MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. X, NO.

4, WINTER 2003

TESTING THE SAUDI WILL TO POWER:

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING PRINCE ABDALLAH
Joseph A. Kechichian
Dr. Kechichian is the author of Succession in Saudi Arabia (New York:
Palgrave, 2001) and (Beirut and London: Dar Al Saqi, 2002 [in Arabic]);
and co-author, with R. Hrair Dekmejian, of The Just Prince: A Manual of
Leadership (London: Saqi Books, 2003), which includes a full translation
of the Sulwan al-Muta by Muhammad Ibn Zafar al-Siqilli.

f the Al Saud faced the wrath of

extremist elements in November
1979, when the Makkah Mosque was
occupied for three long weeks by
hundreds of neo-Ikhwan supporters, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia faced a double
rage in 2003. Riyadh confronted the fury
of Western authorities in the aftermath of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
American soil and, after the May 12, 2003,
terrorist bombings, the vengeance of
radical Islamists at home. Although
surrounded by a very large retinue, the heir
apparent and regent, Abdallah bin Abd alAziz, faced these challenges more or less
alone. Epoch-making changes have
unfolded on his watch, and how he
guides them will probably mark the fate
of the kingdom and the Al Saud for at least
a generation. What confronts the affable
Abdallah, much like what faced his halfbrother the late King Faysal bin Abd alAziz in the early 1960s, is a test of will.
How he responds to accusations that Saudi
Arabia supported terrorist activities
throughout the Muslim world and how

successfully he introduces sorely needed

sociopolitical reforms, will surely shape the
kingdoms immediate future. Yet, much
like his older brother, who saved the Al
Saud dynasty in 1964, Abdallah may well
restore the ruling familys tarnished image
in the West as well as reinstate its influence throughout the Muslim world.1
THE 9/11 WRATH
According to the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), 15 of the hijackers
believed to have taken part in the coordinated suicide missions on September 11,
2001, were Saudi nationals. This claim
was quickly disputed by Interior Minister
Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, and at least two
Saudis whose names were on the FBIs
initial terrorist tally sheets received official
apologies from Washington. Others were
less fortunate because undeniable facts
pointing to the active participation of
several Saudi nationals soon emerged.
Dozens were held and questioned for long
periods of time, even if the main designated
culprit, Osama bin Laden (who was

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stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 1994),

was unaccounted for in late 2003. The
relentless bombardment of Afghanistan
from October 7, 2001, onwards may well
have dismantled bin Ladens al-Qaeda
network, but it failed to produce the hermit
or the Taliban regimes self-declared
leader, Mullah Omar. Likewise, the
American decision to remove the Baathist
regime in Baghdad, allegedly because Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
represented an imminent threat to the
security of the United States (as well as to
that of its junior partner, Britain), added
pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow the
American-British logic, even if conclusive evidence was lacking several months
after Saddam Hussein was toppled on
March 9, 2003.
For much of the past two years, senior
U.S. officials have voiced their general
displeasure with Saudi Arabia, even if most
were aware of how critical the kingdom
remained to U.S. national security. Simply
stated, Riyadh controls 25 percent of the
worlds proven oil reserves, a truism that
did not alter the undeniable fact that U.S.Saudi relations were severely bruised
because of the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. The kingdoms
reputation was further damaged after a
U.S. Congressional Report implied that
Riyadh played a role in the attacks.2
Washington deleted a substantial section
detailing alleged Saudi complicity, and,
while Riyadh made a bid to have these
sections made public, it was unsuccessful.
In fact, it is now clear that no amount of
diplomatic finesse will likely eliminate the
mistrust on either side that, unless carefully
managed, could generate new clashes.
Although U.S. government officials
measured their criticisms of Saudi Arabia,

its Wahhabi creed and Islam in general,

gratuitous remarks abounded in the media
and the instant-analysis industry.
Laurent Murawiec, a RAND Corporation analyst specializing in the kingdom,
briefed the powerful Defense Policy Board
at the Pentagon in July 2002, describing
Saudi Arabia as the kernel of evil, the
prime mover, the most dangerous opponent in the Middle East.3 Murawiec
labeled Saudi Arabia an enemy of the
United States and reportedly argued in his
briefing that the United States should
demand Riyadh end all funding of fundamentalist groups, stop all anti-U.S. and
anti-Israeli statements in the kingdom, and
prosecute or isolate those involved in the
terror chain, including in the Saudi intelligence services. If the Saudis refused to
comply, the briefing emphasized, Saudi oil
fields and overseas financial assets should
be targeted, although specifics were not
outlined. The Saudis, maintained the
analyst, were active at every level of the
terror chain and, clearly, needed to be
reminded of their limitations.4
Others identified the kingdoms religious beliefs as defective, going so far as
to declare that Wahhabism has been a
movement of total intolerance toward those
who did not adopt its principles, including
other Muslims.5 For Americans who
considered Saudi Arabia as Washingtons
anchor in the Arab Middle East [that]
banked our oil under its sand, a frontal
assault was necessary to tame Saudis who
had strayed.6 Instantaneously, the primary
focus centered on the kingdoms education
system, which purportedly taught nothing
but hatred, especially hatred of the United
States.7 When religion and education were
discussed in tandem, the resulting assessments bordered on the highly subjective, a

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litany of emotional sermons.8

The sum total of such negative publicity fundamentally altered American public
opinion of the kingdom. On February 26,
2002, The Washington Post reported that
54 percent of Americans viewed Saudi
Arabia as a state supporting terrorism,
compared with a mere 35 percent who had
a similar perception of Syria, a country long
on the State Departments Terrorism
List.9 This general view remained
constant for the balance of the year and,
after the spring 2003 American-British war
on Iraq, anti-Saudi perceptions solidified.10
A less charitable British commentator
predicted a total collapse of the longstanding relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia, as gloom and
doom forecasts dominated media as well
as scholarly outlets.11
THE WRATH OF MAY 12, 2003
Then on May 12, 2003, powerful
bombs ripped through three foreign compounds in Riyadh, killing 34 people, including eight Americans, along with 9 attackers. Another 194 people were wounded.
The terrorist bombings stung senior Saudi
officials, as most were criticized for doing
little to combat militancy in the kingdom
and throughout the Muslim world. After
this tragedy, Saudi officials displayed
unusual openness and determination to
confront extremist militants. Saudi Arabia
must deal with the fact it has terrorists
inside its own country, White House
spokesman Ari Fleischer declared.12
Cautious Saudi commentators and officials
quickly concluded that radical elements
represented as much of a threat to Saudi
Arabia as to the United States. Heir
Apparent Abdallah went on national
television vowing to confront the murder-

