PUBLIC CORP.

CASE DIGESTS (AMENDED SYLLABUS)

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.

G.R. No. 148339 February 23, 2005
The true role of Constitutional law is to effect an equilibrium between authority
and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the
laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
FACTS:
Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with
the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by
the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city. City
Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to
construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney
terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand,
strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate
which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid
excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void
for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via
petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial
court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena
now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and
Resolution of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to
attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not duly
oppressive upon individuals
HELD:
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single
location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney
terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the
operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the
franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes
to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing
terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the
law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful
formulation of solutions to societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to
be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the
streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed
to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic.
How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from
that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack
adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload
passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to
operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to
provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating
at all.
The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena
City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and similar
expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted
to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular
opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS

CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR
G.R. No. 138810 September 29, 2004
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution
No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV
system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is
authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein,
provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner
increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result,
respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit
unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod,
pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7,
Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV

operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate
theCATV operation in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
May a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by
CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD:
No.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No.
436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion
of other bodies.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to
reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the
use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the
parceling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over
CATV operators.
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we
cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed
from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210
are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States
deregulation policy over the CATV industry. LGUs must recognize that
technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive
regulatory power of the NTC.
MACASIANO vs. DIOKNO
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the
closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena
Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed
pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan
Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a
contract agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the
flea markets and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paraaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also
wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.
Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The
trial court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from
enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.
Issue:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque
authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea
market is valid.
Held:
No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government
devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control
of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate
the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance
with basic principles already established by law.
The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other
public property from public use when circumstances show that such property
is no longer intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the
property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only
then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract.
Roads and streets available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular
traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. The LGU has
no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private
persons.
Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be
considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to noncompliance with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.
The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down
by the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of
the inhabitants of the local units.
As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The

officials of the respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising

from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific
public purpose.
The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable
during its time.
TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner
Celestino
Tatel
owns
a
warehouse
in
barrio
Sta.
Elena, Municipality of
Virac.
Complaints
were received by
the
municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca
bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse.
A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from
its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of
the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the
neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal council
declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694
of the New Civil Code.
Tatel filed a petition for preliminary injunction to prevent council from
implement such a resolution.
Respondent municipal officials contended that petitioners warehouse was
constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the
construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from
said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On
the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 is unconstitutional
and void.
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac
in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of
local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order
to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its
authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative
Code, which reads:
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations,
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of

the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established
and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a
municipal ordinance:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

must
must
must
must
must
must

not contravene the Constitution or any statute

not be unfair or oppressive
not be partial or discriminatory
not prohibit but may regulate trade
be general and consistent with public policy, and
not be unreasonable.

Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is discriminatory in that warehouses
similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted.
The mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded
against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No.
13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction
must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is
implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and
enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain in the
absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in
violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the
bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have
not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound
government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to
engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in
the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the
people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can
be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal
government.

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs CA

G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the registered owner
of two parcels of land with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to
petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable

water to the Canlubang community. Petitioner alleged that respondents

usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem.
Sometime in December 1985, respondents filed a civil case with the Regional
Trial Court seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile.
By way of counterclaim, however, petitioner sought the ejectment of private
respondents. After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the
Department of Agrarian Reform for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC
property under the CARP. The landholding of SRRDC was placed under
compulsory acquisition. Petitioner objected to the compulsory acquisition of the
property contending that the area was not appropriate for agricultural
purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and
that the occupants of the land were squatters, who were not entitled to any
land as beneficiaries. The DARAB ruled against the petitioner. On appeal the
CA affirmed the decision of DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact
that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment
of R. A. No. 6657.
Held:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from its coverage.
We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital part of
an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of
watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.
AUSTIN HARDWARE COMPANY, INC., and ALL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC.
vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-41754 February 27, 1976 No digest found
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41754 February 27, 1976
AUSTIN HARDWARE COMPANY, INC., and ALL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC.,
petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, ELENITA H. MANZANO and
FRANCISCO INOCENCIO, respondents.
Antonio Gaw & Associates and Edit Barot for petitioners.
Vicente Raul Almacen for private respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
The basic issue in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is whether or not
the respondent Court of Appeals acted in excess of its jurisdiction in enjoining

the respondent judge "from continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No.
19233", (Austin Hardware Company, Inc., et al. vs. The Mayor of San Juan,
defendant, and Elenita H. Manzano, et al., intervenors) and the private
respondents (Austin Hardware Company, Inc., et al) "from continuing the
construction of a commercial house from maintaining a hardware business and
a factory for the manufacture of steel products at or in the vicinity of No. 115
L.K.. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal" and in declaring them in contempt for
disregarding such order.
The instant petition is premised upon the following allegations:
On September 9, 1969, the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal issued a business license
and/or permit authorizing petitioner Austin Hardware Company, Inc. to engage
in the business of general hardware manufacture at No. 115 Lope K. Santos
St., San Juan, Rizal. On July 7, 1970, said Mayor issued a business license
indorse permit authorizing All Steel Products, Inc. to engage in the business of
manufacturing steel products, also at No. 115 Lope K. Santos St., San Juan,
Rizal. In accordance with the licenses thus issued, petitioners Austin Hardware
Company, and All Steel Products, Inc. have been engaged in the business
therein described, and to maintain the same they had, of the year 1974, in
good faith invested considerable amounts s capital.
On September 19, 1973, the Parents-Teachers Association of Pedro Cruz
Elementary School addressed a letter to the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, alleging
that the operations of the two petitioners produce nuisance, by reason of the
facts that (1) Lope K. Santos being a very narrow street, the heavy trucks by
petitioners cause a traffic jam thereon and the blowing of horns disturbs the
classes going on in the school; (2) the unloading of steel bars creates much
noise detrimental to the pupils learning; (3) the shop already in operation emits
a foul odor, causing air pollution dangerous to the pupils' health; and (4) it is
possible that chemicals and other combustible materials are stored inside the
factory, which materials constitute fire lizards to the school and other nearby
residential houses.
On September 20,1973, a number of residents of L.K.. Santos Basa Streets and
the Fernandez Compound likewise addressed a letter of the same tenor to the
Mayor, further stating therein that the drainage system of petitioners'
compound is faulty thus causing seepage of liquid into the neighborhood, and
that the warehouse causes so much noise even at nightime, by reason of the
machineries therein installed, that restlessness is caused in the community.
On September 26, 1973, private respondent Elenita H. Manzano wrote a
similar letter to the Mayor, also complaining of the alleged nuisance.
The Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, acting upon the aforesmentioned complaints,
referred the matter to the Municipal Engineer and to the Municipal Health
Officer. The matter was likewise referred by the Mayor to the Municipal Council
for investigation, on the basis of its power "to declare and abate nuisances" in
accordance with Section 2242(h) of the Revised Administrative Code. In turn,
the Council, by Resolution No. 228, dated October 25, 1973, referred the same
to the National Pollution Control Commission for verification. In their reports

