Keanecadinree Tiaattiesaet ge suabacar se toe PO. PO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF B-It SARAJEVO No: KT-RZ-143/07 Sarajevo, 18 August 2008 COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA — Preliminary Hearing Judge -- Pursuunt o Anticle 35 (2) (i) and Article 226 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, | hereby file the following: INDICTMENT AGAINST: Zoran TOMIC a.k.a, “Zgembo", son of Ratko and Durdijana née Vasilié, bor on 3 August 1971 in Stupari, Kladanj Municipatity, Personal Identification Number: 0308971182398, living in Ulice bb [no number], Zvornik, citizen of B-H, literate, sceondary schoo! education, construction machines operator, employed in the Zvornik Police Station, MUP of Republika Srpska, single, did his military service in 1990/1991 in , NO reserve officer rank, no decorations awarded, average financial standing, us convictions, no other pending criminal proceedings against him, currently in custody in the Tuzla Penat Correctional Institution pursuant to the Decision of the Court ‘af B-H No: X-KRN/08/582 of 30 July 2008, the custody shall expire an 2 September 201 : BECAUSE: Intending to exterminate in part a group of Bosnisks causing their anguish by forcible transfer and separation of men from their families, capturing and executing them, as 3 member of the special police force, together with a number of other members of the 2nd Sckoviéi Detachment of the Special Police Force of the Republika Srpska MUP {Ministry of the Interior}, as @ knowing participant of the joint criminal enterprise in the period from 10 July to 19 July 1995, in which the Republika Srpska Army [VRS] and the Republika Srpska MUP carried out 8 widespread and systematic attack against members of the Bosniak people, knowing of such an attack, in co-perpctration with other members of the VRS and the RS MUP, with the common aim to forcibly permanently transfer fromthe UN safe area of Srebrenica around 40,000 civilians and summarily execute and bury more than 7,000 Bosniak men aged between 13 and 17, the Accused: 1. On 12 July 1995, the Accused took pant in the search of the Bosniak-populaicd villages in the UN safe area of Srebrenica, in the Potogari vicinity, in order to find Bosniaks, force them out of their homes and take them to the arca of Potoéari where Bosniaks were being gathered, knowing that those people would be forcibly and permanently ransferred from Pototari to the area under the control of the Army of the Republic of B-H. In the afternoon of the same day and in the following day, 13 July, at the section of the Bratunac-Konjevié Polje road in the place called Sandi¢i, Bratunac Municipality, he participated in keeping the road passable so that the Gosniaks could be transported by buses and trucks without ‘obstruction, in providing sccurity to the road, closing and opening it for traffic in fine with the plan of forcible transfer of the Bosniak women, children and clderly, who, due to the fear caused by the separation of the men, terror, active threats and inflicting of injuries by members of the VRS and RS MUP, were bundled onto the buses and trucks without resistance and they lef the safe arca; 2. On 13 July, the Accused panicipated in the reconnaissance operation and the armed attacks from tanks, the Praga self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, anti-aireraf guns and other small arms against the column of Bosniaks in the arca above Kameniea close to the said road, and by forcing the Bosniak men to surrender, encouraging and cnticing them with fatse promises of exchange, the Accused participated in the capturing of scverat thousand Bosniaks who attempted to escape from the safe arca through the forest, fearing that they would be captured and exceuted by the RS MUP and RS Army, whereupon he scarched the captives and confiscated their money and valuables and ordered them to put aside the (00d, clothes and other things they had in their bags, whereupon in the afternoon of the same day he took part in the escorting of a column of around 1,000 captured Bosniaks from Sandiéi to the werchouse of the Kravica Farming Cooperative, knowing that they would be executed. After the captured Bosniaks were imprisoned in the Warehouse, the Accused and the other members of the 2nd Detachment killed the majority of the captives, the Accused having participated in the execution by firing from automatic gun at the captives, while the other members of the 2nd Detachment were killing the captives using light machine uns, rifles and hand grenades, Therefore, with the intemion of panially exterminating a group of Bosnioks as un ethnic and ious group, as a co-perpeirator, he commitied the killing of members of a group of Bosniak population and the forcible transfer of the Bosniak civilian population 10 the territories outside of Republika Srpska, whereby he committed the at offense of Genocide, in violation of Article 171 of the Criminal Code of B-H, as read with Article 29 and 180 (1) of the Code. ‘Therefore, | hereby file the following:PROPOSAL to the Court of Rosnia and Herzegovina 1 To schedule the main trial, after confirming the Indictment, and summon the attendance of the following persons: + Ibro Bulié, Prosecutor of the Prosecutor's OMice of B-H, - The suspect Zoran Tomié and his Defense Counsel, Atiomey Petko Paviovié + Representative of the injured panies: Nezir Habibovié from Sarajevo. 1 Proposal of evidence to be presented: 1) To hear the following persons as witnesses: 1. Protected witness D-1 2. Protected witness D-2 3. Protected witness 0-3 4. Protected witness 1-4 $._ Protected witness D-533. 34. 35, 2) To hear ax an expert witness EE forcnsic medical examiner, Tuzla 3) To present the following evidence: 3a) 16. 7. 18. List of members of the 2nd Sekovi¢i Detachment who carned their salary for July 1995, Special Brigade, 2nd Sckoviéi Special Police Detachment, List of members of the Special Police Brigade provided by the Republika Srpska MUP, Crime Police Administration, No: 02/3-strictly confidential, 994/05, dated 26 October 2005, Structure of the Special Police Brigade ~ RS MUP, Structure of the RS Police in the Drina Corps zone, dated 12 July 1995 - 7363, ‘Order by Staff Commander Tomo Kovat, No: 64/95, dated 10 July 2005, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vasié, Zvomik CJ (Public Security Center}, No. 277/95, dated 12 July 1995, Dispatch note by Drayomir Vasit, Zvornik CIB, No. 281/95, dated 12 July. 1995, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vasié, Zvornik CIB, No. 282/95, dated 13 July 1995, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vasié, Zvornik CJB, No. 283/95, dated 13 July 1995, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vasié, Zvomik CJB, No. 12-6/08-508/95, dated 14 July 1995, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vasié, Zvornik CB, No. 01-16-02/1-205/95, dated 15 July 1995, Dispatch note by Drugomir Vasié, Zvornik CJB, No. 01-01-0211-206/95, dated 17 July 1995, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vasié, Zvomik CJB, No. O1-16-02/1-206/95, dated 17 July 1995, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vusié, Zvomik CJB, No. 12-6/08-534/95, dated 19 July 1995, Dispatch note by Dragomir Vasié, Zvornik CJB, No. 01-16-02/1-231/95, daied 28 July 1995, Dispaich note by Dragomir Vasi dated 22 July 1995, Dispatch note by Milos Stupar, Commander of the 2nd Sckovici Special Police Detachment, No: O1/1-1-4/2-62, dated 18 July 1995, Repon on panial cleating up of the Srebrenica terrain, Kravica region, State Commission for PoW Exchange and Missing Persons, No. 193/97, dated 29 May 1997, Excerpt from hospital protocol for 13 July 1995, Zyvornik CIB, No. 01-16-02/1-221/95,25, 26. 