Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
MILOVAN D JILAS
CONVERSATIONS
WITH STALIN
Translated from the Serbo-Croat
Michael . Petrovich
PENGUIN BOOKS
tlze memory of
ANEURIN BEVAN
Copyright
~.[~'\
Contents
FORE\VORD
I
Raptures
Doubts
Disappointments
Conclusion
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
INDEX
9
II
70
99
145
149
165
Foreword
Note the Spelling and Pronunciation of
Serbo-Croat Words and Names
s=
s=
=
=
s as in sink
sh as in shift
ts as in ats
ch as in charge
= siilar to, but lighter than, - as in arcl1
z = as in Frencl1jour
z = z as in zodiac
= as in yell
nj = n as in eutral
g=gasingo
dj = g as in George
lj = li as in illion
IO
FOREWORD
Belgrade
November I96I
Raptures
I
12
CONVERSATIONS
\VIH
STALIN
connexion \Vitl1Mosco\v radio. Strictly speaking this connexion \Vas \Vith tl1e Communist International - the Comintern - but at the sarne time it meant connexion with the
Soviet Government as \vell.
The special conditions brought on \Var and the revolutionary movemet's struggle for svival had already, on
several occasions, led to rnisunderstadings \Vith Moscow.
Among the most significat I would mentio the follo\ving.
Moscov.' could never quite understand the realities of the
revolution in YugoslaYia, that is, the fact that in Yugoslavia
sirnultaneously \Vith the resistance to the forces of occupation
dornestic reYolution \vas also going on. The basis for this
rniscoception \Vas the Soviet GoYernrnent's fear that the
W estern Allies, primarily Great Britain, might resent its taking
adYantage of the misfortunes of v.r in the occupied countries
to spread revolution and its Cornunist influence. Like many
other ne\V phenornena, the struggle of the Yugoslay Cornmunists was not in line \\'ith the settled Yiews and indisputale
interests of the Soviet Governent and state.
Nor did Moscow uderstand the peculiarities of warfare in
Yugoslavia. No matter ho;v rnuch the struggle of the Yugoslavs encouraged not only the rnilitary - ;vho ;vere fighting to
preserve the Russian ation fro the Nazi German invasionbut official SoYiet circles as \Vell, the latter nevertheless underrated it, if only because they copared it \Vith their O\Vn
Partisans d their o\vn methods of \Varfare. The Partisas in
the SoYiet Unio \Vere an auxiliary, quite incidental force of
the Red Army, d they ever gre\v into regular army.
Because of their own experience, t Soviet leaders could not
realize tat the YugoslaY Partisans were ! of turning
into an arrny and governent, d that in time they \vould
deye!op an identity and interests ;vhich differed fro tl1e
Soyiet - in short, their own pattern of life.
In this i one incident stands out as extremely
sigificant to , perhaps v decisive. In the course of the
so-called Fourth Offesive, in March 1943, parley between
the Supreme Command and the German commands took place.
RAPTURES
13
The occasion for t parley was an excange of prisoners, but
its essence ! i gettig t Germans t9:recqgnize t rights
of the Partisans as combatats so tat the killing of each oter's
;vounded and prisoners might halted. Tis at tie
when the Supree Comrnand, the bulk of t revolutionary
r, and thousands of our wounded foud themse!yes in
mortal danger, and \Ve needed all the help that we could get.
Mosco\v d to informed about all tbls, but we kne\v full
well- Tito because he kne\v Mosco\v, and RankoYic more
instict - that it \Vas better not to tell Mosco\v everything.
Moscow was sirnply infored that we were egotiating \vith
the Gerans for t exchange of the wounded. Ho\veyer, in
Mosco\v they did not eYen try to put themse!Yes ito our
position, but distrusted us - despite t rivers of lood \Ve had
already sed- and replied very sharply. I rernember- it \Vas
in rnill tl1e R River the of our breakthrough
across the Neretva i February 1943 - ho\v Tito reacted to all
this: 'Our first duty is to look after our \V r and our O\VIl
people.'
This was tl1e first time tat anyone on t Central Co
ittee openly stated that our interests migt different fro
Moscow's. It \Vas also tlle first time that I \vas consciously
aware, independently of Tito's ;vords but not unrelatedly,
tat this difference \Vas essential if \Ve \Vanted to survive in
this life-and-deat struggle bet\veen opposing \Vorlds.
Still another exarnple occurred on 29 November 1943, i
, at t Second Session of t Anti-Fascist Council,
were resolutions \Vere passed tat in fact amounted to the
legalization of w social and political order in Yugoslavia.
At t same time there was fored National Comittee to
act as t proYisional government of Yugoslavia. During t
preparatio for these resolutios i eetings of the Central
Coittee of the Comunist Party, \Ve were deterined that
Mosco\v sluld not informed until after it \Vas all over. \Ve
knew from previous experience of Moscow and fro its line
of propaganda tat it \Vould not ! of understanding.
And ideed, Moscow's reactions to these resolutions were so
CONVERSAIONS WIH
egative
STALIN
RAPTURES
15
16
innermost Party leadership for several years.) The otller members of tlle l\tlission \vere sirnilarly selected as Party or rnilitary
functionaries, and arnong thern \Vas one finacial expert. Tl1e
Missio also included tlle atornic physicist Pavle Savic, \Vith
the object of ea!ing hirn to pursue his scientific \Vork in
Mosco\V. We also llad \Vith us Antu Augusticic, sculptor,
who was give respite frorn the rigours of the \\'ar so that l1e
rnight pursue his art. All of us, to sure, \Vere i uiforrn.
I llad the rank of general. I believe that I \vas selected partly
because I ke\v Russia well - I had learned it in prison during
the years before the war - and partly because I had never been
to tlle Soviet Union before and so could not suspected of
any factional or deviatioist past. Neither had the other rnernbers of the Mission ever been to the Soviet Union, but n
of thern had good cornrnand of Russian.
It \vas the beginning of March 1944
Several days were spent in assern!ing the rnernbers of the
Missio d their gear. Our uniforrns \Vere old d motley,
d sice cloth \\'as lacking, ne\v ones had to made from
the uniforrns of captured Italia officers. W also llad to have
passports i order to cross British d Arnerican territories,
and so they >vere hastily printed. Tl1ese were the first passports
of the ne\v Yugoslav state and r Tito's persoal signature.
The proposal arose alrnost spontaneously that gifts sent
to Stali. But \vhat kind and frorn where? The Supreme
Comrnand \vas situated at the tirne i Drvar, in Bosnia. The
imrnediate surroundings consisted alrnost entirely of gutted
villages, and pillaged desolate little to\vns. Nevertlleless
solution was found: to take Stalin one of the rifles manufactured in tl1e Partisan factory in Uzice in 1941. It was quite
to fid one. Then gifts began to corne in frorn the villages pouches, to'lvels, peasant clothing, and foohvear. We selected
the best of these - sorne sandals of untanned leather and other
things that were just as poor and prirnitive. Precisely because
they were ofthis character, we concluded that \ve ought to take
tllern as tokens of popular goodwill.
One of the objects of the Missio \Vas to arrange for Soviet
17
l for the People's Lieration Arrny of Yugoslavia. At the
sarne tirne Tito had asked us to try to get U N R RA aid for the
lierated areas ofYugoslavia either through the Soviet Governrnent or other channels. 'vVe \vere to ask t Soviet Governrnent
for loan of hvo hundred thousand dollars to cover the
expenses of our rnissios in the 'N est. Tito ernphasized tlt
\Ve should rnake it clear that we would repay the surn as well
as the aid in arms and rnedicine \vhen the country \vas liberated. Tl1e Mission d to take >vith it the archives of tl1e
Suprerne Cornrnand and of the Central Cornrnittee of the
Cornrnunist Party.
Most irnportant of all, it had to fid out wllether the Soviet
Governrnent \vould recognize the National Cornrnittee as the
provisionallegal government, and would influece t Western
Allies to do so too. The Mission was to maintai cornrnunicatios \vith the Suprerne Cornrnand through the Soviet Missio,
and it could also rnake use of the old channel of the Cornintern.
Besides these tasks of the Mission, ito asked rne at our
leave-taking to find out frorn Dimitrov, or fm Stalin if I
could reach hirn, \Vether there \\'as any dissatisfaction with
t work of our Party. This order of Tito's was purely foral
- to call attetion to our disciplied relations with Moscowfor \Vas utterly convinced that the Cornrnuist Party of
Yugoslavia had brilliantly passed the test, d uniquely so.
There \Vas also sorne discussion about the Yugoslav Party
ernigres (Cornuists \Vho d gone to Russia before tlle \Var).
Tito's attitude \Vas tat \Ve \vere not to becorne involved in
rnutual recrirninations \Vit these ernigres, especially if they
d anytlling to do wit Soviet agencies and officials. At t
sarne tirne Tito ernpasized that I ought to beware of secretaries, for there \vere all kinds, wi I understood to rnean
tat \Ve \vere not l to guard an already traditional Party
rnorality, but that \Ve \Vere to avoid anything tat rnight
endanger t reputation d distinction of the Yugoslav Party
and of Yugoslav Corrunists.
I was trern!ing \vith exciternet at the thougt that I \vas
about to see the Soviet Union, the land that \Vas the first in
RAPTURES
18
CONVERSAIONS
WITH STALIN
history - I believed, \Vith belief r adaant than stone to give eaning to the drea of visionaries, the resolve of
warriors, d the sufferig of artyrs, for l too had laguished
and suffered torture i prisos, I too had hated, I too had shed
huan lood, not sparing even that of w brothers.
But there >vas also sorrow - at leaving corades in the
idst of the battle d country i death struggle, one
vast battlefield and souldering ruin.
parting \Vith the Soviet Mission was r cordial tha
ecounters \Vith it usually were. I ernbraced corades,
who \Vere as rnoved as I was, and set out for the iprovised
airfield near Bosanski Petrovac. W spent the whole day there
ispectig the airfield and conversing \vith its staff, \vhich
already behaved as if they \Vere runnig regular d established service, d \vith the peasants, who had already gro\Vll
accustoed to the \v regime and to the inevitaility of its
victory.
Recently British planes had been landing here regularly at
ight, but not. i great urnbers - at rnost, two or three in the
course of single night. They transported the wounded and
occasioal travellers and brought supplies, chiefly edical.
One plane had even brought not long before - gift
fro the British nd to ito. It was at this s airfield,
onth earlier, at high n, that tl1e Soviet Military Mission
had landed in l on skis. ln vie\V of the terrain and other
circustances, this \Vas real feat. It \Vas also quite an uusual
parade, i view of the considerale escort of British fighter
planes.
I regarded the descent and subsequent take-off of rny plane
t.oo as quite feat: the l had to fly low over jagged rocks
i order to in for landing on the narrow and uneve
ice and then t.ake off again.
country seeed sad and dark as I looked down on it.
The outains were pale witl1 SIIO\V and gashed with lack
crevices, while the valleys were engulfed the gloo, t
glimmer of ligt rigt across to the very sea. Below tere was
war, r terrile tha any before, and on soil that was used
RAPTURES
19
RAPTURES
20
2!
22
CONVERSATIONS
WIH
STALIN
velt had stayed. Tl1ere \Vas nobody there no\v and all was as
he had left it.
Finally Soviet l took us to the Soviet Ui- the
realizatio of our dreams and our hopes. The deeper \Ve penetrated into its grey-gree expanse, the r I \vas gripped
w, hitherto hardly suspected ti. It \vas as though I
\Vas returing to prieval hoeland, unko\vn but i.
I had ever had any Pan-Slavic feelings, nor did I look upon
Mosco\v's Pan-Slavic ideas at that tie as aything but
anoeuvre for oilizig conservative forces against the Geran invasion. But this eotion of ine \Vas soething quite
different and deeper, going v d the liits of
adherence to Coiilffiunis. I recalled dily ho\v for three
centuries Yugoslav visioaries and fighters, statese and
sovereigns- especially the ufortunate prince-ishops of suffering Motenegro - d pilgriages to Russia d there
sought uderstading and salvatio. Was I t travelling
their path? d \vas this not the hoeland of our ancestors,
who s unkno\vn avalanche had deposited i the \VindS\vept Balkans? Russia had ever understood the South Slavs
and their aspirations; I \\S convinced that this \Vas because
Russia had been tsarist and feudal. But far r fial \Vas
my faith that, at last, all the social d other reasons for disagreeents bet\veen Moscow and other peoples had been
reoved. At that tie I looked upon this as the realization of
universal brotherhood, but it \Vas also personal link with
the essence of the prieval Slavic counity. This \vas the
hoeland not only of forebears but also of soldiers who
were dying for the final brotherhood of n and an's final
mastery of material things.
I lost myself in the surge of the Volga and liitless grey
steppes and found my prieval self, filled \Vith hitherto unkno\vn eotions. I \\'anted to kiss the Russian soil, the Soviet
soil which I \vas treading, and I \vould have done so had it not
seemed religious and theatrical thing to do.
In Baku we \Vere t coanding general, taciturn
giant of n made coarse garrison life, war, and the ser-
RAPTURES
23
24
CONVERSAIONS WIH
STALIN
RAPTURES
25
it was atter of resurrecting soetlling long since outrtded,
transitional forrn eant to rally support around Couist
Russia, or at least to paralyse anti-Soviet Pan-Slavic currents.
very leadersip of t Coittee \Vas insignificant.
