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Indonesian History Brief: Major Events 1968-2016

Creation of the New Order

Prior to the momentous events of 1968, Sukarno led the island-chain State of Indonesia from
its post-World War Two struggle against the Dutch in 1945 to his ousting in 1967-68. In 1967,
Suharto forced Sukarno to sign the Letter of March, which declared Suharto the interim
President and assured Sukarno that he could flee the country with his life. Between the years
1967 and 1968, Suharto formed what is known as the New Order, which prescribed to the
Indonesian core philosophy of Pancasila and represented a departure from Sukarnos Guided
Democracy (Frederick and Worden 1993, pg 72).
To replace Sukarnos political philosophy for Indonesia, Suharto and the New Order
organized a system that strove for a lack of politics and ideology. It was what writers at the
Library of Congress call a quasi- or pseudo-democratic system that aimed to promote
Indonesian unity and conform to the world order in the hopes of an end to impeded economic
development. This government control took the form of a reorganization of the Peoples
Consultative Assembly and the Peoples Representative Council the top representative and
legislative bodies, respectively. These legislatures were reorganized to constitute civilian and
military appointees, thereby giving Suharto and the military control of the legislature. Political
parties were limited and forbade to tie themselves to any specific identities (religion, ethnicity,
etc..). Finally, the New Order established several functional groups that acted as pro-government
political parties, and further ensured a steady control for Suharto and the Golkar party.
(Frederick and Worden 1993, pg 74).
Suharto restricted the parties to include Golkar, (primarily the military and Suhartos
supporters) the PPP (an aggregation of Muslim parties) and the PDI (a lumped grouping of

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Christians, Nationalists, and any other groups that are not in Golkar or the PPP) (Casper, 2016).
Ultimately, the transition to Suhartos New Order was solidified in March of 1967, after what the
former U.S. Ambassador called Suhartos masterful handling of Sukarno, in not denouncing
him or making him a martyr (Marshall 1990, pg. 97). Instead, The Provisional Peoples
Consultative Assempbly (MPRS), removed Sukarno from the Presidency and made Suharto
Acting President (Marshall 1990, pg. 97).
Asian Flu 1997
When the Thai Baht was heavily devalued in July of 1997, Indonesias Rupiah had
already been floated, and the economy was in a manageable state. Initially, Indonesia did not
follow the rest of South East Asia into the Asian Flu of 1997. Both the IMF and the World Bank
expressed confidence in the Indonesian Economy as late into the crisis as October, stating that
there Should be no problem (Vatikiotis 1998, pg. 220). Shortly afterward, Suharto and his
regime were faced with one of the worst combinations of events: economic crisis and political
isolation. When, in August, the Indonesian currency began to fall and the countrys currency
reserves had been depleted, Suharto had no choice but to go to International Monetary Fund
(IMF) for assistance. This time the IMF, to Suhartos surprise, was not as accommodating and
eager to help as it had been in the 1970s. Suharto was forced to sign a 50-point agreement in
which he conceded the vast expanse of his crony capitalist businesses and covert illegal
operations. In the process of this, many Indonesian banks were closed or failed most of which
were owned by Suhartos relatives and base supporters (Vatikiotis 1998, pg. 221).
As scholars have cited: the quid pro quo for IMF assistance would be a series of
neoliberal reforms which would strike at the heart of the politico-business and conglomerate
power (Robison and Rosser 1998, pg. 1600). One example is Suhartos son, Bambang

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Trihatmodjo who was head of Bank Andromeda. Bank Andromda was one of the banks that was
forced to close, and Trihatmodjo called closures such as that of his bank a movement that hoped
to ensure his father would not win re-election. Suhartos Finance Minister, Marie Muhammad,
was responsible for the bank closures and implementation of IMF demands, and much of the
anger fueled form Suhartos relatives was directed at Marie. The extensiveness of corruption
and crony capitalism in Suhartos New Order regime became even more apparent when the
influence of Suhartos relatives and close confidants began to shape economic policy and
government appointments. Marie was not to return as Finance Minister, a result of
dissatisfaction on the part of Suharto supporters. Suhartos power was so consolidated that when
rumors of his having had a stroke circulated in December 1997, the Rupiah dropped another 10%
in value (Aspinall 2005, pg. 210).
Habibies Presidency
B.J. Habibie ascended to the Presidency in May of 1998 after the resignation of Suharto.
President Habibie was quickly expected to take on the role of economic reformer, but was not the
ideal or likely candidate in the eyes of many Indonesians and foreign scholars. Previously, he led
the formation of the state-owned aircraft corporation after working for several years in Germany
as the leader of a prestigious Airbus project, and was known for unorthodox economic policies.
One of these unorthodox ideas was his zigzag theory of inflation rates, meaning that rates
should be lowered and sharply raised in a repeating pattern to combat high inflation. Habibie was
not a natural reformer for Indonesia, but took on the role to meet the expectations of the
Indonesian people and of external pressures. His reforms included populist initiatives to drive
growth of small and medium-size businesses as well as to decentralize fiscal and monetary