dated November 27 and 28, 1973, the senior mechanical engineer and another
mechanical engineer of the Commission stated that, with respect to Austin
Hardware, the "noise level created by the loading and unloading of steel sheets
was 56db's, which is considered normal in a residential area", and that, with
respect to All Steel Products, Inc., "sampling the noise level conducted at the
complaint's house and located at the back of the firm's residential area." They,
however, remarked that "although at the time of the inspection, the noise level
was normal it is apparent that the noise created during actual construction
would be above normal. Added to this would be the noise resulting from the
operation of the machine shop, mainly coming out from the building openings
at the upper walls of the All Steel Products Shop." They recommended that the
"municipality should be very careful in issuing building permits specially for
structures that will be used for industrial or manufacturing purposes, that will
be located in residential areas."
On February 13, 1974, the Municipal Council rendered its decision on the
matter, the dispositive portion of which decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Council in Session Assembled, holds;
1. That the license and/or permit to operate the Austin Hardware Co., Inc.
should be as it is hereby declared valid, legal and subsiiisting; and
2. That the Municipal Mayor should cancel and/or revoke the license and/or
permit to operate the manufacturing activities of the Austin Hardware Co., Inc.
and the All Steel Products, Inc. as the chief executive officer of the municipal
government pursuant to his duties under Section 2194 of the Revised
Administrative Code to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed.
Accordingly, the Mayor addressed a letter to the petitioners, advising them that:
By virtue of the Decision of the Municipal Council, dated February 13, 1974,
the licenses-permits issued in your favor to establish and, operate
manufacturing activities, at the premises complained of, to wit:
(a) Application for Business License of Austin Hardware Co., approved on
September 8, 1969, as general hardware manufacturer;
(b) Application for Business License of All Steel Products, Inc., approved on
July 7, 1970, as manufacturer of steel products; and
(c) Permit to operate (No. JR-73-1145) issued to All Steel Products, Inc., dated
January 31, 1973, for steel manufacturing, is/are hereby cancelled and/or
revoked and, therefore, without force and effect, after five (5) days from receipt
hereof. Please be guided accordingly.
Two motions for the reconsideration of the revocation having been denied by
the Mayor, petitioners filed an ordinary action for injunction in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 19233), alleging among others, that the
revocation of their licenses or permits violated the requirements of procedural
due process because the investigation which led to the revocation of their
licenses/permits was not to determine the presence of a ground for revocation,
namely, violation of a zonification ordinance of San Juan, but an alleged
nuisance produced by their operations.

Upon application of petitioners, the Court of First Instance, presided over by

Judge Gregorio G. Pineda, issued a restraining order enjoining the. Mayor of
San Juan "and all municipal officers, their agents, representatives and/or
persons acting upon their orders or in their place and stead from enforcing or
implementing the order of defendant Mayor revoking the building permit and
stopping the construction of Austin Hardware's warehouse or bodega at No.
115 L.K.. Santos Street ... or in any manner or form interfering with the
construction of said hardware or bodega" The writ was subsequently amended
to further restrain the officials concerned "from enforcing or implementing the
order of defendant Mayor revoking their business as hardware and steel
products manufacturers."

Private respondents intervened in the above-named case and filed therein a

motion to lift the restraining order but the same was denied by the court in an
order dated September 5, 1974. A motion for reconsideration of said order was
likewise denied. Thereupon, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03932-SP,
entitled "Elenita H. Manzano and Francisco Inocencio, etc. vs. Hon. Gregorio G.
Pineda, Austin Hardware Company, Inc., and All Steel Products, Inc.", praying for
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondent judge from continuing
with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 19233, and, after due hearing, declaring
the writ of injunction permanent, ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No.
19233, setting aside as null and void all the proceedings thereon, and such
other relief as may be just and equitable under the premises.
On March 17, 1975, in accordance with its resolution issued on the same day,
the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction complained of in
this petition, which enjoined "the respondent Judge from continuing with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 19233, and the private respondents from
continuing the construction of a commercial house and from maintaining a
hardware business and a factory for the manufacture of steel products at or in
the vicinity of No. 115 L.K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal, until further orders."
On March 19, 1975, private respondents filed a petition in the appellate, court
citing petitioners for contempt. The petition for prohibition and certiorari, as
well as the petition to cite petitioners for contempt, was orally argued on April
16, 1975. During the hearing, petitioners raised the issue that the restraining
order should not have included the stopping of their hardware business, since
Austin Hardware's license to operate a hardware store with storage facilities is
not involved in Civil Case No. 19233 because neither the Municipal Council nor
the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, cancelled or revoked it.
The Appellate Court in its resolution of August 19, 1975, found petitioners'
contention devoid of merit, declared them guilty of contempt and imposed upon
them a fine of P500.00.
I
We find the petition without merit.
The Appellate Court's action is based on the following:

Careful examination of their pleadings and annexes do not clearly bear private
respondents' pretensions. The maintenance of a hardware store is squarely
dismissed by defendants in intervention in the basic case (Par. 6, sub-par. 2,
Answer in Intervention, Page 31, Records), while the construction of a bodega
or warehouse or storage facilities was raised by no less than private
respondents themselves-in their 2nd cause of action (page 150, Records) in
Civil Case No. 19233, in their petition for the reconsideration of Exhibit '13', to
include the construction of a warehouse (p. 154, Records). Similarly, the
Annexes '2' to '7' and '9' to their Additional Comment found on pages 193-194
of Records refer to a Mayor's Permit but say nothing about a limit to operate a
hardware store. The Mayor's Permit which the records yield is that found on
page 87 of the records introduced as Annex to Intervenor's Motion for
Reconsideration which bears Permit No. 309-5-69, dated January 15, 1969,
expiring on December 31, 1969.
On their part, the petitioners opposed any amendment to the preliminary
injunction alleging that private respondents' claim of having a license to
operate a hardware store with store facilities from their interpretation of the
decision of the Municipal council. The fact, however, is that said decision
merely mentioned payment of a business permit from 1966, which was never
exhibited to the Municipal Council. Noteworthy also is the fact that license fees
for storage facilities began, as stated in same decision, only in 1970, thereby
supporting the petitioners' contention that Austin Hardware was using just one
permit that one approved on September 8, 1969 which was for a general
hardware manufacturer.
As we have stated, the Deputy Clerk of Court of the Division, Atty. Catalina C.
Buena, accompanied by the lawyers of both parties, was ordered to repair to
the premises to verify whether or not the steel production has been stopped
and report her findings to the Court. Here are the observations of the Deputy
Clerk of Court:
OBSERVATIONS
1. More than twenty (20) machines still connected and plugged to power
source;
2. All fuse boxes of said machines on 'ON' position indicating that machines
were ready for use;
3. Some machines had steel rods mounted on them indicating that machine
work was going on before we arrived;
4. Steel filings and copper filings, new (evidenced lack of rust on steel and
shiny sheen of be the copper and steel filings;
5. One heavy drill had a piece of work mounted and the manager admitted they
had worked on that (in-Ride new building);
6. Acetylene and oxygen tanks inside new warehouse and inside the shop were
all plugged to electrical connections;
7. The stripper machine inside new warehouse had a steel plate mounted and a
stripped plate beside it and metal was still hot;
8. Steel bars on floor just Painted, smell of paint strong.
Questioned by undersigned were several laborers seated resting outside the
new warehouse, namely:

