Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
IB History HL
Internal Assessment
Candidate name: Cheng Nicholas Gin Foon
Candidate number:
School: Li Po Chun United World College
Exam session: May 2016
Word count: 1,921
Andrew Gordon, In A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 105.
2
Kenneth Colegrove, Militarism in Japans Foreign Policy, Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 2015, America and Japan (1941): 8.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Richard Smethurst. A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural Community.
(Califronia: University of California Press, 1974), xviii.
6
Ibid., xvi
7
Martin Bernd, Japan and Germany in the Modern World (New York: Bergahn Books, 1995), 81.
8
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy, 8.
9
Shinichi Kitaoka, Diplomacy and the Military in Showa Japan (1990), Daedalus No. 3, Showa: The Japan of
Hirohito (Summer, 1990), Vol. 119: 155.
There was rapid increase in military expenditures after the Triple Intervention (23 April
1895) which signified Japans inability to hold its position against Western powers.10
Formation of national military organizations such as young mens associations.11
Yamagata Aritomo, considered the father of the modern Japanese army, believed
Manchuria was within Japans line of sovereignty (shukensen).12
After the Manchurian Incident (1931), Japans imperial elite convinced the public that
war was inevitable and set about building a political-economic system that would
prepare Japan for war.13
The war office initiated a series of army pamphlets outlining a) Japans lack of
resources, b) Japans divine destiny to expel Western intervention c) the army and
navy must be augmented.14
The rise of ultra-nationalism
During the Great Depression, western countries enacted trade barriers between them
and Japan.15
The United States Immigration Law (1924) prohibited Japanese from immigrating to
the country.16
The Great Depression (1929) caused social uncertainty and rural discontent, which
rallied Japanese opinion behind the militarys acts of aggression in Manchuria.17
The Washington Naval Conference (1921-22) restricted the amount of battleships
between the US, the UK, and Japan to a ratio of 5:5:3.18
10
Bill Gordon, Japans March Towards Militarism, last modified 2000, accessed September 19 2015,
<http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/jhist2.htm>
11
Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism, xiv.
12
Gordon, March Towards Militarism. 13 Matasaka Kosaka, The Showa Era (1926-1989), Daedalus, Vol.
119, No. 3, Showa: The Japan of Hirohito (1990): 35.
14
Colegrove, Japans Foreign Policy,13.
15
Dorothy Perkins, Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of Japanese Military Expansion (Pennsylvania: Diane
Pub Co, 1997), 109.
16
Kosaka, Showa Era, 35.
17
Ibid.
19
28
Northwestern University Library. Guide to the Kenneth W. Colegrove (1886-1975) Papers. Accessed 22
September 2014.
http://findingaids.library.northwestern.edu/catalog/inu-ead-nua-archon-1223
Section D: Analysis
The Manchurian Incident of 1931 was referred to as a prelude to the military
takeover of power in politics by historian Matasaka Kosaka.29 Was Japans entrance into
the military state solely a result of one event? No, Japans passage into militarism was
set long before this first act of aggression.
Japans entrance into militarism was to a large extent due to the role and
independence of its army. A number of legislative decrees enacted by the Meiji
government allowed for the independence and freedom of its military to act as it pleased.
Article XI of the 1889 Constitution allowed the military to exist outside the jurisdiction of the
Parliament.30 The military simultaneously gained the privilege of advising the Emperor
upon all matters pertaining to the defense of the Japanese Empire regardless of the foreign
policy of the Cabinet as a result of Article XI.31 In 1900, it was further stipulated that the
serving War Minister on the Cabinet was to be a elected from the military.32 This resulted in
the military gaining vast political influence over the parliament and Emperor. The military
gained vast control of the cabinet system, able to establish and dismantle cabinets at will as
well as act independently of the cabinets foreign policy.33 This disparity between the cabinet
and military (known as niju-gwaiko), resulted in the Manchurian Incident (1931) which
cemented the militarys place in foreign affairs.34 The Incident represented the Cabinets
failures to control the reckless urges of the Japanese military and exemplified its
independence and role in instigating Japanese militarism in the 1930s.
29
The values held by the Japanese public from the Meiji Restoration (1868) was a major
factor in causing Japanese militarism. The historian Richard Smethurst argued that the
Japanese public was fervently patriotic and nationalistic, and developed deep emotional
feelings towards the emperor36 and held soldierly and nationalistic values.37 These
principles of the Japanese public were caused by the traditional belief of the importance of
the military class in Japanese society, along with religious and educational reforms. Social
Science Professor Kenneth Colegrove argued that the daimyo, or feudal lords who supported
the shogun, ruled by the sword, and their adherents, the samurai, could kill at will.38 From
this quote, one can see the violent militaristic tendencies of the Japanese feudal military caste
and its shift into the modern era. This is substantiated as prior to the Meiji era, the military
class of daimyo held supremacy in the centuries prior.39 The culmination of these factors
created a tradition of military admiration and a sense of loyalty to the state and emperor,
which played a major social role in dramatically increasing Japans militarism in the 1930s.
Educational and religious reforms emphasized traditional values of patriotism and
military reverence which molded a Japanese public which would not oppose the actions of an
. In terms of these reforms, The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) stressed loyalty to the
state and the notion that education served the state and society.40 State-enforced Shintoism
emphasized military glorification and authoritarian rule.41 In tandem, these factors sowed the
seeds for a patriotic Japanese public.
36
10
In response to western attempts to influence Japanese politics and foreign policy, the
Japanese parliament responded with sweeping changes made with great conviction, which
directly led to the militarization of Japan. After the Triple Intervention, the Meiji government
rapidly increased its military expenditure in an attempt to stand up to western Powers.42 The
Japanese War office initiated a series of army pamphlets outlining Japans lack of
resources, and the necessity of the army and navy to be elevated to meet its desire to expel
Western intervention.43
Yamata Arimoto, viewed as father of the modern Japanese military, believed
Manchuria fell within Japans line of sovereignty and hence must be claimed and protected
for the security of Japan.44 Directly as a result of this, the United States and Japan signed a
diplomatic note, known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement (2 November 1917) where Japans
special interests in Manchuria were recognized by the United States.45 Japans special
interests in Manchuria in conjunction with the militarys independence were short term
causes to militarism in the 1930s.
42
11
Section E: Conclusion
One of the main factors that magnified Japanese militarism in the 1930s was the
role and independence of the military. Legislative failures of the Meiji Constitution and
Japanese government allowed the military to garner vast amounts of influence within the
cabinet system and the ability to disregard its foreign policy. Public and parliamentary
response to foreign influences along with Japans fervor for militarization set the
foundation for the rise of ultra-nationalism in the nation. The influence the military held
over the domestic government in tandem with the patriotic and militaristic values held
by the Japanese public further created the conditions which allowed Japanese militarism
to flourish from 1931 onwards.
46
Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 38; Kosaka, Showa Era, 33
Perkins, Japan Goes to War, 109
48
Kosaka, Showa Era, 35
47
12
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