Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Process Safety:
Process safety hazards can give rise to major
accidents involving the release of potentially
flammable, reactive, explosive or toxic
materials, the release of energy (such as fires
and explosions), or both. These are events that
have the potential to lead to multiple fatalities
and/or major environmental damage. Process
safety management ensures there are Adequate
Barriers to MAEs.
Personal Safety:
Incidents that have the potential to
injure one person and generally occur
due to individual work habits.
Occupational incidents
slips/trips/falls, struck-by incidents,
physical strains, electrocution.
Generally OHS are avoided by
wearing PPEs & following
procedures.
PERSONAL SAFETY
BHOPAL 1984
Pesticide plant owned by Union
Carbide.
Methyl isocyanate release from a
15,000 gallon intermediate product
storage tank following water ingress
to the tank.
Over 2000 immediate casualties;
100,000 injuries.
Significant damage to livestock and
crops.
Long-term health effects difficult to
evaluate.
It is estimated that as of 1994
upwards of 50,000 people remained
partially or totally disabled.
Plant closed.
9
10
12
BUNCEFIELD 2005
Failure of overfill detection
Devastating explosion
43 minor injuries, major
environmental pollution, 630
businesses affected
13
14
15
Employee Participation
Training
Process Hazard Analysis
Mechanical Integrity
Process Safety Information
Operating Procedures
Hot Work Permit
Management Of Change
Pre Start-up Review
Emergency Planning &
Response
Incident Investigation
Contractors
Compliance Audits
Trade Secrets
Platform Description
Reservoir Description
Management System
Policy
Organisation
Processes
Risk Assessment
Permit To Work
Moc
Performance Measurement
Audit & Review
Major Hazard Identification
Major Hazard Risk Assessment
Demonstration Of:
Prevention
Control
Mitigation
Evacuation Rescue & Recovery
Safety Case
Employee Participation
Training - BP Texas Refinery fire
Process Hazard Analysis
Mechanical Integrity -Humber RefineryCatastrophic Failure of
De-Ethanizer Overhead Pipe
Process Safety Information
Operating Procedures - Feyzin LPG Disaster
Hot Work Permit - Piper Alpha
Management Of Change - Flixborough
Pre Start-up Review BP Texas Refinery fire
Emergency Planning & Response Piper Alpha
Incident Investigation
Contractors
Compliance Audits
Trade Secrets
17
B u s in e s s R is k s
( M a n a g e m e n t S c ie n c e s )
S o c ia l
C h a n g e s in c o n s u m e r ta s te s
L a b o u r u n re s t
P r o d u c tio n
C h a n g e in u n e x p e c te d c o s t s
R e s tr ic tio n s o n s u p p ly o f r a w m a te r ia l s
M a rk e tin g
L o s s o f m a rk e ts to c o m p e tito r s
E c o n o m ic
In fla tio n
M o n e ta r y a n d fis c a l p o lic y
P u re R is k s
( R is k M a n a g e m e n t )
P e rs o n a l
D e a th
S ic k n e s s
P o litic a l
N a tu r e
W ar
P o litic a l u n r e s t
F lo o d in g
E a r t h q u a k e , . ..
F in a n c ia l
B a d d e b ts
S o c ia l D e v ia tio n s
F ra u d
T h e ft
M a jo r A c c id e n t E v e n ts
B r e a k d o w n o f p la n t
E x p l o s i o n , f i r e , t o x ic e m i s s i o n
M a jo r R is k s
L a c k o f k n o w le d g e
U n e fo r e s e e n s n a g s in n e w p r o c e s s e s
19
RISK MANAGEMENT
Just like in industrial investment, risk management is a
project requiring resources and resulting in a Return of
Investment being the avoidance of loss and the
improved reliability/operability of process units
Risk Management required:
Budget limitations
Lack of resources
Time constraints
Lack of knowledge
Lack of information
20
22
23
PRE-EVENT
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
POST-EVENT
MAH
EVENT
CAUSE
SEVERITY
CONSEQUENCE
MUSTER,
EVACUATION & ESCAPE
RESCUE &
RECOVERY
Initiating Events
Gradual Deterioration
Mechanical Failure
Accidental Overload
Extreme Conditions
Human Error
ELIMINATE
PREVENT
Shaping Factors
Release (size, ...)