Its President, General Gundorov, preaturely grown
old i every respect and of limited vie\vs, \vas not n
could talk to effectively even on t simplest questions of ho\v
Slavic solidarity could acieved. Coittee's Secretary, Mochalov, \vas rater more autoritative simply because
\vas closer to the Soviet security agencies - something tat
concealed rater badly behind his extravagat nr.
Both Gundorov and :ochalov were Red Army officers, but
\vere aong tose \vho d proved to unfit for the front.
One could detect in the the suppressed dejection of n
demoted to jobs tat they did t consider their line. Only
teir secretary, Nazarova, gap-toothed and excessively ingratiating \\', d anything resemling love for the suffering Slavs, tlugh her activities too, as \vas later learned in
Yugoslavia, \Vere subordinated to Soviet security agecies.
In the Pan-Slavic Comittee headquarters ate \vell,
drank even more, d ostly just talked. Long and t
toasts \Vere raised, not uch differet fro one anoter, d
certainly not as beautiful as those of tsarist times. Their PanSlavic ideas struck as completely out of date. So, too, \Vas
the Comittee building- iitation baroque or soething of
tlle sort i the idst of dr city.
The Committee \Vas the result of extepore shallow
and not copletely altruistic policy. Ho\vever, t re~der mus;
understad that though all tis was quite clear to v at
that tie, I was far fro viewig it \vith horror or aazement.
The fact that t Pa-Slavic Comittee \vas naked instruent of the Soviet Governmet for ifluecig back\vard
strata aong the Slavs outside the Soviet Uion d that its
officials were depedent and td \Vith both the secret
and pulic agecies of the goveret- all this did t troule
one it. I was only disturbed its impotence d superficiality, d above all the fact that it could t open the
c.s.- 2
26
RAPTURES
27
obviously waging war idependent of the momentary successes and defeats of the Red r, war, moreover, that was
at the s tie convertig the political d social stucture
of the coutry. Both externally and internally the Yugoslav
revolution had transceded the eeds and accornmodations of
Soviet foreig policy, and tl1is is ho-..v I explained the obstacles
and lack of understanding \vhich I \Vas eeting.
Stragest of all was the fact that those \vho sluld have
understood this best of all subissively kept still d pretended
t to uderstand. I had yet to learn that in :oscow the
discussio and especially the deterrnination of political positios
had to wait until Stalin, or at least :olotov, had spoke. This
applied even to such distinguished persons as the forrner
secretaries of the Cominter, :anuilsky and Dimitrov.
Tito and Kardelj, as -..vell as other Yugoslav Comunists
\Vho had to :osco\v, d reported that Manuilsky -..vas
particularly well disposed to\vard t Yugoslavs. This may
have been held against hi during the purges of 1936-7, in
which alost the entire group of Yugoslav Comunists had
perished in tlle Party purge, but \V, after the Yugoslav
uprising agaist the Nazis, this could take for farsigted
ness. In any case, he injected into is enthusiasm for the
Yugoslavs' stuggle certai dose of persoal pride, tlugh he
kne\v n of t ne-..v Yugoslav leaders except, perhaps, Tito,
and him only very slightly. Our eeting -..vit him took place
in t evening. Also present -..vas G. F. Alexandrov, t noted
Soviet philosopher and, much more iportant, chief of the
section for agitation and propaganda of t Central Coittee.
Alexandrov left no definite impress on . Indefiniteness,
or, rater, colour!essness, -..vas is basic characteristic. was
sort, pudgy, bald man \vhose pallor and corpulence proclaied that he never set foot outside his office. Except for
fe\v coventional observations and benig siles, he spoke
not -..vord about the character and scope of the Yugoslav
Comuist uprising, though in coversations, supposedly
without desig, I touched on tese very points. Obviously the
Cetral Comittee d t yet deterined its stand; thus,
RAPTURES
28
30
RAPTURES
31
RAPTURES
33
Yugoslav lVIacedonia. Dimitrov, I must admit, took rather
differet lie: for him the important rnatter \vas BulgarianYugoslav rapprochement. But 1 do t believe tat even he
maitaied that t lVIacedoians V\'ere separate natioality,
despite the fact that his mother was lVIacedonia d tat
is attitude to\vard the lVIacedonians was distictly sentirnental.
Peraps I was too itter \vhen I replied to Kolarov, 'I do
t ko\v wl1ethe the lVIacedonian laguage is closer to
Bulgaria or Seria, but the lVIacedonians are t Bulgars,
nor is Macedoia Bulgarian.' Dimitrov found this ernbarra~
ing. reddened and \Vaved his had: 'lt is of no importance!' And he passed on to another question.
memory of w attended the third meeting with
Dimitrov is gone with t wid, but certaily Chervekov
could t lve been absent. The meeting took place on the
eve of rny return to Yugoslavia, at the beginig of u 194+
It was to devoted to cooperation bet\vee the Yugoslav
and Bulgarian Cornmunists. But it \Vas hardly \Vorth \vhile
discussing tl1e matter, for the Bulgars in fact had no Partisa
uits at the time.
I insisted that military operations should begin in Bulgaria
and that Partisan units should formed there. I said it \vas
folly to expect any sort of revolt in the Bulgarian Royal Army,
for nothig of this kid had appened i Yugoslavia: from
the old Yugoslav Army the Partisans got only individual
officers, \vhile t Communist Party had to create an army of
small units in the course of very stubborn struggle. It was
evident that Dimitrov, too, slred these illusions, though he
did agree that Partisan units should formed at once.
It was obvious that kne\v sornethig I did not know.
When I stressed that even in Yugoslavia, in \vhich the occupation had destroyed the old state apparatus, rather long
time \Yas needed to come to terms \Vith its remnants, he interjected, 'In three or four months there \Yill revolution i
Bulgaria anY'vay; the Red Army will s its borders!'
Though Bulgaria was not at war with the Soviet U nion, it
was clear to me that Dimitrov tlugt that the Red Arrny
34
CONVERSAIONS WITH STALIN
\Yould the decisive factor. sure, he did not categorically declare that the Red Army would enter Bulgaria, but it
\\'as" obYious that he knew even then that this would happen,
and \Yas giving me hint. Given Dimitrov's view and
expectation, my insistence on Partisan operations d uits
lost any importance and ig. The coversation ?ecame
merely an exchange of opiios and brotherly greetgs to
Tito d the Yugoslav fighters.
It is \YOrth recording Dirnitrov's attitude toward Stalin.
, too, spoke of l1im \Yit admiration and respect, but \Yit
out any noticeale flattery or reverence. His relationship to
Stalin was clearly that of revolutionary who gave disciplined
submission to the leader, but revolutionary who did his
own thinking. particularly stressed Stalin's role in t
\Var.
said: 'vVen the Gerans were outside Moscow,
geeral uncertainty and cofusion ensued. Soviet Government d \Yithdra\vn to Kuibishev. But Stalin remained i
Moscow. I \Vas with him at tlle tirne, i tlle Kremlin.
\Yere taking out archives frorn the Kreli. I suggested to
Stalin that tlle Comintern sllould issue proclamatio to the
German soldiers. agreed, though he felt no good would
come of it. Soon aftevards, I too had to leave Moscow. Stalin
did not leave; he \Vas determied to defend it. And at that
most dramatic momet he held parade in Red Square tlle
aniversary of the October Revolution. The divisions before
him were leaving for the frot. It is impossi!e to say w
great was the effect on morale wlle people learned that Stalin
was sittig in Moscow and \vhen they heard llis \Vords. It
restored their faith d raised their confidece, and it was
worth r tllan good-sized army.'
On that occasion I became acquainted with Diitrov's \vife.
She \vas Sudete Germa, but this was kept quiet because
of the general hatred of the Germans \vhicll carne naturally
to tl1e ordiary Russians d which they understood more
easily than anti-fascist propaganda.
Dimitrov's villa was tastefully luxurious. It had everything
RAPTURES
35
4
Several months before our arrival Moscow had announced
tlt Yugoslav Brigade had been fored i the Soviet Union.
Some time before this, Polish and t.he Czech units had been
formed. We in Yugoslavia could not imagine how such great
number of Yugoslavs came t.o in the Soviet Union when
even tlse few political emigres who foud themselves there
had largely vanished in the purges.
Now, in Moscow, everything became clear to . bulk
of the wr in the Yugoslav Brigade was made up of
the personnel of regimet that the Croatian quisling Pavelic
had sent to the Germans at the Soviet front as token of
solidarity. But Pavelic's n l1ad no luck tl1ere; the regiment
was shattered, taken prisoer at Stalingrad, and, after t
usual purification, transformed, witll Comander Mesic at
its head, into the Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Brigade. few Yugoslav political emigres were collected fro here and there and
give political posts i the Brigade, while Soviet officers - both
military specialists and those from Security - took over the
outfitting and checking of the n.
In the begining the Soviet represetatives insisted tat. the
Brigade's insigia idetical with those of t.he Yugoslav
Royal Army, but w Vlahovic objected, t agreed to
introduce t.he insigia of the People's Lieration r. It
was ard to agree tl1ese insignia way of dispatches, but
Vlahovic nevertheless did wlt could, d the resultig
insignia were sometig of compromise. On our insistence
this matter too was finally settled.
There were no other essential prolems concerning t.he
CONVERSATIONS
\VIH
STALIN
RAPTURES
37
service. Concerning tl1e Yugoslav Brigade, he told , 'It's
not bad, considering the aterial we had to \\ork \vith.' And
tat was true. If, later in Yugoslavia, it hardly distiguished
itself in engageents with the Germans, this \Vas not so muc
due to t fighting qualities of the as because its orgaiza
tion and experience \Vere not suitale for an army different
fro the Soviet and under conditions of warfare differet fro
those on the Eastern Front.
General Zhukov eld receptio in our honour. The
ilitary attache of Mexico, in coversatio \Vith , offered
aid, but ufortuately \ could not tllink of way of gettig
it to our troops in Yugoslavia.
Just before departure fro Moscow, I \Vas guest at
diner at General Zhukov's. d his \vife lived in sall
nvo-roo apartment. Everything was cornfortale, but rnodest,
though alrnost luxurious for Moscow, especially in tirne of
\var. Zhukov \Vas excellet civil servant and experience had
persuaded hirn that force \vas more effective than ideology
as the means of realizing Communism. The relatioship bet\\een us becarne fairly intirnate, yet at the s tirne reserved,
for nothing could alter the differeces in our haits and vie\vs.
Political friendships are good l \vhen each remais \vhat he
is. Before I left his apartet, Zhukov presented rne \Vith an
officer's automatic gu - odest gift, but suitae in tie
of \\.
On the other hand, I had quite different rneeting with the
representatives of the Soviet Secret Service. Through Captain
Kozovsky I \vas visited in the TsDKA odestly dressed
little man who did not hide the fact tlt he was fro the State
Security. We arranged for rneetig on tl1e followig day, in
r so cospiratorial that, just because I had been an
illegal \Vorker for so many years, I felt it was all needlessly
cornplicated, indeed cliche. car a\vaited rne in near-by
street, d, after involved ride, \ve transferred into another,
only to deposited in some street of t huge city frorn which
we then walked to t.hird street, where sorneone from the
\vindow of an enormous apartment building threw down
38
RAPTURES
39
40
CONVERSATIONS
WIH
STALIN
RAPTURES
41
CONVERSAIONS
WITH STALIN
realize the weight of the lo\vs that the Russian people suffered, to those who do not understand that every hurnan
society inevitaly adopts and develops those ideas that are, at.
given rnornent, best suited to rnaintaining and expanding the
conditions of its existence. Though drukard, General Korneyev was not stupid, d he \Vas deeply devoted to the Soviet
systern and to Cornrnunisrn. like rnyself, w d
grown up \Vith the revolutioary rnovernent d \vho d to
fight for survival isistig ideological purity, Korneyev's
hypotheses seerned absurd. et I \vas t at all arnazed - so
\videspread ld Russian patriotisrn, not to say nationalisrn,
becorne- \vhen the Bishop of Urnan raised toast to Stalin as
the 'unifier of the Russia lands'. Stalin uderstood intuitively
that his governrnent and his social systern could nqt \vithstand
the lo\vs of the Gerrnan Arrny unless they leat for support
the older aspiratios d beliefs of the Russia people.
The Secretary of the Urnan Soviet srnouldered with itter
ess at the Bishop's skilful d discreet ernphasis the role
of the Church, and v rnore at the passive attitude of the
populatio. The Partisa uit \Vhich he cornrnaded \vas so
weak in nurnbers that he was lrdly l to deal \Vitli the proGerrna Ukraiian gedarrnerie.
RAPTURES
43
RAPTURES
-..vit teir
45
'Communist morality', that is, -..vith the haits prevailing i their army d Party. But they belved splendidly,
especially as t -..vere not used to alcohol. Only tremendous exertio of -..vill po-..ver and sese of duty did they
-..vithstad so m 'ottoms-up' toasts, d remain their
feet at the d.
I al-..vays drak little and cautiously, excusing myself on
accout of my headaches, from -..vllic I really suffered at the
time. Our General Terzic looked tragic. had to drik even
if he did not feel like it, for he did not kno-..v ho-..v to refuse
Russian colleague -..v -..vould call for toast to Stalin just
secod after t aving spared himself for ito.
