Janae Thomas

PHL 131
Is Virtue Ethics Action-Guiding
Virtue ethics is an ethical theory that dates back as far as Ancient
Greece. Many great philosophers including Aristotle and Socrates study the
theory. In the late 1950s, the theory gained a revival due to an influential
book written by G. Elizabeth Anscombe. With the revival brought new age
supporters, but along with the supporters, it also brought upon new age
opponents. Some modern day philosophers disagree that virtue ethics is a
normative ethical theory stating that it is not action-guiding. One particular
philosopher, Rosalind Hursthouse, as this paper will explain, believe virtue
ethics can hold up as a normative ethical theory and does provide a
guideline for action. In her article Normative Virtue Ethics she provides a
strong argument for virtue ethics and explains how the theory is actionguiding despite the criticisms from other ethical theorists. I will argue that
virtue ethics is action-guiding and a normative theory by disproving the
objections made towards it and giving examples on how it can be actionguiding.
Virtue ethics looks at the character of the moral agent rather than the
acts the agent perform. Some critics used this against virtue ethics and
argue how it is not a normative ethical theory due to it being agentcentered rather than act-centered. They formed what is now called the
Normativity Argument which state: (1) If virtue ethics is incapable of being
action-guiding, then it cannot be considered an independent normative
ethical theory, (2) Virtue ethics is incapable of being action-guiding,
therefore (3) Virtue ethics cannot be considered an independent normative
ethical theory.
Hursthouse begins her article challenging the second premise (645).
Her answer to this objection is how other ethical theories also do not provide

us with what to do. Take for instance, act-utilitarianism. An act-utilitarian

might have a belief that is something similar to an act is only permissible if it
promotes the best consequences. Yet, this belief does not tell us what we
should in any circumstance. As stated by Hursthouse, This premiss provides
a specification of right action forging the familiar utilitarian link between the
concepts of right action and best consequences, but gives one no guidance
about how to act until one knows what to count as the best consequences
(646). Therefore, there must be specification on what is to be counted as
best consequences. A second premise is needed. Hursthouse provides the
premise for the act-utilitarian stating, That the best consequences are those
in which happiness is maximized, and this second premise creates that link
between which consequences are best and happiness (646). Hursthouse
points out this fault in this theory to make the point that virtue ethics is alike
in this way. The theory needs specification in order to be action-guiding.
So, one might ask what makes an action moral correct under the
concept of virtue ethics? Hursthouse delivers a premise that states, An
action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in
circumstances (646). This one premise may not provide a moral agent an
answer for what to do, but as we saw in the previous paragraph, a second
premise can achieve this goal. Therefore, for the second premise we can
make the assumption that a virtuous agent is a person who practices in
possessing and using virtuous traits and a virtuous trait is a trait that brings
along Eudaimonia, or human flourishing. This affirmation of the second
premise makes virtue ethics action-guiding which makes it a normative
ethical theory. Yet, some may argue how would they know what a virtuous
agent would do in circumstances? This is a common sense answer: ask them.
As Hursthouse states, When I am anxious to do what is right, and do not see
my way clear, I go to people I respect and admire people who I think are
kinder, more honest, more just, wiser, than I am myself and ask them what
they would do in my circumstances (647). Humans are social beings and

whenever we are in a bind we seek advice from those who we admire, people
we believe are morally wiser than us. And if we are unable to seek their
advice at that moment, we can always think to ourselves what would they do
in that particular situation. A virtuous agent is one who is honest, charitable,
just, etc. So what she characteristically does is act honestly, charitably,
justly, etc..So given an enumeration of the virtues, I may well have a
perfectly good idea of what the virtuous person would do in my
circumstances despite my own imperfection, as quoted by Hursthouse
(648). There may take some phronesis, or practical wisdom, to identify a
virtuous person, but there is a very clear understanding of what some
virtuous traits are and they are usual easily identifiable in most people.
Yet, if one is still confused on what is morally correct in situations,
Hursthouse provides them with what she calls the v-rules (648). The v-rules
are basic rules that we obtain from either observing what a virtuous person
does or thinking about what they would do. The rules are simple like do not
lie, do not steal, be kind, etc. Whether you know a virtuous person or not,
you can look onto the v-rules and know if an action is permissible based on if
it is a virtuous trait or not. Although, some may argue that the rules are too
thick or difficult to grasp. Hursthouse responded with this by explaining
how even children can follow simple rules like dont lie, be kind to your
sibling, dont be mean, and so on (649). Yes, the rules may involve a lot
around them, but even the simplest minded human beings can understand
them and can follow them.
Some critics may still argue on how the theory is not action-guiding,
but the theory is as action-guiding as any other modern day ethical theory.
Due to the fact that the theory is an older one, they might figure it does not
have the same formation of a modern day ethical theory and therefore
cannot be as action-guiding. Yet, their objections should be expelled and
virtue ethics should be recognized by all that the theory does contain a
guideline for actions and can be considered a normative ethical theory.

Works Cited
Landau, Russ. "Normative Virtue Ethics." Ethical Theory: An Anthology.
Second ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2013. 645-652. Print.
Rosalind Hursthouse, Normative Virtue Ethics, from Roger Crisp, ed., How
Should One Live? (Oxford University Press, 1996), 19-33.