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ARTICLE 115

US v. Bautista
6 Phil 581

FACTS: In 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos in
Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the government of the United States in the
Philippine Islands by force of arms and establishing a new government.

Francisco Bautista (1), a close friend of the chief of military forces (of the conspirators) took part
of several meetings. Tomas Puzon (2) held several conferences whereat plans are made for the
coming insurrection; he was appointed Brigadier-General of the Signal Corps of the
revolutionary forces. Aniceto de Guzman (3) accepted some bonds from one of the conspirators.

The lower court convicted the three men of conspiracy. Bautista was sentenced to 4 years
imprisonment and a P3,000 fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years imprisonment and P1,000.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of conspiracy.

HELD: Judgment for Bautista and Puzon CONFIRMED. Judgment for de Guzman
REVERSED. Yes, Bautista and Puzon are guilty of conspiracy. Bautista was fully aware of the
purposes of the meetings he participated in, and even gave an assurance to the chief of military
forces that he is making the necessary preparations. Puzon voluntarily accepted his appointment
and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance. This may be considered
as an evidence of the criminal connection of the accused with the conspiracy.

However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. He might have been helping the conspirators by
accepting bonds in the bundles, but he has not been aware of the contents nor does he was, in any
occasion, assumed any obligation with respect to those bonds.

ARTICLE 117

Lily Raquiza, et al. v. Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford, et al


G.R. No. L-44
September 13, 1945
FACTS: Petioners file for a writ of Habeas Corpus as they were held by Us military for acts of
espionage claiming that they were confined, restrained and deprived of their liberty in the
Correctional Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma
Link Infante.
Both respondents made returns of service attaching commitment emanating from the
Headquarters and Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that of the
United States Army Forces in the Far East, Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. The returns,
as well as from the arguments of counsel, was due to proclamation issued by General of the
Army MacArthur regarding the arrest of petitioner Lily Raquiza who was arrested by the
Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security
Commitment Order No. being charged as follows:
Commitment Order. The person named and described above is deemed a risk to the
security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth above. The commanding officer of any
military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this person may be confined is
authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by competent military authority.
In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against
petitioner Lily Raquiza is Espionage activity for Japanese.
As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han Kee, was arrested by the same for Active collaboration with
the enemy.With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, Active collaboration with the
Japanese. Her previous association with the enemy constituted a present security risk to the
United States Armed Forces.
Specifically, the proclamation read:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
PROCLAMATION
PROVIDING FOR MILITARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN UPON THE APPREHENSION
OF CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHO VOLUNTARILY HAVE GIVEN AID,
COMFORT AND SUSTENANCE TO THE ENEMY.
WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have
given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Governments
of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and
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WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be enemy in violation of


allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
and
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army,
as Commander-in-Chief Southwest Pacific Area, hereby do publish and declare it to be my
purpose to remove such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic
influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter I
shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases.
Done at General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, in the field, this twenty-ninth day
of December, 1944.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army
United States Army
Commander-in-Chief
ISSUE: Whether or not holding of the petitioners by reason of US Army, and its Intelligence
Department investigation that petitioners are involved in espionage during occupation is valid
notwithstanding that some of the petitioners are Filipino Citizens.
HELD: SC Held , there is no question that the power of the power of the Commander in Chief
of the United States Army to issue the foregoing proclamation cannot be seriously questioned
effects. Reason of the restraint of petitioners were upon two grave reasons, to wit, (1) that
evidence was before him that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have given aid,
comfort and sustenance to the enemy in violation of allegiance due the Government of the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and (2) that military necessity
requires that such persons be removed from any opportunity to threaten the security of our
military forces or the success of our military operations. The exigencies of the military
operations for the destruction or defeat the enemy did not permit of any other procedure. To deny
such power or competency to determine the strength and sufficiency of such evidence would
have been destructive of that military efficiency with which, in the interest of all the citizens of
the Philippines themselves, not excluding the herein petitioners, the operations for their
liberation had to be conducted. Has the war terminated within the meaning of that part of his
proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief declared his purpose to hold such persons in
restraint for the duration of the war? The Sc decided, it did not as there was no Presidential
proclamation to that effect. The Court said in United States vs. Tubig (3 Phil., 244, 254), this
Court said:
From that day the fighting continued, and the insurrection did not end officially until the
President proclaimed it an end, July 4, 1902. It is necessary to refer to a public act of the
Executive Department to fix the date of the closing of the war. (Freeborn vs. The Protector, 79
U.S., 700.)
The SC dismissed the petition.

ARTICLE 123

People v. Lol-Lo And Saraw


43 Phil. 19

FACTS: On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in
the midst of the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were
manned by 24 armed Moros. The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At
first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on the Dutch boats, they asked for themselves
all the vessels cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of the women by
methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the two
young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would
submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders
were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able
to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were
arrested there and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in
this case.
HELD: Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a villainy not against
any particular state but against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.

ARTICLE 125
Sayo v. Chief Of Police Of Manila
G.R. No. L-2128, May 12, 1948
FACTS: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging Melencio Sayo (D) and Joaquin
Mostero (D) with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the
City of Manila, arrested the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them
with the fiscal's office of Manila. When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, the Sayo (D)
and Mostero (D) were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or
filed charges against them with the proper courts justice.
ISSUE: Is the warrantless arrest valid?
HELD: No. Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant
of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of
the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What
he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal or directly
with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. A fortiori a
police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon
complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes
convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.

ARTICLE 127
Villavicencio, et. al v. Lukban, et. al
G.R. No. L-14639
March 25, 1919
FACTS: Mayor Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated
district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
Manila, closed. The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for
sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of
the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the person be actually confined for writ of Habeas Corpus to issue.
HELD: No, there is no need for actual confinement. Any restraint which precludes freedom of
action is sufficient. The forcible taking of women of ill-repute from Manila to be brought to
Davao, deprived them of their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they were
imprisoned.

ARTICLE 129
Burgos, Sr. v. Chief Of Staff
G.R. L-64261
December 26, 1984
FACTS: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, law
enforcement officers searched the offices of the We forum and Metropolitan Mail
newspapers. During the course of the search, the law enforcement officers seized office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and several other materials used in the distribution
of newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the seizure of the properties mentioned above
amounts to seizure of real properties, which cannot be validly conducted under the strength of a
search warrant. It must be noted that real properties are not susceptible of confiscation under a
search warrant. Hence this appeal which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the
properties of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether there is merit in the petitioners assertion that real property were invalidly
seized under the disputed warrants.
HELD: No. The petitioners assertion does not hold water. Under Article 415(5) of the civil
code, machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works are considered immovable
property. In another case decided by the Court, in which the abovementioned legal provision was
invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.

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ARTICLE 131
Navarro v. Villegas
31 SCRA 371
FACTS: The City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for an
assembly. The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grant
permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when
they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community
and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of
demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.
The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to one at the Sunken
Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches
of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and
petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders .
ISSUE: Whether or not the mayors decision is tenable.
HELD: YES. Every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a
state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts
boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the
public.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant petitioners
application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court denied the writ prayed for by Navarro
and dismissed their petition.

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Article 133
People of the Philippines v. Wilfredo Baez y Cabael, alias Willy
G.R. No. 125849. January 20, 1999
FACTS : Wilfredo Baez, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna,
charged the accused with an offense against religion for causing the funeral of a member of the
Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church,
belonging to said church and devoted to the religious worship thereof. The parish priest opposed
this, but through force and threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow
the funeral to pass through the said churchyard.
ISSUE: Whether or not he act complained of is notoriously effensive to the religious feelings of
the Catholics, therby violation Article 133 of hthe RPC.
HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in Article
133 of the Revised Penal Code,and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts
and a trial be thereafter held at which said facts should be conclusively established, the court
may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass
under Article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a
question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic snd not
those of other faithful ones. Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to
depend upon the more or less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but
should be gauged having in view the nature of the acts committed amd after scrutiny of all the
facts and circumstance which should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial
criterion. Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the subjective
characterization of the act from the point of view would be parial and arbitrary, withal,
dangerous, especially in a country said to be once the scene of religious intolerance and
persecution.

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ARTICLE 135- Penalty for the crime of Art 134


Lt. (Sg) Eugene Gonzales, Lt. (Sg) Andy Torrato, Lt. (Sg) Antonio Trillanes Iv, Cpt. Gary
Alejano, Lt. (Sg) James Layug, Cpt. Gerardo Gambala, Cpt. Nicanor Faeldon, Lt. (Sg)
Manuel Cabochan, Ens. Armand Pontejos, Lt. (Jg) Arturo Pascua, And 1lt. Jonnel
Sanggalang
Vs.
Gen. Narciso Abaya, In His Capacity As Chief Of Staff Of The Armed Forces Of The
Philippines, And B. Gen. Mariano M. Sarmiento, Jr., In His Capacity As The Judge
Advocate General Of The Judge Advocate Generals Office (Jago)
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006

FACTS: This is about the Oakwood Mutiny (July 26, 2003) where members of the AFP aimed to
destabilize the government with use of high-powered weapons and explosive devices. Navy Lt.
Trillanes IV & the troops sported red armbands with the emblem Magdalo. They broadcasted
their grievances against GMA, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of
arms & ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to
acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared withdrawal of support
from the GMA & demanded her resignation. After several hours of negotiation, they eventually
surrendered. DOJ charged them with coup detat (defined under Art. 134-A of the RPC) in RTC.
Respondent Gen. Narciso Abaya, then Chief of Staff, filed with the military tribunal for
violations of the Articles of War (Art. 63: disrespect toward the Pres., Art. 64: disrespect toward
a superior officer, Art. 67: mutiny/sedition, Art. 96: for conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman and Art. 97: conduct prejudicial to good order & military discipline). Following the
doctrine of absorption, Gen. Abaya recommended that those charged with coup detat with RTC
should not be charged before the military tribunal for violations of Articles of War. The RTC
decided that all charges before the court martial against the accusedare hereby declared not
service-connected, but rather absorbed & in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup. However,
Judge Advocate Generals Office of the AFP (JAGO)s Colonel recommended that 29 of the
officers (out of 321 coz DOJ dropped the case against the others) be prosecuted before a general
court martial for violation of Art. 96. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed accused to
answer the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with the SC a Petition for Prohibition
praying that the respondents (JAGO) be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Art. 96. Gonzales et al maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of
February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup
detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
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ISSUE: Whether the petitioners (rebels) are entitled to the writ of prohibition.
HELD: NO. There is no dispute that Gonzales et al, being officers of the AFP, are subject to
military law according to Commonwealth Act 408 (AKA Articles of War). Section 1 of R.A.
7055 provides that as a general rule, members of the AFP and other persons subject to military
law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other special penal laws,
or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. It also provides the exception to the
general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be
service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law
states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of
justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
court. The same provision also identifies "serviceconnected crimes or offenses" as "limited to
those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War.
Violations of these Articles are within the jurisdiction of the court martial. SC held that the
offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly
provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. The charge against Gonzales et al
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the
duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the
military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior
as military officers. Equally indicative of the "serviceconnected" nature of the offense is the
penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military
court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military
profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military discipline. There is no
merit in Gonzales et als argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial
because the same has been declared by the RTC as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed
and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The
RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court
martial the jurisdiction over "serviceconnected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred
the court should not take away. Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. The trial court
aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of
coup detat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and
generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are
involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses.
Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over serviceconnected offenses,
including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not
applicable to this case. Military law is sui generis, applicable only to military personnel because
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the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that
of civilians. Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to
prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that
are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no
appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Stated
differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons
from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.
In fine, SC holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in
charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

