1

Investigating the determinants of Chinas non-cooperative response to Japanese

nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012

Teresa Makar
Honors Thesis 2014-2015
Professor Susan Whiting, advisor

Introduction
On September 11, 2012, Japan purchased three small islands from the Kurihara family
for 2 billion, which is around $26 million (Islands Apart, 2013). The islands, part of group of
five islands called the Senkaku in Japanese, are located 120 nautical miles from Okinawa (East
China Sea, 2014). Japans purchase of the three islands completed the national governments
ownership of all five of the Senkaku islands. Covering an area of 7 square kilometers (about 2.7
square miles), the land is both uninhabited and undeveloped (Hasnay, 2014).
The transfer of such a small piece of territory from a private party to the Japanese
government hardly seems to merit international coverage, but reports of Japans purchase
occupied headline news around the world, due to controversial nature of the purchasea result
of the existence of competing claims of ownership over the islands from China and Taiwan.1
Following the purchase, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC) issued a statement
claiming that purchase was illegal and invalid and that it constituted a serious violation of
Chinese territorial sovereignty(FMPRC, Diaoyu Islands cannot be bought, 2012). The
Chinese people appeared to share the states indignation and anger over the sale of the Senkaku,
which China calls the Diaoyu, illustrated by the eruption of protests in 40 Chinese cities
immediately following the purchase, including demonstrations in front of the Japanese embassy
(Johnson and Shanker, 2012).
Chinas territorial dispute with Japan is by means its only territorial conflict. China and
the Philippines have been in conflict since 2012 over the ownership of the Scarborough Shoal, a
small shoal located 220 km (136 miles) from the mainland of the Philippines and 857 km (552
1

Taiwan also claims sovereignty over the Senkaku, which it calls the Tiaoyu or Taioyu-Tai, but due to the
scope of this paper, I will focus on competing claims to sovereignty between China and Japan.

miles) from mainland China, after China militarized the zone in 2012. China holds competing
sovereignty claims with multiple states over territory located in the East and South China Sea,
including Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. In fact, according to
the nine-dash line that China uses to delineate its territorial boundary, China claims ownership
of approximately 90% of the area in the South China Sea (Regencia, 2014).
Most recently, China has come under criticism for taking bold (and according to Admiral
Harry Harris, commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, unprecedented) measures in
constructing artificial islands around Mischief Reef, located in the disputed Spratly islands
region. Since January 2015, China has been dredging sand in and around the reef and using the
sand to build artificial islands (Sanger & Gladstone, 2015). As audacious as this may seem, is
not the first time that China has built an island in a contested zone. Beginning in January 2014,
China began building an artificial island out of dredged sand at Fiery Cross Reef, some 200
miles west, also located in the Spratly islands. Satellite photos taken by IHS Janes, a security
and defense information group, illustrate that the artificial islands at Fiery Cross Reef are capable
of supporting a 3000 meter landing strip and a harbor large enough to dock warships. The
Spratlys, another example of hotly contested territory, are claimed by Vietnam and the
Philippines as well as China (Hardy, OConnor, & OConnor, 2014).
Some western analysts and strategy groups, including Taylor Fravel and IHS
Janes, consider Chinas move to unilaterally build islands a signal that China is attempting to
strengthen its claim to sovereignty in the South China Sea through increased presence, which
places pressure on the other claimants of the territory (Perlez, 2014). China denies these motives
and claims that the purpose of the islands is to provide relief to fishing vessels in the case of
typhoons and storms at sea (Sanger & Gladstone, 2015). Janes claims that the facility appears

purpose-built to coerce other claimants into relinquishing their claims and possessions, or at least
provide China with a much stronger negotiating position if talks over the dispute were ever held
(Hardy et. al, 2014). Fravel agrees: By creating the appearance of an island, China may be
seeking to strengthen the merits of its claims, (Wong and Ansfield, 2014).
Are we witnessing a period of heightened Chinese aggression in the East and South
China Seas? Is China adopting a non-cooperative method of claiming the territory within the
nine-dash line through accusatory language, displays of military force, and unprecedented
building on and occupation of contested territory? And what is motivating Chinas conduct in
the Asia-Pacific?
In order to investigate these questions, this thesis explores Chinas behavior in a recent
flare up of one of its many territorial disputesthe 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku conflict with Japan. I
examine Chinas response to Japans nationalization of the islands and suggest two variables that
may have influenced Chinas response: the Chinese peoples expression of nationalism and the
economic value of the islands. I hypothesize that greater expression of nationalist sentiment by
the Chinese people will be correlated with non-cooperative/aggressive behavior on the part of the
Chinese state. An alternative hypothesis is that high economic value of the disputed territory
will be correlated with non-cooperative behavior by the Chinese government.
I begin by describing the progression of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute and
providing relevant historical context. I follow by presenting current, salient arguments in
academic literature related to Chinas rise in Asia, Chinese nationalism, and the nature of the
Senkaku territorial dispute. Next, I present my research design in the methodology section. I
then present my findings, analysis of my data, and discussion. I consider the implications of my
findings in my conclusion.

History of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute

The contemporary conflict regarding the sovereignty of the Diaoyu islands is only the
most recent in a long history of discord. The two powers have disagreed on the matter of legal
ownership for years, but because neither acted highly aggressive in changing the status quo, the
two have avoided direct confrontation. Tensions and conflict have indeed risen several times
over the past forty years, but never enough to permanently derail China and Japans mutually
beneficial trade and investment relationship. Tensions flared on certain occasions, such as when
China sent 80 armed fishing vessels to the disputed zone in 1978, or when Japanese nationalists
built a lighthouse on one of the islands in 1988 (Blanchard, 2000). After each occasion, feathers
were temporarily ruffled, but the two Asian powers allowed the matter of sovereignty to fall into
the background. Then, on the eve of China and Japans forty year anniversary of normalized
relations, conflict erupted again when Japan announced its intent to nationalize the islands
(Przystup, 2013).
Japanese and Chinese officials give opposing explanations as to the legal sovereignty of
the islands based on differing records of their historical ownership. The Chinese claim to have
discovered and named the islands Diaoyu in 1403, administering over the islands until they
were forced to cede them to Japan in accordance with the Treaty of Shiminoseki in 1895, which
ended the Sino-Japanese War (Blanchard, 2000). The Chinese cite old maps that portray the
Diaoyu as Chinese territory as proof of rightful ownership, and insist that Japan must return what
it stole during the Sino-Japanese War, in accordance with the 1943 Cairo Declaration (FMPRC,
The Diaoyu Islands: The Owner and the Thief, 2012).

