TARRIF CASES

CHEVRON
INC.,
-

PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 178759
Petitioner,
v
e
r
s
u
s

COM
MISS
IONE
R OF
THE
BUR
EAU
OF
CUS
TOM
S,
Respondent.
ENTRY IN SECTIONS 1301 AND
1801 OF THE TCC REFERS TO BOTH
THE IED AND IEIRD
Under Section 1301 of the TCC,
imported articles must be entered within
a non-extendible period of 30 days from
the date of discharge of the last package
from a vessel. Otherwise, the BOC will
deem the imported goods impliedly
abandoned under Section 1801. Thus:
Section
1301. Persons Authorized
to Make Import Entry.
- Imported
articles
must be entered in the
customhouse
at
the
port of entry within
thirty (30) days, which
shall not be extendible
from date of discharge
of the last package
from
the
vessel or
aircraft either (a) by the
importer, being holder of
the bill of lading, (b) by a
duly
licensed
customs
broker
acting
under
authority from a holder of
the bill or (c) by a person
duly empowered to act as
agent or attorney-in-fact
for each holder: Provided,
That where the entry is
filed by a party other than
the
importer,
said

importer shall himself be

required to declare under
oath
and
under
the
penalties of falsification or
perjury
that
the
declarations
and
statements contained in
the entry are true and
correct: Provided, further,
That
such
statements
under
oath
shall
constitute prima
facie evidence
of
knowledge and consent of
the importer of violation
against
applicable
provisions of this Code
when the importation is
found
to
be
unlawful. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section
1801. Abandonment,
Kinds and Effect of. - An
imported
article
is deemed
abandoned under any of
the
following
circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx
b. When the owner,
importer, consignee or
interested party after due
notice, fails to file an
entry within thirty (30)
days, which shall not
be extendible, from the
date of discharge of
the last package from
the vessel or aircraft, or
having filed such entry,
fails
to
claim
his
importation within fifteen
(15) days, which shall not
likewise be extendible,
from the date of posting of
the notice to claim such
importation. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner argues that the IED is an
entry contemplated by these sections.
According to it, the congressional

deliberations
on
RA
7651
which
amended the TCC to provide a nonextendible 30-day period show the
legislative intent to expedite the
procedure for declaring importations as
abandoned. Filing an entry serves as
notice to the BOC of the importers
willingness to complete the importation
and to pay the proper taxes, duties and
fees. Conversely, the non-filing of the
entry within the period connotes the
importers disinterest and enables the
BOC
to
consider
the
goods
as
abandoned. Since the IED is a BOC form
that serves as basis for payment of
advance duties on importation as
required under PD 1853,[20] it suffices as
an entry under Sections 1301 and 1801
of the TCC.[21]
We disagree.
The term entry in customs law
has a triple meaning. It means (1) the
documents filed at the customs house;
(2) the submission and acceptance of
the documents and (3) the procedure of
passing goods through the customs
house.[22]
The IED serves as basis for the
payment
of
advance
duties
on
importations
whereas
the
IEIRD
evidences the final payment of duties
and taxes. The question is: was the
filing of the IED sufficient to constitute
entry under the TCC?
The law itself, in Section 205,
defines the meaning of the technical
term entered as used in the TCC:
Section 205. Entry,
or
Withdrawal
from
Warehouse,
for
Consumption. - Imported
articles
shall
be
deemed entered in
the
Philippines
for
consumption when the
specified entry form is
properly
filed
and
accepted, together with
any related documents
regained by the provisions
of
this
Code
and/or
regulations to be filed with
such form at the time of
entry, at the port or
station by the customs

official
designated
to
receive such entry papers
and any duties, taxes, fees
and/or
other
lawful
charges required to be
paid at the time of making
such entry have been paid
or secured to be paid with
the
customs
official
designated to receive such
monies, provided that the
article
has
previously
arrived within the limits of
the port of entry.
xxx

