RULE 73: VENUE AND PROCESS

POWER OF COURT TO DETERMINE CONJUGAL PROPERTY

G.R. No. L-32281 June 19, 1975
PEDRO ERMAC, and his children, ELENA, CARLOS, ANTONIO, LUCIANO, HILARIO, INDALECIO
and
FRANCISCA,
all
surnamed
ERMAC, petitioners,
vs.
CENON MEDELO and JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA as presiding judge of Branch II of the LANAO
DEL NORTE Court of First Instance, respondents.
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent court of June 25, 1970, in its
Special Proceedings No. 1517, approving the project of partition filed by private respondent,
pursuant to the order of the same court providing for summary settlement of the intestate estate
of the deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit as well as of the order of July
15, 1970 denying reconsideration of the first order

Sps. Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving as the only property to be inherited by their heirs a
parcel of land, Lot 1327, Cad. 292, covered by OCT No. RP-355 (262) of the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City, with an assessed value of P590.00.

Herein respondent Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren of the said spouses, filed a petition
for summary settlement of said estate.

All requirements having been complied with, and there being no opposition thereto, on January
21, 1970, respondent court issued an order granting the same, enumerating all the heirs entitled
to participate in the inheritance and ordering petitioner to present the proper project of partition of
the lot aforementioned.

On February 2, 1970, however, petitioner Pedro Ermac, one of the children of the deceased
spouses, moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement, praying for the elimination of Lot
1327 from the estate on the ground that it belongs to him and his wife. This motion was denied,
the court ruling that the proper remedy is a separate suit.

Accordingly, petitioner, together with his children, filed the corresponding action, Civil Case No.
1564 of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. And when upon submission of the project
of partition, the respondent court approved the same over his objection predicated on the
pendency of Civil Case No. 1564, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in
approving the project of partition covering Lot No. 1327 notwithstanding that it is being claimed by
petitioners in a separate civil action to be their property and not of the estate. Such being the case, the
petition cannot prosper
HELD:

The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons with the least loss of time. This is specially true with small estates for which the rules
provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with the appointment of an administrator
together with the other involved and cumbersome steps ordinarily required in the determination of
the assets of the deceased and the persons entitled to inherit therefrom and the payment of his
obligations.

Definitely, the probate court is not the best forum for the resolution of adverse claims of
ownership of any property ostensibly belonging to the decedent's estate. 1

While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular administration proceedings, 2 it
is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just because an heir or a
third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate but to him. 3

Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court should proceed to
the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal obstacles to it, for after all, such
distribution must always be subject to the results of the suit. For the protection of the claimant the
appropriate step is to have the proper annotation of lis pendens entered.
TITLE TO PROPERTY
[G.R. No. 117417. September 21, 2000]

MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner,

RESELVA, respondents.
FACTS:

vs. COURT

OF

APPEALS

and

MENANDRO

A.

Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante
Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late Sps Teodoro and Lucrecia
Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively.
During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lot consisting of 100
square meters, more or less.
Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a holographic
will which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed
Executrix.
After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before respondent
probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to
vacate the property and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof. This is the motion
which the respondent court granted in the assailed order of October 18, 1993
Appellate court: RTCs decision was set aside for having been issued beyond the latter's limited
jurisdiction as a probate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not claims for title to, or right of possession of, personal or real property, made by the
heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be
entertained by the (probate) court.
HELD:

The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and
which are claimed to belong to outside parties.
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate
the house and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be
considered an "outside party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such,
he is very much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate. [8]
By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all heirs of the decedent,
it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property." [9]
Here, the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the
opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate action would be most
expensive and inexpedient.[10]
In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since
the former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter.[11]
In the same way, when the controversy is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal
partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine
the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs. [12]
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court
Vita vs. Montanano (1991) we ruled:"(I)t is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court
for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership
of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the
latter."[13]
Consequently, this case before us should be returned to the probate court for the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva prior to the settlement of the estate of
Teodoro

RULE 75: PRODUCTION OF WILL; ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
G.R. No. L-23638

October 12, 1967

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,

vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23662

October 12, 1967

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
FACTS:

on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance
a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on
October 22, 1930.

The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased.

The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa
Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all
claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked.

Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel by
laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major
portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which
conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3,
1954, in cases G.R. Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).

RTC: found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the
questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is
opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that
the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959,
the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but
"reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."

On January 11, 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the
sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this was done on February 9, 1960.

RTC: On February 27, 1962, resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale

CA: admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same
was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the claim of
oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944
deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE:
(a) whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become
final for lack of appeal;
(b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel
invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final; and
(c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her
execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944
HELD:
(a) We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is untenable. It is elementary that a
probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and
the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado
vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final
and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that
specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time,
the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke
said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly
lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
The alleged revocation implied from the execution of the deeds of conveyance in favor of the
testamentary heir is plainly irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the testament
was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to probate, or its probate is denied, all
questions of revocation become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there would
be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked by the oppositors-appellants is not an
express one, but merely implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing an
abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the properties concerned. As such,
the revocation would not affect the will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the revoked testament
(b) We have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of
a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's,
expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership
and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a
will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation
(Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of
estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not,
the defense is patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
(c) In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances (affirmed in
that point by this Supreme Court in Reyes vs. Court of Appeals and Dimagiba, L-5618 and L-

5620, promulgated on July 31, 1954), "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent
Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in
conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with
what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure
therefrom.1 Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in the
circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not
apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not
necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies
If the annulment was due to undue influence, as the quoted passage implies, then the transferor
was not expressing her own free will and intent in making the conveyances. Hence, it can not be
concluded, either, that such conveyances established a decision on her part to abandon the
original legacy.

RULE 73 PRIORITY OF COURT FIRST TAKING COGNIZANCE

MACIAS vs. UY KIM
G.R. No. L-31174, May 30, 1972
FACTS:
Macias avers that he is a beneficiary of the estate of Julian Wolfson pending
settlement in Special Proceedings No. 57405 before Branch VI of the Manila Court of
First Instance and also a beneficiary of the estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson
pending settlement in Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the
Manila Court of First Instance. In Special Proceedings No. 63866, he appealed from
the order appointing Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator to the Supreme
Court and that he has been named as special administrator of the estate of Rosina
in Special Proceedings No. 67302 originally assigned to Branch VI but later
transferred to Branch VIII and consolidated with Special Proceedings No. 63866. The
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII dismissed said Special Proceedings No. 67302 which
he also appealed to the Supreme Court. Private respondents Reliable Realty
Corporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong
filed a motion to dismiss appellant Macias' complaint in Branch X of the Manila
Court of First Instance on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of the suit, the complaint states no cause of action, there
is another action of the same nature pending in court, and the plaintiff has no legal
capacity to prosecute the present suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over the case since the subject matter involved properly belongs
exclusively to and is within the competence of Branch VIII and Branch IV before
which courts Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405 are pending and
petitioner's alleged claim of beneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina
depends on a recognition thereof by the probate court in said Special Proceedings
Nos. 63866 and 57405.

RULING:
YES. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore
all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First
Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals,
Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the
testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still
pending. The Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus: The
reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a
deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful
administration of that estate it is necessary that there should be but one
responsible entity, one court, which should have exclusive control of every part of
such administration. To entrust it to two or more courts, each independent of the
other, would result in confusion and delay.

RULE 73 TITLE TO PROPERTY

COCA vs. PANGILINAN
G.R. No. L-27082, January 31, 1978
FACTS:
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948,
respectively. They possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land,
located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental. The other
parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the
Heirs of Juan Pan, represented by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta. According to
Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, surveyed in the
name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms
part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses. The Pangilinan spouses were
survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar
all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in
1961, and (3) Francis, Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the
children of Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow,
Guadalupe Pizarras. Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental was instituted on September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. On
September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the
combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares. It was also
provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of
the estate to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of
heirs, or P1,696.16 for each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan opposed that project of partition. They contended
that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6,
1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare
portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan
should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco

Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed. The appellant contend
that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership
of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or
the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the
ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of
partition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title to the twelve hectares should be decided in a
separate action and not in the intestate proceeding.
RULING:
NO. As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be
ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71
SCRA 262, 266). However, that general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified
by expediency and convenience. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination
in a separate action. Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question
of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one
of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. The instant case
may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be
ventilated in a separate action. Here, the probate court had already received
evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the
motion for its exclusion from title inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

RULE 75 DUE EXECUTION AND EXTRINSIC VALIDITY

MANAHAN vs. MANAHAN
50 Phil 488
FACTS:
On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted Special Proceedings No.
4162 for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan who died in
Bulacan on August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named
the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary
notice required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of the
petition, no opposition thereto was filed and after the evidence was presented, the
court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was
probated on September 22, 1930. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner
executrix with a bond of P1,000, and likewise appointed the committed on claims
and appraisal, whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual course.
One year and seven months later, that is, on May 11, 1932, the appellant herein
filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting
the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab
initio. The appellee herein, naturally filed her opposition to the petition and, after
the corresponding hearing thereof, the trial court erred its over of denial on July 1,
1932. Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of appealing from this last order,
likewise appealed from the judgment admitting the will to probate.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really
probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication.
2. Whether or not the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the
external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not
been complied within the execution thereof.
RULING:

1. NO. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in
question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by
the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in
accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is
no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the
probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in
this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in
the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been
complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid
and effective in the eyes of the law.
2. NO. Once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate,
questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal.
The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugn on any of the grounds authorized by law,
except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings

Rule 72 sec.1
Definition of Special Proceeding
G.R. No. 16680 September 13, 1920
Broadwell Hagans vs Adolph Wislizenus
Facts:
The respondent judge sitting in the probate court issued an order appointing an assessor for the
purpose of fixing the amount due an administrator or executor for latters services and expenses
in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person. Petitioner
contested the order of the respondent judge by writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court. In
support of his demurrer, respondent judge argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him to
appoint assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law
exists for the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
Issue: What is Special proceeding/s and whether or not the order of the judge appointing an
assessor is valid?
Rulling:
There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. An action is a
formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or
by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules.
(People vs. County Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106, 110; Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides.
The remedy in special proceedings is generally granted upon an application or motion.