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policy. To address the concerns of the Indonesian People, Habibie passed significant corruption
legislation, but is accused of never fully implementing it (Marks, 2009).
In regards to political foundations and reforms, Habibie represented the strongest
connection between Suhartos New Order Regime and the Muslim Parties. As president,
Modernist Muslims saw Habibie as the leader who could guide Indonesia in the direction that
they had long sought. This provided Habibie with what one scholar calls symbolic power,
which was combined with Habibies cultural ideas of Iptek and Imtaq. Iptek stands for ilmu
pengetahuan (science) and teknologi (technology), while imtaq refers to iman (faith) and taqwa
(devotion). In addition to his base of support, Habibie was significant because of his handling of
the East Timorese Referendum. Against the wishes of many politicians, Habibie permitted the
East Timorese to hold a referendum for independence, which resulted in East Timors
separation from Indonesia, but which ended international condemnation of the regime.
Habibies presidency ended after just a year and a half, when the Peoples Consultative Assembly
rejected his accountability speech in October of 1999 (Sulfikar 2007, pg. 101).
Megawatis Presidency
In July of 2001, President Wahid was removed from office by the Peoples Consultative
Assembly. He was replaced by his vice president, Megawati. In contrast to the excitement for
Wahids presidency, Megawati was not seen as a politician capable of meaningful reform. In her
first state address, she admitted to the voices who were calling for further reforms, and asserting
that the reforms that had been made were not working and had not put Indonesia on a proper path
to democratization. In regards to making these reforms, she acknowledged the calls for
comprehensive and more conceptual amendments to matters pertaining to the system of state
based on the 1945 Constitution (Documents on Democracy, 2001).

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After the Bali bombings in October of 2002, Megawati proved her ability to combat two
of Indonesias most divisive societal natures: the strong clout of Islam and a remarkably strong
sense of nationalism. The bombings, which many Indonesians said were perpetrated by the
United States in the interest of subduing Indonesias economy, threatened to perpetuate and
permit radical Islam to fester in the island nation. To combat both of these reactions, Megawati
invited investigators from Britain, Australia, and the United States to assist in the investigation,
and voted to declare Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) as a terrorist group at the United Nations. Megawati
proved her ability to stand up to strong factions in Indonesia, and unite a country that has a wide
range of cultures and religions (Brown 2003, pg. 245).
It was during Megawatis Presidency that the presidential elections in 2004 were set in
motion, with the legislature amending the constitution in 2002 to initiate direct presidential
elections in 2004 (two years from the time of the change) and relinquished its own power of
presidential appointment. Interestingly, Megawati was vehemently opposed to this, saying the
Indonesian People are not ready to vote for a head of state in two years (Smith 2003, pg. 101).
Although she held this position up until the August parliamentary session, her party eventually
relented and the motion was passed. Megawati was described as authoritarian and aloof by
one of her former party leaders and advisors who turned against her, Mochtar Buchori (Alifandi,
2002).
2004 Presidential Election
The 2004 Presidential Elections were the first directly-democratic presidential elections
in Indonesia. The elections followed dissatisfaction with the level to which the country had
departed from the ways of the New Order, and the Legislatures implementation of direct
Presidential elections. It also marked the end of military-allotted seats in the legislature. The

