a \ THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ro WASHINGTON 25, 0.c, Wey MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE * Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Guba (TS) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to &request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. 3. Further, it is assumed that e single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and -covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of a Staff. . For the Joint Chiefs of staff: | | i 7 L. L, LEMNITZER Chairman Joint’ chiefs of S 1 Enclosure : Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project — excLupED FROM GDS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 ‘DOES NO? APPLY———_- a. men t Jos 1969/301 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION 12 Maroh_ 1952 ; Page 2165 ] cory. 4 NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES to the JOINT CHIERS OF STAFP )RTHWOODS (8) A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider- ation by the Joint Chiefs of start, F, J. BLOUIN M, 3. TNGREITDO Joint Secretariat Wok weprodueed herewith; on fi1e in Joint Secretariat ErCWoED FROM apg EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP smonur ee eeecero 9 March 1962 copy__or___copmms ‘SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION ARLES REPORT BY THR DEPARTIRNT OF DERENSE AND JOIN? CHIENS OF STARF REPRESENTATIVE ON TE OaRIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP to the SOIND CHIEFS OF staRy on GuBA PROIROR (75) The Chief of Operations, Cubs Project, has requested ‘that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chief's of sta: on this matter by 13 Merch 1962, EXCLUDED FON Gos UHGLASSIFED TOP“ SECRET-— SPECTAT HANDING NOFA —URC JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (7) ‘THE PROBLEM 1. As requested” by chief of operations, Guba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise Gezeription of rretextswhich they consider would provide Justifieation for US military intervention in cuba. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. Tb 1s recognized that any action which beoones pretext for US military intervention in Guba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action. 3. Cognizance hae been taken of a suggested course of activn proposed" by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanano area. 4, For additional facts see Enclosure B. Discussion 5. The sumgested courseyot action appended to Enclosure & are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which Place the United States in the position of suffering justit- lable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter- national amage of the Cuban government ag fash and irresponeible, and ag an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere, 6, While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time 1t will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly anvolve the soviet Union. There 18 * Menovandun for General Oraig from Chief of operations, Guba Frojost, subject: "Operation woNdoosR", dated 5 March 1962, on Tile in General Graig's office. { ** Neovandum for tho Chairman, Joint Gniefe of start, fron Ghief of Naval Operations, subjeot: “Mnstances to Frovoke Military Actions in cuba (1$)", dated 8 Maoh 1962, on file 4n General Craig's office. 2 UHOLISSED — TOP-SECRET —-SPECERE HANDEANO-—-HEFE——UU uYlt thy as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Goviets established Soviet bases in Guba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe, Therefore, since tine appears to be an important factor in resolution of ‘ho Oude protien, all projects are suggostod within tho tine rane of the next £9" sonths. CONCLUSION é 7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enelosure A satiaeactorily respond 0 the etatenent of tho problem, Hovover, these suegestions should be forwarded ae a proliminary subalsston sustable for planning purposes, and together with sinter inputs ; fron otter agencies, provide a basis for developsent of a sineie, integrated, tmo-shased plan to foous all efforts on tho : objective of Justification for US military intervention in Guba. ecomenDar rons 8.-It is recommended thet: a, Bnelosure A together with ite attachments should bo forwarded to the Gocretary of Defense for approval and trenomittal to the Cher of Operations, Cuba Project. >. The paper NOT bo forvantod to comsandors of untfted : or spoctfiod commands, c+ This paper Hor be Zorvanded to U9 ettieers assigned to NATO activities. 4. This paper NOP be fervanded to the Chatman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Comittee. “piss TOP SEGRET——SPEGHE HAN BEN Go GEOR NemLAHEY NSMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE sub joss JustifLoation for US MI1itary Intervention in Guba’ (8) 1, The Joint Chiefs of staf? have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise Aeseription of protexts watch would provide justification ‘ for US iiitexy intervention in Cuba, 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff recomend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. Tb 4s assumed that there will. be Sinilar cubmissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a bosis for developing a time-phased plan, Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basta. > 3. Further, it 1s assumed that a single agency will be sivon the primary responsibility for developing military ana paramilitary aspects of the baste plan, It 1s recomended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operationsbe assigned the Joint Ohiefs of starr. * Wonorandum for den Graig from Chief of Operations, Cube Frojeot, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file.d1 den Craig's office * 4 Enolosure A UHGLASSIED ——FOP~SECRET—-SPECIAEHANDETNO—-NOFORHANULIN. ee APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A omar ANGUISH WEMORANDUM POR CHIEF OF OPRRATIONS, CUBA PROJECT Subject: Justification for US MLlitary Intervention in Cuba (18) 1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, “operation moNGoosE" dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Stat? consider wold provide justification for US military inte: vention 4n Cuba, 2, The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submiasion suitable for planing purposes. Tt is asoumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and thet these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects oan then be sonsidered on a case-by-case basis. no 3. This’plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sourees, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective whieh would provide adequate justification for US nilitary intervention. Such a plan yoyld enable 2 Logical ‘build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Ouben rashness and Arvesponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countnies as voll as the United states, the"plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued, The desired resultant from the execution of this plen would be to place the United states in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and Avresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter- national 4mage of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. Appendix to HSE) se FOP SECRET "SPER H THREoo 4, Time 18 an anportant factor in rebolut. problem, ‘Therefore, the plan should be so time-phaged that projects would be operable within the next few months. 5. Tnasmich as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it ie recomended that primary responsibility for developing militery and para-military espects of the plan ‘for both overt and covert military operetions be assigned the Joint Ohiets of Staff. Appendix to 6 Enolosure A LASSI TOP-SECRET SPECIAL -HNDEANG—NOFORN—~ VELUIAL HANDLIKG = NUFUKN ccm ames moms + lit PRETRXTS TO JUSTISY US MILTPARY INTERVENTION TN CUBA (llote: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. ‘Together with sintlar inputs from other agencies, they are i Antended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, tine-phesed plen. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of andividual projects within the context of owmilative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba), 1, Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Guba 8 cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary aotdons such as has been developed in response to Task 33 0, could be executed as an initisl effort to provoke Cuban veactions, Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince tne Cubana of dnminent ‘invasion would be emphasized. our miistary posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change fron exorcise to intewvention 1f Cuban response justifies, 2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and arowd quantanano “td give genuine appearance of being done by hostile cuban forces. a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order): (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio. (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base. (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside tne base, (A) start ehots near the base main gate (¢riendly Cubans). Annex to Appendix T to Enclosure A (WLS ——FAP-SEAR FT SPER Mand AMIN. ALOE ADM. :Gee 7 (5) Blow up atmanttdon inside the base; start fires, (6) Burn atrerett on air base (sabotage). (7) Lob mortar shelis fron outside of base into base, Sone donage to installations, (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the see or vicinity of Guantanamo city. (9) Capture militia group which storms the bese. (10) sabotage ship an harbor; lange fires -- nepthalens. (11) Sink ship near harbor entrence. Gonduot funerals for mock-victins (may be 11eu of (20)). D. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortor emplacenents vhich threaten the base. ©, Commence Large seale United states military operation: 3. A "Rowenben the Meine" inoldent could be arranged in several forms: a, We could blow up @ US ship in Guantanano Bay end blame Guba. D. We could blow up @ drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere . in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident tn the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or shtps merely inveiGigating the intent of ‘the Vousel could be Fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. ‘The nearness to Havana or Santiago Would add oveatbinity empeotally to those people that wight hove heard the blast op have seen the ine. the US could follow up with an elz/sea resoue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew, Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation. 4, Wo could develop a Commmist Ouban tervor campaign in ie Mant area, in other Florida cities and even An Vashington, ULES col PSG Biome EGE HINER ONA Een Annex to Appendix 8 to Enelosure Asue SLUNCE OF COTRTWRNB TI NOF ERA f UA) | ‘The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United states. We ould sink a boatloed of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). we could foster attenpts on lives of Cuban wefugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publictzed. Exploding a few plastie bombs in carefiilly chosen spots, the é arrest of Cubsn agents and the release of prepared documents substontisting Cuban involvement also would be helpful 4n projecting the iea of an trvesponsinie goverment. 