Illustrations of special proceedings, in contra distinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings

for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate
testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar, etc., etc.
The Court find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which gives us an
interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an "action" and a
"special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in a court
of justice, while "every other remedy furnished by law is a 'special proceeding." Sections 57-62
of Act No. 190 provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace.
Therefore, the only provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of
assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190. Section 154 provides
that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial.
Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided. In
proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority to
appoint assessors.

Rule 73 sec.2
Discretion of Court
PCIB vs Hon. Venicio Escolin
Facts:
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May
1957, while she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.In her will, she left all
her estate in favor of her husband, Charles. Linnie however also stated in her will that should
her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.In December
1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). The lawyer of Charles filed a
motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a
certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the
trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Lawyer manifested that Charles himself
left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles office. Hence, in the meantime, hed like
to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Respondent Judge Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since
said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnies estate opposed
the said petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles will was granted. Eventually still, the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused
to turn over the estate.

Issue: Whether or not the Court has the discretion to determine to which probate proceeding the
estate should be settled?
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband
or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either." Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal
partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits that the
liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it
should be made.
Rule 74 Sec.1,4&5
Summary Settlement of Estates: Substantive requirements
No.L-3367 May 24, 1950 / 88 Phil 785 Ramon Monserrat vs Fidel Ibanez
(I cannot find this case on the web and even in the library materials)
88 Phil 785 said: Unpublished decision

RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan

delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament
of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before the court to
examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field
in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the
special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the
purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate
proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became
vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez,
even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the
will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix+
the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules
of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or
subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of
a valid operative will.

Valerio vs. Inserto

Facts:
In the settlement proceedings of spouses Valera, the heirs of Teresa Garin
(predeceased daughter of Sps. Valera) moved to cite in contempt the
appointed administrators (Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera) of the estate
for failing to render accounting of their administration. In response, the
administrators alleged that no accounnting could be submitted unless Jose
Garin (husband of Teresa) reconveyed to the estate of the Sps. Valera a
fishpond presently in his possession which actually belong to the same
estate. Thus, the administrators moved that the fishpond be reverted to the
estate.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
decide the issue of the title covering a fishpond.

Held:
No, the probate court has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Settled is the rule that the court of first instance (RTC), acting as a probate
court, exercises but limited jurisdiction. Thus no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent. Unless the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly to the
submission of the question to the probate court for the adjudgment or the
interests of the third persons are not thereby prejudiced, it can be permitted.
The reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a
particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.
probate court, land registration, etc) is in reality not jurisdictional but in
essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be
waived.

In re Johnson, 38 Phil 156

Facts:
On February 4, 1916, Emil Johnson, a native of Sweden and naturalized
citizen of US died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with
an estimated amount of Php 231, 800. The will was written in the testator's
own handwritting and signed by himself and 2 witnesses only instead of
three witnesses which is required by sec. 618 of the Civil Code Procedure.
Therefore this will was not executed in conformity of laws generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of these Isalands and hence could
not have proved. However, a petition was presented in the court of first
instance (RTC) of tehe City of Manila for the probate of the will on the ground
that 1) Johnson was at the time of his death, a citizrn of the State of Ilinois,
USA; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of the
State and hence could have properly probated here. The court admitted the
probate of the will.

Issue:

Whether or not the order admitting the will was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court and void because made without notice to the interested party.

Held:
No. The court does not act beyond its jurisdiction.
The court of first instance does not lack jurisdiction over the probate of wills.
It is apparent from an inspection of the record of the proceedings in the court
that all steps prescribed by law as prerequites to the probate of will were
complied with in every respect and the probate was effected in external
conformity with all the legal requirements. Thus, the court made an order of
publication which apprised all interested parties. Hence, court opined that
the proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.

RULE 73:

DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
POWER OF THE COURT TO DETERMINE CONJUGAL PROPERTY

FALCATAN vs. SANCHEZ, 101 PHIL 1238 (1957)

FACTS: Petitioner appealed the decision of the CFI Zamboanga providing for the
summary settlement of the estate of the late Patricio Sanchez which includes a
parcel of land. She contends that the court had no jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of title to real property and then decide on how the lot is to be divided.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court cannot pass upon the question of
ownership that arose during the present case for summary settlement
HELD: The Supreme Court has ruled in the negative. Generally, the jurisdiction of
the probate court relates only to matters having to do with the estate and probate
of a will, and does not include the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during proceedings. However, that is only true if the title is disputed by a third
party, not by the surviving spouse or heirs of the deceased, as successors of the
latter. As long the heirs agree to submit the question for determination by the court
and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced, or that the purpose is to
determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory,
then the probate court may decide prima facie on the ownership of the property. But

such determination is only provisional, not conclusive, and is without preudice to

the right of interested parties to ventilate the question in a separate action. In the
present case, the two conjugal properties involved were correctly ruled to equally
share ownership over the parcel of land. Petition was denied.
(Sorry, this is an unreported case so I couldn't find the actual decision or a digest
with clearer summary of facts. If you can find the decision, hit me up!)

RULE 73

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT

TITLE TO PROPERTY

ORTAEZ-ENDERES vs. CA, G.R. No. 128525, December 17, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner is the alleged illegitimate daughter, among four other siblings, of the late
Dr. Juvencio Ortanez, who also left behind a legal wife and three legitimate children.
The decedent was at the time of Philinerlife's incorporation owner of 90% of
subscribed capital stock. Subsequent to his death, the legal family members
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, partitioning it among
themselves and selling 51% of the company's outstanding capital stock to the
private respondents. The private respondents then doubled the authorized the
outstanding capital stock of Philinterlife, effectively diluting the value of the shares
previously held by Dr. Juvencio Ortanez. Petitioner, for herself and her common-law
mother and siblings, then sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the exercise by the private respondents of their rights as stockholders of
Philinterlife. The prayer for the writ was not granted on the grounds that the
petitioner failed to make a valid cause to entitle them to the relief, and that they
had actual, clear and positive rights over the estate which is still the subject of an
ongoing settlement before the probate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of the settlement of the estate in the probate
court gives the alleged heirs an actual, clear and positive right over the subject
shareholdings
HELD: The Supreme Court has ruled in the negative. The intestate court may pass
upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the
same should or should not be included in the inventory but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be constituted by the parties. The petitioner and her family's
alleged heirship is yet to be established in the probate court and grants only a
contingent and future right to the alleged heirs. Such class of rights is not the
actual, clear and positive right that is required before a writ of injunction may be
granted. Therefore, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of violation
of an actually existing right of petitioners over the shareholdings presently in the
possession of private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a

mere damnum absque injuria. And if the allegations of the respondents dissipating
the said shares are indeed well-founded, these may be brought to the attention of
the probate court. Petition was denied.
(A newer case, Lee vs. RTC with G.R. 146006, Feb 2004, nullified the sale of the
stocks as they were done without the required approval of the intestate court)

RULE 75: MEANING OF PROBATE

DUE EXECUTION AND EXTRINSIC VALIDITY
MANINANG vs. CA, G.R. 57848, June 19, 1982
FACTS: Petitioners are testamentary heirs of the late Clemencia Aseneta, the latter
having died single but with an adopted son Bernardo. The testator left a holographic
will that bequeathed all her properties to the petitioners because she has "found
peace and happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still
alive and especially now when I am being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and
nice Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear (...) I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son." Petitioners then filed a petition for probate of
the will with the CFI Quezon, while private respondent Bernardo claimed to be the
sole heir and instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI Rizal. These cases were
consolidated but the testate case was later dismissed on Bernardo's motion on the
ground that the holographic was null and void because he, as the only compulsory
heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. Petitioners averred that
in the case for probate of a will, the court's are of inquiry is limited to an
examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will, and that if the
court would only examine the will it would find that Bernardo was disinherited and
not preterited. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration, and the CA
denied certiorari on the ground that appeal was the proper remedy; hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the will even before probate
HELD: The Supreme Court has held in the positive. The law enjoins the probate of
the will and public policy requires it so that the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may not be rendered nugatory. Although the intrinsic validity of a
will may be passed upon even before probate for practical considerations, this
should be considered as the exception rather than the rule. The resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the will is demanded in the present case as there is still an issue
of whether or not respondent Bernardo had been preterited or disinherited, and if
the latter, if the disinheritance was valid. It is an important matter of public interest
that a purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Petition was
granted, and the case remanded to CFI Rizal for reinstatement and consolidation for
further proceedings.

(Review: Preterition is the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited; its effect is to annul the institution of heir. Disinheritance, on the other hand, is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized by law; the
effect of invalid disinheritance is annulment of the institution of heirs but only insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited.)

Definition of special proceedings

Natcher vs CA
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located
in Manila
Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six
children , entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate
on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the
real property.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the
six children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the land his wife Patricia
Graciano dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs
Respondents alleged that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed
a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 1987
Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano on 20 March
1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a
compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during
Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties
to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore
claim against Gracianos estate or against herein petitioners property.
A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by the 6
children
Rtc ruled that deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in
favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete
nullity.

no evidence that a separation of property was agreed

upon in the marriage settlements or that there has
been decreed a judicial separation of property
between them, the spouses are prohibited from
entering into a contract of sale

Case was brought to CA; CA decided that:

trying an ordinary action for reconveyance /

annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when
it performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the
estate of a deceased, when it is acting as a court of general jurisdicition in
an action for reconveyance

Ruling:
No, RTC cannot adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the
estate of a deceased when it is acting as a court of general jurisdiction
in an action for reconveyance.
A civil action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law.
A special proceeding is as an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact.

An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the

manner prescribed by the court or by the law.

It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite

established rules.