ous criminals and their supporters behind

the attacks, a very bold statement that
expanded the circle by taking on the
militants sympathizers. He pledged to
remain vigilant about security and to
confront and destroy the threat posed by a
deviant few.13 In fact, Saudi newspapers,
which are government controlled even if
privately owned, carried editorials using
unusually harsh language. Most lashed out
at extremists who, they posited, used
religion to rally misguided and mostly
unemployed youths to carry out suicide
attacks.14
Within a few days, Saudi Arabia linked
a 19-member al-Qaeda team to the carnage, as a direct connection was made
between these latest attacks and a May 6,
2003, gunfight between police and alQaeda operatives in the same part of
Riyadh. According to Saudi authorities, the
19 who escaped included 17 of its nationals, a Yemeni, and an Iraqi with dual
Kuwaiti and Canadian citizenship. Interior
Minister Nayif declared that they were
believed to take orders directly from
Osama bin Laden.15 Speaking to the daily
Ukaz, Nayif did not rule out the possibility
of more attacks: We must not sit back
and say this will not happen, he said.
This is life, and incidents occur in every
country and we are in a period of anxiety
and terror acts. The kingdom is one of the
countries being targeted.16
By late 2003, Riyadh successfully
apprehended most of those on its initial list
of al-Qaeda suspects, and then some.
Dozens were hunted down and hundreds
were arrested. Heir apparent Abdallahs
pledge that he would go after terrorists
with a vengeance, proved true. Various
sweeps in Riyadh but also in Makkah,
Madinah, Abha and elsewhere throughout

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KECHICHIAN: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING PRINCE ABDALLAH

the kingdom netted potential terrorists who

stood accused of collaborating with alQaeda. Equally important, several hundred
clerics were fired from their highly visible
posts and, according to an official spokesman, Riyadh actually suspended many
preachers for allegedly promoting hatred
and intolerance.17
WHAT AILED THE KINGDOM
The firing of several hundred clerics
from their state-appointed posts and the
retraining of many others in special
religious schools illustrated what ailed the
kingdom. Indeed, much of what hurt Saudi
society may well be traced to its complex
socioeconomic makeup and the myriad
problems it has helped create since 1932.18
Although the Al Saud did not face an
imminent risk of instability, they entered the
twenty-first century in the midst of significant political, social, economic and military
transitions.
Political transitions
The most critical internal transition
facing the Al Saud in 2003 was the question of who might succeed a frail King
Fahd. In fact, Riyadh was likely to have a
non-Sudayri at the helm, in the person of
Heir Apparent Abdallah. That is, a son of
King Abdul Aziz whose mother was not a
member of the Sudayri family. Almost
inevitably, this has raised a succession
question among policy makers, focusing
attention on how the Saudi regime might
change under his rule and whether there
might be significant shifts in Saudi foreign
and domestic policies. Irrespective of how
this transition develops, Abdallahs accession to the throne seems assured (assuming
good health), even if the number-two post
promised to Defense Minister Sultan bin

Abd al-Aziz has not been etched in stone.

Questions of this forthcoming succession
aside, Saudi Arabia could face a political
crisis, once the winnowing of senior Al
Saud family members accelerates.19
Abdallah, who assumed authority to
run the day-to-day affairs of the kingdom
in December 1995, when King Fahd bin
Abd al-Aziz suffered a debilitating stroke,
was sensitive to this central question.
Although he became regent in 2000, the
heir apparent probably represents a
minority voice within the ruling family.
Defense Minister Sultan and several of his
full brothers, the so-called Sudayris, tend to
be far more conservative. They also reject
any changes in the alliance that stands at
the center of the familys legitimacy in the
eyes of the religious establishment. It may
thus be safe to assume that while Fahd is
alive, even if barely, Abdallah cannot rely
on the full complement of brotherly support
that he desperately needs to solidify his
position. Needless to say, such support is
critical if one is simultaneously to accede to
rulership, win a war against terrorism, and
no small feat introduce social, economic and political reforms.
Another important transition was
earmarked for the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), which was enlarged to 120
members at the end of May 2001, as it was
called upon to offer genuine advice rather
than rubber stamp government policy.
Observers of the kingdoms political scene
perceived the expanded Council as a way
for technocrats to enter government
service rather than act as real parliamentarians.20 Nevertheless, Riyadh sought to
empower the institution, even if it hesitated.
We need political reform first of all.
Parliament has to have the right to hold
government to account, insisted Talal bin

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Abd al-Aziz, a half-brother of the custodian

of the two holy mosques, to Reuters in
early July 2003.21
Talal, never the shy royal, went even
further in his assessment of what ailed the
kingdom. So far the intellectuals agree on
the unity of the Kingdom, that we should
have an Islamic Shariah law but an
enlightened version, and that we retain the
royal family but with reform. These were
powerful words that could only be voiced
after being vetted with the countrys senior
leaders. What Talal and, through him, Heir
Apparent Abdallah were clearly seeking
was to curtail the immense power of the
religious establishment. Moreover, what
the regent sought was to institute substantial reforms to overcome whatever political
problems Saudi society may have to face,
including terrorism, to ensure Al Saud rule.
Talal was specific in his criticism of the
religious police, and he called on the
government to rein in the Committee for
the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of
Vice, known as the mutawwain or enforcers, a semi-independent institution
created and supervised by the ruling family.
According to this logic, the enforcers
would no longer have free license to arrest
at will but would be accountable to the
police. If, clarified Talal, enforcers of
public morality see violations, it is not they
who should take action; they should just tell
the police.22 Few Saudis and even fewer
members of the Al Saud had ever spoken
with such clarity of purpose on a topic this
sensitive.
The call to further institutionalize
religious activities was not limited to
members of the ruling family. Shaykh Abd
al-Aziz bin Abdallah Al Shaykh, the
kingdoms grand mufti and chairman of the
Council of Senior Ulama [religious schol-

