REPORTTOCONGRESS

ON
CHIEFOFSTAFFOFTHEARMY
ACQUISITIONAUTHORITIES

March2016
InResponsetoSection801oftheNationalDefenseAuthorizationActforFiscalYear2016Pub.L.11492
The estimated cost of this report or
study for the Department of Defense is
approximately $153,000 for the 2016
Fiscal Year. This includes $0 in
expenses and $153,000 in DoD labor.
Generated on 2016Jan29 RefID: 9-E16C4A1

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................................3
PurposeofthisReport..........................................................................................................................3
SectionI. StatusofArmyAcquisition........................................................................................................4
SectionII. ActionsBasedonNewAuthorities............................................................................................4
A. ArmyRequirementsOversightCouncil.........................................................................................5
B. ExperimentationandPrototyping................................................................................................5
C. Sustainment..................................................................................................................................6
D. ArmyRapidCapabilitiesOffice......................................................................................................6
E.

FirstPrinciplesforMeasuringAcquisitionOutputs......................................................................6

SectionIII.RecommendationsforNewAuthorities...................................................................................7
A. DelayeringOversight...................................................................................................................7
B. EnhancedTalentManagement.....................................................................................................8
C. MajorAutomatedInformationSystems.......................................................................................8
D. ProtestRelief.................................................................................................................................8
E.

FundingFlexibility.........................................................................................................................9

F.

TestandEvaluation.......................................................................................................................9

G. OutreachtoIndustry...................................................................................................................10
H. FundingStability..........................................................................................................................10
I.

SustainedCommitmenttoAcquisitionReform..........................................................................11

SUMMARY...................................................................................................................................................11

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION
PurposeofthisReport
ThisreportrespondstotherequirementsofSection801ofPublicLaw11492.Thissection,reprinted
below,directstheChiefofStaff,Armytoreportontheresultsofareviewofacquisitionrelated
authorities,toincludethefollowing:
An Act
Toauthorizeappropriationsforfiscalyear2016formilitaryactivitiesofthe
DepartmentofDefense,formilitaryconstruction,andfordefenseactivitiesof
theDepartmentofEnergy,toprescribemilitarypersonnelstrengthsforsuch
fiscalyear,andforotherpurposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

*******
SEC. 801. REQUIRED REVIEW OF ACQUISITION-RELATED
FUNCTIONS OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES.
(a) REVIEW REQUIRED.The Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief
of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps shall conduct a review of their current
individual authorities provided in sections 3033, 5033, 8033, and 5043 of
title 10, United States Code, and other relevant statutes and regulations
related to defense acquisitions for the purpose of developing such
recommendations as the Chief concerned or the Commandant considers
necessary to further or advance the role of the Chief concerned or the
Commandant in the development of requirements, acquisition processes,
and the associated budget practices of the Department of Defense.
(b) REPORTS.Not later than March 1, 2016, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
and the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall each submit to the
congressional defense committees a report containing, at a minimum, the
following:
(1) The recommendations developed by the Chief concerned or the
Commandant under subsection (a) and other results of the review
conducted under such subsection.
(2) The actions the Chief concerned or the Commandant is taking, if
any, within the Chiefs or Commandants existing authority to
implement such recommendations.