 The term special proceeding may be defined as an application or

proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact.
Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless
the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or motion
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which
are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings
commenced without summons and p0rosecuted without regular
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions.
A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.
an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a
civil action
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such
as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding,
matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
RTC is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of Natcher in the
case for reconveyace and annulment of title with damages

Claims against conjugal partnership

OCAMPO vs Potenciano
89 PHIL 159

Facts:
Yatco was the widow of Edilberto Ocampo
Edilberto Ocampo entered into a sale (house and lot) with pacto de
retro with his relative Conrado Potenciano and the latter's wife, Rufina
Reyes. On that same day, Ocampo signed another document, making it
appear that, for an annual rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is
equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price, the vendees were
leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption
period.
The property was registered in the name of Ocampo alone but in reality
belonged to him andhis wife as conjugal property
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible
to another year," but several extensions were granted, with the vendor
paying part of the principal in addition to interests.
The last extension granted was for year from February 3, 1937, and
the period having elapsed without the repurchase having been made,
Potenciano, filed with the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for
the consolidation of title, on the strength of which the register of deeds
issued a TCT.
This, however, did not close the avenue for settlement as Potenciano,
his wife Rufina Reyes already deceased, gave Paz Yatco an option to
repurchase the property for P2,500 within 5 years, and a lease thereon
for the same period of time at annual rental of P300. Paz Yatco sought
to exercise the option by tendering to Potenciano at his clinic in Manila
the sum of P4,000 an amount sufficient to cover both principal and
interest, and upon the tender being rejected, deposited the money in
court and brought an action in her own name and as judicial
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel
Potenciano to accept it and to have the title to the property reinstated
in her name and that of her husband.
Intervening in the case, Potenciano's children, Victor and Lourdes, filed
a cross-complaint, alleging that the option to purchase granted by their
father to plaintiff was null and void as to the share of their deceased
mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share passed to
them by right of inheritance, and that as to their father's share in the
same property they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of
redemption accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common,
for which purpose they had already tendered him the sum of P1,250 on
the fifth day after they learned of said option through plaintiff's
complaint.
To meet these allegations, plaintiff Paz Yatco amended her complaint
by including the intervenors as defendants and alleging, in effect, that
the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a mortgage to secure
a pre-existing debt, with the rental contract thrown in to cover the
stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that the option agreement for the
repurchase of the property within five years from February 28, 1939,
and for the payment of rental for thaperiod in an amount equal to an

annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was also meant to be in

reality an extension of the life of the mortgage; and that the tender of
payment was valid, the same having been made within the extended
period.
Issue:
Whether or not a surviving spouse have the authority as de facto
administrator of the
conjugal estate
Ruling:
No, the surviving spouse do not have the authority as de facto administrator
of the conjugal estate.
Upon the dissolution of marriage by the death of the spouse, the
surviving spouse must liquidate the partnership affairs. When the
marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the
partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased.
This rule signifies that the surviving spouse do not have the authority
as de facto administrator since his or her properties with the deceased
spouse will be considered as a separate property or estate, because of
liquidation.
Extrajudicial settlement
Guico vs Bautista
110 Phil 584
Facts:
Mariano G. Bautista died intestate on December 5, 1947 and that his
properties had already been extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs;

Gertrudes Garcia likewise died intestate on August 31, 1956 leaving as

her legitimate heirs plaintiffs and defendants; that said Gertrudes
Garcia, during her lifetime, made several deeds of donation of some of
her properties in favor of all the defendants, but did not provide that
the properties donated would not be subject to collation, so that the
donees are legally bound to bring into the mass of the estate by way of
collation the value of the properties received by them in order that the
net hereditary estate may be divided equally among the heirs;

that the deceased Gertrudes Garcia left outstanding obligations to the

Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and the G.A. Machineries, Inc.

 Defendants alleged, that the action was premature because it is

admitted in the complaint that the deceased left certain debts, the
lower court dismissed the complaint .
plaintiffs appealed to SC, urging that their action for partition and
liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding that there are pending
obligations of the estate, subject to the taking of adequate measures
either for the payment or security of its creditors

Issue:
Whether or not an action for partition and liquidation is premature until
all the debts of the estate are paid
Ruling:
Yes, an action for partition and liquidation is premature until all the
debts of the estate are paid
The law allows the partition of the estate of a deceased person by the
heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for petition, without
the filing of a special proceeding and the appointment of an
administrator for the purpose of the settlement of said estate, but this
they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial
guardians
If the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity
for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for
them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they
are immediately entitled.
If the deceased left pending obligations uch obligations must be first
paid or compounded with the creditors before the estate can be
divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable
settlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate
would inevitably be submitted to administration for the payment of
such debts.

RULE 73: VENUE & PROCESS

i. VENUE AND PROCESS: Section 1
MEANING OF RESIDENCE
FULE et al V. CA, et al

November 29, 1976

FACTS:
Virginia Fule, a debtor of the estate of the decedent Amando Garcia, filed a petition for
Letters of Administration for the estate of the decedent. Amanda Garcia who died
intestate in Manila and left real and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places within the jurisdiction of the court. She moved ex part for her appointment
as special administratrix. Her motion was granted. However, a motion for
reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on the ground that the court issued
such special administratrix was without jurisdiction since no notice was served upon all
persons interested in the estate. She also alleged that venue was also improperly laid.
Furthermore, she contended that she should be preferred in the appointment of a
regular administrator as she is the surviving spouse of the decedent.
Virginia Fule instituted a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order to annul
the special proceedings and to restrain the judge from further acting on the case.
ISSUE:
What does the term reside mean in Section 1, Rule 73?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?
HELD:
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed.
In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile.

No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence

must be more than temporary.

JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT: Substantive

BORROMEO HERRERA v. BORROMEO
July 23, 1987

FACTS:
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died without forced
heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the probate of
a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising
all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and
undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof.
After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the
deceased was a forgery.
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the
will was affirmed.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging as heirs of the
decedent.
One of the petitioner argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognisance of
the claim of respondent Fortunate Borromeo because it is not a money claim against
the decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the
shares of the decedents estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on the
waiver of hereditary rights of Fortunato Borromeo.
HELD:
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the waiver agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to matters

incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate.

RULE 74: SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES

i. EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
TWO-YEAR LIEN
MICMIKING V. SY COMBIENG 21 PHIL 211
FACTS:

Road Map:
1902 Margarita Jose (died) Engracio Palanca (administrator) Mariano Ocampo
Lao Sempco and Dy Cunyao (surities) 1904 Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco (died)
Doroteo Velasco (administrator) - Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto
(surities) 1905 - Pio de la Guardia Barretto (died) - Benito Sy Conbieng (administrator)
FACTS:
In 1908, Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said
Margarita Jose and Jose McMicking, was appointed in his stead. Palanca refused to
render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose.
Instead of so doing, he retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with
the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands.
In 1909, Jose McMicking, as administrator, made an application to the court for the
appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo for the purpose of
hearing claims against the estate. The commission having been appointed and

qualified, a claim was presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said
Engracio Palanca, as administrator, which claim was allowed by said commission and
later approved by the court, which directed that the said claim be paid by Doroteo
Velasco, if he had sufficient funds to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found
to be due by the
commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of said Margarita Jose.
In 1905, Pio de la Barretto died and letters of administration were issued to Benito Sy
Conbieng. In 1909, upon the application of McMicking, a committee was appointed by
CFI Manila to appraise the estate of the said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and
to hear claims presented against his estate.
The claim so presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, was
disallowed by the committee thereof. Upon these facts the court having heard the
evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered judgment in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. Hence this
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be further administration of the estate after partition
and division

HELD:
In order that it be a reason for such appointment and administration, the claim must be
presented within two years from the date of the partition and distribution.
After the partition and division provided for in sections 596 and 597 have been fully
consummated, no further administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the
following requisites:
1. There must have been discovered a claim against the estate "within two years after
such settlement and distribution of estate."
2. The creditor holding the claim must be the person who moves the court for the
appointment of an administrator.
If those requisites are lacking, there can be no administration. When one fails the right
too such administration does not arise and any person intersted in the estate may
oppose any effort to administer under such circumstances.

Eusebio vs. Eusebio

100 PHIL 593
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided
in Quezon City. Eugenios siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they
are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenios petition and overruled his siblings objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal?
Held:
No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son,
Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was
able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his sons
residence. It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one
owns health even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to
return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres
retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent
Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon;
and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his
house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed of
sale of his house at 889 A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The
marriage contract signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two
days
prior
to
his
death
stated
that
his
reside.nce is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical
presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with
the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga;
that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased,
the venue having been laid improperly.
Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not changed by presence
in a place for ones own health.

Torres vs. Javier

34 PHIL 382 (GR L-10560)
March 24, 1916
FACTS:
This is an appeal in proceeding to appoint an administrator of the estate of Tan Po Pic, deceased. The
trial court refused to appoint Marta Torres who claimed to be the lawful wife of the deceased, and,
instead, appointed Juan L. Javier administrator. The appeal is taken by Marta Torres from that order of
appointment.
It appears that two women are claiming to be the legal wife of Tan Po Pic, deceased, Marta Torres and a
Chinese woman named Yu Teng New. Marta Torres objected to the appointment of any one except
herself, while Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman, opposed the appointment of Marta
Torres. The probate court being unable to determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased,
appointed a disinterested third person to act as administrator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in appointing Juan L. Javier as the administrator
HELD:
No. The probate court is correct. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that letters of
administration should be granted, first, to the surviving husband or wife; second, to other relatives in the
order named; third, in case the surviving wife or next of kin or person selected by them be unsuitable, the
administration may be granted to some other person, such as one of the principal creditors; and fourth, if
there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, the administration may go to such person as the
court may appoint. The court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name a
disinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled in the
administration proceedings at the proper time.