Ignition (delayed, )
Explosion (strength, )
Energy
Detection Success
DETECT &
CONTROL
Mitigating Factors
Environmental Conditions
Manning
Escalation
Impairment
Human Factors
MITIGATE
Success Factors
Procedural Arrangements
Drills & Training
Lifesaving Equipment
Rescue & Recovery
Arrangements
RESCUE
Reducing Effectiveness
24
HAZARD ASSESSMENT
[[FRA][EETRA][QRA][ALARP][DO][LOPA]
Sources of Information
Legislation & Regulations
International Codes & Standards,
Industry Standards, Company
Standards
HAZARD MITIGATION
[F&G][[IGNCONTROL][AFP][PFP][BLOWDOWN][FLARE]
[DOP]
Routine Activity by
Individuals and Workgroups
25
QUALITATIVE
26
27
28
29
NODES
HAZOP Team
Process description
PID
Documentation
DEVIATION
Likely
Report
Unlikely
Very unlikely
Extremely
unlikely
Remote
Moderate
RECOMMENDATIONS
Serious
Major
Catastrophic
Disastrous
CAUSES
POTENTIAL
RISK
RESIDUAL
RISK
UNDESIRED
EVENT
EFFECTS
IMPACT
SAFEGUARDS
30
chemistry
S o ft w a te r
V e n t
E m e rg e n c y
A V 1
v e n t
1 0 0 %
H S
6 0 0 m m
F T
F A L
F I
P la n t
a ir
s u p p ly
D ry
a ir
A c r y la m id e
S to ra g e
M ixe r
T a n k
T I
L A L
E le c t r ic a l
L SH
h e a te r
A ir
d r ie r
T o
P u m p
p r e p a r a t io n
p la n t
F Q
L T
P a c k a g e
C O
U S T IB L E
L I
P a c k a g e
IN E R T
A V 2
W
T T
T T
T A H
P I
W
F L A M
B L E
a te r
a te r
A V 3
V e n t to
F i lt e r
a tm o s p h e re
C o n tro l
u n it
R A
N G E
N R V
V e n t
S o ft
W
T o
U F L
a te r
d r a in
S e a l
p o t
A d d it iv e
L F L
0
%
1 0 0 %
%
A c r y la m id e
D e liv e r y
H o s e
T ru c k
O X ID A N T
substance properties
equipment design
operating procedures
31
a te r
A ir
32
OVERPRESSURE due to
Control failure
Cooling failure (distillation condenser)
Overheating (external fire, ambient temperature, )
Vent plugging (polymers, crystallisation,)
Badly designed collecting network (back pressure)
Badly designed pressure limitation devices
Connection of vessels at different pressure
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34
Barrier
Recovery
Measure
Barrier
Mechanical
Failure
Barrier
Barrier
Helicopter
crash
Barrier
Pilot Error
Helideck
Consequence 1
Fire
Helicopter Operations
Contaminated
Fuel
Barrier
BARRIERS:
Prevent MAE from
occurring
Recovery
Measure
Recovery
Measure
Recovery
Measure
Recovery
Measure
Recovery
Measure
Injury
Consequence 1
Fatality
Major equipment
Structural1
Consequence
Damage
RECOVERY MEASURES:
Prevent or reduce the
consequence of MAE
36
37
Sensory Information
Action
Human
TASK
Controls
Displays
Output
Input
Machine
39
Low temperature
(brittle fraction)
Scenario 2
External loads
(heat radiation, blast,)
Scenario 3
Wrong manipulation
(operator error)
Scenario 4
Fatigue
Scenario 5
LPG
Leak
Mechanical failure
(valve, gasket, flange,..)
Scenario 6
Scenario 7
Overpressure
Scenario 8
Overfilling
Corrosion
40
External impact
(missiles, collision,)
Scenario 9
Scenario 10
Undesired
event : major
leak
Probability of Wind
Direction
= 0.07
Probability of Ignition
= 0.1
0.5
Leak
Deviation :
other than
water
Cause : error
during41
water
drain operation
Undesired
event : 10 kg/s
LPG to
atmosphere
0.2
Relief valves and rupture disks are part of an emergency pressure relief system. Its design
must not only prevent equipment overpressure, it must also make certain that material
discharged does not lead to personnel injury. The system needs to ensure that there is no
fire, explosion, or toxic material exposure hazard from the material released through a
relief valve or rupture disk.
Plant modifications include new platforms, vessels, piping and a variety of other additions.
Potential exposure to effluent from existing and new pressure relief devices must be
included in your management of change process.
Drain, vent and sample valves from equipment or piping as well as vessel overflows can
have similar hazards. Any material which could be released from process equipment,
including pressure relief valves or rupture disks, must discharge to a safe location.
Any open pipe has the potential for an unexpected discharge. The release could occur for
a variety of reasons and will often be a surprise Use extra caution when working around
them expect the unexpected !
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RESULTS
Release rate (kg/s)
Release velocity (m/s)
T after expansion
Flash (liquid fraction)
Droplet diameter (mm)
WEATHER PARAMETERS
Ambient Temperature: Ta
Humidity: H
Wind speed: VW
Roughness (surface nature: sea, flat land, open countryside,
urban area,... ): Z
Atmosphere Stability: Pasquill's classification
46
47
Effects
Heat released - thermal effects
Products of combustion - toxic release
Consequence
exposition effect = consequence
48
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50
150
200
300
500
Within cloud
Damage
Roof of cone-roof tank collapsed
Damage to above-ground telephone and public address systems
Piping, instruments and cables hit by debris, causing limited damage
Instrument windows and gauges broken
Breakage of gauge glasses
Extensive minor damage due to debris
Some fire heaters moved and pipes broken
Exposed pipework and fire hydrants damaged
Missile damageInstrument and power lines severed
Failure of hold-down on half-full conventional storage tank
Cooling tower badly damaged
Failure of hold-down bolts on most storage tanks
Collapse of steel stacks
Fire heaters overturned
Pipework by movement of large or distortion of pipe supports
Substations severely damaged
All above ground wrecked
Transformer power lines severed
Some columns overturned or destroyed
Failure of bracing on spheres
Reactors, horizontal vessels and exchangers overturned
Loss of power to motors
USACE CDL
Superficial Damage
Moderate Damage
Heavy Damage
Hazardous Failure
Blowout
51
100 mbarg
Impact of blast
overpressure on
reinforced concrete
frame building
300 mbarg
52
54
55
56
57
58
Process
SIF
Process
Output
Input
SIS
Program
Safety
valves
Transmitters
Sensors
SV
Logic solver
Final
Elements
SIS
Logic
Solver
Sensors
Final elements
59
Interlocks
60
Plant and
Emergency
Response
Blast wall
Dike
Fireproof
Relief valve,
Rupture disk
SIS
Safety layer
Trip Level Alarm
Process Shutdown
Operator
Intervention
Process alarm
Basic
Process
Control
System
Process
value
Inherently Safer
Design
Normal behaviour
62
63
Operating Procedures
Compositions
Operating
Conditions
Substance
Properties
Ignition Data
Lifting Data
Leak Frequency
Data & Reliability
Data
64
Evacuation-Rescue.xls
Evacuation & Rescue
Event Trees
Cargo.xls
Cargo Offload
Release rate & Fire
Modelling
Evacuation &
Rescue Fatality
Probabilities
Parts Count.xls
Parts Count
Leak Frequency &
Hole Size
Distribution Data
Leak
Frequency
per Event
Ship Collision.xls
Ship Collision Risk
Assessment
Process Events.xls
Total PLL for each
event
Fire Modelling
Event Trees
Run Button and raw
results
Ship Collision
Area Risks
Cargo Fire
Area Risks
Process Event
Area Risks
Enfield
Results.xls
Area and Event
Risks for all worker
groups.
