MajorityOpinion

LockheadandGuarcov.Mecklai
HeardApril25,2016

ChiefJusticeDanaA.Raphael
JusticeAndrewR.Distell
JusticeDeanIschiropoulos
JusticeAnaleseBridges

OnApril25,2016,petitionersTannerLockheadandJohnGuarcofiledaformalpetitionwiththe
JudiciaryregardingPresidentKeizraMecklaisissueofavetoonApril24andApril25,2016for
thefundingfortheChanticleer.ThepetitionersallegedthatPresidentMecklaisvetoofthe
Chanticleerfundinginthecontextofthe20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonApril20,2016
constitutedalineitemvetoandshouldthereforebedeclaredunconstitutional.

StatementofFact

OnApril20,2016,theSenateapprovedthe20162017AnnualBudgetbyamajorityvote.The
20162017AnnualBudgetcontained$20,000allocatedtotheChanticleer.

TheDukeStudentGovernmentSenatevotedtofundtheChanticleerwitha1919voteas
anamendmentproposedtotheAnnualBudget.Inturn,ExecutiveVicePresidentJohn
Guarco,asthePresidentoftheSenateandinaccordancewiththeSenateByLaw
votedintheaffirmativetherebybreakingthetie.TitleII,SectionII,ClauseDofthe
SenateByLawstatesthat,
TheExecutiveVicePresident,inaccordancewithandin
additiontotheDSGConstitutionshall:D.Voteonlegislationtobreakatie.Ifthe
ExecutiveVicePresidentcaststhetiebreakingvote,theymustannounceatthattimeto
theSenatethattheyhavedoneso.
Thevideofootageofthefinalvotecanbefoundat
approximatelythe2:57:00mark.Subsequently,theDukeStudentGovernmentSenate
voted2317topasstheentiretyoftheChanticleerBudget.Thevideofootageofthevote
fortheentiretyoftheChanticleerBudgetcanbefoundatapproximatelythe2:58:00
mark.Afterwards,VicePresidentofDurham&RegionalAffairsTannerLockhead
movedtobring
ABudgetaryStatuteoftheDukeStudentGovernmenttoFundtheDuke
Chanticleer
tothetopoftheagenda.Afterthemotionwasmade,itwasseconded,and
votedintheaffirmativebytheSenate.VicePresidentTannerLockhead,then,spokein
favorofthebudgetarystatutewhichwasthereaftervotedintheaffirmativebyamajority
oftheSenate.Thevideofootageofthevotecanbefoundatapproximatelythe3:01:00
mark.


OnApril24,2016,PresidentMecklaiissuedaformalvetoonApril24,2016,strikingthe
$20,000infundingallocatedtotheChanticleerinthe20162017AnnualBudget
approvedon
April20,2016
(
Appendix1
).Thisvetodidnotcontainjustificationforstrikingthefunding.

OnApril25,2016,PresidenMecklaiissuedasecondformalvetoofthe$20,000infunding
allocatedtotheChanticleerinthe20162017AnnualBudget
approvedonApril20,2016
(
Appendix2
).Thisversionwasidenticaltothefirstvetoissued,butitcontainedjustificationfor
thestrikingofthe$20,000.

OnApril25,2016,PresidentMecklaiissuedathirdformalvetothatvetoedtheentire20162017
AnnualBudget
approvedonApril20,2016(
Appendix3
)
.

Duringoralargumentof
LockheadandGuarcov.Mecklai
onApril25,2016,thefocusofwhich
wasontheuseofthesecondveto,PresidentMecklaiexpressedherdesiretorescindthethird
veto.PetitionersLockheadandGuarcoexpressedduringoralargumentthattheywouldnot
opposetherescindingofthethirdveto.

OnApril26,2016,PresidentMecklaiformallyrescindedthethirdvetooftheentire20162017
AnnualBudget
approvedonApril20,2016,thusrevertingbacktothesecondveto(
Appendix4
).

RelevantLaw

DukeStudentGovernmentConstitution
SOFCByLaws

SummaryofPetitionersArgument

ThepetitionersmadethreeclaimsagainstPresidentMecklai.