Japan claims that its ownership of the islands preceded the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japan
argues that it discovered the islands in 1894 and a year later annexed them after confirming that
the islands were uninhabited. Japan argues that there were no signs of Chinese presence or rule
over the islands and that China failed to react to Japans annexation of the Diaoyu at the time;
Japan holds firm that it acquired the islands terra nullius. Japan argues that it has complete legal
authority to administer over them, and it has every right to transfer ownership of the islands from
a private Japanese family to the government (Wei Su, 2005).
The main cause of uncertainty surrounding the sovereignty of the islands is the failure of
post-World War II documents to clearly address their ownership. When the United States
became the trustee of the Ryukyu Islands after World War II in accordance with the 1951 San
Francisco Treaty, it also administered over the Senkaku, though they were not explicitly
mentioned in the treaty (Wei Su, 2005). Very little attention was paid to these islands at all until
1969. That year, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)
published a report on the seabed surrounding the islands. The report announced the potential that
the continental shelf under and around the islands might contain large oil and natural gas
reserves (Li, 1975). After the report was published, suddenly a group of small, rocky,
uninhabited islands became the center of much conflict and debate.
Literature Review
The Diaoyu are exceptionally small islands, covering a total area of only 2.7 square
miles. However, the owners of the islands may gain a much larger territory if jurisdiction grants
rights to a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well. Within an EEZ, the state is granted:
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the

seabed and its subsoil (Article 56, UNCLOS). Under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states are granted EEZs up to 200 nautical miles from their
mainland.
Unfortunately, the East China Sea is only 360 nautical miles across at its widest point
(Ramos-Mrosovosky, 2008). This has resulted in the overlap of Japan and Chinas maritime
boundary claims by over 81,000 square miles (Hasnay, 2014, p. 1767). China claims an EEZ
that extends 350 nautical miles from the mainland, in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS,
which grants EEZs based on the natural boundary formed by continental shelves. Chinas
boundary claim covers nearly the entire East China Sea, right up to Japans Ryukyu Islands.
Japan, on the other hand, supports a Sino-Japanese maritime border that follows the equidistance
approach (Hasnay, 2014), which paradoxically is also supported by UNCLOS in Article 15. The
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands fall squarely in the zone in which China and Japans boundary claims
overlap (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Competing claims to maritime boundary delimitation

(Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration)

According to UNCLOS, the Diaoyu Islands, if they are considered islands, are granted the same
200 nautical mile EEZ that mainland China or Japan enjoy. Article 121 states, the territorial sea,
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land
territory. However, UNCLOS definition of what constituents an island is vague at best.
Article 121 does not specify what an island is, although it describes what an island is not: islands
are not rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life. This calls into question
the ability of the Diaoyu to sustain habitation and economic life. Although the Japanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs claims that more than 200 Japanese lived on the Senkaku islands, at some
point (Information about the Senaku, 2015), they were likely only inhabited seasonally, and
they are not inhabited now. Moreover, it is doubtful that the islands can sustain economic life on
their own; that is, inhabitants would likely need to rely on resources (i.e. fish) in the surrounding
sea for their livelihood (Hasnay, 2014).
Several questions remain: Do the Dioayu truly classify as islands? Would international
arbitration conclude that the islands belong China or to Japan? 2 For the purpose of this paper, I
assume that China wishes to enforce an EEZ that extends 350 nautical miles from the Chinese
mainland. Chinas claim to vast expanses of the East and South China Seas that fall within its

There is substantial literature that attempts to predict how the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
would arbitrate over China and Japans maritime boundaries. For example, Braden Hasnay (Brooklyn
Law School) argues that the Senkaku do not fit under UNCLOS definition of islands. He cites former ICJ
cases in which islands that were larger and more populated than the Diaoyu (which have a population of
zero) were denied EEZs. Moreover, Hasnay argues that the ICJ has a history of giving precedent to
equitability in its arbitration over territorial disputes. He predicts that if China and Japan were to agree
to third party arbitration, the ICJ would grant the Senkaku at most a 12-24 mile territorial sea and
contiguous zone, but not an EEZ or continental shelf(p. 1756). Hasnay claims that granting the islands
anything more would constitute an inequitable solution, which the ICJ attempts to avoid.

10

self-proclaimed nine-dash line and its assertions of ownership over the Diaoyu, which are located
200 miles from the Chinese mainland, fit within this paradigm (Ramos-Mrosovosky, 2008).
Regardless of whether or not the Dioayu truly qualify as islands under UNCLOS or whether
international arbitration would grant jurisdiction of the islands to China, this is the angle China is
pursuing. According to Chinas 350 nautical mile boundary delimitation, the Diaoyu fall
squarely in Chinese territory, and China has the right to exploit the Diaoyu and the ocean around
them. The right of a state to exploit the natural resources in the seabed located in its EEZ will
become highly relevant later in my analysis of the potential economic benefits that the owners of
the Diaoyu may enjoy. While understanding how the vague and at times contradictory nature of
UNCLOS provides China with a legal basis for what may appear to be a very ambitious
territorial claim, it is also important to investigate some of the oft-cited motivations for China to
claim such a large EEZ.
Taylor Fravel (2010) addresses Chinas growing power in the Asia Pacific through the
lens of power transition theory. Power transition theory is utilized in international relations to
predict when conflict is likely to occur between states. According to power transition theory,
conflict is most likely when a rising power, dissatisfied with the status quo, approaches parity
with the dominant state in a region or the system and is willing to use force to reshape the
systems rules and institutions (p. 505). Fravel analyzes potential incentives for Chinese
territorial expansion, including increased spheres of influence, access to resources, or status in
the system (p. 506). After examining the benefits and costs, he concludes that policymakers can
rest assured that China will not challenge the United States as the global hegemon or engage in
territorial expansion, as the costs (including harming trade relationships or diplomatic ties)

11

outweigh the potential benefits. Fravel views the benefits of expansion as modest, and is
doubtful that China even has the ability to expand far beyond Taiwan (p. 526).
However, Fravel observes that territorial conflicts in the South and East China Seas
create additional incentives that are not posed by potential onshore expansion, including the
belief that the disputed territories are historically Chinese and the perception of large deposits of
oil and natural gas in the disputed zones (p. 526). He also gives weight to nationalism as
creating motivation for territorial expansion. Fravel notes that nationalism is often the driving
force behind efforts to regain lost territory and to right past injustices to the nation for
countries in which territorial loss is a major historical legac[y] (p. 519). He sees the potential
for party leadership to exploit anti-Japanese nationalism in order to pursue territorial acquisition.
Fravel remarks that expressions of nationalism have become more frequent and intensified in the
past 20 years: the number and scope of demonstrations, protests, and riots classified as mass
incidents in China has increased dramatically from 8,700 in 1993 to potentially as high as
170,000 in 2009 (p. 519). Fravel concludes that both the potential for oil and gas wealth and
nationalism may serve as possible motivations for Chinese aggression in the East China Sea. He
predicts an increase in Chinese naval presence in the South and China Seas, although he
considers Chinese seizure of the disputed territories unlikely, as he views the Chinese navy as
too weak to hold on to any seizures (p. 526).
Among some policy analysts, Chinas recent military development is an alarming sign
that the Asian giant is attempting to curb American influence in the Pacific. A May 16 New York
Times article described how, after 20 years of possessing the technology and intelligence, China
finally developed long-range missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads (Sanger and Broad,
2015). The logical question arose: why develop them now? Combined with Chinas increased

12

presence in the Pacific Ocean, Sanger and Broad raise the concern that China may be attempting
to diminish American influence in the region in order to achieve its own goals of territorial
expansion. The article notes that Chinas assertiveness in the East and South China Seas reflects
a rapid transformation of foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. The authors describe
Chinas construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea as clear signals that
underscored for White House policy makers and military planners the speed and intensity of
Mr. Xis determination to push potential competitors out into the mid-Pacific (Sanger and
Broad, 2015).
Some military analysts considered the missile upgrade a sign that China is attempting not
only to exert its control in the Pacific, but is challenging the United States as the global
hegemon. Ashley Tellis, former senior national security official under the George W. Bush
administration, warned that Chinas development of advanced missile technology is obviously
part of an effort to prepare for long-term competition with the United States (Sanger and Broad,
2015). Tellis also noted that of the range of missiles China could have chosen to upgrade, it
chose one of few that can unambiguously reach the United States. In addition, Sanger and
Broad posit that by building up its naval fleet, China is creat[ing] an overall force that could
pose a credible challenge to the United States in the event of a regional crisis. This article
raises important questions about Chinas motives for increasing its military capacity. Is China
building up its military simply out of self-defense? Is it hoping to achieve regional dominance
by reducing American influence in the Pacific? Or is it preparing to challenge the global order
and aiming to replace the United States as the hegemonic power? Further investigation is
necessary to answer these questions.