xxx

xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the operative act that
constitutes entry of the imported
articles at the port of entry is the filing
and acceptance of the specified entry
form together with the other documents
required by law and regulations. There
is no dispute that the specified entry
form refers to the IEIRD. Section 205
defines the precise moment when the
imported articles are deemed entered.
Moreover, in the old case of Go
Ho Lim v. The Insular Collector of
Customs,[23] we ruled that the word
entry
refers
to
the
regular
consumption entry (which, in our current
terminology, is the IEIRD) and not the
provisional entry (the IED):
It is disputed by
the parties whether the
application for the special
permit.
Exhibit
A,
containing
the
misdeclared weight of the
800 cases of eggs, comes
within the meaning of the
word "entry" used in
section
1290
of
the
Revised
Administrative
Code,
or
said
word "entry" means only
the "original entry and
importer's
declaration."
The court below reversed
the decision of the Insular
Collector of Customs on
the
ground
that
the
provisions of section 1290
of
the
Revised

Administrative Code refer

to
the
regular
consumption entry and
not to a provisional
declaration made in an
application for a special
permit, as the one filed by
the appellee, to remove
the cases of eggs from the
customhouse.
This court is of the
opinion that certainly the
application,
Exhibit
A,
cannot be considered as a
final regular entry of the
weight of the 800 cases of
eggs imported by the
appellee,
taking
into
account the fact that said
application sought the
delivery of said 800 cases
of eggs "from the pier
after examination," and
the
special
permit
granted,
Exhibit
E,
provided for "delivery to
be
made
after
examination
by
the
appraiser."
All
the
foregoing, together with
the circumstance that the
appellee had to file the
regular consumption entry
which he bound himself to
do, as shown by the
application,
Exhibit
A,
logically
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
the
declaration of the weight
of the 800 cases of eggs
made in said application,
is merely a provisional
entry, and as it is subject
to verification by the
customhouse examiner, it
cannot
be
considered
fraudulent for the purpose
of imposing a surcharge of
customs duties upon the
importer.[24] (Emphasis
supplied)

Republic
Supreme
Manila

of

the

SECOND DIVISION
COMMISSIONER
OF
CUSTOMS
and
the
DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------x
Because petitioners failed to
follow the requirements enumerated by
the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO
27-3003, we likewise hold that it is
unconstitutional for being violative of the
equal
protection
clause
of
the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause
means that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place in like
circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of
the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable
classification. For a classification to be
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
is not limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it applies equally to all members
of the same class.[22]
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does
not meet these requirements. We do not
see how the quality of wheat is affected
by who imports it, where it is discharged,
or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if
other millers excluded from CMO 272003 have imported food grade wheat,
the product would still be declared as
feed grade wheat, a classification

subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the

other hand, even if the importers listed
under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed
grade wheat, they would only be made
to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state
of the taxes due. The regulation,
therefore,
does
not
become
disadvantageous to respondent only, but
even to the state.
It is also not clear how the
regulation intends to monitor more
closely wheat importations and thus
prevent their misclassification. A careful
study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not
only fails to achieve this end, but results
in the opposite. The application of the
regulation forecloses the possibility that
other corporations that are excluded
from the list import food grade wheat; at
the same time, it creates an assumption
that those who meet the criteria do not
import feed grade wheat. In the first
case,
importers
are
unnecessarily
burdened to prove the classification of
their wheat imports; while in the second,
the state carries that burden.
Petitioner
Commissioner
of
Customs also went beyond his powers
when the regulation limited the customs
officers duties mandated by Section
1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as
amended. The law provides:
Section 1403.
Duties of Customs Officer
Tasked
to
Examine,
Classify,
and
Appraise
Imported Articles. The
customs officer tasked to
examine,
classify,
and
appraise
imported
articles shall determine
whether the packages
designated
for
examination and their
contents
are
in
accordance with the
declaration
in
the
entry, invoice and other
pertinent
documents
and shall make return
in such a manner as to
indicate whether the
articles have been truly
and correctly declared
in the entry as regard
their
quantity,
measurement, weight,
and tariff classification