1. PresidentMecklaisuseofthefirstvetolackedthespecificobjectionsasrequiredin
Article4,Section5oftheDukeStudentGovernmentConstitution.
2. Boththefirstandsecondvetoconstitutealineitemveto,andshouldthusbedeclared
unconstitutional.
3. AskedtheJudiciarytoclarifythemeaningofwhatconstitutestheAnnualBudget.

QuestionOne
Canamultiplevetoesforthesamelegislationbeenactedandcanthepresidentrescinda
previouslyissuedveto?


Beforethepetitionersargumentscanbeconsidered,firstitmustbedeterminedwhichvetois
currentlyineffect.ThereisnothingintheDukeStudentGovernmentConstitutionorthebylaws
thatprecludesaPresidentfromissuingnumerousvetoesforthesamelegislation,orprohibitsa
presidentfromretractinganyofthosevetoes.TheDukeStudentGovernmentSenatemaywishto
clarifythelimitsofthevetopower,butasitcurrentlystands,nothingprohibitsPresident
Mecklaifromeitherissuingmultiplevetoes,orchoosingtorescindherlastveto.

QuestionTwo:PetitionersClaims

PetitionersFirstClaim
DoesPresidentMecklaisuseofthefirstvetolackthespecificobjectionsasrequiredin
Article4,Section5oftheDukeStudentGovernmentConstitution.

Sincethevetocurrentlyunderdiscussionisthesecondveto,whichneitherpetitionersnor
respondentsdisagreedidincludespecificobjections,thereisnoneedfortheJudiciaryto
considerthepetitionersclaimregardingthefirstveto.

PetitionersSecondClaim
Doesthesecondvetoconstitutealineitemveto,andisalineitemvetoconstitutional?

Alineitemvetois,asdefinedbyMerriamWebster,
apowerthatallowsapresident,governor,
etc.,toofficiallyrejectspecificpartsofaproposedbillwithoutrejectingtheentirebill.The
secondvetoPresidentMecklaiissuedreads:

Iherebysubmitthisletterasformaldeclarationofmydecisiontoexercisetheexecutive
vetoasgrantedbysection4,clause8oftheConstitutionregarding:

Chanticleer$20,000

inthe20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonApril20,2016.

ThethirdvetoPresidentMecklaiissuedreads:

Iherebysubmitthisletterasformaldeclarationofmydecisiontoexercisetheexecutive
vetoasgrantedbysection4,clause8oftheConstitutionregarding:

The20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonApril20,2016.

Inthesecondveto,itisclearMs.MecklaiintendedtostrikeonlythefundingfortheChanticleer
fromthe20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonApril20,2016insteadoftheentireAnnual
BudgetapprovedonApril20,2016,whichiswhatthethirdvetodid.PresidentMecklaihas
sincerescindedthatveto.

The20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonApril20,2016wasonesinglepieceoflegislation
thatcontainedasummaryofnumerousotherpiecesoflegislationalreadyvotedonandenacted.
Despitecontainingasummaryofnumerousotherpiecesoflegislation,the20162017Annual
BudgetapprovedonApril20,2016doesconstituteonepieceoflegislation.Fundingforthe
Chanticleerwasgrantedasanamendmenttothe20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonApril
20,2016.Thus,strikingonelineoroneamendmenttheChanticleerfundingfromthe
20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonApril20,2016constitutesalineitemveto.

BothPresidentMecklaiandPetitionersLockheadandGuarcoagreethatalineitemvetois
unconstitutionalunlessexplicitlygrantedtotheexecutiveforthesamereasonstheUnitedStates
SupremeCourtfoundthelineitemvetounconstitutionalunlessexplicitlygrantedin
Clintonv.
CityofNewYork(1998)
.Alineitemveto,assummarizedin
Clintonv.CityofNewYork
,
gives
thePresidenttheunilateralpowertochangethetextofdulyenactedstatutes.

As
Clintonv.CityofNewYork
continues,
thisdecisionrestsonthenarrowgroundthatthe
[lineitemveto]proceduresarenotauthorizedbytheConstitution.

SincePresidentMecklaihasnotbeengrantedlineitemvetoauthoritybytheDukeStudent
GovernmentConstitutionnorbythebylaws,itcannotbeassumedthatshehasthe
unilateral
powertochangethetextofdulyenactedstatutes.