IRPAs
PLL
Area and Event Risks
Manning
Distribution
for each
worker group
Manning Distribution.xls
Distribution of each worker
group
Worker Group
Manning
Levels and
Exposure
Others.xls
Cargo Tank Fire
Engine Room Fire
Structural Integrity /
Stability
Occupational
Pilot Transfer
Helicopter Transport
FRC Operations
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66
D W
V E R G
K A T O E N
U N D
N A T I E P R
O JE C T
N IE U
W E C
R E S S O R S
P T U
N IE
U W E C
O M P
R E S S O R
P TU
O JE C
P R
2 T
P L AT F O R M O P
3 T
G F - 6 5 0 3A
G F - 6 5 0 3B
C -6 0 0 1 A
B E S T A A
N D
O P V A N G I N S T A L L A T IE
P C - 60 0 1 B
B E S
P P 9 0 3A
M F 9 05
R E C Y C LE A & B
P C 6 00 1C
M S9 41
M S 9 11
M S 9 10
O P SL AG &
O P S LA G
E LE K T R IS C H
O N D E R H O U D
O N D E R S T A T IO N 2
T R A N S FO R M A T O R E N
A D M IN I S T R A T I E F G E B O U W
K A T A LIS A T O R
L A B O R A T O R IU M
A C T IV E R IN G
Z . 20 0.00 0
M EN G T A N KS
214600
AA R DE W E G
O .7 4 5 .9 0 0
O .6 5 2 .6 0 0
B A AN
B A AN 1 5
O U D E O O S T E R W E E LS E S T E E N W E G (=V R O E G E R E G E M E E N T E W E G )
B U R E L E N C O N S T R U C T IE
L O SP LA AT S V O O R V R AC H T W AG E N S
T T 21 8
M S1 8 5
AS2 03
T T 14 3
AS1 0 8
M S1 19 3
T T 1 19 3
A S1 03
A S1 02
V E R Z A M E L P LA A TS
A FV AL S T O F FEN
O .5 8 8 .0 0 0
PP1 63 A &B
P P 16 4
18 m x 32 m
B AAN 1 4
M S 1 10 1
M S 1 19 2
HO O F D
P P 2 28 A & B
Z .1 4 7 .7 5 0
B A A N 2B
Z .1 3 4 . 7 5 0
B AA N 2
B AA N 2
Z .1 4 7 .7 5 0
Z .1 4 7 .7 5 0
O PS L AG P LA A TS
H U LP S T O F F E N
P C 98 0 A
HF
9 02 B
H F
90 2A
PC 98 2A
M F 14 2D
M F 2 4 2G
M F 2 42 H
M F1 42 E
R E A KT O R G E B O U W
M F1 4 2F
M F 24 2K
M F 91 4
M F 14 2C
M F 14 2B
M F1 4 2A
M S 1 12 5 A ,B O F C
BA AN 1 3
O N DE R S T A T. R 8
O .38 8.00 0
P C 98 2B
E LE K T R IS C H
O N D E R S T A T IO N R 2 .