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Article 139
The People of the Philippine Islands v. Graciano L. Cabrera, et al.
GR No. 17748, 4 March 1922
FACTS: On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a
member of the household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this
city. The arrest of the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers as an outrage
committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of Manila
police department and member of the Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policeman named Artemio Mojica, posted on
Calle Real, in the District of Intramuros , ciy of Manila, had an encounter with various
Constabulary soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary.
Private Macasinag was seriously, and as afterwards appeard, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policemen Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and other
companions of the Manila force and private Macasinag and other companions of the
Constabulary, with its grave consequences for a Constabulary soldier endangered a deep feeling
of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon
converted into a desire for revenge against the police force of the city of Manila. The officers of
the Constabulary appear to have been aware of the state of excitement among the soldiers the
shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding officer of the Barracks, increased
the number of guards, and confined all he soldiers in theBarracks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused of sedition
HELD: Sedition, in its more genereal sense, is the reaising of commotions or disturbances in the
State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292) makes all persons guilty of sedition who
rise publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of
vie objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular Government or of Provincial or Minucipal Government. The
rial court found that the crime of sedition, as defined and punished by the law, had been
committed, and we believe that such finding is correct. Counselss contention that in order for
there to be a violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292, it is necessary that the
offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functionary, and that what
really happened in this instance was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine
Government, is absolutely without foundation. Subdivision 3 of section 5 of the Treason and
Sedition Law makes no distinction between the persons to which it applies. In an unequal fight
brought on by the actions of the accused
Article 143
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People v. Alipi et al
Gr NO. L-18853, 22 August 1922
FACTS: The election of the municipal president was contested on the ground of minority. He
yielded the chair to the vice-president. The meeting of the municipal council presided over by the
vice-president was stopped by the chief of police and the municipal president by arresting the
vice-president and threatening the councillors with arrest if they would continue holding the
meeting. The councillors then dispersed, leaving the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not the chief of police and municipal president himself are liable under
Article 143 for preventing the meeting of the municipal council.
HELD: Any stranger,, even if he be the municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal
police, must respect the meeting council presided over by the vice-president and he has no right
to dissolve it through violence under the pretext of lack of notice to some members of the
council, which was not apparent, but required an investigation before it could be determined.

Article 145
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Sergio Osmena Jr. v. Salipade Pendatun


GR No. L-17144, 28 October 1960
FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr. Delivered a speech entitled A Message
to Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged the President Carlos Garcia and his administration.
Subsequently, House Resolution No. 69 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the
charges made by Osmena during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be baseless
and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmena then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmena
avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress.
Congressman Salipada filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmenas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 5, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamenta privilege cherished in every parliament
in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a
member therein. Therefore, Osmenas petition is dismissed.

Article 147
Serafin G. Cruz v. Gen Romeo Gatan
GR No. L-44910, 29 November 1976
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FACTS: Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on August 30, 1976, at the Baguio
Checkpoint along Kennon Road, Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, under the command of respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan for custodial interrogation
where he is presently detained. On October 22, 1976, a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus was filed in restrain of his liberty without due process of law and is in the custody
of the respondent not by virtue of a judgment or court order; that he is not a member of any
subversive organization covered by Proclamation No. 1081 and falls within the class ofpersons
to whom the privilege of the writ of habes corpus has not been suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not arrest or detention made was legal
HELD: Petition is dismissed. The petitioner in the instant case was arrested and detained by
virtue of Arrest, Search, and Seizue issued by the Secretary of National Defense for violation of
Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to the aforequoted General Order No. 2-A, as
amended; hence, his arrest and continued detention is legal. The declaration of martial law and
the consequent suspension of the privilege of the writ of habes corpus with respect to person
reasonably believed or charged to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it have been settled
in the case ofAquino, Jr. Vs Ponce Enrile et.c., et al., any inquiry by this Court into the continued
detention of the petitioner would be purposeless.

ARTICLE 157- Evasion of service of sentence

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Benjamin Pangan Y Rivera v. Hon. Lourdes F. Gatbalite, As The Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court Of Angeles City, Branch 56, And Col. James D. Labordo, As The City Jail
Warden Of Angeles City
G.R. No. 141718. January 21, 2005

FACTS: On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was
sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner
never got to serve his sentence and hid for about nine years.
Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat
Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC
of Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga).
Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight
penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article
93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b) having been able to continuously evade service of
sentence for almost nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under No.
6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the service of
the sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed
HELD: NO.
The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the
RPC discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein that,
"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion
service of sentence, its elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final
judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms
of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment."
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That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence of
Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other
convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another
expression of the term "jail breaking."
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles
93 and 157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even before
the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he
failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed.
He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

ARTICLE 159
People Of The Philippines v. Remigio Pontillas

21

FACTS: That on or about the 24th day of December, 1935, in the City of Manila,
Commonwealth of the Philippines, the said accused, having been granted on September 8, 1922,
by His Excellency, the Governor-General, a pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of this
sentence of six years one day of prision correccional imposed upon him in criminal case No.
21823 of the Court of First instance of Manila for the crime of illegal marriage, which he began
to serve on February 14, 1921, subject to the condition that he shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippine Islands, which condition was accepted by him on September 8,
1922, causing thereby his immediate release on that date from the Bilibid Prisons, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate the conditions of such pardon, by then and
there committing the crime of damage to property thru reckless driving, for which he was
received again in Bilibid Prisons on June 26, 1936, to suffer thirty days' subsidiary imprisonment
in lieu of P61 fine and P60.30 indemnity imposed upon him by the Municipal Court in criminal
case No. H-47583, by virtue of the judgment rendered by the said court, which judgment has
become final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person - who has been conditionally pardoned by the Chief Executive
for illegal marriage or bigamy after he has served nineteen months of the penalty of six years and
one day of prision correccional imposed upon him - be criminally prosecuted for violation of a
conditional pardon on the sole ground that, contrary to the condition that "he shall not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands" he has committed the crime of damage to
another's property through reckless imprudence?
HELD: In this jurisdiction a conditional pardon is certainly a contract between two parties: the
Chief Executive, who grants the pardon, and the convict, who accepts it. It does not become
perfected until the convict is notified of the same and accepts it with all its conditions.
Accordingly, if it is a contract, it cannot be doubted that the pardoned convict is bound to fulfill
its conditions and accept all its consequences, not as he chooses, but according to its strict terms.
Otherwise, he would find himself in the same situation as before he was pardoned and he could
be compelled to serve the remainder of his sentenced, which he has not yet served. In the
appealed resolution it is stated that the crime of damage to property committed by the appellee is
not one which shows moral perversity on his party, meaning thereby that, strictly speaking, he
did not infringe any condition of his pardon. The above reason has no weight at all because the
condition of the pardon did not consist in that he would not commit any crime, more or less
grave, which might denote perversity, but in any violation of any penal law of the Philippines.
The crime of damage to property of another, through reckless imprudence, is a crime expressly
punished and considered as such by article 356 in relation to article 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since the question and the facts before us are different, it is not necessary for us to decide
whether an action may be brought for the purpose of enforcing the service of a part of a sentence,
which was not extinguished on account of conditional pardon, after the usual period of
prescription of the penalty.

22

ARTICLE 161
Maximino Gamido v. Court Of Appeals

23

FACTS: Maximino B. Gamido was convicted by the Regional Trial Court on eleven counts of
having forged the signature of the Chief Executive. Specifically, petitioner was accused in 11
cases of forging the signature of the President of the Philippines in documents and making it
appear that the documents were genuine official documents of the Republic of the Philippines.
On September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty. Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer,
petitioner appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming that President Ferdinand E.
Marcos had signed them in his (petitioner's) presence. The lone witness for the prosecution,
Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential Staff Director of the Malacaang Records Office (MRO),
testified that there were no copies of the documents on file in his office and that the signatures
thereon did not appear to be those of the former President. The RTC held Gamido guilty, to
which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming Gamidos conviction.
HELD: The petition has no merit. Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacaang
Records Office, testified that his office did not have a record of the documents. For his part
Executive Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring
Services as nonexistent and its alleged Executive Director, herein petitioner, as not in any
capacity connected with the Office of the President. From these premises it is rational to
conclude that the documents in question, which purport to have been signed by then President
Marcos, are bogus documents. The trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found petitioner to
be the author of the forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and user of a falsified
document is the forger thereof. What dela Cruz said that is that he was familiar with the signature
of President Marcos and that the signatures on the documents in question were not those of
President Marcos. This is sufficient to establish the signatures as forgeries. Under Rule 132, 22
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is not required that the person identifying the handwriting
of another must have seen the latter write the document or sign it. It is enough, if the witness
"has seen writing purporting to be his [the subject's] upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person." De la Cruz has
been record custodian at Malacaang for so many years; it is inconceivable he had not acquired
familiarity with the signature not only of President Marcos but of other Presidents under whom
he had served. There was thus no necessity for a handwriting expert testify on the genuineness of
the challenged signatures. As this Court has once observed, the authenticity of signatures "is not
a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or
topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion
of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less
compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical issue. The
signatures on a questioned document can be sighted by a judge who can and should exercise
independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of such signatures." Here, as the trial court
observed, "the forgeries were not only established by the evidence, but they are also as clearly

24

discernible to the naked eye or mere ocular inspection, as they are conspicuously evident from
their appearance.