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

SectionI. StatusofArmyAcquisition
Withrapidlyproliferatingtechnology,amyriadofnewthreats,anddecreasingbudgets,itisessential
thatweprovideourSoldierstheequipmenttheyneedtodefendourNation.Thechangesinthe2016
NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct(NDAA)areagoodstart,andweappreciatethesupportofCongress.
Thecomplexityandbureaucracyoftheacquisitionprocesstranslatesintounnecessarycostsandlengthy
programtimelines.Increasedtimelinesleadtoprogramswithstalerequirementsthatbecomeoutof
dateandlatetoneed.Theacquisitionenterprise,underthecurrentconstruct,hasoftenfailedto
maintaintheadvantageourSoldiersdeserveandneedtomaintainovermatch.
TheindustrialmightoftheUnitedStateshastraditionallybeencentraltoourabilitytoproducethe
equipmentandtechnologynecessarytodominateanyadversary.Itisbecomingincreasinglyclearthat
weoperateinachangingworldwheretechnologyevolvesatanexponentialrate,proliferates,and
becomesmoreaffordabletobothstateandnonstateadversaries.Privateindustry,nottheDepartment
ofDefense,nowdrivesthemajorityofinnovativetechnologicalchange.Weareinaracewithour
adversariestoharnessandfieldthebestmilitaryapplicationsofproductinnovations.Inthefuture,we
cannotcountonlongperiodsoftechnologicalmonopolyorovermatch.Therefore,itismoreimportant
thaneverthatwequicklyadaptouracquisitionprocessestorapidlyexploiteveryopportunity.We
simplymustbemoreagile.
Additionally,traditionalsuppliershaveattemptedtomaintaincompetitivemarketpositions.Thishas
resultedinreducedcompetitiveness,increasedsustainmentcosts,reducedinteroperability,escalating
softwarecosts,protractedtimelines,consolidations,andmorecontractprotests.Nontraditionaland
smallvendorswhoperforminthehightechsectorhavebeenreticenttoengageinthedefenseindustry
duetotherelativelysmallbenefitsandovercomplicatedadministrativerequirements.
Trainingandexpertisealonecannotsolvetheseissues.Newtoolsandprocesseswillbeessentialtothe
effort.Determiningwhatsystemsshouldbedevelopedtosupportthenationalmilitarystrategy
requiresextensiveanditerativeprototypingtoallowforrefinementofrequirementswithoutexcessive
riskorrequirementscreepwithinprograms.Thistypeofprototypingrequiresresourcesforactivities
thatmaynotresultinprogrammaticendstates.Itisnecessarytohavetheabilitytoriskfailurequickly
andrelativelycheaplytoenablerapidlearningandagility.Thisissimilartohightechindustries
processesthatallowsthemilitaryleadershipandendusertoevaluatetechnologiespriorto
commitmenttoafullprogramwheretheirstrengthsandweaknessesareonlyrealizedinoperational
testingorfielding.
Giventheauthoritiesgrantedinthe2016NDAA,outlinedbelowareseveralactionsIamtakingto
improvetheArmyAcquisitionsystem.

SectionII. ActionsBasedonNewAuthorities
ShortlyafterbecomingChief,Idirectedanassessmentofpreviousacquisitionlegislation,historical
organizationalchanges,andacquisitionreformstudies.Inadditiontoleveraginginternalexpertise,we
initiateddialoguewithU.S.SpecialOperationsCommandandtheotherServicestoincorporateproven
bestpractices.IampersonallyleadingtheefforttoidentifyopportunitiestoimproveArmyacquisition.

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A. ArmyRequirementsOversightCouncil
OnelargechangeImadeimmediatelyistoreinvigoratetheArmyRequirementsOversightCouncil
(AROC)toensuretheArmysacquisitionsystemremainscustomerfocused.Iamusingthisforumto
implementmynewauthoritiesregardingmyparticipationinMilestoneAandBdecisionsforMajor
DefenseAcquisitionPrograms,SelectedAcquisitionReports,andapprovalofproposedConfiguration
SteeringBoardchangesthatcouldhaveanadverseimpactonprogramcostorschedule.Additionally,I
amworkingwiththeSecretarytoexpandmyroleacrossotheracquisitiondecisionsandprograms,
whichdonotmeettheMajorDefenseAcquisitionProgramthreshold(ex.concurrenceincost,schedule,
technicalfeasibility,andperformancetradeoffsinconjunctionwithMilestoneCdecisionsand
acquisitioncategory(ACAT)IIandIIIauthoritiesconsistentwith2016NDAAintentonMDAPs).This
expansionoftheAROCprocessensuresthatI,astheChiefofStaff,provideleadershiptotheprocess
whilethevoiceofthecustomerpermeatesthroughoutalloftheArmysacquisitionactivities.TheAROC
forumiswhereIprovidepriorities,vision,intent,andapproverequirementsfortheArmys
modernizationprogramthroughouttheacquisitionlifecycleofrequiredcapabilities.
Similarly,Ichangedthemembershipfrombeingstaffcentrictocommandcentric.TheCommanding
GeneralofForcesCommandrepresentstheoperationalArmyandtheSoldiersthatwillultimatelyuse
theequipment;theCommandingGeneralofTrainingandDoctrineCommandrepresentsourtraining
baseandrequirementsrecommendedforfuturecapabilities;theCommandingGeneralofArmy
MaterielCommandrepresentsourlogisticsfunctionstobothimplementandsustainacquisition
systems.TobetterensureCyberresiliencyineverythingwedo,theCommandingGeneralofArmy
CyberCommandwillalsoparticipatealongwiththeCommandingGeneralofourArmyTestand
EvaluationCommandwhowillensurewegetimmediateandactionablefeedbackfromongoingtesting.
Finally,becauseprototypingandtechnologymaturationarekeytomyefforts,wehavealsoaddedthe
CommandingGeneralofourResearch,Development,andEngineeringCommand.
ItismyintentforthenewAROCtoserveasthehubforenablingcollaborationacrosstherequirements,
resourcing,andacquisitioncommunities;establishingprioritiestobalanceresourcesandrequirements;
andenforcingaccountability.TheultimatepurposeoftheAROCistoensurethattheWarfighter
receivestherightcapabilityinthetimeframethatmakesitusefulonthebattlefieldandwithincost.