2. 28. 2. 30. 31. 32 33. 34. 3s. 37. 38. 40. 4, 42. 43. 44, as. 46. 47. Data of the wounded, sick, missing and killed-in-action members of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade Letter of the RS MUP of 22 November 2005 Re: supply of lists of the 2nd Detachment members, -ycar report of RS MUP, Special Police Brigade, 2nd Sckoviei Special Police Detachment, No. O1/1-1-1/2-230/95, dated 5 July 1995, Record on crime scene investigation and reconstruction with witness| GE Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No. KT-RZ-10/0S, dated 29 September 2005, with transcript, Record on crime scene investigation and reconstruction with suspect Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No, KT-RZ-10/05, dated 29 ‘September 2005, with transcript, Record on crime scene investigation und reconstruction with Prosecutor's Office of BH, No. KT-RZ-10/05, dated 4 October 2005, Record on crime scene investigation and reconstruction with witness jl TEBE Prosccutor’s Office of B-H, No. KT-RZ-10/05, duted 4 October 2005, with transeript, Brochure - Photographs selected from the video footage from the Srebrenica trial - P22, Brochure - Book for Identification of Bosnian Muslims - P23, Photograph of a crossroads made from a hill in the direction of Konjevié Polje -P8.1, ‘Aerial photograph of Bratunac - P12.1 Acrial photograph of Bratunac, marked by @ witness during evidence presentation procedure - P77, Acrial photograph of Bratunac - P12.1, Photograph ~ arrival of a bulldozer, 5 July 1995, with truck tracks - P8.9, Photograph ~ arrival of a bulldozer, 5 July 1995, with tractor trailer and tractor tracks — P8.11, Photograph — arrival of a bulldozer, 27 July 1995, with truck tracks — £3.10, Photograph ~ arrival of a bulldover, 27 July 1995 - P8.8, Photograph - arrival of a bultdozer, 27 July 1995 - P8.12, Acrial photograph of the Sandiéi valley ~ P9.3, Photograph of the Sandii valley, 13 July 1995 - P9.1, Photogroph of the Sandiéi valley, magnified — P9.2, Photograph of Glogova, 5 July 1995, with a note - PH.2, Aerial photograph of Glogova, with a note - P1I.1, Glogova from the air on 17 July 1995 - PIT.3, Photograph of Glogova dated 17 July 1995 marked by a witness during hearing — P679, Photograph of Konjevié Pole dated 14 August 1995 - P8.4, Photograph 1° A Crom Glogova - P657, Photograph taken from the direction of Brotunae of the arca between Keavica and Sandiéi, with a warchouse marked - P9.5,48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 33. sa. 16. 7. 7B. 79. 80. Photograph of shoeprints under a window - P10.7, ‘Aerial photograph of ihe area, with notes - P8.5, Acrial photograph of Pototari, 13 July 1995 ~ P50, Acrial photograph of Potogari taken on 13 July 1995, with notes - PSI, Photogeaph of the warchouse in Kravica taken from P-10.1, marked by @ witness - P60, Photograph of the warehouse in Kravi hearing ~ P678, Photograph of the backside of the warchouse with remains of @ corn field - P10.6, Photograph of the roof-bcam on the west side with traces of blood - P10.5, Photograph of the interior west pan of the warchouse with blood stains on the wall - P10.4, Photograph of the area with grave sites taken from a helicopter - P6.t ‘Map showing direction of the column's movement - P138, Map showing the direction of movement of the columns divided in the North and South - P24, Map showing primary graves | and 2 in Glogova - P566, ‘Map showing the village of Kravica and a road in Kravica - P674, Map of Kravics - P43, ‘Mass graves in the area of Tatara-Bratunac, 27 July 1995 - P567, Panorama of the warchouse in Kravico - P10.3, View on the White House with objects scattered around - P9.4, Photograph of the warchouse in Kravica, 13 July 1995 - P10.2,, Acrial photograph of the warchouse - P10.1, Photograph of Srebrenica and Zepa, July 1995 Magnified photograph of a shoeprint under a window - P10.8, Photograph of disturbed soil, Glogova, 9 November 1995 - P571, Photograph of disturbed soil, Glogova, 30 October 1995 - $70, Video photographs of a body in front of the warehouse in Kravica, 13 July 1995, Film Petrovié on OVD (set) with a transeript for compiled video foot Skeich of the Kravica place, No. 14-13/1-7-243/05, dated 4 October 2005, Repon on combat activities of the Special Police Brigade and other police forees in the Srebrenica 95 operation in the period from 11 July 19 21 July 1995, repon submitted by Ljubomir Borovtanin, ERN 0294-1600-0294- 1603, Report on the activities of the 2nd Sckovici Special Police Detachment for the second quarter of 1995, dated $ July 1995, drafted by Milo’ Stupar, Repon by 2nd Sekovidi Detachment Commander Milo$ Stupar, datcd 16 ‘August 1995, Order on mobil 10 July 1995, Regular combat repon by Radislav Krstié for 13 July 1995, Security report No. 200, dated 12 July 1995, Bijeljina MUP, marked by 9 witness during ion of all able-bodied men by Vidoje Blagojevié, dateda1. 82, 33. 84. 85. 87, 88, 89. a. 92. 93. 95. %6. 97. 98. 109, ton. 102. 103. 104, los. 106. 107. 108. 109. 0, mm 112, "13. ta. Order to obiain buses for evacuation by Milenko Zivanovié dated 12 July 1995, Order to prevent the groups of Muslims from passing toward Kladanj and ‘Tuzla by Milenko Zivanovié, dated 13 July 1995, Order on application of International Law of War in the Army of the Serb Republic of B-H, issued by Radovan Karadzié, Glasnik srpskog naroda [The Serb People Gazesie], dated 13 May 1992, Guidelines for establishing criminal prosecution criteria from 1992 by the Military Prosecutor's Office, Order (0 introduce first level combat readiness by Radovan Karat dated 16 June 1995, Chart — expens and rep Chant — exhumed graves, Map showing primary and secondary graves, (CTY Photograph of Glogova, ICTY, Acrial photographs taken on 27 July 1995 and 20 October 1995 ~ Tatar Bratunae, ICTY, Zeleni Jadar— grave, ICTY, Aerial photograph ~ Zeleni Jodar, ICTY, Acrial photograph — Zeleni Jadar, disturbed soil, 7 September 1995, ICTY. Zeleni Jadar - grave, disturbed soil, 24 August 1995 and 2 Ociober 1995, icry, Zeleni Jadar - grave, disturbed soil, 20 October 1995 and 23 October 1995, ICTY, Zeleni Jadar - grave, disturbed soil, 7 Sepiember 1995 and 2 Ociober 1995, ICTY, Pan of report —expcr Gi. 1 - Photogeaph, Table—MMNI results, Srebrenica graves ~ primary and sccondary, graph, Laboratory report — auiomatic ballistic comparison of 24 February 2000 by the Coun Scientific Laborato Graph showing the connection between the exccution si Graph — experts and reports, dated 5 February 2004, Forensic analysis of explosives samples taken from various locations in Srebrenica conducted by the Netherlands Forensic Institute, ate of @ minimum number of bodies exhumed by the ICTY from 1996 (0 200! by EE January 2004, Srebrenica exhumations, blindfolds, photographs - ICTY, Srebrenica exhumations, ligatures, photographs — ICTY, Table -- blindfolds and ligatures found 1996-2001 ~ ICTY, Photograph of Pototari ~ ICTY, Photograph of Energoinvest Factory - ICTY, Photograph of Energoinvest, 11 March - ICTY, Photograph of Potogari— ICTY, Photograph of the White House ~ ICTY,115. 116. 417. 118. 419, 120, 121. 122 123. 124, 125. 126. 127. 128, 129. 130. 131. 132, 138. 