Our escort seemed v more tragic to . -..vas colonel
from t Soviet General Staff, and because l1e -..vas 'from the
rear', the Marsal d his geerals picked im, takig full
advantage of teir igher rank. Marshal Koiev paid no attention to the fact that this colonel \\S fairly -..veak; had
brought back to -..vork t Geeral Staff after having been
-..vounded at the frot. simply commaded the colonel:
'Colonel, drink up hundred grammes of vodka to the success
of the Secod Ukraiia Front!' silence ensued. All turned
to t coloel. I -..vated to intercede for him. But got up,
stood at attention, and drank. Soon beads of s-..veat broke out
on his pale high forehead.
But t everyone drank: those -..vho -..vere duty d in
contact ,,ith the frot did t. Nor did the staff drik at the
front, except -..vhen there -..vas definitely lull. They said that
durig the Finnish campaign Zhdanov asked Stali to authorize an issue of one udred grammes of vodka day per
soldier. From that time on, t custom remaied in t Red
Army, except tat the issue -..vas dou!ed before attacks: 'The
soldiers feel more relaxed!' it -..vas explaied to us.
1\or did Marshal Koiev drik. l1ad superior to
order im to do so; besides, d liver trou!e, and so is
doctors forbade him to. -..vas !d, tall man of fifty, -..vith
very eergetic face. Though he abetted gluttony, for
he held to t official 'philosophy' tat 'the men v to have
CONVERSAIONS WIH
STALIN
good tie now and then', he hiself was above that sort of
thig, beig sure of hiself and of his troops at the front.
The author Boris Polevoi id us to the front as
correspondet for Pravda. Though he all too easily
ethusiastic over the herois and virtues of his country, l1e
told us aecdote about Koiev's superhua cooless and
courage. Finding hiself at look-out post uder fire fro
Gr ortars, Koniev pretended to lookig through his
binoculars, but was actually watchig out of the corer of his
to see how his officers were taking it. Every of the
knew that he would deoted the spot if he showed any
vacillation, d dared point out to hi the dager to
his own life. And this wet . fell dead and were
wounded, but he left the post l after the inspectio was
over. On another occasio shrapel struck hi i the leg. They
took off his boot d bandaged the leg, but he reaied at
tl1e post.
Koiev was of Stali's w wartie cornaders. His
prootio had less rapid tha Rokossovsky's, whose
career was uch r sudden d story. joined the Red
r just after the revolution as young worker, and gradually rose through the ranks d through the arrny schools.
But he, too, rnade his career i battle, which was typical of the
Red Arrny uder Stalin's leadership in the Secod World
\Var.
Tacitur as usual, Koiev explaied to i few words
the course ofthe ig at Korsun-Shevchekovsky, which
had just been copleted d which was copared i the
Soviet Uion \Vith the one at Staligrad. descried, soe
\vhat gleefully, Gerrnay's latest catastrophe: s eighty, or
v hudred, thousad Gerrnans had refused to surreder
d d forced ito arro\v space, the taks sased
teir heavy equipet d acl1ie-gu posts wl1ile the
Cossack cavalry fially fiished t off. 'We let t Cossacks
cut the up for as log as t wished. They v hacked off
the ands of those who raised thern to surreder !' the Marshal
said with sile.
RAPTURES
47
48
5
It ust have about five o'clock i the afternoon, just as
I had copleted lecture at the Pa-Slavic Coittee d
had begu to ans\ver questions, \vhe soeone \Vhispered to
to finish iediately because of an iportat d pressing
atter. Not only \Ve Yugoslavs but also the Soviet officials had
treated this lecture as rnore tha usually important. Molotov's
assistat, . Lozovsky, had introduced to select audiece.
Obviously tl1e Yugoslav r! \vas becoing rnore and
r acute aong the Allies.
I excused yself, or they d excuses for , d
\vas \vhisked out into the street i the iddle of the eeting.
There they rd and General Terzic into strage
and t very imposing car. Only after the car had driven off
did unkno\V!l colonel fro tl1e State Security infor us
that we were to received Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.
that tie our Military Mission had oved to villa
in Serebrenny Bor, Moscow suburb. I remebered the
gifts for Stalin, but feared that we \vould late if we \vent
so far out of our \vay to get the. But the ifalli!e State
Security ld taken care of that too; the gifts ! t to the
Colonel in the car. Everything then was in order, v our
uifors; for s ten days or so we had wearing new
ones d in Soviet factory. There was nothing to do but
RAPTURES
and
liste
to the Colonel,
ask
hi
49
as little as
possile.
so
CONVERSATIONS
WIH
STALIN
RAPTURES
SI
52
CONVERSATIONS
\VIH
STALIN
RAPTURES
53
54
CONVERSATIONS
\VIH
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RAPTURES
55
es, that was the real Stalin, who did t xnince words. But
I \Vas used to this in own Party, and I myself partial to this
maner \vhen the time to reach final decision.
General Zhukov swiftly and silently rnade note of Stalin's
decisions. But the sllips were never bought and the Yugoslavs
were ever supplied Soviet ships. chief reaso for tis
was, doubt, the progress of operations on t Eastern
Front- the Red Arrny soon reached tlle Yugoslav border and
was tllus ! to assist Yugoslavia land. I maintain that at
tlle tie Stalin d rnade up his mind about helping us.
Tis was tlle gist of the conversation.
In passing, Stalin expressed interest in rny opinion of individual Yugoslav politicians. asked me what I tought of
Milan Gavrilovic, tl1e leader of t Serian Agrarian Party d
tlle fust Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow. l told im: '
srewd rnan.'
Stalin commented, as toug to imself: ' es, tere are
politicians who think sre>vdness is the rnain thing in politics
- but Gavrilovic irnpressed rne as stupid man.'
I added, ' is not politician of broad horizons, toug
I do not think it can said that is stupid.'
Stalin inquired where Yugoslav ing Peter had found
wife. When I told hi that he had taken Greek princess, he
shot back ischievously, 'w >vould it , Vyacheslav Miklilovich, if you or I rnarried some foreign princess?
s good could come of it.'
Molotov lauged, but in restrained manner and noiselessly.
At the end I presented Stalin \vith our gifts. looked
particularly prirnitive and wretched now. But he did not disparage the in t least. When saw the peasant sandals, he
exclairned: 'Lapti!'- the Russia \Vord for tern. As for the
rifle, he d and shut it, efted it, d rernarked:
'Ours is ligter.'
The rneeting d lasted about hour.
It was already dusk as we were leavig the remlin. The
officer who accoropanied us obviously caught our enthusiasro.
56
CONVERSATIONS
WIH
STALIN
6
But I vas to haYe still another, eYen r significant and
interesting, encounter vitll Stalin. I rr exactly vhen
it occurred: on the eve of the Allied landing in Norandy.
This tie too no one told anything in adYance. They
siply infored that I \Vas to go to t Krelin, and
around nine in the eYening they put i car and droYe
tere. Not even anyone in the Mission knew \vhere I was
going.
They took to tl1e building in \Vich Stalin had receiYed
us, but to other roos. There l\!IolotoY \vas preparing to
leaYe. vVhile he put on his overcoat and hat, told tat
we were havig supper at Stalin's.
MolotoY is not Yery talkatiYe . Wen he was \Vith
Stalin, i good rnood, d '"ith those \vho thought as he did,
contact \Vas easy d direct. Othevise MolotoY reained
irnpassiYe, eYen in priYate conYersation. All the s, he
asked rne in the car what laguages I spoke besides Russian.
I told hi tat I spoke Frech. h \Ve talked about tlle
strength and organization of the Cornrnunist Party of YugoslaYia. I emphasized that at the begiing of the \Yar the
YugoslaY Party was illegal d relatiYely few i numberss t thousad mebers, but excellently organized.
I added, 'Like the BolsheYik Party in the First \Vorld
War.'
'You are wrong,' MolotoY retorted. 'The First World \Var
found our t in very \Veak state, its organization not co
nected but scattered, and \Yith srnall rnebership. I rernernber,' he contiued, w at the beginig of the war I
RAPTURES
57
S8
CONVERSAIONS \VIH STALIN
and soon came to clup of young fir trees. Again there was
barrier, then short ride, and the gate. We found ourselves
before not very large villa which was also in thick clup
of firs.
We no sooner went through the door into sall all tan
Stalin appeared - tllls tie in sles d dressed in his plain
tunic, buttoned up to is chin, and known so well fro is
pre-war pictures. Like tis he seeed v saller, but also
sipler and copletely at h. led us into sall d
surprisingly t study - no books, no pictures, just bare
\Voode walls. W seated ourselves around sall writing tale,
and he irnediately began to ask questios about \vhat had
d to the Yugoslav Supreme Staff.
The very nr of is inquiry showed sharp contrast
between Stalin d Molotov. With Molotov it was ipossile
to tell \vhat he was thinkig or how ld arrived at his
thoughts. His ind reained sealed and iscrutale. Stalin,
however, was of lively, almost restless teperaent.
always questioed- iself and others; and he argued- wit
hiself and others. I will not say tat Molotov did not easily
get excited, or that Stalin did not know w to restrain hiself
and to dissiulate; later I was to see both i these roles. But
Molotov was alost always t s, wit hardly shade of
variety, regardless of what or w was uder consideration,
whereas Stalin was copletely different i his own, Co
unist, ilieu. Churchill has descried Molotov as coplete
odern robot. That is correct. But tat is on one, external side
of i. Stalin was less cold calculator than he. But
precisely because his was r passionate and any-sided
nature- though all sides were equally strong and so convincing that it seemed never disseled but V.'as al\vays truly
experiencing each of his roles - he was more penetrale and
offered greater possiilities. l'olotov seeed to look upon
everytl1ing- even upon Counis and its fial ais - as
relative, as somethig to wich he had to, rather t ought
to, subordiate his own fate. It was as though for there
\Vas rthig peranent, as though there was only transitory
RAPTURES
59
terrile n
of every
r.'
RAPTURES
61
took up our relations with the Allies, priarily with Great
Britai, \vhich \Vas, as I realized even the, the principal
reason for the eeting \Yith .
The substace of his suggestios \Vas, firstly, that we ought
t to 'fl"ighten' the Eglish, \Yhich he t that \Ve ought
to avoid anythig that ight alar the ito thiking that
reYolutio \Yas goig in Yugoslavia or an attept at Co
uist cotrol. 'vVhat do you \Vant \Vith red stars your
caps? The for is t iportat but \vhat is gained, and you red stars! God, there's d for stars!' Stalin exclaied
angrily.
But did not hide the fact that his ager was not very
great. It \vas reproach, and I explained to hi: 'It is impossiie to abolish the red stars because they have already
tradition and have to n soethig to our
fighters.'
stuck to his opinion, but without great insistence, and
then tured to aother aspect of relatios with the W ester
Allies, and continued, 'Perhaps you think tlt just because
,,. are the allies of the English \Ve v forgotten v they
are d \Vho Churcill is. Tere's nothig t like better
tan to trick teir allies. During tl1e First World \Var they
constantly tricked the Russians and tlle Frenc. And Churchill? Churchill is the kid of \vho will pick your pocket
of kopeck if you don't watch hi. Yes, pick your pocket of
kopeck! God, pick your pocket of kopeck! d Roosevelt? Roosevelt is rt Iike tat. dips in his had ! for
igger coins. But Churchill? Churchill - will do it for
kopeck.'
kept stressig that we ought to be\Yare of t Itelligence
Service d of Eglis duplicity, especially \Vith regard to
Tito's life. 'They \Yere the ones \Vho killed General Sikorski
in plane d ten neatly shot down the plane - no proof,
\Vitnesses.'
I the course of the eetig Stalin kept repeatig these
warnigs, \vhich I passed to Tito upon return d which
probaly ifluenced is decision to k his conspiratorial
62
RAPTURES
64
CONVERSAIONS WIH STALIN
late evening. This made the work of the higher adinistratio
difficult and complicated, but it adapted itself, even the diplomatic corps when they had contacts with members of the
Politburo.
There \Vas no estalished order in \Vhich members of the
Politburo or other high officials attended these diners. Usually they were tlse who d some connexion with t business
of the guest or \Vith current issues. But apparently t circle
was narro\V, and it \Vas an especial honour to invited to sucl1
diner. Molotov \vas the only person \vho was al\vays preset,
d I tik this \vas not only because he was Comissar, that
is, Minister for Foreign Affairs, but also because he was i
fact Stalin's deputy.
At these dinners the Soviet leaders were at their closest,
most intiate with one anoter. Everyone would tell the news
from is departmets, \Vho he had met that day, d wat
plas he was making. The sumptuous tale and considerale,
though t imoderate, quantities of alcoll eliveed spirits
and increased the atmosphere of cordiality and infonality.
An uninstructed visitor might hardly have detected any difference between Stalin and the rest. et it existed. His opiion
was carefully noted. No one opposed him very hard. It all
rather resemled patriarchal family with crotchety head
whose foiles always made his kisfolk somewhat apprehensive.
Stali ate food in quantities that would have enorus
even for much larger n. usually chose meat, which
was sign of his moutain origins. also liked all kinds of
!! specialities in which this land of various clies and
civilizations abounded, but I did not notice that one dish
was his particular favourite. drank oderately, usually
ixing red wine d vodka in little glasses. I never noticed
signs of drukeness in him, whereas I could not say the
same for Molotov, let alone for Beria, w was practically
drukard. As all to over-ate at these dinners, the Soviet
leaders ate very little d irregularly during the day, and n
of the dieted on fruit d juices one day in each week, for the
sake of razgruzhenie (unloading).
RAPTURES
65
RAPTURES
67
Molotov laughed too, but again sparely d soudlessly.
Humour was something which he was quite unae to give
or take.