ARTICLE 163
United States v. Agustin Basco
25

FACTS: The defendant attempted to pay for a package of cigarettes which he bought at a certain
store with what appeared to be silver coin, but which, as a matter of fact, was a Philippine copper
cent; that he insisted that the owner of the store should accept the same as a peseta, that is to say,
a twenty cent piece; that the latter refused to accept it upon noticing what the real value and
denomination of the coin was; that the defendant again insisted that the money be accepted and
the owner of the store refused to do so; that as a result of such refusal a quarrel ensued between
them; that a policeman then interfered, and upon being informed of what had happened, placed
the defendant under arrest and took him to the police station, where several Mexican and
Japanese coins were found in his possession together with a roll of Philippine copper cents, the
latter being silver plated, and identical with the coin which he had attempted to pass at the store
as a twenty-cent piece; and that upon an examination of these plated coins it was found that they
were genuine Philippine copper cents, which apparently and been whitened with quicksilver to
give them the color and brightness of silver. The defendant having been asked as to where he had
obtained the said coins, first answered that he had received them as change, but later admitted
that he had silvered them himself.
ISSUE: Whether or not Basco should be charged of counterfeiting of money or estafa.
HELD: There can be no counterfeiting of money when, as in this case, no spurious or clipped
coin was used. The coins in question were genuine copper cents and bore their original designs
and inscriptions. The defendant did not make or attempt to make any alteration in the designs and
inscriptions of the said coins. All that he did was to give them the appearance of silver pieces for
the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent coins. He did not, however, attempt to imitate the
peculiar design of such coins. The acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of defrauding
third persons by deceiving them us to the real value of the coins in question constitute the crime
of estafa and not of counterfeiting money. There were not legal grounds upon which a charge for
these latter offense could be based.

ARTICLE 169
United States v. Mariano Solito
26

FACTS: That the defendant Mariano Solito was, at the time mentioned in the complaint,
correspondence clerk and acting chief clerk in the office of the division superintendent of schools
in the municipality of Dumaguete; that, as such clerk, he was intrusted with the care of the
correspondence of said office, and was authorized to open letters of an official character
addressed to the office; that it was the custom to the Director of Education to forward to the
division superintendents of schools checks for the reimbursement for travel expenses and for the
payment of the salary of employees; that on the 19th day of April, 1915, said Treasury Warrant
No. 428426 was issued to the said Alvah D. Riley for the sum of P657.53 by the Auditor of the
Philippine Islands directed to the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands for payment; that on the
same day (April 19th, 1915) said warrant was sent to the Director of Education; that said warrant
was sent to Alvah D. Riley, through the division superintendent of schools, by the Acting
Director of Education on April 29, 1915; that the defendant herein presented said warrant to the
municipal treasurer for payment, bearing the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley, early in the month
of May, 1915, and received the amount of money called for (P687.53) from said municipal
treasurer; that Alvah D. Riley never had in his possession said warrant, nor had he ever seen the
same, until after the defendant had presented it for payment to the said municipal treasurer; that
he did not indorse the same by writing his name on the back thereof; that his signature which
appears upon the back of said warrant was not his signature; that he did not write his name
thereon; that the said division superintendent of schools did not receive said warrant and had
never seen it until after the defendant herein had received the money thereon; that there is no
proof in the record showing that any person or persons had in his possession said warrant after it
left the hands of the Acting Director of Education until it was presented by the defendant to the
said treasurer indorsed as above indicated; that, at the time the defendant presented said warrant
to the municipal treasurer for payment, he also presented a note purported to have been written
and signed by Riley, in which the latter requested the said treasurer to cash the warrant. Riley
denies absolutely that he gave to the defendant said note.
ISSUE: Whether or not Solito committed forgery.
HELD: Said warrant was a check issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands and,
therefore, an obligation of the Government of the Philippine Islands as defined by section 1 of
Act No. 1754. It was originally made payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to his order. When it was
indorsed as above indicated, it became a check or warrant payable to bearer. The indorsement
made a material alteration in said warrant. The indorsement changed said check from one
payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to one to whom he ordered it paid, to one payable to bearer. The
indorsement by the defendant had the effect of erasing the phrase "or order" upon the face of the
warrant. Whenever the holder of a check, without the consent of the maker, changes its terms so
as to make it payable to bearer by erasing or changing the words "or order" after the payee's
name, he thereby makes a material change in said document. Changing the phrase "or order" to
"bearer" is a material alteration. While the instrument was payable to Alvah D. Riley, or order, it
was negotiable by the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley only. The change made it payable to
27

"bearer" and it was thereafter negotiable and transferable by delivery simply. In construing the
effect of the indorsement we must only look to said indorsement, but to the face of the document
also, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the indorsement operated to alter the terms or
conditions of the original contract. The defendant having passed and uttered an altered obligation
of the Government of the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud is guilty.

28

ARTICLE 173
United States v. Joaquin Romero
FACTS: On April 24, 1908, Joaquin Romero, as postmaster in charge of the post-office and
telegraph station in the pueblo of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac, received from one named Eugenio
two telegrams for their transmission one to Olongapo, addressed to Mariano de la Cruz, and
the other to Los Banos, addressed to Severino Maguigao. The telegram sent to Cruz in Olongapo
was drawn up in the following terms: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Sr. Mariano de la Cruz.
Olongapo. Aver is hay dinero necesita porque estoy enfermo manda si puede, Eugenio." (See
whether there is money. I need it because I am sick. Send if you can. Eugenio.) This telegram
consists of twenty-one words and was transmitted by the telegraph operator Romero in the
following form: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Mariano de la Cruz. Olongapo, Mandame
dinero pronto, estoy enfermo Eugenio." (Send me money soon, am sick. Eugenio.) The original
telegram was thus reduced to nine words, and twelve words were omitted. The telegraph operator
Romero received for the transmission of the said telegram P1.26, the price charged for the
twenty-one words which it contained, and by the reduction gained P0.72, corresponding to the
twelve words omitted. The second telegram was originally worded as follows: "Paniqui, April,
24-08. Sr. Severino Maguiago. Los Banos. Haga el favor de remitir lo que me debe
estoy muy enfermo y necesita el dinero. Eugenio." (Please remit what you owe me. I am very
sick and need to money. Eugenio). The operator omitted eight words from this telegram, which
was reduced to the following: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. Severino Maguigao. Los Banos.
Remitame dinero, necesito estoy enfermo. Eugenio." (Remit me money. Need. Am sick.
Eugenio.) By the reduction of words made, the telegraph operator Joaquin Romero gained the
price corresponding to the difference of eight words, to wit, P0.48. The case having come to trial,
the judge, in view of the evidence adduced thereat, sentenced the accused, on January 13, 1909,
to the penalty of three years and seven months prision correccional, crediting him with one-half
of the time he was held as a detention prisoner, to the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
the payment of the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification of telegrams.
HELD: It is a fact, admitted by the defendant, that he changed the wording of the telegrams
which he received, by omitting several words in each of them; and the record of the cause shows
no proof of his allegation that he made an error in recounting the amount received for each one
of the telegrams, owing to the number of words they contained, and that he was therefore obliged
to diminish the number of words of each of them. Such allegation is negatived by the proven
facts that he affixed stamps only to the value of P.054 to one of the telegrams, and of P0.60 to the
other, and as he received P2.34 for the dispatch of the two messages, it is evident that the surplus
money must have remained in his possession, since, on striking a balance, instead of a surplus it
was found that there was a shortage of P3 in the postal funds, as the defendant himself confesses
29

in his official letter of April 25, 1908 (p. 39 of trial record). From all of which it is concluded, as
aforesaid, that the defendant obtained profit from the remainder of the sum received by him,
equivalent to the price of the words omitted by him from the two telegrams before mentioned.
The defendant, therefore, with manifest violation of a prohibitive law perpetrated the unlawful
act in question and has thereby incurred the penalty which he merits for his criminal acts. In view
of the fact that no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance enters into the commission of the
crime, the punishment should be imposed upon him in the medium degree of the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees.

30

Article 177
Jose C. Miranda v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 154098, July 27, 2005
FACTS: The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City,
isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 35 July 1997 to 2 January 1998 for
alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro contended
that Mayor Miranda asserted thet he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good
faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum from
DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately
complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Mirandas counter-affidavit also stated that he left the
mayorality post after coercion by the Philippine National Police.
ISSUE: Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner
HELD: The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed office
under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension. Pertitioners pretense
cannot stand scrutiny.Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too
flimsy to merit even a side-glanse. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer.
If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have assailed
the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.
Unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that the
term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some
physical or material harm, would unjustly nnoy or orritate an innocent person.
The paramount question in a prosecution for unjust vexation is whether the offenders act causes
annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person of whom it is
directed. That the victim, after the incident cried while ralting to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved betond
cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed, by the acts of the Baleros.

31

ARTICLE 179
People Of The Philippines v. Romero
FACTS: In November 1955, information reached the Mother Superior of the religious order of
Daughters of St. Paul, that a woman was roaming around alone asking for alms for orphans in
the name of the said organization. The woman was wearing the organizations habit. The
Daughters of St. Paul had no orphans, asking for alms was not its mission. Among those
approached by said woman was Leandra Sajagon, mother of two sisters in the convent of the
Daughters of St. Paul. Leandra gave her P 1.00 to which no receipt was issued.
HELD: To bring a culprit within the coverage of Article 179 of the Revised Penal Code on the
illegal use of uniforms and insignia, an exact imitation of a uniform is unnecessary. A colorable
resemblance calculated to deceive the common run of people not those thoroughly familiar
with every detail or accessory thereof is sufficient.

32

ARTICLE 181
People v. Reyes [48 O.G. 1837]
FACTS: The accused was the star witness in a prosecution for robbery against Jemenia. Before
the trial, the accused executed an affidavit in which he manifested that he was not interested in
the prosecution of the case and that he wanted to give the accused a chance to earn his living
wisely in the honest way. The fiscal refused to ask for the dismissal of the case. When the case
was called for trial, the accused, who was asked to identify Jemenia, testified that he could not
remember anymore the face of Jemenia. After further questions failed to elicit other data, the
case against Jemenia was dismissed by the court, resulting in his acquittal.
ISSUE: Is it necessary that the false testimony directly influence the decision of acquittal to be
liable under Article 181 of the RPC?
HOLDING: The contention of the defense that the acquittal of Jemenia was due to failure of the
fiscal to call other witnesses who could have properly identified Jemenia, is irrelevant. It is not
necessary that the testimony given by the witness should directly influence the decision of
acquittal, it being sufficient that it was given with the intent to favor the accused.

33

ARTICLE 183
Villanueva v. Secretary Of Justice GR No. 162187, November 18, 2005
FACTS: An agreement was entered into between Refactories Corporation of the Philippines
(RCP) as represented by Villanueva and Borgonia and Humburg Trading Corporation (HTC) as
represented by the Horst-Kessler Von Springesner. The agreement was a result of the amicable
settlement of the same parties. However, the conflict arose when a phrase was inserted by RCP in
the said agreement to the prejudice of HTC because of their lack of knowledge and consent.
HTC filed an Urgent Motion to vacate the agreement because of the false testimony particularly
by accusing Villanueva to be the one who prepared and inserted the said phrase. Upon
determination of probable cause, the perjury case was filed against HTC in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila. On appeal, Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor for failure to establish the materiality of false assertions and the said assertion were
willful and deliberate. RCP filed a petition for certiorari in the CA but the same court affirmed
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Humburg Trading Corporation committed perjury.
HELD: The Court held that perjury is an obstruction of Justice. Its perpetration may affect the
earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false
statement is made.
In perjury, a mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood is root enough. The
assertion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is avoiding the
belief or conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. A false statement
which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not perjury.
In the said case, the testimony of HTC in its urgent motion to vacate honestly believed
that it was Villanueva who prepared and inserted the said phrase in the agreement.
Thus, the assertion was an honest mistake.