REBONG VS IBANEZ
79 PHIL 324 (G.R. No. L-1578)
September 30, 1947
FACTS:
REBONG was the sole heir of her predecessors-in-interest. She appropriated the estate of her
parents extra-judicially. REBONG petitioned the CFI to cancel the annotation on the Cert. of Title over an
inherited land. The Cet. of Title had the annotation that the land was subject to the claims of the creditors
and other heirs of the deceased parents within two years from July 9, 1947 (no further explanation,
perhaps the parents died together on the said date)
REBONG's petition was anchored on Sec. 112 of Act 496 which stated that Any registered owner
or other person in interest may petition to the court, upon the ground that the registered interests of
any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; or that
new interests have arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; ... and the court shall
have jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition and may order the entry of a new certificate, the
entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security if necessary, as it may deem proper;
REBONG even offered to file a bond amounting to P5000 to answer for any contingent claim that
may arise. The lot in question was worth P5000. CFI judge, respondent IBAEZ, denied REBONG's
petition. Hence, this case.
ISSUE:
Whether REBONG's petition should be granted in light of Rule 74, Secs. 1 & 4, vis-a-vis Act 496.
HELD:
No, since the registered or annotated contingent interest of the creditors or other heirs of REBONG's
predecessors-in-interest, established by Sec. 4 of Rule 74, has not yet terminated or ceased, or the
period of two years from July 9, 1947 has not yet elapsed, respondent IBAEZ had no jurisdiction or
power to order the cancellation of said lien or annotation as prayed by REBONG. Neither Sec. 4, Rule 74,
of the Rules of Court, nor Sect. 112 of Act No. 496 authorizes interest of substitution of a bond for a lien or
registered interest of any description, whether vested, expedient, inchoate or contingent, which have not
yet terminated or ceased. (NB: Decision was promulgated by SC on Sept. 30 1947, clearly less than two
years from July 9, 1947).
Concurring Opinion (Perfecto, J.):
While no provision of law is invoked by REBONG in support of her prayer, she alleges as reasons, (a) that
the rights of third persons whose claims are cancelled by the lien are merely contingent, expectant and
inchoate; (b) that the dominical rights of petitioner would greatly be hampered and she cannot transact or
deal with the real estate property with third persons; and (c) that the bond, in the event that there exist
claims against it within a period of two years will answer for such eventuality, so much so that no right of
third persons will really be prejudiced. She alleges that when she filed the petition on July 14, 1947 with
the lower court, she alleged that she desired to cancel the annotation of the lien "in order to mortgage the
property to a bank."
REBONG's reasons are unconvincing. If her intention in seeking the cancellation of the annotated lien is
to have an opportunity to mortgage the property to a bank so as to obtain a loan, the purpose can be
accomplished without the cancellation prayed for. If she can secure sureties willing and able to answer for
the amount of P5,000, we do not see any reason why she cannot obtain from a bank a loan with the same
sureties. If they can offer a good guarantee for the bond of P5,000, surely they can offer a good
guarantee in favor of a bank for a loan that petitioner may apply for.

RULE 73 VENUE, SEC. 1 - Venue may be Waived or Objected to or Changed

RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. vs. DE BORJA

G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966
FACTS:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963; on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament
of Fr. Rodriguez; on March 12, 1963, petitioners herein filed before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other
things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will; and on
the same date, Pangilinan and Jacalan filed a petition in the Court of Bulacan for the probation of the
will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Pangilinan and Jacalans petition for probate, contending
that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed hours earlier than
the petition for probate filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. The Court of First Instance denied the motion to
dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has jurisdiction to try the case in view
of the pending action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal.
HELD:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio,
have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, as ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred
by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not
the jurisdiction of the Court. The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of
First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court.

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT TITLE TO PROPERTY

CUNANAN vs. AMPARO

G.R. No. L-1313, February 16, 1948

FACTS:
Soriano, one of the present respondents, filed a money claim against the decedent's estate.
Petitioner, in her capacity as administratix asked the court for authority to negotiate a loan in such
amount or to sell so much of the property described in the inventory as might be sufficient to satisfy
the obligation, which was granted. She later manifested to the court that she had tendered to
Soriano in March of that year P880 but that Soriano refused to accept it. She prayed that the creditor
be ordered to accept the amount tendered, to execute the necessary deed of cancellation, and to
return the possession of two parcels of land which had been conveyed to him.
On June 15, 1944, the Honorable Quintin Paredes, Jr., authorized the administratix to
deposit with the clerk of court P880 in full payment of the obligation in favor of Soriano and ordered
him to deliver the property in his possession to the administratix. This order was not appealed nor
was any motion for its reconsideration filed, so far as the pleadings would reveal. On July 17, 1944,
the administratix filed a complaint against Soriano for contempt of court, alleging that Soriano
disobeyed that part of it which commanded him to return the two parcels of land to the estate of
Isaac Cunanan and Candida Joaquin. After hearing, Soriano was found not guilty of contempt but he
was ordered to deliver the property in question to the administratix Rosalina Cunanan for the benefit
of the Intestate Estate. Soriano filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of August 4, 1944, that
is, the last order of Judge Paredes. Soriano stated as grounds of his motion, first, that the title to
those lots had been consolidated in his and his wife's names by virtue of a deed of sale in their favor
by Isaac Cunanan and Rosalina Cunanan on April 7, 1938.
On August 16, 1946, the Honorable Rafael Amparo, who now was presiding over the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in a lengthy order granted Soriano's motion. The petitioner sought a
review of the orders of the respondent Judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to
the estate.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court did not agree with the respondents that the court lacked jurisdiction
to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate. This power is a mere consequence of
the power to approve Soriano's claim; a power which the court undoubtedly had and which Soriano
himself invoked with full knowledge of the facts. As a general rule, with the consent of the parties
matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in
the course of the intestate proceeding provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced.
Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.

RULE 75 DUE EXECUTION AND EXTRINNSIC VALIDITY

PASTOR, ET. AL. vs. CA
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983.

FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children
Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr.
with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada.
Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of
Pastor Sr. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy
which were in the names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in
their own rights.
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The probate court set the
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the ground of
pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. While the reconveyance suit was
still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the
legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of
execution and garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as well
as their motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity of the will.
RULING:
No. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate. He was survived by his wife and 11 children. He left
several properties in Manila and Tarlac. His 8 children petition for the judicial
settlement of the estate in RTC Manila & appointment of bro Romeo as
administrator. Trial court order declaring the whole world in default, except the
government. Thereafter, order of general default set aside upon motion of
petitioners (wife & remaining 3 children). The trial court order admitting the petition

for judicial settlement of estate. Petitioners file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, in which case, absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members
of the same family; and no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the
petition.
oletters of admin, settlement & distribution of estate is an ordinary civil action thus
should be dismissed
ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution
of Estate an ordinary civil action, thus Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis
Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the petition

HELD:
No. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be
controlling.
o Scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution (ILASD) of Estate belies herein petitioners claim that the
same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
Petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate.
fact of death
residence at the time of his said death
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the
probate proceedings.
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard
the intention to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased
father.
o Petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil
action & so petitioners, as oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent
effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article
222 of the Civil Code.
Civil Action/Suit-action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong.
o Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions
Use of term suit
Excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only
to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of
the same family.
Specialo Proceedings- remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status,
right or particular fact.gue

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989, GANCAYCO, J.:]
FACTS:
1. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed
away without a will
a. survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner
Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.
2. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.
a. REASONS:
i. he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the
deceased
ii. deceased left no will
iii. there are no creditors of the deceased
iv. deceased left several properties
v. the spouse of the deceased had been working in London as an
auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the
estate of the deceased.
b. Victoria opposed: there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes
of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does
exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued
in her favor as the surviving spouse.
c. RULING: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate
estate
3. CA: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate
ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts?
HELD:
1. GENERAL RULE: when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator
a. EXCEPTION: when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator.
2. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.

a. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.
3. What constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the
estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no
creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
a. Questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.
b. Merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for
partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration.
c. To have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings.

MARIA CALMA vs. TAEDO

FACTS: The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the
property described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also
indebted to Esperanza Taedo, chargeable against the conjugal property, in the
sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum. On
October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her
daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the
commencement of the corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Calma, was appointed judicial
administratrix of the properties of the deceased.
While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending,
Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for
the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac
rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment,
despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the property described in
the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this
action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the
complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the
sole and absolute owner thereof.
0
ISSUE:
Whether or not a complaint can be filed against Eulalio Calma.
Whether or not the property in this case is subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta.

HELD: No. Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal
property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against
him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the
committee on claims.
Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made
by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the
collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and
said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.

Octavio Maloles II vs Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips

324 SCRA 172
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He
claimed he had no compulsory heirs and had named in his will as sole legatee
and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his
will his properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00;
and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix,
defendant Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing
the will. Ten days after the allowance Santos died. Petitioner (testators
nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceaseds sister Alicia de santos,
filed a motion for intervention as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of
the deceased. Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary in Makati Branch 61, but then withdrew the same. Later
defendant then filed the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65. Petitoner then filed
a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a full
blooded nephew and that a case already related to the subject matter was
pending in Branch 61. Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61.
Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied the petitioners motion to
intervene, and denied taking cognizance of the case forwarded by Branch 65,
because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of the decedent, while the
one in Branch 61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive
and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.
Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed its decision and again
took cognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition
for issuance of letters testamentary filed by defendant.
HELD:
Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioners contention that that the
proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs,
devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, SEC 1 of the Rules of
Court is without merit. In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the
authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. This was already done in the ante-mortem
probate of Dr. De Santos will during his lifetime in Branch 61. Thus, after the
allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else
for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to
Rule 73, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene,
cites Rule 73, 1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure
is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. It is noteworthy that,
although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the
will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court
from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator after his
death.
Lastly, regarding petitioners claim as heir and creditor the Court said that :
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the
decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only
and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in
case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which has already been
probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit only if
the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct
or immediate. His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having
been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to
intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
GERONA vs.DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-19060
May 29, 1964
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona
and Placida de Guzman. Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman
and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz. After the death of Teodora, Marcelo married
Camila Ramos. Their children are herein respondents de Guzman heirs. Marcelo died
in September 1945 and respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of
his estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein that they were the only surviving
heirs of Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also his forced heirs. They
were able to cause the transfer the certificates of 7 parcels of land each in their
names. The petitioners discovered the fraud only the year before the institution of
the case. Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as have their
shares in the said properties reconveyed to them. Defendants argue that Placida de
Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo as she was an illegitimate
child and that the action of the Petitioners is barred by the statute of limitations.
Petitioners assert that since they are co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition is
not subject to the statute of limitations; that if affected, the period of 4 years did
not begin to run until discovery of the fraud. They claim that the fraud done by
respondents took place in 1956 or 1957 and that it had not prescribed when the
present action was commenced.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of the Gerona heirs was barred by the statute of
limitations.
HELD:
Yes, the statute of limitations operates from the time the adverse title is asserted by
the possessor of the property. The defendants excluded the petitioners from the
estate of Marcelo when they executed the deed of extra-judicial settlement claiming
that they are the sole heirs thus setting up an adverse title to the estate. An action
for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust,
resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations and the action may
only be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the
discovery was made on June 25, 1948 when the deed was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents
exclusively. Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than
10 years after. Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of
majortity in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of discovery within which to file an
action. Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority in 1952 and 1954, thus had
2 years after removal of legal incapacity within which to commence their action.