Stal asked which leaders I had met in Moscow, and when
I mentioned Dimitrov and Manuilsky, he rearked, 'Dimitrov
is cleverer man than Manuilsky, uch cleverer.'
At this he rearked on the dissolution of the Cointern,
'They, the Westerners, are so sly that they mentioned nothing
about it to us. Aild we are so stubborn that had they entioned
it, we would not have dissolved it at all! The situation \Yith the
Cotern was becoing r and r abnormal. Here
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich and I \Yere racking our brains, while
the Comintern was pulling in its own direction - and the
discord grew worse. It is easy to work >Yith Diitrov, but witl1
the others it was lrder. Most important of all, there was
soething abnonnal, soething unnatural about the very
existence of general Comunist foru at time when the
Comunist parties should v been searching for national
language and fightg under the conditions prevailiilg their
\v countries.'
In the course of the evenig two dispatches arrived: Stalin
anded both to read.
reported what Suba8ic d said to t United States
State Departent. SubasiC's line was tis: We Yugoslavs ca
not against the Soviet Unio nor can \ pursue an ati
Russia policy, for Slavic and pro-Russian traditions are very
strong aong us.
Stalin remarked, 'Tis is Suba8ic scarig the Aericans.
But w is scarig them? Yes, scarg the! But w,
'.Yhy ?'
Aild then added, probaly noticg t astonisll!Ilent on
face, ' steal our dispatches, we steal theirs.'
The second dispatch was fro Churchill. anounced
that t landg France would g on the next day.
Stalin began to k fun of the dispatch. 'Yes, there'll
landing, if tere is no fog. Until no>v tere was always
soeting that put it off. I suspect toorrow it will s-
68
thig
RAPTURES
takig leave, I again asked Stali if had aythig
to say about the \\'ork of the Yugoslav Party. replied, 'No,
I have t. ou yourselves kow best \vhat is to d.'
arriving at Vis, I reported this to ito d to the other
members of the Cetral Comittee. d I summed up
Mosco\v trip: the itr factually no loger existed, and
\Ve Yugoslav Comunists had to shift for ourselves. We had
to deped priarily on our O\Vn foces.
As I was leaving after that diner, Stalin presented with
sword for Tito- the gift of the Supree Soviet. go wit
this agnificent d exalted gift I added \v odest ?,
\vay back via Cairo: ivory chess set. I do t thk
tere was sybolis tere. But it does seem to tat
v the there was suppressed iside me world different
fro Stali's.
From the clup of firs around Stalin's villa tere rose the
rnist d the da\v. Stali d Molotov, tired after another
sleepless ight, shook hads \vitll me at the tr. The
car bore away ito the rnorig d to not yet a\vakened
Moscow, bathed i the lue haze of u d the de\v. There
came back to me the feelig I had ld \v I set foot
Russia soil: the \Yorld is t so ig after all \vhe vie\ved
from this lad. And perhaps not unconquerale- with Stalin,
\vith the ideas that were supposed finally to have revealed to
m the trut about society and about himself.
It \Vas beautiful dream- in the reality of war. It never
even occurred to to decide \Vi of tese \vas the more
real, just as I \vould not l today to dec~de \vhic.h, the
drea or the realitv failed r to live up to Its promrses.
live i drea~s and in realities.
Doubts
I
DOUBTS
71
that all three of us should attend the meeting alog \vith two
of the most distinguised Yugoslav commanders- Generals
Peko Dapcevic and Popovic.
Tito put t pro!em to Korneyev in an extremely mild and
polite for, which only made Korneyev's crude and offended
rejection all the more astonishing. We had ivited Koreyev as
comrade d Communist, d here he shouted, 'In t
name of the Soviet Government I protest against suc i
sinuatios agaist t Red Army, wi s .. .'
All efforts to covince him were i vai. r suddenly
loomed within llim t picture of himself as the representative
of great po\ver and of 'lierating' army.
It \vas then that I said, ' prolem lies in the fact, too,
that our enemies are using this against us and are comparing
the attacks the Red Army soldiers \vith the behaviour of
the Eglis officers, who do not indulge in such excesses.'
Koreyev reacted to this \Vith gross lack of understanding.
'I protest most sarply against the insult to the Red Army in
comparig it\with t armies of capitalist countries.'
! later did t Yugoslav autorities gather statistics on
the lawless acts of the Red Army soldiers. According to complaints filed citizens, tere were 121 cases of rape, of which
I 1 I involved rape with murder, and 1,204 cases of lootig with
assault- figures that are ardly isignificant if it is borne imind
that the Red Army crossed only the north-eastern cor'er of
Yugoslavia. These figures show why the Yugoslav leaders had to
consider these icidets as political pro!em, all t more
serious because it had become an issue i the domestic struggle.
The Commuists also regarded this pro!em as moral .
Could this the ideal d long-awaited Red Army?
The meeting >vith Korneyev eded without results, tough
we did otice later that the Soviet commads treated their
soldiers' misdemeanours r strictly. As s as Korneyev
left, some of tlle comrades reproached me, some mildly and
others more sharply, for \vhat I had said. It truly never
crossed my mind to compare the Soviet Army \Vith the British
- Britain had only mission in Belgrade- but I was stating
DOUBTS
obvious facts and presenting my reaction to political problem, and I had been provoked too the lack of understanding
and intransigence of General Koreyev. It was certainly far
fro my mind to insult the Red Army, which was at the time
ho less dear to than to Geeral Korneyev. ln view of the
position I held, I could t keep silent \Vhen wome were being
violated - crirne I have al\vays regarded as beig among the
most einous - and when our soldiers were being abused d
our property pillaged.
These words of mine, and few ot.her matters, were the
cause of t first friction bet\\'een t Yugoslav aad Soviet
leaders. Though actually rnore serious causes t tese were
to arise, it was tl1ese very \Vords that were to most frequetly cited as t reason for the indigation of the Soviet
leaders and their representatives. I may mention incidentally
that this was certaily the reason why the Soviet Goverrnent.
did t preset me with the Order of Suvorov whe it distriuted them to some other leadig members of the Yugoslav
Central Comrnittee. For similar reasons it also passed over
General Peko Dapcevic. This caused Rankovic and me to
suggest to ito that he decorate Dapcevic \vitll the Order of
Yugoslav Natioal Hero, to couter tis snub. s words
of mine were also one of the reasos w Soviet agents i
Yugoslavia began, early in 1945, to spread rumours about my
'Trotskyism'. They thernselves \Vere forced to abandon this
measure, t just because of the senselessess of such carges,
but because our relations improved.
Nevertheless, because of rny declaratio, I soon foud myself almost isolated, t particularly because my closest frieds
condemed me - though there \Vere ideed some severe reproaches - or because the Soviet leaders d exaggerated and
lo\vn up the entire incidet, but perhaps more profoudly
because of w iner experiences. That is to say, I found
myself even then in t dilemma in which every Commuist
w had adopted the Communist idea \vith good will and
altruism fids himself. Sooer or later he rnust confront the
icogruity between that teory and the practice of the Party
leaders. I tis case, however, it was t because of the discrepacy betwee an ideal depiction of tl1e Red Army and the
actual deeds of its ernbers; I too was aware that, tlugh it
\Vas t arrny of 'classless' society, the Red r could 'not
yet' all that it should , d tat it still had to contain
'rernnants of the old'. dilemrna was created the indifferet, not to say benign, attitude of t Soviet leaders and
Soviet cornaads toward crime, revealed their refusal to
recognize it and their protests \vhenever it was brought to
their attention. Our owa intentioas were good: to preserve the
reputation of tl1e Red Army and of the Soviet Union, \vhich
t propaganda of the Comunist Party of Yugoslavia had
been building up for years. And \vhat did tese good intentions
of ours encounter? Arrogance and rebuff typical of ig state
towards small one, of the strong to\vard the weak.
Tis dilemma was made muc rnore acute because of the
efforts of Soviet representatives to use rny basically \vellitentioned words to support their arrogaat and critical attitude to the Yugoslav leadership.
vVat \Vas it tllat prevented the Soviet representatives from
understanding us? For \vhat reason were my words exaggerated and twisted? Why \Vere t Soviet representatives exploiting them ia this perverted form for their political ends to portray tl1e Yugoslav leaders as ungiateful to Red Army
whicl1 at certain mornet \vas supposed to lve played the
principal role in lieratig tl1e capital city of Yugoslavia and
istalling the Yugoslav leaders there?
But tl1ere was no answer to these questions, nor could there
at that time.
Like rnany others, I too \Vas perturbed oter acts of the
Soviet representatives. For example, the Soviet Cornand
announced that it \Vas presenting as aid to Belgrade gift of
large quantity of wheat, but it turned out that this \vas in fact
wheat that t Gerrnans had collected from Yugoslav peasats
and had stored on Yugoslav territory. The Soviet Command
Iooked upon that wheat, and much else besides, sirnply as
teir spoils of war. Moreover, Soviet itelligence agents were
73
CONVERSAIONS \VIH
74
STALIN
recruiting, en masse, emigre white Russians, and even Yugoslavs; some of these people were in the very machinery of the
Central Committee. Against whom and why were these people
employed? Also, in the field of agitation and propaganda,
which I directed, friction with Soviet representatives was
acutely felt. The Soviet press systematically distorted and
belittled the struggle of the Yugoslav Communists, \\'hile
Soviet representatives sought, at first cautiously and then more
and more openly, to subordinate Yugoslav propaganda to
Soviet needs and Soviet patterns.
And tl1e drinking parties of the Soviet representatives,
which \vere becoming more and more like real bacchanalia
and to which they \vere trying to entice the Yugoslav leaders,
could only cofirm in my eyes and in the eyes of m others
the incongruity bet\vee Soviet ideals and actios, their profession of ethics in \vords and their amorality in deeds.
The first contact betwee tl1e t\vo revolutions and the t\vo
governments, though they \vere founded similar social d
ideological bases, could not but lead to frictio. d sice it
occurred within an exclusive d closed ideology, the frictio
was bound to expressed at first as rl dilemma and
feeling the part of the Yugoslavs of sorrow d regret that
the centre of orthodoxy did not understand the good intentions
of small Party d poor land.
Since men do not necessarily react consciously, I suddenly
'discovered' man's indissolu!e bond \Vith nature- I reverted
to the hunting trips of my early youth and suddenly noticed
that there \Vas beauty outside t Party d the revolution.
But the itterness was just beginning.
2
joureyed
DOUBTS
75
was also l to tell me tlle huma reactions of tlle Soviet
leaders, to which I was particularly sensitive.
The delegation, both individually and as whole, suffered
costant recriminations about the general situatio in Yugoslavia and certain of the Yugoslav Ieaders. The Soviet officials
usually g \Vith the correct facts, d then exaggerated
them and made generalizations. make matters worse, the
cl1ief of the delegation, Hebrang, stuck closely to tl1e Soviet
representatives, submitting written reports to them and shifting Soviet displeasure on to other members of the delegation.
Hebrag's motive for tllis behaviour seemed to , as far as I
could make out, his grudge because he had been rernoved from
t position of Secretary of the Commuist Party in Croatia,
and even more because of his craven behaviour while in prison.
This did t become kown until later, and he was bellaving
Iike this i order to conceal his cowardice.
give informatio to the Soviet Party was at that time
not in itself cosidered deadly sin, for no Yugoslav Communist set his own Central Comittee against tl1e Soviet.
Moreover, iforation the situation in the Yugoslav Party
\Vas availale and accessiie to the Soviet Central Comittee.
But Hebrag's object was to underine tlle Yugoslav Central
Committee. It \vas never discovered \vhat he was reportig.
But from tl1e time he took d fro \vlt individual rs
of the delegatio related, it was possiie to conclude without
any doubt that. even at this time Hebrag was giving ifora
tion to tl1e Soviet Cetral Comittee witll the i of getting
its support d inciting it against the Yugoslav Cetral Co
mittee in order to brig about cllanges within it that would
suit blm. sure, all of tllis was done in the n of
principle d justified tlle r or less obvious lapses d
faults of the Yugoslavs. The real reason, tllougll, lay in this:
Hebrag believed tllat Yugoslavia should not costruct its
economy and econoic plans independently of ilie U S S R,
while the Central Comrnittee supported close cooperation
with the U S S R but not to the detrient of our own independence.
76
DOUBTS
77
article about 'Meeting with Stalin' whic pleased hirn
greatly. Soviet representative had called rny attention to the
fact tlt in subsequet editios I ought to cut out the observation that Stalin's feet were too ig and tlt l should stress
r t intimacy betwee Stalin and Molotov. At the s
time Stalin, who sized up people quickly and wl was always
particularly skilful in exploitig people's weaknesses, rnust
have know that he could not win over through political
amitions, for l had none, nor on an ideological basis, for I
did not love the Soviet Party rnore than the Yugoslav.
could only influence through rny eotions - throgh
sincerity d rny enthusias - and so he took tlt course.
But though sensitivity and sincerity were strong
points, they easily turned into sornetlling quite opposite when
I encountered insicerity and injustice. For this reason Stali
did not dare recruit rne openly. I became all the more adaant
and deterined as experiece showed the Soviet's unjust
imperialistic aitions, that is, as I freed myself of rny
setirnentality.
CONVERSAIONS WIH
STALIN
DOUBTS
79
huma
CONVERSAIONS
WITH STALIN
DOUBTS
81
4
Nothig significar1t occurred over the treaty of alliance benveen Yugoslavia and the U S S R. The treaty was the usual
thig, and \Vas siply to check the traslatio. .