13

When reporting on or analyzing Chinas territorial conflicts and its claim over a vast
majority of the territory in the South and East China seas, Western literature and news often cite
a new nationalism as taking hold in China and as responsible for what some view as a rise in
aggressive behavior (Sanger & Gladstone, 2015). Yinan He argues that this new nationalism has
its roots in Deng Xiaopings era and his restructuring of the goals of the Chinese Communist
state. Deng shifted the ideological focus of the CCP from supporting communism towards
patriotism and nationalism. This new nationalism portrayed China as superior to other nations
and its forthcomings as results of its victimhood during the early twentieth century (He, 2007).
Beginning in 1991, the Patriotic Education Campaign attempted to reframe Chinese
historical memory through changes in education that depicted China as a victim of Western,
especially Japanese, aggression (Wang, 2008). Education and historical memory evolved from
portrayals of China as a victor to China as a victim. Modern school curricula taught children
about Chinas suffering under on the one hundred years of humiliation, especially at the hands
of the Japanese (p.1). The education program highlighted Japanese wartime atrocities and paved
the way for an increase in anti-Japanese sentiment throughout the past four decades (He, 2007).
Zheng Wang argues that the Chinese Communist Party actively encourages anti-Japanese
sentiment by frequently reminding its citizens of past harms Japan has committed against China
and its failure to adequately apologize and provide reparations to China for its suffering (Wang,
2008). This has resulted in increased frequency and intensity of anti-Japanese protests in recent
years. Yinan He warns that if the CCP is unable to control anti-Japanese sentiment, this new
nationalism may increase Sino-Japanese conflict, especially over territorial disputes (i.e. Diaoyu)
and the demarcation of Exclusive Economics Zones (He, 2007).

14

Both Yinan He and Zheng Wang point out ways in which the Chinese Communist Party
has shaped nationalism. I am interested in evaluating how nationalism might affect the behavior
of the state. It may appear as though this will cause a simultaneity problem, if nationalism and
the state both shape one another. James Reilly (2012) addresses this question of causality in his
book Strong Society, Smart State. He acknowledges that the state has certainly had a role in
shaping nationalism, noting that decades of propaganda certainly helped to create the broad
base of popular distrust and animosity toward Japan (Reilly, p. 208). However, he concludes
that displays of nationalism, in the form of public mobilization, political activism, and
popular media content, are usually organic (p. 209). This solves the question of reverse
causality: according to Reilly, the state does not cause displays of nationalism, such as protests.
However, it still leaves the question: does nationalism actually affect the actions of the Chinese
state?
Reilly and others have argued that public opinion is in fact a large and powerful
determinant of state action, especially in the case of Sino-Japanese relations. Peter Gries
describes public opinion as so influential that the Chinese Communist Party is held hostage to
nationalist opinion in the making of Chinas Japan policy (Reilly, 2012, p. 6). Gries argues that
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot make Japanese foreign policy without taking into
consideration public opinion. Reilly describes China as a fragile state, bowing to public
demands for a more aggressive foreign policy (p. 7). An authoritarian regime bowing to public
demand seems paradoxical, but Reilly argues that an important source of legitimacy for the CCP
is appropriately responding to public opinion with foreign policy that reflects the opinions of the
Chinese people. However, he predicts that the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment in China will
result in increasingly aggressive foreign policy. In fact, Reilly finds it shocking that the bilateral

15

relationship have remained stable and healthy for the most part over the past several decades,
despite rising Sino-Japanese tension.
In his 1995 article, Allen Whiting discusses the different factors that may have influenced
cycles of affirmative and assertive nationalism in China in the in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
He writes that both domestic and external factors, including the rise of factions, leadership
instability, and changes in the global balance of power, may prompt nationalistic posture and
policy (p. 295-296). Whiting explains the relationship between nationalism and
aggression/non-cooperation:
Three types of nationalism may be distinguished in this regard: affirmative, assertive and
aggressive. Affirmative nationalism centres exclusively on "us" as a positive in-group
referent with pride in attributes and achievements. Assertive nationalism adds "them" as a
negative out-group referent that challenges the in-group's interests and possibly its
identity. Aggressive nationalism identifies a specific foreign enemy as a serious threat
that requires action to defend vital interests. (Whiting, 1995, 295)
He goes on to explain the functions of different types of nationalism. Of particular interest is his
conjecture that aggressive nationalism arouses anger and mobilizes behaviour and can have
significant consequences for foreign policy and foreign relations. (p. 295). Whiting predicts that
as Chinas military strengthens, assertive nationalism will prevail in party rhetoric. He warns
that, depending on party leadership and the strength of the Peoples Liberation Army, China may
respond to territorial conflicts in the South and East China Seas with aggressive nationalism.
However, some scholars criticize the broad use of the term nationalism by scholars and
pundits alike. Nationalism is often poorly-defined term and used without establishing consensus
as to its meaning. It can include aspects of a countrys culture, political system, history,

16

economy, and more, yet very infrequently are journalists and academics clear about what
nationalism describes. Particularly with China, scholars who write about a rise of Chinese
nationalism often confuse popular opinion with the opinion of a few state newspapers or CCP
officials or vice versa (Chubb, 2015). In my own analysis, I am careful to define nationalism and
to separate how I measure popular nationalism from state opinion in order to avoid some of these
pitfalls.
In addition, there is a lack of consensus among scholars that this new nationalism has
manifested itself into assertive or aggressive behavior. Alastair Ian Johnston (2013) criticizes
western newspapers and bloggers for treating it as conventional wisdom that China is newly
assertive. He argues that the medias definitions of assertive are often vague, their criteria
unclear, and their methodology poor. He does not observe any substantial changes in Chinas
behavior over the past few decades that would indicate a new assertiveness. As I am only
measuring Chinas behavior during the brief period surrounding Japans nationalization of the
Diaoyu, I cannot draw any conclusions about whether Chinas behavior reflects new
cooperativeness or aggression, or whether it reflects a longer trend of similar behavior.
Methodology
Measuring the Economic Value of the Diaoyu
I define economic value broadly to include the potential for economic benefit that
ownership of the islands may provide, including natural resources on the islands themselves and
in the sea surrounding themI assume that jurisdiction over the islands grants an Exclusive
Economic Zone. These natural resources include fish, wildlife, mineral deposits, and
hydrocarbons. However, certain natural resources overshadow others in terms of potential for
economic gain.

