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CABLE

Yol. 25, No. 5

56th Field Artillery Command

July 1987

USAREUR. Comm1nder, Gen. Glenn K. Otis h1ng1 the Superior Unit Aw1rd 1tr11mer on the Comm1nd Colors H the Com1n1nd8f of the 56th Fl1ld Artillery Comm1nd,
BG Raymond E. Hlddock, end the former Chief of Stall of the Germen Army. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Meinhard Ol1nz look on. An 'AFN tellvl1lon crew wH on hend to
record the hl1torlc event which took piece on July 1. (Photo by Randy Yecklet)

Disci/Jline and performance ,,,aised

Superior unit awarded

by John K. D'Amato
NCOlC Public Affairs
The Superior Unit Award was prtsentl
10 the S6th Field Artillery Command (Per
shing) by USAREUR Commander, Gen.
Glenn K. Olis, in a ceremony held on the
Comm and parado ground >t Hardt Kuerne,
July I in Schw:Obisch GmUnd.
The Superior Unit Aard was given in

recognition of the long hours, hard work

and personal sacrifice of thousands of Pershing soldiers durinc tho years 1983 throu~h
1986. During those y<ors Pershing ,oldicrs

were challenged with the mission of fielding

the Pershinx II missile synem. They w<r<
facl ,.,th musive demonstrations by antinucl<ar and anti-P,rshing protestors, nearly
back-to-back guard duty committmencs to
proct equipment, and intense mlia inter
est.

Pershing units not only overcame all of

those obscacles, they completed the deployment of th< Pershing II in only 16 months.
Ta.skcd also with developing a new organi
z.a:iional structure and unic.aJ doctrine, the
Command mtt all of those requirements and
hu since proved iu combat-readincn re
peatedly through ccu firings in tho United
s,.,es and field training exercises in Ger

many. "This award", said Gen. Otis, could

"By its oumanding performance of duty",
be on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty uid Gl11n2, "'PershinJ; is no, only in strl
Organization. The Command hu proven gy, but in ruli1y. a decisive pn of a credits "suvicc 10 the alliance" and through its ible denercncc."
"dlicated service" 1w bad implications of
Brig. Gen. Haddock thanked the German
far-reaching importanoe.
pcoplo, the suies of Bden Wunenbcrc and
Former Chief of Stff of the German Bavaria, and the German Police for the supArmy, Lt. Gen. (Ret) Meinhard Gian<, po" they have provided 10 Command .
speaking on behalf of the German Minister
The final tribute was paid to the Pcrshin~
of D,fensc, said, it was his pleasure 10 con- soldiers who, Haddock ,aid, ha\'e "per
vey "the congn1ulttions, rcspeet ,nd satis lorml magnifici<ntly in some vur diff,cuh
fcrion of his fellow countrymen. He con- times." Without their discipline. dedication
cludl that the Pmhing II, backed by com and selfsacrificc, 1he awnd would no, h,"e
bat-mdy soldiers. plays a vital role in the been po11ible.
puce scrucgics of che U. S. and the entire

alliance.

Pershing Cable

July 1987

Training

Super troops make their mark

The S6th Field Anillery Brigade (Pershing), consisting of
Headquarters a.nd Headquaners Battery; 1st B,ttalion, 41st
Fidd Artillery; lsc Battalion, 81st Field AniUery; ld Batta
lion, 84th Field Anmery; 2d Battalion, 4ch Infantry; 55ch
Mincenance Bttlion; and chc 266ch Chemical Detachment (Deconmnination), performed with great distinction
during the period November 1983 to Dccembcr 1985 by
succcufuUy fielding the Pershing II weapon sysccm.
The fielding of the Pershing II played a vita.I role in furthering che national interests of the United Smes of Americ. and in strengthening the NATO AUianec.
The fielding of the Pershing II wu accomplished in spite
of unprecen.dcntcd challenges faced by the Brigade and its
soldiers. The 56th Field Anillery Brigade (Pmhing) mec
chese and other challenges hed-on and accomp~shcd ,Jl
deployment milesconcs on schedule.
The first Pershing II missiles arrived in the Bri~ade on 27
November 1983 ond che fielding got underwy 1n eameSt.
On 1S December 1983, che first Pmhing II battery (Battery A, lsr Bttalion, 41st Field Artillery) became operational.
The complete integmion of the first Pershing II banery
into brigade operations wu accomplished in ihon order
despite a mvriad of challenges. From the time of receiving
the Pershing II musiles in December 1983 until April 1984,
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery underwent
four tesu under the Army Training and Evaluation Prog
nm. The unit wts tlso evaluated on four sepme occ.sions
by Nude.r Weapons Technical Inspectors (NWT!) under
Nucl-ear Surety Inspection (NS!) cmeria.
In addition to challenges faced by any unit involved with
fielding a new system, Battery A was faced with severe advcrs~ weather conditions, with up to rwo feet of snow on

che ground nd extremely cold temperatures, throughout

its field mining..
Addi,ionally, demonstutor activity throughout this pt
riod required the unit 10 perform deuiled coordination
with supporting host nation police agencies far beyond that
required of other units. Battery A faced every chllenge and
began performanly its musion on schedule.
Fielding of the new Pershing II missile followed in the
rem,in.ing ,hree firing batteries of the In B,ualion, 41st
Field Artillery. The focus of training shifted from individu,J battery operations to integrated battalion Pershing II
operations.
As banaJion exercises increased so too did dc:monstator
activity. Convoys were routinely di,ruptcd by the demonstrators who threw objects .such a,s .,crow's feet" under vc
hides in tn ttempt to d:unage tires.