and
not
imported
contrary to law. He shall
submit samples to the
laboratory for analysis
when feasible to do so and
when such analysis is
necessary for the proper
classification,
appraisal,
and/or admission into the
Philippines of imported
articles.
Likewise, the
customs officer shall
determine the unit of
quantity in which they
are usually bought and
sold, and appraise the
imported
articles
in
accordance
with
Section 201 of this
Code.
Failure on the part
of the customs officer to
comply with his duties
shall subject him to the
penalties prescribed under
Section 3604 of this Code.
The provision mandates that the
customs officer must first assess and
determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be
imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007
has already classified the article even
before the customs officer had the
chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner
Commissioner of Customs diminished
the powers granted by the Tariff and
Customs Code with regard to wheat
importation when it no longer required
the customs officers prior examination
and
assessment
of
the
proper
classification of the wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and
regulations, which are the product of a
delegated power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law, should be within the scope
of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature
to
the
administrative
agency. It is required that the regulation
be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; and that it be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with,
the standards prescribed by law.[23]
In summary, petitioners violated
respondents right to due process in the
issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they
failed to observe the requirements under
the
Revised
Administrative
Code.

Petitioners likewise violated respondents

right to equal protection of laws when
they provided for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the
regulation.
Finally,
petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went beyond
his powers of delegated authority when
the regulation limited the powers of the
customs officer to examine and assess
imported articles.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24348

July 30, 1968

FELIClDAD
VIERNEZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE
COMMISSIONER
OF
CUSTOMS, respondent.
Juan
T.
David
for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

All three assigned errors are untenable.

1. Petitioner argues that the Collector of
Customs of Jolo, who has "jurisdiction
over all matters arising from the
enforcement of tariff and customs laws
within his collection district", as provided
for in Section 703 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, is exclusively authorized
to proceed against the cigarettes in
question inasmuch as the smuggling was
allegedly perpetrated in his collection
district. Hence, petitioner concludes that
the seizure and forfeiture thereof by the
Collector of Customs of Cebu is irregular
and illegal for lack of jurisdiction.
We do not agree. First, because Section
703, on which petitioner's conclusion is
premised, is legally non-existent, the
same having been vetoed by the
President.1 Secondly, the Tariff and
Customs Code clearly empowers the

Bureau of Customs to prevent and

suppress smuggling and other frauds
upon the Customs [Sec. 602 (b)] over all
seas within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines and over all coasts, ports,
airports, harbors, bays, rivers and inland
waters navigable from the sea and, in
case of "hot pursuit", even beyond the
maritime zone (Sec. 603). For the due
enforcement of this function, a Collector,
among others, is authorized to search
and seize (Sec. 2203), at any place
within the jurisdiction of the said Bureau
(Sec. 2204, sec. par.), any vessel,
aircraft, cargo, article, animal or other
movable property when the same is
subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine
imposed under customs and tariff laws
(Sec. 2205). It is of no moment where
the introduction of the property subject
to forfeiture took place. For, to our mind,
"(i)t is the right of an officer of the
customs to seize goods which are
suspected to have been introduced into
the country in violation of the revenue
laws not only in his own district, but also
in any other district than his own".
[Taylor vs. U.S., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197, 11
L. ed. 559]. Any other construction of the
Tariff and Customs Code, such as the one
proposed by petitioner, would virtually
place the Collector of Customs in a
straitjacket and render inutile his police
power of search and seizure, thereby
frustrating effective enforcement of the
measures provided in the Code to
prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the Customs. This we
can not sanction by subscribing to
petitioner's conclusion. The Code, as a
revenue law, is to be construed to carry
out the intention of Congress in enacting
it and as would most effectually
accomplish its objects (15 Am. Jur. 304).
Petitioner also attacks the jurisdiction of
the Collector of Customs of Cebu on the
ground that the forfeiture of the
cigarettes is not in accordance with
Section 2531 of the Code, as the same
were, at the time of seizure, no longer in
the custody and control of the Bureau of
Customs nor in the hands, or subject to
control, of the importer, original owner,
consignee, agent or person with