ars], declared in May 2003 that terrorism

ha[d] nothing to do with Islam [and that]
Islam should not be blamed for the acts of
other people. People, underscored the
learned scholar, should be held responsible
individually for their own acts. In August
2003, Al Shaykh cautioned believers to
abandon extremism and fanaticism, emphasizing that Muslims must understand that
the path of reform never comes through
violence. Islam is not a religion of violence. It is a religion of mercy for everyone.23 Speaking in Makkah in early
September 2003, he further indicated that
Friday sermons should address the interests of the entire Muslim community.24 For
his part, the minister of Islamic Endowments, Dawa, Awqaf and Guidance
Affairs, Shaykh Salih bin Abd al-Aziz Al
Shaykh, cautioned Saudi youth to remain
vigilant about religious and political deviations. Shaykh Salih called on Saudis to
oppose hatred in all its forms and pledged
to allocate a larger portion of his ministrys
resources to programs that will propagate
truth.25
Needless to say, such a global perspective required coordination and, more
important, cooperation among religious
authorities, who would have to accept a
certain degree of uniformity. Yet, and it
may be worth underscoring, the kingdoms
religious figures would neither utter such
declarations nor embark on radical approaches were it not for the heir apparents
specific instructions. In fact, Abdallahs
outlook on religious tolerance was changing
so quickly that, at the end of his historic
September 2003 visit to Russia, he called
on Muslims and Christians in that country
to preserve social harmony. Receiving
members of the Russian Orthodox Church,
he forcefully declared that Russians were

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capable of opposing evil that sought to

separate or harm their respective religions.26 At a time when Saudis were
accused of doing little to promote concord
among various religious communities,
Abdallah was certain that Russian Muslims
and Christians were capable of preventing
divisions. Although this statement was
meant to be supportive of Russias estimated 20 million Muslims, it also reflected
the heir apparents desire for tolerance
among all believers. By making such a
statement in Moscow, Abdallah further
cautioned radical Islamists at home,
insisting that extremism and intolerance
would not be condoned.
Economic transitions
Abdallah faced equally daunting
challenges on the economic front that preoccupied him far more than generally
assumed. He realized that the kingdoms
estimated 30-percent unemployment rate
stood as a stark reminder of past failures.
Unless major economic reforms were
implemented, and sooner than many
wished, Riyadh could not hope to emerge
out of its sociopolitical doldrums.
In 1973, before the beginning of the
infamous oil boom, Saudi Arabia had a
population of roughly 6.8 million. It grew
to 15.8 million by 1990 and 22 million by
2000. It is currently projected to reach
25.8 million in 2005 and over 30 million in
2010. At an annual growth rate of 3.7
percent, the Saudi population will have
nearly doubled between 1990 and 2010.
The World Bank forecasts that Saudi
Arabias population will grow by about 3.3
percent per year over the next few years.
As a result, even conservative estimates
project a total Saudi population approaching
30 million in 2010. This will add substantial

pressures on Riyadh.27 What the kingdoms

demographic data clearly illustrate is that
Saudi Arabia is a very young country ruled
by old men. Abdallah, who is 80, must
therefore rule with a young heart if he is to
address the concerns of his people.
Similarly, in 1973, Riyadhs gross
domestic product (GDP) stood at less than
100 billion riyals (approximately $35 billion),
and per capita income was less than
$2,500. The economy was largely rural
and pre-industrial. By 2002, however, the
Saudi GDP rose to 700 billion riyals (approximately $200 billion) with per capita
income hovering around $9,000 (having
peaked at $15,000 in 1981). These figures
indicated that a largely agricultural entity
had slowly become a heavily urbanized
welfare state with a significant service
sector. Yet, because of dramatic transitions, Saudi Arabia faced a critical threat to
the welfare state it created after 1974,
especially because the anticipated population growth was not matched by liberalized
economic policies. Clearly, oil income
alone would not and will not offset a
steady drop in per capita income, as
Riyadh encourages rapid diversification
and prepares for the day when many
subsidies, a significant drain on its unbalanced budgets, are permanently removed.28
To some extent, these changes explained why Heir Apparent Abdallah
continued his efforts to seek major reforms
in the Saudi economy, to reduce dependence on foreign labor, encourage private
domestic and foreign investment, and open
up the nations economy to help make it
globally competitive (as well as qualify for
membership in the World Trade Organization). In fact, the need for substantial
foreign investment, especially in the oil and

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gas industries, was deemed a priority.

Towards that end, Abdallah invited leading
oil-industry titans to return to the kingdom,
even if no agreement had been reached by
the fall of 2003.29 The heir apparent
understood that Saudi Arabia remained far
too heavily dependent on oil revenues (for
around 90 percent of total export earnings,
about 70 percent of state revenues and 40
percent of GDP), despite repeated attempts to diversify. Still, without high oil
prices, Riyadh was poised to face budget
and investment problems, the major
challenge on this front being whether
Abdallah could fund both entitlements and
development programs simultaneously.30
Military transitions
The kingdoms military transition was
even more complicated. Despite large
defense expenditures and vast programs to
absorb Western military hardware, the
Saudi military remained relatively weak
against its opponents, chiefly because
Riyadh lacked the minimum manpower
required to defend Saudi Arabia. Pressure
on the Al Saud to form a capable fighting
force increased after the 1991 war for
Kuwait, not only because of the countrys
small population base, but also because
able-bodied Saudi men have in large part
stayed outside the military, essentially to
manage businesses. To compensate for
chronic manpower shortages among the
kingdoms population, the Al Saud have
now opened military service to various
tribal elements, in order to maintain the
armed forces at a reasonable level. Tribal
and cultural aversions, combined with a
lack of technical education, have severely
limited Riyadhs ability to raise an efficient
force, one capable of using its sophisticated
weapons without massive and unabated

outside assistance. In this instance as well,

Heir Apparent Abdallah encouraged a
different approach.31
If the Al Saud mistrusted their military
before 1990, the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait and the 2003 war in Iraq
have dramatically altered their assessments. Although Riyadh spent some $18 to
$22 billion annually on defense during the
past decade, new financial austerity
measures were implemented after 2000.
To be sure, Saudi Arabia signed new arms
agreements, but these paled in comparison
to what was purchased earlier.32 What
preoccupied Al Saud officials in 2003 were
the preparedness levels of many units
rather than the latest sophisticated equipment. Even the Royal Saudi Air Force,
certainly the crown jewel of the Saudi
military, faced austerity measures.33
Abdallah insisted that the military
prove itself and, in so far as it may be
possible, rely less on outsiders for training
and maintenance. The heir apparent
maintained the longstanding cooperation
accords with the United States, which
allowed the latters Special Operations
Forces to operate out of key Saudi bases
during the attack on Iraq but simultaneously welcomed Washington s decision
to redeploy a U.S. Air Force Wing out of
Sultan Air Base at Al Kharj in the summer
of 2003.34 Abdallah understood that his
will and massive military expenditures
notwithstanding, such austerity measures
were absolutely necessary, as he concentrated on internal and regional disturbances.
THE DOMESTIC WAR ON
TERRORISM
Critics of the heir apparent view his
pledges and limited actions to date with