34

ARTICLE 185
Alfredo M. Ouano, petitioner, v. Court Of Appeals, And Heirs Of Julieta M.
Ouano, respondents. G.R. No. 129279. March 4, 2003
FACTS: On June 8, 1977, respondent Julieta M. Ouano (Julieta), now deceased, obtained a loan
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P104,280.00. As security for said
loan, she executed a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue
City.She defaulted on her obligation. On September 29, 1980, PNB filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure with the City Sheriff of Mandaue City.
On November 4, 1980, the sheriff prepared a notice of sale setting the date of public auction of
the two parcels of land on December 5, 1980 at 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. He caused the notice to be
published in the Cebu Daily Times, a newspaper of general circulation in Mandaue City, in its
issues of November 13, 20 and 27, 1980.He likewise posted copies thereof in public places in
Mandaue City and in the place where the properties are located.
However, the sale as scheduled and published did not take place as the parties, on four separate
dates, executed Agreements to Postpone Sale (Agreements).These Agreements were addressed to
the sheriff, requesting the latter to defer the auction sale to another date at the same time and
place, without any further republication of the Notice.
ISSUE: Whether the postponed auction sale of subject properties held on May 29, 1981 upon
written agreement of the parties was null and void for lack of publication of notice of sale on the
said date although the requirements of publication of notice of sale on the originally intended
date [were] fully complied with.
HELD: Petition DENIED. It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication
of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight
deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable. In a number
of cases, we have consistently held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in
compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the
sale.Consequently, such defect renders the sale absolutely void and no title passes.Petitioner and
respondents have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of Act
No. 3135. Publication, therefore, is required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably wide
publicity such that those interested might attend the public sale. To allow the parties to waive this
jurisdictional requirement would result in converting into a private sale what ought to be a public
auction.

35

ARTICLE 189
Savage v. Judge Taypin GR No 134217, May 11, 2000
FACTS: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, President and
General Manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO) Supervising Agent Jose
Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation filed an application for search warrant
with the RTC of Cebu City. The application sought the authorization to search the premise of
wrought iron furniture found therein which were allegedly the object of unfair competition
involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the RPC as amended. The assailed search
warrant was issued by respondent Judge on October 16, 1997and executed in the afternoon of the
following day by NBI agents. Seized from the factory were several pieces of furniture , indicated
in the inventory sheet attached to the return of Search Warrant, and all items seized have
remained in NBI custody up to the present. On October 30, 1997 petitioners moved to quash the
search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime they were accused of did not exist; (b) the issuance of
the warrant was not based on probable cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the witnesses searching
questions; and (d) the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized.
HELD: The issue involving the existence of unfair competition as a felony involving design
patents, referred to in Art. 189 of the RPC, has been rendered moot and academic by the repeal
of the article. The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the
IPR Code. The assailed acts specifically alleged were the manufacture and fabrication of
wrought iron furniture similar to that patented by MENDCO, without securing and license or
patent for the same, for the purpose of deceiving or defrauding MENDCO and the buying public.
There was no mention of any crime of unfair competition involving design patents in
the controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists
at all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the RPC. In
the face of this ambiguity, the courts must strictly construe the statute against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.

36

ART 191 & ART 193


People v. Kamad G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010
FACTS: On October 16, 2002 the Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Southern Police District, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig received information from an asset that a certain
Zaida was selling shabu at Purok IV, Silverio Compound, Paranaque City. At 10 PM of
October 16,2002, SPO2 Sanchez, poseur-buyer, gave marked PHP 300 bills to accused-appellant
for thepurchase of shabu. Upon receipt of the item, Zaida Kamad and her boyfriend, Leo, were
arrested.The RTC Branch 259 of Paranaque City found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for violation of Section 5, Article II, of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of
methamphetamineHCL. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Is accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165for the illegal sale of 0.20 gram of shabu?
RULING: No, the Court ruled that in the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, thethe
followingelements must must be established: (1) proof that the transaction took place, (2) corpus
delicti presented as evidence. Records showed that the prosecution through SPO2
Sanchez,established the sale of the prohibited drug shabu by accused-appellant but the RTC and
the CA failed to notice the defects in the prosecutions case such as (1) lapse in implementing
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 in the handling of the seized shabu and (2) failure of police to
complywith the chain of custody rule.For violations of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, no
inventory and photographing of seized drugswas done at the place of arrest as well as the
presence of the accused as it was being done nor arepresentative of the media, the DOJ, and any
elected pubic official who will confirm thatevidence seized were as they were found. Neither was
it established by the prosecution why suchthing were not followed by presenting (1) justifiable
cause and (2) preserving the integrity andevidentiary value of seized evidence as required by the
IRR of RA 9165 Section 21-A.For non-compliance of the chain of custody rule, which requires
the documentation anddescription of evidence as it is being processed along the system was
neither complied.Court reverses and sets aside the decision of the CA affirming the final
judgment of RTC Branch259 of Paranaque City for the illegal sale of shabu of accused-appellant.
Zaida Kamad is herebyacquitted and ordered released from detention.

37

PEOPLE v. DIOLO BARITA G.R. No. 123541. February 8, 2000


FACTS: Diolo Barita (BARITA), Denver Golsing (GOLSING) and Dionisio Cuison (CUISON)
were charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, the accused was
charged with selling and delivering more or less 2,800 grams of dried marijuana. In support of
his appeal, BARITA denies any participation in the alleged sale of marijuana. He claims that no
buy-bust operation was conducted and that the accusation against him was all part of a frame-up.
To prove this, BARITA alleges that the prosecution evidence is replete with numerous flaws and
glaring inconsistencies.
ISSUE: Whether or not is guilty under Sec. 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425.
HELD: Accused-appellants defense of frame-up does not convince us of their innocence.
Such defense has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted but difficult to prove and is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Any person who sells or acts
as a broker in the sale of marijuana shall be punished with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos if 750 grams or more of
marijuana is sold.

38

ARTICLE 195-199
Yun Kwan Byung v. Philippine Amusement And Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 163553
FACTS: PAGCOR is a government-owned and controlled corporation tasked to establish and
operate gambling clubs and casinos as a means to promote tourism and generate sources of
revenue for the government. To achieve these objectives, PAGCOR is vested with the power to
enter into contracts of every kind and for any lawful purpose that pertains to its business.
Pursuant to this authority, PAGCOR launched its Foreign Highroller Marketing Program
(Program). The Program aims to invite patrons from foreign countries to play at the dollar pit of
designated PAGCOR-operated casinos under specified terms and conditions and in accordance
with industry practice.
The Korean-based ABS Corporation was one of the international groups that availed of the
Program. In a letter-agreement dated 25 April 1996 (Junket Agreement), ABS Corporation
agreed to bring in foreign players to play at the five designated gaming tables of the Casino
Filipino Silahis at the Grand Boulevard Hotel in Manila (Casino Filipino).
Petitioner, a Korean national, alleges that from November 1996 to March 1997, he came to the
Philippines four times to play for high stakes at the Casino Filipino.Petitioner claims that in the
course of the games, he was able to accumulate gambling chips worth US$2.1 million. Petitioner
presented as evidence during the trial gambling chips with a face value of US$1.1
million. Petitioner contends that when he presented the gambling chips for encashment with
PAGCORs employees or agents, PAGCOR refused to redeem them.
ISSUE: Whether PAGCOR can validly share its franchise with junket operators to operate
gambling casinos in the country.
HELD: PETITION DENIED. Gambling is prohibited by the laws of the Philippines as
specifically provided in Articles 195 to 199 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Gambling is
an act beyond the pale of good morals, and is thus prohibited and punished to repress an evil that
undermines the social, moral, and economic growth of the nation. Presidential Decree No. 1602
(PD 1602), which modified Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code and repealed
inconsistent provisions, prescribed stiffer penalties on illegal gambling.
As a rule, all forms of gambling are illegal. The only form of gambling allowed by law is that
stipulated under Presidential Decree No. 1869, which gave PAGCOR its franchise to maintain
and operate gambling casinos.
The issue then turns on whether PAGCOR can validly share its franchise with junket operators to
operate gambling casinos in the country. Section 3(h) of PAGCORs charter states:
Section 3. Corporate Powers. - The Corporation shall have the following powers and functions,
among others:
39

h) to enter into, make, perform, and carry out contracts of every kind and for any lawful purpose
pertaining to the business of the Corporation, or in any manner incident thereto, as principal,
agent or otherwise, with any person, firm, association, or corporation.
There can be no apparent authority of an agent without acts or conduct on the part of the
principal and such acts or conduct of the principal must have been known and relied upon in
good faith and as a result of the exercise of reasonable prudence by a third person as claimant,
and such must have produced a change of position to its detriment. Such proof is lacking in this
case.
In the entire duration that petitioner played in Casino Filipino, he was dealing only with ABS
Corporation, and availing of the privileges extended only to players brought in by ABS
Corporation. The facts that he enjoyed special treatment upon his arrival in Manila and special
accommodations in Grand Boulevard Hotel, and that he was playing in special gaming rooms are
all indications that petitioner cannot claim good faith that he believed he was dealing with
PAGCOR. Petitioner cannot be considered as an innocent third party and he cannot claim
entitlement to equitable relief as well.
For his third and final assigned error, petitioner asserts that PAGCOR ratified the acts of ABS
Corporation.
The trial court has declared, and affirm, that the Junket Agreement is void. A void or inexistent
contract is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning. Hence, it is as if it has
never been entered into and cannot be validated either by the passage of time or by ratification.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides that contracts expressly prohibited or declared void by
law, such as gambling contracts, cannot be ratified.

