parti- cularly in our day, to be despatched in a footnote to however prestigious a volume. Perhaps it will not seem too ungracious if I make a few brief counter-observations to keep the issue alive. ‘The first of those observations is this : Markus does not seem to have based his judgment on any wider a textual basis than a procession of earlier scholars — Hessen, Gilson and Bardy among them, — have proposed as arguing for the pre-existence of the soul®, Even those texts, he admits, “ suggest Augustine may have adopted, at least in part, the Platonic 1, Edited by A, H, Armstrong, Cambridge University Press, 1967. Markus’ essay on Augustine appears on pages 341-419. 2. OP. cit., p, 366, n. 2, 3. He cites only Sol. 2, 35 and De quant. an. 34. He omits the important allusion in Acad. I, 22 where the purified soul is depicted as“ returning more safely to hea- ven" (securior rediturus in coelum), a heaven which is designated as its’ region of origin" (regionem suae origimis). But there are a number of other indices as well : Johannes Hessen, for example, adds De beata vita 1, De immort. animae 6, De lid. arb. 1, 24-26, aud the crucial Epistola VIL, 2ff, analysed below (see: Augustins Metaphysih der Evkenninis, 2d. ed., revised, Leiden, 1960, pp. 53-59)68 ROBERT J. O’CONNELL theory of ‘ reminiscence’, according to which such intelligible knowledge formed part of the mind’s equipment brought with it into this life from a pre-mundane existence in the world of eternal truths and in direct contact with them”. After this slightly nervous avowal, however, Markus immediately extricates himself by adding that “‘ In later works, Augustine rejected this view”, and he cites in evidence the familiar loci from the Retractations and from the Twelfth Book of the De Trinitate’. The Retractations text dates from A.D. 426 at the earliest® ; the Twelfth Book of the De Trinitate can be reliably dated in the years 416-417". Gilson, one remembers, placed this explicit rejection a year earlier, by appealing to Letter 166 and to De Civitate Dei, Book XI, both dating from A.D. 4r5°. But the nagging doubt remains: what of the intervening quarter-century that preceded this ‘ rejection’ ? ‘The question is only more pressing in that Gilson's judgment on the early Augustine is significantly bolder than Markus’ : not only the “unmistakable language” the recent convert uses, but also the very “ manner of his subsequent retraction”, make it “ difficult to question” that he (quoting Hessen’s view) “ leaned towards the doctrine of the pre- existence of the soul” during the years A.D. 387-389. Gilson finds himself, therefore, “ inclined to think that the first Augustine accepted the genuine Platonic doctrine” of the soul’s pre-existence. “ This opinion”, he goes on to add, “ seems all the more probable if we bear in mind that he never rejects as certainly false the notion that the soul may exist before the body’, Basing his judgment on the very same texts, Gustave Bardy is only slightly less bold, but still bolder than Markus, He lists the “ pre- existence of souls and reminiscence” as two connected doctrines which, “at the beginning, exercised a seductive attraction on Saint Augustine's mind”! “The disapproval the Retractations express anent the passage from the Soliloquies implying this view is, Bardy notes, “ formal” ; the “refutation” Augustine presents “seems to bear on the doctrine itself” contained in the passage, to wit, the “ Platonic thesis of reminis- cence”. And the question arises whether the reminiscence doctrine there expressed entailed what Gilson terms its “ natural complement”, 4. Op, cit., p. 366, 5. Ibid, ‘The citations are : Retr. 1, 4, 4 and 1, 8, 2; De Trinitate XII, 24 (and later, on pp. 368-9 of Markus’ essay, De Trinitate XII, 26). 6. See Gustave Bardy, in the Bibliothéque Augustinienne edition of Les Révisions (Volume 12), Paris. 1950, pp. 17-20. 7. See the Note Complémentaire to this effect in the Bibliothégue Augustinienne edition of La Triniié (Vol. 15), Paris, 1955, pp. 557-566 8, See my article on‘ The Ptotinian Fall of the Soul in Saint Augustine’, in Traditio 19 (1963), esp. pp. 2-3. 0. The Christian Philasophy of Saint Augustine, New York, Random House, 1960, PP. 71-72 and notes, especially note rr. 10, Les Révisions, p. 14r. 11, Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, p. 72.PRE-EXISTENCE IN AUGUSTINE’S SEVENTH LETTER 69 the doctrine of pre-existence ; and its other, equally natural complement, the “ fall’ of the soul. “ One would therefore”, Bardy concludes, “ be tempted to think that the philosopher of Cassiciacum admitted of Plato's doctrine, except for the fact that in those very Soliloquies we find an expose of the illumination thesis”’ : the thesis which the Augustine of the Retvactations sets in direct opposition to the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence™. That final demurral is typical of the confusion haunting much that has been written on this thorny question — including Markus’ essay!