4, 135, Photogroph —an opening in the fence ~ ICTY, Photograph of Potodari ~ a corn field - ICTY, ‘Acrial photograph — Pototari- 13 July 1995 - ICTY, Photograph of Pototari ~ 12 July 1995 -- ICTY, ‘Map showing direction of movement of the column and deployment of the Serb forees - ICTY, Photograph showing the hill and the forest where the columns of Muslims were moving ~ ICTY, Photograph ~ a crossroads ~ ICTY, ‘Aerial photograph ~ Sandiéi, 13 July 1995 -ICTY, ‘Acrial photograph ~ Nova Kasaba, football playground, 13 July 1995 — ICTY, Security report of the 2nd Sckovidi Police Detachment of 3 August 1995 by Nedeljko Sekula, Report of the MUP, Special Police Brigade, No. 285/95 of 13 July 1995, by LjubiSa Borovéanin, Special Police Brigade Deputy Commander, Delivery of information to the Deputy Minister by’ Dragan Kijac dated 14 July 1995, Regular combat report dated 14 July 1995 by Mite Simani¢, Regular combat report dated 17 July 1995 by Mite Simanié, Report on combat readiness status dated 17 June 1993 by Rade Rodi, Directive No. 7 on further actions, No. Dt 2/2-11, dated 8 March 1995, Supreme Command of thc Republika Srpska Armed Force, by Supreme Commander Radovan Karadzié, Directive No. 7/1 on further actions, No. Dt 2/2-15, dated 31 March 1995, Main Staffof the Republika Srpska Army, by Commander Ratko Mi “Treatment of prisoners of war by Milomir Savdi Report by AMEN exper in forensic medicine, dated 12 February: 2007 Record of handing over Zoran ‘Tomi¢, person deprived of liberty, 10 the Prosecutor in charge, State Investigation and Protection Agency [SIPA}, No. 14-04/2-04-2-16/08, dated 2 June 2008, Record of deprivation of liberty of Zoran Tomi¢, SIPA, No. 17-04/2- 16/08, dated 2 June 2008. 3b) Evidence proposed on the grounds of Article $ of the Law on the Transfer of Cases From the ICTY 10 the Prosecutor's Office of B-H aud the Use of Evidence Collected by ICTY in Proceedings Before the Courts in B-H: 2 Statement by (EEE given to the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) on 26 June 2002, 28 and 29 April 2004, Statement by TEE given 10 the CTY OTP on 29 October 2004, Statement by JE given to the ICTY OTP on 20 February 2002, 11 March 2002,Statement by! Wven to the {CTY OTP on 9 July 2000, 26 August 2002, 10 June 2003, Statement by IMEI ven to the (CT'Y OTP on 16 March 2002, Starement by witness S.K. given to the ICT'Y OTP on 22 January 2004, Statement by witness H.E. given 10 the ICTY OTP on 8 March i999, Staicmcnt by SMM civen to he ICTY OTP on 16 December 1997, 4 February 1998, 21 October 1999, 12 March 2001, 25 November 2003, 9. Statement by (IN given to the ICTY on 23 Junc 1999, 15 December 1999, 28 May 2005, 10. Statement on facts and admission of gui! 11. Statement by EME given to the ICTY on 2 April 2000, 4 June 2003, 5 February 2004, 12, Statement on facts and admission of guilt, 13, Statement by Jean Rene Rucz given to the ICTY OTP on 15 May, 16 May, ena 19 May, 21 03, 14. Statement by| given 10 the ICTY OTP on $/6 February 2004, 15. Statement by| given to he ICTY OTP on 28 September 1995, 3 February 1998 16. Statement by given 10 the ICTY OTP on 24 October 1995, 9 July 1999, 30 April 2000, 17, Statement by given to the ICTY OTP on 26 September ! 18. Statement by the ICTY OTP on 26 September 2005, 19. Statement by| ven to the ICTY OTP on 28 September, 9 October 199! 20. Statement b} iven to the ICTY OTP on 23 September 1997, 21. Statement by| ven t0 the ICTY OTP on 6 October 1999, 22. Stavement by 23. Statement by n . given to the ICTY OTP on 29 November 1999. Jc) Evidence proposed on the grounds of Article 4 of the Law on the Transfer of Cases from the ICTY to the Prosecutor's Office of B-H and the Use of Evidence Collected by ICTY in Proceedings before the Courts in B-I: 1. Repon on military events in Srebrenica (revised) - Krivaja 95 operation dated | November 2002, (CD and the associated material), 2. __Repon on command responsibility in the VRS, Richard Butter (CD), 3. Expert finding of the Netherlands Forensic Institute, Subject: Examination of textile dated 11 February 2000, 4, The US Navy Investigative Service repon on review and finding of evidence from the Kravica warehouse, 5. Report-Appendix to the number of the missing and the dead in Srebrenica +6. ana con the number of the missing and the dead in Srebrenica by H. 7. Report on the review and finding of evidence from the Krovie Warehouse, 8. Report on blood and tissue samples found in the Grbavei School, Kravica Warehouse, 9. OTP repon’ The Missing from Srebrenica — Persons Registered as Missing. Afier the Fall of Srebrenica, 10. The ICRC list of missing persons, 11. Summary of the forensic medical evidence ~ mass graves exhumed in the course of 2000, 12, Report on excavation and exhumation of the Glogova | mass grave in 2000, 13. Report on excavation and exhumation of the Glogova 2 mass grave in 1999-2001 by forensic inivopo: ar 14. Summary of the forensic medical evidence — execution and mass burial sites - ICTY ines 16 May 2000, 1S. Report by Chief Pathologist - burial sites of Srebrenica, ICTY, 1999, 16. Repo on review and finding of the evidence from the Keavicu Warchouse, September-October 2000, 17, ICRC publication Afissing Persons in the Territory of B-H, dated 30 June 1998, 18, Additional repons by EEE daicd 8 June 2007 and 27 November 2007 (The Srebrenica investigation). RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION: Having conducted an investigation against the suspect Zoran Tomig, the Prosecutor's Office of B-H believes that there is sufficient evidence in suppor of grounded suspicion that the Accused, as a co-perpetrator, committed the criminal offense of Genocide, in violation of Anicle 171 of the Criminal Code of B-H, in the manner, at the place and time as explained in more detail in the operative pant of the Indictment, ‘The investigation has revealed the following: ‘Throughout the period referred to in the Indictment, there was an armed conflict in place in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H). ‘Throughout the relevant period, the participant: the armed conflict were, on the onc side: Republika Srpska (RS), whose Armed Force included the formations and units of the Republika Srpska Army (VRS) and clements of the Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska (RS MUP) and the police force thut acted in concen, or otherwise, with the VRS; and on the other side, Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose Armed Force consisted of formations and units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzcgovina (ABIH).‘Throughout the relevant period, members of the 2nd Sckoviéi Detachment of the Speciat Police Brigade of the RS MUP ond the VRS were obliged 10 comply with the laws and customs of war, All acis and omissions were pan of a widespread and systematic attack agoinst the Bosniak civiliuns in the UN protected arca of Srebrenica und its surroundings. After the armed coniTict broke out in the Republic of B-H in spring 1992, Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces attacked and occupied towns, places and villages in the astern pan of the country, including Zvomik, and participatcd in the cthnic cleansing campaign that resulted in a mass exodus of Bosniak civilians to the enclaves of Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa. On 19 November 1992, Gen Ratko Mladié, Commander of the VRS Main Staff, issued Operational Directive No. 4. This Directive, in part, ordered the Drina Corps to “...inflict the heaviest possible losses [on the enemy), and force them to leave the Biraé, Zepa and Gorutde areas together with the Muslim population, First, offer the able-bodied and ‘armed men to surrender, and if they refuse, destroy them." On 16 Aprit 1993, the United Nations Security