MAXIMUS CONFESSOR AND JOHN SCOTTUS

ERIUGENA ON PLACE AND TIME

carlos steel
Maximus considerations on place in Ambigua ad Iohannem VI (X)
PG 91, 1180B-1181A offered Eriugena the starting point for his own
views on place. This contribution presents first a close reading of
Maximus argument and investigates in a second part how Eriugena
transformed Maximus views to develop his own doctrine. Maximus
argument is not primarily about place, but about the temporality of
the universe. Whatever is in place, is limited and must have a beginning in time, as both time and place are inseparably connected. Eriugena learns from Maximus that place is the natural definition of every
creature, but takes definition in the sense of the essential or quidditative definition. Eriugena also uses place in a more common sense
as the tridimensional containment of a corporeal quantity. How the
two notions of place/space are related remains unclear. The inseparable
connection between time and place poses another difficulty. That the
whole creation is characterized by temporality is easy to admit, but
how could one understand that the whole creation is in place ? What
about incorporeal beings ? Maximus insists that time and place characterize the very being or ousia of created things ; it is what makes them
finite beings and distinct from the creator. For Eriugena the ousia
never becomes itself subjected to spatio-temporal conditions ; only in
its accidental appearance does it become spatial and temporal. Ultimately God and creation are the same reality, as will become evident
at the return of all things when the conditions of time and space will
cease to exist.

In the first book of the Periphyseon Eriugena devotes a long discussion to the ten categories and their possible application in
a discourse on divine nature. It is in this context that we find
an extensive investigation into the nature of place. At a crucial
moment in the discussion Eriugena paraphrases and quotes a long
text of Maximus Confessor, which, as he says, offers the starting
point for his argument :
Proceedings of the International Conference on Eriugenian Studies in honor of E. Jeauneau, ed. by W. Otten, M. I. Allen, IPM, 68 (Turnhout, 2014), pp. 291-318.

DOI 10.1484/M.IPM-EB.1.102065

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Take as starting point of this reasoning the following [text], which

we have taken from the holy fathers, Gregory the theologian and
the excellent interpreter of his sermons, Maximus.1

The long quotation comes from the Ambigua ad Iohannem VI (X),

of which Eriugena made his own translation.2 In this contribution
I will not present a general presentation of Eriugenas doctrine on
place, which has already been amply discussed by scholars,3 but
first (A) offer a close reading of Maximus argument and investigate in a second part (B) how Eriugena adopted and transformed
Maximus views to develop in an original way his own doctrine
on place. This investigation will not only contribute to a better
assessment of Eriugenas genius in dealing with his Greek sources, but also touch upon the general subject of this volume, nature
and creation. For place and time constitute the necessary conditions (sine quibus non) of the creation of the universe, as Eriugena
following Maximus repeatedly says. But before we engage in any
speculations, let us have a close look at the text of Maximus quoted by Eriugena.
A. Maximus
If I may say in passing, the very fact that beings have their
being in a qualified sense and not absolutely (
, ) which is the first form of circumscription () is a powerful and important <argument> to
demonstrate that beings have had a beginning in respect of being
and coming to be. Who could then ignore that, before conceiving any kind of being except the divine being and only this,
which in a strict sense exists even beyond being itself , one conceives somewhere ( ), together with which,
always and in every respect, one necessarily conceives at some
time ? For it is not possible to conceive somewhere separate

1 Eriugena, Periphyseon 1.481B, CCCM 161 : 55-56 ll. 1667-9 : Accipe igitur
tale ratiocinationis huiusmodi exordium, quam a sanctis patribus, Gregorio
uidelicet theologo sermonumque eius egregio expositore Maximo, sumpsimus.
2 Maximus Confessor, Ambigua ad Iohannem VI (X), CCSG 18 : 93-94
ll. 1421-1452 ; PG 91, 1180B-1181A.
3 See Moran (1989) (1992), Courtine (1980) ; Bertin (1995). On Maximus
doctrine of place see Mueller-Jourdan (2005), on Maximus influence on Eriugena Kavanagh (2005).

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from and deprived of at some time (for they are <conditions>

that are together, as they are also <conditions> without which
<nothing exists>). If, then, somewhere cannot be separated from
and deprived of at some time, together with which it is naturally
conceived, and if all beings are shown to fall under the somewhere as they are all in place, --- for the totality of the universe
does not itself exist above the totality (
) (for how absurd and impossible is it to proclaim that
the totality itself exists above its own totality), but it has from itself
and in itself its circumscription after the infinite power of the cause
of all, which circumscribes everything , namely the external limit
of itself ; and this is precisely the place of the universe, as also certain people define place, saying that place is the outside circuit of the
universe, or the outside position of the universe, or the limit of the
container in which what is contained is contained --- , it will also be
demonstrated that all things fall always under the <category> at
some time, since all things that have being after God have this
being not absolutely, but in a qualified sense, and therefore they
are not without beginning. For everything that receives a qualification ( ) in whatever way, even if it is now,
was not <always>. Hence, when we say of the divine being that
it is, we do not say that it is after some manner, and therefore
we say in this case both that it is and was unqualifiedly and in
an indeterminate manner and absolutely. For the divine cannot
admit any account or thought ; hence, even when we predicate of
it being, we do not say that it is. For being is derived from it but
it is not itself being. For it is even beyond being itself, whether is
it said or conceived qualifiedly or absolutely. If beings, then, have
being after a certain manner, and not absolutely, it can be shown
that, just as they fall under the <category> somewhere because
of the position and the limitation of their natural logoi, they also
always fall absolutely under the <category> at some time because
of their beginning.4

The text we are dealing with comes from a series of arguments

demonstrating that the created world did not exist in all eternity,
but had a beginning in time. Maximus argues that all created things
have being not in an absolute sense, but in a qualified sense, after
some manner, which gives them a limited, finite, or, as Maximus

4 For the Greek text I use the edition of Carl Laga in preparation for the
CCSG. For my translation of Maximus I made use of the translation of Louth
(1996), but modified it thoroughly. For translations of Periphyseon I-IV, I use
Sheldon-Williams translation with modifications.