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skepticism. Many have concluded that

Abdallah is window dressing and that there
is little substance to his promises. Yet
significant changes have already taken
place, and, while hardened perceptions are
difficult to dissipate, the desire to reform
while conducting a full-fledged war on
terrorism is genuine. To be sure, some
diehard Al Saud members may have little
interest in introducing modernizing features,
but the regent has probably crossed the
Rubicon. There is no going back, even if
Abdallah knows all too well that there are
few liberals throughout the kingdom that
stand ready to support him in his many
endeavors.
Internally, Riyadh now faces the
prospect of sustained turbulence, even if
not all of the countrys difficulties are
socioeconomic. As the demographic bulge
cited above illustrates, half of the population (which is under the age of 15) will
continue to demand increasing political
accountability. Moreover, opposition
groups link Al Saud policies on the domestic front with Saudi Arabias standing at the
international level. Within the Arab world,
Riyadh is criticized for paying lip service to
the core concern of Palestine and, within
the world at large, for kowtowing to
American policies. The regents declaration of war on terrorism must, therefore, be
assessed within these parameters. At
stake is Al Saud rule itself.
Although the tragedy of September 11,
2001, dramatically altered Abdallahs
perceptions of the war on terrorism, the
fact remained that the Bush administration
had squandered several peacemaking
opportunities during its first year in office.
At the height of the Palestinian intifada
Abdallah was dismayed by how callous the
new president was towards the Palestin-

ians. According to The Washington Post,

the regent drafted a 25-page letter to
President George W. Bush in late August
2001, in which he vociferously complained
about U.S. policy on Israel. Abdallah
noted that repeated American vetoes at the
U.N. Security Council illustrated this
bias.35 In fact, Arab and especially Saudi
perceptions were so negative that the heir
apparent turned down an invitation to visit
Washington in June 2001. Interior Minister
Nayif, for his part, regretted that Washington came at the top of the list of countries
that have an unfair stance as regards the
cause of the Arabs and the Palestinians in
particular.36
Whether the letter and such comments
were meant to assuage a growing antiAmerican sentiment throughout the Arab
world in fact, throughout the Muslim
world was difficult to determine.37 What
was irrefutable, however, was Heir Apparent Abdallahs frustration with U.S. Middle
East policy. When Abdallah turned down
the invitation to visit Washington, he
announced that Riyadh must abide by
principled stands on behalf of Palestinians.
He voiced his bewilderment at international
inaction while visiting several European
capitals. He insisted that Israeli violence
was a kind of state terrorism, highlighting
the dangers associated with Israels
aggressive retaliatory measures, along with
confiscating land, building settlements and
laying economic siege to an entire captive
population. The heir apparent called for a
more balanced U.S. position to better
protect vital American interests throughout
the region.38 Riyadhs unrelenting criticism
of Washington necessitated an intervention
by George H.W. Bush (who nurtured
special contacts with senior Al Saud
figures during his own political career).

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The former president telephoned Abdallah

in June 2001 to reassure the Saudi that his
son was going to do the right thing. He
reportedly confided to Abdallah that his
sons heart was in the right place as far
as the conflict between the Palestinians
and Israel was concerned.39
Such assurances notwithstanding, Al
Saud rulers were not overjoyed by the U.S.
decision to limit its direct involvement in the
peace process, as Washington argued that
it was up to the two parties to resolve longstanding differences. It may well be that
Abdallah then took the decision, before
September 11, 2001, to reduce the U.S.
military presence in Saudi Arabia. In other
words, Abdallah had to contend with
growing anti-U.S. sentiment across the
kingdom, directly related to developments
elsewhere in the Middle East. While the
Al Saud have never allowed the ArabIsraeli conflict to infringe on their special
relationship with successive American
administrations, Abdallah and several other
senior ruling-family members were finally
reconsidering whether existing strategic
ties could proceed as in the past.
Saudi Arabia then embarked on a
major peace initiative to collectively commit
the entire Arab world to normalizing
relations with Israel in exchange for the
establishment of an independent Palestinian
state. It was probably designed with full
American blessings.40 The fanfare that
preceded the plans formal unveiling at the
League of Arab States Beirut Summit
bordered on the comical.41 It was entirely
possible that the United States sought Saudi
assistance through the kingdoms religious clout within the larger Muslim world
to advocate an acceptance of Israel.
Riyadh, for its part, was eager to ingratiate
itself with Washington in a full-fledged

rehabilitation effort. Yet, although the Saudi

plan was unanimously adopted by the
League on March 28, 2002, Israeli conditions ensured its premature death.42
When, a few months later, Washington
turned to its latest peace initiative, the socalled Roadmap (which was also derailed),
Saudi Arabias role was significantly
marginalized. Although Abdallah s initiative
flopped, the heir apparent had taken a
calculated risk in Beirut when he promoted
inter-Arab reconciliation, including a thaw
in Iraqi-Kuwaiti and Iraqi-Saudi ties.
These significant measures were
followed by a major rapprochement effort
with the Bush administration in April 2002.
The Saudi regent visited Crawford, Texas,
where he confided his personal views on
the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on terrorism. He
pleaded for action on the Palestinian-Israeli
front and promised to muzzle radical
Islamists in the kingdom. By all accounts,
the meetings were fairly blunt and did not
go as well as many anticipated. The two
determined men stood their ground.43
Riyadh then took several practical
steps to address intrinsic internal problems
ranging from measures to prevent money
laundering to ordering banks and other
financial institutions to strictly monitor any
large transactions. Against a plethora of
evidence, Friday sermons throughout the
kingdoms mosques stressed the need to
combat terrorism, offering support to the
coalition to defeat Osama bin Ladens alQaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The Iraq situation was more delicate, as it
necessitated a sophisticated response. In
fact, Saudi officials went out of their way
to differentiate between Iraq and the
Baathist regime. They opposed Saddam
Hussein but strongly objected to the