knowledge that the same were imported

contrary to law.
Again, we disagree. The forfeiture is
effected precisely in accordance with
Section 2531 afore-cited, which plainly
provides "that forfeiture shall be effected
when and while the article is in the
custody or within the jurisdiction of the
customs authority ... or in the hands or
subject to the control of ... some person
who shall receive, conceal, buy, sell or
transport the same ... with knowledge
that the article was imported ... contrary
to law" (Emphasis supplied). There can
be no question that the cigarettes
involved were seized and forfeited at the
port of Cebu which is within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs
and, as will be shown later, while the
cigarettes were subject to the control of
petitioner, who bought, concealed, and
transported the same aboard the M/V
"Legaspi" with knowledge that they were
imported contrary to law. Besides, it is a
settled jurisprudence that forfeiture
proceedings are in the nature of
proceedings
in
rem
wherein
the
jurisdiction to proceed against the res is
vested in the court of the district where
the same is found or seized (25 C.J.S.
572). Therefore, the Collector of Customs
of Cebu, who has the authority under the
Tariff and Customs Code to institute
forfeiture proceedings, lawfully assumed
jurisdiction to forfeit, in favor of the
Government, the smuggled cigarettes
found and seized within his collection
district.
2. Petitioner next argues that the
cigarettes
in
question
are
not
merchandise of prohibited importation
inasmuch as she had purchased the
same in the open market in Jolo; which
goes to show that she is not the
importer, original owner, consignee,
agent or person who effected the
importation thereof; and that in the
absence of evidence that she bought the
same with knowledge that they were
imported contrary to law in accordance
with Section 2531, as the lack of internal
revenue stamps is not evidence of illegal
importation much less her knowledge

thereof, the said cigarettes are not

subject to forfeiture under Section 2530
(f) of the Code.
This is not the first time that this
question has been posed before us. In
the case of Gigare vs. Commissioner of
Customs (G.R. No. L-21376, August 29,
1966, 17 S.C.R.A. 1001), we disposed of
the same by holding that "(s)ince,
admittedly, the internal revenue tax on
the cigarettes indispute has not been
paid, it is clear that said cigarettes fall
within the category of "merchandise of
prohibited importation," the importation
of which is contrary to law and may
justify its forfeiture, as provided in
Sections 1363 (f) and 1364 of the
Revised Administrative Code," which
correspond to Sections 2530 (f) and
2531, respectively, of the Tariff and
Customs Code. "Moreover, the blue seals
affixed on said commodities prove
satisfactorily that they are foreign
products. Again, the importation thereof
into the Philippines is attested by the
presence of said products within our
jurisdiction" (Ibid.) And concerning
petitioner's knowledge of these facts,
the following disquisition by the Court of
Tax
Appeals,
lengthily
quoted
in
the Gigare case,
finds
significant
application in the case at bar:
Were the cigarettes in question
illegally
imported
into
the
Philippines? We are of the opinion
that,
the
Commissioner
of
Customs should be sustained in
his finding that the cigarettes in
question were imported illegally.
The absence of Philippine internal
revenue
strip
stamps
on
cigarettes indicates that they are
either
manufactured
clandestinely
within
the
Philippines or imported illegally
into the country. In the case at
bar, concomitant circumstances
militate against the clandestine
manufacture
within
the
Philippines of the cigarettes. The
affixture of blue seals on the
packs of the cigarettes, the
wrappers, the purchase of the

cigarettes in the open market of

Jolo, a place where American and
other foreign made cigarettes
are, of common knowledge,
frequently smuggled from Borneo
... and the failure of petitioner to
show that the cigarettes in
question
were
locally
manufactured
rule
out
the
possibility that the cigarettes in
question were manufactured in
the Philippines. Consequently, we
are constrained to conclude that
these cigarettes were foreign
(American) made. They were
merchandise
of
prohibited
importation, the importation of
which was contrary to law, and
should be forfeited under Section
1363
(f)
of
the
Revised
Administrative Code.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The fact that petitioner is merely

a buyer of the cigarettes in the
open market of Jolo does not
render the cigarrettes immune
from the penalty of forfeiture.
This is so because forfeiture
proceedings are instituted against
the res (cigarettes) ... and, by
express provision of Section 1364
of the Revised Administrative
Code, the forfeiture shall occur
while the merchandise is in the
hands or subject to control of
some person who shall receive,
conceal, buy, sell, or transport
the same with knowledge that
the merchandise was imported
contrary to law. Petitioner cannot
but
be
charged
with
the
knowledge that the cigarettes in
question were imported contrary
to law, for if it were otherwise,
why
were
these
cigarettes
concealed
on
board
the
vessel ... ? Why did she deny
ownership over said cigarettes?
For what plausible reason was
she afraid of detention? What
impelled her to believe that she
would be detained by the
customs authorities? To uphold