1. Adolfo Ehen Dionisio Ng, Gomer Abad, who limited they were welding that
morning,
2. Alejandro Cabasa, Crispulo Colomba and Leodegario de los Reyes helpers
and machinists in shop who admitted working on the shop in the morning,
3. Romeo de los Reyes who claimed he was a the delivery truck.
xxx xxx xxx
At two (2:00) p.m., after lunch and before returning to the court the
undersigned requested Mrs. Manzano to bring her back to the premises. Upon
arrival at the compound, even while in the street yet, the undersigned heard a
loud disturbing noise she could feel a strong vibration coming from a machine i
the new warehouse.
Upon verification, she saw a forklift in operation, lifting the painted metal rods
and/or steel bars or metal bars and lowering them at another place. While
operating the forklift emanated a loud disturbing noise while the movement of
the forklift as well of the falling of the long bars on the place where its
transferred caused strong vibrations.
Inside the machine shop at the back portion thereof, three laborers were
operating a machine attached to a big ' acetylene tank welding a big metal or
steel part; three (3) others were around another machine which was apparently
to start work thereon while a Chinese was tinkering with another machine
which was also plugged on.

The laborers in the middle bodega were just moving about to start work but
undersigned did not same the machine there being operated.'
xxx xxx xxx
On these findings the representative of the Court made the following remarks
in her report:
REMARKS
1. Definitely there is evidence that the steel manufacturing operations of
private respondents were being continued even up to the morning of the date of
'said hearing and were in the afternoon of said date;
2. That even the hardware business and bodega of private respondent cannot
be carried out without causing too much noise and disturbance AS the goods
stored therein are so huge that they cannot be moved without the use of big
machines like a forklift or enormous lifting chains (like those used by boats for
anchorage) which produces disturbing loud noises and strong vibrations while
in operation. The undersigned also notes that said parts and metals cannot be
taken in and out of the compound except in big trucks for besides being very
heavy they are either very long or very wide.
The foregoing facts prove that notwithstanding the restraining order and the
injunction issued by this Court, private respondents did not stop altogether
operating their manufacturing business. The observations of Atty. Buena that
she found

1. About twenty (20) big machines were plugged in to electrical connections

with their individual switches open;
2. The presence of scrap of iron on the flooring of the cutting machines
showing recent use of said machines;
3. The presence of another machine for cutting and/or for boring holes in
metals in the middle of the bodega or warehouse and which was plugged into a
long extension electrical wire;
4. The presence of steel plates cut into strips with the use of acetylene and
oxygen cutters by the side of a stripper machine which was still connected with
acetylene and oxygen tanks nearby, and the steel strips still hot, showing that
laborers had just worked on them upon their arrival;
5. The fact that upon returning to the premises after lunch the investigator
heard a loud disturbing noise and could feel a strong vibration coming from a
machine inside the warehouse even while they were yet in the street;
6. The fact that a forklift was in operation lifting newly painted rods and/or
steel bars and lowering them at another place causing a loud disturbing noise
with strong vibration in the premises and inside the warehouse, a machine
attached to the acetylene tank welding a big metal was being operated by 3
laborers while 3 others around another while were about to start working on it,
and a Chinese was tinkering with another machine that was also plugged in;
show beyond doubt that private respondents have not complied with the
injunction issued by this Court.
Moreover, it is admitted that respondents have continued to operate a hardware
store with storage facilities. But as found out, machineries were also installed
in that store and warehouse which were undoubtedly in operating during the
ocular inspection. If in the operation of a hardware store private respondents
must also operate house machineries as found out, then with greater reason,
the order of injunction should apply to the said business. It must be noted that
the writ clearly enjoins the respondents ... from continuing the construction of
a commercial house and from maintaining a hardware business and a factory
for the manufacture of steel products ... .' This order is so worded specifically
mentioning a hardware business to be included in its restriction. The private
respondents tried to justify their continuing operation of a hardware store with
storage facilities with the excuse that the permit to run store was never
nullified by the decision of the Municipal Council of San Juan, Rizal. The
petitioners disagree and impute that private respondents were probably misled
by the wordings of the decision of the Municipal Council. Considering that no
separate permit for the operation of a hardware store was exhibited by private
respondents, and that the various receipts of payments presented by private
respondents do not show that they were in payment of a license or permit to
run a hardware store, we are inclined to agree with the petitioners. Moreover if
private respondents ever had a license to operate a hardware store, the new
zonification ordinance of the town of San Juan Rizal shall have nullified said
permit.
We therefore find that the petition to cite private respondents for contempt is
meritorious. They have not stopped running their store in which machines were
found in operation. They try to justify their operations by saying that their right

to operate a hardware is not covered by the injunction. The injunction order

has been received them. If they failed to get the exact scope of the injunction,
they should have addressed themselves to this Court for a clarification of the
order, or for an amendment thereof, as they subsequently did. Instead they
have willfully disobeyed a legal order of this Court.
The afore-mentioned findings are neither based on speculation nor on a
misapprehension of facts, but on substantial evidence. This Court has
consistently respected, with some few exceptions, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals. Such exceptions do not obtain here. 1
II
The power to license necessarily carries with it the authority to provide
reasonable terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall be
conducted. The authority which grants the license always retains the power to
revoke it, "either for cause of forfeiture or upon a change of policy and
legislation touching the subject. 2 In the case at bar, the permit to the Austin
Hardware Company, Inc. and the All Steel Products, Inc. was granted subject to
the provisions of existing ordinances. Likewise, petitioners' permit to construct
a warehouse at 115 L.K. Santos St., San Juan, Rizal was subject to the
condition that its construction or use will not conflict with the provisions of the
zoning ordinance, otherwise the construction will be removed by the
government at the expense of the permitee or licensee.
It is not disputed that the business establishments of petitioners were situated
within the residential zone and, therefore, the issuance of a license or permit in
favor of the petitioners appears violative of Section 2 of Municipal Ordinance
No. 90, Series of 1968, of San Juan, which provides that "No building permit,
business license, or any other certificate of approval shall be issued by the
municipality for commercial or industrial establishments which shall be
erected, operated, and maintained within any residential zone, unless the site
has been or so declared as commercial or industrial zone in the municipal
council." It is precisely for this reason that the Municipal Mayor of San Juan
cancelled or revoked (a) the business license of the Austin Hardware Company,
Inc. dated September 8, 1969 as general hardware manufacturer; (b) the
business license of the All Steel Products, Inc. dated July 7, 1970 as
manufacturer of steel products; and (c) the permit to operate issued ' to All
Steel Products, Inc. dated January 31, 1973 for steel manufacturing. Since the
obvious purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience
and welfare, it would have been inconsistent with such purpose to have allowed
the operation of petitioners' manufacturing business in a residential zone.
It is true that petitioners insist that they have a separate permit to operate the
business of hardware store, but as found by the Court of Appeals, no separate
permit for the operation of a hardware store was shown by them and that the
various receipts of payments presented by petitioners do not show that they
were in payment of a license or permit to run a hardware store. On the
contrary, as shown by the joint manifestation of the petitioners and the private
respondents dated November 27, 1975, said parties admitted that in their
conference with the Municipal Mayor of San Juan, in the afternoon of