17

The highest value of the Diaoyu islands lies not in the land, but in the sea surrounding it.
Vast quantities of oil and natural gas lie under the seabed and continental shelf under and around
the islands. Other natural resources are also abundant, but their economic value seems pale in
comparison. The islands have been used in the past for collecting guano, but there is little
evidence that either China or Japan is interested in using them for this purpose today (Position
Paper, 2012). The East China Sea is also rich in marine life,3 but as the space around the
islands could be used for much more profitable uses (oil rigs), there would be a high opportunity
cost for fishing in the region as opposed to drilling for oil and natural gas.
Therefore, I evaluate the economic value of the Diaoyu islands assuming their highestvalue use, which is the extraction of oil and natural gas. Unfortunately, the Diaoyu islands
dispute has prevented extended probing and investigation of the seabed surrounding it. The
initial survey performed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) 4 in 1969 yielded no definite results, but concluded that there was potential for rich oil
and gas reserves in the area (Li, 1975). Chinese oil producers, such as the Chinese National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, have surveyed

various oil fields just outside of the disputed zone and have made tentative estimates on the oil
and gas reserves within the contested region. However, only the CNOOP has published public
reports of its estimates. Fortunately, recent estimates have been made through the United States
Geological Survey, a highly reputable source (East China Sea, 2014). While further
exploration is necessary to establish a more complete understanding of the quantity and
accessibility of oil and natural gas below the seabed, the limited data available can be used to

China already fishes in the East China Sea, sharing in the annual catch of 3.8 million tons of fish per
year in that region (McGinley, 2011).
4
Now called the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for ASIA and the Pacific (ESCAP).

18

develop a tentative evaluation of the volume of oil and natural gas present in the seabed
surrounding the Senkaku islands. Estimates are provided in Table 1.
In order to understand the relevance and importance of access to an additional source of
oil and natural gas, it is important to understand Chinas current non-renewable energy use, the
role of non-renewable energy in Chinas economic growth, and Chinas reliance on oil and
natural gas imports.
According to BPs 2014 Statistical Review of World Energy, at the end of 2013, China
had 18.1 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.5 In 2013, China consumed 10.7 million barrels of
oil daily, which adds up to about 3.9 billion barrels a year. This represents a 3.8% increase in oil
consumption from 2012. At 12.1% of global oil consumption, China was the second largest oil
consumer in 2013. However, in 2013, China only produced 1.5 billion barrels of oil, less than
half of its yearly consumption, forcing China to import oil to meet its energy needs (BP, 2014).
These statistics are summarized in Table 1.
Statistics of natural gas reserves, production, and consumption paint a similar picture.
China had 115 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves in 2013 (BP, 2014),
produced 4.1 Tcf yearly (US EIA), and Chinese consumption represented 4.8% of global natural
gas consumption at 5.7 Tcf a year (China, 2014), a 3.8% increase from 2012 (BP, 2014).
China is a net importer of natural gas, as well. In fact, China was the second largest net-importer
of oil and the third largest net-importer of liquid natural gas6 in 2013.
Chinas immense economic growth in the past decade is underpinned by large energy
consumption, with fossil fuels serving as the primary source of electricity at 75% of all capacity.
As the largest energy consumer in the world, Chinas energy consumption is only expected to
5

Proven reserves is the quantity that extractors are at least 90% confident can be extracted, given
current technology, political conditions, etc. (Oil Reserves Definitions, 2014).
6
Liquid natural gas is natural gas that has been pressurized into liquid form for ease of transport.

19

rise as it attempts to maintain its enormous economic growth rate of 7% a year. Given current
trends, the US Energy Information Administration predicts Chinas natural gas use to triple by
2040 and its oil imports to increase to 72% of all consumption, as energy demands far outpace
domestic oil supply. In addition, although oil and natural gas combined currently only make up
22% of Chinas current energy use (coal remains the primary energy source), China is hoping to
transition from heavy-polluting energy sources such as coal to oil and natural gas (China,
2014).
Chinas rising demand for oil and natural gas and its inability to meet its energy needs
without relying heavily on imports have driven it to seek ways to increase domestic energy
production. Chinas primary land-based natural gas basins are located in the provinces of
Sichuan, Qinghai, and Shanxi, and its primary onshore oil production occurs in the provinces of
Xinjiang, Sichuan, and Gansu. However, it has explored offshore oil and natural gas production
in the East and South China Seas as promising additions to its energy production. The U.S.
Energy Information Administration claims that Chinas ability to transition from utilizing coal as
a primary energy source towards using natural gas and oil in the long term depends on the
countrys ability to increase domestic production through shale gas and offshore reserves
(China, 2014). In 2013, China invested $13 million in oil and natural gas exploration to this
end. Exploration has been focused in the offshore regions of the inner bay of the Yellow Sea
(Bohai Bay), the Pearl River Mountain and Qiongdongnan Basins in the South China Sea, and
the Okinawa trough7 in the East China Sea.8
7

China claims that the Okinawa trough marks the end of its continental shelf and falls at the edge of its
350 mile EEZ. Japan rejects this notion and maintains its claim over the equidistant maritime boundary
(Ramos-Mrosovosky, 2008).
8
China first began exploring the East China Sea in the 1980s, and in 1983, China and Japan jointly
financed oil and gas pipelines running from the newly probed Pinghu field, which lies just outside the
disputed zone, to terminals in Shanghai and Ningbo, both of which are cities located on the Chinese

20

Table 1 compares estimates of the quantity of oil and natural gas present in the East
China Sea with Chinas current energy demand.
Measuring Nationalism
As Andrew Chubb (2003) and Alastair Ian Johnston (2013) point out, nationalism can be
challenging to measure, especially because there may not be consensus as to the definition of
nationalism among different sources that are attempting to measure it. I define nationalism as
the expression of the belief of the inherent superiority of ones own state compared to other
states. With respect to territorial conflicts, nationalism may include the expression that ones
own country has an inherently superior claim to the territory in question. Popular anti-Japanese
expression is the type of nationalism that is particularly relevant to investigating Chinas
response to Japans nationalization of the Senkaku.
I utilize newspaper reports of Chinese protests as a measurement of nationalism during
the period July 1, 2012 to January 1, 2013. Using a Chinese newspaper, such as the China Daily,
would be valuable in that Chinese reporters are most likely to be aware of a protest taking place
and the details of that protest, because Chinese reporters are on the ground and not corresponding
from across the globe. However, Chinese newspapers may be an unreliable source for reporting
on anti-Japanese protests, due to censorship. During periods of public opinion crisis, when
there exists a mismatch between the position of the state and public opinion on a particular
issue, the state will censor all news sources, commercialized or otherwise, for the purpose of
altering public opinion to realign with the states position (Stockmann, 2010, p. 270). This takes
form through homogenization of news or forbidding newspapers to report on certain events (p.

mainland. It is unclear what Japan gains from co-financing this project. A few additional fields have
been developed in recent years by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation and the China
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, but Pinghu remains the most lucrative field (China, 2014).