The sigig took place in the Krelin the eveng of
I I April, i very sall official circle. No rs of tlle
pulic - if such an expessio used i that environent - except Soviet camerame >vere present.
The sole striking episode occurred when Stalin, holdig
glass of champagne, turned to waiter d invited him to
clik glasses. The >vaiter emba~rass~d, but w?
Stalin uttered the words: 'What, you \V t drk to SovietYugoslav friendship ?' he obediently took the glass and drank
it bottoms up. There was soethig demagogic, even gr~
tesque, about the entire s, but everyone looked upon It
\Vith beatific smiles, as expressio of Stalin's regard for the
mn people and his closeness to tl1e.
.
.
.
This was my first opportunity to meet Stalm g. H1s
82
CONVERSAIONS WITH STALIN
attitude was ungracious, though it did not have Molotov's
frigid stiffess and artificial arniabllity. Stalin did not address
single '\Vord to rne personally. The dispute over the behaviour
of t Red Arrny soldiers \Vas obviously neither forgotten nor
forgiven. I \vas left to go on turning over the fires of purgatory.
Nor did he say aything at the dinner for the inner circle,
in the Krernlin. Mter diner we saw sorne filrns. Because of
Stalin's remark tlt he \vas tired of gunfire, t put. on, not
war filrn, but shallo\V, happy, collective-far rnovie.
Throughout the perforrnance Stalin rnade cornrnents - reactions to what was goig on, in the rnanner of uneducated rnen
who istake reality for actuality. The second filrn was pre\var one \Var therne: 'If War Cornes Tornorrow' ('Esli
zavtra voina .. .'). The \Var in that filrn was waged \Vith t
help of poison gas, while at the rear of the invaders - t
Gerrnans - rebellious elernents of the proletariat were breaking
out. At the end of the filrn Stalin calrnly rernarked, 'Not rnuch
different frorn what actually appened, l there was
poiso gas and the Gerrna proletariat did not rebel.'
Everyone \Vas tired of toasts, of food, of filrns. Again without \vord, Stalin shook hands \vith too, but now I
\Vas more onchalant and calm, though I could not say \vhy.
Perhaps because of the easier atosphere. Or \vas it rny O\vn
ir deterinatio d resolutio? r! both. In any
event- life is possi!e without Stalin's love.
day or t\vo later there \vas foml diner in Catherine
Hall. Accordig to Soviet protocol at tl1e tie, ito \Vas
seated to t left of Stalin and to t right of Kalinin, then
President of the Suprerne Soviet. I \Vas seated at Kaliin's
left. Molotov and Subasic sat opposite Stalin and Tito, \vhile
the other Yugoslav and Soviet officers sat around i circle.
The stiff atosphere seeed all the rnore unatural because
all present, except Dr Subasic, were Counists, yet they
addressed one aother as 'Mister' in their toasts d adhered
strictly to interational protocol, as though this \Vas eeting
of the representatives of differig systes and ideologies.
Apart frorn the toasts and tlle protocol, we acted like
DOUBTS
corades
84
CONVERSAIONS WITH STALIN
heavy-footed fun of him \vhen the old man asked Tito for
Yugoslav cigarette. 'Don't take any- those are capitalist cigarettes,' said Stalin, and Kalinin confusedly dropped the cigarette from his trembling fingers, \vhereupon Stalin laughed
and t expression on is face was like satyr's. little later
Stalin himself proposed toast in onour of 'our President',
Kalinin, but this was polite prase obviously picked for
someone who for long d been noting more tan mere
figurehead.
Here, in ratl1er broader and more official circle, the
deification of Stali was more palpale and obvious. Today
I have come to t opinion that t deification of Stalin, or
the 'cult of the personality', as it is no\v called, was at least
as much the work of Stalin's circle and t bureaucracy, who
required such leader, as it was is own doing. Of course, the
relationship changed. Turned ito deity, Stalin became so
po\verful that in time ceased to attentio to the clnging
needs and desires of those w exalted him.
ungainly dwarf of man passed through gilded d
marled imperialllls, and path d before him; radiant,
admiring glances followed hi, while the ears of courtiers
strained to catch his every word. And he, sure of iself and
his works, obviously paid attention to all tis. His coutry
was in ruins, hungry, exhausted. But his aries and marshals,
v \Vit fat and edals and druk \Vith vodka and victory,
had already trapled half of Europe under foot, and he \Vas
coviced tlley would traple over the otller llalf in the t
round. knew that he \Vas one of t cruellest, ost despotic
figures in ln history. But this did not worry hi it, for
he was convinced tat lle \Vas carrying out the will of history.
His conscience was trouled othing, despite the millions
who had been destroyed in his and llis order, despite
the thousands of his closest collaborators who he had ur
dered as traitors because they doubted that he was leading the
country and people into happiness, equality, and lierty. The
struggle ld been dagerous, log, and all the r underanded because the opponents were few in ur d \veak.
DOUBTS
Bs
5
Still I \\'as pleasantly surprised when I, too, \Vas taken to
intiate dinner in Stalin's villa. Dr Subasic naturally knew
absolutely othing about it. l \Ve Yugoslav Communist
inisters \Vere there, and, on the Soviet side, Stalin's closest
associates: Malenkov, Bulganin, General Antonov, Beria, and,
of course, Molotov.
As usual, at about t o'clock at night we found ourselves
around Stalin's tale. I d arrived in the car with Tito. At
the head of the tale sat. Beria, to his right Malenkov, then I
and Molotov, then Andrejev and Petrovic, while to the left sat
86
87
DOUBTS
88
CONVERSAIONS WITH STALIN
engineer. They sentenced the r to death. But 'soehow
the atter >vas brought before , and l d inquiries - I
have the right as coander-in-chief in tie of war- and I
released t r and sent hi to tlle frot. No>v l1e is of
our heroes. ls to understad the soldier. The Red r
is not ideal. The iportant thing is tat it figllts Germas and it is figllting tlle \Vell; the rest does't atter.'
S afterwards whe I returned fro Moscow I heard to
llorror, of far r significant l' of Stalin's
'uderstanding' attitude toward the sins of Red Army persorel. While crossing East Prussia, Soviet soldiers, especially
the tak units, had regularly selled and killed all tl1e German
civilia refugees - w and childre. Stali >vas informed
of this and asked \vllat sllould d. replied: 'We lecture
our soldiers too ucll; let the have s initiative!'
That nigl1t at llis villa, he then asked: 'And what about
General Koreyev, the chief of our Missio, what kind of
is l1e ?'
I avoided saying anythig bad about and about bls
Mission, tllough all sorts of things could have been brought
up, but Stalin hiself concluded: 'Tl1e poor n is not stupid,
but he is drunkard, an icurale drukard!'
After tllat Stalin even joked \Vith , on seeing that I was
drinkig beer. As atter of fact, I don't v like beer.
Stalin td: 'Djilas here drinks beer like Geran,
like Geran - he is Geran, God, German.'
I did not find tllis joke at all to liking; at that time
hatred for the Gerans, even for those few Counist
eigres, was at its height i Moscow, but I took it without
ager or inner resentent.
With this, it appeared, the dispute over tlle behaviour of
the Red r \vas resolved. Stalin's relations with becarne
as cordial as they had been before.
And so it >vent , until the rift benveen tlle Yugoslav and
Soviet Central Coittees, in 1948, >vhen Molotov d Stalin
dredged up i their letters that s dispute over the Red
r and the way I had 'isulted' it.
DOUBTS
89
DOUBTS
92
CONVERSATIONS
WIH
STALIN
DOUBTS
93
did Stalin know better tha Dimitrov what ought to done
in Bulgaria? Did not holding Dirnitrov in Mosco\V agaist his
will uderrnine bls reputation g Bulgaria Cornrnunists
and the Bulgaria people? And, i general, \vhy tllis intricate
game over s retur, in \vblch t Russians were not accounta!e to anyone, t even to Dimitrov?
In politics, more tan i aything else, the beginning of
everyting lies in moral indignation d in doubt of the good
itentions of oters.
DOUBTS
95
some two and half million Ukrainians were drafted into the
Red Army. Although mior operations \Vere still beig carried
out against Ukrainian ationalists (one of their victis was the
gifted Soviet General Vatutin), we still could rt quite accept
the explanatio tlt this state of affairs in the Ukraine \Vas
caused entirely stubborn Ukrainian bourgeois ationalis.
questio reained to answered: Were did tis natioal
is frorn if_ the peoples of the U S S R were really
equal?
W were bewildered and astonished at the marked Russification of pulic life. Russian was spoken in t theatre, d
there ;vere even daily newspapers in Russian.
However, it was far from our intention to l our solicitous host, N. S. Khrushcev, for this or anything else, for, as
good Cornunist, he could do noting else but carry out
the orders of his Party, his Leniist Cetral Committee, and
his leader and teacher, . V. Stalin. All Soviet leaders have
distinguished theselves their practicality and their
directness, at least i Cornunist circles. N. S. Khrushchev
stood out from the rest in t respects.
Neither the nor IlO\V- after carefully reading his speeches
at congresses - did I have the impression that is knowledge
wet beyond the liits of classical Russian literature and
Russia history, while his grasp of theory ;vas the level of
an itermediate Party sclol. Beside this external kno;vledge
gathered from courses, much more important is the kowledge
that gained as self-taught man, constantly improving
imself, and, even more, the experience he gained fro his
lively d may-sided activities. It is ipossile to deterrnine
the quantity and quality of that knowledge, for equally
astoishing is his ko;vledge of some rare fact and is igrrace
of some eleentary truths. His rneory is excellet and he
expresses himself vividly d graphically.
Unlike other Soviet leaders, was urestrained and very
talkative, although Iike them he was fond of using folk proverbs
and sayings. This ;vas kind of fasion at t time d proof
of one's ties wit the people. With hirn, ho;vever, there was
96
CONVERSATIONS WITH STALIN
less artificiality about this because of his naturally simple d
unaffected behaviour and maner of speaking. also had
sense of humour. Unlike Stalin's humour, which \Vas predominantly intellectual d, as such, cynical, Khrushchev's
humour \vas typically folksy and thus often almost crude, but
it >vas lively and inexhaustiie. No\v that he has attaied the
most exalted heights of power and is in the gaze of the whole
world, one can tell that he is careful of bls pose and manner of
expression, but he has remained basically unchanged. Beneatl1
the present SoYiet chief of state and Party it is not difficult to
discern man of the popular masses. et I should add that he
suffers less than any self-taught Commuist or half-educated
scholar from feeling of inferiority, that is, he feels need
to hide his persoal ignorace and \Veaknesses behind an
external brilliace d \vide geeralizatios. The comrnonplaces \Yith \Yhicl1 his coversation abounds are the expi"essio
of both real ignorance d Marxist maxims Iearned rote,
but even tl1ese he presents \Vith conviction and frankness. The
Ianguage d manner \Vith which he expresses himself encompass \vider circle tha the one to \Vhich Stalin spoke,
though he, too, addresses himself to the same Party pu!ic.
ln his not very ne\v, unpressed general's uniform, he \'l'as
the only amog the Soviet Ieaders who delved ito details,
ito the daily Iife of the Comunist rak and file and the
ordinary people. Let it understood: he did not do this \Vith
the aim of changing the system, but of strengtheing and
improving things uder the existing system. did look into
atters and remedy them, \vhile others issued orders from
offices and received reports.
None of the Soviet leaders \Vent to collective farms, except
occasionally to attend some feast or parade. Khrusl1chev accompanied us to collective farm and, \Vithout harbouring in
any Iittle corer of his mind tlle slightest doubt of the justice
of the system itself, he not only clinked huge glasses of vodka
\Vith the collective farmers, but he also inspected tl1e garden
hotbeds, peeped into the pigsty, and began discussing practical pro!ems. Durig the ride back to iev he kept coming
DOUBTS
97
g8
3
Disappoitn1ets
I
IOI
DISAPPOINTMENTS
ialline.
cornpaes.
102
DISAPPOINTMENTS
particularly sesitive about Yugoslavia's idepedet associatio with the other East Europea coutries d the growth
of her prestige amog them.
The frictio s carried over ito ecoomic relatios
especially whe it became obvious to the Yugoslavs that:
apart from their ordiary comrnercial ties, they could t
cou~t Soviet ai~ i carryig out tl1eir five-year l. Whe
s:al detected. reststace he stressed tlt it was t good for
fr1e~Iy d ~ coutries to use joit-stock cornpaies, and
promtsed to fursh all possile aid, but at the sarne tirne his
traders exploited the ecoomic advantage they gained as
result of exacerbated Yugoslav-Western relatios d from the
Yugoslav illusio that the U S S R \Vas unselfish state with
no territorial amitios.
Except for A!ania, Yugoslavia had the only East
European country to free itself frorn the Nazi invasion and
at the same time carry out dornestic revolutio without the
decisive l1elp of the Red Arrny. It had gone the farthest i
effectig social transforrnatio, and yet it was also situated
in ':hat \Vas i days to corne the most exposed salient i the
Sov~et l. In Greece civil war was beig fought. Yugoslav had been accused in the Uited Nations of giving it
rnaterial aid d ispiring it; wl1ile Yugoslav relatios \Vith
the \Vest, and especially with the United States were straied
to breaking poit.