40

P/C Insp. Menandro P. Hayag V. Judge Eustaquio C. Lagrimas, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Palapag, Northern Samar
A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-1775-MTJ : January 15, 2007
FACTS: On June 5, 2005, he led the operations of the Northern Samar Police Provincial Office
Anti-Illegal Gambling Special Operation Task Force at Sitio Cale, BarangayMagsaysay, Palapag,
Northern Samar. There had been a report that a "dos manor alfor" (a game similar to cara y cruz)
and card games know as monte and illegal cockfighting were being held in the place.
Complainant alleged that he was surprised to find that it was respondent Judge Lagrimas who
was the "promoter of said illegal cockfighting." He further alleged that "about ninety percent
(90%) of the illegal cockfights in the municipality of Palapag and nearby towns
during barangay fiestas are 'pacquiao'/monopoly of Judge Lagrimas despite his knowledge, as he
is a Judge, that cockfighting outside a licensed cockpit arena is illegal."
The same Judge and his wife actively finance the operation of Lotto Suertes (Illegal Numbers
Game based on the Result of the Lotto) operating in the municipalities of Gamay, Lapinig,
Mapanas and Palapag. In the recent raid by this Office last 21 September 2005 at more or less
8:00 in the evening in Brgy. Tinampo, Poblacion Palapag, N/Samar, accused Dan Apolonio y
Laureano and Gabriel Tobes y Tubello confessed to the undersigned that their financier are the
Spouses Judge Lagrimas and his wife and that they were just fronts of the two.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Eustaquio is guilty of illegal gambling.
HELD: The Court resolves to DISMISS the administrative charges against Judge Eustaquio C.
Lagrimas for lack of merit. He is reminded, however, to be more mindful of his conduct outside
his sala.

41

Artcle 201
Fernando v CA G.R. No. 159751 December 6, 2006
FACTS: Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, officers of the
Philippine Natioal Police CIDG conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-1216 for violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain
Warren Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler,
IOU magazine, and VHS tapes. On the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served
the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the
store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25)
VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines, which they deemed pornographic.
All appellants pled not guilty to the offenses charged. They waived their right to present
evidence. The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted
herein petitioners Fernando and Estorninos. The CA affirmed the decision. The petitioners sought
for review in the SC on certiorari and assailed the CA decision.
They assigned the following errors:
I. Respondent court erred in convicting petitioner Fernando even if he was not present at the time
of the raid
II. Respondent erred in convicting petitioner Estorninos who was not doing anything illegal at
the time of the raid.
Petitioners contend that the prosecution failed to prove that at the time of the search, they were
selling pornographic materials. Fernando contends that since he was not charged as the owner of
an establishment selling obscene materials, the prosecution must prove that he was present
during the raid and that he was selling the said materials. Estorninos, on the other hand, insists
that he was not an attendant in Music Fair, nor did he introduce himself so.The Solicitor General
counters that owners of establishments selling obscene publications are expressly held liable
under Article 201, and petitioner Fernandos ownership was sufficiently proven. As the owner,
according to the Solicitor General, Fernando was naturally a seller of the prohibited materials
and liable under the Information.
ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners conviction.
HELD: No. Petition dismissed. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the
right to regulate, the State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.

42

ARTICLE 203
U.S. v. Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
FACTS: In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding
charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him
from his office. Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude,
and theft.The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the
judge still found him guilty. Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution
and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He
was acquitted. The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt acted
upon. Criminal action was instituted against the residents by Punsalan. The CFI found almost all
of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of
insolvency.The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan.
The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments
of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused
of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by
their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the
accusation in this case arose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace in Pampanga.
HELD: Yes. Defendants acquitted. Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before
1900. There were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution,
on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech

43

ARTICLE 207
Wingarts v. Mejia
FACTS: Col. Munar filed criminal cases for malicious mischief (Crim Case 2663) and grave
threats (Crim Case 2664) against Johan Wingarts. Wingarts filed a counter-charge against Col.
Munar for usurpation of authority (Crim Case 2696). All three cases were decided by Judge
Sevillano Mejia.Relative to the said judgments, Wingarts filed an administrative case against
Judge Mejia for malicious delay in the administration of justice in relation to Crim Case 2663,
alleging that the case dragged on for a year and four months in the Judges sala which was
ultimately dismissed.
A second complaint for incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking
cognizance of Crim Case 2664 and issuing a warrant of arrest against Wingarts despite the lack
of prior barangay conciliation.
The third complaint charged the judge for rendering an unjust decision in Crim case 2696, where
Capt. Manuel and Col. Munar (military lawyers) appeared in the civil courts without necessary
authorization.
ISSUES: Whether or not Judge Mejia is liable for malicious delay in administration of justice.
HELD: On the charge of malicious delay in administration of justice, the judge cannot be held
liable. While there was some delay in the hearing, it does not appear to be malicious or
deliberate, the judge should not be subjected to liabilities where delays are brought about by the
parties and their lawyers. Litigants should not blame a judge for the delay which was not of his
own making. It was found by the Court administrator that it was deemed submitted for decision
on May 6, 1994 and was decided barely a month after on June 8, 1994.

44

ARTICLE 209
Hadjula vs. Atty Madiana
FACTS: Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at
the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent for some legal
advice and further alleged that in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept
confidential she disclosed personal secrets only to be informed later by the respondent that she
(respondent) would refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states,
of respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
Respondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about
the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the
observation that the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact
matters of common knowledge in the BFP.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a
client and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished. The moment complainant
approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain
restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship
is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The seriousness of the respondents
offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent
compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to condone the
error of respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends becoming
bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even
the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent was actuated by the
urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative
sentiment, she was violating the rule on confidentiality.

45

ARTICLE 211
Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Petitioner Leonor Formilleza, convicted in the Sandiganbayan for indirect bribery, has
been with the government service for around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the
regional office of the NIA in Tacloban City, Leyte. Her duties include the processing of the
appointment papers of employees. She then filed a petition for review of her case.
Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA from February, 1978 up to March, 1985. Her
appointment was coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31, 1983, her
appointment was terminated. This notwithstanding, she continued working for the NIA pursuant
to the verbal instructions of the regional director of the Administration. Mrs. Mutia testified that
she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed appointment; that when she
approached the regional director about the matter she was advised to see the petitioner who was
to determine the employees to be appointed or promoted; and that the petitioner refused to attend
to her appointment papers unless the latter were given some money. Mrs. Mutia reported her
problem to the Philippine Constabulary authorities in the province. The PC officials told her that
steps were to be taken to entrap the petitioner. The entrapment equipment consisted of marked
paper money bills. Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks at the
canteen, she handed the marked money bills under the tabl ewith her right hand to the petitioner
who received the same with her left hand. At that moment, Sergeant Bonjoc approached the
petitioner and held her hand holding the money bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his camera
and took photographs of the sequence of events. The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers
despite her objections to the entrapment. She was brought to the PC crime laboratory in the
locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. In the presence of the corporate
counsel of the petitioner, she denied accepting any bribe money from Mrs. Mutia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused accepted the supposed bribe money
HELD: The Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. She is ,therefore, entitled to an acquittal. Against the evidence of the respondents that the
money was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the table is the assertion of petitioner that it
was when she stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand which she did not
know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. An examination of the
seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the money shows
that the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her.

46

ARTICLE 223- Conniving with or consenting to evasion


Edmundo S. Alberto, Provincial Fiscal And Bonifacio C. Intia 1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal,
Both Of Camarines Sur, Petitioners, v. Hon. Rafael De La Cruz, In His Capacity As Judge
Of The Cfi Of Camarines Sur And Eligio Orbita, Respondents.

FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio
Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner,
defined and punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. In the course of the trial
thereof, or more particularly during the cross- examination of prosecution witness Jose
Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought forht and
confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov. Armando
Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his
house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used as an official
guest house. Jose Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded the
note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he
was not present when the note was made and signed by Gov. Cledera. Believing that the escape
of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that
Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which the accused Eligio Orbita had
been charged, the defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the
information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein.

ISSUE: WON Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda may be held liable for the escape of Prisoner
Pablo Denaque.

HELD: No. The offense under article 156 is usually committed by an outsider who removes
from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who
has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined
and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor is the
jailer of the province, and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be
prosecuted for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of
the Revised Penal Code. In order to be guilty under article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner
under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in
charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of
47

the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with
the fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. For sure no
connivance in the escape of Pablo Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be
deduced from the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the
guest house, it appearing that the notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought
to the guest house; and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the
work party. Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under
Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public officer in whose custody
or charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite
amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty.

ARTICLE 225 Escape of prisoner under the custody of a person not a public officer.
48

Bondoc vs. Sandiganbayan


G.R. No. L-58652 May 20, 1988
FACTS: On or about the 27th day of March, 1980, in the City of Caloocan petitioner allow and
permit said Zenaida Sacris Andres to have snacks and enter the comfort room at the second floor
of the Genato Building, Rizal Avenue, Caloocan City after the hearing of said case, v,,ithout first
ascertaining for himself whether said comfort room is safe and without any egress by which the
said detention prisoner could escape, thereby enabling said Zenaida Sacris Andres, to run away
and escape thru the window inside the comfort room, as in fact she did run away and escape
from the custody of said accused.
Issue: Whether the acts of petitioner could be qualified as definite laxity amounting to deliberate
non-performance of duty to sustain his conviction?
HELD: The court ruled that no quarters should be extended to such kind of law officers who,
deliberately or otherwise, fail to live up to the standard required of their duties, thus directly
contributing not only to the clogging of judicial dockets but also to the inevitable deterioration of
peace and order. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of
the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED

ARTICLE 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer.


49

Air Philippine Corporation vs. Penswell Inc.


G.R. No. 172835 December 13, 2007
FACTS: Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Petitioner asserted
that it was deceived by respondent which merely altered the names and labels of such goods so
they refused to pay the goods. During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to
Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the
following products
ISSUE: Whether or not the ingredients of the products can be subject for disclosure?
HELD: The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of
ingredients of its lubricants is to disregard respondents rights over its trade secrets. It was
categorical in declaring that the chemical formulation of respondents products and their
ingredients are embraced within the meaning of trade secrets.

ARTICLE 235. Maltreatment of prisoners


50

People vs. Galit


G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
FACTS: The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had
been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something
drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. So
they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face
into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no
longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been
broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the
confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment. There were no eyewitnesses, no property
recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the
scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession
ISSUE: Whether or not the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession extracted from the
accused was through torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without the benefit
of counsel?
HELD: Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking
of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one.
Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another
one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be
released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.

ARTICLE 247: Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances


51

G.R. No. 97961. September 5, 1997


People Of The Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Jimmy Talisic y Villamor, accusedappellant.