Z U IV E R IN G R E A K T O R T O P P R O D U K T
M S 9 01
M S 1 72
M S 2 6 5
M S 1 73
M S 2 6 6
A S 1 13 1
G F 1 10 5
O .6 5 2 .6 0 0
M S 11 10
M S 9 08
T R A N S F O 'S
V E R Z A M E L P LA A TS
A FV AL S T O F FEN
S TE L C O N D A L S
(S T E L L I N G M A T E R IA A L )
18 m x32 m
18 m x 24 m
B AAN 1 5
G E BO U W
Z U U R D O S E R IN G
P C 98 0B
O N D E R S T A T IO N R 2
G Z1 24 2
M S 1 2 42
BA AN 12
P R O D U KT
T R A N S F O T R 9 + O N D E R S T A T IO N R 0 9
O PS L A G TA N KS
P R O D U C T AF V A L
(2x 2 4, 5m 3 )
T R A N S F O 'S T R 2 A & B
V E R Z A M E L P LA A TS
A FV AL S T O F FEN
18 m x 24 m
M S 11 26 A /B
AF V AL W A TE R
M E E T S T A T AI OF NV A L W O A NT DE ER R H O U D S G E B O U W
M E E T S T A T IO N
B A A N 1
6 m
M A G A Z IJ N ( B O O G L O O D S )
M F -9 0 6 A
6 m
B A A N 2
STO O M KE TE L S
E .3 5 0 . 0 0 0
M S 6 03
K
& O P L O S M ID D E L
P P 90 5A B C
Z .1 7 0 . 0 5 0
Z . 1 7 3 .3 0 0
ET H YL E EN
Z U IV E R I N G V A N M O N O M E E R
P P 9 68
M S 1 24 0
M E ET S TA TIO N
B U L K S T A T IO N 3
K O N T R O L EG EBO U W
S O L V E N T H E R W IN N IN G
G Z 12 41
V O E D IN G S K A B E L S 3 6 k V E L E C T R A B E L
E S 1 01
O .4 9 0 .0 0 0
G E BO UW
E X T R A K T IE
M S1 21 0
0 .4 2 0 .5 0 0
M S 12 46
M S1 19 0
P P 96 0
M F 90 6B
P D 93 2
M S 94 6
A S1 04
A S2 01
M S9 40
E LE K T R IS C H
O N D E R S T A T IO N R 1
O .5 8 8 .0 0 0
M S6 32
M S 9 03
W A T ER TA NK
V R IJE H O O G T E : 4 3 00
B AA N 1
Z .1 7 3 . 3 0 0
M A G A Z IJ N ( B O O G L O O D S )
Z .1 0 3 .7 5 0
M F -11 00
T A 1 19 2
BA AN 1 4
V E R Z AM E LPU T
B A AN 1
M S 6 0 1 N /P
B AAN 1
A AN N E M E RS P A R K
M F 14 0
M F 1 27
B AA N 3
P D 16 2A &B
M S1 37
S I L O 'S M S 6 3 0 M S 6 3 1
M S 5 00 6 A /B
K O N T R O LE G E BO U W
B AAN 1 0
A
E S 10 0
M S 95 0
P C 6 0 1 F /J
M S 6 0 2 R /Y
Z . 6 2 .6 0 0
M F 12 2B
Z . 1 0 3 .7 5 0
M S1 13 1
M S 5 0 0 1 A /D
E L E K T R IS C H
O N D E R S T A T IO N 1
M S6 1 3
M F14 1 B
M S 11 30
TR A N FO R M AT O R E N
M S 6 18
M S 1 11
M S1 1 0
BA AN 13
M F 5 0 1 E /F
P C 9 0 1 A -B
A
M S 9 51
A C T IV E R I N G
B A AN 4
M F1 22 A
M F14 1 A
M S 1 01
B AA N 3
M S 1 50
O . 4 9 0 .0 0 0
M A ST ER B AT C H
K O N T R O LE G E B O U W
G S 51 4 H
KO ELTO R EN S
HF 1 2 40
M F 5 0 1 A /D
K A T A L IS A T O R
S O C IA A L
G E B O U W
100m
M S 92 1
M F 12 9
Z .1 0 3 .7 5 0
B AA N
H YD R A N T
H Y D R A N T
G S 5 1 4 G
E XT R U D E R G E B O U W 2
50m
P R O P IO N Z U U R -O P S LA G T A N K
M S 1 19
G T 9 01
O .3 8 8 .0 0 0
G T 92 0
B AA N 1 2
P R O D U KT O P S LA G
D
G T 93 0
HF 9 0 1A
M S9 02
T R A N S F O 'S
H F 9 0 1B
M S 60 07
P R O DU K T O P SL A G
C
B AA N 3
T R A N S F O 'S
P C 5 05 H
P C 5 05 I
D
T T 50 2F
LO S P LA A T S V O O R V RA C H T W A G E N S
M S 10 5
M F 9 06 C
M S 9 36
P C 5 03 J
M S 6 00 3
P C 50 6
M S 6 07
C
H E R W I N N IN G
P C 5 03 I
BAA N 1 0
M S9 47
P C 6 01 L
P C 6 21 C
+ N IE U W E E X T R U D E R " H "
P C 6 21 B
K
0
P C 6 01 K
F P 9 01 B
B A A N 3 Z. 1 0 3 .7 5 0
LO S P LA A T S V O O R V R A C H T W A G E N S
N IE U W E X T R U D E R G E B O U W
P C 6 21 A
A
B
LO SP L AAT S VO O R V R AC H T W AG EN S
BAA N 1 9
0 .9 7 .0 0 0
M S41 0
M R 4 0 4 A /B
M R 40 0 3
M S 60 1Q
B 5 01
G EK L EU R D PR O DU KT
M S 4 07
0 .1 6 7 .0 0 0
R EA C T O R EN
R E A CTO R D
L
E E N H E ID
AF V A L W A TE R
0m
TO EVO ER
H YD R A N T
M F 50 1
M
RU B B ER
LU C H T & K O E L-
M F 11 2 B
B A A N 13 B
IN S T A L L A T IE
A
M S 4 20
F I L T E R IN S T A L L A T I E ( 5 + 1 R E S .)