B. ExperimentationandPrototyping
TheArmywillincreasetheuseofearlyprototyping.Experimentationiscriticalforaholisticandin
depthunderstandingofhowamaterielsolutionmightbeusedandultimatelyintegratedtoovercomea
capabilitygap.Wemustclearlyarticulatethestandardforsuccess,witheacheffort,toensureclarityof
purposeandtoprecludewaste.WhilethereisriskandtheArmycouldoccasionallyfail,learningfrom
thesefailuresearlyismuchlesscostlythanhavingmuchlargerfailureslaterintheprocess.Additionally,
Ibelievetheriskofearlyprototypingisworththepotentialbenefitofultimatelongtermpayoff.
Unfortunately,thereareinhibitorstothisapproachandtheArmyofferssomelegislativechangesfor
considerationthatenablegreateragilityonthefrontendbyincentivizingorprotectingexperimentation
beforetheestablishmentofaformalprogramofrecord(seeSectionIII).
Wehavealreadystartedmovingoutonthisnewpath.Weareexploringoptionsthatwillprovide
mobileprotectedfirepowercapabilities(e.g.,LightArmoredVehicle)todefeatarmoredthreatsforour
InfantryBrigadeCombatTeams.UnderourGroundMobilityProgram,weareexperimentingwiththe
useoflightandhighlymobileplatformsforoperationalusewithourearlyentryairborneforces.Weare

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increasingthelethalityofourStrykerplatform,withyourassistance,inordertogetcapabilitytoEurope
asquicklyaspossible;weintendtoacceleratetheprocurementoftheArmoredMultiPurposeVehicle
togetareplacementfortheM113toEuropethisdecade;weareseekingtointegrateactiveprotection
systemsonourBradley,Stryker,andAbramsplatforms;andwearegoingtouseourTankand
AutomotiveResearch,Development,andEngineeringCentertobuildprototypesofourMobile
ProtectedFirepower,incollaborationwiththe82ndAirborne,sothatthisnewprogramisbuiltfromthe
beginningwithSoldierinputandreducedrisk.Takentogether,theseactionsrepresentaculturalshift,
potentiallycuttingyearsofftheprocessofgettingcapabilitiestoourSoldiersanddoingitatareduced
cost.

C. Sustainment
Thesustainmentcostsassociatedwithaweaponssystemtypicallyaremoreexpensivethanits
developmentandprocurementcosts;GovernmentAccountabilityOffice(GAO)estimatesthisnumberto
beupto70percentoftotalsystemlifecyclecosts.ThisdrivestwochallengesthatIamseekingto
reconcilenow.
First,giventhatsustainmentissuchalargecostfactor,IwanttostrengthenexistingArmypolicies
regardingsustainmentanalysisdoneduringthedevelopmentofacquisitionstrategies.Thiswillensure
thatArmyMaterielCommandandtheArmyG4inputsareadequateandfullyassessedpriorto
submissionforfinalapprovalofanacquisitionstrategy.Thisiscriticaltoensureourprogramsare
affordableacrosstheirlifecycle.

Second,IwillworkwiththeSecretaryoftheArmytobetterdefinethemanagementtransitionsacrossa
systemslifecycleandtheroleofthesecretariatintheexecutionofsustainment.CurrentArmy
regulationschargetheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnologytobe
responsibleforsupervisinglogistics,includingacquisitionfielding,sustainmentanddisposallogistics
management,andadministeringlifecyclelogisticssupportplanningandexecution.TheArmy
considerslogisticsexecutiontobeanoperation.Whilerecognizingtheroleofthesecretariat,Iwill
seektoensurethatIhaveadequateauthoritiesacrosstheentirelifecycle.