®. For if the early Augustine defended both reminiscence and the pre-existence of the soul, the likelihood is that he held those doctrines as he came to under- stand them from Plotinian Neo-Platonism, and not as Plato himself presented them, And, for the father of Neo-Platonism, there is no opposi- tion between “ reminiscence” of a vision enjoyed in pre-existence, and “illumination” enjoyed by the soul even now. Plotinus avows quite frankly that here he may be departing from the common view of Plato’s doctrine ; but just as candidly he espouses the view that while “ fallen”, the soul is not entirely fallen, Qua fallen, the soul “‘ remembers” the Intelligible World it gazed on “ before” its fall ; inasmuch as it is not entirely fallen, however, it still remains in contact with that Intelligible World, “ illuminated” even now, from above. Hence the presence of an illumination doctrine in the Soliloquies in no way weakens the contention that a ‘‘ reminiscence” and “ pre-existence”’ theory may be there as well. It simply warns the researcher that if such be the case, the ensemble must be designated as characteristically Ploti- nian rather than “ Platonic” in the stricter sense, And this should be a surprise to no one!4, Markus’ skepticism, then, seems based on a more timid reading of the evidence in the early Augustine than previous reliable scholars have brought to it. My next suggestion is this: his reservations may spring directly from his having misread one of the capital proof-texts bearing on this question, * ae Both Gilson'® and Bardy}® interpret Letter 7 to Nebridius, written in A.D. 389, as lending substance to the suspicion that Augustine favored 12, Les Révisions, p. 144. 13. Markus regulafly refers, as so many authots do, to the“ Platonic ” theory of reminiscence and pre-existence, 14. I have tried to disengage what is characteristic of Plotinus’ theory in my article on “ Plotinian Fall”, referred to in note 8, above ; see the summary on PP. 32-33. 15. Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, p. 284, note x1, 16, Les Révisions, p. 143, note 2, Hessen gives am extended analysis of this let- ter ; see in/ra, notes 19 and 20.70 ROBERT J. O'CONNELL a “reminiscence” theory implying the soul’s pre-existence. Markus, surprisingly, assures us that this letter ‘‘ indicates... very clearly” Augus- tine’s later approach to the issue: it already embodies “the Platonic conception as revised” by Augustine “ to free it from reference to the past”. After treating of memory-of-the-past in its familiar, ordinary sense, Markus explains, Augustine “ goes on to include in the sphere of memory the knowledge which we learn by reasoning, such as that which Socrates elicited from the slave-boy in the Meno, an example which Augus- tine mentions here!?, But since this knowledge is not really derived from past experience, and not through the senses, so Augustine argues, it follows that memoria does not necessarily refer to the past and need not necessarily involve images derived from sense-experience””™*. To judge of Markus’ interpretation of this letter, it is well to recall that Augustine’s correspondent, Nebridius, had given it as his opinion (in Letter 6) that we cannot have any “memory” without some imagi- native image ; this holds, he proposes, even for acts of intellectual understanding, He asks what Augustine thinks to be the truth of the matter. Augustine is of a different opinion ; in the course of exposing it» (Letter 7, paragraph 1), he would first have Nebridius note that the objects of “memory” are not always things which pass away (praetereuntium) but sometimes also things which still endure in existence (manentium). But the function of memory, he admits, ‘‘ is to retain hold of what belongs to time past”: sibi memoria praeteriti temporis vindicet tenacitatem. He is, in effect, formulating an implied objection to his eventual position: how can we be said to have memory, in the strict sense of the term, of something which endures in the present ? The preliminary answer is that things which have “ passed away” have “left us” (nos deserunf) : at this point one is tempted to infer that Augustine implies that their pastness allows them to be objects of memory. But we are soon alerted to the contrary : even of things that still endure in existence, it can be said that “ we have left them": deseruntur a nobis. Even in the case of the still-exis- tent Carthage which Augustine has left, therefore, just as truly as of his dead father who has left him, it is correct to say that “ memory retains what belongs to past time” : in utrogue tamen horum generum praeteritum tempus memoria tenet (Ep. VII, 1). A moment later, he resumes this contention in other terms : he is confident that, despite his previous admis- sion that the term necessarily implies a reference to the past, he has “proved... that memory can be spoken of as embracing also those things which have not yet passed away” : rerum, quae nondum interierunt (Ep. VIL, 2). 