PO E D E R O P S LA G
P A R K
A N T I-O X Y D A N T
S E AK T PI EC 4 0 53 B
E X T R U D E R G EB O U W 1
BAA N 1 8
0 .4 0 . 0 0 0
B AA N 17
W .2 0 .0 0 0
W .7 . 4 0 0
B AAN 16
M S 60 3
D
P C 4 05
S .10 8.50 0
0 . 2 8 0 .0 0 0
P C 50 7
L
P P 9 03 B
F P 9 01 A
PU T
P C4 00 4
M S 92 0
K A T O E N N A T IE P R O J E C T
P R O D U K T O P S LA G
EN M EN G E R S
H YD R A N T
M S
4 1 0E
P C 50 1
TR AN SF O R M A TO RE N
TR AN S F O "F"
P T U 2 P R O JE C T (C O M P R E S S O R E N )
T A A N D
M S 60 2
M F 91 2
M R 40 4E
V E R P A K K IN G
B E Z IN K V IJ V E R
O N D E RS T. P8
EL .3 2 5 0
3 T
BE ST A AND E
P I J P EN B RU G
( E L .8 45 0 )
O ND E R H O U D
3 T
O M P
P R O J E C
M S 60 1
R EA CT O R E
LE K O LIE
2 T
4 T
3 T
M F1 12 A
O P S L AG P L AA T S
T A LK
D O S E R ING
M E N G IN G
4 m
R E E D S
O R Y
R 4
M S1 60
P R E S S
E N M E N G ER S
M S 41 9
H YD R A N T
(R E E D S V E R G U N D )
M S 92 5
C O M
T T - 6 5 0 3
F -6 5 0 3 C
P C - 6 01
P R O D U K T O P S LA G
M S 61 4
M S 41 9
M S 4 07 B
R E AC TO R C
M R 4 0 4
C
O N D E R S T A T IO N
M S 5 03
W .1 0 .0 0 0
A
M S6 0 9
P C 10 03
M S6 50 2
TR AN S FO T R 1 4
R E C IR C U L A T IE
P C 10 02 B
R E C IR C U L A T IE
214700
BA AN 1 0
M S6 50 1
)
O .5 8 8 .0 0 0
O O G )
M S - 6 50 2 ( L A A G
80 00
P A R K IN G C O N S T R U C T I E
M F 12 1 B
6 m
B AAN 14
M S6 50 3
O O G )
M S - 6 50 4 ( L A A G
AF D A K
M S - 6 50 3 ( H
O PSL A G P L.
R U B B E R S N IJ M A C H IN E
S -6 0 1 W
M S - 6 0 1 V
B AA N 1 3B
M A G A Z IJ N
M F1 21 A
Overpressure contours
W A A K V LA M
A F W E R K IN G S G E B O U W
S- 6 0 1 U
M S - 6 0 1 T
A F W E R K IN G S G E B O U W
E .4 4 3 7 4 5
E E N H E ID
0 1R
M S - 6 0 1S
O .3 5 1 .0 0 0
M S -6
LU C H T
M S 6 01
B -7 3
AA N N EM ER S
M S 6 20
B -7 2
AW W
M S 91 1
M S - 6 50 1 ( H
P R O D U K T M A G A Z IJN
M A G A Z IJ N
H Y D R A N T (M O E T V E R P LA A TS T W O R D E N )
M S 6 0 3 M /N
M S6 50 4
B
C
B AA N 1 1
M F 6 0 3 A /F
E
A
M S 3 10
M S 9 16
PC 60 3
B A A N 4 Z . 5 0 .0 0 0
0.28 0.00 0
P R O DU KT O P S LAG
M S 10 1
P C 1 00 1
P R O D U K T
M A G A ZI JN 1
CO M PR ES S O R EN
M S 6 13
M S 1 03 B
Z . 5 0 .0 0 0
P C 1 00 2A
Z .4 . 5 0 0
G Z 1 2 39
P R O D U KT
M A G A Z IJ N 2
P A R K ING
A W W
G Y 65 4
M F 10 2
B E Z I N K V IJ V E R
M S 1 01 B
W ATE R K A N O N HY D R AN T
B A AN 4
P R O D U K T M A G A Z IJ N 2
LU C H T & KO EL -
PU T
B
AA R DG AS
M S6 0 7
M S 6 0 7
P R O D U K T M A G A Z IJ N 1
M S 12 04
LA A D S T A T IE
BA A N 13
B U LK LA A D S T A T IO N 2
O PV AN G P U T B LU S W A TER
A
M S 1 20 5
P A R K E E R -E N LA A D P L A A T S
B A A N 5 B ZA . A4 . N5 0 5 0
VO O R V RA C H T W A G E N S
H Y D R AN T
M S 9 13
M S 42 4
K A S S E IS T E N E N
G E B O U W V E R B IN D I N G S G R U G T U S S E N F C A E N K T N
M S 6 13 J
S PO O R W E G
80 00
K A S T E L W E G (= G E M E E N T E W E G )
1 40 m m
K A S S E IS T E N E N
M S 61 4C
M S 6 04
B U L K LA A D S T A T IO N 1
R E G E N W A TE R
G Y 90 2
H YD RA N T
A W W % % c30 0m m ST A DS W A T E R
W A TE R K AN O N H Y D R A N T
TO O R T S
A AR D G A S
A W W % % c30 0m m S T AD S W AT ER
K A S T E L W E G (=G E M E E N T E W E G )
214800
80 00
QRA RESULTS
QRA : (Quantitative Risk Assessment)
LSIR CONTOURS ON LAY-OUT MAPS
IRPA TABLES ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSED WORKERS CATEGORIES
AND PUBLIC
PLL TABLES
S T A A N P L A A T S C IT E R N E
Z .1 9 6 .5 0 0
B A AN 1
Z .1 9 6 . 5 0 0
B A A N 1
Z . 1 9 6 .5 0 0
B AA N 1
Z .1 9 6 .5 0 0
A D M IN IS T R A T IE F G E B O U W
P A R K IN G
R E FT ER & BU R E LE N
S O C IA A L
G E B O U W
ETH YL E E N
A F S L U IT V A L V E N
L A B O R A T O R IU M
P O R T IE R S
P A R K IN G
LO G E
P A R K ING
P A R K ING
V O E D IN G S K A B E L S 3 6 k V E L E C T R A B E L