D. ArmyRapidCapabilitiesOffice
IamcommittedtodevelopingaRapidCapabilityOfficesimilartowhatcurrentlyexistsintheAirForce
toaddressemergingthreatsandtechnologies.Muchoftheframeworkforthisofficewilllikelybe
shapedbythedirectivesinparagraph804inthe2016NationalDefenseAuthorizationActwhichdirects
theDepartmentofDefensetoestablishguidanceformiddletieracquisition.TheArmywillwork
closelywithboththeOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)andtheJointStafftodeveloppolicythat
willenabletheeffortsofthisnewoffice.However,certaininhibitorsexistthat,ifreconciledthrough
legislation,couldfurtherenhancerapidacquisition(seeSectionIII).

E. FirstPrinciplesforMeasuringAcquisitionOutputs
Ihavedevelopedaframeworktomeasureourprogramsofrecord.Thesefirstprinciples,usedtoassess
newprogramsandtheacquisitionsystemssupporttotheseprograms,are:

PutSoldiersfirstrightequipmentattherighttimetofightandwin.
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REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

Maintaintechnologicalrelevanceremainaheadofadversaries.
Provideresourcesandmandateaffordabilitypeopleandfundingalignedtoaprogramand
considerthefullrangeoflifecyclecoststoensuresustainability.
Holdpeopleaccountableforresultsprogramhasempoweredleadersandappropriately
definedrequirements,timelines,cost,andmetrics.
Integratedoctrine,organization,training,materiel,leadership,personnel,andfacilities
informedandsynchronized.
Ensuretechnologicalfeasibilityindustryinformedfeedback.
Drivecosteffectivenessavoidwaste,pushdowncost.

SectionIII. RecommendationsforNewAuthorities
AcquisitionReformisasignificantandcomplexinitiative.Itwilllikelytakesomeyearstocompletely
reformDODandArmysystems.Asnotedearlier,the2016NationalDefenseAuthorizationActisagreat
stepintherightdirectiontoaligntheauthoritiesandresponsibilitiesoftheServiceChiefs.TheArmyis
vigorouslyimplementingthesechangesnow.However,tofurtherenhancemyroleandadvancethe
principlesforbothacquisitionreformandmeasuringprogramsofrecord,Ibelieveadditionalauthorities
areneeded.ThefollowingsectionsidentifyanumberofareaswheretheCongresscanfurtherthe
reformeffortsalreadyunderway.

A. DelayeringOversight
Majordefenseacquisitionprogramshavemultiplelayersofoversight,oftenleadingtolongcycletimes
forstaffing,reviews,anddecisionmaking.Muchofthisoversightresidesintheechelonednatureofthe
departmentandhasbeenreinforcedinpreviouslegislation(e.g.GoldwaterNichols).Tofix
accountability,decisionmakingauthorityshouldresidewhereaccountabilityisexpectedinthiscase,
withtheServices.The2016NDAAmadesignificantprogressonthisandgavetheServicesmilestone
decisionauthorityforprogramsunlesstheprogramsarejointorOSDspecialinterest.However,
authorityfortechnologyreadinesslevelcertification,testingdetermination,independentcost
assessment(ICE),andanalysisofalternativeapprovalremainwithOSD.
TheArmyshouldhaveresponsibilityforcertifyingtechnologylevelsaspartoftheacquisitionprocess.
TheArmyResearch,Development,andEngineeringCommandandprogramexecutiveofficeshave
extensiveknowledgeabouttheirprograms,industrycapabilities,andtechnologymaturity.Havingthis
expertisemakesthemwellsituatedtobestcertifytechnologyreadinesslevelspriortoMilestoneBand
assesstestingrisk.
TheresponsibleServiceshouldalsohaveresponsibilityforcostestimationsupportedbythevalidation
ofathirdpartyandreportedwhereappropriatetoCongress.AstheServicesareresponsibleformaking
tradeoffs,theyshouldalsohavecontroloverthemethodologies,assumptions,andlevelofrigor
necessarytomakedecisions.
Similarly,givingtherespectiveServicefulloversightoftheiranalysisofalternativesassociatedwiththeir
programswouldalsogofurthertowardaligningdecisionauthoritywiththeresponsibleparty.The
Service,asthedecisionmakingauthority,shouldhavetheresponsibilityfordecidingwhatanalysis
needstobedoneandwhenthatanalysisisadequatetoinformtheirdecisionmaking.