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likes to say, circumscribed being. One of the first forms of circumscription is precisely that all created beings do not just exist,
but have their being somewhere, in some determined place. It is
impossible to think of some being without considering it as being
in some place. Whatever falls under the category somewhere, also
falls under the category at some time, as there is nothing that
exists in place but does not exist in time. Hence, if all created
things are somewhere, they must also be at some time and, therefore, have a temporal mode of existence with a beginning in time.
The place of the universe
In a small digression in his argument (put in italics in my translation) Maximus raises the question whether the totality of created
being can be said to be in place. The universe is not in a place if
we understand by place something outside the universe in which
the universe would be located. For how could there be something
outside the totality of all things ? This does not mean, however,
that the created universe is an infinite place-less totality. It has,
as Maximus says, besides the circumscription it receives from
being created by the infinite cause of all, also from itself and in
itself its circumscription, namely the outside limit of itself.
In order to explain in what sense the totality of all created
being could be in a place, Maximus introduces some definitions
of place, which one may find among experts in these matters,
the philosophers. We have to read and interpret these definitions
carefully, as they are often misunderstood by commentators, and
even by Eriugena himself, but, in his case, the misunderstanding
is philosophically fertile, as I hope to demonstrate. I therefore give
both the Greek text and Eriugenas translation.

, , (1)
(2)
(3) , .
ipse finis ipsius exterior ; ipse etiam locus est uniuersitatis, sicut
quidam diffiniunt locum dicentes : (1) Locus est ipse extra uniuersitatem ambitus, (2) uel ipsa extra uniuersitatem positio, uel
(3) finis comprehendentis, in quo comprehenditur comprehensum.

The third definition (the limit of the container in which what is contained is contained) is clearly a reference to Aristotles celebrated

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conclusion at the end of the argument in Physics IV 212a19-20 :

,
. In the handbooks of philosophy that Maximus used one
finds the definition almost in the same formulation. Thus Nemesius,
de nat. hom. 3, p. 41,22-42,1 , (adopted also by John
the Damascene, Exp. Fidei 13,2-3). We find the same definition
often in the Alexandrian commentators, Ammonius, Simplicius,
Philoponus. See, for instance, Simplicius, In DC, 258,3-4 ; 269,16-26 ;
In Cat. 185,4-6 ; 150,2-3 ; 337,12-13 ; In Phys. 571,17 ; 585,31-35.
Maximus changes the formulation slightly, writing instead
of the standard formula , maybe because he wants to put
emphasis on the fact that the world is contained in its place.
However, notwithstanding this clear reference to Aristotle, Maximus understanding of place is different from what Aristotle originally meant with his definition, and is clearly influenced by the
Neoplatonic understanding of place, of which we are well informed thanks to the celebrated Corrolarium de loco of Simplicius.
Simplicius, though mostly an admirer of Aristotle, was upset by
Aristotles argument in Physics IV 5 that the universe, as a whole,
does not exist in place. This seems to be an unavoidable consequence of Aristotles understanding of being in place as being
encompassed by a body external to it (212 a33-34). If there is
nothing outside the universe, the universe as a whole cannot be
said to be in a place. Aristotle concludes :
The universe is not somewhere ( ). For what is
somewhere is itself something and yet another thing must exist
beside it wherein it is and that contains it ; but beside the universe
and the whole there is nothing outside the universe. (212b 14-17)

Aristotles thesis that the universe is not itself in a place, though

it may be accidentally in place, as all its component parts are in
place (212b11-13), had been criticized by the Neoplatonists since
Iamblichus.5 To avoid the absurd consequence that the whole universe is not itself in a place, the later Platonists modified the defini5 That the category of place should not be limited to physical bodies occupying a certain place but could be applied to all levels of reality beyond the
first cause (in the sense of being encompassed by a higher principle) is a view
defended by Iamblichus (see Simplicius, In Cat. 361,7-364,6).

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tion of place. If we consider place as the limit of the containing,

this should not primarily be taken in the corporeal sense of one
body encompassing another, but as the demarcation and measure or
position of all things in relation to one another and to the universe.
That Maximus understands place in this Platonic tradition is
clear from his two first definitions, though exact parallels are more
difficult to recover in the tradition : (1)
(2) . The Greek formulation is ambiguous. In fact, it is possible to interpret the genitive as related to the adverbial preposition and
to translate place is the circuit outside the universe or the position outside the universe or to consider the genitive
as a subject genitive and to translate as I do place is the outside
circuit of the universe, or the outside position of the universe.
Eriugena opted for the first possibility, which seems the most
obvious and which he translated as Locus est ipse extra uniuersitatem ambitus, uel ipsa extra uniuersitatem positio. He is followed
by his modern translators : place is the boundary outside the universe or its very position outside the universe (Sheldon-Williams) ;
the circuit outside the universe or the position outside the universe (Uhlfelder) ; une frontire extrinsque lunivers ou bien
une position extrinsque lunivers (Bertin) ; la circonferenza
estrema delluniverso, o quello che si colloca esternamente alluniverso (Moreschini). However, the whole context of the argument
makes it clear that we cannot understand the definition in this
sense. For just before the digression wherein the three definitions
are given Maximus had rejected the view that place would be
something outside the world as if it were an infinite space wherein
the world occupies only a limited place : but the totality of the
universe does not itself exist beyond the totality, but it has from
itself and in itself circumscription. Maximus considers as place of
the universe the external limit of itself (
) and finds a confirmation of his view in the definitions
of place from the philosophical tradition. Therefore we should
interpret these definitions in that sense and translate the outside
circuit of the universe or the outside position of the universe.6

6 Mueller-Jourdan (2005) rightly translates : le lieu est la priphrie

extrieure du tout, ou bien la position extrieure du tout (p. 42).

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The view that there would be a space/place outside the world

is unanimously rejected by the Platonic philosophers following
Aristotles authority :
(212b17-18). There is nothing outside the universe, not
even an empty infinite space (vacuum), and therefore it makes no
sense to talk about a place outside the universe. We find the argument often in Proclus, who even based an argument for the eternity of the world on it, for which he was subsequently criticized
by Philoponus (see In Tim. 2,60,20ff. ; Philoponus, De aet. mundi,
294,1ff). But not only pagan philosophers, also Christian authors
shared this view. Augustine found in the limitation of space to the
mass of the bodily world an argument to insist also on the limitation of the temporal duration of the world. One may recall Augustines notable question What was God doing before he created the
world ? And how much time has there been before he started creating the world ? As Augustine explains, such questions are senseless as they presuppose that there ever was a time preceding the
creation of the world, whereas in fact time was created together
with the world. In fact, as Augustine says, only the Epicureans
accepted that there was an infinite space wherein innumerably
different worlds existed, while all later authors rejected their view
as absurd. If, then, it is absurd to consider an infinite place outside the universe here all intelligent philosophers agree it is
also absurd to talk about an infinite time. Here, alas, the philosophers do not agree, as Augustine protests.
But if they say that the thoughts of men are vain when they
impute infinite space, since there is no space outside the world
(cum locus nullus sit praeter mundum), we answer that it is by the
same token vain to conceive of the past times during which God
was idle, since there is no time before the world. (De civitate dei
XI, 3)