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economic sanctions that were strangling a

hapless population. Equally important,
Saudi and Gulf leaders were like their
own residents exposed to television
reports from Iraq that displayed the
horrible impact that sanctions had visited
on the Iraqi public.44 Consequently, the
flood of anti-American sentiment increased; pro-American Saudi elites were
not able to stem the tide.
Throughout the kingdom, sermons
routinely raised these critical nuances.
Even if some preachers warned against
unmeasured responses, radical clerics
routinely issued critical statements on the
American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Abdallah, for his part, knew that his
decision to crack down on Islamists would
actually increase their popularity within the
kingdom.45 Even before the polarizing
debate over Iraq, leading Saudi clerics
openly challenged Riyadh to distance itself
from the West in general and the United
States in particular. Shaykh Hammud AlShuaybi of Burayda, for example, wrote
that helping the infidels against Muslims is
defecting from Islam, and that whoever
helps America and its fellow infidels
against our brothers in Afghanistan is an
apostate.46 Another Saudi cleric, Shaykh
Abd al-Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbu, penned a
fiery pamphlet that concluded that Osama
bin Laden was Muhammad bin Abd alWahhabs natural inheritor.47 This was a
clear affront to the Al Saud.
Not surprisingly, and in the aftermath
of the American-British attacks on Iraq,
the fiery radical Islamist message increased once again, escalating into armed
confrontation. By the time the May 12,
2003, terrorist attacks hit the capital,
Riyadh was embarked on a full-fledged
internal war against radical Islamists.

These facts, as well as the overall

criticism of the ruling family, riled the Saudi
government because they struck at the
very heart of its claim to legitimacy.
Moreover, such arguments echoed Osama
bin Ladens view of the ruling dynasty as
too doctrinaire, too corrupt and too unIslamic to rule. From an internal Saudi
perspective, what the suicide bombings
revealed was the extent to which some
Saudis were ready to defy the Al Saud,
especially in light of the latters discreet but
sustained support of the United States over
the years. The regents mission was and
is to conduct a war on terrorism without
appearing to conduct a war on religion.
Riyadh certainly favored a public distance
between its policies and American demands for more action. It was paramount
to ensure that anti-American criticisms did
not translate into anti-Al Saud measures.
CONCLUSION
Heir Apparent Abdallah faced several
key transitions in 2003. Within the region,
these challenges ranged from the removal
of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, a
major force in Gulf security, to Irans
welcome shift towards political moderation
and regional cooperation. While SaudiIraqi ties, which had deteriorated throughout 2001 and 2002 due to continued border
skirmishes, cannot but improve in the
future, diplomatic strains with the United
States have continued. Simply stated, the
United States is now a Gulf power that
shares a border with Saudi Arabia, a reality
that weighs heavily in Riyadh. In fact,
Washingtons regional footprint in Iraq and
throughout the Gulf region has changed
perceptions that many Saudis had of the
United States.
Likewise, while Saudi-Iranian ties

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. X, NO. 4, WINTER 2003

were also improving, Riyadh was wary of

Tehrans long-term political and military
capabilities. Iran no longer played the role
of a balancer in the Gulf (vis--vis Iraq)
but risked a confrontation with the United
States. Needless to say, such an outcome
was not in Saudi Arabias interest, as
Abdallah did not wish to drag the Gulf
region into a fourth war in less than two
decades.
If the Saudi heir apparent appreciated
Washingtons inclination to seek a just and
comprehensive peace, in Iraq, as in
Palestine after Mr. Bush vowed to support
the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state, Saudi Arabia remained
suspicions of U.S. motives.48 Abdallah
pledged to exert special effort to serve
security and stability in the region but
wondered whether Washington aimed
solely to entice Arabs and Muslims into
joining the campaign against terrorism. In
his mind, as in the minds of many Arab and
Muslim leaders, this duality was illustrated
with strong steps in Afghanistan or Iraq
and lukewarm, indeed reluctant, ones on
the Arab-Israeli front. Nevertheless, even
the Al Saud realized that the United States
could no longer distance itself too far from
obligations of its making, in Iraq for obvious
reasons, but also on the peace process,
because the Bush administration has
committed the United States to supporting
the principle of a Palestinian state.
Few doubt that Saudi relations with its
erstwhile staunch American ally are now in
dire straits. In fact, ties are so strained
that Prince Bandar bin Sultan, son of the
powerful defense minister and dean of the
diplomatic corps in Washington, because of
his long-established presence in the American capital, has sought advice from the
presidents father, as well as from Vice-

President Dick Cheney. These urgent

meetings were meant to halt the slide in
Washingtons confidence in Riyadh amid
concerns that some Saudis, including some
serving in the government, were linked to
terrorists who may have targeted the
United States. Prince Bandar left nothing
to chance. He flew to Kennebunkport,
Maine, in late August 2003, before going to
Wyoming to meet the vice-president, both
to show respect and to seek advice.49
These meetings followed a very strong
statement by Richard Armitage, the deputy
secretary of state, who declared that
terrorists attacking American troops in Iraq
were slipping across the border from
Saudi Arabia. Although Riyadh denied
the change, and called on the occupying
forces to seal their border, the Saudis were
dismayed that Armitage and other senior
American officials would place Saudi
Arabia on the same level with Iran and
Syria. Even if an official State Department
spokesman insisted that Armitages comments about the kingdom were overplayed and that the deputy secretary was
not trying to lump Saudi Arabia in the same
category as Iran, Bandars visits were
telling.50
To be sure, both Washington and
Riyadh have managed their numerous
differences with aplomb for over 50 years.
Whether Saudi Arabia, or for that matter
the United States, can afford to place the
Al Saud ruling family at risk will be a key
strategic question for both countries in
2004. Although some American and some
Saudi officials may be fed up with each
others policies, inevitable and tangible
progress in the Middle East peace process
can only help preserve long-term interests.
A modicum of evenhandedness will likely
accelerate the process and, equally impor-