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Finally,theArmyshouldhavefullresponsibilityforthetestplanfortheprogramswhichithasdecision
authority.IfaccountabilityistobefixedattheServicelevel,thentheServiceshouldbeabletomake
thefinaldecisionontheleveloftestingnecessary,basedonoperationalemploymentandrisk
management.
ItshouldbenotedthatthisdoesnoteliminatetheoversightroleresidinginOSD.Theoversightrole
neednotequatetodecisionmakingauthority;decisionauthorityandaccountabilityneedtobe
consolidated,whileoversightresponsibilitiesremainseparate.OSDoversightcouldbemaintainedby
submittingassessmentstoboththeServiceSecretaryandSecretaryofDefense,independentofthe
decisionauthority.Thedecisionauthoritywouldultimatelybeaccountableforthedecisionsthatheor
shemadetotheServiceSecretaryandSecretaryofDefenseinlightofanyoversightassessments.

B. EnhancedTalentManagement
Whilethe2016NDAAdirectstheServicestoimplementdualtrackingtoensureacquisitionprofessionals
remaincloselylinkedtotheoperationalforce,whichtheysupport,IrecommendthattheCongressallow
theArmytoimplementanEnhancedTalentManagementprogram.TheArmysEnhancedTalent
ManagementprogramwouldmeetthesameintentasdualtrackingwhileallowingtheArmygreater
flexibilitytoensureanoptimalmatchingoftalentedprofessionalstojobopportunities.

C. MajorAutomatedInformationSystems
The2016NDAAwassilentregardingmajorautomatedinformationsystems(MAIS).MAISprograms
accountforalmost10percentofArmyacquisitionprograms.AlegislativechangethatextendsArmy
authoritiestoMAISprogramswouldensureIhavearoleindecisionsonArmyacquisitionprogramsfor
equipmentandsoftware.

D. ProtestRelief
Protestsdisruptprocurements.Currently,anunsuccessfulcontractorcanfiletheirbidprotestwiththe
contractingagency,theGAO,ortheUnitedStatesCourtofFederalClaims(COFC).Becausethetime
limitsallowedtobringaprotestaredifferentinthesevenues,acontractorcangetseveralbitesatthe
protestapple.Routinely,theArmyisforcedtohaltallactiononaprocurementduringthebidprotest,
whichaddsfurtherdelayandcoststotheprogram.
Alegislativechangethatprovidesrelieffromthedisruptioncausedbyprotestswouldmakethe
acquisitionsystemmoreresponsive.28U.S.C.1491shouldbeamendedtochangethetimelimitfor
filingabidprotestwiththeCOFC,sothatitmatchesthetimelimitforfilingabidprotestwiththeGAO.
Agencieswouldnothavetolitigaterepetitiveprotestsandprotesterswouldstillreceiveanexpeditious,
yetfairresolutionoftheirbidprotest.
AnothernecessarylegislativechangeistolessentherequirementstooverrideCompetitionin
ContractingAct(CICA)stays.Currently,performanceofanycontractprotestedatGAOcanbe
automaticallystayedundertheCICAandtheagencymuststopallwork.Forapreawardprotest,an
agencycanoverridethisautomaticstayonlyifitcanshowurgentandcompellingcircumstanceswhich
significantlyaffectthebestinterestsoftheU.S.thatwillnotpermitwaitingforGAOtoissueadecision
ontheprotest.Inthecaseofapostawardprotest,anagencycanoverridetheautomaticstayifeither
theperformanceofthecontractisinthebestinterestsoftheU.S.orthesameurgentandcompelling

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

standardalreadynoted.Alesserstandardthataccountsfortheexerciseofsoundandreasoned
discretionwouldallowfederalagenciestomoveforwardontheprocurementofsensitiveandneeded
items,whilemaintainingtheunsuccessfulofferorsrighttohavetheirbidprotestresolvedbyGAO.