21

273). Stockmann notes that censorship occurs most frequently when the CCP views an issue or
event as being core to social stability and economic growth (p. 273).
This complicates efforts to measure nationalism using Chinese newspapers. First, the
CCP often forbids the media from reporting about protests (Stockmann, 2010, p. 273). If the
CCP selectively prevented media from reporting on some protests, but not others, then
performing a content analysis on Chinese newspapers would inadequately reflect the number of
protests that actually occurred. Second, a newspapers may reflect a mixture of popular opinion
and state sentiment depending on how commercial or official it is, making it difficult to
measure nationalism as a reflection of popular expression (p. 271). Instead of using a Chinese
newspaper to measure nationalism during and around the time of the purchase of the Diaoyu, I
utilize New York Times articles. The New York Times, as a for-profit, non-government-affiliated
newspaper, should not have political reasons to selectively report on only certain protests,
making the New York Times a more appropriate option.
I sample New York Times articles online (nytimes.com) from a six month period: July 1,
2012 to January 1, 2013. I use the search term Diaoyu and limit my search to articles
(omitting opinion pieces) in the world section (which removes articles from sports,
entertainment etc.). I note the number of the times the phrases protest and nationalism
appear in each article (includes derivations of those words) and whether Chinese citizens are
portrayed as angry or emotional in response to the Diaoyu dispute. If the article does
reference a protest, I note the date the protest occurred and the event that triggered the protest. I
also record whether or not any property was destroyed, whether anyone was injured/killed, and
whether the protest was considered violent by the reporter. If the number of protest

22

participants is mentioned, I note that as well. These indicators are included to develop an
understanding of the magnitude or intensity of the protest.
My initial search yields 47 articles. I analyze every fifth article (10 total) as a
representative sample. My findings are summarized in Table 3.
Measuring Chinas response: cooperation or non-cooperation
Finally, I measure whether Chinas official response to the Diaoyu island conflict tended
towards cooperation or non-cooperation (aggression). I do this in two ways. First, I measure
how official statements from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs frame Japan (as either a
neighbor sharing common goals or as the other) during the height of the conflict and whether or
not the statements propose cooperative solutions to the territorial dispute, such as dialogue and
negotiations. I then evaluate the 10 New York Times articles to examine Chinas actions during
this period and record how often military intervention was utilized, as an indicator of noncooperation.
I model my methodology loosely on Michael Chans analysis of China Daily articles that
reported on the Diaoyu islands dispute during the period 2002-2011. Unlike Chan, I do not
examine China Daily articles, but analyze official statements from the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Although utilizing the same source of information would provide consistency
and a point of comparison with Michael Chans findings, there is a small risk there will be
differences in China Daily articles from 2002-2011 and the height of the conflict in 2012, due to
increased government censorship during the latter period. It is important to provide relevant
context to understand how deregulation, censorship, and state ownership all play a role in
Chinese news reporting.

23

Despite the fact that in China all news sources are owned and regulated by the state, there
is actually substantial variation in reporting. Media reforms in the past three decades have led to
increased autonomy for some news sources. The result is that some will reflect the opinion of
the state to a greater degree than others. According to Daniela Stockmann (2010), deregulation,
commercialization and partial privatization of the Chinese media throughout the past 35 years
has allowed some news sources to evolve into profit-seeking models, which more accurately
reflect public opinion than news sources that are overwhelming state-funded (p. 271). All news
sources are registered to the state and belong to the Chinese Communist Party, but they differ in
the level of autonomy they enjoy and hence how strongly they haul the party line (p. 274).
However, because fully commercialized, privatized media source does not exist in China,
the state will routinely censor all news sources regarding issues that it deems highly sensitive. I
consider it likely that state censorship occurred during the height of the Diaoyu conflict in 2012,
and there is a possibility that censorship may have altered China Daily reporting to the point that
2012 articles are not representative of China Daily reporting in the same way as articles
published pre-2012.
It is also important to note, however, that Michael Chan analyzed articles in a newspaper
that should, for the most part, reflect official state opinion. In conducting her research,
Stockmann categorized news sources into three progressive categories: commercialized, semiofficial, and official. She argues that news sources falling in the official category are least
progressive and operate like organs of the state (p. 272). The China Daily is ranked by
Stockmann as the third most official of 21 major newspapers (p. 272). This makes the China
Daily a suitable resource for measuring state opinion (as opposed to popular opinion) concerning
Japan during the period 2002-2011 and likely also surrounding the period of the Japans

24

purchase of the Diaoyu islands. Although I chose to utilize statements from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, it is likely that China Daily articles would have also accurately reflected state
opinion.
From his content analysis, Michael Chan concludes that, in the 2002-2011 news reports
about the Diaoyu conflict, the Chinese Communist Party effectively balanced two important
discourses. First, the state was firm in asserting Chinas sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands and
negating Japans claims to them. Second, it upheld the CCPs international foreign relations
policy, which emphasizes cooperation and peace. Chan concludes that while the CCP was
unyielding in reinforcing its sovereignty over the islands, the majority of China Daily articles
during this period also portrayed Japan in a positive light and emphasized commonalities and
shared interests over antagonism. The China Daily referenced Japan as a member of the greater
Asian community; it emphasized that the two countries share goals and aspirations for peace and
prosperity and reinforced the importance of cooperation for reaching those goals.
I suspect that official statements from the Ministry of Foreign affairs published around
the period of Japans nationalization of the Senkaku will not reflect the same balance that Chan
observed in articles published pre-2012. During this period, strong accusations and statements of
indignation are likely to come at the cost of neglecting language of peaceful compromise and
shared identity.
I perform a content analysis on a sample of 11 official statements from the English
version of the Foreign Ministry of the Peoples Republic of China website (fmprc.gov). I
analyze half (every other document) of the 23 statements available under the topic, The Issue of
Diaoyu Dai. Statements range in date from August 15 to October 30, a considerably shorter
time frame than my analysis of New York Times articles. I record how many times each

25

statement references Japan as belonging to a shared in-group, such as being a member of the
greater East Asian or Asian community. I observe the frequency of appeals to cooperative
solutions to the territorial dispute, such as calls to stand together in peace (FMPRC,
RemarksMarking the 40th Anniversary) or manag[e] disagreements through dialogue and
consultation. (FMPRC, Remarkson the Issue of Diaoyu Dao) I contrast these with the
number of times the Foreign Ministry accuses Japan of wrongfully obtaining the islands, such as
stealing or seizing them or acquiring them through backroom deals with the United States
(FMPRC, Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China). I also record the frequency of phrases
that assert that China will firmly uphold its claims over the Diaoyufor example, "China will
never tolerate any violation of or damage to the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity
(FMPRC, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi)and the number of articles that appeal to supposed
historical facts regarding Chinas ownership of the Diaoyu. I present my findings in Table 3.
In addition to examining how the Ministry of Foreign affairs framed solutions to the
dispute, I examine what actions the state actually took. In my content analysis of New York
Times articles (described in the previous section), I record how many articles mention Chinese
military intervention in the disputed region and what type of military intervention occurs. These
findings are included in Table 2.