P A R K IN G
R 5 0m
O . 8 5 0 .0 0 0
O . 8 0 0 .0 0 0
O . 7 5 0 .0 0 0
O . 7 0 0 .0 0 0
O . 6 5 0 .0 0 0
R 5 0m
O . 6 0 0 .0 0 0
O . 5 5 0 .0 0 0
O . 5 0 0 .0 0 0
O . 4 5 0 .0 0 0
O . 4 0 0 .0 0 0
O . 3 5 0 .0 0 0
NA AR S C HE L D E % % c2 0"
G E C O N T R O L E E R DE L O Z IN G
O . 2 7 3 .0 0 0
O . 2 5 0 .0 0 0
O . 2 0 0 .0 0 0
O . 1 5 0 .0 0 0
O . 1 0 0 .0 0 0
O . 05 0.0 00
S E K T IE 4
00 0.00 0
O . 05 0.0 00
S E K T IE 1
SC HELD E
150100
150200
150300
150400
150500
150600
150700
150800
150900
151000
1
0
-5
1
0
-6
67
68
Trigger Facility Protection Systems i.e. Ventilation, Water Mist, Fire Suppression
69
Emergency Shutdown (ESD 1) of affected Fire Zone ( on confirmed gas detection or fire
detection )
Initiate Alarms
Initiate fire water deluge system (fire, sometimes toxic or flammable gas)
70
VESDA
The use of fire and gas mapping to ensure coverage is adequate
71
72
DAN FE
X- 03 0 1
DAN FA
P- 03 0 3
L AR G E M O NI TO R
X- 0 3 22
X- 0 314
X- 03 13
X- 0 31 2
DAN FB
h elid ec k m on it o r s
X- 031 7
X- 0 3 28
X- 03 1 5
X- 0 3 18
X- 0 32 8
X- 0 31 6
P- 03 05
P - 0 30 6
X- 032 7
DA N FF SYS TE M
X- 03 2 5
X- 03 2 6
DAN FC
X- 0 3 2 2
P - 0 30 1
P- 0 30 2
X- 0 32 3
L ARG E M O NI TO R
P- 0 3 03
P - 0 3 04
XV- 035 25 5
XV- 0 35 35 4
X V- 0 3 5 35 3
XV- 03 53 5 1
XV- 035 25 6
XV- 03 520 6
XV- 0 35 3 52
DAN FF SYSTEM
DAN F F
DA N FF SYS TEM
74
75
A = 60 minutes
H = 120 minutes
J = J-class is not a standard fire rating. SEV
specification retains H capabilities of 120 minutes
1 200
1 000
Jet fire
Hydrocarbon fire
800
Penetrations :
Seals suitable
for For A / H / JF
Cellulosic fire
600
400
200
10
20
30
40
50
60
minutes
76
To protect personnel, e.g. smoke and gas detection in the HVAC intakes of Buildings.
ESD system shall take into account the requirements that may arise during other possible (and
likely to occur) abnormal or down-graded configurations.
New hazards can appear as a consequence of the loss of essential utilities such as essential
power, air, hydraulics, etc. These new hazards shall be identified, mitigated ad the associated
risks shall be assessed.
77
78
80
81
Minimise the risk of ignition (evacuation of flammable liquids away from ignition
sources)
to appropriate
83
84
85
86
Zone 1.
In which ignitable concentrations of flammable gases or vapours are likely to exist under normal operating conditions. (for
a full definition refer to API RP 505).
Zone 2.
In which ignitable concentrations of flammable gases or vapours are not likely to occur in normal operation, and if they do
occur will exist only for a short period (for a full definition refer to API RP 505).
87
CODE
(IP15, API 505,)
FREQUENCY
OF RELEASE
FLUID CLASS
AND
CATEGORY
GRADE OF
RELEASE
GAS
BUOYANCY
EXTENT
OF
ZONES
TYPE OF
VENTILATION
89
90
91
Ventilation air can be taken from a nonhazardous area, or an external Zone 2 area,
but must not be drawn from either Zone 0 or
Zone 1 area.
92
93
94
95
96
TECHNICAL INTEGRITY
Technical Integrity (TI) is all about management of SCE ( HAZARD MITIGATION MEASURES)
Hydrocarbo
n
Leak
A
Safe
Operation
Shutdown
Systems
Z
A
R
D
S
Prevention Barrier
A
Plant
Design
Inspection
and
Maintenance
Permit to
work
D Plant change
management
Thickness
Ignition
Control
PM checks
mment
Equip. online
Fire & Blast
walls
location
Condition
monitoring
Defined &
understood
scope of
work
Hazards
identified,
risk
assessed &
Controls in
place
Work
authorised
Risk
assessment
for potential
impacts
Authorised
management of
change
Case to
operate
Mitigation Barrier
Staff
Competence
E Operational
Mech
Integrity
Major
Accident
Procedures
Operations
Proedures
Standardsd
Operating
Procedures
Periodical
review done
Temporary
procedures
for changed
situations
risk assessed.