E. FundingFlexibility
Additionalfundingflexibilitywouldenablegreateragilityintheacquisitionprocess.Theacquisition
processasawholewouldbeimprovediffundingwerebetterprotectedforadditionalprototypingand
experimentationaswellastheabilitytorapidlyacquireemergingtechnologiesoraddressemerging
threats.Thecurrentbudgetprocessmakesitdifficulttoseizethesetypesofopportunitiesasfunding
plansaredevelopednearlytwoyearspriortoexecution.Severalmeasurescouldmakefundingmore
flexible,therebyenablinggreateragilityintheacquisitiondecisioncycle.
TheArmywouldbenefitfromanaccountorappropriationdedicatedtoexperimentationand
prototypingthatwouldpromotediscoverywhilenotbeingoverlyconstrainedbyaprescriptive
endstate.ThiswouldallowtheArmytoleverageemergingtechnologies,generateprototypes,
experimentwiththoseprototypes,developnewandrelevantconceptsofoperationbasedonnew
technologies,wargamethoseconceptsandtechnologiesagainstarepresentativethreat,anddevelop
wellinformedrequirements.ThisconceptwouldbefurtherediftheArmyhadtheabilitytotransfer
fundsintothisaccountasnewopportunitiesarose.
TheCongressshouldconsidercombiningresearch,development,test,andevaluation(RDT&E)funding
withprocurementappropriations,orestablishingcapabilitybasedprogramelementlineswithina
capabilityareasuchasGroundCombatVehiclesorArmyAviation.Eitheroftheseinitiativesprovidethe
Armywithgreaterflexibilitytomakeexecutionyearadjustments,allowprogrammanagerstoexploit
newtechnologies,andimprovetheArmysnegotiatingpositionswithindustry.Permittingthetransfer
offundsbetweenRDT&EandprocurementwithoutCongressionalapprovalwouldhaveasimilareffect
ontheArmysacquisitionagility.
TheCongressshouldconsiderraisingthe"belowthresholdreprogramming"limitto$50millionforboth
RDT&Eandprocurementappropriations.Currentreprogrammingthresholdsare$10millionforRDT&E
and$20millionforprocurement(or20percentoftheprogrambaseamount,whicheverisless).This
wouldallowtheArmytomakeagileadjustmentsinresponsetounanticipatedchanges.

F. TestandEvaluation
Asthe2016NDAAstates,theServiceChiefsandSecretariesarecustomersoftheacquisitionsystem.
However,wehavenoinputontheleveloftestingriskwearewillingaccept,nordowehavethe
opportunitytocommentonoursatisfactionwiththeannualoperationaltestandevaluationresults
submittedbytheDirectorofOperationalTestandEvaluation(DOT&E).
Testingisessentialtoensuresafetyandassessprogramperformance.However,overtestingcanadd
significantdelaysinschedulesandincreasecost.Additionally,theArmysplantoincreaseprototyping
andexperimentationcanbeleveragedtoreducetestingrequirements,andineffectreducingprogram
timelinesandcost.Notwithstandingtherequestfordecisionauthorityintesting,alegislativechange
providingtheServicesauthorityfortestingwaiversshouldbeconsidered.Explicitwaiverauthoritiesfor
theSecretaryandmyselfwouldprovidetheabilitytobalancecost,schedule,andriskintestingwhile
strikingabalancebetweenServicetestingandexternaloversight.

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

Similarly,Title10establishesDOT&Esoversightauthorityregardingoperationaltestandevaluation.It
alsoprovidesthatDirector,DOT&Emaycommunicatehisviewsonthescopeoftestingnecessarytothe
SECDEForDeputySECDEFwithoutobtainingtheapprovalorconcurrentofanyotherofficialwithinthe
DepartmentofDefense.TheCongressshouldconsideramendingthelegislationtorequiretheService
SecretariesandtheChiefstoconcurontheleveloftestingproposedbyDOT&E.
Inaddition,DOT&Epreparesanannualreportsummarizingtheoperationaltestandevaluationactivities
oftheDODduringtheprecedingfiscalyear.NeithertheServiceChiefsnorSecretariesareaffordedan
opportunitytocommentonthefindingsofthereport.Thiseffectivelycutsus,thecustomer,outofthe
processbyprecludingusfromprovidingfeedbackonoursatisfactionwithprogramperformanceduring
operationaltesting.Thus,Title10shouldbeamendedtorequireDOT&Etosubmittheirannualreport
toCongress,SECDEF,USD(AT&L),andtheServices(ServiceSecretariesandChiefsoftheServices).
Further,amendlegislationtoallowtheServiceChiefsandSecretariestherighttocommentonthe
annualreportthattheDirector,DOT&EsubmitstoCongresssimilartotheGAOprocess.