Couneil, acting pursuant to Chapter Vil of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 819, in which it demanded that all parties to the conflict in the Republic of B-H treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a “safe arca” which was to be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. On 8 March 1995, the Supreme Command of the Armed Force of Republika Srpska issued Operational Directive No. 07. In this Directive, Republika Srpska President Radovan Karadzié directed the VIS (specifically, the VRS Drina Corps) to “complete the physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepo, to prevent even individual communication bewween the bo enclaves. By planned and well-thought-out combed ‘operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity, with no hope of further survival and life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa." On 2 July 1995, in the Drina Corps operational order for the attack on the Srebrenica enclave, Gen Milenko Zivanovié ordered that the altack on the enclave should result in “reducing the enclave 10 its urban arca*. The size of the enclave on 2 July 1995 was approximately $8 squarc kilometers, while the urban orca of the enclave was about 2 (ovo) square kilometers. Large numbers of the Bosniak population of the enclave lived outside the urban area of Srebrenica prior to 2 July 1995. The Drinu Corps plan for the execution of the order was a step toward the larger VRS goal of plunging the Bosnisk population into a humanitarian crisis and, ultimaicly, eliminating the enclave. On or about 6 July 1995, units of the Drina Corps shelled Srebrenica and attacked the Dutch-manned United Nations obscrvation posts located within the enclave. The Drina Corps attuck on the Srebrenica enclave, including the shelling, continucd through I Julyx1995, when the troops of The Drinu Wolves, the Browwnac Brigade and other VRS units entered Srebrenica. On 10 July 1995, upon the Order 64/95 issued by Tomo Kovat, Acting Minister of the Interior of Republika Srpska, the joint forces of MUP units were formed (involving 3 Company from the Jahorina Training Centre, the 2nd Sckovidi Detachment and the Ist Company of the Zvornik Public Security Center) in order to assist the VRS forces in the attack, According to that Order, the Joint Forces of the MUP units were placed under the command of the Drina Corps that was subordinated to the VRS Main Staff under the command of Gen Ratko Mladié. “The shelling of Srebrenica by the Drina Corps on 10 and 11 July 1995 was designed 10 terrify the Bosniak population and drive them out of the Srebrenica town and the arca. “The Bosniaks, men, women and children who were in Srebrenica following the outset of the VRS attack, could choose one of the two options: 8) Several thousand women, children, and some, mostly elderly men, fled to the UN Compound in Pototari within the Srebrenica “safe arca”, where they sought protection from the Dutch Battalion. These Bosniak civilians stayed in Pototari and its surroundings from 11 to 13 July 1995 and were being mistreated by the VRS and MUP members in that period. ANer that, they were transported out of the enclave by buses and trucks overscen by the VRS and the MUP. b) Meanwhile, approximately 15,000 Bosnisk men from the enclave, with some women und children, gathercd in the villages of Susnjari and Jagli¢i in the evening of 11 July 1995 and set off, in a huge column, through the woods toward Tuzla, Approximately one-third of this group consisied of the soldiers of the 28th Division of the Army of RB-H. Approximately two-thirds were Bosniak civilian men from Srebrenica. The rest were also civilians and unarmed military personnel, On oF about 12 July 1995, Ratko Mladig, Radislav Krstié and other representatives of the VRS and the Bosnian Serb civilian authorities met at the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac with the Dutch militury senior officers and representatives of the Bosniaks who took refuge in Pototari. At this meeting, Ratko Miadié explained that he would supervise the “evacuation” of the refugecs from Pototari and thot he wanted to sec all Bosniak men aged between 16 and 60, so that they could be screened for possible war criminals. On or about 12 July 1995, approximately 50 t0 60 buses and trucks arrived ncar the UN military compound in Pototari accompanied by Retko Mladié and Radistav Krstié. Shorily after the arrival of these vehicles, the process of forcible transfer of the Bosniak women and children began. As the women, children and men started to board the buses and trucks, the VRS soldiers and the MUP members separated the men from the women and children and detained the men in Potoéari and its surroundings.On 12 and 13 July 1995, the Command and the units of the Drina Corps, as well as the MUD units, were present during the supervision of the forcible wansfer of the Bosniak civilians from Pototari The staff of the Drina Corps who were in the Poto¢ari compound on 12 and 13 July 1995 were aware of the catastrophic humanitarian situation faced by the Bosniak refugces and of their mistreatment by the Bosnian Serb forces, but failed 1o do anything about thai. ‘The Bosniak civilians from Srebrenica who were taken by buses from Pototari on 12 and 13 July 1995 wore deprived of their right to freely’ decide if they wanted to leave the region of the former enclave. The Drina Corps and the MUP personnel who participatcd in the transport operation knew that the VRS had forced the Bosniak population to leave that region. ‘The members of the Drina Corps and the MUP who were in the Potogari compound on 12 and 13 July 1995 knew that the Bosniak men, having been separaicd from the women, children and the clderiy, were not treated in accordance with the accepted practice of screening for possible war criminals and that there was a great uncertainty about the fate of these people. The Drina Corps Command and the MUP Commanders also knew that the separated men from Pototari were taken by buses 10 the detention locations in Brownac. For that purpose the buscs were used that had originally becn intended for the transport of women, children and the elderly, supervised by the Drina Corps. Following the taking of Srebrenica, the whereabouts of the 28th Division of the Army of B-H were unknown. This caused great concern to the VRS, as did a possibility that the ABiH 2nd Corps could launch an attack from the direction of Tuzin and Kladanj and link up with the paris of the ABiM 28th Division. At the meetings held at the Fomana Hotel ‘on II and 12 July, Gen Miadié attempted to negotiate the surrender of the ABiH forces from the territory of the former enclave. However, since he failed, the VRS units, including the Drina Corps units that did not take part in the aitack on Zepa, were tasked in the coming days to block the column, {In addition to the Drina Corps units. units outside the Drina Corps, such as the MUP Special Brigade, clements of the Military Police Battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment and the regular police force, undertook the blocking of the column. ‘Afr the ABIM 28th Division had withdrawn from the enclove following the fall of Srebrenica, the MUP forces were involved in the “final” operations. ‘The MUP units were present in Pototari and, together with the 2nd Sckoviei Detachment Of the Special Police Brigade, were deployed along the Gratunac-Konjevié Polje road, where they took part in the blocking of the column and capiuring a large number of Bosniaks on 13 July 1995. Members of the VRS that