The accused-appellant admits having killed his wife but insists that he did so only after
surprising her in the very act of sexual intercourse with another man. However, he fails to
substantiate the stringent elements required by law to absolve him of criminal responsibility. His
defense appears no more than an amalgam of confusion, contradiction and concoction.
Statement of the Case
That on or about May 8, 1988, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived a deliberate intent to kill his wife
Janita Sapio Talisic, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident
premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a result of said attack, the said Janita
Sapio Talisic died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS: Sixteen-year old Danilo Talisic testified that at dawn of May 8, 1988, his mother, Janita
Talisic, was stabbed to death with a chisel by his father Jimmy Talisic, who afterwards displayed
the bloodied weapon before their altar. Realizing that his mother was already dead, Danilo
decided to bring his younger sister to their grandfathers house. They passed by the house of their
aunt, Victoria Sapyo Tautho, a sister of the deceased, and related to her the bizarre killing. The
latter hurried to the house of the deceased, arriving at six oclock that morning. In the meantime,
Danilo also related the killing to his paternal grandfather, Simon Talisic, who thereupon
proceeded to the house of his son, Accused-appellant Jimmy Talisic, and brought the latter to the
military camp at Tipanoy, Iligan City.
ISSUE: The crucial question in this appeal is whether the totality of the evidence presented
before the trial court justifies the application of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, he argues that he killed his wife under the exceptional circumstance provided in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally
married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
52

another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or
shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. xxx.
Having admitted the killing, the accused must now bear the burden of showing the applicability
of Article 247. Accordingly, the defense must prove the following:
1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18
years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious
physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or
she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.[13]
We stress that the burden of proof to show the concurrence of all three elements rests on the
defense. Most critically, Appellant Jimmy Talisic must prove that he caught his wife inflagrante
delicto; that he killed her while she was in the very act of voluntary sexual intercourse with
another man or immediately thereafter. Sadly for him, he has miserably failed to do so.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find no reason -- as indeed appellant has
failed to provide any -- to overturn the trial courts well-reasoned ruling. Verily, the claim of the
accused-appellant is thoroughly unworthy of belief. He was unable to controvert the finding of
the trial court as follows:
If the accused was attacked by the victim with a chisel, would he not use his bolo since he was
admittedly raging mad due to the victims infidelity? Why used [sic] a chisel when the bolo in
hand was more handy?
The foregoing demonstrate that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is inapplicable to this case
because appellant failed to prove the essential requisite of having caught his wife and her alleged
paramour in flagrante delicto. Indeed, appellant succeeded only in demonstrating his utter lack of
credibility on the witness stand.
All in all, we find no ground to reverse or modify the well-reasoned rulings of the trial
court. Appellants uncorroborated, implausible and flimsy testimony has not convinced us one
whit that he caught his wife in the very act of voluntary sexual intercourse with another man in
the living room of their house while he was momentarily away fetching water. In fact, he has not
even convinced us that such a man was in their house when he brutally killed his wife. A man
betrayed and aggrieved by his wifes brazen unfaithfulness would have immediately surrendered
53

to the authorities and confessed the truth, instead of simply awaiting his father to bring him to the
military camp. Incredible - that about sums up appellants case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the trial court
convicting Jimmy Talisic y Villamor of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 249 : Homicide


G.R. No. 175023

Giovani Serrano y Cervantes,


Petitioner, versus People of The Philippines, Respondent.
FACTS: The case stemmed from a brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two (2) rival groups
that occurred at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City (UP) on the evening
of March 8, 1999. The incident resulted in the stabbing of Anthony Galang
(victim). Pinpointed as the victims assailant, the petitioner was charged on March 11, 1999,
[5]
with frustrated homicide in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 8th day of March 1999, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
ANTHONY GALANG Y LAGUNSAD, by then and there stabbing him on the
stomach with a bladed weapon, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of homicide, as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of some causes independent of the will
of the accused; that is the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
ANTHONY GALANG Y LAGUNSAD which prevented his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party.
THE CA RULING

54

In its decision, the CA agreed with the RTC that the petitioner had been positively
identified as the victims assailant. The CA, however, ruled that the crime committed was
attempted homicide, not frustrated homicide. The CA ruled that the prosecution evidence failed
to conclusively show that the victims single stab wound was sufficient to cause death without
timely medical intervention.
The petitioner was positively identified
The RTCs and CAs conclusions on the petitioners positive identification are supported by ample
evidence. We consider in this regard the following pieces of evidence of the prosecution: (1) the
manner of attack which was done frontally and at close range, thus allowing the victim to see his
assailant; (2) the lighting conditions at the scene of the stabbing, provided by two Meralco
posts; the scene was also illuminated by white, fluorescent type light coming from a steel
manufacturing shop; and (3) that the victim and the petitioner knew each other also allowed the
victim to readily identify the petitioner as his assailant.
The intent to kill was sufficiently established
The petitioner posits that he can only be held liable for serious physical injuries since the intent
to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently
proven. The assailants intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical
injuries from the crime of homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is
proven.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the petitioner, in stabbing, beating and
stoning the victim, intended to kill him. Thus, the crime committed cannot be merely serious
physical injuries.
Frustrated homicide versus attempted homicide
The CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the attempted stage as there was
lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the victims death. The CA
observed that the attending physician did not testify in court. The CA also considered that the
Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the East Avenue Medical Center fell
short of specifying the nature or gravity of the wound.
The view from the frustrated stage of the crime gives the same results. The elements of frustrated
homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Since the prosecution failed
to prove the second element, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for frustrated homicide.
We modify the CA decision with respect to the petitioners civil liability. The CA ordered
actual damages to be paid in the amount of P3,858.50. This is erroneous and contrary to the
prevailing jurisprudence.
Lastly, we find that the victim is also entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P10,000.00 in accordance with settled jurisprudence.[36] Under Article 2219, paragraph 1 of the
55

New Civil Code, the victim is entitled to moral damages in a criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition. The decision, dated July 20, 2006, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29090, finding petitioner Giovani Serrano y Cervantes
guilty
beyond
reasonable
doubt
of
Attempted
Homicide,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner is ORDERED to PAY the victim,
Anthony Galang, the following amounts:
(1) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(2) P10,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 251 : Death Caused In A Tumultuous Affray

[G.R. No. 141080. September 17, 2002]


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANECITO UNLAGADA y
SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad," accused-appellant.

For the murder of twenty-four-year old Danilo Laurel, ANECITO UNLAGADA y


SUANQUE alias "Lapad" was charged and subsequently convicted by the court a quo and
sentenced toreclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as temperate damages, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.[1]
On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house
together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Rizal St.,
Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00
o'clock that evening, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their
personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and
bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.
According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from Danilo who was relieving
himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at
56

the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost
simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him
with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood.
PO3 Jomarie Sarrosa narrated that at around 11:30 in the evening of 27 January 1989 he was
inside his house entertaining some visitors when suddenly he heard frantic shouts, "fight,
fight!" Answering the call of duty, he took his service pistol, went outside and fired a warning
shot in the air to break up the fight that was going on some fifty (50) meters away. Instinctively,
the protagonists broke up and scampered away.
Accused Anecito Unlagada now assails his conviction on the ground that it was error for the
trial court to give full faith and credence to the lone and uncorroborated testimony of witness
Edwin Selda, and in finding that the crime of murder was committed instead of "death caused in
a tumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.
In an attempt to discredit the lone eyewitness, accused-appellant posits the view that the
circumstances of the place, the swiftness of the attack, and the drunken state of the witness
engender serious doubt that the witness positively identified the malefactor.
But, accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred in convicting him of murder
qualified by treachery and not "death in a tumultuous affray."
"Death in a tumultuous affray" is defined in Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the
affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage
in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and
the author thereof cannot be ascertained.The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct
group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the
killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a "tumultuous
affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all,
where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a
confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.

57

The civil aspect of the case should however be modified in consonance with prevailing
jurisprudence. In addition to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the heirs of the decedent are entitled
to a reduced amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, while temperate damages of P50,000.00
and exemplary damages of another P50,000.00 should be deleted for lack of factual and legal
basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad" is
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus moral
damages in the reduced amount of P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

ARTICLE 253: GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE


G.R. No. 192993

August 11, 2014

Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., And Reginaldo Oben/Wallem Shipmanagement Limited,


Petitioners,
v.
Donnabelle Pedrajas And Sean Jade Pedrajas, Respondents.
58

The antecedents are as follows:


Petitioner Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. is a domestic corporation licensed to engage in the
manning business. Petitioner Wallem Maritime Ship Management is a foreign corporation which
is the principal of Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., while Reginaldo Oben is the President of
Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. In 2004, petitioner Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. and Hernani
Pedrajas (Hernani) entered into a contract of employment wherein Hernani was hired as Engine
Boy on board the M/V Crown Jade. She was also informed that investigations were being
conducted by the Italian Government relative to Hernani's death. His body was repatriated back
to the Philippines in April 2005.
Suspecting foul play, Donnabelle sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory to conduct a forensic examination on the remains of Hernani and to investigate
the cause of his death. Donnabelle also requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
investigate the incident. After the investigation, the PNP Crime Laboratory and the NBI
concluded that homicide cannot be totally ruled out. Due to the foregoing, in June 2005,
Donnabelle, as beneficiary of Hernani, filed a claim for death compensation benefits under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract and the AssociatesMarine Officer's and Seafarer's Union
of the Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement (AMOSUPCBA). She also demanded
attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages.
Petitioners claim that they have no obligation to pay death benefits to the heirs of Hernani
because the latter's death was self-inflicted and therefore exempted from the coverage of death
benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract
(POEASEC) and the AMOSUP-CBA. Petitioners argued that Hernani was involved in a drug
smuggling activity and fearing that he would be arrested and would bring shame to his family, he
committed suicide. To support their claim, petitioners attached anauthenticated Forensic
Report3 released by the Medical Examiner in Italy which stated that Hernani committed suicide
by hanging himself. The same report indicated that during the course of the autopsy, Hernani was
found positive for cocaine.4 When his lifeless body was found hanging, two suicide notes were
found by the Italian authorities. One was addressed to his wife and the other to the vessel's crew.
The suicide note addressed to his wife stated that he committed suicide because he was
implicated in a drug syndicate and he did not want to be jailed for the rest of his life. The second
suicide note led to the arrest of Deck Boy Joseph Harder, who admitted his participation in the
drug dealing operation. It also pointed the Italian authorities to where the remaining cocaine and
the proceeds from its illegal sale were being hidden on-board the vessel. On March 31, 2006, the
Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioners and denied the respondents' claim for death
benefits. The LA sustained petitioners' claim that Hernani committed suicide, giving credence to
the Forensic Report submitted by the Italian authorities concluding that his death was selfinflicted.