the claim of petitioner and forego

the forfeiture would be giving a
chance to accessories after the
fact of smugglers of foreign
cigarettes to ply their trade with
impunity and with sanction of the
courts.
What
the
executive
department could not curb, that
is rampant smuggling of foreign
cigarettes, the courts should not
tolerate ...
3. Petitioner finally contends that the
decision of the Commissioner of Customs
libeling and forfeiting the cigarettes
involved in the present case for violation
of Section 2530 (m-1) of the Tariff and
Customs Code is unconstitutional, in
view of the fact that she was allegedly
not afforded an opportunity to defend
the cigarettes against such charge, said
section not being one of the original
grounds cited by the Collector of
Customs of Cebu in forfeiting the same.
The contention has no merit. Certainly,
the appellate power of the Commissioner
of Customs to review seizure and protest
cases is not limited to a review of the
issues raised on appeal. He may affirm,
modify or reverse the decision of the
Collector (Section 2313) on other
questions provided that his findings and
conclusions are, as in the case at bar,
supported by evidence. It is of no
consequence whatsoever what were the
original grounds of the seizure and
forfeiture if, in point of fact, the goods
are by law subject to forfeiture [Wood vs.
U.S., 16 Pet. (U.S.) 342, 10 L. ed. 987].
As there is evidence on record showing
that the cigarettes in question were
imported and introduced into the
country without passing through a
customs house, the same may be
forfeited under said Section 2530 (m-1)
of the Code, notwithstanding that it is
not one of the original charges. As we
held in Que Po Lay vs. Central Bank, et
al. (104 Phil. 853), what counts is not the
designation of the particular section of
the law that has been violated but the
description of the violation in the seizure
report.2

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from

is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioner. 1wph1.t

FELICISIMO
RIETA,
No. 147817
People

G.R.
Vs.

DECISION

Petitioners
contention
is
untenable. Persons found to be in
possession of smuggled items are
presumed to be engaged in smuggling,
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
[29]
The burden of proof is thus shifted to
them. To rebut this presumption, it is not
enough for petitioner to claim good faith
and lack of knowledge of the unlawful
source of the cigarettes. He should have
presented evidence to support his claim
and to convince the court of his noncomplicity.
In
the
case
adverted
to
earlier, Rimorin v. People, we held thus:
In his discussion
of a similarly worded
provision of Republic Act
No. 455, a criminal law
authority explained thus:
In order that a
person may be deemed guilty of
smuggling or illegal importation
under the foregoing statute three
requisites must concur: (1) that
the merchandise must have been
fraudulently
or
knowingly
imported contrary to law; (2) that
the defendant, if he is not the
importer himself, must have
received, concealed, bought, sold
or in any manner facilitated the
transportation, concealment or
sale of the merchandise; and (3)
that the defendant must be shown
to have knowledge that the
merchandise had been illegally
imported. If
the
defendant,

however, is shown to have had

possession
of
the
illegally
imported merchandise, without
satisfactory explanation, such
possession shall be deemed
sufficient
to
authorize
conviction.[30] (Emphasis
supplied)
In
the
present
case,
the
explanation given by petitioner was
found to be unacceptable and incredible
by both the RTC and the CA, which said:
Now
on
the
explanations of Police Sgt.
Rimorin of Pasay City
Police Force and Pat. Rieta
of Kawit Police Force,
riders in the loaded cargo
truck
driven
by
Boy. Their claim that
they did not have any
knowledge
about
the
cargo
of
blue
seal
cigarettes is not given
credence
by
the
court. They tried to show
lack of knowledge by
claiming that along the
way, Boy and Gonzalo
Vargas left them behind at
a certain point for snacks
and picked them up later
after the cargo had been
loaded. The Court cannot
see its way through how
two policemen, joining
Boy in the dead of the
night, explicitly to give
him and his goods some
protection, which service
would be paid, yet would
not know what they are
out
to
protect. And
neither could the Court
see reason in Boys
leaving them behind when
he was going to pick up
and load the blue seal
cigarettes. Boy knew the
risks. He wanted them for
protection, so why will he
discard them? How so
unnatural and so contrary
to reason.[31]