November 22, 1975, "the Mayor informed them that he would maintain his act
of revoking the permits and/or licenses of the petitioners as hardware and steel
products manufacturers and that he had not issued any Permit for the
hardware store with storage facilities."
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed
and, accordingly, the writs prayed for denied, with costs against the petitioners.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000
314 SCRA 315 Political Law Municipal Corporation Proprietary Functions
Police Power
FACTS:
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in
Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of
Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which
basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be
issued by local optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice
optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however
acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later,
Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of
the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is
estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same
and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police
power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary
function hence the permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise
of police power.
HELD:
NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and
not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of
Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot
be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a
valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose
conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or
ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the
license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppel does not apply.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR
and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY
G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011

FACTS:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters
situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay
Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and
the rest theyrented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only
property and only source of income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize
then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for
the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it
for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving cityinhabitants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its discretion in
adoptingResolution No. 552.
HELD:
No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while an
ordinance is a law that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred
by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of
what the law-making body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a law-making
body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for
a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution,
therefore, the Sangguniang Panlungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of
all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally
protected right.
HEIRS OF SUGUITAN vs. CITY OF MANDALUYONG
G.R. 135087 March 14, 2000
Facts:
On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City
issued a resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to institute
expropriation proceeding over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni
Avenue and Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong City for the expansion of
Mandaluyong Medical Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote
Alberto Suguitan offering to buy his property, but Suguitan refused to sell.
Consequently, the City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss. The trial
court denied the said motion and subsequently, it allowed the expropriation of
the subject property. Aggrieved by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan
asserted that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of

eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of

Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a mere resolution.
Issue: WON the city of Mandaluyong has validly exercised its power of
expropriation.
Held: NEGATIVE
Ratio:
The Court ruled that the basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
by local government units is Section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that: "A
local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or
welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property. In the present case, the City of
Mandaluyong sought to exercise the power of eminent domain over petitioners'
property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The
law in this case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code
requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain. Therefore, while the Court remains conscious of the constitutional
policy of promoting local autonomy, it cannot grant judicial sanction to a local
government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in
contravention of the very law giving it such power.
The law may delegate the power of eminent domain to local government units
that shall exercise the same through an ordinance. The local government unit
failed to comply with this requirement when they exercised their power of
eminent domain through a resolution.
The Local Government Codes
requirement of an ordinance prevails over the Implementing Rules and
Regulations requiring the issuance of a resolution.
LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs CITY OF PASIG
G.R. No. 136349 January 23, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land
with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila. The then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent,
notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of

her property to be used for the sports development and recreational activities of
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42,
Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose
was allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide
land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. Petitioner sent
a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is
unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither
sufficient nor suitable to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors
of our community.
Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation and
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint alleging that plaintiff has no
cause of action for the exercise of the power of eminent domain considering
that: (1) there is no genuine necessity for the taking of the property sought to
be expropriated; and (2) plaintiff has arbitrarily and capriciously chosen the
property sought to be expropriated. The trial court issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate the property for the sports and recreational activities of the
residents of Pasig. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the taking of the property of
petitioner.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. The
records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council
the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said
Association are desirous of having their own private playground and
recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. The
purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has
not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility
for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of
Caniogan. Therefore, the petition for review was granted.
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private
property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can
be done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It
is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for
public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the

power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations,
subject only to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of
eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of
at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration;
and (3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property
There is already an established sports development and recreational activity
center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine
necessity to justify the expropriation. The records show that the Certification
issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the
passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a
private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
DACANAY vs. ASISTIO
G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992
FACTS
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of
Caloocan in accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of
a flea market located in the streets of Caloocan.
On January 5, 1979 Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance
allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several
conditions.
1987 Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stall
owners filed a case against such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del
'96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce
of man.

After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and
current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left
the flea markets in the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to
remove the stalls in their street.
ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a
city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?
HELD: NO
1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of
man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or
other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were
intended to serve such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public
street because it is going to be contrary to the general law

1. Jurisprudence applicable to property of public dominion

The streets, being of public dominion must be outside of the commerce of man.
Considering the nature of the subject premises, the following jurisprudence
co/principles are applicable on the matter: (1) They cannot be alienated or
leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts.(Municipality of Cavite
vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602); (2) They cannot be acquired by prescription against the
state (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505). Even municipalities can
not acquire them for use as communal lands against the state (City of Manila
vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327); (3) They are not subject to attachment
and execution (Tan Toco vs.Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52); (4) They
cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement (2-II Colin & Captain 520;
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. Vol. II, 1983 Ed. pp. 29-30).
2. Context of the ordinance of the Metropolitan Manila Commission as to the
establishment of flea markets on municipal streets, roads and open spaces.
Ordinance 2, s. 1979 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is an ordinance
authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets,
roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market
and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions, subject to the
approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, and for other purposes.
Section 2 of said ordinance provides that the streets, roads and open spaces to
be used as sites for flea markets (tiangge) or vending areas; the design,