17. Markus seems to have slipped here ; there is no express mention of the Meno’s slave-boy experiment in Letter 7 itself, 18, Op, cit., p. 370.PRE-EXISTENCE IN AUGUSTINE'S SEVENTH LETTER qt For (and here we come to the vital point), he “‘ remembers” both his father and Carthage — memini can be used in the strict sense of both of them — not inasmuch as he is beholding them now, but inasmuch as he beheld them in the past : ex e0 quod vidi, non ex eo, quod video, memint. ‘What is “ past” is the seeing of the object remembered, not necessarily the object itself (Ep. VII, x). ‘This distinction, between the pastness of the object and the pastness of our having seen it, is what allows him then to deal with an objection some have raised against Socrates’ theory that all learning is remembe- ring. ‘The objectors in question appeal to what ‘“‘ Plato himself has taught”, namely, that “ those things which we leam by the exercise of understanding are permanent (quae intellegendo discimus... manere semper), and, being imperishable, cannot be counted among things which have slipped into the past” : nom esse practerita, ‘The objectors have rightly seen that “memory ” necessarily implies a reference to the past ; but they misconstrue that reference by ‘‘affirming that memory has only to do with things which have slipped into the past” : dicentes memorians practeri- tarum rerum. But, Augustine goes on to show in terms of the distinction developed above, the objectors have brought a groundless accusation (calumniantur) against Socrates’ nobilissimum inventum, ‘For they fail to focus on the fact that the seeing in question is in the past ; because we at some time saw these things with our minds”: qui non adtendunt illam visionem esse praeteritam, quia haec aliquando mente vidimus (Ep. VIL, 2). ‘he presence ot pastness of the objects seen, therefore, does not directly affect the issue ; it is this pastness of the seeing that justifies Socrates’ claim that we truly “remember ” those objects of understanding, Consequently, a few phrases later, Augustine can say of eternity itself, surely the unquestio- nable example of ‘something which is forever permanent”, that “ it could never enter the mind otherwise than by our remembering it” : nec tamen in mentem venive posset, nisi eius meminissemus (Ep. VIL, 2). Markus is, therefore, seriously inexact in interpreting Augustine as arguing here that ‘ memoria does not refer necessarily to the past. On the contrary, the supposition throughout Augustine's argument could scarcely be clearer : to justify using the term memoria, there must be refe- rence to the past. This supposition he shares with both Nebridius and his eventual adversaries, those who invoke Plato's authority against Socrates. Contrary to Markus’ view, the Augustine of Letter 7 would have said that Plato’s own theory was as “free” from " reference to the past” as his own later approach was to become : free, that is, from necessary reference to the pastness (and passing-ness) of the objects-seen. But this, the early Augustine would have added, is beside the point at issue : what allows 19. Loc. cit., supra, note 18. Markus’ interpretation is all the more surprising in that Hessen’s dense analysis of Letter 7 brought out the same point as I do here ; see Hessen, pp. 53-54:72 ROBERT J. O'CONNELL for our using the term memoria when applied to knowing the eternal objects of understanding is the pastness of owr having seen them, sometime or other ; aliquando. * ae ‘As vague as that provocative aliquando is the explanation Augustine goes on to give of why we must regain our knowledge of those intelligible objects by * remembering” : @ quibus guia defluximus et aliter alia videre coepimus, ea nos reminiscendo vevisere, id est per memoriam (Ep. VIL, 2). Literally, he is telling Nebridius that “ we have flowed down from them” (defluximus) : one of the classic images Plotinus uses for the “ fall”” of the soul. The result? We began to “ see other things in another manner” : Plotinus teaches that our present dependence on sense-knowledge for dealing with sense objects is result of our fall. ‘To return to the direct intellectual vision of the Intelligible, we must turn away from these “other objects” and this “ other manner” of seeing, — we must take the path of “memory”, of “ remembering” the Intelligible World we have not entirely forgotten : ea nos reminiscendo revisere. To test whether this is the most natural interpretation of that vague text, one need only (as Hessen long ago took the trouble of doing)? read further. In answer to Nebridius’ question about the origin of images in the soul, Augustine repeatedly refers to a “‘ past” bearing all the ear- marks of a Plotinian pre-existence. He speaks (in terms he does not think Nebridius would gainsay) of a situation of the “ mind... before it uses the body (priusquam corpore utatur) to perceive bodily objects”. “No sane man will doubt”, he adds, that ‘‘the mind received more reliable and correct impressions before