We may now better understand what Maximus means when he

says that the place of the whole world is its outside or external
limit. Less clear is where he found definitions (1) and (2) in the
tradition. For the first definition ( )
there are antecedents if one replaces (taken not just in
the sense of revolution but of the revolving vault of the heaven,
its circumference) with . As Aristotle says in his treatise
On Heaven : we apply the world ouranos to the substance of the

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outermost circumference ( ) of the world or to the

natural body which is at the outermost circumference of the world,
but we can also apply the word ouranos to indicate the world as a
whole, for the world is as a whole enclosed by the outermost circumference (De caelo I 9 278b11-14).
The second definition ( ) seems more
particular to Maximus himself, though here again he stands in a
tradition. Maximus considers as one of the five fundamental
categories of all created beings (, , , ,
).7 In attributing this important ontological role to
Maximus may have been influenced by Nemesius understanding
of providence, to which he refers later in his argument (1188D).
As Nemesius says, providence is according to the philosophers the
permanency of all things and in particular of things subject to
generation and corruption and the position () and order of all
beings in the same way.8 Just as within a living body all different
parts have been given their positions, which make the structured
order of the organism possible, so the different parts also keep
their position in the whole universe. In the Neoplatonic view place
is indeed given a fundamental role in the providential ordering
of the world, as it assigns to all things their natural position, so
that the whole is constituted as a well-organized system. To be
in place, then, is much more than being encompassed by another
containing body ; it means to occupy a determined position in relation to other bodies within the order of the world. As Simplicius
formulates it, following his master Damascius :
place taken unqualifiedly is the demarcation of the position of
bodies ( ), but to speak of
place according to nature, it is the demarcation of the position
assigned to the parts of the bodies in relation to each other and to
the whole, and of the whole to the part. For, as the different parts
of the earth and the heavens are differently disposed on account
of place, some as it happens in the north, others to the south, so

See Ambig. ad Iohannem VI (PG 91 : 1133A-1137C) and Steel (2012),

247-254.
8 Nemesius, De natura hominis, p.120,25-121,2 ed. Morani ; quoted by
Maximus, Ambigua ad Ioh. VI (PG 91 : 1189 A-B) : :

.

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also the whole heaven and the whole earth, are parts of the universe and have their proper measure and arrangement of position
( ) because of place, one
retaining the outside of the whole, the other the middle.9

If this is then the nature and function of place, it cannot simply

be the limit of the container, as Aristotle said. For, as Simplicius
objects, how could such a limit ever be the cause of order or
demarcation, being itself rather marked off by the things which
come into and are contained by it ?10 With this enlarged understanding of place as what assigns a well-ordered position to all
things, one may also consider, Simplicius claims, the whole world
as being in place, meaning that it has been given by its creator
a well-ordered positioning of all its parts, which always remains
the same, whatever their movements may be and the multitude
of varied succeeding positions in the universe which are like a sort
of unfolding of it.11
Time and place : the conditions without which of the created world
As Maximus says in the text quoted above, it is not possible to
consider somewhere without thinking of at some time, or the
other way around. For time and place always coexist as they are
both together the conditions without which nothing can exist (
, ).
That place and time are conditions sine quibus non of whatever
exists except the creator, is taken as the premise for Maximus
next argument against the infinity of the world :
If no being is free of confine (), all beings have also
taken being sometime and being somewhere analogous to their
being. For without these absolutely nothing can exist ; no substance, no quantity, no quality, no relation, no affection, no motion, no disposition nor something else of the <categories> in which
the experts in these matters enclose all things.12
9

Simplicius, In Phys. 626, 19-27 ; translation J.O. Urmson, slightly modified.

Simplicius, In Phys. 627,6-9.
11 Simplicius, In Phys. 632,29-31.
12 Ambigua ad Ioh. VI (PG 91 : 1181A-B) :
,
,
, , , , , , ,
, .
10

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The experts to whom Maximus is again referring here stand for the
philosophical tradition, in this case the discussion of the categories
which enclose whatever is. Among these categories two are singled
out, time and place, because they are the conditions sine quibus
non, making it possible that the other modes of being are implemented. This is a surprising claim. Normally substance is singled
out as the most fundamental category, while time and place are
never given a privileged status. In this argument, however, even
substance is said to depend upon time and place. The terminology of comes, as is well known, from Plato, who
distinguishes in the Phaedo what he calls the true or real causes
from the necessary material conditions, which make it possible for
the true causes to exercise their activity. In the Timaeus Plato
also uses the term for these necessary conditions.13 In
the later philosophical tradition the distinction between causes
and auxiliary causes is often made. Interestingly, Chrysippus considered time and place as necessary conditions making it possible
for the true causes to exercise their causality.14 This may have led
to the view that time and place are the of all the
other categories. In his treatise on the ten commandments Philo
of Alexandria discusses the ten categories in this way :
Those who are versed in the doctrines of philosophy say that
the categories which are said to exist in nature are only ten :
substance, quality, quantity, relation, to act, to suffer, to have,
to be situated and those without which ( ), time
and place. For there is nothing that does not share in them (),
as none of the previously mentioned categories can exist without
these two.15

13

See Tim. 46c7, d1 ; cf. also Polit. 281c4-e9 ; 287b7-289c8.