Data

26

27

Table 2: Content analysis of New York Times articles (8/1/12-1/1/13)

Topic of interest

Number of articles that make

reference to topic of interest

Nationalism or nationalists

2 (20%)

Chinese as "angry" or "emotional"

in response to islands conflict

6 (60%)

Chinese protests

7 (70%)

"Violent" Protests

5 (50%)

Property destruction or vandalism

as a result of protest

3 (30%)

Someone is injured or killed in

protest

1 (10%)

China as exhibiting
assertive behavior

6 (60%)

(China as "expanding claims"

in the Pacific; Chinese patrol boats
as a "direct challenge" to Japan)
Chinese military intervention
in or very near the disputed region
(patrol boats or airplanes)

6 (60%)

The Diaoyu/Senkaku as containing

valuable oil and/or gas reserves

4 (40%)

Chinese officials promoting

cooperative solutions
(negotiations, peace talks)

1 (10%)

Source: The New York Times

Table 2.1: Statistics for New York Times articles
Total number of articles

10

Total word count

8212

Max word count

1368

Min word count

125

Average word count

812

28

29

Analysis
Economic Value
Comparing different evaluations of the oil and natural gas reserves located in the East
China Sea provides disappointingly inconsistent results. While the United States Geological
Survey estimates that the East China Sea contains 200 million barrels of oil and 1-2 trillion cubic
feet (Tcf) of natural gas, estimates by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company cite only one
tenth those amounts. It is possible that the CNOOCs evaluations only include oil and gas fields
outside of the disputed zone, such as the offshore fields at Pinghu and Chunxiao. As a national
oil producer, CNOOC may also be under pressure from the state to downplay the potential
economic value of the disputed zone. China may wish to draw attention away from the potential
material gains from ownership of the Diaoyu in order to focus the dispute on historical claims of
ownerships. While there are no sure explanations for the incongruent energy evaluations, we can
still draw valuable conclusions from the data.
Regardless of which evaluation of the volume of oil and gas reserves we use, contrasting
the potential energy available in the East China Sea with Chinas current energy demand and
other presently exploited energy fields illustrates that the East China Sea should not be
considered a significant source of non-renewable energy. Even by using the US Geological
Surveys more generous estimates, the amount of oil in the disputed region is decent, but not
impressive. According to BPs evaluation of Chinas current oil consumption rate, China would
use up the entire reserves of oil in the East China Sea in less than a month. While 200 million
barrels is certainly not a negligible amount of oil, the value of Chinas other numerous onshore
and offshore oil fields far overshadows the value of the oil in the East China Sea. Despite having
been exploited for over 50 years, oil fields at Daqing (onshore) and Shengli (offshore) are still

30

producing oil at rates of 290 million barrels/year and 200 million barrels/year, respectively
(China, 2014). In addition, because the territorial dispute has prevented extensive exploration
of the region, it is not clear how much of the oil is easy-to-extract, surface-level oil and therefore
how much could reasonably be extracted each year. If that amount is perhaps only five or ten
million barrels a year, then the East China Sea holds little potential value to a country that that
consumes that amount daily.
Estimates of natural gas deposits are a bit more promising at one to two trillion cubic
feet, which is on par with Chinas total gas imports in 2013. However, China has a dozen other
lucrative gas fields, such as on the mainland in Changqing and Daqing and offshore in the gulf of
the Yellow Sea, which are already producing a combined 4.1 Tcf/year. There are numerous
natural gas fields that have already been surveyed extensively and are ripe for development. For
example, the CNOOC estimates that there are 4-6 Tcf of natural gas reserves located in Liwan
(near Hong Kong in the South China Sea) and 16.2 Tcf located at additional fields in the Tarim
basin in Xinjiang. The introduction of new technologies such as hydraulic fracturing, commonly
called fracking, has opened up the opportunity for gas extraction in formerly undeveloped
regions. In fact, the US Energy Information Administration estimates that China has the largest
recoverable shale gas reserves in the world at 1,115 Tcf, which can be extracted using fracking
(China, 2014). While evaluations of the volume of natural gas in the East China Sea are more
impressive than estimates of oil reserves, they are not significant compared to Chinas other
natural gas reserves.
China is expected to experience continual rising oil and gas demand due to prolonged
economic growth and its attempts to transition away from coal as a primary energy source.
However, China has numerous onshore and offshore oil and gas fields that can be further

31

developed in order to supplement its energy needs. The East China Seas energy reserves are
simply not large enough to be considered a significant source of potential energy.
Nationalism
Table 2 illustrates that the majority of New York Times articles I sampled cited what can
be described as nationalistic behavior by Chinese citizens in the two months preceding Japans
nationalization of the Senkaku islands and in the four months afterward. Of the 10 articles I
sampled, the majority (60%) portrayed Chinese citizens as angry or emotional in response to
perceptions of Japans unacceptable actions, including Japans nationalization of the islands and
refusal to acknowledge the dispute. The exhibition of strong emotions indicates that the
territorial dispute was a salient issue for many Chinese people. Perceptions of Japanese
wrongdoing were met with protests; 70% of the articles sampled referenced some form of
Chinese protest, including street protests, attacks on the Japanese embassy, vandalizing Japanese
stores, and civilian landings on the Diaoyu. Of the 7 articles referencing protests, 5 (71%)
described protests as violent and 3 (43%) noted that vandalism and property destruction
accompanied the protest mentioned.
However, it is important to note that while multiple protests took place, many occurred
on the same day: protests only occurred on three separate days during this time period. The
protests that occurred on September 15, 2012 were referenced in multiple articles, due to their
scale and intensity. On September 15, protests took place in 40 Chinese cities in objection of
Japans nationalization of the Diaoyu four days earlier. Demonstrators threw eggs and rocks at
the Japanese embassy in Beijing, while others burned down a Toyota dealership, while still
others marched with banners and chanted Death to Japan (Johnson & Perlez, 2012). In another
notable protest that took place on August 12 prior to the nationalization, 14 Chinese nationals

32

rented a fishing boat and landed on the disputed islands. When questioned by the Japanese
police, they argued that they had every right to be on the islands, which they considered Chinese
territory (Fackler, Aug 17, 2012).
Combining quantitative data with qualitative descriptions of the protests provides a
portrayal of how nationalist sentiment played out in the months surrounding Japans purchase of
the islands. From the scale of protests and the different kinds of protests (street protests, Chinese
nationals entering the disputed region), it is evident that many Chinese citizens interpreted
Japans nationalization of the Senkaku as a serious offense and were not afraid to give witness to
their opinion. I conclude that there were clear displays of nationalism during the sixth month
period of July 1, 2012-January 1, 2013.
However, only 20% of the total articles described Chinese protesters as nationalists. It
is unclear why. Perhaps the journalists whose pieces I sampled viewed the protests as reasonable
responses to perceived violations of Chinas territorial integrity. Perhaps the term nationalism
is considered a loaded word, and so they were hesitant to use it. Perhaps actions speak louder
than words, so the label nationalist was unnecessary. Despite the low frequency of the term
nationalism in the articles sampled, I conclude that nationalism was clearly exhibited during this
period.
Chinas response
Data from Tables 2 and 3 confirm that Chinas response to the territorial conflict was
non-cooperative. This is evident in the relatively low recognition of shared in-group identity
with Japan, the low frequency of phrases promoting cooperative solutions, and the high
frequency of military interventions during the height of the dispute. While Japan was mentioned
regularly throughout the eleven Foreign Ministry statements at a total of 536 times, only 13