it was involved in the illusions which the senses produce” (antequam his fallacibus sensibus implicaretur) ; before, that is, it was open to these “‘ blows inflicted through the senses” (plaga inflicta per sensus) (Ep. VII, 3). For it is “‘ manifest” that “the mind is less liable to illusions when it has not yet been subject to the deceptive influence of the senses, and of things sensible” ; Nebridius will never convince him that “‘ the soul, while nod yet using the bodily senses (nondum corpore sentientem) and not yet rudely assaulted (nondum per sensus... verberatam) through these fallacious instruments by that which is mortal and fleeting, lay under such ignominious subjection to illusions” (Ep. VIL, 5). The images his friend queried him about, then, “ are not evolved by the mind from within itself while it has not received them through the senses from without”. He does not think the mind “capable of any such conceptions before it uses the body and the senses” : priusquam corpore sensibusque wtatur (Ep. VII, 7). 20, Hessen, op. cit., p. 54.PRE-EXISTENCE IN AUGUSTINE'S SEVENTH LETTER 73 In order to find the pattern of Plotinus’ anthropology in the early Augustine one must, admittedly, be looking for it, But let it be remem- bered that the slave-boy experiment in the Meno was originally designed to satisfy a similar, and obvious, heuristic demand : to find anything, one must have some notion of what one is looking for. In the present instance, to find possible traces of Plotinus’ anthropology in Augustine's writings, one must first have a reasonably firm idea of what one expects to discover. And once the mind has been alerted by the few stray texts that previous scholars have agreed upon as inclining them to think Augustine accepted those two complementary features of Plotinus’ view of man — reminis- cence and pre-existence — it is inevitable that the mind start questioning further. What other features are characteristic of Plotinus’ theory of man as “fallen soul” ? Are they, too, found in the early Augustine ? Does Augustine, for instance, speak of the soul as in any sense “ divine” ? — identify the soul as the real “I” ? — relate it to the body as Plotinus did ? — imply that not all souls are equally fallen ? — strive in similar terms to reconcile the “ fault’ involved in our fall with the workings of cosmic law ? — similarly explicate the role of “‘ memory” in the soul’s “return” ? Once the text is queried for all these features of Plotinus’ doctrine (not precisely Plato’s !), a host of confirmatory details leaps to the eye. I do not claim to have presented all those confirmatory details as yet ; nor do I mean to blame Markus for not having searched for them. My intention here has merely been to keep the question from being closed before that search has been seriously undertaken and brought to some measure of completion. Robert J, O’ConnzELL, S.J. Fordham University 2x, See my forthcoming Saint Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391, Harvard University Press, 1968,Le péché originel dans la pensée de saint Augustin, de 412 a 430 En 412, comme nous l'avons montré dans un précédent article!, apparatt pour la premiére fois, dans le De peccatorum meritis®, en contraste avec Tuniverselle médiation du Christ, l’affirmation de la présence d’un péché chez tous les descendants d’Adam des leur naissance. Ce péché, qui s’ap- proprie l'appellation de péché originel, se situe A la pointe extréme, et si mystérieuse, de notre héritage adamique. En une premiére étape de I’élaboration de sa doctrine, Augustin, en conformité avec l’enseignement des Eglises de son temps, insistait sur la mortalité. Tous, enfants comme adultes, nous tenons d’Adam une chair corruptible qui alourdit le vol de l'esprit. L’universelle prolifération du péché qui se constate das I’éveil de la raison provient, comme de sa racine, de notre condition mortelle. En cette premitre étape, les enfants ne par- tageaient le péché d’origine qu’en raison de leur mortalité. En une seconde étape, l'évéque, en se référant 1a Gendse, plagait non plus en la mortalité mais en la concupiscence l'impact premier de notre héritage adamique. Cette blessure d'ame, comme il I’appelle, entraine a sa suite la corrupti- bilité de la chair. Aussi se rencontre-t-elle, dés la naissance, chez l'enfant ; elle implique au regard de Dieu une culpabilité, remise au baptéme. La concupiscence est appelée péché ; mais I’enfant n'est pas considéré de naissance A proprement parler comme pécheur. II n’existait encore, pour Vévéque, de pécheur proprement dit que de volonté propre. C'est avec l’entrée en scéne des pélagiens qu’ Augustin accéde a sa con- ception définitive. Nous héritons d’Adam, est-il désormais enseigné, non seulement une chair corruptible qui nous voue 4 la mort, non seulement la concupiscence qui nous lie au péché, mais un péché d’éternelle condamna- I. Péché oviginel. Naissance d'un dogme, dans Rev, #. auguslin., 13, 1967, pp. 218 248. 2, De pece, mer., 1,9, 9 Ply 4a, £14.