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On Conceptual History
Jan-Werner Miler
‘Aconsclousness of te story of concepts Deames 2 duty
ofa thinking
— Hane Georg Gadamer
Concepts ike joints king language ad the
‘etralinuite worl. To deny tis station sw hypnotie
‘oneself an, lke Hier, to sccum to aslfproduced
Stesoay.
Reinhart Kotlleck
‘Words, too can destoy
Reinhart Koslleck
Reinhart Rosleck waste greatest theorist of history n postwar
Germany et, omen pardon, here eit nota theory of
‘he sppeoach iq intellectual history for which Kowelleck became
‘most famoas both in Germany ad internationally: conceptual
story, or Bogie! While Kosleck throughout hs ie was
‘rorking ot is prope Fitort—that isa theory expisting the
‘ery conditions of posible storiesconcepil history remaed 2
{elated but in many ways gute undertheorized, project lathe end,
‘uch of what he wot ether about ofr the famous lexicon of
Base Hisar Concept (Geile Gane takes 2
pragiatic approach
‘That pragmatism, however, ls helped Begrifigechiche rave
‘par fom the orignal project in Germany, there are now pest
‘ollotive research undenaings in other parts of Europe especially
low concsrrvnt mtton 75
northern Europe, but alo Fusthe fild—with Latin America a patculaly
‘importa area of development Ye the global eapasion of oncepial history
Jas algo been overshadowed by 2 number of doubt about the vey approach,
Some ofthis skepticism is purely methodological, especially when i aks the
for of intelectual siping from members ofthe "Cambridge Schoo” In pu
‘ial, there have been questions about whether concepts an actly change,
coe whethr al that ean be invested she “hanging uge of words” There
‘ave algo ben concerns 2 to whether conagpual istry ca relly gv 4c:
erent account of, breuly speaking the relationship between language snd
sci history, which n many ways was its most exiting nial promise
(On a more poi fon. Barifgechichie hasbeen suspected of being
bound up with-or, less potely pt contaminated bys profound antimod
cis and deeply problematic sumption abot the nature of pli an
cial fe that ulnately derive from Car Schmit and Ot Brine, legal
‘hoods andstoran, respectively, dagpyimpleated ia Nationa Sodom
Many observers think that conceptal history cn be dsentangled ftom
“Kosei and Schmit dagnotes of modernity aan age of dangerous ie
logiations” At the sie time the clam that concep istry nec tae
{nto account the particular dynamis of modernity in parla, the ise of
“eallecive singular term” such as “History” ia and of itl, whic ints
tact quality i pone a some frm of “deloiaton) i pein what
‘made cancepus istry as practice by Kosleck and his flowers so st:
ning inthe ist place—a opposed toa pedestrian comparison of the usage of
‘odin lexicons in, es ay, ify intervals (an approach that, als, can
tlk be found ina mer ofthe chapter in the Gaile Grandi,
I what sense, then, might very diferent moderns need very dierent con
cepa ister? In ter words conceptual hiss completely bound
‘up witha particular European, teas Western, expevience—and ca there
‘be multiple conceptual histories for multiple maderitis? Or ae there iis
torre ater al?
in this ey shall start out by recnatratng the origins of concep
istry, before discussing the pest succes of Gexhiiche Gondhgi,as
well as atemps to export conceptual history bejund i oil German con
‘ext, Subsequent shall addres some ofthe dou and concer about -
cep history t which J aleady hinted I shall argue that conceptual history
‘a indeed be dlsocited from some of the pacar assumpions about
‘modernity that pethaps tell us more about 9308 and 1960s Weer Europe
‘han modernity as such. On the eter hand, salen the ugpcon hatin
‘any way the actual “metid”or frthat mater, the underlying theoretical
sumptions of once history are not nearly slat a might be desirable176. nerinwsowe MODER: EUROPEAN NTELECTUAL MisTORY
nic, concept history has alvays remained somewhat indeterminate:
promise to mediate between “soci history andthe history of eonscousness”
to. pt diferent, “erween anguae nd ea” witout iteverbecoming Fly
‘dec how that edition an be ate ut abet. or or tht mater whether
suming pt erwen language and reali was actualy plmssible? This
Indtermincy ot the nly explanation fr concept story aceras— but,
ts Hans Use Gumbrect hs pointed at probly cote skcarly
tot Pu diferent: ding concep history tel opens cra oeizans of
‘apettons abot hw one can ely comprehend very largescae processes
oF histori hange (nt usin itlecual hstay)—but there are legitimate
doubts so the etent to which these xpecations can actualy befall,
Hing sd hai aio sommewbat nave ora least unimaginative to
expt thata method, een with tambon fiscal understanding some.
‘wha scaled down, ca somehow mechanical be apple o ever more op,
‘mes, and geographical reas, unl regions and hitrel experiences ave
‘ben covered wth thet” concepial histories, What then should one expect. of
‘work toward? This quetion opens up the final section ofthe essay, where |
fe an explic atesament of whats dead and what salve in conceptual hie
to, Concept history in the way nly envisaged by Koseleck (before he
moved aay fn avery normative considerations), can provide a "semantic
hice havea Gating function fr present.dy pita ehorzng pe
‘ily coupled wth cnnvncingacount of present day understandings of the
‘experience of itercl ime hie may sound rater cyple—beat wi me
am les conve, however tht somehow eanceptua histories can serve as
eb to reaiae ly Wels such a mutual Bizopean understanding” oF
‘ren “interlizadonal dlogue ass sometimes med
‘Secoad, | want o encourage more werk on how concepts travel and are
reworked under very diferent cieumstances of “eal istry” Final, | want
to suggest that conceptual history could uty be broadened both in its
object and ints ambition to comprehend lied experience, a opposed to
tte dicoures. For insane, it could inde a focus on poltallonoogy at
hassomesimes been nuggstd. Most important however might bea stronger
stenton to semanti felis, opposed to single words, especialy in everyday
se and lived experience, not ust among socal and pot theorist The
lar point nota cheap popllt shot. Concept history ie as | shall
show demande an account of historical timer and experience, sn the broader
that acount the better. In that sense, “poplin” was always postulate of
conceptual history isle
“This essy wil offer three recommendations in the end: w undertake s
cecal once history of the resent ownte more histories of tansations
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and appropriations, as well ak mistranslatons and mlsppropiations; and, 6
nally, to make more sophisticated use of the ies of conceptual history a8
‘means to theerize processes of historical chaage—inputcua the changing
nature of experience itself and ona beader basis than “base ince o
Grn nal hee areas Koselleck' ow theory of history magi be po