MORALES vs.CFI OF LAGUNA

G.R. No. L-47125 December 29, 1986

FACTS:
Simona Pamuti mortgaged her saltbed property in favor of petitioner Princesita
Santero Morales. On July 26, 1974, the property, following extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, was sold at public auction to Princesita for the sum of P15,452.00.
Petitioner is Simonas grandchild. Simona survived both her husband Pascual and
son Pablo. The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero, were filed on January 3, 1974 by Juanito Santero, Pablo's eldest
child. Princesita was an oppositor in these proceedings.
The respondent Clerk of Court was appointed legal guardian of Simona Pamuti. As
such guardian, he filed a motion to use the funds of the estates of Pascual and Pablo
Santero to redeem Simona's property that had been sold at auction to petitioner
Princesita to which the latter opposed.
On August 6, 1975, the Deputy Sheriff of Cavite, Mario Abueg, tendered to
petitioners account the sum of P16, 342.00 by way of redemption of the property.
The tender was not accepted by the petitioners on the ground that the check was
not a certified check, that the amount tendered was insufficient and that the tender
was made after the lapse of the redemption period.

On January 1, 1976, Simona Pamuti died intestate. In the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Simona, Princesita Santero was allowed to intervene not
as heir but as "creditors of the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti. The same
respondent Clerk of Court was appointed Administrator and eventually, the three
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estates of Pascual Santero,
Pablo Santero and Simona Pamuti were consolidated.
On June 15, 1976, the respondent Clerk of Court in his capacity as administrator of
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti, filed a "Motion to Order the Provincial Sheriff
of Cavite To Issue Certificate of Redemption.
On January 13, 1977, the respondent court granted the aforementioned motion. In
its Order, the respondent court stated that on July 17, 1975, the amount of P16,342
was deposited with the provincial sheriff, that the provincial sheriff requested
Princesita Santero Morales to get the check but the latter refused to do so because
the check was neither a cashier's-check or a manager's check and because the
amount was insufficient; that the insufficiency was due to the "misinformation
erroneously furnished by the sheriff', that the deficiency which represented interests
in the amount of P964.24 was deposited on August 25, 1975; and that in view of the
refusal of Princesita to accept payment, "the check in the amount of P16,324.00
covering the principal together with interest in the amount of P964.24 in cash or a
total of P17,306.24 were deposited with the Rural Bank of Kawit under Savings
Account No. 13147 in the name of the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite and for which the
Provincial Sheriff had issued a receipt dated July 17, 1975
To implement the just cited order, the respondent court, on June 16, 1977, ordered
the administrator to break open the bodega standing on the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over the redemption of property as
in the case at bar.
HELD:
No, According to settled jurisprudence, such controversy is outside the jurisdiction
of the probate court. Parenthetically, it must be mentioned that the respondent
court itself had, at that time, already determined that the petitioners are
intervenors in the settlement proceedings of Simona's estate not as heirs but as
"co-owners" with the intestate estates.
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be

administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.
In Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) the court held that
for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but
such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the questioned Orders of January 13, 1977, May 17,
1977 and June 16, 1977 are declared VOID for having been issued beyond the
jurisdiction of the probate court.

IN RE ESTATE OF JOHNSON
39 PHIL 156
FACTS:
Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in
Manila, leaving a holographic will by which he disposed of his estate. The said document was
not executed in conformity with the provisions the Code of Civil Procedure generally applicable
to wills executed by inhabitants the Philippines. Thereafter a petition was presented in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for the probate of the will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time
of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly
executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here
pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After which, the document was declared
to be legal and was admitted to probate. After the will had been probated, the attorneys for Ebba
Ingeborg Johnson entered an appearance in her behalf and asserted that Ebba is a legitimate
heir of the testator. Thus, she cannot be deprived of the legitime to which she is entitled under
the law governing testamentary successions in these Islands. Therefore, she moved to annul
the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration in order for her to claim the
estate as the sole legitimate heir of her father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of the probate can be set aside on the ground that the testator was not
a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of
that State.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the probate of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its
provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive only as regards the due execution of the will.
The intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be determined by the law of Illinois and
not of the Philippines.
In paragraph 2 of article 10 of the Civil Code it is declared that "legal and testamentary
successions, with regard to the order of succession, as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the laws

of the nation of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country where it may be situate."
In this case the petition submitted to the lower court was insufficient to warrant the setting aside
of the order, probating the will in question, whether said petition be considered as an attack on
the validity of the decree for error apparent, or whether it be considered as an application for a
rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in the affidavits which accompany the
petition. Further, in the latter aspect the petition is subject to the further fatal defect that it was
not presented within the time allowed by law.
Thus, the trial court committed no error in denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is
accordingly affirmed.

IN RE ESTATE OF DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY

95 PHIL 500
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decree of the CFI of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and
testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China on 4 January 1931 by Jose B. Suntay.
Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, Fookien Province,
China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy and 9
children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and a child named Silvino by the
second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings
were instituted in the CFI of Bulacan and after hearing letters of administration were issued to
Apolonio Suntay. The surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of a
last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. The petition was denied because of the loss of said
will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the
evidence to establish the loss of the said will. After liberation, claiming that he had found among
the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters
executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded
and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a
petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in Amoy,
Fookien, China.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will allegedly probated in Amoy, China may be probated in the Philippines.
HELD:
No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved.
The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The
legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established
by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the
Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the
matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are a deposition or a perpetuation of
testimony, and even if it were so, it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on
the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or
by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case
were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received
by the interested parties residing in the Philippines.
In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in
accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held
in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings
leading to the probate or allowance of a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

ABUT, ET. AL. VS. ABUT

GR L-26743
MAY 31, 1972
FACTS:
The case is about the probate of the will of Cipriano Abut. The petitioner is the son of the
deceased and the appointed executor of the said will. During the pendency of the case but
before the court a quo could even start the formal hearing of the petition, Generoso Abut, the
original petitioner, died. This eventuality prompted Gavina Abut, a sister of the deceased
executor and an heir and devisee under the will of the testator Cipriano Abut, to ask the court a
quo to substitute her in lieu of original petitioner and to admit an amended petition wherein she
prayed that the probate of the will be allowed and that letters of administration with the will
annexed be issued in her favor. The court a quo dismissed the petition originally brought by the
deceased Generoso Abut, "without prejudice to the filing of another petition pursuant to the
requirements of the Rules of Court."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court correctly dismissed the petition on the ground that the
original petitioner who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated died
before the petition could be heard and/or terminated.
HELD:
No. The court finds the dismissal untenable. The court ruled that Jurisdiction of the court
once acquired continues until the termination of the case, and remains unaffected by
subsequent events. The court below erred in holding that it was divested of jurisdiction just
because the original petitioner died before the petition could be formally heard. Parties who
could have come in and opposed the original petition, as herein appellees did, could still come
in and oppose the amended petition, having already been notified of the pendency of the
proceeding by the publication of the notice thereof.

DE ARANZ VS. GALING

GR NO. 77047
MAY 28, 1988
FACTS:

Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for probate and allowance of the last will
and testament of Monserrat R-Infante y G-Pola. The petition specified the names and
addresses of the petitioners as legates and devisees. The probate court then issued an order
setting the petition for hearing. This order was published in in Nueva Era, a newspaper of
general circulation once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. Joaquin was then allowed to present
evidence ex-parte and was appointed executor.
The petitioners filed and MR alleging that as named legatees no notices were sent to them as
required by Section 4 of Rule 76 and they prayed that they be given time to file their opposition.
This was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirement under Sec. 4, Rule 76 is mandatory and the omission
constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of direction
HELD:
Yes. It is clear in the Rule that the notice in time and place of hearing for the allowance of a will
shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such place of residence be known.
In this case, there is no question that the places of residence of the petitioners are known to the
probate court. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere
publication of the notice of hearing for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation.

BASA VS. MERCADO

61 PHIL 632
FACTS:
The judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga allowed and probated the last will and
testament of Ines Basa, deceased. In 1932, the same judge approved the account of the
administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed
the administration proceedings. In 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which
they prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to
act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication
of the notice of hearing prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been
complied with in view of the fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the
publication of the required notice for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed
for the hearing on the will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931,
and the hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the
first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The appellants
also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in
which the notice of hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the 21 days requirement of publication be followed pursuant to the
section 630 of the civil procedure.
2.
Whether or not Ing Katipunan newspaper is considered a newspaper of general
circulation.
HELD:
As regards the first issue, was held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full
weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the
notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing.
As to the second issue, the record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general
circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general
information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at
regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan
precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." The
law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure,
should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a
newspaper of general circulation.

CAYETANO VS. LEONIDAS

GR NO. 54919
MAY 30, 1984
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita
Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory
heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the
entire estate of Adoracion.
Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that
Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in
Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.
While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as
the executrix. Hence, this case.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the will was valid
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings
HELD:
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issues.
In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law
which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the
decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national
law of the decedent must apply.
As to the issue of jurisdiction -The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where
she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a
citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.
Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the
petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction.

Rule 73
Jurisdiction of Probate Court

Title to Property issue

PCIB vs CA 344 SCRA 596
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Rule 74
1. Extrajudicial settlement

For Substantive requirements

92 Phil 723
Rodriguez vs Tan
Facts:
Flaviano Rodriguez died on February 8, 1944, at Paraaque, Rizal, leaving an estate with a
value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata, and six children who are the
petitioners and respondent Abelardo all the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a
verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to place it
under the administration of the widow with the understanding that each of the six children would
be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal shares from year to year for the needs of
their families provided that they do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled; that
on March 19, 1952, or eight years after the death of Flaviano, respondent Abelardo filed a
petition for administration of their intestate estate of said deceased in spite of his knowledge that
the estate had no debts and all the heirs were of age; that on June 2, 1952, the other heirs,
petitioners herein, objected to the petition invoking the rule that if the estate is free from
obligations and the heirs are all of age, no administration proceedings shall be allowed; that on
August 11, 1952, respondent Judge, after overruling the opposition, appointed Abelardo
administrator of the estate upon filing the requisite bond. Oppositors filed a petition
for certiorari seeking to nullify the order of respondent Judge

Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge acted properly in maintaining the administration
proceedings and appointing Abelardo as administrator notwithstanding the fact that the estate
has no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution are all of age?