'
When I thik back, it seems to me that the Soviet Governrnent t only looked with satisfactio at this worsenig of
Yugoslav-Western relatios but v incited it, taking care,
?f course, not to go d the Iirnits of its w practical
tere~ts. Molotov almost ernbraced Kardelj i Paris after two
Amer1ca planes ?ad shot dow i Yugoslavia, though
he also \Varned h1rn t to shoot dow third. The Soviet
Gove.rrnent to?k direct. action over the uprisig i Greece,
practically leavg Yugoslavia to face the rnusic l i the
Uited Natio~s,.or did it udertake aythig decisive to brig
about armistice t util Stali foud it to his interest.
So, too, the decisio that Belgrade should the seat of
CONVERSATIONS
WIH
STALIN
BISAF'POINTMENTS
105
IOO
CONVERSAIONS
WITH STALIN
DISAPPOINTMENTS
107
3
This view \Vas aired v before it should v been, at
dier in t Yugoslav Ernbassy in Bucharest which was
attended Ana Pauker, the Ruaian Foreign :inister,
d several Rumaia officials.
All the Yugoslavs, except Ambassador Golubovic, who later
emigrated as adherent of :osco\v, said more or less openly
that the Soviet U nio could not an absolute model in 'the
buildig of socialism', for the situation had chaged and
DISAPPOINTMENTS
coditions and circumstances differed in the individual countries of Eastern Europe. I noticed tlt Ana Pauker was
carefully silent, or else agreed with sometblng reluctantly, and
tried to avoid talking about such delicate questions. One of
the Rumanians - I believe it \Vas Bodara$ - opposed our
views, and another - his n I have ufortunately forgotte
- cordially agreed with us. I regarded conversation of tbls
sort as awkward, for I was convinced that every word \vould
reach the ears of the Russians and they would ul to
understand thern as being anything but 'anti-Soviet' - synoym for all the evils of tbls earth. At the same time however,
I could not retract the opinions I had expressed, so I tried
to t down views, stressing the merits of the U S S R
and the theoretical importance of Soviet experience. But all
this was of hardly any use, for I myself had stressed that
everyone ougt to laze his own path according to bls own
actual circumstances. Nor could the awkwardness dispelled.
I d premonition; I knew that the Soviet leaders had
liking for subtleties and compromises, least of all within teir
own Communist ranks.
Though \Ve \Vere only passing through Rumania, we found
reason for our criticism everywl1ere. First, as to the relations
between the Soviet Union and the other East European countries: these countries were still being held under actual occupation, and their wealth was being extracted in various ways,
most frequently througl1 joint-stock companies in whic t
Russias barely invested aything except German capital,
which they had simply declared prize of war. Trade with
tese countries was t conducted as elsewere in the world,
but on the basis of special arragemets according to which the
Soviet Governmet bougt at lov;er and sold at higher than
\Vorld prices. Only Yugoslavia was exceptio. We kew all
that. d the spectacle of misery as well as our awareness of
irnpotence d subservience g the Rumaian authorities
could l heighten our indigation.
W were rnost taken aback the arrogat attitude of t
Soviet represetatives. I remember how horrified we were at
108
I()(j
traditios.
IIO
CONVERSATIONS
\VIH
STALIN
DISAPPOINTMENTS
III
have always waited long, so that there was saying tat went
round among them: It is easy to get to Mosco\v but hard to
get out again. sure, even if I had been tired, I would
have accepted Stalin's invitation most willingly. Everyone in
the delegation regarded with enthusiasm, though also not
without envy, and Popovic and Todorovic kept reminding not to forget why they, too, had along, even
though I had taken advantage of our travelling togetl1er to
acquaint myself in detail \vit tl1eir requests.
over t ipending meeting wit Stalin \Vas sober
and not unixed, if only because of t haste wit wblc it
d come. Tis misgiving never left me t \vole nigt that
I spent with im and other Soviet leaders.
As usual, at about nine o'clock in the evening, they took
to the Kremlin, to Stalin's office. Gathered there \\'ere Stalin,
Molotov, and Zhdanov. The last, as I knew, was in the
Politburo and responsile for rnaintaining relations with foreign parties.
After the customary greetings, Stalin immediately got down
to business: 'So, members of the Central Committee in Aania
are killing thernselves over you! Tbls is very inconvenient,
very inconvenient.'
I began to explain: Naku Spiru \Vas against linking Aania
wit Yugoslavia; he isolated himself in his own Central Committee. I ld not even finished whe, to rny surprise, Stalin
said: 'We have no special interest in Alania. We agree to
Yugoslavia swallowing A!ania! .. .' At this he gatered together t fingers of his right and and, bringing them to bls
mouth, he made as if to swallo\v thern.
I was astonished, alst struck dumb Stalin's maner
of expressing hirnself and the gesture of S\vallo\ving, but
I do not know whether this was visi!e on face, for I tried
to make joke of it and to regard this as Stalin's customary
forcile d picturesque manner of expression. Again I explained: 'It is not matter of S\vallowing, but unification !'
At tis Molotov interjected: 'But that is swallowing!'
d Stalin added, agai wit tat gesture of his: 'es, yes.
II2
CONVERSAIONS
WITH STALIN
DISAPPOINTMENTS
114
CONVERSAIONS \VIH
STALIN
At that mt
i d as the
DISAPPOINTMENTS
II5
5
\Ve seated ourselves i Stali's car, \vhic seemed to to
the same as t i which I rode with Molotov i I945
Zdaov sat i the back to right, \vhile Stalin d Molotov
sat i frot of us the foldig seats. Durig t trip Stali
tured little light the l i frot of him under
\vhich hug pocket watch- it \Vas almost t o'clock- d
1 observed directly i frot of his already huched back
d t grey of his k with its wrinkled ski
above t stiff marshal's collar. I reflected: is of the
most powerful m of today, d r are his associates; what
sesational catastrope it would if w exploded
i our idst d lew us all to pieces! But this thougt \vas
l fleetig d ugly d so uexpected even to myself that
it horrified me. With sad affectio, I saw i Stali little
old gradfater who, all his life, d still w, looked after
the success d happiess of the whole Commuist race.
While waitig for the others to gather together, Stali,
Zhdaov, d I foud ourselves i t tr hall of the
villa, the map of the world. I agai glaced at the lue
pecil ark that ecircled Staligrad - d agai Stali o
ticed it; 1 could t fail to observe tat my scrutiy pleased
im. Zhdaov also oticed this exchage of glances, joied us,
d rearked, 'The begiig of the Battle of Staligrad.'
But Stalin said othig to that.
If 1 remember \vell, Stali g to look for Kigsberg,
for it \Vas to reamed Kaliigrad - d i so doig we
came across places aroud Leigrad that still bore German
ames from the time of Catherine. This caught Stali's
d he turned to Zhdaov, sayig curtly: 'Change these
ames - it is absurd tat these places should still bear Gr
ames!' At tbls Zhdaov pulled out small otebook d
recorded Stali's order with little pecil.
After this Molotov d I wet to t lavatory, which was
i the basemet of the villa. It cotaied several cuicles d
urials. Molotov g to ubutto his trousers v as we
CONVERSAIONS
WITH STALIN
ZhdanoY, too,
\Vas
bro,vnish clipped
DISAPPOINTMENTS
II7
DISAP.POINTMENTS
chief even as they played role that was decisive for the human
race. I recalled that the Russian tsar, Peter the Great, like\v"ise
held such suppers with llis assistats at \vhich they gorged and
drank themselves into stupor \vhile ordainig the fate of
Russia and the Russian people.
This impression of the vacuity of such life did not recede
but kept recurring during the course of the diner despite my
attempts to suppress it. It \vas especially strengthened
Stalin's age, conspicuous signs of his seility. No amount
of respect and love for his person, \Vhich I stubborly nurtured inside myself, was able to erase that realization from my
mind.
There \Vas somethig both tragic and ugly in his senility.
The tragic was ivisile - but I \vas aware of it in mind
as I reflected that v so great figure must inevitably fall
into decline. The ugly kept cropping up all the time. Though
he had always enjoyed eating well, Stalin was now quite
gluttonous, as though he feared that there would not
enough of the food he \vanted left for him. the other hand,
he drank less and more cautiously, as though measurig every
drop - to avoid any ill affects.
His intellect \vas in even more apparent decline. liked
to recall incidents from his youth - his exile in Sieria, l1is
childhood in the Caucasus; and he \vould compare everything
recet \Vith somethig that ld happeed long ago: 'Yes, I
remember, the sarne thing ... .'
I could hardly believe how much he had changed in two or
three years. When I had last seen him, in 1945, he \Vas still
lively, quick-\;itted, and had pointed sense of humour. But
that \Vas during the \Var d it d , it would seem, Stalin's
last effort and had taken him to is limit. Now he laughed at
inanities and sallow jokes. occasio he not ! failed
to get t political point of an anecdote I told im about how
he had got the better of Churcill and Roosevelt, but he even
seemed to offeded, as old m sometimes are. I perceived
an ernbarrassed astonishment on the faces of the rest of the
party.
II8
II9
120
CONVERSATIONS
\VIH
DISAPPOINTMENTS
STALIN
121
DISAPPOINTMENTS
even before the First World War and sice then was
considered the authoritative Bolshevik view.
At question Molotov first joined i: "'People" and
"nation" are both the s thing.'
But Stalin did rt agree. 'No, nonsense! They are different !'
And he g to explain siply: ' "N ation" ? ou already
know what it is: the product of capitalis with certain characteristics. And "people" - these are the workers of give
natio, that is, workers of the s language, culture, custos.'
And cocering his book Marxism and the National and
Colonial Question, he observed: 'That was Ilyich's- Lein's
view. Ilyich also edited the book.'
The second questio involved Dostoevsky. Since early
youth I had considered Dostoevsky i n ways the greatest
writer of the odern age, and I could never quite accept the
Marxist attacks hi.
St~in also answered tllis siply: ' great writer and great
reactnary. We are not pulishing lli because is bad
influece on youth. But, great writer!'
We turned to Gorky. I pointed out that I regarded as his
greatest work - both in ethod and in tlle profundity of its
picture of the Russian Revolutio - Tl!e Life Klim Samgin.
But Stalin disagreed, avoiding the subject of ethod. 'No, his
b~st th~ngs are those he wrote earlier: The Town Okurov,
h1s stoes, and Foma Gordeyev. And as far as the picture of the
~ussian Rev?lution in Klim Samgin is conceed, there is very
l1ttle revolutn there and ! single Bolshevik - wlt \Vas
his n: Lyutikov, Lyutov?'
I corrected hi: 'Kutuzov- Lyutov is an entirely different
caracter .'
Stalin cocluded: 'Yes, Kutuzov! The revolution is port:ayed fro one side, and iadequately at that; and fro the
llterary point of view, too, his earlier works are better.'
It was clear to tat Stalin and I did not understad one
another and that we could not agree, though I had had an
o~portuity t? hear the opinios of iportant critics who, like
lliself, condered tese particular works of Gorky his best.
122
pulished
123
CONVERSATIONS
124
\VIH
- or, rather, bet\veen their Party d i, between Yugoslavia d the U S S R. I order to prepare the groud, I referred to Tito d to Cetral Coittee several ties i
passig, ut i way that \vould t lead iterlocutors to
speak out as they iteded.
Stali attepted to k the coversatio persoal and
itiate, but \vithout success. reided of his i
vitatio, d through Tito i 194.6, d, he asked me: 'd
\vhy did you t to the Criea? Why did you refuse
ivitatio
DISAPPOINTMENTS
STALIN
?'
125
lived.
Stali eded the dinne raisig toast to Lei's
r: 'Let us drik to t emory of Yladiir Ilyic, our
DISAPPOINTMENTS
126
urealistic
127
!28
CONVERSAIONS WIH
DISAPPOINTMENTS
STALIN
129
CONVERSAIONS WIH
STALIN
DISAPPOINTMENTS
131
city, but they lived lonely lives and were glad to rneet rnen
frorn another clirne and culture. W got along wit thern
easily and quickly- as rnen who had survived sirnilar fate.
Though it never occurred to us to complain about the Soviet
leaders, still we observed that these men approached the life
of their city and citizens - that rnost cultured and ost industrialized centre in the vast Russian land - in sipler and
r hurnan way than the officials in Moscow.
It seeed to tlt I could very quickly arrive at common politicallanguage with these people sirnply employing
the language of hurnanity. Indeed, I was not surprised to r
t\vo years later tat tese people, too, had failed to escape
the mills of totalitarianism just because t dared also to
men.
Tis bright, yet sad, Leningrad interlude of ours was marred one unpleasant lot- our escort, Lesakov. Even at
that time one migt meet officials in the Soviet Unio who
had emerged from the lower strata of t working rnasses.
seerned to an illiterate country burnpkin, and one could
see tlt he had been an ordinary worker until recently. These
deficiencies would not have been vices had he not tried to
conceal thern and made conspicuous display of pretentions
beyond his capacities. In actual fact, he had not rnade his way
up his own strength of caracter and aility, but he had
been dragged to t top and planted in the Central Cornmittee
rnachine, in which he was responsile for Yugoslav affairs.
was cross between an intelligence agent and Party
official. behaved in toroughly 'Party' rnanner, acted the
part of Party man, and rnade clumsy of collecting
information about the Yugoslav Party and its leaders.