G
F
Alarms &
Instruments
Staff
Competence
Role specific
competency
criteria for
process safety
Periodic
inputs
for
updating
Periodic
assessment
Emergency
arrangements
Alarms &
Instruments
C
O
N
S
E
Q
U
E
N
C
E
S
Emergency
Arrangements
Periodic
testing of
ESD / trips and
emergency
systems
Periodic Mock
drills of ERP
Emergency
procedures
updated
97
Technical
TechnicalIntegrity
IntegrityManagement
Management
MAXIMO
98
HOW
WHO
Audit
Corporate Audit
Audit Program
Status Judgement
MA
Class
Verification
Regulator
Verify
Peer/Third Party
Verification
Maintenance
Inspection
Testing
Compliance
Review
KPI
Effectiveness
Review
Asset Manager
/
ICP
KPI/Target
Verification
Competency
Assurance
Operator
Maintainer
Risk Overview
Risk Overview
Status Judgement
MOC
Standards
,
Regulations
,
& Class Compliance
Status
Report
Technical
Authority / OPS
Manager
Status Judgement
Monitor
Critical Information
Engineering TI
Maintenance
Status
Processes
Inspection
Compliance
Safety
Action
Monitor Compliance
Case
Morning
Tracking
MOC
Performance
SC Equipment
Audit
and
call
Standard
Maintenanc
Trip
Process
& e Condition
Surveillance
Compliance
Classification etc
Status Judgement
Process
Change
Management
System
Procedure
BOD ,/
Technical Stds
Operating Envelope
CTO
Production
Accounting
System
Risk
Management
Incident
Investigation
Management
Competency
Management
System
Maintenance
Management Sys
Permit
to work
Regulations
Legislation
Technical
Integrity / Safety
Engineer
Process Owner
Implementer
Gap
99
(Outcome is the
100
1. Number of
deviations
from codes &
Standards
____________
2. Number of
plant
modifications
done to
improve
process
safety
Safe
Operation
Inspection &
Maintenance
1. % of
process
safety PM
checks
completed on
time
____________
2 % of process
safety PM
checks
with
identified
gaps to
performance
standard.
Permit to
Work
1. % of Permits
(sampled)
where
hazards
identified and
control
measures
specified
2. % of permit
(sampled)
with controls
verified on
site.
Operating
Procedures
1. % of
Operating
Procedures
periodically
updated as
per plan
-------------------2. % of
Operating
Procedures
requiring
significant
modification
Staff
Competence
Inspection &
Maintenance
Alarms &
Instruments
1. % of staff in
technical role
with verified
. process
safety
awareness
-------------------2. % of staff in
Process
safety
management
role with .
. verified
competency
criteria
1. % of inhibits
(sampled)
executed as per
specified
procedure
--------------------2. No of inhibits
in place as % of
total final control
elements
_____________
3.No of standing
alarms per
panel
LOC
Escalation
Barriers
Prevention
Barriers
Lagging KPIs
Plant
Design
Plant Change
1.Management
% of changes
risk
assessed, &
approved
before
installation
___________
2. % of audited
MOC
meeting
MOC
procedure
_____________
3.% MOC s
closed out in
10% of the
execution time
HAZARD
Plant
Design
Permit to
Work
Plant Change
Management
No of leaks
Operating
Procedures
Staff
Competence
Alarms &
Instruments
Emergency
Arrangements
% of persons
who (sampled)
participated in
an emergency
exercise in the
last 6 months.
----------------------2. % of
Emergency
Shutdown
valves /BDVs &
process trips
tested, as per
schedule
1.
CONSEQUENCES
Leading KPIs
Major
Accident
Event
No of MAEs
Emergency
Arrangements
Number of Process safety near misses, Loss of containment incidents, fires, explosions with root cause linked to deficiency in this dimension
INHERENT SAFETY
But are design should be Inherently Safe in the first place
1 . Minimise use smaller
2 . Substitute
quantities of hazardous
substances
substance
Gas
Hot Oil
Gas
THE BASICS
Fewer hazards
Fewer causes
Reduced severity
Fewer consequences
3 . Moderate
Hot
Water
complexity and make operating errors less likely and that are more
forgiving of errors which are made
barg
barg
102
Physical protection
Safety valves to flare
Rupture disks to flare
Vacuum breakers
Blowdown systems
Reduction of Leak
Frequencies
Enhanced inspection
plan (mechanical
integrity)
Full containment
design
Corrosion allowance
Corrosion risk
management
Safety Critical
Procedures (with high
reliability level in
execution)
103
104
105
Part 1
Introduction
and
Management
Summary
Part 2
EHS
Management
System
Description-
Part 3
Facility
Description
Part 4
Formal
Safety
Assessments
& Hazards
and Effects
Analysis
Part 5
Management
of SCEs
Part 6
Remedial
Action
Plan
Part 7
Conclusions
106
Surface Blowout
Structural Damage
Ship Collisions
Turret Failure
Dropped Objects
Subsea Release
Natural Hazards
Toxiic Release
107