See SVF III 63 (p.16,7-8) ; II 346 (p.120,7-8). See also Philoponus, In
Meteor. 4,28 : , . Sextus, Empiricus,
Pyrrh hypoth. III 118 (p. 166 Mau) :
, .
,
. Prolegomena in Platonem 16, p. 25, 16-17 ed. Westerink-Trouillard.
15 Philo, De decalogo 30-31 :
,
, , , , , , , ,
, . . See also De post.
Cain 111.
14

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The similarity with Maximus text is so striking that one must

admit that Maximus was influenced by his reading of Philo. In
Philo the argument is about the ten categories, and it is said that
without time and place the eight others (including substance !)
cannot really exist. For whatever exists, is somewhere and at some
time. With Maximus, however, this doctrine acquires a metaphysical meaning : time and place are considered as the conditions of
the existence of all creation, thereby differentiating it from its
creator. Creation never enjoys being absolutely, but always has
it in a certain respect, after a certain mode, as qualified being.
Only God has absolute being and can even be said to exist beyond
being as all beings (in a qualified sense) originate from him. God
is therefore above time and place, as Maximus explains :
God exists absolutely and without determination beyond all
beings, both what circumscribes and what is circumscribed, and
the nature of those [conditions] without which none of these could
be, I mean, time and eternity16 and place, by which the universe is
enclosed, since He is completely unrelated to anything.17

That whatever is created has its being in time is a not a controversial claim for Christian authors. But it seems difficult to admit
that whatever exists in time, must also be somewhere. What
about incorporeal beings, such as souls or angels who cannot be in
place ? Or should we take place here in a broader sense indicating
limitation, position within a whole ?
In other texts, in particular in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium,
Maximus seems to limit the necessity of place and time for existence to the world of nature, which is subject to generation and
change. As he says in question 55 :
The law of nature encompasses both the genera and species falling under nature ( ) and what is considered around
nature ( ), namely time and place. For one naturally

16

is not the eternity of the divinity, but the shared eternity (or
eviternity) of creation.
17 Maximus, Ambigua ad Ioh. VI (PG 91 : 1153B) :
,
, ,
, .

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considers together with every generated being [the conditions]
without which nothing [exists].18

Interestingly, the scholiast of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium, who

may have been a disciple of Maximus and the editor of his work,
feels the need to explain in a note in what sense Maximus understands time and place as necessary conditions to exist (
). As he says, upon their coming into being all beings have
been assigned a universal position and movement (
). Nature exists in place according to its
outward position ( ) and in time because
it is moved towards its principle. The scholiast insists, however,
that nature is not in place and time according to its existence
( ). For, as he argues, nature is not composed out
of time and place, but it has in them from outside the beginning
of its being and its position ().19 This annotation is clearly
an attempt to limit Maximus provocative claim that all beings
are in time and place. According to the scholiast time and place
are only necessary conditions for the movement and positioning of
all things, not for their being. In the Ambigua passage, however,
Maximus clearly states that even the ousia of created beings is
dependent upon place and time.
In the last question of Ad Thalassium (65) Maximus explains
more clearly what he means by time and place as necessary conditions of all created beings. Place is the limited, determinate stand
( ) of beings in movement and change. As
all created beings are, in Maximus view, characterized by movement until they reach their ultimate end, only then will they
stand in the creator from whom they originated. The world as
a whole is therefore a determinate or limited place and stand
( ). Time is the measurement and
limitation of movements ( ). When, at the
end, all nature, having gone through place and time, is connected
18 Maximus, Quaest. ad Thal. q.55, 66-69 : (CCSG 7 : 485) :

, .
. (see also scholion 6 on
p. 517, 50-57) Q. ad Thal. q. 64, 356-358 (CCSG 22 : 209) :
,
(see also scholion 13, on p. 243,37-38).
19 See also scholion 6 on p. 517, 50-57.

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with God according to grace, its motion, which is the cause of permanent change, will come to an end by the presence of an unlimited standstill ( ). Then the
world itself as a circumscribed and determinate place will come to
an end and so will time as a circumscribed motion. There will be
no need any more for time and place as conditions without which
nothing can exist, as all limitations will have been taken away.
Nature will enter into a state of standing still without any motion.
Yet this rest should not be seen as the contrary or end of motion
for that could only produce a determinate limited stasis , but
will instead be a standing still without any limitation () ; for
there will be neither motion nor extension ().20
It is clear, then, that place and time are not just conditions for
the existence of the physical world in this sense even Aristotle
could say that there is no movement without place and time ,
but that they must be understood as the ontological conditions
for whatever exists apart from the creator. This is exactly what
Maximus intends to say in the conclusion of the long text from
Ambigua quoted by Eriugena :
just as all beings fall under the <category> somewhere because
of the position and the limitation due to their natural logoi, they
also fall absolutely under the <category> at some time because
of their beginning.21
20 Quaest. ad Thal. 65,516-540 (CCSG 22 : 283-285) :
()
,
. () ,
,
. , ,
, .
() ,
. ,
, ,
,
.
21 , ,
,
.

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Every being has within the universe, in accordance with the ideal
logoi which are constitutive of its nature, a determinate position
and a determinate time.
B. Eriugena
Having explained Maximus views on place, let us now investigate how Eriugena interprets and develops them. The first interpretation of a text is its translation. Maximus is an incredibly
difficult author and the Ambigua in particular offer a challenge
to any translator, as is evident from contemporary translations.
Eriugenas translation of Maximus text on place is a superb
example of his philological genius.22 In the Periphyseon Eriugena
does not scrupulously quote his own translation, but sometimes
intervenes in the translation to make its harsh Latin more fluent.
Thus he replaces participle constructions with constructions with
a personal verb, as in :
Ambig.1425-6 : praeter Deum solum et super ipsum esse proprie
subsistentem
Periph.1670-1 : praeter deum, qui solus super ipsum esse proprie
subsistit
Ambig.1434-5 : sed sub seipsa habens
Periph.1682-3 : dum sub seipsa habeat

Or he may reorganize a sentence :

Ambig. 1432-3 : Hoc enim quantum et irrationabile et impossibile
est statuere ipsam universitatem
Periph.1680-1 : Hoc enim statuere irrationabile est et impossibile,
ipsam uidelicet universitatem.

The most interesting changes, however, are his replacement of the

categorical vocabulary of quando () and ubi () by tempus
and locus :
22 One may criticize Eriugenas translation of Ambigua VI, ll. 1448-1449 :
Est enim super ipsum esse, super aliquo modo esse, et uniuersaliter super
quod dicitur et intelligitur. A correct translation would be : Est enim super
ipsum esse, et (= add. ante corr. M) super quod dicitur et intelligitur aliquo
modo esse et [super quod dicitur et intelligitur] universaliter [esse]. In VI,
line 1421 localiter for may be a free translation, as is also universa in VI,
l. 1440 for .

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305

Ambig. 1425-1430 : intelligitur ubi, cum quo cointelligitur

quando. Non enim possibile est intelligere diffinitum ubi per privationem quando.23
Periph. 1671-4 :
intelligitur in loco. Cum quo (loco uidelicet)
cointelligitur tempus. Non enim possibile est
locum subtracto tempore intelligi.
Ambig. 1450-2 :
quemadmodum sub ubi esse et sub quando
esse.
Periph.1704-5 :
quemadmodum sub loco esse et sub tempore
esse.