measurement or specification of the structures, equipment and apparatuses to

be used or put up: the allowable distances: the days and time allowed for the
conduct of the businesses and/or activities herein authorized; the rates or fees
or charges to be imposed, levied and collected; the kinds of merchandise, goods
and commodities sold and services rendered: and other matters and activities
related to the establishment, maintenance and management and operation of
flea markets and vending areas, shall be determined and prescribed by the
mayors of the cities and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila where the
same are located, subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission and consistent with the guidelines hereby prescribed. Section
6(m) of said ordinance provides that in the establishment operation,
maintenance and management of flea markets and vending areas, the following
guidelines, among others, shall be observed: xxx (m) that the permittee shall
remove the equipment, facilities and other appurtenances used by him in the
conduct of his business after the close or termination of business hours.
3. Related case, Municipality of Cavite; Return of rent
In the case of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, it was held that properties for
public use may not be leased to private individuals. Such a lease is null and
void for the reason that a municipal council cannot withdraw part of the plaza
from public use. If possession has already been given, the lessee must restore
possession by vacating it and the municipality must thereupon restore to him
any sums it may have collected as rent.
4. Relate case, City of Manila v. Garcia; Ordinance legalizing the occupancy of
squatters of public land is null and void
In the case of City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia, 19 SCRA 413, it was held that
The property being a public one, the Manila Mayors did not have the authority
to give permits, written or oral, to the squatters, and that the permits granted
are therefore considered null and void. As reiterated in the case of Baguio
Citizens Action Inc. vs. The City Council. 121 SCRA 368, an ordinance
legalizing the occupancy by squatters of public land is null and void.
5. Occupation of private individuals of public places devoted for public use a
nuisance
The occupation and use of private individuals of sidewalks and other public
places devoted for public use constitute both public and private nuisances and
nuisance per se, and this applies to even case involving the use or lease of
public places under permits and licenses issued by competent authority, upon
the theory that such holders could not take advantage of their unlawful
permits and license and claim that the land in question is a part of a public
street or a public place devoted to public use, hence, beyond the commerce of
man. (Padilla. Civil Code Annotated, Vol. II, p. 59, 6th Ed., citing Umali vs.
Aquino, IC. A. Rep. 339.).

6. Authority of the city mayor and the city engineer to order the demolition of
illegal structures
"The authority of the Municipality to demolish the shanties is mandated by PD
772, and Section1 of Letter of Instruction 19 ordering certain public officials,
one of whom is the Municipal Mayor to remove all illegal constructions
including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad
tracks and those built without permits on public or private property
(Zansibarian Residents Association vs. Mun. of Makati, 135 SCRA 235). The
City Engineer is also among those required to comply with said Letter of
Instruction. Further, Section 185, paragraph 4 of BP 337(Local Government
Code) provides that the City Engineer shall (c)Prevent the encroachment of
private buildings and fences on the streets and public places, (j)inspect and
supervise the construction, repair, removal and safety of private buildings, (k)
With the previous approval of the City Mayor in each case, order the removal of
materials employed in the construction or repair of any building or structures
made in violation of law or ordinance, and cause buildings and structures
dangerous to the public to made secure or torn down, among others. Likewise,
the Charter of the City of Caloocan, RA 5502, Article VII, Section 27, paragraph
g, 1 and m, grants the City Engineer similar powers.
7. Public street cannot be made subject to a lease
A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man
(Arts. 420, 424.Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be
the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. vs. Castaeda and
Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA
602; Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869,and Muyot vs.
De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860). The disputed areas from which the market stalls
are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil
Case C-12921.
8. Lease or licenses null and void for being contrary to law
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy
portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been
leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and
void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may
not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should
not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose
health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city
officials are under legal obligation to protect. The Executive Order issued by the
Acting Mayor authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for
stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the
general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. The Executive
Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for
the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles
and pedestrians.

BINAY vs DOMINGO
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No.
60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross
family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken
out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro
Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal
secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of
the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution
and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following
reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection
clause
since
it
will
only
benefit
a
few
individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the
general
welfare
clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on
the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort
and
convenience
of
the
people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the
inherent
powers
of
the
State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.
Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection
of
property
therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-

expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of
the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a
broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of
the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
which
shall
absolutely
indicate
the
limits
of
police
power.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general
welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The
support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion
of
the
common
good.
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious
to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of
the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing
the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This
decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal
for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO vs. JUDGE
GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU
G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004
Facts:

The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late
1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu.
Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu
to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to
discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted
ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of
execution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was
about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the
MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City
was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors
request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately
for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
(SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized
housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance
No. 1843 for being unconstitutional.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an
endeavor contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the
Constitution.
Held:
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in
the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA
7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to
expropriate.
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was
enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless
and low-income residents of the City. However, while we recognize that housing
is one of the most serious social problems of the

country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise

their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not
absolute.
In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must
comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
ANTONIO vs. GERONIMO
G.R. No. 124779 November 29, 2005
Facts:
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Antipolo by private respondent, who alleged that he was the registered
owner of four (4) parcels of land situated at Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal. The
defendants therein were the petitioners, who were occupying the said
properties.
Private respondent claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his
land without requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter would
immediately vacate the same in the event that the former would need the
premises. However, when private respondent notified the petitioners of his need
for the property, they refused to vacate the land even after demand. The private
respondent filed a complaint and it was resolved in his favor. The petitioners
were ordered to vacate the area and a motion for writ of demolition was filed by
the private respondent which was later on approved.
Lately, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed a resolution authorizing the
Mayor of the town to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject
properties for public purposes/socialized housing. Though the writ of
demolition had not yet been fully implemented, the demolition proceeded
despite said resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioners filed a motion to
stay invoking the Commonwealth Act No. 538 in asking respondent judge to
suspend the action for ejectment in view of the announced expropriation of the
subject properties1.
Issue:
WON a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can suspend the
writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case.
Held:
1

clearly provides that for the purposes of the Act, the action shall be considered instituted
from the time the competent authority advises in writing the owner of the intention of the
government to acquire his land.

Petition DISMISSED.
The fundamental precept that underlies this case is that expropriation has no
binding legal effect unless a formal expropriation proceeding has been
instituted.
The Sangguniang Bayan, being a local legislative body, may exercise the power
to expropriate private properties, subject to the following requisites, all of which
must concur: 1). An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property. 2). The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3). There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article
III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4). A valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the instant case, no ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Antipolo. In it instead were resolutions and it was emphasized in previous
decisions that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of
private property through a mere resolution of its law-making body. These
resolutions cannot partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of
execution in the ejectment proceedings. As to the suspension of ejectment
proceedings, the Commonwealth Act No. 538 applies only to cases where there
exist actual expropriation proceedings.
There is no dispute that a local government unit possesses the power of
eminent domain. But the taking of private properties is not absolute. The
power of eminent domain must not be exercised arbitrarily, even if purposed for
resolving a critical problem such as urban squatting. The safeguards afforded
by law require strict observance.

SEVERINO B. VERGARA vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J.

LAJARA, and VIRGINIA G. BARORO
G.R. No. 174567 March 12, 2009
FACTS:
1. The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where petitioner was a member,
issued Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to
negotiate with landowners within the vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang,
and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the public hearing, the choice for
the new city hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot
in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba.