5. A "Guben-based, Cestro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Oaribbean nation (in the vein ba of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We mow that Casto ig backing subversive efforts olendestinely against fatts, Dondnican Republic, Gusteasia, and Wiearague ot prosont and possible others. ‘these efforts oan be magnified and adaxtional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage ean be token of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to : intrusions within their national air space. “Cuban” B-26 or C-46 type atreratt could make cane-burning raids at. night. : Soviet Bloo tneendiartes eould be found. ‘This could be coupled with "Cuban" mossages to the Communist underground in the Donindean Republic end "Cuban" ahipmonta of ama which vould be found, on intercepted, on the beach.” : 6, Use of MIG type atroraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation, Harassment of otvit air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone airoratt bby HIG type planes vould be useful as oomplenentary actions, An P-€6 properly painted would convince aix passengers that they Saw @ Cuban MIG, espeolally if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fect, ‘the primary drawback to this suggestion eppears to be the security risk inherent An obtaining or modify ing en atreratt, However, reasonable copies of the MIG could ‘be produced fron US resources in sbout three months, Annex to Appendix 9 . to Bnolosure A ULES wc Ef PRR Tom COED MAMTA san =UICLISS 7. Wjacking attempts against civil air and surface or should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba, Concurrently, genuine defections of cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged. 8. Ib 48 possible to create an incident which wL1l demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aireraft has attacked and shot doxn & chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jenatee, cuatensie, Penam ar Venenisla, The destination woud be chosen only to esse the Flight plan route to cross Cuba, ‘The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to pee re nee a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and riombored as an exact duplicate for a civil registered atrenatt velonging to ¢ OIA proprictery orgentzation in the and aves, At & dosignated tine the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil etorart and would be ae Loaded with the selected passengers, ali boarded under cavefully prepared aliases. tho actus reeiavared aivoratt would be comverted to @ drone, b. Tale off times of the drone airoratt and the actual sinoraft will be scheduled to allow a rendecvous south of Plorida, fron the rendezvous potnt' the passenger-oarnying strepatt will descend to mindmn altitude and go dizeotly nto an auxiliary fleld at Zelin AmB vineve etvangenents Wl2 have been mide to evasuate the passengers soi retum ‘he atveratt to 16s origine! status, ‘the drone etvorart eshte wii continue to fiy the fled fighb plan. When over Cuba the drone will being tranoattting on the inter national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he 4o under attack by Cuban MEG algoratt, the transmission Wl be Antexeupted by destruction of the adrerart which wil be triggered by sedio slgual, Mil will alow TCA0 ratio Annex to Appendix to Enélosure A ARLSS 4: te Ku OLUR Teen i : -— we has happened to the afroratt instead of the US trying to gel" the tmotdent. : 9. Th 4s posatble to create an incident which will make 16 appear that Communist Cuban Mids have destroyed a USAR airerart over international waters in an unprovoked attack, a, Axprextnately 4 op 5 ¥-10L atverate will be aispatoned | An trail from Homestead ANB, Floride, to the vioinity of Guba. Their mission will be to reverse course and similate fakir \ aireratt for an aly defense exercise in southern Florida, | ‘These atroraft would conduct variations of these flights at \ frequent intervals. Grews would be briefed to remain at i least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; hoover, they would be required to carry Live ammunition in the event that hostile | actions were taken by the Cuban Mids.” | b, On one such flight, a pre-priefed pilot would fly tall-end Charley at considerable interval between atroraft. | While near the Ouben Teland this pilot would broadoast that he had been jumped ty MIs and was going dom. Wo other ; calle would be made, ‘The pLlot would then fly éirectiy west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an | Bglin auxiliary. he atreraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a rev tail number. she pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resune his proper Jdentity and retumn to his normal place of business, The pilot end alrerart would then have @teeppeared. ¢. At precisely the seme time that the streraft was presumably shot down a submarine cr small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, ete., at approxinately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart, the pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as ! ‘thoy Imow, Searoh shipa and atrerart could be dispatched and parts of atzerart found, Annex to Appendix UNCLASSIRED . 0 Endlosure Aa. FACTS BRARING ON THE PROBLEM 1, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be : undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an Aneddent upon’ which to base overt intervention. 2, he need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indloated** by the Joint chiefs of star? on 7 March 1962, as follows: ~~ determination that © credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United states to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justifieation for 7 positive US military action." . | 3+ Tb is understood that the Departuent of state also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba. ¥ JES 19697 303 we JOS 1969/313, 12 Enclosure B UIRLASSIAE)