Insummary,regardingthepetitionerssecondclaim,themajorityfindsthatthesecondvetodid
constitutealineitemveto,andsuchlineitemvetoesareunconstitutionalunlessthatpoweris
explicitlygiventotheexecutive.Thus,PresidentMecklaissecondvetoisunconstitutional.The
remainingfirstvetoisalsounconstitutionalsinceitisidenticalineverywaytothesecondveto
exceptforasectionoutliningspecificobjections.

PetitionersThirdClaim

PetitionersLockheadandGuarcoaskedtheJudiciarytoclarifythemeaningofwhatconstitutes
theAnnualBudget:isitthefinaldocumentsummarizingalltheotherpreviouslypassed
budgetarystatutes,ordoesitalsoincludeeveryindividualbudgetarystatute?

Themajorityfindsitdoesnotneedtoanswerthisquestion.Thepetitionersfiledagainst
PresidentMecklaisuseofthelineitemveto,whichexpresslyreferredtothe
20162017Annual
Budgetapprovedonaspecificdate,April20,2016.Theuseofthespecificdateindicatesthe
vetowasinrelationtotheonesinglepieceoflegislationcontainingasummaryofnumerous
otherpiecesoflegislationalreadyvotedonandenactedasopposedtoavetoofeverysingle
individualbudgetarystatuteofeachdifferentorganizationsummarizedinthe20162017Annual
BudgetapprovedonApril20,2016.Sincethevetoesinquestionallspecificallyrelatedtothe
20162017AnnualBudgetapprovedonthespecificdayofApril20,2016,themajorityseesno
reasontoclarifyhowtheAnnualBudgetmoregenerallymaybedefined.Toavoidfutureissues
ofconfusion,theSenatemaywishtoconsiderclarifyingwhatitmeanswhenreferringtothe
AnnualBudget.

Summary

Insummary,themajorityhasdeclinedtoanswerPetitionerLockheadandGuarcosfirstand
thirdclaims.ThemajoritydeterminedthatPresidentMecklaididinfactissuealineitemveto
andfurtherconcludedthatsuchlineitemvetoesareunconstitutionalunlessapresidentisduly
grantedsuchpower.Thus,thereiscurrentlynovetoineffectforthe20162017AnnualBudget
approvedonApril20,2016.

Itissoordered.

DissentingOpinion
LockheadandGuarcov.Mecklai
HeardApril25,2016

AssociateJusticeDevavratV.Dabke

Overview
This caseisincredibly complicated,andthenarrativeisnotparticularclear.Insum,astatutewas
enacted by the senate that allocated a budget. Essentially, there were several layers of vetoesas
issued by President Mecklai that obfuscate the legalproceedingsherewithin(
Appendices1,2,3,
4
). However, there are an inordinate number of procedural complications that are now brought
forward.

ClarificationofFactI:TheJudiciaryAlreadyDecided
First and foremost, the Judiciary had renderedaunanimousdecisionat10:11PMEDT,April25,
2016,sentinanemailtoMs.Mecklai,Mr.Guarco,Mr.Hopkins,andMr.Lockheadasfollows:

The Judiciary has unanimously decided to reject the case Lockhead and Guarco v. Mecklai on
grounds of standing, since the most recent presidential veto overrides any previously issued
vetoes. Questions regarding the line item veto and sufficient justification then need not be
answered.

According to the Constitution: All decisions and rulings oftheJudiciaryshallbetransmittedin

writing by the Chief Justice, or by a Justice selected by the Chief Justice, to the appropriate
officerorbody.

In this case, we had already transmitted a formal

decision to all relevant parties and officers.
Note the language in the email: has unanimously
decided
(emphasis added). Although it
certainly did not look like adressedupdecision,wesatisfiedtheConstitutionalrequirementofa
transmissioninwritingofadecision.

By even continuing this discussion of a new decision

afteradecisionhadalreadybeenrendered
is frankly not a power vested to the Judiciary by the Constitution or the ByLaw, has no legal
precedence, and is an incredibly steep and slippery slipperyslope. What does it mean toissuea
new decision on a case? Technically, by issuing the decision, we have fully dispatched a case
from our docket. This majority decision that is issued is beingdeclaredontoacasenotcalledor
heardintotheJudiciary.