59

ISSUE: Whether Hernani committed suicide during the term of his employment contract which
would exempt petitioners from paying Hernani's death compensation benefits to his
beneficiaries.
Section 20 (D) of the POEA-SEC provides:
No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or
death of a seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties x x
x.
Therefore no elements at all have emerged such as would lead us to believe that third parties may
have intervened in causing the death, and the way inwhich Mr. Pedrajas died, as described,
conforms to suicide.13
To be able to determine if the strangulation is "suicide or homicide," it should not be only limited
to the autopsy, but it must be based on several aspects like knowledge of the "crime scene,
victims behavior and other things related to it. x x x
In the present case, the LA found that:
Since the Labor Arbiter had, after comparing the suicide notes and the letters presented by the
respondents, concluded and determined that the letters were of the handwriting of Hemani, the
CA should have considered these pieces of evidence, in determining whether Hemani committed
suicide, as it explained the reason why Hemani took his life. Further, the petitioners were able to
explain why the original copies of the documents were not presented during the proceedings
before the LA. The reason for its nonproduction is that the notes were in the possession of the
Italian Authorities as part of the evidence in their investigation and will not be released until such
time as a final determination in said proceedings is made.23 Petitioners' failure to submit the
original copy of the suicide notes is, thus, not a ground for disregarding such note.
Moreover, the credibility and authenticity of Hemani's suicide notes are also beyond doubt. In
fact, the statements contained in the notes led to the investigation and arrest of Deck Boy Harder,
who confessed as to his participation in the drug operations which eventually led the Italian
authorities to where the remaining cocaine and proceeds thereof were being hidden on-board the
vessel.
Since the petitioners were able to prove that Hemani committed suicide, Hemani' s death is not
compensable and his heirs are not entitled to any compensation or benefits. It is settled that when
the death of a seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life, and it is directly
attributable to the seaman, such death is not compensable.

60

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 102499, dated February 11, 2010, and the Resolution dated July 20, 2010, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's Decision dated March 31, 2006 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

61

ARTICLE 255: Infanticide


G.R. No. 45186

September 30, 1936

The People Of The Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
Josefina Bandian, defendant-appellant.
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
the corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from
said sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she
had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her
to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor,
saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond
to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A
few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood
both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support
herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and
helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar
brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very
dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called
Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo
leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone
about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter
told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which
had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the
appellant's house and found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and
beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood.
62

By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died.
Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not
caused by the hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket
where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or
consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even
in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits
them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties.
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take
her child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her
will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are
true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee
accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection
with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.

63

ARTICLE 269
P/Chief Inspector Fernando Billedo v. Wilhelmina Wagan
Wilhelmina Wagan
FACTS: The case stemmed from the arrest of complainants Alberto Mina, Nilo Jay Mina and
Ferdinand Caasi on February 27, 2000 along an alley, Interior 332, Edang Street, PasayCity, by
petitioners-police officers. They were reported to have been caught in flagrante delicto drinking
liquor in a public place. The complainants alleged that their arrest was unlawful and was only
upon the inducement and unjustifiable accusation of Ferdinand Cruz and Mariano Cruz (the
Cruzes).[4]
Thereafter, they were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City (MeTC) with a
violation of City Ordinance No. 265 (Drinking Liquor in Public Places), which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 00-621.
On March 20, 2000, after the said incident, the complainants filed Civil Case No. 00-0089
against the petitioners for damages. Subsequently, criminal complaints were also filed against the
petitioners before the City Prosecution Office and the Office of the Ombudsman for Unlawful
Arrest and Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Act Defining Rights of Person under Custodial
Investigation). The CPO dismissed the case for lack of merit while the Ombudsman, in its Joint
Resolution dated October 13, 2000,[5] dismissed both complaints for lack of probable cause, but
recommended the filing of 3 corresponding criminal informations for Violation of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regional trial court or any other courts has the jurisdiction to try civil
case no. 00-0089 given the mandatory simultaneous institution and joint determination of a civil
liability with the criminal action and the express prohibition to file the said civil action separately
From the criminal action as provided for under section 4 of Republic Act 8249?
HELD: After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of
discretion which can be attributed to the public respondent in issuing the challenged Orders
dated May 8, 2006, July 12, 2006 and August 26, 2006.
The Court finds that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders, the petition is denied.

64

ARTICLE 271
People of The Philippines v. Alagao

FACTS: City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees charging
them of the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then members of the Manila Police Department, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the
crime by bribery thru unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the
aforesaid date, without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial Apolonio y
Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly
being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place on
commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial Apolonio
y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he (Marcial
Apolonio y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila,
would appear to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y Santos) duties, which was to expedite the issuance of
a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos
the commission of the crime of bribery." -defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense (because the two crimes cannot
be complexed); and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
-CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants -MFR was denied -appeal by fiscal
before SC

ISSUE: WON the CFI erred in granting motion to quash

65

HELD: YES - It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in the
information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary means to
plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating him.

From a reading of the info the SC finds a close connection between the act of the accused in first
unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and it was during that
investigation that they plated incriminatory evidence against him. SC agrees with the Solicitor
General in his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able
to plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken from the offended party.

Also the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the
information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or
imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months, and a fine not exceeding P500.00; 5
and the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or
imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months.

ARTICLE 273
Angeles v. Gaite
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was given custody of her grandniece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care
and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took
care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-brother of
the grandniece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support ranging from
daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.
2. After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grandniece, Michael Vistan, failed
to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since
no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her
to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to mislead the
petitioner and the police.
3. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation.
4. The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10
(a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four
counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel
against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.

66

5. The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the
case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a
decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC.
Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC Perez
and was also denied
6. She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the
ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review
of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death
7. Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
8. Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t diminishes
the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
ISSUE: W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of
the President?
HELD: NO, it does not diminish the power of the President. The President's act of delegating
authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the
purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction

ARTICLE 275
Lamera v. CA
FACTS: An owner type jeepney, driven by petitioner, hit a tricycle resulting to the damage of
the tricycle, and physical injuries to the passengers of the said tricycle. Two informations were
filed against petitioner. First is reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and physical
injuries under Article 365 of the Revised penal Code and second, abandonment of ones victim
under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. The second information was filed because the
petitioner, instead of giving assistance to the victims, fled and left them.
He invoked his right against double jeopardy saying that his conviction of reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property and multiple physical injuries is a bar for the prosecution to
charge him with the crime of abandonment of ones victim.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals ruled against the petitioner, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall fail to help
another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was previously charged with

67

"reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries" under
Article 365 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD: There is no double jeopardy, because these two offenses are not identical. Reckless
imprudence is a crime falling under the chapter on criminal negligence, while abandonment of
ones victim is a crime falling under the chapter on crimes against security. The former is
committed by means of culpa, while the latter is committed by means of dolo. Failure to help
ones victim is not an offense by itself nor an element of reckless imprudence. It merely
Increases the penalty by one degree.

ARTICLE 277
The People of the Philippines v. Icasiano Cuello
FACTS: On 20 April 1955 Icasiano Cuello was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila
with a violation of paragraph 2, article 277, of the Revised Penal Code,t hat in, about and during the
period from 1950 and continuously up to the present, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
being then the legitimate father of Armando, 13 years of age and Reynato, 12 years of age, all surnamed
Cuello, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously neglect his aforesaid children by not
giving them the education which his station in life requires and financial condition permits.

On 25 July 1956 the Court rendered judgment finding the defendant guilty as charged and
sentencing him to suffer two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of P200,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of the insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. The defendant has appealed. On 29

68

March 1958, after the parties had filed their respective briefs, the Court of Appeals certified the
case to this Court on the ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not Icasiano Cuello is sentence of arresto mayor

HELD: Section 43 (f), Republic Act No. 296, as amended, provides that Courts of First Instance
have original jurisdiction of "all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos," and section
87 (b) of the same Act provides that Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts have original
jurisdiction over "All offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not
more than six months, or a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment."
The above-quoted provision3 simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and
another for the damage to property, for both the injuries and the damage committed were caused
by one single act of the defendant and constitute what may be called a complex crime of physical
injuries and damage to property. It is clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the
jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of the court of first instance.

This Court held that the Municipal Court and not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of
the case. The case at bar is different from the cause relied upon by the appellant. Here the penalty
of the offense charged is arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500. There it is destierro in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period. Clearly, the latter case is not within
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

ARTICLE 287
Renato Baleros, Jr. v. People of the Philippines
GR NO. 138033 January 30, 2007
69

FACTS: At about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila,
he accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth
soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, tried to rape the victim by lying on top of her with the
intention to have a carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Renato Baleros, Jr. Moved for a partial reconsideration of a Sc decision acquitting him of the
crime of attempted rape but adjudging him guilty of light coercion. It is Baleros submission that
his conviction for light coercion under an Information for attempted rape, runs counter to the en
banc ruling in People v. Contreras where the Court held: The SOLGEN contends that Contreras
should be liable for unjust vexation do not form part of the crime of rape as defined in Art. 33 5.
Moreover, the circumstances stated in the information do not constitue the lements of the said
crime. Contreras, therefore, cannot be convicted of unjuct vexation.
ISSUE: Whether Renato Baleros, Jr. Is guilty of unjust vexation
HELD: Yes. He argues that the Information waginst him does not allege that the act of covering
the face of the victim with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical caused her annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress and disturbance. The SC wish to stress that malice, compulsion or restraint need
not ne alleged in an Information for unjest vexation.

ARTICLE 293
Rommel C. Briones, Petitioner, v. People Of The Philippines, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 156009. June 05, 2009]

70

FACTS: A criminal information was filed against Briones for crime of robbery. Briones
allegedly took the service firearm of S/G Gual while the latter approached the group where the
former is involved in a mauling. S/G Gual positively identified Briones. RTC found Briones
guilty of the crime of simple theft (Art. 309 Par. 3 of RPC) after giving weight to prosecutions
positive testimony as against the defenses of denial and alibi. On his appeal, he raised the issue
of self-defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293 in
relation to par.5 of Art. 294 of RPC, and not of theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not the robbery is the proper felony.
HELD: No. Briones is found guilty of theft. The SC agrees with the RTC that only the crime of
theft was committed in the case as S/G Gual's testimony does not show that violence or
intimidation attended the taking of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely
grabbed the firearm and ran away with it. Thus, the Court can only convict Briones for the crime
of theft for taking S/G Molinas firearm without his consent. Theft is produced the moment there
is deprivation of personal property due to its taking with intent to gain. However, since there was
no evidence presented as to the value of stolen firearm, he can only be sentenced to the lightest
penalty prescribed by law applicable to the facts of the case. The lightest penalty that applies to
theft, where the value of the thing stolen does notexceed five pesos, is found in paragraph 6 of
Article 309.