33

phrases described Japan as sharing a larger in-group identity with China. There were a roughly
equal number of phrases encouraging cooperative solutions at 14 total. However, I did not
observe a strong correlation between the reference of a shared in-group identity and appeals to
cooperate. Three of the eleven documents (27%) referred to Japan as sharing an in-group
identity with China, while five articles (45%) recommended a cooperative solution to the islands
dispute. However, only twice was there an overlap between the two themes. The Foreign
Ministry was not appealing to shared in-group identity as a reason for cooperation.
Allegations that Japan had stolen or otherwise wrongfully obtained the Diaoyu islands
appeared far more frequently at 124 total references and a maximum of 44 references in a single,
albeit long, statement of 5100 words. These included assertions that China had acquired the
islands through backroom deals with the United States, that the act of nationalizing the islands
constituted a violation of Chinas territorial sovereignty, and that the farce of purchasing the
islands would be considered illegal and invalid by the Chinese government (FMPRC, Vice
Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun).
These weighty assertions by no means prove that China was rejecting cooperation as a
mechanism to resolving the conflict. However, they do contribute to demonization of Japan and
the conceptualization of Japan as the other and not as a neighbor and friend who shares similar
goals and aspirations. This indicates that, unlike the pre-2012 China Daily articles that Michael
Chan sampled, Foreign Ministry statements during this period were not reinforcing images of the
Japanese as members of a larger community with shared goals.
There is also a disconnect between the inclusion of appeals to cooperate and the relatively
higher frequency of phrases reminding Japan and the international community that China was
committed to upholding and protecting its sovereignty over the Diaoyu. In the same statement in

34

which China indicated its commitment to safeguard its friendship with Japan, encourage winwin cooperation, and to stand together in peace, there are phrases that indicate little room for
negotiation or cooperation, but suggest Chinas willingness to act unilaterally: "China will not
sit idly by when its territorial sovereignty is violated" (FMPRC, RemarksMarking the 40th
Anniversary). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is sending mixed messages about its commitment
to promote cooperation, especially because phrases asserting Chinas intention to uphold its
sovereignty appear three times as frequently as phrases encouraging cooperation (46 to 14).
Data concerning Chinas military actions during the dispute confirm that its response to
the dispute is non-cooperative. 60% of the New York Times articles I sampled cited China as
engaging in military intervention in the contested zone, with both patrol boats and airplanes. In
the month after the dispute, China exerted pressure by sending unarmed surveillance ships into
waters near the disputed islands on almost a daily basis (Fackler, Oct. 10, 2012). Often, the
patrol boats would enter just within the zone, only to be chased out by the Japanese coast guard.
Chinas largest naval presence in the disputed zone was on Thursday, September 20, just a week
after the nationalization, when China sent 16 ships into the contested waters. The following
month 11 ships and 8 airplanes took part in naval exercises held in the East China Sea
(Associated Press, Oct. 20). Three months after the nationalization of the Senkaku, on
December 13, a Chinese military aircraft entered into the disputed airspace, only to disappear
before Japan could assemble its jets (Tabuchi, 2012). New York Times journalists cite the patrol
boats and airplanes as a direct challenge [to] Japans claim to the islands (Fackler, Sept. 22,
2012) and as attempts to wear down Japans resolve (Tabuchi, 2012).
Of the ten New York Times articles I sampled, only one spoke of China promoting a
cooperative solution to the dispute, and even then the phrasing is not very convincing. When

35

asked about the dispute in October, Chinese foreign minister Hong Lei said, Japan should face
reality, acknowledge the dispute, correct its mistakes and come back to a solution to the issue
through negotiation (Fackler, Oct. 10, 2012). Again, we see that entreaties for diplomacy are
combined with accusations of Japanese wrongdoing.
Comparing Chinas words and actions reveals that while China may have at times
utilized cooperative rhetoric to create the illusion of supporting cooperative outcomes to the
territorial dispute, it was actively pursuing a non-cooperative strategy that included the threat of
military intervention in the disputed zone and actual intervention at times. Chinas actions speak
louder than its words, and its actions reveal a willingness to act unilaterally in order to protect is
territorial integrity from perceived violations. I conclude that Chinas response to Japans
nationalization of the islands was non-cooperation.
Discussion
The potential to own the oil and natural gas reserves in the Exclusive Economic Zone
around the Diaoyu is often cited among journalists and scholars as being one of the underlying
causes of Chinas unyielding assertions that Senkaku are its inherent territory. 40% of the New
York Times articles I analyzed described the islands as granting access to valuable oil and/or gas
reserves. However, I find little evidence that the energy reserves in the East China Sea are as
valuable as they are often claimed to be. We cannot consider the economic value of the Diaoyu
to be one of the causes for Chinas non-cooperative response, especially in light of Chinas own
evaluations of the energy wealth in the East China Sea conducted through the Chinese National
Offshore Oil Company, which revealed unimpressive amounts of oil and natural gas reserves.
There is evidence to suggest that displays of nationalism during the dispute may have
influenced Chinas responses toward Japan into one of non-cooperation. During the two months

36

preceding and the four months after Japans nationalization of the Senkaku, violent protests took
place in cities all over China in which citizens denounced Japans intent to purchase the islands
and later, its nationalization of them. While it may be tempting to argue that protests of a similar
scale and intensity would have also taken place if the territorial dispute were with any other
country, we cannot dismiss the distinctly anti-Japanese tone of many of the demonstrations.
Attacks on Japanese businesses, such as Toyota, go beyond a simple assertion of Chinas
sovereignty over the Diaoyu and illustrate a larger assault not just on Japans actions, but on the
Japanese people. It appears that many Chinese have treated Japans nationalization of the islands
as a personal offense and as a sign that Japan is reliving its history of imperialism by seizing
Chinese territory. Many of the protests called attention to Chinas past suffering under Japanese
imperialism with banners that were sexual in nature, reflecting the Japanese militarys brutal
wartime treatment of Chinese, including the systematic rape of Chinese women. For example,
one banner depicted a Chinese soldier castrating a Japanese soldier (Shanker & Johnson,
2012). The demonstrations were not simply emphasizing Chinas claim over the islands, but
revealing strong anti-Japanese sentiments that could discourage attempts by the state to negotiate
and develop cooperative solutions with a group of people who may be viewed as aggressor,
antagonizer, and enemy.
Displays of anti-Japanese sentiment may have tied the hands of the Chinese government
and led it to take a non-cooperative response to the dispute. According to James Reilly (2012),
the only way the CCP can respond to large protests is for foreign policy to take a hard line
against Japan. Describing Japan as a thief, as the Foreign Ministry did, may actually have been
considered the most appropriate response if the CCP wanted to maintain its legitimacy.

37

There are of course limitations to my findings. There have been few evaluations of the
oil and natural gas wealth in the East China Sea, and the estimates I present here are unsatisfying
in their inconsistency. Further exploration of the disputed region is difficult due to the dispute,
so more conclusive information on the volume of energy reserves located in the disputed zone
may not be available for some time. As the analysis section mentions, it also possible that the
CNOOCs estimates of the oil wealth were deliberately low in order to reinforce the image that
Chinas claims over the Diaoyu originate from a desire to protect its territorial sovereignty and
not from a desire to get its hands on valuable resources. However, this approach seems unlikely,
considering how confident much of the international community appears to be that there are
large oil and gas deposits in the East China Sea. If the CNOOC low-balled its estimates in order
to influence outsiders perceptions, it was unsuccessful. Moreover, only one statement from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned the speculation from the international community
regarding the perceived oil and gas wealth. The statement did not attempt to correct the
speculation, (although it did not confirm the presence of valuable energy sources, either). The
reason for the disparities in evaluations of the oil wealth in the East China Sea is unclear; further
exploration of the region is necessary but unlikely due to Sino-Japanese tension.
My evaluations of Chinese nationalism were based only on reports in American news
media. Evaluating a range of methods for detecting nationalism would provide more
comprehensive information than just examining protests that occurred during this period. For
example, examining social media would provide insight on how anti-Japanese nationalism was
expressed through various platforms.
In measuring Chinas degree of cooperativeness, I selected only two mediums.
Contrasting statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with those made by the Ministry