2. The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001,
authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots owned by Pamana with a
total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of P 129,017,600. Mayor
Lajara was also authorized to execute, sign and deliver the required
documents.
3. The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor Lajara,
entered into the following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA).
4. The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City Council.
Petitioner, however, alleged that all these documents were not ratified by the
City Council, a fact duly noted by the Commission on Audit.
5. The respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City Council of
the MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They
cited Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) which spoke of prior
authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did
not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to negotiate
and sign the subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who made the
motion to enact Resolution No. 280.
6. The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was not a
condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on
behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from the City Council
and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City Councils
stamps of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject
lots.
7. Aggrieved by the Ombudmans findings, petitioner elevated the case before
this Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear
the ratification by the City Council of Calamba.
HELD:
On the ratification by the City Council of all documents pertaining to the
purchase of the lots
Petitioner contends that all the documents, like the Memorandum of
Agreement, Deed of Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment, do not
bear the ratification by the City Council.
In the assailed order, the Ombudsman held that the various actions performed
by Mayor Lajara in connection with the purchase of the lots were all authorized
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod as manifested in numerous resolutions. The

lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties
as one that have unwarranted benefits.
In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the ratification by the City
Council is not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to enter
into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization from
the City Council and in this case, Resolution No. 280 is the City Councils
stamp of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, provides:
Section 22. Corporate Powers.- x x x
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered
into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without
prior authorization by the sanggunian concercerned. A legible copy of such
contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the
city, municipal or barangay hall.
Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers, duties, and
compensation of the Chief Executive. Specifically, it states that:
Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. x x x
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code, the city mayor shall:
xxx
(vi)Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in its
behalf all bonds, contracts and obligations and such other documents upon
authority of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance;
Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of
prior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod and not
ratification. It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No.
280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
Resolution No. 280 states that:
RESOLUTION NO. 280
Series of 2001
A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE CITY MAYOR OF CALAMBA, HON.
SEVERINO J. LAJARA TO PURCHASE LOTS OF PAMANA INC. WITH A
TOTAL LAND AREA OF FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (55,
000 SQ. M.) SITUATED AT BARANGAY REAL, CITY OF CALAMBA FOR A
LUMP SUM PRICE OF ONE HUNDRED TWENTY NINE MILLION
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P 129,017,600),

SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE,

FURTHER AUTHORIZING THE HON. SEVERINO J. LAJARA TO
REPRESENT THE CITY OF GOVERNMENT AND TO EXECUTE, SIGN,
AND DELIVER SUCH DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS AS MAYBE SO
REQUIRED IN THE PREMISES.
WHEREAS, the City of Calamba is in need of constructing a modern City
Hall to adequately meet the requirements of governing new city and
providing all adequate facilities and amenities to the general public that
will transact business with the City government;
WHEREAS, the City of Calamba has at present no available real property
of its own that can serve as an appropriate site of said modern City Hall
and must therefore purchase such property from the private sector under
the terms and conditions that are most beneficial and advantageous to
the people of the City of Calamba;
NOW THEREFORE, on motion of Kagawad S. VERGARA duly seconded
by Kagawad R. HERNANDEZ be it resolved as it is hereby resolved to
authorize the City Mayor of Calamba, Hon. Severino J. Lajara, to
purchase lots of Pamana, Inc. with a total area of fifty five thousand
square meters (55, 000 sq.m.) situated at Barangay Real, City of
Calamba, for a lump sum price of One Hundred Twenty Nine Million
Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P 129, 017, 600) subject to the
availability of funds, and for this purpose, further authorizing the Hon.
Mayor Severino J. Lajara to represent the City Government and to
execute, sign, and deliver such documents and papers as maybe so
required in the premises.
As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not
a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the
resolution issued by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there
was evident bad faith in purchasing the subject lots. The lack of ratification
alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave
unwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue
injury to Calamba City.

GREATER BALANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. MUNICIPALITY

OF BALANGA, BATAAN
G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994
Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the
public market in the Municipality of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is
registered in the name of Greater Balanga Development, Corp., owned and

controlled by the Camacho family. The lot was part of Lot 261-B, formerly
registered in the name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which was later
subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold, others donated. Five
buyers of the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for partition and delivery
of titles.
Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the
Mayor of Balanga but failed to mention the existence of the civil case for
partition and delivery of titles. The permit was granted the privilege of a
real estate dealer/privately-owned market operator. However, the
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling the
Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that the issue as to the
ownership of the lot caused anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the
stallholders and traders in the lot, and advising the Mayor to revoke the
permit to operate a public market. The Mayor then revoked the permit
through EO No. 1 s-88.
Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction or restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's
permit and to curtail the municipality's collection of market and entrance
fees from the lot occupants. He alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus,
there's no reason for revocation of the permit; 2) Respondents failed to
observe due process in the revocation; 3) the collection of market fees is
illegal.
On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief
executive has the power to issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that
the revocation was due to the violation by Petitioner of Section 3A-06(b) of
the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made false statement in the
application form, failing to disclose that the lot was subject to adverse
claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to apply for 2 separate
permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).

Issue: WON the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

Held: NO.
The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi
juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the
municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a
violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation
to be justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1) proof of
willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make a false statement.
Good faith is always presumed.
In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requires the applicant to
state the type of business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for.
Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is only in the
Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation
is not justified because Petitioner did not make any false statement
therein.

 Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a

ground for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does
not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more
businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each
business. Granting, however, that separate permits are actually required,
the application form does not contain any entry as regards the number of
businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.

The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for
expansion of the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't
actually maintain a public market on the area. Until expropriation
proceedings
are
instituted
in
court,
the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.

Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to
regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the
conditions under which a municipal license already issued may be revoked
(B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness"
among the stallholders and traders doing business on a property not owned
by the Municipality cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of
Petitioner.

Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed
petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of
the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and
neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreover,
Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus
cannot collect market fees, which only an owner can do.

VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. vs CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL.

G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria)
Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being
public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the
subject of private occupancy.
Facts:
In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands
on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners
claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by
virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the
municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of
their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council
Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place
and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking
Resolution
No.
218.
Issue:

WON

petitioners

have

the

right

to

occupy

the

subject

land.

Ruling:
Petition Dismissed.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the
construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance
subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first
place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there
now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid
lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively
terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the
loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria.
Note: Below is the digest of the case where the decision of CFI Pampanga held
that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of
man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
FACTS:
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along
Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a
conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as
a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they
have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a
previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The
respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal
constructions on public property. At the petitioners behest, we have issued a
temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties
pending our decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of
San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent
stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was protested on
November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented
the defendants from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the
controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal
council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject
area as the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby
impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years later, on
November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and
held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was
beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private
occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent.