ARTICLE 295
People v. Enguero, 100 Phil 1001
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FACTS: Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno were charged
with the crime of robbery in band in three separate informations and after a joint trial the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur found them guilty as they appealed. Jose Tariman withdrew
his appeal. As no question of fact is raised, the only error assigned to have been committed by
the trial court being the conviction and sentence of the defendants for three robberies in band
instead of only one, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the argument of counsel de oficio that the appellants are guilty of one
crime only is tenable.
HELD: Counsel de oficio argues that the appellants are guilty of one crime only citing in
support of his contention the case of People vs. de Leon, 49 Phil., 437. The contention is without
merit. In the case cited by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where he found two
fighting this case, after committing the first crime of robbery in band the appellants went to
another house where they committed the second and after committing it they proceeded to
another house where they committed the third. Obviously, the rule in the case cited cannot be
invoked and applied to the present.
The crime committed is robbery in band punished in articles 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18, in connection with article 295 of the same
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 373, with prison correccional in its maximum period to
prison mayor in its medium period. As the robbery was committed in band, the penalty to be
imposed is the maximum period of the proper penalty, which is prison mayor in its medium
period, or from 3 years and 1 day to 10 years. The second paragraph of article 295 of the Revised
Penal Code which impose the penalty next higher in degree upon the leader of the band has been
left out by Republic Act No. 373, amending further article 295 of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed upon each of the
appellants is the next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, or 4
months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor, as
maximum, in each of the three crimes committed, and the accessories of the law. Modified as to
the penalty to be imposed upon each of the three appellants, the rest of the judgment appealed
from is affirmed, with proportionate costs in each case against the appellants.

ARTICLE 299
People v. Jaranilla
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FACTS: Jan 9, 1966 11pm Heman Gorriceta had just come from Ford San Pedro in Iloilo City
and was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister. In front of the Elizalde Building on
J.M. Basa Street, he saw defendants Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They
asked Gorriceta to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in the city, as Jaranilla told Gorriceta that
he had to get something from his uncles place. Gorriceta initially demurred but the appellants
eventually prevailed. Upon reaching Mandurriao, they parked the pickup truck at a distance 50
70 meters away from the provincial hospital and Gorriceta was instructed to wait for the
defendants as they alighted. After twenty minutes, the three accused arrived carrying two
roosters each. They ran to the truck and instructed Gorriceta to drive immediately as they were
being chased. Gorriceta then drove the truck to Jaro, another city district. The four of them were
on the front seat of the truck. Gorriceta, as the driver, was on the extreme left and to his right was
Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes and on the extreme right was Jaranilla. In the middle of the
road, they were intercepted by Policemen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro. Gorriceta
stopped the truck near the policemn after Jabatan fired a warning shot. Jabatan went to the right
side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all of them to step out which they did not heed.
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it while Suyo did nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden,
shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting frightened Gorriceta who immediately started the truck and
drove straight home while Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes
alighted in front of Gorricetas house where the latter was instructed not to tell anybody about the
inicident. Gorriceta went to his room and after a while, he heard policemen calling his name
asking him to come down. He initially hid in the ceiling of his house and it wasnt until 8am the
following day that he decided to come down and was brought to police headquarters.
Victorino Trespeces, a witness, testified that: On the date of the crime, he was conducting a
friend to the housing project near the Mandurriao provincial hospital. Near the residence, he saw
three men emerge from the canal of Taft Street in front of Valentin Baylons house. He also
noticed a red Ford truck parked about 50 yards from the place where he saw the three men and
shortly afterwards, the same three men emerged carrying roosters. He immediately reported the
incident to the authorities and Police officers Jabatan and Castro sought to intercept the truck. At
the place of the shooting, Trepeces was about to return to Mandurriao when he heard gunshots
and Police Officer Castro came up to him and told him that Jabanta had been shot. Jabanta was
later brought to the hospital where he later died. Valentin Baylon, owner of the fighting cocks,
provided that: At 6am in the morning of Jan. 10, 1966, he discovered that the door of one of his
chicken coops was broken and that six of his roosters were missing. Each coop contained 6
fighting cocks. He reported the incident to the authorities and was summoned to the police
station at Mandurriao where he positively identified a rooster as his.
During the proceedings of the case, Jaranilla escaped. The trial court convicted Suyo and
Brillantes of robbery with homicide while the charges against Gorriceta were dropped and he
was utilized as a state witness.
There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla who had escaped from jail, so he
could not have appealed and his inclusion in this petition filed by Suyo and Brillantes was
erroneous. Hence, only the appeals of the latter were entertained.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of the roosters was theft and, alternatively, if it was robbery,
the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the robbery was already consummated
when Jabatan was killed.
HELD: YES. The crime was theft and not robbery.
There was no evidence that violence or intimidation was employed in the taking of the roosters
hence, Art. 294 of the RPC (Robbery with violence against or intimidation) could not be invoked
It also could not fall under Art. 299 (which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house, public
building or edifice devoted to worship) as the chicken coop was outside Baylons house. Nor was
it a dependency thereof as contemplated under Art. 301. The next article in consideration would
be Art. 302 which punishes Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building
other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Art. 299, if the value of the property exceeds
250 pesos,
One essential requisite of robbery with force upon things under Arts. 299 and 302 is that the
malefactor should enter the building or dependency where the object to be taken is found. If the
culprit did not enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things. In the
instant case, the chicken coop cannot be considered a building within the meaning of Art. 302.
Building in Art. 302 as construed in US v. Magsino refers to any structure not mentioned in
Art. 299 used for storage and safekeeping of personal property. In the Magsino case, it was held
that a freight car was a building as contemplated in art. 512 (now 312) so, unnailing the strip of
cloth used to seal it constitutes breaking by force within the meaning of the provision.
However, the Court, using rulings of the Spanish Supreme Court held that Art. 302 refers to
houses or buildings which are actually habitable despite being uninhabited. Hence, the stealing
of a pig in a pig sty is theft and not robbery, although the culprit breaks into it.
In the case, photos show that the chicken coops could not accommodate a person inside its
compartments. It wasnt intended that a person should go inside the compartment. Taking the
roosters could be effected by putting ones hands inside and grabbing the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the roosters from the coop only amounted to theft and not robbery.

ARTICLE 305
G.R. No. L-18766 People Of The Philippines v. Ramon Lopez,

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FACTS: At 10:00 a.m., the Chief of Police of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte, apprehended three
suspicious-looking strangers who were loitering in Pagao, a sitio of Bacuag. A bag which they
were carrying was confiscated with the following contents: three carbines, caliber .30 Ml; one
revolver, caliber .22; three flashlights with batteries; two carbine ammunition magazines, fully
loaded; twelve rounds of carbine ammunition; one balisong; a screw driver; seven false keys, one
of which was a master key; trousers; shirts; and a pair of shoes.After an investigation, the
aforesaid persons Ramon Lopez, Manuel Buico and Arturo Caniete were charged in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Bacuag with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and, in a
separate complaint, the crime of illegal possession of false keysThis time, however, Buico and
Caniete pleaded guilty. Lopez, pleading not guilty, stood trial. After the prosecution presented
one witness, said accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense. It was argued that an essential element of illegal
possession of false keys was not alleged, namely, that the picklock or false keys in the possession
of the accused were "specially adapted to the commission of the crime of robbery."
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of illegal possession of false keys.
HELD: Yes. Such crime of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools has, accordingly, two
elements: (1) possession of picklocks or similar tools specially adapted to the commission of the
crime of robbery; (2) such possession is without lawful cause.1wph1.tThe information
alleged that the accused possessed, "without lawful cause ... seven (7) false keys, one of which is
a picklock or master key." Since picking of locks is one way to gain entrance to commit robbery,
a picklock is per se specially adapted to the commission of robbery. The description in the
information of a picklock as "specially adapted to the commission of robbery" is therefore
unnecessary for its sufficiency. Notwithstanding the omission of such superfluous description,
therefore, the charge of the offense of illegal possession of a picklock is valid. We find both
elements of the crime clearly alleged in the information in question. Furthermore, the
information alleged illegal possession of "seven (7) false keys." The Revised Penal Code, in
Article 305, defines "false keys" to include "the tools mentioned in the next preceding article."
Article 304 "the next preceding article" mentions "picklocks or similar, tools
speciallyadapted to the commission of the crime of robbery." It follows that the term "false keys"
appearing in the information sufficiently describes such tools.

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ARTICLE 309
Beltran, Jr. & Beltran vs. People G.R. No. 181355 : March 30, 2011
FACTS: Petitioners Benjamin Beltran, Jr. and Virgilio Beltran, together with a certain Francisco
Bravo (still at large), were charged with the crime of theft of a hand tractor belonging to one
Vicente Ollanes, valued at P29,000.00. Finding petitioners defense of denial and alibi
unmeritorious is-visthe testimonies of witnesses for the prosecution, particularly their positive
identification of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime, the RTC convicted the petitioners
and were ordered to pay P12,000 as civil liability. The CA affirmed petitioner's conviction but
modified the penalty imposed by the trial court, to the effect that petitioners are sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eleven
(11) year[s] of prision mayor, as maximum.
On review, petitioners argue that the evidence of the prosecution miserably failed to establish the
first element of the crime of theft,i.e., taking of personal property.The private complainant
himself was not certain as to what personal property was stolen from him as there was disparity
between what was entered in the barangay blotter and in his testimony in open court.Petitioners
maintain that the appellate court erred in finding them civilly liable for the value of the stolen
engine since the prosecution failed to produce the receipt therefor. They also fault the appellate
court in imposing upon them a higher penalty considering that the prosecution did not
satisfactorily establish the value of the stolen property that would be the basis of the penalty to
be imposed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower courts conviction should be upheld
2. Whether or not civil liability should be awarded
3. Whether or not the CA imposed the proper penalty
HELD: The Court upholds the conviction.
First issue: The elements of the crime of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that
the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Petitioners
assailed that the first element of the crime of theft,i.e., that there be taking of personal property,
was not substantially proven by the prosecution because of the inconsistencies in the private
complainants testimony and the contents of the barangay blotter as to what personal property was
actually taken. However, entries in a police or barangay blotter, although regularly done in the
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course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries,
for these are often incomplete and inaccurate.These, therefore,should not be given undue
significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein. Such error and inconsistency, in this
case, is therefore not detrimental to the case, more so since the police presented a certification
rectifying the error, and Vicente is consistent in his trial testimony on the identity of the thing
taken, among others.
Second issue: The law does not require a definite degree of certainty when proving the amount of
damages claimed. It is necessary, however, to establish evidence to substantiate the claim.To
justify an award for actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of
loss.Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. While
petitioners did not rebut the amount of P12,000.00 as the value of the engine lost (with regard to
the body of the tractor, it had been returned), no receipt to prove such claim has been adduced in
evidence by the prosecution.Thus, the award of P12,000.00 as actual damages in favor of the
private
complainant
is
improper
for
lack
of
any
legal
basis.
Third issue: Since the value of the lost engine was not properly proven by the prosecution, its
value therefor cannot be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon the
petitioners.Only the value of the body of the hand tractor, which is P17,000.00, as evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 313,can be considered in determining the imposable penalty upon
petitioners. Under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for theft when the value of
the stolen property is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 is prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods, subject to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Appeal is DENIED, but with MODIFICATIONS.

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