were assigned to the respective Bratunse, Zvornik and Miliéi Brigades, together with elements of the Sth Engincering Battalion, the 65th Protection Regiment and the MUP Special Police, supported by armored carriers, tanks, antiintercept the column. While reireating, some armed i engaged in a fight against the Bosnian Serb forces. Thousands of Bosniaks from the retreating column were captured or surrendered to the RS Army and MUP. ‘The Drina Corps assisted the MUP forces with the task of blocking and capturing the Bosniaks who tried to escape and they coordinated thcir military operations with the MUP forces. Foltowing the taking of Srebrenica in July 1995, the RS Army and MUP devised and implemented the plan to execute as many able-bodied Bosniak men in the enclave as possible. Within several duys from the attack on Srebrenica, the VRS and the MUP forces captured, kept in captivity, forcibly transferred, summarily executed and buried more. than 7,000 Bosniak men and young men from Srebrenica enclave and forcibly transferred Bosniak women and children from Srebrenica out of the enclave. ‘The Bosnian Serb forces executed several thousand Bost victims ranges most likely between 7,000 and 8,000 men. men, The total number of The political and military leadership of the VRS devised a plan to permanently remove the Bosniak population from Srebrenica afler the taking of the enclave. In the peri between I! and 13 July, this plan, colloquially referred o as “ethnic cleansing”, was implemented for the most part through the forcible transfer of the major pan of the civilian population from Pototari, the able-bodied men having been scparated from the rest of the population. In their efforts to eliminate a pan of the group of Bosniaks, members of the VRS and RS. MUP committed genocide. They selected 40,000 Bosniaks, inhabitants of Srebrenica, for ‘execution, which, as a group, represented the Bosniaks in general. They seized personal items and documents from ail the captured Bosniak men, soldiers and civilians, old and young, and they were killing them deliberately and methodically, exclusively on account of thcir ethnicity. ‘The Bosnian Serb forces were aware, when they embarked on the genocide venture, that the harm they had caused to the Bosniaks would bring the Bosniaks permanent suffering. In the final ICTY Judgment rendered in the casc of Gen Radislav Kesti¢, it was cstablished that during the Krivaja 95 military-police operation of the taking of the UN Protected Zone of Srebrenica by the RS Army and MUP, genocide was against the Bosniak population, which was slso confirmed by the rendered by the International Court of Justice in The Hague on the Appli filed by B-H aguinst Serbia and Montenegro. ‘Among others, the fact that within a shon period of time, bewween 10 and 19 July 1995, all the Gosniak women, children and elderly were expelled from the enclave and that mass liquidations of the Bosniak men and young men were carried out, indicates that the ‘times against the Bosniaks were planned and organized. ‘Thus, the final Judgmey against Radislav Krstié and Vidoje Blagojevié determined the time of the execuli 4Bosniuk men and young men carried out at the locations of Poroturi, Ti8éa, the Cerska Valley, Jadar, warehouse in Kravica, Orahovac, Dom kulture Pitica [Pitica Culture Comer], Army-uperated farm of Vranjevo, Stadion [Stadium] in Nowa Kasuba. These locations were used by the Army and ihe Potice of Republika Srpska as execution sites. On 13 July 1995, organized killings took place in the morning hours in Jadar, in the alternoon hours in the Cerska Valley, in the late afternoon in the Kravica Warehouse, a in the evening in Ti8éa. In the coming days, the liquidations took place in Pilica, Oruhovac and the Army-operated farm of Branjevo (ICTY Judgment against Drazen Erdemovie). {In addition 10 the above mentioned ICTY Judgments, an important contribution toward casting some light onto the so-called Srebrenica events were the confessions by Mo Nikolié, a security officer in the Bratunac Brigade, and Dragan Obrenovié, Chicf of of the Zvornik Brigade, Important information was obtained in the confession of Momir Nikolié, first of all the fact that the crime was centered around the Militury Security Service and that everything was very well organized. In his confession, Momir Nikolié said that in the morning of 12 July, Gen Mladié was still negotiating the evacuation of civilians from Pototari with the UN, while Nikolié was given order to find appropriate locations for the cuptives and then find adequate execution sites, ‘The forensic evidence collected by the ICTY investigators and expenss over the past 10 years is vitally important for getting an objective picture of the events in and around Srebrenica in July 1995. It is a common knowledge that the process of finding mass graves (primary, secondary and tertiary) is still going on and that the major pan of the bodies of the killed Bosniaks have not been located and identified yct. Extensive forensic evidence firmly corroborates the important aspeets of testimonies by the survivors ot various execution sites. Since 1996, the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor has conducted chumations of 2! graves related to the taking of Srebrenica, as follows: four exhumations during 1996 (graves in Cerska, Nova Kasoba, Orahovac (also known as Lazete 2) und at the Army-operated farm in GBranjevo (Pilica)); cight during 1998 (a dam Canéurski put 12, Cantarski put 3, the Road toward Hodzidi ~ site No. 3, the Road toward Hod2i¢i - site No. 4, the Road toward Hodzii ~ site No. 5, Liplje 2, Zeleni Jadar 5); five graves in 1999 (Kovluk, Nove Kasaba, Konjevié Polje 1, Konjevié Polje 2 and Gloyova); and four graves in 2000 (L.azete 1, Lazete 2C, Ruvnice and Glogova 1). Out of 21 exhumed graves, 14 were primary graves, where bodies were placed immediately upon the killing. Out of those graves, cight were subsequently dug up without authorization and corpses were transferred to and buried at another location, often in secondary graves, located in more remote areas. Seven of the exhumed graves were sccondury graves. ‘The OTP hired experts in ballistic analysis, analysis of soil and fabrics, in order to make comparative testing of the fabrics and remains found in the primary and secondary graves. As a result of those analyses, links were discovered between cenwin primary and cenain secondary grave sites. As of 2000, national judi institutions have taken over the task of locating and exhuming mortal remains of the “Srebrenica” people killed during the Krivafa 95 operation, with very important assistance provided by the Commission on Tracing Missing Persons, the intemational Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) and the Tuzlo-based Podrinje Identification Comter.