HELD:
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could
have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power
cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.
In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital
infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a
postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to
change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.
We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in
sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from
the disputed area and clear it of all the structures illegally constructed therein.
CITY OF ANGELES vs CA, TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION G.R. No. 97882 August 28, 1996
FACTS:
In a Deed of Donation, private respondent donated to the City of Angeles, 51
parcels of land situated in Barrio Pampang, City of Angeles (50,676 sq. m). The
amended deed provides that: The properties donated shall be devoted and
utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center. Any change or
modification in the basic design or concept of said Sports Center must have the
prior written consent of the DONOR. The properties donated are devoted and
described as open spaces of the DONORs subdivision, and to this effect, the
DONEE, upon acceptance of this donation, releases the DONOR and/or
assumes any and all obligations and liabilities appertaining to the properties
donated.
On 1988, petitioners started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on
a portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent
protested such action for being violative of the terms and conditions and also
offered another site for the rehabilitation center. However, petitioners rejected
the alternative because the site was too isolated and had no electric and water
facilities. Private respondent filed a complaint for breach of the conditions
imposed in the amended deed of donation and seeking the revocation of the
donation.
Petitioners admitted the commencement of the construction but alleged that
the conditions imposed in the amended deed were contrary to Municipal
Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise known as the Subdivision
Ordinance of the Municipality of Angeles.
ISSUE:

Whether a subdivision owner/developer is legally bound under Presidential

Decree No. 1216 to donate to the city or municipality the open space
allocated exclusively for parks, playground and recreational use.
HELD:
PD 1216 (amending PD 957) defines open space as an area reserved exclusively
for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship,
hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and
amenities.
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be nonalienable public lands, and non-buildable. No portion of the parks and
playgrounds donated thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or
purposes.
Upon their completion xxx, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall
be donated by the owner or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be
mandatory for the local government to accept; provided, however, that the
parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the
project with the consent of the city or municipality concerned. xxx. (amended
sec. 31, PD 957)
It is clear from the aforequoted amendment that it is no longer optional on the
part of the subdivision owner/developer to donate the open space for parks and
playgrounds; rather there is now a legal obligation to donate the same.
Although there is a proviso that the donation of the parks and playgrounds
may be made to the homeowners association of the project with the consent of
the city of municipality concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is still
obligated under the law to donate. Such option does not change the mandatory
character of the provision. The donation has to be made regardless of which
donee is picked by the owner/developer. The consent requirement before the
same can be donated to the homeowners association emphasizes this point.
We hold that any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the
same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. The contention of petitioners that the donation should be unconditional
because it is mandatory has no basis in law. P.D. 1216 does not provide that
the donation of the open space for parks and playgrounds should be
unconditional. To rule that it should be so is tantamount to unlawfully
expanding the provisions of the decree. In the case at bar, one of the conditions
imposed in the Amended Deed of Donation is that the donee should build a
sports complex on the donated land. Since P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the
3.5% to 9% of the gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is nonbuildable, then the obvious question arises whether or not such condition was
validly imposed and is binding on the donee. It is clear that the non-buildable
character applies only to the 3.5% to 9% area set by law. If there is any excess
land over and above the 3.5% to 9% required by the decree, which is also used
or allocated for parks, playgrounds and recreational purposes, it is obvious that
such excess area is not covered by the non-buildability restriction. Inasmuch

as the construction and operation of the drug rehabilitation center has been
established to be contrary to law, the said center should be removed or
demolished. At this juncture, we hasten to add that this Court is and has
always been four-square behind the governments efforts to eradicate the drug
scourge in this country. But the end never justifies the means, and however
laudable the purpose of the construction in question, this Court cannot and
will not countenance an outright and continuing violation of the laws of the
land, especially when committed by public officials.
MIRANDA vs. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999
FACTS:
In 1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago,
Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was
approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was
enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners
assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit
the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said
act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component
city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They
also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that
the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

HELD:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the
jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a
justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law
passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the implementation of RA No. 8528. Miranda
was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang
Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City
of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city through a
plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA

No. 8528 gives

unconstitutional.

them

proper

standing

to

strike

down

the

law

as

Sec.1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
- when the boundaries of a LGU is substantially altered, there are necessarily
more than one unit affected -- the parent LGU and the new LGU that was
created
as
a
result
of
the
alteration
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act
Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of
Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos
and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto.
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a
plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition
and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code because:
(1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those
living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not
included in the plebiscite
(2) The area which would comprise the new provinc of Negros del Norte would
only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area
prescribed by the governing statute
The Supreme Court was in recess at the time so the petition was not timely
considered. Consequently, petitioners filed a supplemental pleading on January
4, 1986, after the plebiscite sought to be restrained was held the previous day,
January 3.
ISSUE:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites
under Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, which states that -"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the

approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

HELD:
In interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court held that whenever a
province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries, "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or
units affected" must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily
result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental.
"Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because
its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would
be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte."
The Supreme Court further held that the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes
versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No.
55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6), which the respondents used to support
their case, should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather,
it held that the dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in the
aforementioned case is the forerunner of the applicable ruling, quoting that:
"...when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of
the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the
case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. I
see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."
It appeared that when Parliamentary Bill NO. 3644 which proposed the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte was passed for approval, it
recited therein that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected
within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act."
However, when the bill was enacted into B.P. 885, tehre was an unexplained
change from "areas affecte" to "the proposed new province, which are the areas
affected." The Supreme Court held that it was a self-serving phrase to state
that the new province constitutes the area affected.
"Such additional statement serves no useful purpose for the same is
misleading, erroneous, and far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent
province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects
it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners."
Consequently, the Supreme Court pronounced that the plebscite held on
January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional.

The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the
appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED."
ALVAREZ vs. GUINGONA
G.R. No. 118303 January 31, 1996
252 SCRA 695 Political Law Municipal Corporation LGU Requirement
Income Inclusion of IRAs
FACTS:
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago
into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was
passed in the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of
HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994,
the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate
Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of
HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243.
Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et
al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill
creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of
Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum
in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average
income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs
income.
HELD:
1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows.
Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB
was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1 st
hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate
(in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average
annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income
because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local

treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government
unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably
rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis,
too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a
technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government
Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers
referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national
government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled
corporations.
MARIANO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie
Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act
No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City) as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was
filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners,
only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following
grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation
to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general

reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years

following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey
(1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the
constitutionality of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
No merit in the petition.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed
city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present
territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the
southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest
by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining
local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a
local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within
the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of

governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This
is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that
the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be
brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that
said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any
clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present
territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why
the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A.
No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense
of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose
the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its
exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice
of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds
description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes.
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In
the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,
we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional.
We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond
cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of
newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds,
with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which
the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the
establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this
case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has
been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain
therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens
titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which
the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code
is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It
seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their
constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral
type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the
spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave,
instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means
that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72
SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials
of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of
Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time
that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will
acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees
of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties
and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the
City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for
a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including
Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are
prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue
that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence,
section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In
particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati
Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run
and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for
the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since
his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently
crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay
will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
no jurisdiction.
III

Finally, petitioners assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A.