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direct results of the elections in 2004 included Suhartos Party from the days of the New Order,
Golkar, with 21% of the vote, and Megawatis PDI-P with roughly 18% of the vote. The
Presidential election was decided in two separate elections, the first of which involved five
candidates, with Partai Demokrats Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono winning 33.6%, PDI-Ps
Megawati Sukarnoputri with 26.6%, Golkars Wiranto (a military affiliate) won 22.2%, Amien
Rais of the National Mandate Party and former head of the modernist Muslim organization
Muhammadiyah garnered 14.7%, and PPPs Hamzah Haz, the incumbent Vice President, won
only 3%. Haz was the only candidate who considered himself from an Islamist party, while the
others prescribed to the ideology of Pancasila. Megawati and SBY faced each other in a runoff
election, and SBY won with over 60% of the vote (National Election Commission, 2004);
(Liddle 2005, pg. 122).
The election focused on the personalities running for office to a greater extent than it
focused on the ideas. Scholars say that the platforms for the different parties were almost
indistinguishable, and that it was the people running for office who were the true debate.
Golkars chairman had been recently cleared of corruption charges, Megawati was described as
being distant, aloof, and uncaring by the media (Dagg 2007, pg 52). SBY was more respected
for his firm and swift handling of the Bali Bombings under Megawati, but occasionally criticized
for being too willing to cooperate with the U.S. and Australia. SBYs early decisions were
representative of the mandate that he won in the election: a far-reaching and widely varied
support base. As President, he appointed a mixture of pro-market and protectionist economic
ministers, sending a mixed signal in terms of his priorities and his ability to effectively lead
(Liddle 2005, pg 125).

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Current Government: Unconsolidated Democracy

Indonesias current government is an unconsolidated democracy because of the lingering

military influence, the still strong executive, and the 2014 law that instituted bureaucratic control
over non-governmental organizations. Most importantly, this law included a provision that
required all groups in Indonesia to support Pancasila (Freedom House 2015).
Freedom House
Freedom House defines Indonesia in 2015 as Partly Free, but far more significant is
that it was designated Free from 2006 until 2014, when its freedom rating was decreased. The
country report justifies this degredation by saying: Indonesias civil liberties rating declined
from 3 to 4 and its status declined from Free to Partly Free due to the adoption of a law that
restricts the activities of nongovernmental organizations, increases bureaucratic oversight of such
groups, and requires them to support the national ideology of Pancasilaincluding its explicitly
monotheist component (Freedom House, 2014). A separate piece, published by the Freedom
House News Division, highlights the fact that since 1998, 18 countries have made the transition
from partly free to free, including Indonesia. The article then draws attention to the fact that
only four have reverted to partly free: Indonesia, Sierra Leone, Mexico, and Ukraine. The
author criticizes these nations with the warning that Indeed, most democratic societies fully
understand that they must work constantly to defend their own rights from a variety of current or
potential infringements (Roylance, 2015). Indonesia remained partly free in 2015, and does
not seem on track to return to a free status in regards to political rights and civil liberties while
strict legislation regarding national ideology and non-governmental organization oversight
remain in place.

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In the appendix is a graphical representation of Indonesias Freedom House scores, with a

trend towards democracy in 2004, following the first direct elections of President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono. This trend was reversed after the 2014 laws that placed restrictions on
non-governmental organizations, but cemented by several other acts of the legislature that diluted
the democracy of Indonesia. Freedom House uses two measures, civil liberties and political
rights, to asses a country. Each are measured on a 1-7 scale (1 being most democratic, 7 being
least democratic). The scores are then averaged to create the countrys freedom rating, which
in turn defines the countrys Freedom Status (Freedom House 2015). (see figures 1 and 2)
Polity
Polity can be used as another measurement of democracy, and records an assention to
near-consolidated democracy. This can be explained through an analysis of the polity scoring
process, which focuses upon the contestation and participation aspects of Dahls definition of
democracy (Dahl, 1971). Polity measures both executive recruitment and executive restraints,
both of which were partially addressed after Suhartos fall in 1999, but more efficiently tackled
by President Megawatis regime prior to the 2004 elections. The polity scorers quote the
eliminated ability of political elites to heavily influence the presidential candidates, and cite the
first-ever presidential election in which the people were permitted to directly elect the executive
(Marshall, 2010).
In regards to participation, the Polity scorers note that Suhartos regime portrayed a
falsely homogenous Indonesian population. The presence of many factions, religions, and
special interests has created a heterogeneous political landscape, particularly in regards to the
military. The Polity scorers gave Indonesia such a high polity score, despite the remaining
influence of the military and its wide reach into economic and potentially political affairs,