BP TECHNICAL SAFETY
PROCESS
108
109
110
Example Safety
consequences
- Unplanned release of
hydrocarbons
- Equipment failure release
pressurized drilling foam
Stored Energy
- Suspended Load, Hydraulic
Systems
Biological Agents
- Laboratories, Sewers,
Contaminated Water, Cooling
Equipment, Bio-treaters
- Person is poisoned
Hand Tools
- Hammers, Bolsters, Drills, Chisels,
Flogging Spanners
Chemicals
- Corrosive, Toxic (acute or chronic),
Harmful, Irritant,
Oxidizing, Flammable (incl mists and
dusts),
Sensitizing, Dangerous for the
Environment
Asphyxiants
- Nitrogen, Carbon Dioxide, Halon,
Light hydrocarbon
gases
111
Example Safety
consequences
Operation of Vehicles
- Fork Lift trucks, Cranes, JCBs,
Piling Rigs, Rail Cars, Rail Engines,
Tractors/Trailers, Low loaders,
Lorries, Ground Loading,
Underground services,
Overhead cables
Drowning
- Waves, Tides, Currents,
Entanglement, Slippery Surfaces
- Man overboard
Confined Spaces
- Storage Tanks, Ducting, Main
Separators, Voids, Sumps,
Excavations, Exposure to High/Low
working Temperatures
- Fatalities
Excavations
- Contaminated soil, buried services,
un-shored sides
Explosion (Implosion)
- Chemical, Pressure, (Vacuum),
Dusts, Mists, Low Ignition Energy
Materials (e.g. Hydrogen
112
- Fatality
Electricity
- Cabinets, Switchrooms,
Transformers
- Fatality by electrocution
- Injury
- Burn injury
- Back injury
113
Noise
- Piling Rigs, Compressors, Pumps,
Fans
Incorrect Posture
- Confined Spaces, Poor Balance,
Use of Computer
Use of Machinery
- Moving Parts, Dangerous Parts,
Entanglement, Tripping
Radiation
- Nucleonics, Gamma Rays, LSA
Scale, Weld Flash,
Thermal Radiation (flares)
Vibration
- Percussive Tools, Heavy Plant
Mechanical Lifting
- Cranes, Hoist
114
115
116
117
C o m m a n d & C o n tro l
C om m and
C
E
C
E
o m m u n ic a
m e rg e n c y
o n tro l R o o
r g o n im ic s ,
C o n t r o l & M it ig a t io n
tio n s
Power & U PS
m
e tc .
P ro c e s s C o n tro l
& A la r m s
S e g r e g a tio n
& I s o la t io n
F & G D e t e c t io n
ES D
B lo w d o w n
A c t iv e F ire
P r o t e c t io n
P a s s iv e F ire
P r o t e c t io n
F ir e B a r r ie r s
& P e n e t r a t io n s
M a t e r ia ls H a n d lin g
P r o t e c t io n
H a z a rd o u s A re a
C la s s if ic a t io n
G a lle y F ir e
P r o t e c t io n S y s t e m s
H a b it a b ility
H V AC
E m e r g e n c y L ig h t in g
E s c a p e & E v a c u a t io n
E s c a p e R o u te s
L if e b o a ts
L if e r a f ts
L a d d e r s & C h u te s , e tc
L if e ja c k e ts
L if e b u o y s
P e r s o n a l P r o t e c tiv e
E q u ip m e n t
P y r o t e c h n ic s
E P IR B S
H e lid e c k C r a s h
R e s c u e K it
R e c o v e ry
H e lid e c k w a v e - o ff
E m e rg e n c y P o w e r
A c t iv e F ir e P ro t e c t io n
118
119
LPG sphere
Logic solver
Gas detection
ESD system
Control valve
120
121
Learning from
the Past
Control, Alarm &
Shutdown system
Inherent Design
Plant Layout
Effective
Supervision
/ Leadership
Operations
Procedures
Maintenance
& Inspection
Work Control
Communication
Investigation &
Lessons
Learned
Support to Next
of Kin & Injured
Escape /
Access
Management
of Change
HAZARD
Normal
Hydrocarbon
Inventory in
Raffinate
Splitter
Rescue &
Recovery
HAZARD
REALIZATION
Loss of
containment
Ignition
Explosion
Multiple fatalities
and injuries
Inventory
increased
Proximity
of nonessential
personnel
to hazard
Flare not
used
No up to
date relief
study design
basis
unclear
Capacity
of
blowdown
drum
exceeded
Operate
outside
envelop
No failsafe
shutdown
No mass
balance
or
attention
to other
data
Lost
process
control
Faulty
high level
alarm not
reported
Previous
incidents
& upsets
not
reported
Admin.
rather
than ISD
solutions
Hierarchy
of control
not
applied
Procedure
s not
followed
Steps not
signed off
Use of
local
practices
Failure to
recognize
hazard to
trailers from
start-up
People not
notified of startup
Multiple
sources of
ignition in
adjacent areas
Inadequate
HAZID skills
Lack of
underpinnin
g knowledge
Failure to
follow
procedures
Confusion
over who was
in charge
No
verification on
procedures in
use
Absent from
unit at critical
times
Pre-start-up
review not
performed
Procedural
compliance not
checked
Supervisor
offsite
No interventions
Inadequate
KPIs for process
safety
No effective
handover
between
shifts
Unit alarm
not sounded
No / incomplete
MOCs for trailer
siting
Blowdown
drum modified
without rigorous
MOC
Active &
passive fire
protection
Emergency
response by site
and external
authorities
Hospitalization
Access & escape
route diversity
Access to scene