“The forensic evidence corroborates the Prosecution argument that, following the taking of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosniak men were executed summarily and buried in mass graves. Although forensic experts could not indisputably cstablish the cxaet number of bodies in the mass graves due to the degree of decomposition of the bodies and the fact that_muny bodies were disfigured in the process of relocation from primary into secondary graves, which was done using heavy mochinery, the experts did manage (0 make conservative estimate, according to which at least 2,028 individual bodies were exhumed from the mass graves. Based an the results of forensic testing, it can be concluded that the majority of the persons whose bodies were exhumed were not killed in action. These people were killed in mass executions. Grounded suspicion that the accused Zoran Tomi¢ ak.a. "Zyembo" committed the criminal offense of Genocide, in violation of Anicte 171 of the CC B-H, as read with Anicle 29 and 180 (1) of the CC B-H, arises from the evidence collected ding the investigation, in panicular from the statements of protected witness 0-5, given belore te TCTY, as ‘well ag the statements given by others, who talked during the investigation about the participation of the Accused in the mopping up of the terrain ncar Potogari aimed ot finding and expelling Bosniaks, that is, about the panicipation of the Accused in securing the road; confiscating money, valuables and personal documents from the captives and Bosniak men who were surrendering to the RS MUP members on the Bratunac-Konjevié Polje; escorting the column of captives into the hangars of the Kravica Farming Cooperative and killing the captives, which is described in more detail in the operative part of the Indictment. Among the most important testimonies are the testimonies of two surviving witnesses at the site of mass execution in the Kravica Farming Cooperative Warchousc, who testify under the pscudonyms of D-1 and D-2. In his statement, the witness D-I gave doiails on the circumstances whereby rather a large group of Bosniaks, some 400-500 persons, surrendered to the Serb Army after having been surrounded in the territory’ above Kamenica. Some of the Bosniaks even got wounded as there was some shooting. “The witness also described the events on the meadow where they were held prior to being taken in a column escorted by armed soldiers to the Kravica Farming Cooperative Warchouse. Particularly important is the pant of the testimony about the moment when the shooting started at the Warchouse, where the witness specifically states that the shooting at the prisoners started immediately when the last prisoner entered the hangar and that the shooting of prisoners was not preceded by any immediate resistance on the part of the prisoners, that is, shooting on the pan of the prisoners, which convincingly climinates the claims by mony witnesses and the Accused that the shooting stated afler the killing of police officer Krsto Dragitevié. In more or less identical way, this claim was also climinated by the statement of protected witness D-2, who claimed that the killing of the prisoners started without any prior provocation on the part of the prisoners. ‘Also important are the \estimonies of direct witnesscs to the massacre, primarily the employees at the Keavica Farming Cooperative, including eS and the testimonies of the members of the 2nd Sckoviti Speci: 16Detachment, as follows: jand others; testimi ‘of the members of the Civilian Protection of the Bratunac Brigade who were involved in the cleanup of the area, and others. The cleanup implied the loading of corpses by excavators onto trucks, transporting them to the previously set focations in Glogova, wherefrom the remains were dug up several months later in 1995 and hidden in secondary raves at Zeleni Jador. ‘There is also substantial material evidence that confirms that at the time of the commission of the crime the Accused was deployed in Bratunac, more specifically in Sandiéi and Keavica, as a member of the 2nd Sckoviéi Special Police Detachment and that he took an active part in the relevant events. There arc numerous photographs and satellite images that objectively testify on the events at the warchouses of the Kravica Farming Cooperative, showing buses parked in front of the Warchouse and the disturbed soil testifying on the re-tocating of the mortal remains from mass graves and the very locations of mass graves. Bascd on the foregoing, the Prosecutor's Office considers that there is suTiciemt evidence proving that the Accused commiticd the criminal offense he is charged with in the Indictment, while the intention 10 commit genocide arises from the Fact that the captured Bosniak men did not pose any serious threat from the military point of view, while the decision of the Accused to take part in the execution of the captives while the planned and organized killing of the captives was taking place did not stem exclusively from the intention 10 climinate them as a mi threat. The killing of able-bodicd men undoubtedly constituted a physical liquidation and, considering the proportions of the killing, their extermination was motivated by a genocidal intent. The Accused was aware that, having in mind the patriarchal nature of the Bosniak community in Srebrenica, the Killing of so many men would unavoidably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosniak population in Srebrenica. Therefore, the physical liquidation of the men caused severe consequences for the creation of progeny i Srebrenica, with the possibility of the community's extinction. The Accused, as 2 member of the RS MUP, was aware of those consequences when he decided to aid in the systematic climination of the captured men. ‘The forcible transfer of women, children and elderly people was another method used to ensure physical destruction of the Bosniak community in the Srebrenica safe area. By this transfer, all Bosniaks were definitely removed from Srebrenica, whereby even the slightest possibility for the revival of the Bosnisk community in that erca was eliminated. AS opposed to the operation of killing the captured men, such opcration was difficult to hide or be presented as a military operation, therefore, it posed a higher risk of international condemnation. The chief question while determining if genocide was committed in Srebrenica is whether the intention to convmit genocide existed. Although such intention has to be confirmed by facis, the evidence that the perpetrator chose the ‘most effective method to achieve his aim to destroy the targcied pant of the group is not necessary for the criminal offense of Genocide. Even when the chosen method fails to lead to the full implementation of the perpetrator’s intention and the destruction remains incomplete, the mere ineffectiveness does not rule out the conclusion that the gon: 7intention existed. It is imporant to mention here that protected witness D-5 stated that it had been known alrcady on 10 July 1995 in Srednje that the 2nd Detachment would be sent 10 Srebrenica, ond that neither he, nor some other police officers were glad about it, since they knew that “ugly things" would happen there and that somcone could recognize them as it was their native area, This suggests that the Accused knew that the reason behind his sending to Bratunac and Srebrenica was the expulsion of the Bosniak population from that area, not combat assignments in connection with the fights with the Army of B-H. MATE, UPPORTING THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE INDI 1, Record on examination of suspect Zorun Tomié, Prosecutor's Office of B- H, No: KT-RZ-143/07, dated 2 and 3 June 2008, 2, Transcript of testimony of protected witness D-1, Coun of B-H, No. XKR- 05/24, dated 5 October 2006, 3. Transcript of testimony of protccied witness D-2, Count of B-H, No. XKR- 05/24, dated 12 October 2006, 4, Transcript of testimony of protected witness D- 05/24, dated 21 March 2007, ‘Transcript of testimony of protected witness D-4, Coun of B-H, No. XKR- 05/24, dated 7 March 2007, Record on es ion of witness D-S, Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No. 10/05, dated 18 April 2008, 7. Transcript of the hearing held for examination of witness