This replacement may be questioned, as it is not evident that

the categories somewhere and at some times mean the same
as place and time, but we find it also in modern translations,
because it makes the translation more fluent.24
As his translation and his paraphrase of the text make clear,
Eriugena understood Maximus argument very well. Nevertheless,
as we shall see, in his own doctrine of place, although inspired by
Maximus, he goes far beyond his Greek authority. I will explain
the difference between both views in five points.
1) Focus on place, not on time. As we have already seen, Maximus
argument is not primarily about place, but about the temporality
of the universe. The consideration of place offers an argument for
the demonstration that the world has a beginning in time. Eriugena takes Maximus argument out of its original context. As
said, Eriugena starts his investigation into place with the question whether and how we can apply the different categories in a
discourse about divine nature. In contrast to Maximus, John is
above all interested in the discussion of place. He only deals with
time parenthetically, as he notices himself. When arguing about
place we discussed some issues about time, insofar as the present

23 In l. 1429 (Ambigua, ed. Jeauneau, CCSG 18 : 271) we find in manuscript

Mazarine 561 (which is the main manuscript of Eriugenas translation) for ubi
and quando in the margin respectively locus and tempus. Eriugena probably
added these variant readings himself.
24 Interestingly, Eriugena (or his disciple editor) started editing his own
translation to make it more easily readable. Some readings ante correctionem
in M are more literal (see Jeauneaus introduction, CCSG : LX-LXI).

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discussion required.25 One will have to wait until Periphyseon V

for a more thorough treatment of time.
2) What Eriugena mostly learns from Maximus is that place is
the natural definition of every creature. Summarizing his long
digression on Maximus the master concludes that place is nothing
but the natural definition and mode and position of each creature,
whether general or specific (naturalem diffinitionem modumque
positionemque uniuscuiusque siue generalis siue specialis creaturae).
And his student confirms that now the intention of the whole
argument has become clear : the different terms used by Maximus
to characterize place : finem, terminum, diffinitionem, circumscriptionem, all mean the same thing, namely, the circuit of a finite
nature (ambitum scilicet finitae naturae).26 This is, however, much
more than a summary of Maximus views. The use of the term
diffinitio prompted John to a lengthy development of great originality that goes beyond what Maximus had in mind. The occasion
for this development is offered by the Latin term diffinitio, which
cannot only be used to indicate the boundary, circumscription,
or limitation that are characteristic of finite beings, but also, and
even more so, entails the logical sense of definition, an explanation
of the essential properties of things. When Maximus understands
place (locus) as the definition of a thing, he means, Eriugena explains, the essential or quidditative definition. In fact, there are
as many sorts of places as there are types of beings that are defined (Periphyseon I.474D). The term place is now understood in
the tradition of dialectic and rhetoric to indicate topics, subject
matter, heads under which, general notions.27 In Eriugenas Platonic understanding these general notions of what things are exist
in the human mind. If, then, places are definitions, and definitions exist in the human mind, we have to admit that place will
necessarily be nowhere else but in the defining mind (Periphyseon
I.475B). Against the objection of the student that this understanding of place is far removed from what people usually understand
25 Periphyseon 1.504A, CCCM 161 : 85 ll. 2647-9 : nam disputantes de loco
quaedam de tempore, quantum praesentis disputationis necessitas exigebat
discussimus.
26 Periphyseon 1.483B-C, CCCM 161 : 58 ll. 1750-64.
27 On the early medieval tradition of the topics, see Gersh (1997).

maximus confessor and eriugena on place and time

307

as place (as habitationes, abodes inhabited by animals) the teacher

argues that place cannot be a body (Periphyseon I.475B-C). The
general conclusion of the argument is obvious, and yet provocative, going far beyond what Maximus originally meant :
Do you understand, then, that place is nothing but the act of
someone who understands and by virtue of his understanding
comprehends those things which he can comprehend.28

The above quoted text is often used in arguments about the socalled idealism of Eriugena. To ascertain that place has no other
reality than in the mind and ultimately in God himself sounds
indeed like an anticipation of a Kantian transcendental understanding of place. I do not believe that such considerations are helpful.
The most provocative formulations on place are found in book I
where Eriugena almost exclusively deals with place understood as
the essential definition of things. Definitions this is evident
only exist in minds, not in bodies. If taken in this sense place is
nothing but the act of understanding the essence of things. Eriugena uses, however, locus also in connection with spatium, by
which the quantity of bodies is extended : spatium quo corporum
quantitas extenditur.29 He speaks of spatia or intervalla locorum vel
temporum. 30 Explaining the growth of animal bodies in book V he
gives the following definition of time and place :
With time I now mean the interval needed for a body to reach its
perfect development in growth and with place I mean the seat of
the singular bodily parts. 31

Such an understanding of place was rejected and almost ridiculed

by the master in book I : eos qui talia dicunt vera deridet ratio. 32

28 Periphyseon 1.485D, CCCM 161 : 61 ll. 1857-9 : Videsne itaque non aliud
esse locum nisi actionem intelligentis atque comprehendentis uirtute intelligentiae ea quae comprehendere potest.
29 Periphyseon 5.889D, CCCM 165 :43 ll. 1347-9.
30 Periphyseon 3, CCCM 163 : 28 l. 749 ; 115 l. 3329 ; 130 l. 3763 ; 158 l.
4618 : Periphyseon 4, CCCM 64 : 82 l. 2407 ; 118 l. 3556.
31 Periphyseon 5.950C, CCCM 65 : 126 ll. 4067-70 : tempora nunc dico spatia
quibus corpus humanum perfectum ad sui incrementum peruenit, loca uero
sedes singulorum corporis membrorum.
32 Periphyseon 1.475C, CCCM 61 :49 ll. 1431-3.