Slight as was, wit creased face and short yellow teeth,
tie tl1at was always askew and shirt that kept spilling out
of is trousers, always afraid rnigl1t look 'uncultured',
Lesakov would have been pleasant as an ordinary workingrnan d he not been given such an iportant to do and so
kept provoking us - and usually rne - into unpleasant discussions. boasted of lw 'Cornrade Zhdanov purged all the
132
fro
s tie
7
After days of idleness, Popovic decided to return to our
country, leaving Todorovic in Mosco1v to attend the outcome,
that is, to 1vait for the Soviet leadership to take pity and to
resume talks. I would have gone off with Popovic had not
message arrived frorn Belgrade aouncing t arrival of
Kardelj and Bakaric, and thus I had to join them i conversations wit the Soviet Governent concerning 't coplica
tions that d set in'.
DISAPPOINTMENTS
133
CONVERSAIONS
DISAPPOINTMENTS
WITH STALIN
135
136
CONVERSAIONS WIH STALIN
Dimitrov tried to explain, to justify l1imself, but Stali kept
interrupting \vithout letting him finish. Here, at last, \vas the
real Stali. His \Vit \V turned into crude malice and his
aloofness into itolerance. Still, he kept restraining himself and
succeeded i keepig his tempe. vVithout losing v for
moment his sense of the actual state of affairs, he upbraided
the Bulgars and itterly reproached them, for he kne\v they
would submit to him, but in fact he had his sights fixed on the
Yugoslavs- as in tl1e peasant proverb, 'She scolds her daughter in order to reproach her daughter-i-law.'
Supported Kardelj, Dimitrov pointed out that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had not announced signed treaty at
Bled but only statement that agreeet had been reached
leading to treaty.
'Yes, but you didn't cosult \vith us,' Stalin shouted. 'vVe
learn about your doigs i the ne\vspapers. ou chatter like
woen from the housetops whatever occurs to you, and then
the ne\\'Spaperme get lld of it.'
Dimitrov continued, oliquely justifyig his position on
the customs ui \vith Rumaia, 'Bulgaria is in such econornic difficulties that \Vithout cooperation '''ith other cou
tries it canot develop. As far as staternet at the press
conferece is concerned, it is true that I was carried a\vay.'
Stali interrupted irn, 'You \Vanted to shie, to original.
It \vas copletely \\'rog, for such federation is incoceivale.
What historic ties are there betwee Bulgaria d Rurnania?
N. And we d not speak of Bulgaria and, let us say,
Hungary or Polad.'
Dirnitrov rernostrated, 'r are essetially differences
bet\vee the foreig policies of Bulgaria d the Soviet
Uion.'
DISAPPOINTMENTS
1 37
DISAPPOINTMENTS
1 39
between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, siged at Bled had been
previously submitted to the Soviet Government but that. the
Soviet Government had d no coment ;ther than to
suggest that its duration should 'twenty years' instead of
'for all time'.
Stalin kept glancig. silently and not witout reproach at
Molotov, who hung h1s head and with clenched Iips tacitly
confired what Kardelj had said.
'E:ccept ~or that suggestio, which we adopted,' Kardelj
contued, there were no differences .... '
. Stalin interrupted hi, no less agrily though Iess offensively tha he had interrupted Dimitrov. 'Nonsense! There
are differences, and grave ones. What do you say about
Aania? ou did not consult us at all about the etry of
your r into Aania.'
Kardelj replied that we had had the consent of t Albanian
Government.
Stalin shouted, 'Tis could lead to serious internatioal
co~p;icatio?s. ~i is ~1 i~dep~ndent state. What do you
thk. Justlficatn or no JUStificatn, the fact reains that
you did not consult us about sendig two divisios into
Albaia.'
DISAPPOINTMENTS
Stalin broke in: 'No, this is preventive war- the commonest Komsomol stunt; tawdry phrase which only brings grist
to the enemy ill.'
Molotov retured to the Bulgarian-Rumanian customs
unio, emphasizing that this was the begirig of merger
bet\vee the two states.
Stali broke in \vith the observation that customs uions
are generally unrealistic. Since the discussion had agai subsided soe\\hat, Kardelj remarked that some customs unios
had sho\V thernselves t to so bad in practice.
'For l ?' Stali asked.
'Well, for l, Beelux,' Kardelj said cautiously, 'where
Belgiu, Hollad, d Luxebourg joined together.'
Stalin: 'No, Holland didn't. Only Belgiu and Luxebourg. That's nothig, insignificant.'
Kardelj: 'No, Holland is included too.'
Stali stubborly: 'No, Hollad is rt.'
Stali looked at Molotov, at Zorin, at the rest. I wanted to
tell hi tat t syllale 11 in Beelux from t Netherlands, the Dutcl1 name for Hollad, but since v else
\Vas silet, I held my tongue and Holland remained outside
Benelux.
Stalin returned to the coordiation of economic plas
bet\veen Ruania and Bulgaria. 't is senseless, for instead
of cooperation tere \vould soon quarrel. The unification
of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia is aother rnatter- they have
things in , anciet aspirations.'
Kardelj pointed out that at led it d also decided to
work gradually to\vard federation bet\veen Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but Stalin iterrupted i rnore precise ters: 'No, but
irnediately- tomorro\v! First Bulgaria and Yugoslavia ought
t.o unite, and then let A!ania join them later.'
Stali then turned to the uprising in Greece: ' uprising
in Greece \Vill have to fold up.' ( used for this the \Vord
svenzut, \Vhic eans literally to roll up.) 'Do you believe'he tured to Kardelj - 'in the success of the uprising in
Greece?'
I4I
142
CONVERSAIONS WIH
STALIN
DISAPPOINTMENTS
143
If4
Coclusion
people, anng them Trotsky, of course, have stressed
Stalin's criminal, loodthirsty passions. I can neither confirm
nor deny them, since the facts are not that >vell know to me.
Recently it >vas made pulic in Mosco>v that had probaly
killed the Leningrad Secretary, Kirov, to give himself pretext for settling accounts >vitl1 the oppositio wit.hi the Party.
probaly had hand in Gorky's death, for it >vas depicted
too prominently i his propaganda as t >vork of the opposition. Trotsky v suspects tat he killed Lenin 'ith the
excuse that he was shortenig his misery. It is claimed tlt he
killed his own wife, or at all events, was so cruel to her tlt
she killed herself. The romantic legend spread Stalin's
agents, d \vhich I, too, had heard, is really too !v - that
she \Vas poisoned \vhile tasting food before r good husbad
ate it.
Every crime was possile for Stalin, d there >Yas not one
he ld not committed. Whatever standards >ve use to take his
measure, he has the glory of being the greatest crimial in
history- and, let us hope, for all time to come. For in him was
joined the crimial senselessess of Caligula \vith the refie
met of Borgia and the brutality of Tsar Iva the Terri!e.
I was more interested, d am still more iterested, in how
such dark, cunnig, d cruel man could ever haYe led one
of the greatest and most po>verful states, not just for day
or year, but for thirty years. This is >vhat Stalin's present
critics - I m his successors - must explai; d until they
do so they will only confirm that in the mai they are contiuing his \vork and tat they are made up of the same
elernets and are governed the same ideas, patters, d
methods as he was. For it is t merely true that Stalin took
advantage of the desperate exhaustio of Russian post-revolutioary society in order to gain his own eds, but. it is also
MANY
!46
true that certain strata of that society, that is to say, the ruling
political bureaucracy of the Party, needed just such man :...
one \vho was reckless in his determination and extremely
practical in his fanaticism. The ruling Party followed im
doggedly and obediently- and he led it from victory to victory,
until, carried a\vay po\ver, he began to sin against it as \Vell.
Today this is all it reproaches him for, passing in silece over
his m greater d certaily no less brutal crimes agaist
the 'class enemy' - the peasatry and the intelligetsia, and
also the left and right wings within the Party and outside it.
And as long as that Party fails to shake off in its theory d
especially in its practice, everything that comprised the very
originality and essence of Stalin and of Stalinism, that is to
say the strict ideological conformity and so-called monolithic
structure of the Party, it will bad but certai sig that it
has not emerged from uder Stalin's shado\v. Thus the present
over the liquidation of Molotov and the so-called antiParty group, despite the odiousness of his personality and the
depravity of his vie\vs, seems to to shallo\v and premature. For the essence of the pro!em is not \Vhether one group
is better than another, but \vhether either should exist. at alland whether, at least as begining, the ideological and
political monopoly of single group in the U S S R shall
ended. Stalin's dark presence continues to hover over the
Soviet Union and, provided there is not \Var, I fear that it
\Vill go hovering for long time. Despite the curses against
his n, Stalin still lives in the social and spiritual foundations of Soviet society.
The speeches and solemn declarations, \Vith their references
to Lenin, cannot change the substance. It is much easier to
expose some crime of Stalin's than to conceal the fact that it
\Vas this man \Vho 'uilt socialism', \vho gave rise to the
foundations of present Soviet society and of the Soviet empire.
All this sho\vs that Soviet society, despite its gigantic technical
achievements, and perhaps largely because of them, has barely
begun to change, tlt it is still imprisoned in its O\vn, Stalinist,
dogmatic framework.
147
Despite this criticisrn, there does seem to some hope
tlt in the foreseeale future new ideas and phenomena may
appear \vhich, though they may ~ot shake K~r~schev's 'mon~
lithisrn', will at least sllo\v up 1ts contrad1ctns and what 1t
really is. At the moment more drastic changes are impossile.
Those \vho govern are still thernselves too poor to find dogmatism and monopoly of rule unnecessary or hindrance, while
the Soviet econorny can still exist enclosed in its o\vn empire
and can absorb the losses caused its separation from the
\Vorld market.
Of course, the value of much that is human depends on the
point of vie\v from \vhich it is seen.
So it is \Vith Stalin.
If \Ve take the point of view of huanity and freedom,
history does not kno\V despot as brutal and as cynical as
Stalin was. was methodical, all-embracing, and total as
criminal. \Vas one of tose rare and terrile dogmatists
l of destroying nie-tents of the uman race to 'k
happy' the rernaining tenth.
.
.
Ho\\'ever, if \Ve \Vish to determe \vhat Stal really rneat
in t l1istory of Comnnism, then he must for the pres~nt
regarded as far the most import~nt figure ...after Le:n.
did not substantially develop t 1deas of Comusm,
but he championed them and brought tem to realization in
society and state. did not costruct ideal soci~ty
this is impossi!e in the very nature of m and uman soc1ety,
but l1e transformed backward Russia into an industrial po\ver
d an empire tat is more and rnore resolutely and iplacaly
aspiring to world mastery.
..
Fro t point of view of success and pol1~1ca~ acumen,
Stalin is l1ardly surpassed any statesman of h1s :1me. . .
I of course, far from thinking that success pol1t1cal
struggl~s is the only criterion. Even less do 1 \vis~ to identify
politics \Vith amorality, though 1 do no.t deny that~ JUSt because
politics involve struggle for the surv1val of part1~ular human
communities, they are apt to marked d1sregard for
normal morality. For great politicians and great statesmen
CONCLUSION
Biograpical
and
Notes
Oter
t Autlr
Cllief Caracters
\Vas free parole for fifteen months followhis imprisonment for more than four years on charges of
'slandering' d \vritig opiions 'hostile to the people and the
state of Yugoslavia'. was, up to the time of his expulsion
from the Communist Central Comrnittee in January of 1954,
one of the four chiefs of the Yugoslav Governme!lt, at times
Miister, head of the Parliament, and Vice-President.
Djilas was born i 1911 i lVlontenegro, the fateful lad he
descries poetically in the autoiography of his youth, Land
Witlut Justice. At the age of eighteen he went to Belgrade to
the Uiversity d \VOH early recognitio for his poetry a!ld
short stories - d notoriety as revolutionary. joined the
illegal Comnnist Party in 1932 and \vas subsequently arrested
the Royal governmet, tortured, and imprisoned for three
years. the time he was rnenty-seve he \Vas member of the
Central Comrnittee of the Party, and i 1940 ember of its
Politburo.
Following the Germa occupatio of Yugoslavia in 1941,
Djilas became Partisan leader. In 1944, as Partisan Geeral
he headed military mission to Moscow; the following year,
as Minister in the post-\var Tito government, he went again
to Mosco\v to hold talks "\vith Stalin, Molotov, and other Russian leaders. I 1 947 he took part i the foration of the
Cominform, which had its headquarters, at Stali's insistence,
i Belgrade. I 1948 he once again headed Yugoslav delegatio to 1\1oscow in futile attempt to stave off the break
between the two Communist states that occurred later in the
same year.
Ideological disagreements between the Party leaders.ip and
Milovan Djilas arose in Yugoslavia begiing in 1953. wrote
articles critical of the bureaucracy he was later to call 'the new
class', and i January of 1954 he was expelled from the Cetral
Committee. During tbls period he devoted hirnself to tlle writig
MILOVAN DJILAS
ig
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
of The New Class, which was to become known the world over
for its analysis of Communist oligarchy, and Land Without
Justice. The year following his break ;vith the Party, 1955, fo1d
Djilas being tried and sentenced ( sentence of three years ;vas
passed but suspended) for 'hostile propaganda' arising from an
intervie;v he gave to the New York Times. After the uprising in
Hungary, Djilas criticized the Yugoslav Govemment's position
to;vard tl1e brutal Soviet action and was, as result, sentenced
to three years in prison. The manuscripts of his two books ;vere,
shortly before he was arrested, sent out of Yugoslavia, and the
publication of New Class caused him to brought from
prison and, following third trial, given further sentence of
seven years.