D-5, Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No. KY'A-RZ-100/08, dated 22 May 2008, 8 ‘Transcript of testimony of protected witness 9-5, Court of B-H, No. XKR- 05/24, dated 29 May 2008 and 11 June 2008, 9. Record on examination of witness D-5, Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No KTA-RZ-100/08, dated 18 August 2008 10. Transcript of testimony of witness MEE Coun of D-H, No. XKR-05/24, dated 17 January 2007, 11, Transcript of testimony of witness In of B-H, No. XKR- 05724, dated 22 March 2007, 12. Transcript of testimony of witn Coun of B-H, No. XKR-05/24, dated 15 September 2006, 13, Record on examination of suspect AT Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No: KT-RZ-10/05, dated 21 June 2005, 14, Record on examination of suspect ME lrosecutor's Office of 8-H, No: KT-RZ-10/05, dated 1 July 2005, 15. Record on examination of suspcc EE Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No: KT-RZ-10/05, dated 24 June 2005, 16. Record on examination of witncss EE Reput Sepska MUP, Bijeljina Public Security Cenier (CJB), Bratunac Police Station, No: (2-1-7/02-230-468/03, dated 21 August 2003, , Coun of B-H, No. XKR-Record on cxamination of witness EMINEM Republika Srpsko MUP, Bijeljina C)B, No: 12-02/4, dated 19 June 2005, 18 Record on examination of witness KML Prosccutor's Office of B-H, No: KT-RZ-10/05, dated 10 October 2005, 19. Record on examination of witness: Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No: KT-RZ-10/05, dated 9 November 2005, with a transcrip! of the examination in the investigation, 20. Record on cxamination of witness SAME SIPA, No. 14-0472- 327105, dated 12 October 2005, ie 21. Record on examination of witness PA, No. 14-04/2- 388/05, dated 26 October 2005, 22. Record on examination of witness fig, SIPA, No. 14- 04/2-387/05, dated 25 October 200! 23, Revord on examination of witne: PA, No. 14-0472 308/05, dated 27 September 2005, 24, Record on examination of witness IPA, No. 14-0472 290/05, dated 20 September 2005, 25. Record on examination of witness IPA, No. 14-04/2- 330/05, dated 12 October 2005, 26. Record on examination of vin Prosecutor's Office of B-H, No: KT-RZ-158/06, dated 16 January 2007, 27, Record on examination of witness | SIPA, No. 14-0472 389/05, dated 26 October 2005, 28. Record on examination of witness ME SIDA, No. 14. 04/2-393/05, dated 27 October 2005, 29. Record on examination of witne: PA, No. 14-0472 329105, dated 12 October 2005, 30, Record on examination of witnest SIPA, dated 18 October 2005, 31. Record on cxamination of witness QE SIPA, No. 14-04/2- 391/05, dated 27 October 2005. MATERIAL EVIDENCE: Stated in Count 3 of the Indictment. MOTION TO EXTEND CUSTODY ‘The Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina petitions the Count, within the meaning of Anicle 137 of the CPC B-H, 10 extend custody of the accused Zoran Tomié a.k.a. "Zyembo" for the reasons scl oul in Anicle 132 (1)(b) and (d) of the Criminat Procedure Code of B-H after the confirmation of the Indictment Article 132 (1)(1 jafluence on INeSSes, accessories und accomplices“There is a justified fear to believe that the Accused, if released, may contact co- ‘ith a view to destroying clucs important to the criminal proceedings influcacing witnesses, accessories or accomplices. It is in the interest of the Prosecutor's Office, the Court and justice for the trial to progress without obstructions and to prosecute the culprits of this heinous crime during which at least 1,000 detained Bosniak civilians were killed in a hangar of the Kraviea Farming Cooperative and the ‘Accused was an active participant in this crime as a member of the 2nd Sckoviéi Special Police Detachment. The Prosecutor's Office submits that there is a realistic risk that the ‘Accused, if released, would be in an opportunity to make arrangements with other co- perpetrators, which constitutes a risk of adverse influence on the quality of the criminal proceedings, and that there is also a risk that, if the Accused were (0 be at liberty, he could make arrangements and jointly conceal clucs to the criminal proceedings and the means used for the perpetration of the offense together with other co-perpetrators who arc at libeny. (1) Partieutar ciceumstonces which indicate that the Accused, if at liberty, could hinder the criminal proceedings by influencing witnesses, accessories and accomplices emanale from the fact that the majority of the witnesses live in eastern Bosnia, the Emity of Republika Srpska, where the Accused lived until he was deprived of liberty. If at liberty, the Accused could contact his former colleagues from the Detachment who will appear as wiinesses for the Prosceution in the procecdings against the Accused. Some of the witnesses were members of police units of the RS MUP at the time (and some of them still have the same status) and they worked with the Accused in the RS MUP (including members of the Ist Company of the Special Police Units of the Zvornik Public Security Center and members of the Special Police Brigade) and, if the Accused were to be at liberty, these individuals could be exposed to condemnation and pressure by the Accused and the Accused's friends and relatives. (2) The Prosecutor's Office of Bill is conducting an investigation against a number of members of the RS MUP due to the grounds for suspicion that they’ participated in different ways in the crimes commitied beween 11 July and 1 November 1995 as members of two police units: 1st Company of the PJP (special police units] with the ‘Zvomik Public Sccurity Center (police officers from eight police stations: Sckovici, Zvornik, Beatunac, Viasenica, Miliéi, Osmaci, Kozluk, Srebrenica), and the 2nd Sckovii Special Police Detachment (police officers from Sekoviéi, Skelani, Kladanj, Srebrenica), who are at large. Some of them are inaccessible 10 the Court and the Prosecutor's Office, that is, they are in flight, and international arrest warrants have been issued pursuant to an ‘order issued by the Court of B-H (the suspects Milenko Savie, Milija Blagojevié, Zeljko Wwanovié, Milija Jovanovig, Miko Milié). (3) ‘The Prosecutor's Office believes that that there are numerous witnesses with information about the activitics of members of the military and police of the RS in removing the races of mass killings of Bosniak men such as: information about the locations of mass geaves, the exceution sites, the time and manner of digging of mass graves and reburial of moral remains. By acting in this way, those witnesses prevent detection of perpetrators of serious crimes. Bearing in mind the fact that the la 20number of bodies of killed Bosniaks at the warchouse of the Kravica Farming Cooperative has not been recovered, there is # risk that the suspects could autempt 10 conceal traces of mass graves and make recovery of the mortal remains of victims of the crime more difficult. (4) Taking into consideration the need of the Prosecutor's Office to examine during the trial a large number of witnesses who, for fear of retaliation, have avoided to mention names of perpetrators of the crime in their previous statements (although they have described in detail the event, location, time and manner of perpetration of the erime), it is necessary that those witnesses are examined without influence exerted on them and that they give their testimony in a relaxed atmosphere free of fear. The majority of potential witnesses who gave testimony at the main trial in the Milos Stupur et al. case (former colleagues) have changed their testimony obviously under pressure or for fear. Considering