Ruling:
The appointed administrator Abelardo appears to be qualified to act as administrator of the
estate of the deceased Flaviano and does not possess any of the disqualifications. Moreover,
he is one of the heirs left by the deceased.
Rule 74 Section 1 does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even
if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel
them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not
mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the
intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was
done in other provisions that are mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not
only once but in the whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the
discretion of the heirs.

Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement

G.R. No. 118680

March 5, 2001

Pedrosa vs CA

Facts:
In 1946, the spouses Rodriguez initiated proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal
adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena. The CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner
Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina. In 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter,
petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. In the same year private
respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City,
with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants.CFI denied the petition and
upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision
to the Court of Appeals.In 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into
an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and
of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez.

Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents
herein.Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the
properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were
not heirs since they were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the
1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later
amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise
were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed." Respondent opined
that the action for annulment has already prescribed, it being filed beyond the 2-year
prescriptive period under sec.4 Rule 74.The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Action for Anullment of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition has
already prescribed?
Ruling:
No. Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently
then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.The applicable prescriptive
period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which
held that:[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of
fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed
to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.Considering that the
complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after
the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her
action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial
settlement. It states:The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but
no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in
the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule
contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or
Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the
instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not
participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.The provision of Section 4,
Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on
the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena
is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of

Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following
the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code.
*The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's
adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim
that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the
time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed
only twenty six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to
prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid
and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of
partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

Rule 75
2. Nature of Proceedings
Testate estate of Apostol
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:

3. Discovey of will
G.R. No. L-24742

October 26, 1973

Cuenco vs CA and Gonzales

Facts:
Decedent Cuenco died at a hospital in Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
petitioner, and their two sons and the respondents children by the first marriage of the decedent.
Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance
of Cebu, alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila. The CFI of
Cebu ruled that the Petition was not yet ready for consideration of the said court given the noncompliance with the notice and publication requirements. In the meantime, (a week after the
filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa filed a petition with the court of first instance of
Quezon City for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa filed in
said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, the Cebu court issued an order holding in
abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of

Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the
last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco. Such order of the Cebu
court deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor
sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge
the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of the will in the CFI of Quezon City valid?
Ruling:
Yes. The Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City
court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to
the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the
appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will
and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's
testamentary disposition.
The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental with facts
analogous to the present case is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned
decision. In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over
intestate proceedings in this wise:
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally
true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a
will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

RULE 73: VENUE VS JURISIDICTION

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance
of
Laguna,
Branch
Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA
GARCIA
FULE,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS:
Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister of decedent) filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba, a petition for
letters of administration over the Estate of Amado G. Garcia. At the same time, she moved ex parte for
her appointment as special administratrix over the estate, which the Judge granted. Virginia had forgotten
to place in the original petition the last place of residence of the decedent. She filed a supplemental
pleading which stated among other things that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia his
last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna. This was questioned by Preciosa B. Garcia (spouse
of decedent) through an MTD on the ground of jurisdiction and improper venue after filing an MR to the
appointment of Virginia as Special Administratrix. During the hearing of this case Virginia presented the
death certificate of the decedent showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City.
On her part, Preciosa presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G.
Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
The CFI ruled in favor of Virginia.
CA ruled in favor of Preciosa and annulled the proceedings before the CFI.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the
name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where
this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are

foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if
the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court
over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties. 5
maloBecause of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of
residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue."
[G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001]
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA
MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO,
ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and
IMELDA MANALO, respondents.
FACTS:
1. Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died intestate in 1992. He was survived by his wife
and his eleven children, who are all of legal age. He left several real properties located in Manila and in
Tarlac including a business- Manalos Machine Shop with offices at Quezon City and at Valenzuela.
2. In November, the respondents, who are eight of the surviving children filed a petition with the RTC
for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo,
as administrator thereof.
3. The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing the publication of the
order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and directing
service by registered mail of the order.
4. The trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the government, and set the
reception of evidence of the petitioners. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial
court upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to
the petition.

5. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by petitioners, culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion
seeking:
(1) to reconsider the denial of the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition;
(2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case;
(3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction; and
(4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
6. The trial called resolved such issues in the following manner:
1.) admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the merits
2.) denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are irrelevant and immaterial
3.) declared that the court had jurisdiction
4.) denied the motion for inhibition
5.) set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the for
hearing
7. The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition for certiorari, contending that:
(1) the venue was improperly laid;
(2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons;
(3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings;
(4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family;
and
(5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition
8. CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
9. Petitioners claim that the petition for letters for administration, settlement and distribution of estate is
actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family and thus should be dismissed
under Rule 16 of the ROC on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with- that is, that there was failure to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made involving members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines
ISSUE:
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing of the petition but
that the same have failed

HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments[15] and the character of the relief sought [16] in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar,
shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in
the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio
Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said
death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. [17] The petition in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the
properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and
immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has
limited and special jurisdiction 20 and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may
be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect
that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the
averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would
not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
strategem.21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the
petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is
clear enough. The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions.

G.R. No. L-8409

December 28, 1956

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitionerappellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS
EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:
Eugenio Eusebio file a petition with the CFI of Rizal for his appointment as administrator of the estate of
his father, Andres, residing, according to the petition, in the City of Quezon. Amanda, et al, all surnamed
Eusebio, objected to the petition, saying that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the
latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon
the ground that venue had been improperly filed. It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952,
Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. Because of his heart
condition, he bought a house and lot at 889-A Espaa Extention, in said City. While transferring his

belongings to this house, he suffered a stroke and subsequently died. Consequently, he never stayed in
the said house in Espana extension. The CFI overruled the objection and granted the petition.
ISSUE: WON venue may be changed
HELD:
Rule 73 refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the
Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance
of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction and,
hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts but, also, because the
statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last
part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled
the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts,
and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been
improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may,
thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA
CAYETANO
CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO
REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons,
residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children
from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon
City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI
Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the
opposition
until
CFI
Quezon
shall
have
acted
on
the
probate
proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or

improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a
writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to
CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings
HELD:
1. The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ
of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without
bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish.
2. the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon
City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said
rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City
court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted
without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition
G.R. No. 133000

October 2, 2001

PATRICIA
NATCHER,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES,
ALBERTO
FUENTES,
EVELYN
DEL
ROSARIO,
and
EDUARDO
DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..

FACTS:
Graciano del Rosario (decedent) had two marriages. When his first wife, Graciana, died, her estate was
extrajudicially settled. Graciano received his fair share, the questioned lot included. Graciano thereafter
entered into a second marriage with Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, he sold the same lot to the
Natcher. This sale is being questioned by Gracianos heirs (children by the first marriage) upon his death.
Gracianos heirs then filed an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages to question the
validity of Natchers title. The RTC ruled that although the sale was invalid, Natchers title to the property
was valid because the RTC considered it as an advance of her legitime, being a compulsory heir of
Graciano.
ISSUE:
WON venue may be waived
HELD:
we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the
decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that
although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership. 16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate
that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.

VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate. He was survived by his wife and 11 children. He left
several properties in Manila and Tarlac. His 8 children petition for the judicial
settlement of the estate in RTC Manila & appointment of bro Romeo as
administrator. Trial court order declaring the whole world in default, except the
government. Thereafter, order of general default set aside upon motion of
petitioners (wife & remaining 3 children). The trial court order admitting the petition
for judicial settlement of estate. Petitioners file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, in which case, absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members

of the same family; and no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the
petition.
oletters of admin, settlement & distribution of estate is an ordinary civil action thus
should be dismissed
ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution
of Estate an ordinary civil action, thus Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis
Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the petition

HELD:
No. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be
controlling.
o Scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution (ILASD) of Estate belies herein petitioners claim that the
same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
Petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate.
fact of death
residence at the time of his said death
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the
probate proceedings.
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard
the intention to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased
father.
o Petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil
action & so petitioners, as oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent
effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article
222 of the Civil Code.
Civil Action/Suit-action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong.
o Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions
Use of term suit
Excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only
to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of
the same family.
Specialo Proceedings- remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status,
right or particular fact.

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989, GANCAYCO, J.:]
FACTS:
4. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed
away without a will
a. survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner
Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.
5. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.
a. REASONS:
i. he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the
deceased
ii. deceased left no will
iii. there are no creditors of the deceased
iv. deceased left several properties
v. the spouse of the deceased had been working in London as an
auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the
estate of the deceased.
b. Victoria opposed: there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes
of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does
exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued
in her favor as the surviving spouse.
c. RULING: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate
estate
6. CA: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate
ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts?
HELD:
4. GENERAL RULE: when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator
a. EXCEPTION: when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator.

5. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.
a. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.
6. What constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the
estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no
creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
a. Questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.
b. Merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for
partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration.
c. To have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings.

MARIA CALMA vs. TAEDO

FACTS: The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the
property described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also
indebted to Esperanza Taedo, chargeable against the conjugal property, in the
sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum. On
October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her
daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the
commencement of the corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Calma, was appointed judicial
administratrix of the properties of the deceased.
While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending,
Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for
the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac
rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment,
despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the property described in
the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this
action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the
complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the
sole and absolute owner thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a complaint can be filed against Eulalio Calma.

Whether or not the property in this case is subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta.

HELD: No. Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal
property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against
him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the
committee on claims.
Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made
by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the
collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and
said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.

VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate. He was survived by his wife and 11 children. He left
several properties in Manila and Tarlac. His 8 children petition for the judicial
settlement of the estate in RTC Manila & appointment of bro Romeo as
administrator. Trial court order declaring the whole world in default, except the
government. Thereafter, order of general default set aside upon motion of
petitioners (wife & remaining 3 children). The trial court order admitting the petition
for judicial settlement of estate. Petitioners file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, in which case, absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members
of the same family; and no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the
petition.
oletters of admin, settlement & distribution of estate is an ordinary civil action thus
should be dismissed
ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution
of Estate an ordinary civil action, thus Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis
Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the petition

HELD:
No. In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment
and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be
controlling.
o Scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement
and Distribution (ILASD) of Estate belies herein petitioners claim that the
same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.
Petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate.
fact of death
residence at the time of his said death
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the
probate proceedings.
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard
the intention to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased
father.

Petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil

action & so petitioners, as oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent
effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article
222 of the Civil Code.
Civil Action/Suit-action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong.
o Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions
Use of term suit
Excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only
to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of
the same family.
Specialo Proceedings- remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status,
right or particular fact.
o

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989, GANCAYCO, J.:]
FACTS:
7. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed
away without a will
a. survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner
Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.
8. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.
a. REASONS:
i. he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the
deceased
ii. deceased left no will
iii. there are no creditors of the deceased
iv. deceased left several properties
v. the spouse of the deceased had been working in London as an
auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the
estate of the deceased.
b. Victoria opposed: there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes
of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does
exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued
in her favor as the surviving spouse.
c. RULING: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate
estate
9. CA: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate

ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies

intestate without leaving any debts?
HELD:
7. GENERAL RULE: when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator
a. EXCEPTION: when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator.
8. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.
a. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.
9. What constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the
estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no
creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
a. Questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.
b. Merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for
partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration.
c. To have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings.

MARIA CALMA vs. TAEDO

FACTS: The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the
property described in the complaint, being their conjugal property. They were also
indebted to Esperanza Taedo, chargeable against the conjugal property, in the
sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum. On
October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her
daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her properties. Upon the
commencement of the corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Calma, was appointed judicial
administratrix of the properties of the deceased.

While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending,
Esperanza Tanedo, on January 27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for
the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac
rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment,
despite the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the property described in
the complaint was sold by the sheriff.
Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this
action and asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the property described in the
complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the
sole and absolute owner thereof.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a complaint can be filed against Eulalio Calma.

Whether or not the property in this case is subject to the
testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta.

HELD: No. Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal
property had with his wife Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against
him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal property,
and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the
committee on claims.
Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made
by the sheriff in execution of the judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the
collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal property, is void and
said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.

Rule 73
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
Title to Property issue

PCIB vs CA 344 SCRA 596

GR No. 103149 November 15, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner bank filed with the RTC a claim for payment of a loan against decedent Ang Sr. where in the
latter had previously executed a surety agreement and real estate mortgage. Petitioner bank caused the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage and its sale at public auction; however it failed to recover the full
amount of the obligation thus, filed a claim against the estate of the decedent Ang Sr. Meanwhile,
Blanquita, surviving wife of the deceased filed with the RTC a petition for preliminary injunction to enjoin
petitioner and the other defendants-in-intervention from consolidating title in the name of PCI Bank.
Surviving spouse alleged that several documents purporting to be promissory notes and real estate
mortgages covering parcels of land included her share in the conjugal property; however she denied
being a party to any of those documents. Trial Court upon notice and hearing allowed intervenor spouse
to present evidence ex-parte. Court of appeals affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not there was adjudication of title to property to intervenor surviving spouse?
Ruling:
The Probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may
not be included in the estate proceedings, but such determination is provisional in character and is
subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Thus, the allegations of Blanquita that her
signatures on the real estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated in a separate
proceeding, requiring the presentation of clear and convincing evidence.

Rule 75
2. Nature of Proceedings
Testate estate of Apostol

Rule 78
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, when and to whom issued
iii. Order of Preference sec.6

Capistrano vs Nadurata
G.R. No. L-18754

46 Phil 726
September 26, 1922

Facts:
This is a proceeding commenced by the appellees for the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator of
the estate of Petra de los Santos, deceased. The application filed by the appellees was opposed by the
appellants Pedro and Juan de los Santos who prayed that the first of them be appointed administrator.
Then respondent Nadurata intervened, asserting himself to be the surviving spouse of the intestate Petra,
and praying that the letters of administration be issued to him. The lower court had appointed Justo as
special administrator; and after a hearing, it decided the controversy, declaring respondent not to be the
surviving spouse of decedent Petra and that the latter's nearest relatives are not the opponents Pedro
and Juan who allege themselves to be, but are not, brothers of the deceased, but the petitionerapplicants Capistrano, who are her true brothers by the same mother. Upon these findings, the lower
court confirmed the appointment of Justo as administrator of the estate. From this judgment respondent,
Pedro, and Juan appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the selection of administrator by the probate court proper?
Ruling:
The selection of an administrator of the estate of a deceased lies within the discretion of the court. And
the record does not contain anything tending to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court.
On the contrary, the act of the lower court in overruling the objection of the opponents and confirming the
appointment as administrator of the person proposed by the applicants is not only indicative of sound
discretion, but is right and just; for the evidence shows that respondent Nadurata is not surviving spouse
of decedent Petra, who died widow and not twice widow, and that the opponents Pedro and Juan de los
Santos are not, as they pretend to be, brother of the aforesaid deceased.
However, the declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently
shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the
proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated .

69 Phil 656
Arevalo vs Bustamante

G.R No.101512 August 7, 1992

Gabriel vs CA
Facts:

Nine months after the death of decedent Domingo Gabriel, private respondent filed with the RTC a
petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, fully
capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo. Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein
petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent. No opposition having been filed despite
such publication of the notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex
parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, appointing private respondent as administrator of the
intestate estate of the decedent. Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the
estate of the decedent was published. As a consequence, Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed a
"Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of decedent alleging that the decision in a civil case
between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate.
Private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and Appraisal". Petitioners all
surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration
issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda as the legitimate
daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein petitioners. The probate court
denied the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had not shown any circumstance sufficient to
overturn the order.
Issue: Whether or not the probate court appointment of administrator proper?
Ruling:
Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise
when there is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is coadministration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining
executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will
constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable
services rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate. On
the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the estate
and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally
permissible and sanctioned in practice.
Also, the determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not
to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right
and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal
without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the
probate court to remove an administrator. While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample
discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to
justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or
substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of
the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate
ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator
does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the
court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to
letters fail to apply therefor within a given time.

PCIB vs Escolin
L-27860 March 29, 1974
Facts:
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while
she was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.In her will, she left all her estate in favor of
her husband, Charles. Linnie however also stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate
shall be turned over to her brother and sister.In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also
domiciled here). The lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing
probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of
the estate. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Lawyer manifested that
Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles office. Hence, in the meantime,
hed like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. Respondent Judge Escolin approved the motion.
Later, Charles will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnies estate opposed the said petition.
Eventually, the probate of Charles will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of administrator by the probate court proper?
Ruling:
An administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular party and his acts are
deemed to be objectively for the protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the
decedent, and from this point of view, it may be said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be
no fear of undue disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6
of Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of administration should be granted that the
criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality alone but, more importantly, the extent
of his interest in the estate, so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to
another who has less. Taking both of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to
Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their
properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical that
both estates should be administered jointly by representatives of both, pending their segregation from
each other.

Rule 103 Change of Name and Rule 108 Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry and R.A
9048 Clerical Error Law
Silverio vs CA 304 SCRA 541
Facts:

Petitioner Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC
of Manila, and impleaded the civil registrar as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was
born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio and Anita. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He
further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a mans
body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated
in 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. He was thereafter examined by a
plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in
fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." On the scheduled initial hearing,
jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made the trial court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. In 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing the change
of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor
of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Petition for change of first name and correction of entry indicating the sex can be
had on the ground of sex reassignment?
Ruling:
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. The State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege,
not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed
by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Also under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if
not attended by error, is immutable.For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering
his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to
First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity.
* The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards
his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the
legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought
by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as
the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.

discovery of a will

balanay vs Martinez
Facts:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari to declare illegal and void the
will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding
into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the
corresponding notice to creditors

 Leodegaria Julian, she was survived by her husband,

legitimate children.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition
his mother's notarial will

and by their six

for the probate of

In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of
the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the
absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her
father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should
not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that
their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties
(Par. IV).

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's
death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and
all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should
be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her
will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all
owned by her.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the
will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence,
preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the
conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should
collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaa, assumed that
the issuance of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had
agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaa and Guyo
that the will was void.

So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the
probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the
intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower
court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973.

 The notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on

May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of
April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for
reconsideration.
The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It
clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own
independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty.
Montaa's arguments.
Issue:
Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void

Ruling:
No, the probate court did not err in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will before ruling on its allowance or formal validity.
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void
However, the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void
and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.
The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given
effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes.
The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death
of Felix Balanay, Sr. In themeantime, the net income should be
equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse

Casiano vs Maloto

Facts:
Adriana Maloto died on October 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of
residence.
On November 1963, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo
Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews respectively, of Adriana
Maloto commenced an intestate proceeding in the CFI of Iloilo
They executed an intestate proceeding and divided the estate in the
proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. The CFI judge approved
the partition.
On April 1, 1967, a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the CFI of Iloilo. Aldina et
al. were all named as heirs but Aldina and Constancio appeared to
have bigger shares in the will than what they received in the
extrajudicial partition.
There were also dispositions in favor of Asilo de Molo, the Roman
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldino and Constancio, along with the other devisees and legatees,
filed a motion, among others, the allowance of the will of Adriana
Maloto. The CFI judge denied the motion on the ground that the said
motion had been filed out of time.
The petitioners (Aldino et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the SC but it was denied on the ground of improper
remedy.
The petitioners then commenced a proceeding in the CFI of Iloilo for
the probate of the alleged last will and testament. The probate court
dismissed the petition on the basis of the finding of said court that the
alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and revoked by
the testatrix.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the petition for probate
fo the last will and testament of Maloto is now barred by judgment
Ruling:
The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate
of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed,
the motion to reopen the was denied because the same was filed out of time.

Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding

that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate
court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16,
1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the
Will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more
appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is
for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged
with in question."
In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special
Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of
the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

Rule 76

guevara vs guevara 98 phil 249

Facts:
Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various
bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage.
He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario.
Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.
In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate
nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated.
It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he
adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody,
did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given
to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime
from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the
acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption
that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated.
She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be
disregarded.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue:
Whether or not the probate of a will can prescribe
Ruling:
No, the probate of a will cannot prescribe. Prescription of the will is
considered an attempt the last will and testament of a decedent.The
presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance
is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without
probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.
duran et al vs duran L-23372
Facts:
Pio Duran died without testament . Among his alleged heirs are
Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters;
nephews and nieces

Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a public

instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the
decedent's estate in favor of Josefina Duran, for the consideration of
P2,500.00.

A year later, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay
a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further
asking that he be named the administrator.
Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed an opposition, praying for its
dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested
person" in the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation
the estate, in view of afore-stated, attaching a copy of the same; in the
alternative, she asked to be appointed administratrix.
Appellants contend that the deed of assignment executed by Cipriano
did not operate to render him a person without interest in the estate.
They argue that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to
a co-heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement
court to be effective; and that the assigning heir does not lose his

status as a person interested in the estate, even after said assignment

is approved by the court
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for administration and settlement of an estate
must be filed by an interested person

Ruling
Yes, the pettion for administration and settlement of an estate must be
filed by an interested person. The rules of court has provided that a
petition for an administration and settlement of an estate must be filed
by such person.
In the present case, the assignment took place when no settlement
proceedings was pending

Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join

petitioner Cipriano Duran as co-petitioner in the latter's petition . . .
and incorporates herein by adoption all the allegations made in said
petition." The same, therefore, amounted to a petition to intervene in
the settlement proceedings. As aptly ruled by the court a quo, since
there was really no settlement proceedings in the first place, the
petition to intervene must be denied.

Salazar vs cfi
Facts:
Oben instituted a special proceeding for the probate of the will of his
mother.
The petition was opposed by Sabina Rivera and prayed for the probate
of the will of the deceased that was made on a latter date.
The court denied the motion for publication and ordered Rivera to
institute another proceeding and apply separately for the probate of
the latter will.
Rivera filed a motion for recon to set aside the order.

 The court issued an order setting aside the former will and directed
that the will presented by Rivera be set for hearing.
Issue:
Whether or not the acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance for the probate of
the secod will

Ruling:
Yes, the court acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the second will. The
court acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown that aperson has
died leaving a will, the the decedent has died in the province where the court
exercises territorial jurisdiction and that in case of a non resident, that he has
left estate in the province where the court is situated.
It is evident that the court has acquired jurisdiction for the probate of the
second will , in view of the presence of the above mentioned requisites.

tule 78
qualifications
lim vs diaz L-17633
Facts:
Cirilio Lim filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for his
appointment as judicial administrator of Millarez.
The petition alleged that the deceased left no relatives such as
descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse, except collaterals.
Diaz-Millarez claims to be the widow of Millarez. She filed an opposition
on two grounds:
that the petitioner has an adverse interest in the estate;
o that the properties of the estate are the subject matter of a
litigation between her as plaintiff and Cirilo Lim as defendant in
Civil Case No. 2986.
Trial of the case was postponed several times.

 When the case was called for hearing on March 17, 1959, both parties
manifested the existence of a litigation between them over the
properties of the estate
Failing in his motion for the reconsideration of this order, the petitioner,
Cirilo Lim, brought the case to the Court of Appeals but that court has
certified the appeal to Us for the reason that there is no question of
fact involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has an interest to the estate of the
deceased, and therefore, cannot be appointed as an administrator
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner has an interest to the estate of the deceased, and
therefore, cannot be appointed as an administrator
It cannot be denied that the petitioner is a relative of the deceased. He
has some interest adverse to that of the widow of the deceased.
The petitioner is shown to have some liabilities to the widow of the
deceased and to the latters estate.
Being a debtor, he cannot compatibly perform the duties of an
administrator.
In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment
as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind or hostility
to those immediately interested in the estate.
The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to
be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.

medina vs ca 34760
Facts:
Beda Gonzales has been appointed as the special administrator of the
intestate estate of Agustin Medina.
The heirs of the estate of the deceased opposed in the appointment of
Gonzales as the special administrator on the ground that the former is
presuming that the latter will use his position as special administrator
to favor his personal interests as one interested in the purchase of the
property for himself.

 This allegation has been denied by Gonzales stating that there is no

evidence or pleading of record that he is interested for the acquisition
of the property for himself.
Gonzales also contended that it is a matter of record that having
acquired the rights and interests of the majority of the heirs, he had
stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, his concern and interest to
protect the estate, as special administrator" which is to say, to
protect his claimed majority interest in the estate, hence his insistence
on opposing the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not Gonzales is suitable to become a special administrator
Ruling:
Yes, Gonzales is suitable to become a special administrator.
The appointment of a special administrator is merely
temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is duly appointed (since Rule 80,
section 1 provides for the appointment of a special administrator as a
caretaker only "when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause") the Court has resolved to allow the
appointment of respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand,
insofar as taking care of the other properties of the estate are concerned, to
the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the estate to
petitioner.
Since the appointment of a special administrator is merely temporary, its
appointment need not to last for a very long time and the lower court is
therefore ordered to appoint a permanent administrator, in accordance to
the requisties of the Rules of Court.

maloles vs philips 324 scra 172

Maloles II v. Phillips, 324 SCRA 172 (2000)
Facts:
-

On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will.
He claimed he had no compulsory heirs and had named in his will as

sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not
less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the
custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips.
On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an
order granting the petition and allowing the will, the court found that
the testator was of sound mind and freely executed said will.
Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died
Petitioner (testators nephew) claiming to be the only son of the
deceaseds sister Alicia de santos, filed a motion for intervention as the
nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of the deceased.
Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in
Makati Branch 61, but then withdrew the same. Later defendant then
filed the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65.
Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65,
stating again he was a full blooded nephew and that a case already
related to the subject matter was pending in Branch 61.
Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61.
Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied the petitioners motion
to intervene, and denied taking cognizance of the case forwarded by
Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of
Decent Arturo De Santos, while the one in Branch 61 was filed by
Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive and had already been
decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed the will.
Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed its decision and
again took cognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the
probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of
the deceased
Ruling:
Yes, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate
proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing the will of the
deceased.
The court has lost its jurisdiction upon the allowance of the will and its
jurisdiction does not continue until the estate is fully distributed to the
heirs, devisees and legatees.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of
the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in

accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. This was already

done in the ante-mortem probate of Dr. De Santos will during his
lifetime.

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996,
there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of
allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court.

sison vs teodoro 98 phil 680

Facts:
The CFI of Manila which had jurisdiction over the estate of Margarita
David, issued an order appointing appellant Carlos Moran Sison as
judicial administrator without compensation after filing a bond.
After entering into his duties as administrator, he filed an accounting of
his administration which included items as an expense of
administration the premiums he paid on his bond.
One of the heirs, objected to the approval of the items. The court
approved the report but disallowed the items objected to on the
ground that these cannot be considered as expenses of administration.
Moran Sison filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence
this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not an executor or administrator can validly charge the
premiums on his bond as an expense of administration against the estate
Ruling:
No, an executor or administrator cannot validly charge the premiums on his
bond as an expense of administration against the estate
The premiums paid by an executor or administrator serving without a
compensation for his bond cannot be charged against the estate.
Further Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the
executor or administrator to charge to the estate the money spent for
the bond.
The position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. The law
safeguards the estates of deceased persons by making as a
requirement for qualification the ability to give a suitable bond. The

execution of said bond is therefore a condition precedent to

acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust.
The giving of the bond is not a necessary expense in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of Sec.
680 of the Civil Code of Procedure, since such are the requirements
after the executor or administrator has already qualified for the office
and has entered the performance of his duties.
matute vs ca 26751
Matute vs. Court of Appeals
26 SCRA 768
G.R. No. L-26751, G.R. No. L-26085, G.R. No. L-26106
January 31, 1969
(L-26751)
Facts:
On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of the Matute heirs
and a full-blood brother of both the petitioner and the herein
respondent Matias S. Matute, filed in Special Proceeding (settlement of
the Matute estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias as coadministrator and his appointment in such capacity.
Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two years from the date
of his appointment, said Matias S. Matute has neglected to render a
true, just and complete account of his administration and that he is not
only incompetent but also negligent in his management of the estate
under his charge consisting of five haciendas.
The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that it is completely
without basis and false. Records show that he made an accounting and
the same was submitted to the court. That his competence to act as
administrator has been established to the satisfaction of the court.
It appears that during the reception of evidence conducted on
December 29, 1965 by the probate court, Carlos S. Matute and the
other heirs submitted their respective lists of exhibits in support of
their motion to ousts Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written
objection to the admission of the movants exhibits on the ground that
the same were hearsay, self-serving, irrelevant and/or mere
photostatic copies of supposed originals which never properly
identified nor shown in court. four days later, the Counsel for Matias
filed with leave of Court a Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to
Evidence which avers that there is no sufficient evidence on record to
justify and support the motions for the removal of the herein coadministrator Matias S. Matute.
The probate court issued an order removing Matias S. Matute as coadministrator. Hence, the certiorari. The respondent contends that the

disputed order removing him as co-administrator is a patent nullity.

Upon the other hand, the petitioner advances the reason in support of
the order of removal that the probate judge accorded the respondent
all the opportunity to adduce his evidence but the latter resorted to
dilatory tactics such as filing a motion to dismiss or demurrer to
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is
applicable to special proceedings such that its disregard by the
probate court amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.
The application of the above cited Rule in special proceedings, like the
case at bar, is authorized by the Rules.
Instead of resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued the
controverted order removing the respondent as co-administrator
without giving him the opportunity to adduce his own evidence despite
his explicit reservation that he be afforded the chance to introduce
evidence in his behalf in the event of denial of his motion to dismiss
and/or demurrer to evidence.
The Court view that the above actuation of the probate judge
constituted grave abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident
order as nullity.