Djilas ;vas conditionally released from Sremska Mitrovicathe very same prison where he had, ironically, suffered as
Comnist rebel at the hands of the pre-;var Royal govemment
- in January of 1961. While in confinement he ;vrote steadily and
he has since completed three books: massive d scholarly
iography of the great Montenegrin prince-poet-priest Njegos;
historical d fictional account of Montenegro during the
First World War; and sixteen short stories (or tales). The
present work, Conversations ztitlz Stalin (in Serian Susreti sa
Staljinom), was ;vritten during the short period he ;vas free.
On 7 April 1962, Milovan Djilas ;vas rearrested the Yugoslav authorities, presumaly in corexion ;vith the then forthcorning publication of Conversations wit Stalin.
*
). Leading
Soviet pbllosopher and Comunist Party member since 1928.
worked in the Agitation and Propaganda Section (Agitprop)
of the Central Comittee from 1934 and was its head from
1939 to 1947. His book History Western European Pbllo.sophy
in tlze Nineteentlz Century, pulished in 1944, was officially
attacked Zhdanov for presenting Marxism as part of the
Westem pbllosopblcal tradition. In 1950 he was official commentator on the pbllosophical implications of Stalin's articles
on linguistics. served as Minister of Culture in 1954-5, after
which he joined tl1e Institute of Philosophy of the Byelorussian
Academy of Sciences in isk.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
VLADIMIR BAKARIC (1912-
).
Georgian Communist who made career in the Soviet Becret Police - the
Cheka G U, and N V D. Comrnissar for Internal Affairs
from ;938 to 1948 and Deputy Prime Minister in c~ar~e of
security from 1941 to 1953, he ended the Great Purge ldat
ing bls predecessor, N. I. Yezlv, and many otl1e~ officia.ls: he !~
directed the reign of terror, not only in the SoVlet Uruon but
ilie satellite states, that marked Stalin's last years. was
purged in ilie struggle for power following Stalin's deaili.
SEMYON MIKHAILOVICH BUDYONNY(1883). MarshaJof
the Soviet Union, from 1935. was active in the Revolution
of 1917. From 1939 he has member of the Central C~m
rnittee of the Comunist Party, and in 1940 was first V!ce-
Comrnissar of Defence.
Leading Bolshevik theorist and member of ilie Politburo from 1918 to 1929
who supported Stalin against Trotsh.-y but.;vas himsel~ ~tripped
of power Stalin as leader of the Rig~t .Oppos1tn and
executed during ilie Great Purge. Many of h1s 1deas have found
expression in post-Stalin revisionism, especially in Poland,
Hungary, and East Germany.
152
153
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
the Djilas affair; it was his actress wife, Milena Vrajak, whom
Djilas defe11ded against t 'New Class'.
155
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
154
ENVER
(1893). Communist
of hum!e ewish origin who was Party organization man.
rose to power as one of Stalin's chief henchmen. During t
Secod World War he was meber of the State Defence
Committee and subsequently eld high posts in the Caucasus
and the ~kraie. His ifluece declined in Stalin's Jast years,
per~aps part because of the anti-Seitic campaign. A.fter
Stal's deatJ; he becarne prominent once again, but was divested
of all power 1957 as member of the 'ar1ti-Party group'.
(1894). Chairman
of the Soviet Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the
Cetral Coittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Jocksmith trade, he rose through the ranks of the Co
munist Party chiefly through his activities in the Ukraine.
Follo;vig the Civil War, in which he served as political
comissar of Partisan detachment, he was sent to the Workers'
School at Kharkov University. Thereafter he ascended the
ladder of Party posts up to the Politburo (candidate member i
1935) and Central Comittee. In 1938 he ;vas put in charge of
carrying out purge in the Ukraine, and during the Second
World vVar he served there in various army posts. After the war
he ;vas transferred from the Ukraine to Mosco;v, where he
full meber of the Party's Central Committee and
Presidium in 1952. After Stalin's death, in 1953, he was elected
First Secretary and eventually replaced Malenkov.
BORIS IDRIC
(r9I9-53). Yugoslav Communist leader of Slovorigin. joined the Party in 1928 and lived the life of
constantly hunted uderground revolutionary. joined the
Partisans in 1941, and became political commissar for Slovenia.
In 1945 he was made Preier of Slovenia and continued har-sh
programme of esta!ishing Communist hegemony there. I 1946
;vas set to Moscow to study the Soviet economy. From his
return, in the auturnn of the same year, to his death, he was
virtual director of the entire Yugoslav economy. His administration is associated with the ruthless collectivization of agriculture,
abandoned after his death, and vigorous drives for higher production in idustry. was member of the Politburo.
enia
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
157
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
BoJshevik
first supported Stalin in his rise to power but opposed his personal rule
after the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 His assassination
in December 1934, probaly at Stalin's behest, set off the Great
Purge.
War. After the war he served as Secretary of the Central Committee and Deputy Prime Miister. succeeded Stali as
Prime Minister in the era of 'collective leadership' but was
forced to step dow after pulic admission of failure in .1955
In 1957, as member of the 'ati-Party group', he was stpped
of power.
DMITRI
(1949).
IVAN STEPANOVICH KONIEV (1897). Marshal of the
Soviet Union. distinguished hirnself during the Second
World War, especially in the lieration of harkov (1943) and
irovograd (1944). After the war he was Soviet representative
on the Allied Control Commission in Vienna. From 1946 to
1955 he \vas Commander-in-Chief Land Forces, d from 1955
First Deputy Minister of Defence d Commader-i-Chief of
the Wsaw Pact forces. resiged from this post in 1960 on
grouds of ill ealth. \vas chaim1an of the special court that
sentenced Beria in 1953.
TRAICHO KOSTOV (1897-1949). Bulgarian Commurlist leader.
was mernber of the Politburo and Deputy Prime Minister
who, thougl1 an anti-Titoist, was associated with 'ulgaria
first' outlook. Stripped of po\ver i March 1949 d indicted
in December of that year, he created sensation repudiating
bls cofession at the trial. \vas executed.
GEORGI MAXIMILIANOVICH MALENKOV (1902). Soviet
Commuist Party leader who worked his \vay through the Party
machie to becorne member of the Cetral Committee in 1939,
where he was placed in charge of the admiistratio of cadres. In
1941 he became cadidate member of the Politburo d served
VYACHESLAV
MIKHAILOVICH
MOLOTOV
(189-
).
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
IS9
ALEXANDAR-MARKO RANKOVIC (1909- ). Yugoslav Communist Party Jeader, \vho joined tl1e Serblan Youth Section of
the Party i 1927. spent five years in various prisons, \vhere
he got to krw Tito d Pijade. In 1937, whe Tito reorganized
the Party, he \Vas in the Politburo and has remained a.top Communist ever since. After t Jieration struggle, of wh1ch he \Vas
leading orgaizer, he became best kno\vn as lVIinister of the
Interior d Director of the Military and Secret Police. d
Kardelj are generally regarded as being next to Tito in power.
KONSTANTIN KONSTANINOVICH ROKOSSOVSKY (1896- ).
native w joined the Red Army in 1919 and made
brilliant military career in the Soviet Union. \Vas of the
USSR's most outstanding generals during the Second World
War. For his part in the defence of Moscow, Stalingrad, a~d
Kursk he \vas nvice a\varded the title of Hero of the Sov1et
Union', d became Marshal in 1944. In 1949 he \vas officia_Ily
transferred to the Polish Army d held t posts of Po~1sh
Minister of Defence, Commander-i-Chief, Depu~ P~1me
Miister and rnember of the Politburo of the Polrsh Communist Party. In November 1956 the Gomulka regi~e had him
transferred back to the Soviet Unio, \vhere he has smce served
as Deputy Minister of Defence.
PAVLE svrc (1909). Paris-trained Yug?slav nuclear
physicist and ember of the Communist Party smce 1939
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
IV AN us I 6 (1892-1955). Croatian politician. was Governor () of Croatia from August 1939, and went into exile
during the war. On 1 June 1944 he \Vas appointed Premier of the
Yugoslav Royal Government-in-exile at the insistence of the
Allies. rnerged his cablnet \vith Tito's after the Tito-Subasic
Agreernent concluded on the island of Vis. In the Provisional
Government, he served as Foreign lVIinister, until the coalition
broke down.
MIKHAIL ANDREYEV1CH SUSLOV (1902). Communist
Party leader in the U S S R. joined the Party in 1921, entered
the Central Cornmittee in 1941, and \Vas higl1-ranking political
officer during the war. In 1946 he became head of the Agitation
and Propaganda Section of the Central Cornrnittee, and in 1947
Secretary. In 1949-50 he served as editor-in-chief of Pravda. His
chief posts since then have been chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Cornrnittee of the Soviet Union (1954) and rnember of the
Central Cornrnittee's Presidium (1955). Generally regarded as
doctrinaire, he has nevertheless supported hrusl1chev in defeating the 'anti-Party group'.
MIJALKO TODOROVIC (1913). Yugoslav Cornrnunist
leader. began his Party career in the youth rnovement.
rr
ALEXANDR MIKHAILOVICH VASILYEVSKY (1895- ). Leading Soviet general and Chief of the Soviet General Staff at the
tirne of the Battle of Stalingrad. was rnade Marshal in 1943,
and was cornmander of the Byelorussian Front in 1945. Since
then he has served as Minister of War.
NIKOLAI F. VATUTIN (1901-44). Soviet general. With Koniev
and Malinovsky, he distinguished himself in the lieration of
the Ukraine from the German Army.
VELJKO VLAHOVIC (1914). Montenegrin member of the
Yugoslav Comrnunist Party since 1935. fought in the Spanish
Civil War and \vas especially active i organizing the Cornmunist Youth League of Yugoslavia. Durig the Secod World War
he directed the F Yugoslavia radio statio. returned to
Yugoslavia at the end of 1944 to serve as editor of the Cornmunist daily, Borba, and as Deputy Foreign Minister. has
gained cosidera!e reputation as theoretician, especially since
Djilas's fall.
NIKOLAI ALEXEYEVICH VOZNESENSKY (1903-50). Leading
Soviet economist. During the Great Purge, he rose rapidly to the
post of Chairman of the State Planing Cornrnission (Gosplan),
\vhich plans d coordinates the \vhole Soviet economy. \Vas
also Deputy Pime Miister in 1939 and member of the State
Defence Committee during the \var. Candidate rnember of the
Politburo in 1941 and full mernber in 1948, he \Vas stripped of all
his posts in 1949 during lVIalenkov's campaign against Zhdanov's
followers, and \vas arrested and shot on Stalin's orders.
SVETOZAR VUKMANOVIC-TEMPO (1912). l\.1ontenegrin
who joined Yugoslav Comrnunist Youth i 1933 and became
Party member in 1935. His speciality in undergroud \vork \vas
organizing cladestine presses. During the Second vVorld War
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
162
Secretary
of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee from I935
\Vas candidate member of the Politburo in 1934 and full
member in 1939. In charge of ideological affairs, he made
Socialist Realism in tlle arts oligatory and directed the postwar campaign against Western cultural ifluences. During the
Second World War was leader in the defence of Leningrad.
was promient in the foUilding of the Comiilform. Died r 948.
ANDREI ALEXANDROVICH ZHDANOV (1896-1948).
VALERIAN
Inclex
Index
Albania, 6s-6, ro2, 104-6, ro7,
111-14, 133, 137, 139, 140
AIanian r, 105
Albanian
Comunist
Party
Central Coittee, 104, r II
Alexander I, 24
Alexandrov, G. F., 27-8, 123
Andrejev, ., 78, 8, 85
Anti-Fascist Council, 13
Antonov, General, 86, 87, 132
Archangel, 20, 91
Army of People's Lieration
and Partisan Units, 11-13,
16-17, 35, 57, 59, 62, 70, 76,
89, 1
AugustinCic, Antun, 16
Austria-Hungary, 135
Bagdad,
20
Bakaric, Vladimir, 133-4
Baku, 22
Balkans, 22, 40, 137, 141,
Baltic states, 31, II2-I3
Bari, 19
Belgiu,
44
INDEX
INDEX
Crimea, r, 124
Cmobrnja, Bogdan, 129
Czeclslovakia, 100, 137
Dapcevic, Peko, 71, 72
Deakin, Major, 19
Dimitrov, Georgi, 17, 24, 27,
29-35, 50, 67, 92-3, !, 101,
129, 133. 134-7. 138-9, 142-3
Dimitrov, Mrs Georgi, 34
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 87, 122
Duclos, Jacques, 99
East Prussia, 88
Eastern Europe, 81, 83, roo-102,
108, II9, r, 132, 133, 134,
137
Eastem Front, 37, 55
Egypt, 54
Ehrenburg, Ilya, 109
Fadeev, Alexandr Alexandrovich,
123
Far East, 54, I4I
Finland, 14, 120
Foma Gordeyev (Gorky), 122
For Lasting - For
People's Democracy, 10I
France, 90
Free Yugoslavia (radio station),
14, 24
French Communist Party, , 99
Gallipoli, 91
Gavrilovic, Milan, 55
German Army, , I2-I, 20,
22, 26, 30, 32, 34, 41, 42, 43,
46-7,57, , 89,94,97-8; 102,
144
Japan, 141
Jovanovic, Arso, 7+
Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseyevich,
93
Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 82,
83-4
Kapital, Das (Marx), 120
Kardelj, Edvard, 27, 70, 102,
II9, 132-4, 136, 137, 138-43,
144
Opposition (Stalin), 86
INDEX
I7I
INDEX
Canada
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INTO
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EVGENIA S. GINZBURG