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KECHICHIAN: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING PRINCE ABDALLAH

tant, allow Heir Apparent Abdallah to

introduce sorely needed economic and
political reforms to his kingdom.
For Abdallah is aware that serious
internal problems cannot be resolved by
fiat. Acknowledging the existence of
poverty in the kingdom, disparities between
rural areas and urban sprawls, rising
unemployment levels, intrinsic structural
weaknesses within the economy, as well as
unrepresentative government, all necessitated serious action. Much like his older
brother, King Faysal bin Abd al-Aziz, the
current regent took several key decisions
even if most were long overdue. In fact,
these were taken to address popular
demand and ensure that Al Saud rule was
preserved.
Towards that end, in the spring of
2003, Saudi Arabias first independent
human-rights organization was authorized.
It held its first major conference on Human Rights in Peace and War in midOctober 2003, when some 70 papers were
discussed.51 According to press reports, the
conference emphasized the need to adopt
common international standards for human
rights that respect all religions, cultures and
traditions. Significantly, one of the participants, Princess Hussa bint Salman, daughter of the powerful governor of Makkah,
addressed Saudi Arabias stand on human
rights and clarified several recent changes
in the law.52 Her participation as well as
her interventions revealed the importance
that the Al Saud have attached to this key
question.
Simultaneously, a National Dialogue
Panel as well as a 30-strong Saudi
Intellectual Dialogue group emerged. The
latter forwarded a series of recommendations to the heir apparent. They called on
him to widen freedom of expression,

broaden the decision-making process,

improve communication lines between
rulers and ruled, empower women, accept
intellectual diversity within society, and
balance economic and commercial development. They also asked the heir apparent
to confront extremism by differentiating
between terrorism and jihad, while paying
more attention to youth concerns. Finally,
they pleaded for an accelerated pace for
the implementation of ongoing reform
programs that recognize the impact of
regional and global situations.53 A tall order
indeed.
To his credit, Abdallah pushed through
the Saudi Cabinet a number of measures
that addressed several of these recommendations. In an earthshaking step, the Saudi
cabinet announced that it was contemplating elections to choose half of the members
of each of 14 municipal councils.54
Riyadh decided to widen participation of
citizens in running local affairs through
elections within one year.55 While longoverdue elections were perceived as a
beginning, an al-Watan columnist in Riyadh
hoped that they would lead to elections in
the Shura Council, in universities, and [in]
the right to form syndicates.56 Still,
Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal insisted
that Saudi leaders are not experimenters,
and that they are only seeking to do what is
the wish of the Saudi citizen.57
Another significant item, which could
only have been addressed with the heir
apparents full consent, was the Shura
Council debate on Saudi Arabias naturalization laws. Although the Council could
not reach a consensus, discussions were
taking place on relaxing citizenship laws for
foreigners, especially those who have lived
in the kingdom for ten years or more.58
The need to alter existing regulations,

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MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. X, NO. 4, WINTER 2003

including the much-despised sponsorship

(kafeel) system, was first raised in public
by Prince Abd al-Majeed bin Abd al-Aziz
Al Saud, the governor of Makkah. More
recently, Shura Council members weighed
how to change naturalization rules to
narrow geographical gaps and remove
differences based on gender, religion and
color.59
In national addresses, Heir Apparent
Abdallah referred to the need for such

genuine debates on a slew of key questions, including tolerance, national unity and
reform. As a listener willing and eager to
learn from ordinary citizens as well as from
intellectuals, Abdallah repeatedly insisted
that Riyadh would combat regional, tribal
and ideological discord. Much like his
brother, the late King Faysal bin Abd alAziz, the current heir apparent relished the
opportunity to confront the challenges that
tested his will.

For a discussion of the key 1979 Makkah mosque takeover, see Joseph A. Kechichian, Islamic Revivalism
and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybis Letters to the Saudi People, The Muslim World, Vol.
70, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 1-16; and, idem., The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The
Case of Saudi Arabia, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 1986, pp. 5371. For an analysis of the will to power in a contemporary setting, see idem., Saudi Arabias Will to Power,
Middle East Policy, Vol. 7, No. 2, February 2000, pp. 47-60.
2
S. Rept. No. 107- 351, 107th congress, 2d session and H. Rept. No. 107-792, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington,
DC: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, September 2003.
3
Thomas E. Ricks, Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies: Ultimatum Urged To Pentagon Board, The
Washington Post, August 6, 2002, p. A1.
4
Jack Shafer, The Power Point That Rocked the Pentagon: The La Rouche Defector whos Advising the
Defense Establishment on Saudi Arabia, August 7, 2002, published online by Slate at http://slate.msn.com/id/
2069119/.
5
Dore Gold, Hatreds Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Washington, DC:
Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2003), p. 12.
6
Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude (New York: Crown
Publishers, 2003), p. xxvii [emphasis added].
7
A carefully researched and analyzed study of the Saudi education system that debunks most of the instant
analysis arguments is available in Eleanor Abdella Doumato, Manning the Barricades: Islam According to
Saudi Arabias School Texts, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 230-47.
8
Many anti-Saudi reports are widely available on the Internet. For a more serious assessment, but still in the
same genre, see Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Saud from Tradition to Terror
(New York: Doubleday, 2002).
9
Saudis Seen As Supporting Terror, Poll Shows, The Washington Post, February 26, 2002, p. 19. The poll,
by the Institute for Jewish and Community Research, ranked Saudi Arabia ahead of both North Korea and
Syria as a supporter of international terrorism.
10
Lisa Beyer with Scott MacLeod, Saudi Arabia: Inside the Kingdom, Time, September 15, 2003,
pp. 38-51.
11
Paul Michael Wihbey, The End of the Affair, The Spectator, September 6, 2003, pp. 20-21.
12
Quoted in Donna Abu-Nasr, Saudis More Open About Recent Attacks, The Associated Press, May 15,
2003.
13
Press Release, Address to the Nation by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, Washington, DC:
Embassy of Saudi Arabia, May 13, 2003.
14
See, for example, Khalid al-Ghanami, Al-Insan wal-Watan Ahamun min Ibn Taymiyyah [The Human
Being and the Nation are More Important than Ibn Taymiyyah], Al-Watan, May 22, 2003, p. 6. Al-Watan,
which championed the anti-extremist cause, was mired in controversy and suffered significant setbacks when
1