Field Artillery's proficiency was conducted by

sixty NATO observers who were a.lso onhand during the unit's Tactic,J Evtluation.
The 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery was
credited with 100% in missile operations and

received an overall rating of Outstanding dur

ing the evtluation. Fielding of the first Pershing II battalion w,s compleic.
The requircme-nt to develop a new orga.ni
utiona.l structure and new tactical doctrine

prior to field testing of the new Pershing sys

tern also challenged the brigade.
As the brigade lbored to complete fielding,
it led the way in developing a new Pershing
organizational structu_r t and operuiona.l concept needed 10 support the new Pershing II
Missile System.
Working closely with Headquarters United
Stam Army, Europe, U. S. Army Major
Commands and the Army Staff, the 56th Field
Artillery Brigade compleied, in one year, pro Aa pmrt of IN NATO TWln Tr11ek AgrNment, the commncl
cedures which norma.lly require three years.
deployed the Perlhlng II Mlaeli. Syatem In Europe.
Initial operation,J te5ting of the Pershing II
highlighted a variety of areas of command,
The brigade was faced with major demonscratiom such
control, nd communications needing improvement within
tS ,he Easter demonstmions of 1983 and 1984 and ,he
the Brigade. The brigade mimd the U.S. Army in the ac"Hot FII 83" demonStmion where over 100,000 demontions nectssary to solve these critical command an~ constrators gathered at brigade insullationS to protest the- statrol shortcomings. Included in theses measures were retioning of the Pershing II.
Structuring the bri~ade to , comm,nd and !tying the
In the face of this continued aggravation, harassment,
groundwork for activation of a new signal battalion.

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threats, and on a few occasions. damage to equipment,

Pershing soldiers never lost their ,clf-disci pl inc

and demonstmed great restraint.
llrigade soldiers never failed to follow in
struction.s with respect to use of minimum
force. These soldiers, confronted with aggressive demonstrators who anemptt:d to wrestle
away weapons, stood their ground and per-

formed their duty with great distinction.

Per.shing soldiers earned the sincere admiration of both German leaders and people for
their consistant discipline and professional ac~

tions.
Perhaps the greatest challenge met by the
brigade occured in 1985. On 11 Janum J985.
a Pershing II !St s1aie section cough, /ire ond
burned. This tragic incident caused the dc>th
of 3 Pershing crewman nd the injurv of 16
others. The incident created enormous additional political pressures and re~.tcti,,ncd d....-..
monstrator interest in the brig2dt.

Com11111nd soldiers muat hive high degrN of dlaclpllne to deal

with the 11111ny dernonatratlone fllC4ld by Pershing unite.
Enensive investigation of the incident revraled that the
fire was caused by a build-up of electrostatic clectricit)' and
In addition, intense political pressures developed with
with the attention of the highest levels focused on the batwu
in no way etuscd by soldier error.
,he deployment of the miuile system. The 56th Bng,de and
talion.
its soldiers experienced massive demonstrations, touling
In
the aftermach of the fire, training programs were mod
The intense training by the 1st Battalion, 41st Field Arthousands of people, as well as a continua.I demonstntor
ified and a variety of innovative techniques and devices
tillery culminated in a battalion level NATO Tactical Evapresence at Mutltngen Missile Stora~c Are since the fall of
were employed in order to keep the fielding on ><hedule
luation in September 1984. Becuse of the high level int<r
1983. Throughout these demonstrations, the soldiers of the
and 10 maintain combat readiness.
est and politically sensitive nature of ,he Pershing II
S6th Field Artillery Brigade conducted themselves in a
In the face of these enormous challenges, ,be soldiers nd
weapon system, the evaluation of the 1st Batulion, 41st
most professional manner.
leaders never lost faith in the mission nor the Pershing II
systecn which was considered vital 10 nucleu deterrence in
As PII fielding progressed, the topic of the
NATO.
deployment was a political issue at the top of
During chi, two yeu period, the brigade was also in ,he
every European agenda and the peace/an,;nu
process of modernizing ns Aeet of vehicles across the com
clear movement was moving at a fever pitch.
mand
while building a maintenance program that guarPershing soldiers were faced with nearly backantees the sucecss of equipment operating in the field.
to-back guard duty to /rotect sensitive mis, ion equipment require to ,Jlow the fielding
More than 800 of the brigade's fleet ol 1700 vehicles were
,o proceed on schedule.
s.,apped out during this period; this created. an additional
requirement for intensified training for dnvers and for
Throughout the deployment preparation
maintenance personneL
period, political opposition to the Pershing II
became monger and more voc,I in the FedeThe Brigade successfully fielded two Pershing JI battal
rll Republic. With the actutl arrival of the
ions, fully accomplished its NATO mission, and main
new missiles in Germany on 22 November
tained it's combat readiness through this challenging two
1983, decnonmator activity increased signifiyear period. According to USAREUR Commander, Gen.
cantly.
Glenn K. Otis, the Brigade's efforts resultc,d in a dearly
stronger NATO Alliance.
Prior to 1983? the demonstration dm: .H rn
the 56th Brigade was minimal. This situa<1<n
According 10 Ocis, the fielding of the PcrshingII demon
changed considerably with ,he tnnounced de
mated ,he resolve of the United States nd its allies ,o im
ployment 10 the field for training. Before ex
prove its defen,e nd played a key role in bringing the Soercises had been routine business. After the
viet Union to the anns control bargaining rabl~. He praised
Attention to detell plY an lmport.nt pert In Pllfshlng units.
fielding, ordinary ,ctivities such as simply
the effort of the soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officPershing aoldlera encl IHdllfl constantly check ind Inspect
getting on or off base bectme a major chal
ers, tnd civilian employees of the Pershing Brigade, and
their mlaelln for the smallest deflclenclea.
lenge.
their ftmily mcmberS.
The first Pershing II battalion fielding and training exer-

cises were conducted in a gold fish bowl" atmosphtrc