the first instance Verdict against the Accuscd's colleagues, primarily Brane who was provided with an alibi by the Accused during the latter's testimony {Brane Dzinié was found guilty by the Court of B-H of participation in the crime in Kravieo), the Accused Zoran Tomié would now be even more motivated 10 influence witnesses und compel them to testify in his favor. Furthermore, there is a strong likelihood that the Accused could use people who arc connected with one another wi 3 community and network (0 seek or receive help from co-perpetrators who are still in Aight (8) The Prosecutor's Office believes that the Court of B-H arrived at a correct conclusion in its Decision number X-KRN-08/552 dated 5 Junc 2008 that distinctive characteristics ‘of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide arc the oryanized and systematic Perpeiration and far-reaching consequences on the victims, and that the scriousness and ‘scope of these consequences require a greater protection of witnesscs even from the merc possibility of influence by the Accused and prevention of co-perpetrators from influencing witnesses through contacts with the Accused in custody, witnesses being Panicularly important evidence in prosecuting this type of crime. The Court further correctly concluded that “coneretization of influence would mean not only the necessity to protect witnesses, but also 10 prosecute the perpetrators of that influence, as such acts satisfy the elements of the criminal offense of Obstruction of Justice referred to in Article 241 of the CC of B-H. (6) The Prosecutor's Office hereby points 1o a specific example of influence on one of the protected witnesses in the present case when several accused persons from Case No. X= KR-05/24 (Kravica) contacted the witness and one of them, the Accused Miladin Stevanovié, presented his alibi to the wilness and the witness accepted it as being truc. When specifically asked by the Prosecutor's Office, the witness answered that he based his claim on what the Accused in Stevanovie told him. This is a striking example of how not even custody precludes the possibility of influence on witnesses. (7) The Prosecutor's Office believes that the nature of the crimes committed by the Accused suggests a risk of intimidation of witnesses. The criminal offense with which the Accused is charged suggests @ total lack of respect for human dignity and human i 21while the manner of perpetration of the criminal offense -- shooting into the warehouse full of people —- suggests a high degree of cruelty on the part of the Accused and their tendency 10 violent behavior towards other individuals. ‘The Prosecutor's Office stresses that custody appeared to be a justified measure in the Kravica case, conducted before the Count of B-H, because the Court prevented influence of the Accused on witnesses and co-perpetrators by correctly finding that there was a justified fear that the Accused, if released, would influence witnesses and co-perpetrators. ‘who are inaccessible to the Coun. Article 132 (1) (d): Exceptional circumstunces and disturbance of public order (1) The Accused is charged with the crime of Genocide punishable by imprisonment for term not less than 10 years or long-term imprisonment. Bearing in mind the demonstratcd cruclty in the perpetration of the offense, the fact that a particularly scrious consequence was brought about (that is, the deaths of more than 1,000 individuals), and the fact that individuals who are directly or indirectly victims of the offense are rcturning to the arca where the crime was committed, the Prosecutor's Office belicves that the cumulative requirements under Article 132 (1) (4) of the CPC B-H have been met in the present case; the formal-legal requirement pertaining to the prescribed punishment as well as the subjective requirement pertaining to exceptional circumstances and actual threat 10 turbance of public order. We arc dealing with exceptional circumstances and the criminal offense which is panicularly scrious given the manner of perpetration and consequences of the criminal offense, and the release of the Accused would result in an actual threat of disturbance of public order. Taking into consideration all the particular circumstances, especially the manner of perpetration and the incalculable consequences. of the committed crime of genocide as one of the most scrious breaches of values protected under national and intemational law, the role of the Accused during the relevant time as a member of the 2nd Sckoviéi Special Police Detachment and the fact that dividuals with which the Accused was supposed to be indicted have been sentenced 10 long-term imprisonment by a non-final verdict, the Prosecutor's Office maintains that all these circumstances, being unquestionable in their entirely, constitwte an circumstance within the meaning of Anicte 132 (1)(6) of the CPC 8-H. (2) The validity of the aforementioned position stems from the fact that there is an ongoing return of refugees and individuals who are direct and indirect victims of the offense 10 the arce where the offenses were committed and where the Accused had residence at the time of perpeiration of the offense, and mecting the Accused again would mean re-\raumatization of victims and would undoubtedly disturb what is otherwise a fragile peace of citizens-returnces. One should ensure their faith in the rule of law and do ‘one’s utmost to prevent contact between the injured parties and the Accused, that is, the witnesses must have confidence in the ability of judicial bodies to prevent possible contact between them and the Accused before justice is finally served. Any contact with and meeting the Accused prior to that moment would undoubtedly bring about disruption of peace and coexistence that have been difficult o achieve and would ultimately lea disturbance of public order in the community where these individuals live.(3) This is also contributed by the fact that the Accused Zoran ‘Tomié was a member of the Republika Srpska MUP up until the moment of his arrest, which may affect the safety of the Bosniak retumees to Zvornik if they find out that 2 police officer suspected of commission of a mass crime resulting in the deaths of around 1,000 Bosniaks is at liberty and makes contact with the retumees and other members of the MUP. This constitutes a threat of disturbance 10 public order. ‘The Prosecutor's Office maintains that citizens would be justified in fearing over the fact a police officer charged with such a serious crime was looking after their safety. Bearing in mind the aforesaid and in consideration of the fact that a non-final verdict convicting seven co-perpetrators of the Accused Zoran Tomié of the same crime to long imprisonment has bccn delivered and all the characteristics of this ease, the Prosecutor's Office believes that release of the Accused ‘Zoran Tomié would undoubtedly lead to public condemnation because the public would ‘not tolerate his stay at liberyy. For these reasons, the Prosecutor's Office submits that custody, albeit being the strictest measure, is the only measure to ensure the attendance of the Accused in the further course of the proceedings and that there is no other appropriate alternative measure 10 ‘ensure the attendance of the Accustd Zoran Tomié in the further course of the proceedings. PROSECUTOR PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE OF B-It Ibo Bulié 1 hereby confirm that this ducument is a true translation of she original writen in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, 2