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because the military has chosen to not be coercive (Marshall, 2010). The graph below
represents Indonesias Polity scores since 1945 until 2015. Polity is measured using a scale of
-10 to positive 10, with -10 being full autocracy and positive 10 being full democracy. It is
worth noting the strengthening of the authoritarian regime that occurred when Suharto seized
power from Sukarno in 1968 (Marshall, 2010). (see figure 3)
While Polity and Freedom House do not portray Indonesias current level of democracy
in the same manner, they are both accurate and legitimate measures of Indonesias regime type.
Polity measures political participation and contestation in elections, both of which have
drastically improved from the end of Suhartos New Order. Freedom House reports on political
rights and civil liberties, which were initially improved with the election of President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004, but were detrimentally affected by a series of constrictive laws in
2014. These scores combine to support the assessment that Indonesia is an unconsolidated
democracy. Indonesia is a country with legitimate systems for widespread political participation
and meaningful contestation of candidates that are selected by the people. Despite this progress,
Indonesia has not consolidated because of the remaining inhibitors of political rights and civil
liberties, inhibitions which have intensified in recent years, and do not point to near-term
consolidation (Marshall, 2010).
Factors of Indonesias Unconsolidated Democracy
One of the most controversial aspects of Pancasila is the specificity of one true God,
and the requirement that all Indonesians must believe in this one true God. While this does not
institute sharia law in Indonesia, it permits local paths to such governance. In Aceh, for instance,
there are Sharia Police who are permitted to enforce Sharia law in the province (U.S. State
Department, 2015).

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Military Clout
Indonesias military has a strong, sometimes repressive influence in regards to minority
groups. The official representative of American Samoa to the U.S. House of Representatives,
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, travelled to Indonesia to discuss the atrocities committed by the
Indonesian military in West Papua during the 1960s. During a hearing of a House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee, Faleomavaega accused Indonesia of gross violations in the past, and
continued military authoritarianism. When he travelled to Indonesia in 2007 for a promised 5day trip to visit Biak, Manokwari, and Jayapura to discuss increased autonomy for those regions,
he was meeting by strong security upon his arrival. Indonesian Security Forces erected
barricades wherever he went to prevent local people from meeting and speaking with him.
Instead of 5 days in these areas, he was permitted two days in Biak. In Manokwari, where he
was promised to meet the Governor, he was told that the governor had been in China for the past
five days. He deplaned to a view of Indonesian Military Forces in Riot Gear pushing back the
local Papuans and preventing him from conversing with them. Within ten minutes, he was put
back on his plane by the security services and returned to Washington. His letter of complaint to
President SBY was never answered (U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, 2010).
Another aspect of Military clout, beyond excessive aggression and repression, is the
economic self-sufficiency of the Indonesian Military. In the early 2000s, the Indonesian Military
was 70% funded by independent commercial ventures that were not part of the official
government budget. In 2004 significant reforms were made to put the Indonesian Military
funding on-budget, but were not complete or successful. Roughly 20% of the budget is still
funded by independent economic sources, some of which are reportedly illegal (Misol and

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Mietzner 2012, pg. 102). Independently funded militaries are not successful facets of democracy,
and an aspect of the Indonesian regime that remains unconsolidated and not fully democratic.
Pancasila-Related Laws that Restrict Political Rights and Civil Liberties
This is perhaps the most significant hindrance to Indonesian Democracy, as a lack of
political and civil rights for minority groups has been increasing, rather than improving. The
province of Aceh approved the Islamic Criminal Code and the government instituted laws by
which non-Muslims who commit infractions of Sharia law in the presence of a Muslim, are also
subject to Sharia law. Previously, only Muslims had been subject to Sharia law. This marks a
massive departure from freedom of religion, and has alarmed human rights activists and foreign
governments (Hamayotsu 2015, pg. 182). Freedom House, in degrading Indonesias Freedom
Rating in 2014, stated that the rule of law remains weak in protecting basic rights for all
citizens (Freedom House, 2014).
The requirement, per the Indonesian Constitution, that all individuals prescribe to
Pancasila is a restrictive doctrine that can be interpreted as permitting (although does not
explicitly condone) Sharia law. It also restricts independence movements, by requiring national
unity. The U.S. State Department noted government efforts to silence and detain members of
independence movements under this legal justification. While humanitarianism, social justice,
and democracy do not directly threaten the rights of Indonesian citizens, explicit restrictions are
never conducive to expansive civil liberties and political rights (U.S. State Department, 2015).
Executive Power and Unchecked Security Services
While the direct power of the executive has been constrained by constitutional
amendments that institute legislative oversight of the executive, the President retains significant
clout as commander in chief over domestic security services that are often unchecked and