Being
contrary
to
human
experience, his version of the facts is too
pat and stereotyped to be accepted at
face value. Evidence, to be believed, not
only must proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must also be credible
in itself, as when it conforms to common
experience
and
observation
of
humankind.[32]
The absence of any suspicious
reaction on the part of petitioner was not
in accordance with human nature. The
involvement or participation he and his
co-accused had in the smuggling of the
goods was confirmed by their lack of
proper and reasonable justification for
the fact that they had been found inside
the cargo truck, seated in front, when it
was
intercepted
by
the
authorities. Despite his protestation, it is
obvious that petitioner was aware of the
strange nature of the transaction, and
that he was willing to do his part in
furtherance
thereof. The
evidence
presented
by
the
prosecution
established his work of guarding and
escorting the contraband to facilitate its
transportation from the Port Area to
Malabon, an act punishable under
Section 3601 of the Tax Code.
Under the Tariff and Customs Code,
a search, seizure and arrest may be made
even without a warrant for purposes of
enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without
mention of the need to priorly obtain a
judicial warrant, the Code specifically
allows police authorities to enter, pass
through or search any land, enclosure,
warehouse, store or building that is not a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, box or envelope or
any person on board; or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying
any
dutiable
or
prohibited
article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law.[38]

PILIPINAS
PETROLEUM
161953
CORPORATION,

G.R.
Petitioner

SHELL
No.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by the BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS,
Promulgated:

Respondent.

March 6, 2008
DECISION
Assessments inform taxpayers of
their tax liabilities.[36] Under the TCCP,
the assessment is in the form of a
liquidation made on the face of the
import entry return and approved by the
Collector of Customs.[37] Liquidation is
the final
computation
and
ascertainment by the Collector of
Customs of the duties due on
imported
merchandise based
on
official reports as to the quantity,
character and value thereof, and the
Collector of Customs' own finding as to
the
applicable
rate
of
duty. [38] A
liquidation is considered to have been
made when the entry is officially
stamped liquidated.[39]
Petitioner claims that it paid the
duties due on its importations. Section
1603 of the old TCCP stated:
Section 1603. Finality of
Liquidation. When articles
have been entered and
passed free of duty or
final
adjustments
of
duties
made,
with
subsequent
delivery,
such entry and passage
free of duty or settlement
of duties will, after the
expiration of one year
from the date of the final
payment of duties, in the
absence of fraud or
protest, be final and
conclusive
upon
all
parties,
unless
the
liquidation of the import
entry
was
merely
tentative.[40]

An assessment or liquidation by
the
BoC
attains
finality
and
conclusiveness one year from the date of
the final payment of duties except when:
(a) there was fraud;
(b)
there is a pending
protest or
(c)
the
liquidation
of
import
entry
was
merely tentative.
None of the foregoing exceptions
is present in this case. There was no
fraud as petitioner claimed (and was
presumed) to be in good faith.
Respondent does not dispute this.
Moreover, records show that petitioner
paid those duties without protest using
its TCCs. Finally, the liquidation was not
a tentative one as the assessment had
long become final and incontestable.
Consequently, pursuant to Yabes[41] and
because of the cancellation of the TCCs,
respondent had the right to file a
collection case.
Section
provides:

1204

of

the

Section 1204. Liability of

Importer
for
Duties.
Unless relieved by
laws
or
regulations,
the liability for duties,
taxes, fees and other
charges attaching on
importation
constitutes a personal
debt due from the
importer
to
the
government which can
be discharged only by
payment in full of all
duties, taxes, fees and
other charges legally
accruing.
It
also
constitutes a lien upon
the articles imported
which
may
be
enforced while such
articles are in the
custody or subject to
the control of the
government. (emphasis
supplied)