For this reason, our original decision must stand until anew caseisbroughtforthortried,butin

this instance, since no new case was brought forth, even this very opinion is simply a judicial
statement, not a legally binding opinion. Themajorityopinionitselfshouldnotevenqualifyasa
majorityopinion,asitnotevenanopinion.

ClarificationofFactII:ALateRescissionofaVeto
After the above decision was rendered, President Mecklai, upon
ex parte prompting during
judicial deliberations of the Weisman et al. v. Brunetti et al. case,
after this case had been
decided,transmittedthefollowing:

Hiall

I am formally rescinding my veto of the full annual budget. EVPGuarcoverballyindicatedthat

he will accept the rescinding of a veto and tanner and john indicated that they do not intend to
sue to say that I cannot rescindaveto.Withthatsaid,isitpossibleforyoutoadjudicatethecase
asifthatvetonolongerexists,becauseithasbeenrescinded.

Let me know if you would like to see a formal signed letter with me rescinding the veto of the
annualbudget.

KeizraMecklai

This emailwassenttoChiefJusticeDanaRaphael,Mr.Guarco,Mr.Lockhead,andMr.Hopkins
at10:29PMEDT,April25,2016,whichwas
after
thiscasehadalreadybeendecided.

Again, implicitly giving the aforementioned majority opinion permits rescinding a veto. Just as
there is no Constitutional provision that allows for a lineitem veto, there is no Constitutional
provision that allows for the rescission of a veto. First and foremost, this creates several
problems. When a law is enacted by the Senate and transmitted to the President, the President
may choose to ignore the law (and in 5 days it will automatically vest), the President may sign
the law (in which case itcomesintoforceassoonastheactissigned),orthePresidentmayveto
the law. If the President vetoes the law, according to the Constitution, the law standsbeforethe
Senate, in which case the act shall not take effect unless subsequently passed by a twothirds
vote of the Senate to override the veto (Article 4,5.3oftheConstitution).Therefore,afterthe
veto was issued by President Mecklai (
Appendix 2, 3
), there is no procedure for rescinding the
veto (
Appendix 4
). The act is dead and beforetheSenate.Whatis theretoantiveto?Whatare
the limits to this antiveto? Does the time limit still stay in place or canthePresidentgoback
and antiveto anything from the past? This entire process has now been constructed by the
Judiciary, especially since the recession of the veto was prompted
after the Judiciary had
rendered a decision. The Judiciary has inserted an entire procedure into the Constitution, again

dispensingofthenormaldemocraticmeasuresthatamendingtheConstitutionnormallyrequires.

Conclusion&FinalThoughts
There were many good points and interesting legal questions raised, such as the unicity or
atomicity of the annual budget (i.e. is the annual budget simply the ledger of several other
statutes already passed, or is it
per se a legislative act that actually dictates the spending of
funds). However, because of the complications and several unresolved legal questions, it is
impossibletoproperlydecidethiscase.

So many new, probably unconstitutional, and strange things occurred, it is hard to even make a
proper judicial and legal opinion on a substantial basis. The current majority opinion simply
ignores most of what has happened in favor of a false mirage of simplicity, providing the
significant collateraldamageofinventingnotone,but
twonewConstitutionalprocedures.Ittries
to compact everything into the lens of lineitem vetoes, but by the opinions own admission,
there was no realconflictasbothsidesstipulatedthatalineitemvetoisperhaps notpermissible.
The real presentation given by Mecklai was that the annual budget is simply an aggregation,
while the individual budgetary statutes provide for the actual disbursement of funds. This isnot
sufficiently answered by the majority opinion, and still remains an interesting question. The
majority technically stated that it didnt answer it, but by considering Mecklais actions a
lineitem veto, it does implicitly assume that the Annual Budget functions as a whole piece of
legislation
perse
,andthusdoesinfactanswerthatquestion.

The judiciary should simply dispense this case, which it already did. The first (and only
legitimate)rulingshouldstand,andthisentiremattershouldbelefttotheSenate.

Frankly, I do not know what the legal status is, and I do not know what the legal status of this
opinionis.Iamgoingtoproceedforthesakeoffamiliarity:

Irespectfullydissent
.

Appendix1

Appendix2

Appendix3

Appendix4