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rampantly violate human rights. The U.S. Department of State recorded in its Human Rights
2014 Indonesia Country Report that frequent arbitrary arrests took place in Indonesia, despite
constitutional provisions that ban it. The State Department blames this on a lack of enforcement
and regards it as detrimental to human rights in Indonesia. The report also cites similar
infringements on freedom of speech, publishing freedoms, and freedom from unlawful and
arbitrary detention. These infractions are usually justified by citing anti-terror laws, but are
clearly being abused, according to the U.S. State Department (U.S. State Department, 2015).
Following the populist President Jokowis first year in office, the country remains with
hazy outlooks on democratic consolidation (Hamayotsu and Nataatmadja 2016, pg. 129).
Although Jokowi has enacted many of his promised initiatives to change the fortunes of the poor,
political corruption and the institution of political elite remain. Jokowis opponent in the 2014
Presidential Election, Prabowo Subianto, was a nephew of Suharto and part of the established
political elite. Jokowis running mate, Jusuf, Kalla, was the former chairman of Suhartos Golkar
Party and the Vice President during SBYs 2004-2014 Presidency (Hamayotsu 2015, pg. 179).
III.

Future of Indonesias Regime

Between 2017 and 2022, I predict that Indonesia will remain an unconsolidated democracy,
because it lacks a fervent public support for further democratization and faces many challenges
to any further consolidation of existing institutions. In Asian Surveys yearly country profile, the
author cautions after the success of the 2014 legislative and presidential elections that it is the
quality of democracy and governance that is questioned and must be addressed (Hamayotsu
2015, pg. 175). In the 2014 election, the PKI-P party won the presidency with Joko Widodo
carrying on the legacy of former President Megawati as a populist figure. Despite the
continuance of legitimate and direct presidential elections, the government has failed to chart a

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new course to rectify the harmful legislation and status quos that have emerged in Indonesia
during the 2010s. Islamitization of the law, including the enforcement of Sharia law in new and
inappropriate circumstances, do not lend themselves to a country being labeled a true democracy.
Jokowi, seen as the peoples president, could take steps to change this reality and alter the
previously addressed concerns of humanitarian abuses, military overreach, and Pancasila
related laws that infringe upon civil liberties and political rights (Hamayotsu 2015, pg. 183).
As Jokowi continues his infant presidency, other problems persist that contain his leadership
in uncertainty, such as deep-seated corruption, patronage-driven clientelistic politics, and an
oligarchic political economy (Hamayotsu 2015, pg. 175). Also a test to Jokowi is his control
over his own party, the PDI-P. Former President Megawati remains a powerful figure, and her
daughter, Puan Maharani, seems relevant to the leadership struggle as well. Jokowi does not
have a working relationship with the sometimes antagonistic legislature, and his party does not
have a strong enough majority in parliament to operate without a coalition. All of these factors
lend themselves to resounding doubt as to Jokowis ability to enact any real change, let alone the
momentous sort of changes that would need to occur for Indonesia to move toward democratic
consolidation.
Before the inauguration of the new parliament and President, the outgoing legislature took
further acts to inhibit Indonesia from consolidation, and threatens to undo the work that has been
done in founding a strong democracy. A law was passed to end elections for regional
administrative heads, meaning that governors, mayors, and district chiefs will no longer be
elected by the population, but will instead be appointed by local assemblies. This, according to
Freedom House, increases the power of established parties and solidifies the political monopoly
of the traditional elite. While SBY issued regulations to combat this law before he left office, the

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new legislature did not approve of them, and the law remains in effect. In July, the parliament
passed an amendment to the 2009 Legislative Institutions Law that, among other things, reduces
the power of law enforcement agencies to investigate lawmakers by requiring the written
approval of the president or the parliaments Honorary Council. Again, this enshrines the
political establishment and makes it harder to combat corruption (Freedom House, 2015).
Although I do not expect Indonesia to revert to an authoritarian regime within the next five
years because of its firmly established national practices of contestation and participation as
described in Dahls definition of Democracy. The abysmal state of political rights and civil
liberties, a third aspect of democracy, threaten to send Indonesia in the direction of returned
authoritarianism. More than a popular and moral President, Indonesia needs a coherent and
democratizing legislature to enact real change toward consolidation.