112

KECHICHIAN: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING PRINCE ABDALLAH

its editor in chief, Jamal A. Khashoggi, was eventually muzzled. See Neil MacFarquhar, A Saudi Editor who
Offended Clerics is Ousted from His Post, The New York Times, May 28, 2003, p. A1. This setback
notwithstanding, the assault on extremists was ongoing. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, The Liberal Impulse in
Saudi Arabia, Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 3, Summer 2003, pp. 400-13.
15
Al-Qaidas Challenge, Mideast Mirror, May 14, 2003, section B.
16
Interview with Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz, Ukaz, May 14, 2003, p. 1.
17
Press Release, Statement by Adel Al-Jubeir, Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Crown Prince, Washington,
DC: Embassy of Saudi Arabia, June 12, 2003.
18
A discussion of how rapid changes associated with modernization inevitably imposes on traditional
societies is beyond the scope of this essay. For a fascinating discussion of how modernization literally altered
the conservative Saudi society, see the masterful trilogy by Abdelrahman Munif in Cities of Salt (New York:
Vintage International, 1989); The Trench (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), and Variations on Night and
Day (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).
19
Simon Henderson, After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia, policy paper number 37, 2nd edition,
Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995; and Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession
in Saudi Arabia (New York: Palgrave, 2001), especially pp. 5-9, 61-65.
20
Abdallah al-Fawzan, Exposing the Shura, Arab News, February 25, 2003.
21
Reuters, Political Reform Essential for Saudi Arabia, Says Prince Talal, Gulf News, September 13, 2003,
p. 15.
22
Ibid.
23
Press Release, Saudi Arabias Highest Religious Authority Warns Against the Dangers of Extremism,
Washington, DC: Embassy of Saudi Arabia, August 21, 2003.
24
Jamil al-Ziabi, Al Shaykh wal-Turki Yushadidan ala Ahamiyat al-Masajid [Al Shaykh and Al Turki
Underscore the Importance of Mosques], Al Hayat, Number 14772, September 3, 2003, p. 4.
25
Mustafa Shihab, Al Shaykh Yadu ila Muharabat al-Ghilu Bikul Ashkaliha [Al Shaykh Calls to Oppose
Hatred in all its Forms], Al Hayat, Number 14777, September 8, 2003, p. 4.
26
Raid Jabar, Al-Amir Abdallah: Al-Muslimun wal-Masihiyun Qadirun ala Dahadh Quwa al-Tafaruqat
[Prince Abdallah: Muslims and Christians Capable of Refuting Divisive Forces], Al Hayat, Number 14774,
September 5, 2003, pp. 1 and 6.
27
World Development Indicators, 2002, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002, p. 50.
28
Brad Bourland, The Saudi Economy at Mid-year 2002 (Riyadh: Saudi American Bank, August 2002),
pp. 2 and 32.
29
For an interesting take on decision making that led to the invitation, see Nawaf E. Obaid, The Oil Kingdom
at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 2000. For the latest roadblocks that prevented an agreement, see Oliver Klaus, Saudi Arabia:
Challenging Times, Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 47, No. 24, June 13, 2003, pp. 25-42. The Saudi
Supreme Petroleum Council announced a $2 billion agreement in principle with Shell-Total on November 2,
2003 for the development of a gas project. Press reports highlighted that this may well be the first of several
agreements. See Agence France Presse, Riyadh Okays Gas Deal with Shell-Total, Gulf News, November 3,
2003, p. 37.
30
Robert E. Looney, Saudi Arabia: Measures of Transition from a Rentier State, Iran, Iraq, and the Arab
Gulf States, Joseph A. Kechichian, ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 131-159.
31
Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International
Security Dimensions (Westport, CT and London: Praeger [published in cooperation with the Center for
Strategic and International Studies], Washington, DC, 2003), especially pp. 51-68.
32
For detailed yearly data, see ibid., pp. 71-86.
33
Ibid., pp. 203-235.
34
In addition to the U.S.A.F. air wing, Sultan Air Base housed a state-of-the-art command and control center
that was extensively used during the war for Afghanistan for most of 2001-2002. An updated facility was
created in neighboring Qatar from which American military officers conducted the war on Iraq. See Agence
France Presse, U.S. Military Presence in Al Kharj Ends, Gulf News, August 28, 2003, p. 12.
35
Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, Saudi Leaders Anger Revealed Shaky Ties, The Washington
Post, February 10, 2002, p. A1.

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Iran Attacks Iraq-based Rebels as Saudi Minister Meets Iraqi Dissident in Tehran, Mideast Mirror, April
19, 2001, Section B.
37
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, a number of research institutions have started to canvass Arab
public opinion with some regularity. The attempt to answer semi-prophetic questions of the why do they
hate us genre suddenly required attention as the need to know overwhelmed customary patterns of neglect.
Not surprisingly, available results were telling, even if consistently devastating to Americans. See, for
example, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, What the World Thinks in 2002 (Washington, DC: The Pew
Research Center for The People and The Press, December 2002); idem, Views of a Changing World (Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center for The People and The Press, June 2003). Pew researchers did not poll
in Saudi Arabia but they conducted detailed interviews in several Muslim countries. See Brian Knowlton, A
Rising Anti-American Tide, The International Herald Tribune, December 5, 2002, p. 6. When questioned
about such anti-American feelings, President George W. Bush replied: I hope the message that we fight not a
religion, but a group of fanatics which have hijacked a religion is getting through. . . . Well do everything we
can to remind people that weve never been a nation of conquerors; were a nation of liberators. See Richard
Morin, World Image of U.S. Declines, The Washington Post, December 5, 2002, p. A26. These assessments
did not resonate and, even more telling, the American position despite undeniable post-9/11 sympathy best
illustrated by the French daily Le Monde headline Nous Sommes Tous Americains [We Are All Americans]
many dismissed the cartography painted by senior American officials. For the majority of world public
opinion, dividing the world between good and evil was infantile or even comical. More recently, a study
commissioned by Congress, under the chairmanship of former Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, has concluded that the United States overlooks public diplomacy at its peril. See Report of the Advisory Group on
Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic
Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC: U.S. House of
Representatives, October 1, 2003). See also Sonni Efron, U.S. Advised to Invest in Its Image, The Los
Angeles Times, October 1, 2003, p. A8; and Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Must Counteract Image in Muslim
World, Panel Says, The New York Times, October 1, 2003.
38
Michael Jansen, Saudi Arabia: Displeasure with the U.S., Middle East International, No. 653, June 29,
2001, pp. 10-11.
39
Jane Perlez, Bush Senior, on His Sons Behalf, Reassures Saudi Leader, The New York Times, July 15,
2001, p. 6. See also Michael Jansen, Saudi Arabia: Pressure on the U.S., Middle East International, No.
655, July 27, 2001, pp. 12-13, and Reuters, Bush Senior Calls Saudi on Mideast Report, July 15, 2001.
40
Lamis Andoni, Saudi Arabia: The Princes Peace Plan, Middle East International, No. 670, March 8,
2002, pp. 8-10.
41
Thomas Friedman, a columnist for The New York Times, just happened to uncover the carefully designed
initiative during his interview with the heir apparent. See Thomas Friedman, Dear Arab League, The New
York Times, February 6, 2002, p. A21.
42
Israeli negotiators insisted that Riyadh use its full leverage to pressure Yasser Arafat to end the intifada and
called on Palestinian leaders to acquiesce to an annexation of certain settlement blocks. See Michael Jansen,
Arab Summit: Palestine and Iraq, Middle East International, No. 672, April 5, 2002, pp. 7-9.
43
America and the Arab World: A Delicate Balance, The Economist, 363:8271, May 4, 2002, pp. 27-28.
See also Caroline Montagu, Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince in U.S., Middle East International, No. 674, May
3, 2002, p. 17.
44
Many of these reports highlighted the social humiliation that Iraqis endured, including long lines at food
stores and disintegrating health services. Beggars emerged where the phenomenon was rare. Many Iraqis
were forced to sell household goods and more personal items, including books and in the Iraqi context this
represented a most visible sacrifice to purchase food. Saudis and others watched a relatively learned society
lose the intrinsic capability to function, blaming Western-imposed sanctions on what befell their Arab
brethren.
45
Radical Islamists became more popular since 2001, commanding the sympathy as well as support of the
masses and, as noted above, the so-called liberal campaign criticizing the kingdoms religious institutions
remained weak. Jamal Khashoggi, the influential editor of the daily Al-Watan, who wrote several articles
against religious authorities and criticized Wahhabi doctrine, was summarily dismissed after a senior cleric
issued a fatwa calling for a boycott of the newspaper. Khashoggi accepted an advisory post to Prince Turki
36