TCCP

Under this provision, import duties

constitute a personal debt of the
importer that must be paid in full. The
importers liability therefore constitutes
a lien on the article which the
government may choose to enforce
while the imported articles are either in
its custody or under its control.
When
respondent
released
petitioner's goods, its (respondents) lien
over
the
imported
goods
was
extinguished. Consequently, respondent
could only enforce the payment of
petitioner's import duties in full by filing
a case for collection against petitioner.[42]
Respondent filed its complaint for
collection on April 3, 2002. The
governing law at that time was
RA[43] 1125 or the old CTA Law. Section 7
thereof stated:
Section
7.
Jurisdiction. The Court of
Tax
Appeals
shall
exercise
exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to
review by appeal, as
herein provided
(1)
Decision
of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue in cases
involving
disputed
assessment, refunds of
internal revenue taxes,
fees or other charges,
penalties
imposed
in
relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the
National
Internal
Revenue Code or other
laws or part of law
administered
by
the
Bureau
of
Internal
Revenue;
(2)
Decision
s of the Commissioner
of Customs in cases
involving liability for
customs duties, fees
or
other
money
charges;
seizure,
detention or release of
property

affected; fines
and
forfeitures or other
penalties imposed in
relation thereto; or
other matters arising
under Customs Law or
other laws or part of
law administered by
the
Bureau
of
Customs; and
(3) Decisions of
the provincial or city
Boards of Assessment
Appeals
in
cases
involving the assessment
and taxation of real
property or other matters
arising
under
the
Assessment
Law,
including
rules
and
regulations
relative
thereto.[44] (emphasis
supplied)
Inasmuch as the present case did
not
involve
a
decision
of
the
Commissioner of Customs in any of the
instances enumerated in Section 7(2) of
RA 1125, the CTA had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. It was the RTC
that had jurisdiction under Section 19(6)
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended:[45]
Section
19.
Jurisdiction in Civil
Cases. Regional Trial
Courts
shall
exercise
exclusive
original
jurisdiction:
xxx

xxx

We
are
not
unmindful
of
petitioner's pending petition for review in
the CTA where it is questioning the
validity of the cancellation of the TCCs.
However, respondent cannot and should
not await the resolution of that case
before it collects petitioner's outstanding
customs duties and taxes for such delay
will unduly restrain the performance of
its functions.[46] Moreover, if the ultimate
outcome of the CTA case turns out to be
favorable to petitioner, the law affords it
the adequate remedy of seeking a
refund.

G.R. No. 180597

7, 2008

November

RAUL BASILIO D. BOAC, RAMON B.

GOLONG, CESAR F. BELTRAN, and
ROGER
A.
BASADRE, petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious. Petitioners
should be acquitted of the charge.

xxx
(6)
In
all
cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of
any
court,
tribunal,
person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial
functions,
xxx.
In view of the foregoing, the RTC
should forthwith proceed with Civil Case
No. 02-103191 and determine the extent
of petitioner's liability.

The prosecution has the burden of

proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, it is clear
that petitioners neither searched the
container vans nor effected seizure and
arrest. The testimony of Customs Broker
Amolata,
The information charged petitioners for
illegally flagging down, searching, and
seizing the three container vans on July
27, 2004. Petitioners, however, could not
also be held liable for these acts. It is a
fact that no search and seizure of the

vans was done on the night of July 27,

2004. The act of flagging down the
vehicles is not among those proscribed
by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. Mere flagging down of the
container vans is not punishable under
the said law.

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which
the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due
process clause of the Constitution
which protects the accused from
conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is
charged. The burden of proof is
on the prosecution, and unless it
discharges
that
burden
the
accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf, and he
would be entitled to an acquittal.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not, of course, mean such
degree of proof as, excluding the
possibility of error, produce
absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that

the accused is responsible for the

offense charged.21
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the
rule that the conviction of the accused
must rest, not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, not on the accused to
prove his innocence.22 In this case, the
prosecution
failed
to
show
that
petitioners
committed
the
acts
prohibited by Sec. 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code. There is no such
evidence, testimonial or otherwise, that
identifies petitioners as responsible for
the alleged illegal search. Hence,
acquittal is in order.
As regards the second issue, there is no
conflict
between
the
aforequoted
provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code and RA 6975, as amended. The
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Customs is clearly with regard to
customs duties. Should the PNP suspect
anything, it should coordinate with the
BOC and obtain the written authority
from the Collector of Customs in order to
conduct searches, seizures, or arrests.
Coordination is emphasized in the laws.
While it is an admitted fact that there
was no such coordination initiated by the
PNP-CIDG in this instance, nevertheless,
petitioners cannot be convicted under
the Tariff and Customs Code since there
is no evidence that they did actually
search the container vans.