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Even more disturbing is the following definition of place in relation to quantity and dimensionality :
Quantity is nothing but a certain dimension of parts, which are
separated either in thought alone or by natural difference, and a
rational progression of what is extended by natural spaces, I mean
length and breadth and height, into certain limits ; and place is
nothing but the confine and the containment (ambitus et conclusio)
of what is limited by a certain term. 33

The use of the term ambitus and conclusio reminds us of Maximus doctrine of place, which was discussed in Periphyseon I. Now,
however, no connection is made with the dialectical meaning of
place as essential definition. On the contrary, place is here
understood in a physical sense, as the containment of the three
dimensions of a certain corporeal quantity. The extension of space
and the intervals of time are required as conditions of the movement and development of the natural world. Eriugena was himself
aware that he used the term locus in different senses, as he explicitly formulates in Book V : by place I now mean not the definition of things, which remains in the mind, but the space wherein
the quantity of bodies is extended. 34 It remains difficult, however,
to explain what exactly the relation is between the spaces/places
occupied by the physical bodies and place understood as the natural essential definition of things.
3) As we have seen, Maximus considers time and place as the conditions sine quibus non ( ) for the existence of the
created world. Eriugena was so taken by this view that he often
referred to it using even the Greek phrase. Already in his translation of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium he feels the need to add his
own scholion to help his readers how to understand this phrase :

33 Periphyseon 1.478B, CCCM 61 : 51 ll. 1532-8 : nil aliud est quantitas

nisi partium quae seu sola ratione seu naturali differentia separantur certa
dimensio eorumque quae naturalibus spatiis extenduntur, longitudine dico,
latitudine et altitudine, ad certos terminos rationabilis progressio ; locus uero
nil aliud est nisi rerum quae certo fine terminantur ambitus atque conclusio.
34 Periphyseon 5.889D, CCCM 65 : 43 ll. 1347-8 : Locum nunc dico non
rerum diffinitionem, quae semper manet in animo, sed spatium quo corporum
quantitas extenditur.

maximus confessor and eriugena on place and time

309

One should supply after the things (namely places and times)
without which (que sine quibus) : nothing in this life is generated
or exists or lives or is in movement ; therefore they are called by
the Greeks , that is, the [conditions] without which,
that is, places and times. 35

Eriugena returns to this issue several times in the Periphyseon.

Thus, when introducing the discussion of the categories of place
and time, he notices :
Place and time are counted among all the things that have been
created. For in these two the whole of the world that now exists
consists and without these it cannot exist, and therefore they are
called by the Greeks , that is without which
the universe cannot exist. 36

And he concludes :
For no creature can be without its own definite and unchangeable
place and its own definite intervals and limits of time, whether
it be corporeal or incorporeal ; and that is why, as we have often
said, these two, namely place and time, are called by the philosophers , that is, without which ; for without these no
creature which has its beginning by generation and subsists after
some manner can exist. 37

Following Maximus Eriugena insists that place and time must

be understood before we can understand a finite being : videsne
locum tempusque ante omnia quae sunt intelligi ? (1.1706-7). How35 Quaest. ad Thal. q.65, scholion 33 (CCSG 22 : 320 ll. 168-171) : Que, id est
loca et tempora, sine quibus subaudis : nil in hac uita uel nascitur uel est uel
uiuit uel mouetur, que propterea a Grecis uocantur , que quibus
sine, idest loca et tempora. Also in the translation of Ambigua VI we find him
in the margin explaining sine quibus : id est locus et tempus (CCSG 18 : 271).
36 Periphyseon 1.468C-D, CCCM 161 : 39 ll. 1131-5 : Locus siquidem et tempus inter omnia quae creata sunt computantur. In his nanque duobus totus
mundus qui nunc est consistit et sine quibus esse non potest, ideoque a graecis dicuntur (id est quibus sine uniuersitas esse non
ualet). (translation Sh.-W., slightly modified).
37 Periphyseon 1.489A, CCCM 161 : 65 ll. 1993-7 : Non enim ulla creatura
certo suo loco atque immutabili certisque temporum spatiis finibusque, siue
corporea sit siue incorporea, potest carere. Ideoque, ut saepe diximus, duo
haec, locus profecto et tempus, a philosophis appellantur (hoc est
quibus sine) ; nam sine his nulla creatura generatione inchoans et aliquo modo
subsistens potest consistere.

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ever, this priority of place and time should not be taken in a temporal sense, as if place and time existed before the creation of
the universe of which they are the conditions. They are created
by God together with the world of which they are the conditions.
What Eriugena says in the Homily on the Prologue to St. John about
time, that it has not been made before but together with the world
(tempus non ante factum, non praelatum, sed concreatum) 38, can also
be said of place. Time and place precede the world only logically
(sola ratione) as a container precedes what is contained by it
not temporally : non spatiis temporum, sed sola ratione conditionis
praecesserint. 39
In Book V Eriugena devotes a special question to examining
the relation between time and place and the universe.40 As he
says, there are among catholic authorities two opinions on this
issue. Some say that time and place are not a part of the universe but external to it (non intra partes mundi, sed extra ipsius
universitatem). They argue that time and place cannot themselves
belong to the created world, as it is contained and circumscribed
by them. Besides, time and place are incorporeal beings ; they
should not be counted together with corporeal things. Others
comprehend time and place within the universe. They say that
time and space have been created together with all the rest that
is contained in the universe. For if time and space were before
the world, which has a temporal beginning, they would certainly
be eternal. And if they were eternal, they would be no different
from God himself or subsist as primordial causes in him. Eriugena rejects this view as stultissimum referring to Augustine who
said that nothing would be more stupid than to believe that there
was a place before the creation of the heaven and a time before
the creation (loca supra caelum and tempora ante mundum). Therefore, Eriugena concludes with Augustine that time and place originated together with the universe (simul cum mundo orta et coorta) ;
they neither precede it nor will continue to exist after its return

38

Vox spiritualis VII, 28-29 (SC 151 : 237).

Periphyseon 1.482B, CCCM 61 : 57 ll. 1718-9.
40 See Periphyseon 5.888B-889B, CCCM 65 : 41-42 ll. 1266-96 and, on this
same text, the excellent note 99 by Bertin (1995), 227-229.
39

maximus confessor and eriugena on place and time

311

to the creator at the end of times.41 From the development of the

argument it is clear that Eriugena here follows the second view,
which is explicitly attributed to Augustine. As to the first position, which he rejects, it seems to be Maximus view. Eriugena
even uses the phrase extra universitatem from his translation of
Maximus (which as I have attempted to show is incorrect). Does
this mean that Eriugena here makes a retractatio of his previous
position in Book I, in which he certainly followed Maximus ? One
may explain the apparent conflict between Eriugenas views in
Book I and in Book V by pointing to the two senses of place he
distinguishes, the definition of things and the spatiality that is
the condition of the extension of corporeal masses.42 Only when
place is understood in the latter sense, does it belong to the corporeal world and will disappear with it. When it is taken as the
definition of all things, however, it is not included in the world
but precedes it, coming forth from the mind of the creator, and
eternally remains in the divine mind. Eriugena has no problems
in accepting that the rational principles of place and time are in
the mind of the creator, and he attributes this view even to the
second opinion forwarded by Augustine.43 It is interesting to see
that already in the first book, when he is defending with Maximus
the priority of time and place over the universe, he appeals to the
authority of Augustine and thus sees no conflict between his two
authorities. Eriugena refers to the conclusion of De musica, where
Augustine proposes the ultimate explanation of the harmonic
order of the universe.
For the number of places and times, as St. Augustine says in chapter six of De musica, precedes all things that are in them : for the
mode, that is, measure, of all things that are created, naturally
precedes in reason (ratione) their creation ; and this mode and measure of each is called place, and so is it. Similarly, the beginning