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KECHICHIAN: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING PRINCE ABDALLAH

al-Faysal who, in turn, was appointed ambassador to London.

46
Shaykh Al-Shuaybi, considered a learned scholar in the kingdom, was briefly imprisoned in 1995. In 2001,
he threatened to excommunicate the king and senior members of the ruling family, especially if the latter were
to support a military offensive against Afghanistan. What concerned the regent was the frequency with which
junior clerics, many of whom sympathized with Al-Shuaybi, were resorting to issuing their own religious
decrees, which turned the Al Saud into legitimate targets. See Nicolas Pelham, Saudi Clerics Issue Edicts
Against helping Infidels, The Christian Science Monitor, October 12, 2001, p. 4.
47
Abd al-Aziz bin Salih al-Jarbu, The Foundations of the Legality of the Destruction that Befell America, at
www.saaid.net/book/kotop.htm.
48
Although the Bush and Blair administrations argued Iraqs WMDs were the most compelling reason for the
United States and Britain to resort to war, in the summer of 2003, the emphasis changed. At first, Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz testified to congressional committees that the evil, dictatorial nature of
former president Saddam Husseins defunct government and the opportunity to turn Iraq into a beacon of
hope for the rest of the Middle East, were equally valid reasons to go to war. See Michael Dobbs,
Wolfowitz Shifts Rationales on Iraq War: With Weapons Unfound, Talk of Threat Gives Way to Rhetoric
on Hussein, Democracy, The Washington Post, September 12, 2003, p. A23. The logic of war shifted shortly
thereafter, when Mr. Wolfowitz maintained that the WMD issue was a bureaucratic fudge, and that the real
reason was Americas need to shift its military bases from Saudi Arabia. The nuance was not lost on Gulf
pundits. A particularly perceptive commentator opined that the world recognized what Washington refused
to admit, that this was not a war of liberation but a war of occupation. Iraqis understood this immediately,
which is why their relief at Saddams departure has not translated into a welcome for American troops. See
M. J. Akbar, Bush has run out of ideas, but he had only one to begin with, Gulf News (online Edition),
September 15, 2003.
49
Reuters, Amid Tensions, Saudi Envoy Meets Bushs Father, Gulf News, August 29, 2003, p. 16.
50
Ibid.
51
Raid Qusti, First Rights Conference in Kingdom, Arab News (online edition), October 14, 2003.
52
Raid Qusti, Conference Ends With Call to Stress Islams Protection of Human Rights, Arab News (online
edition), October 16, 2003; and Idem., Saudi Constitution Guarantees Human Rights, Arab News (online
edition), October 22, 2003.
53
In September 2003, 300 Saudis signed a petition, the third of the year, urging rulers to speed promised
reforms to ward off the influence of militant Islam in the Kingdom, The Associated Press. Saudi Arabia
Announces First Local Council Elections, but No Date, The New York Times, October 14, 2003.
54
Reuters, Saudi Announces Plans to Hold First Elections, The New York Times, October 13, 2003.
55
Isa Mubarak, Saudi Arabia Says it will Hold First Elections, The Washington Post, October 14, 2003,
p. A19.
56
Ibid.
57
Slobodan Lekic, AP Interview: Saudi Touts Vote as Reform, The Associated Press, October 14, 2003. A
day after Riyadh announced these anticipated elections, hundreds took to the streets in front of the AlMamlaka shopping mall in the capital city demanding political, economic and administrative reforms.
According to Saad al-Faqih, the spokesman for the London-based Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia
(MIRA), protesters called for the freedom of jailed activists. An estimated 300 protesters were arrested,
although the interior ministry reported 150 arrests. Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al Shaykh, the grand mufti,
condemned the demonstration as an act of anarchism, and urged protesters to obey the law [that bans
demonstrations]. See The Associated Press, Saudis Protest for More Freedoms, October 14, 2003; see also
Badr Almotawa, 150 Arrested During Demo: Naif, Arab News, October 16, 2003, p. 1.
58
Raid Qusti, No Consensus on Citizenship Rules for Foreigners, Arab News, October 27, 2003, p. 2. See
also Majlis al-Shura al-Saudi Yuajilu Iqrar Tadilat ala Nizam al-Jinsiyat [Shura Council Postpones Calls to
Amend Citizenship Laws], Al-Hayat, No. 14826, October 27, 2003, p. 3.
59
Mazen Balelah, Scrap the Sponsorship System, al-Watan, October 26, 2003, reproduced in Arab News,
October 27, 2003, p. 3.

115