G. OutreachtoIndustry
Therearetwonoteworthyproblemswithindustryengagement.First,nontraditionalindustriesare
reluctanttoenterthedefensesectorbecausetheyarereticenttoembracethebureaucracyand
complexitysurroundingacquisitionandcontracting.Themostinnovativecompaniesareoftenthe
smallestandcannotaffordthecostandtimeittakestounderstandthebureaucracy,complywith
complexlaw,orwaitoutaprotest.Second,theArmyisoftenriskaverseandfearsaccusationsof
preferentialtreatment.
IfthecuttingedgeinnovationsofU.S.companiesaretobeeffectivelytappedandutilizedfordefense
systems,itmustbecomeeasierfortheentireindustrialbasetoworkwiththegovernmentandwemust
appropriatelyincentivizeprogramofficesandotherArmyentitiestocollaboratewithindustry.
Giventhecomplexitiesinvolvedandthesignificantpotentialbenefit,Congressshouldestablisha
commissiontoreducethebarriers,bothrealandperceived,whichlimitdialogue.Thecommission
wouldassessthechallengesfromboththeDepartmentandindustryperspectives,andproduce
actionablerecommendationsincludingestimatesofthecost,risks,benefits,andimplementationtime
foreachrecommendation,whichcouldbeincludedinfuturelegislation.

H. FundingStability
Arecurringcontributiontoacquisitionchallengesisthestabilityoffunding.Continuingresolutions
typicallyimpedetheprogressofindividualacquisitionprograms.Themostconsequentialarethe
restrictionsagainstnewstartsandlimitationsbasedonthepreviousyearsfundinglevels.Asprograms
arebeinginitiatedordeveloped,thefundinglevelsareexpectedtoincreaseandthelimitationsnotonly
causedelays,theycontributetoincreasedcosts.Congressshouldconsiderwaystoprovidegreater
fundingstabilityforacquisitionprogramsandrelaxthescrutinyoffirstyearobligationrates.Program
managersareoftenforcedtouseorlosemoneywellbeforeitissettoexpire.Byreducingtheriskto
fundingbasedonfirstyearobligationrates,programmanagerswouldmakebetterdecisionsand
industrywouldnotbeabletoleveragefiscalmanagementpracticesagainsttheDepartment.Itwould
alsogivetheArmymoreflexibilitytoaddressemergingthreatsandopportunities.

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REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

I. SustainedCommitmenttoAcquisitionReform
IhaveimplementedseveralchangestowardsimprovingArmyacquisitionandwillaggressivelycontinue
ourimprovementeffortsinaccordancewiththe2016NDAA.Thesechangesareonlyaninitialstepon
thepathofincrementalacquisitionreforms.However,thesystemitselfdesigned,built,andrefined
overmanydecades,rarelywithaholisticintent,andwithoriginsfromadifferenterastillremains
exceedinglycomplex.Althoughthe2016NDAAchangesandtherecommendationsinthisreportallseek
torectifyinefficiencies,onepossiblealternativewouldbefortheCongresstoappointacommissionto
takeamorecomprehensivelookatacquisitionreform.Theprocesswouldbenefitfromaholisticreview
withouttheinconsistenciesgermanetoincrementalchangeandinfluenceofisolatedinterests.

SUMMARY
TheArmylooksforwardtoworkingwithOSD,theJointStaff,andtheCongresstotacklethechallenges
associatedwithDefenseacquisition.Thelanguageinthe2016NDAAbringstheArmyonestepcloserto
fieldingthecapabilitiesourSoldiersneedinatimelyandefficientmanner.Inthisdocument,Ihave
providedanoverviewofactionstheArmyistakingtoimprovetherequirements,acquisition,and
budgetingsystems.Ialsoidentifiedareasforyourconsiderationtofurtheracquisitionreform.
However,theArmywillcontinuetoassessareasforimprovementwithinexistingauthoritiesand
developfurtherrecommendations.

11