41

See Augustine, De civ. Dei XI, 5. Eriugena refers to this authority also
in Periphyseon 2.558BC (CCCM 162 : 44 ll. 1036-1038) and in his homily Vox
spiritualis VII.
42 See Bertin (1995), 227-229.
43 Periphyseon 5.888B, CCCM 165 : 41 ll. 1280-2 : rationes siquidem locorum et temporum, priusquam in mundo crearentur, in verbo dei, in quo facta
sunt omnia, praecesserunt.

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and the start of birth is conceived prior to everything which is
born and has a beginning.44

The order of this universe as a spatial corporeal reality depends

upon the locales numeros (1) expressed in it. But that spatial numeric order is again dependent upon the harmonic order of the temporal numbers (2) governing the movements of planets and stars.
Superior to it is the order of life, whose movement is not itself
ordered by temporal measures, but produces by its psychic movement the numbers (3) governing the temporal intervals. Finally
there are the intelligible numbers in the divine mind (4). Eriugena learns from this Augustinian speculation that the numbers
or measures or rational principles of place and of time precede
by reason the spatial and temporal universe that is measured by
them. This means in his view that at the end space and time will
return to their eternal causes.45 In that way Augustine is made
concordant with Maximus view.46
Time and place are thus conditions of the created universe as
it now exists. These conditions will disappear after the return of
the universe to its creator at the end of time, or rather return to
their primordial causes. There will be no more time and no more
place, as there was no time and place before the creation of the
world. The Greek phrase may therefore not be
taken in an absolute sense as if these were the necessary conditions for whatever comes to exist. They are only conditions for
the existence of the world as long as it exists as a finite, created
world and will also disappear together with the world to which
they belong. The teacher thus warns his disciple not to take the
phrase sine quibus non in a strict sense as referring to absolute
conditions of existence.
Regarding the fact that the Greeks call these two parts of the
world, I mean place and time, (that is, [the parts] with44

See Periphyseon 1.482B-C, CCCM 161 : 56-57 ll. 1707-15.

See Periphyseon 5.970D, CCCM 165 : 155 ll. 5026-9 : Nam et ipsa loca et
tempora cum omnibus, quae in eis adhuc in hac vita ordinantur et mouentur
et circumscribuntur, in suas aeternas rationes redire necesse est.
46 I do not agree with Marenbon (1981), p. 86, n. 82 that Johns reference
to the primordial causes of space and time is a measure of his desperation
in trying to reconcile the irreconcilably different concepts of space and time
furnished by Maximus and Augustine.
45

maximus confessor and eriugena on place and time

313

out which the other parts cannot exist), I would definitely affirm
that this phrase only holds for them as long as that whole [sc. the
world] of which they are parts remains. When the world, however,
passes by, together with it also the meaning of this phrase will
become empty.47

If time and place are, however, the conditions sine quibus non
of the finite world, distinguishing it from its creator, Eriugenas
claim (non temere dixerim) that both will eventually disappear,
becomes a controversial one, since it seems to remove the distinction between the creator and the creature. When all things will
return to their eternal reasons, they will lack every local and
temporal limit.
For being infinite they will to infinity adhere in the Cause of all
things, which lacks all definition because it is infinite.48

As we will see, Augustine would never have subscribed to this

conclusion. Space may indeed disappear, but time will not.
4) According to Maximus there is no time without place, no place
without time. Both conditions are inseparably connected as the
conditions sine quibus non of the created universe. That the whole
creation is characterized by temporality is easy to admit, but how
could one understand that the whole creation is in place ? Bodies
certainly are both in time and situated in place, but what about
souls, angels and other incorporeal beings ? They are in time but
not in place. Eriugena raises this question explicitly in the fifth
book in connection with the question we discussed in the previous section. Is everything that moves temporally necessarily also
moved in place ?49

47 Periphyseon, 5.889D-890A, CCCM 165 : 43-44 ll. 1349-54 : Nam quod

graeci duas illas mundi partes, locum dico et tempus, (hoc est sine
quibus caeterae partes esse non possunt) appellant, tamdiu illud uocabulum
non temere dixerim in eis praeualere, quamdiu totum illud cuius partes sunt
permanserit. Eo uero transeunte, simul et illius uocabuli uirtus euacuabitur.
48 Periphyseon 1.483A, CCCM 65 : 57 ll. 1737-9 :
Causae enim omnium
rerum, quae omni caret circumscriptione quoniam infinita est, infiniti in
infinitum adhaerebunt.
49 Periphyseon 5.888D, CCCM 65 : 42 ll. 1296-7 : utrum omne quod mouetur
temporaliter necesse sit etiam localiter moueri ?

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On this issue Eriugena finds the authorities in the catholic tradition again in disagreement. That God is himself beyond time
and place is agreed by all, and neither is there any discussion on
corporeal beings which are and move both in time and place. But
it is questionable how to understand the motion of spiritual beings
like angels or souls. Some hold that they occur only in time without place, others insist that time and place are inseparably connected and that whatever moves in time is also situated in place,
and vice versa. The second position is clearly that of Maximus, as
we have seen. The first is held by Augustine. According to Augustine whatever is in place must be also moving in time, but not the
other way around. What is in time, is not necessarily in place, as
is proven by the example of the angels. Eriugena refers to a passage of De Genesi ad litteram VIII, XX, 39 : creator spiritus movet
sine tempore et loco ; creatus spiritus per tempus sine loco ; corpus per tempus et locum.50 We have thus the following gradation :
1. God is above time and place ; 2. the souls are in time but not
in place ; 3. bodies are in time and place. The angels, which are
purely spiritual beings, stand between God and souls. They share
in Gods eternity, Augustine says, when they are contemplating
sine loco et tempore ; but when they fulfil their tasks in the providential administration, they may themselves be moved in time
and could even move bodies in time and space without, however,
losing their contemplative attitude.51 That the measures of time
precede in the ontological order the measures of place is also what
we learned from the conclusion of De musica.52 The positions of
Maximus and Augustine seem difficult to reconcile and surprisingly Eriugena himself does not opt for one of the two : but what
of the two views should be held as most appropriate, it is not up