IV. Works Cited

Alifandi, Anton. 2002. "Analysis: Megawati's first year", BBC Indonesian Service, 23 July.

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Aspinall, Edward. 2005. Opposing Suharto: Compromise Resistance, and Regime Change in
Indonesia. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA.
Casper, Gretchen. 2016. PL SC 458 In-Class Lecture: Indonesia since 1968. 12 April. The
Pennsylvania State University.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971 Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Freedom House. 1998-2015 Freedom in the World 2015: The Annual Survey of Political Rights
and Civil Liberties. Washington, D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield.
Hamayotsu, Kikue and Ronnie Nataatmadja. 2016. Indonesia in 2015. Asian Survey, Vol. 55
No. 1, January/February 2015.
Hamayotsu, Kikue. 2015. Indonesia in 2014. Asian Survey, Vol. 56 No. 1, January/February
2016.
Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Indonesian National Election Commission). 2004.
http://www.kpu.go.id/
Liddle, William R. and Saiful Mujani. 2005. Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono. Asian Survey, Vol. 45 No. 1, January/February (pp. 119-126)
Marks, Stephen V. 2009. "Economic Policies of the Habibie Presidency: A Retrospective."
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 45.1 (2009): 39-60.
Marshall, Green. 1990. Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation 1965-1968. The Compass Press:
Washington, D.C.
Marshall, MG and K Jaggers. 2012. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2012." (http://www. systemicpeace. org/polity/polity4. htm). Accessed
14 April 2016.

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Marshall, Monty G. 2010. "Policy IV: Indonesia." Polity IV Country Reports. Center for
Systemic Peace. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ins2.htm>.
McCarthy, Terry, Johm Colmey, David Liebhold, Jay Branegan, and Douglas Waller. 1998.
Who is B.J. Habibie? Time Magazine, 1 June.
Mietzner, Marcus and Lisa Misol. 2012. Chapter 5: Military Businesses in Post-Suharto
Indonesia: Decline, Reform and Persistence The Politics of Military Reform. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg: Berlin.
No Author. 2001. "Documents on Democracy." Journal of Democracy 12.4 182-186. Project
MUSE. <https://muse.jhu.edu/>.
President of Indonesia. 2014. Law Concerning Halal Availability Assurance
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins139990.pdf 16 April 2016.
Robison, Richard and Andrew Rosser. 1998. Contesting reform: Indonesia's new order and the
IMF." World Development 26.8: 1593-1609.
Roylance, Tyler. 2015. Freedom Isnt Always Forever. Freedom Houses Freedoms at Issue
Blog. Freedom House: New York. 17 April 2016.
suara/hasilsuara_dpr_sah.php , May 5, 2004
Sulfikar, Amir. 2007. Symbolic Power in a Technocratic Regime: The Reign of B.J. Habibie in
New Order Indonesia. Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia. Vol. 22, No.
1 (April). pp. 83-106
U.S. Department of State. 2015. "Human Rights in Indonesia 2014." Human Rights Practices
Country Report: Indonesia.
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2014humanrightsreport/index.htm?
dlid=236442&year=2014#wrapper>

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U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment. 2010. Crimes Against Humanity: When Will Indonesias Military Be Held
Accountable for Deliberate and Systematic Abuses in West Papua? By Eni F.H.
Faleomavaega. 22 Sept. <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG111hhrg58430/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg58430.pdf>.
Vatikiotis, Michael R.J. 1998. Indonesian Politics Under Suharto. 3rd e.d. Routledge: London
William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden, editors. 1993. Indonesia: A Country Study.
Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.

IV.
Figure 1

Appendix: Figures

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Indonesia Freedom House Score 1998-2015

4

3.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

3.5

Civil Liberties

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

2.5

Political Rights

Freedom Rating

Figure 2

Indonesia Freedom Status

Partly Free

Free

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Indonesia Polity Score 1945-2015

888888888888
6666

33
222
000000
-1-1

-5-5

-5-5-5-5-5-5-5
-5
-6-6
-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7-7
Year

Figure 3