No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highlyurbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative
districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by
the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections
to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in
lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment cannot made by a special law, (2) the
addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill and (3)
Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In
said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for
an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with
a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever
whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as
of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population

has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the
title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the
policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not
command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
NAVARRO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011
Is the Law Creating Dinagat Province Valid? (A 2011 ruling update)
FACTS:
The National Statistics Office certified that Dinagat Islands population is
120,813. Its land area is 802.12 square kilometers and its average annual
income is P82,696,433.23, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance. On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. 9355
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC
conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the LGC which yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province
of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the
President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of
office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized
elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who
assumed office on July 1, 2007.
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro and other
former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before the SC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9355 alleging that that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if
uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly
deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial
territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area.
Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional? On February 10, 2010 Ruling, the Supreme
Court held it unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is
below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of
250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land
area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area

requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more
islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the said
exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. There is no dispute that in
case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and
regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law, held
the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat
filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?
HELD:
The April 12, 2011 Ruling:
Yes, it is constitutional. The Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act
No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared
VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is
not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of
municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population,
and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created
consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement
as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply
to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the
physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater

likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a
newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore,
logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in
Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the
LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight
in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would,
then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR.
xxx Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units
genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area
requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation
adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counterproductive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an
intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities
which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC.
Yet, the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area
criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands.
fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a
distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land area over one
composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of
self-reliant communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to
the constituency. This preferential option would prove more difficult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered
because the islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with
a contiguous land mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability
of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by
the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and
sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May
10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE vs MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO
G.R. No. 140474 September 21, 2007
FACTS:

On October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in the Province of

Nueva Vizcaya, filed for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the
barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. As the parties failed to amicably settle
during the pre-trial stage, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial was almost over, with petitioners rebuttal witness already under
cross-examination, when the court, realizing its oversight under existing law,
ordered the suspension of the proceedings and the referral of the case to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya.
In turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed on the matter to its Committee on
Legal Affairs, Ordinances and Resolutions, which recommended adopting
Resolution No. 64 dated September 14, 1979 of the former members of its
Provincial Board.
Said resolution previously resolved to adjudicate the barangays of Bantinan
and Canabuan as parts of respondents territorial jurisdiction and enjoin
petitioner from exercising its governmental functions within the same.
Subsequently, as per Resolution No. 357 dated November 13, 1989, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the Committees recommendation but
endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings and
preservation of the status quo pending finality of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial courts dismissal of the
instant case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that at the time of the filing
of the motion to dismiss the original jurisdiction to hear and decide, the case
had been vested on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no longer on the RTC.
HELD:
NO. The difference in the factual setting notwithstanding, Municipality of
Sogod still applies in the sense that similar thereto the pendency of the present
case has also been overtaken by events the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and the enactment of the LGC of 1991.
Since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been
the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary
disputes between or among two or more municipalities located in the same
province. With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced
that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only
issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the
case within the reglementary period.
The LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
concerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from
having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening
or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually

hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in
the law and its implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect,
reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128,
under which the provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the
parties and eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand,
under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first
instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should
any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate
the same.
MAGTAJAS vs PRYCE PROPERTIES
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc.,
renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during
the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the
casinos opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of
business permit and cancelling existing business permit to the establishment
for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they
both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant
to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit
the operation of casino for the general welfare.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.
Held:
No.
CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC.
However, ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are
merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only
delegated powers conferred by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino
gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
DRILON vs. LIM
G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
Facts:

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the
LocalGovernment Code2.
The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer)
declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for noncompliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC
revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared
Sec. 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the
power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section
187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment
of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not
been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to
submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issues:
1. WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec
187 of the LGC.
2. WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

Held:
1. Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases
in which the subject of the litigation are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Moreover, Article X, Section5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts
in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration
of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the
doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court,
2

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.

including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation

before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was
first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there
was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
2. Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the

constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke

it on either or both of these grounds.

When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also

permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not
replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. What he found
only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance
with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere
supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by
his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does not laydown such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy
Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity
of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would
involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an
examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law
had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere
supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any
rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section
187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of
the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on
two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions
and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These
grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax
measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the

enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (Allegations: No
written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no
minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had
been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the
City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the
Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather
and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25exhibits) later submitted
to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the procedural
requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings
were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings
are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that
the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila
Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due
process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been
translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of
local development plans and public investment programs of the local
government unit and not to tax ordinances.
ANDAYA vs RTC
G.R. No. 126661 February 13, 2004
FACTS:
On January 3, 1996, the position of City Director, Cebu City Police Command
(chief of police) became vacant after P/Supt. Antonio Enteria was relieved of
command.
Thereafter, petitioner Andaya submitted to the City Mayor of Cebu a list of 5
eligibles from which the latter would choose and appoint as the new chief of
police. However, the mayor did not choose anyone from the list because P/Chief
Inspector
Andres
Sarmiento
was
not
included
therein.
Petitioner Andaya refused the Mayors request to include Major Andres
Sarmiento in the list of police officers for appointment since he was not
qualified for the position under NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 95-04.
ISSUE:
WON Mayor of Cebu City may require the inclusion of his protg in the list of 5
eligibles to be recommended to him by the Regional Police Dir., Regional Police

Command No.7, for his selection of the City Director, City Police Command
(chief of police).
HELD:
No.
RA 6975
Sec.51 deputizes the Mayor of Cebu City as representative of the National
Police Commission in his territorial jurisdiction
grants the Mayor of Cebu City authority to choose the chief of police from a
list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Director, Regional Police
Command No. 7. The City Police Station of Cebu City is under the direct
command & control of the PNP Regional Director, and is equivalent to a
provincial office.
It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the 5 eligibles from
a pool of eligible officers, screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and
Selection Board, without interference from local executives.
The National Police Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 to
implement RA 6975.
Memorandum Circular 95-04 provides qualifications for Chief of Police
of highly urbanized cities:
(1) completion of the Officers Senior Executive Course (OSEC)
(2) holding the rank of Police Superintendent
In case of disagreement between the Regional Police Director and the
Mayor, the question shall be elevated to the Regional Director, National
Police Commission, who shall resolve the issue within 5 working days
from receipt and whose decision on the choice of the Chief of Police shall
be final and executory.
As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In
reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited power of
selecting one from among the list of 5 eligibles to be named the chief of police.
The actual power to appoint the Chief of Police is vested in the Regional
Director.
As such, the mayor cannot require the Regional Director to include the name of
any officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of 5 to be submitted to him. This
is to enhance police professionalism and to isolate the police service from
political domination.