50 This authority is also quoted in Periphyseon 1.504C, CCCM 161 : 87

ll. 2681-4 ; 5.1000D, CCCM 65 : 196 ll. 6370-5 and in De praedestinatione
VIII.148-50, CCCM 50 : 53.
51 Augustines solution clearly stands in the Plotinian tradition, which he
may have known through Porphyry. See the notes on this of P. Agasse and
A. Solignac in their French translation of De Genesi ad litteram (Oeuvres de
saint Augustin 49, 1970, p. 514-516).
52 The question whether quando takes precedence over ubi or vice versa
was discussed by the ancient commentators on the categories : see Simplicius,
In Cat. 340,27-342,20.

maximus confessor and eriugena on place and time

315

to us to adjudicate.53 He leaves the question open ; after deliberation everybody can decide what position seems to be more reasonable. Later, however, in Book V he returns to the same question
referring again to the authority of Augustine in the De Genesi ad
litteram.
The context is now given by an interpretation of the biblical
narrative of the last judgment when Christ will come down on
the clouds of heaven (see Matth. 24 : 30).54 In Eriugenas views the
clouds stand here for the celestial substances, namely the angels.
But can the angels be said to move in place, coming down from
heaven ? Eriugenas view is different from Augustines as discussed
above : Eriugena claims that the angels only have a spiritual
movement without any temporal or local motion. Some people,
he says, might object that this denial of temporal movement in
angels goes against Augustines view who argued that only God
is sine loco et tempore, whereas the created spiritual beings are in
time but not in place. He agrees, but he defends his position by
following the authority of the Greeks, which ascertains without
a doubt that whatever is moved in place is also moved in time.
Therefore, whatever is without local motion must also be without
temporal motion. For both time and place will either be together
or be taken away together, as they are inseparable. Although at
first Eriugena had left the issue open, he now clearly takes position for Maximus contrary to Augustine.55
5) According to Maximus time and place characterize the very
being or ousia of created things ; it is what makes them finite
beings and distinct from the creator. At first Eriugena just seems
to adopt this view, when he says that every ousia created from
nothing is local and temporal ; local because it exists after some
manner as it cannot be infinite, temporal because it begins to be
what it was not before.56 However, the way he explains this the53

Periphyseon 5.889A-B, CCCM 65 : 42-43 ll. 1215-24.

Periphyseon 5.1000C-1001B, CCCM 65 : 196-97 ll. 6351-81.
55 At Periphyseon 5.6375-81 Jeauneau does not identify Eriugenas Greek
authority as Maximus, Ambig. VI. 1180B-C (CCSG 18 : ll. 1426-31).
56 Periphyseon 1.487A, CCCM 61 : 63 ll. 1913-6 : omnis enim C de nihilo
creata localis temporalisque est, localis quidem quia aliquo modo est quoniam infinita non est, temporalis uero quoniam inchoat esse quod non erat.
54

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sis is far different from what Maximus intended to say. In fact,

according to Eriugena the ousia never becomes itself subjected to
spatio-temporal conditions ; only in its accidental appearance does
it become spatial and temporal. As Eriugena repeatedly says, what
the ousia of a thing is remains unknown for human beings, who
only have access to it through sense perception. What Dionysius
said about the divine essence itself, that we only can know that
it exists, not what it is, must be said of every ousia. We can only
affirm that the ousia exists but, not knowing what it is in itself,
we can attempt to indicate what it is starting from its accidental
properties, such as quantity, quality, and primarily from its being
located in place and time. Place and time offer indeed the conditions for the appearance of the other accidental forms attached to
the ousia.
Therefore ousia is in no way defined as to what it is, but it is
defined that it is ; for from place and from time and from the other
accidents, which are understood to be either within it or outside
it, is given not what it is but only that it is.57

In fact, as Eriugena learns from Gregory of Nyssa, the sensible

bodies are not themselves substances, but made up from an aggregation of properties, which are in themselves incorporeal and intelligible, such as quantity and quality and time and place. In that
sense the ousia of things (with its triadic structure of essence, power
and act) never enters as such the spatio-temporal condition, but
remains eternally established in God himself. This means that
contrary to what Maximus said the ousia is as such never temporal and local ; it remains as ousia a primordial cause created by
God but also identical with God in his Word : created and creative.
Summarizing the Aristotelian doctrine after the long and
detailed discussion of each of the ten categories, the disciple
clearly distinguishes ousia or substance from the nine accidental
genera. The ousiai do not require anything in order to exist ; on
the contrary, they have been established by the Creator as the
immutable foundations of all things. In their trinitarian struc57 Periphyseon 1.497A, CCCM 61 : 63 ll. 1917-20 : C itaque nullo modo
diffinitur quid est, sed diffinitur quia est. Ex loco nanque, ut diximus, et
tempore accidentibusque aliis, quae siue in ipsa seu extra intelliguntur esse,
tantummodo datur non quid sit sed quia est.

maximus confessor and eriugena on place and time

317

ture they even resemble the divinity. Therefore, the substances

do not themselves fall under the spatial-temporal conditions which
the Greeks call .
For the fact that place and time are called by the Greeks ,
that is, without which the other things cannot exist, should not
be understood as meaning that the above mentioned substantial trinity [sc. essence, power, act] is to be counted among the
things which cannot subsist without place and time ; for it does
not require the aid of place and time to subsist since it exists by
itself by the excellence of its own creation before and above place
and time. 58

A daring conclusion, which goes far beyond what Maximus said.

The ousia of all things never becomes itself temporalized and localised and thus never becomes itself finite.59 The spatio-temporal
conditions only concern the accidental appearances of the substances on the level of what is created. Here again we have to admit
that for Eriugena God and creation are ultimately the same reality. This will be definitely so at the return of all things when
there will be not more appearances in time and space.
bibliography of secondary literatur
Bertin (1995), Francis Bertin, (transl.), Jean Scot Erigne. De la division
de la nature. Periphyseon. Livre I-II, Paris.
Courtine (1980) = J.-F. Courtine, La dimension spatio-temporelle dans
la problmatique catgoriale du De divisione naturae de Jean
Scot Erigne, in Les Etudes philosophiques 3, 343-367.
Cristiani (1973) = Marta Cristiani, Lo spazio e il tempo nellopera
dellEriugena, in Studi Medievali, 3a Serie XIV, I, (1973) : 39-136.
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