38

of Defense might reveal that each signals non-cooperation in a different way. In addition, it
would be valuable to examine how the timing of protests may have preceded certain military
action in order to examine the strength of nationalism as a causal mechanism. Were bursts of
nationalism correlated with more aggressive military intervention in the disputed zone? Aside
from military intervention and rhetoric, how else might the CCP signal to Chinese citizens that is
taking a hard line against Japan?
There are additional variables along with economic value and nationalism that should be
considered in order to develop a greater understanding of the factors that may impact Chinas
non-cooperative behavior. For example, the military-strategic value of owning the Diaoyu and
its Exclusive Economic Zone should be considered. Perhaps ownership of the Diaoyu would
solidify Chinas historical claims over territory in the South China Sea, as well, providing China
additional leverage in other territorial disputes. Examining changes in political leadership
around the time of the dispute may also provide interesting findings. Journalists Ian Johnson and
Jane Perlez argue that Xi Jinpings replacement of Hu Jintao as president only a few weeks after
the nationalization of the islands may have led Hu Jintao to escalate maritime disputes in order to
retain control of the military after Xis ascent to power (Johnson & Perlez, 2012). This brings
into question how much impact public opinion vs. party politics had on military intervention
during the height of the dispute.
Conclusion
I predicted that both the economic value of the oil and gas reserves around the Diaoyu
and the presence of heightened anti-Japanese nationalism would contribute to a non-cooperative
response on the part of China. While I found evidence of displays of nationalism, I did not find
evidence indicating that the oil and gas reserves around the islands are sufficiently valuable to

39

warrant an uncooperative response. I conclude that displays of nationalism may have been a
driving force in Chinas non-cooperative response to Japans nationalization of the Diaoyu
islands.
It is difficult to draw conclusions about Chinas assertiveness or aggressiveness in the
Asia-Pacific region as whole without comparing the Sino-Japanese territorial dispute with other
territorial conflicts, such as conflicts between China and the Philippines or China and Vietnam.
By comparing different disputes, one could examine if and how nationalism influenced Chinas
behavior in multiple settings. Perhaps oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea are larger than
those in the East China Sea and nationalism is less important than economic motivations in these
cases. Continued research and analysis is necessary to continue investigating the motives for
Chinas behavior regarding the Diaoyu islands dispute and in other prominent disputes in the
Asia-Pacific region.

40

Statements used in content analysis, Foreign Ministry of the Peoples Republic of China:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China. (2012, Sept. 14). Convoys of
China's Maritime Surveillance Vessels Arrived in the Waters of Diaoyu Dao on
September 14, 2012 on a Law Enforcement Patrol Mission to Uphold China's Rights.
Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Sept. 26). Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China. Retrieved from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Sept. 9). Hu Jintao States China's Position on Relations with Japan,
Diaoyu Islands. Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Sept. 10). Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Summoned Japanese
Ambassador to China and Lodged Strong Protest. Retrieved from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (n.d.). Ironclad Evidence Shows that Diaoyu Dao is China's Territory. Retrieved
from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Sept. 10). Premier Wen Jiabao Attends Inauguration of a Bronze Statue
of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi and Delivers a Speech at China Foreign Affairs University.
Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Sept. 28). Remarks by Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng At
Symposium Marking the 40th Anniversary of The Normalization of Relations Between
China and Japan. Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Sept. 14). Remarks by Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng at the
Symposium on the Issue of Diaoyu Dao. Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/

41

-----------------. (2012, Oct. 22). The Diaoyu Islands: The owner and the thief. Retrieved from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Oct. 27). Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun Gave Briefing to Chinese
and Foreign Journalists on the Diaoyu Dao Issue (Transcript). Retrieved from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
-----------------. (2012, Sept. 28). Yang Jiechi Meets with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Retrieved from http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/

Articles used in content analysis, New York Times:

The Associated Press. (2012, Oct. 20) Naval Exercises Begin in East China Sea. Retrieved
from http://www.nytimes.com/
Fackler, M. (2012, Oct. 10). China Snubs Financial Meetings in Japan in Dispute Over Islands.
The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
-------------. (2012, Aug. 21). Dispute Over Islands Reflects Japanese Fear of Chinas Rise. The
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
-------------. (2012, Aug. 17). Japan Deports 14 Chinese Citizens in Island Dispute. The New
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
-------------. (2012, Sept. 22) In Shark-Infested Waters, Resolve of Two Giants Is Tested. The
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
-------------. (2012, Nov. 5). U.S. and Japan Begin Huge Military Drill, Minus Key Part. The
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Fackler, M. and Johnson, I. (2012, Sept. 20). Sleepy Islands and a Smoldering Dispute. The
New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/

42

Johnson, I. and Perlez, J. (2012, Sept. 15). A Chinese Leader Returns Amid Tumult. The New
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Shanker, T. and Johnson, I. (2012, Sept. 18). More Protests in China Over Japan and Islands.
The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Tabuchi, H. (2012, Dec. 13). Japan Scrambles Jets in Islands Dispute With China. The New
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/

Bibliography
Beckman, R., Townsend-Gault, I., Schofield, C., Davenport, T., & Leonardo, B. (Eds.). (2013).
Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. Northampton MA: Edward Elgar
Publishing Inc.
Blanchard, J. (2000). The U. S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku)
Islands, 1945-1971. The China Quarterly, 161, 98-100
BP Global. (2014). BP Statistical Review of World Energy (63rd edition). Retrieved from:
http://bp.com/statisticalreview
Oil Reserves Definitions (2014). BP Global. Retrieved from http://bp.com/en/global/corporate
Chan, M. (2014). (Re)categorizing Intergroup Relations and Social Identities Through News
Discourse: The Case of the China Dailys Reporting on Regional Conflict. Journal of
Language and Social Psychology, 33(22), 144-164.
China. (2014). U.S. Energy Administration Association. Retrieved from: http://www.eia.gov
Chinas Maritime Disputes. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: http://www.cfr.org
Chubb, A. (2015). Nationalism and Chinese public opinion. China Policy Institute Blog.

43

East China Sea (2014). U.S. Energy Administration Association. Retrieved from
http://www.eia.gov
Fackler, M. (2012, Sept. 6) Japan Said to Have Tentative Deal to Buy 3 Disputed Islands From
Private Owners. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Fackler, M. (2012, Sept. 11). Japan: Cabinet Approves Plan to Buy Disputed Islands. The New
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Fravel, T. (2010). International Relations Theory and Chinas Rise: Assessing Chinas Potential
for Territorial Expansion. International Studies Review, 12, 505532.
Hasnay, B. (2014). An Empty Prize: Fighting Over Rocks in the East China Sea. Brooklyn Law
Review, 79(4).
Hardy, J., OConnor, L., and OConnor, S. (2014, Nov. 20). China building airstrip-capable
island on Fiery Cross Reef. IHS Janes 360.
He, Y. (2007) History, Chinese Nationalism, and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict. Journal
of Contemporary China, 16 (50), 1-24.
Islands apart: There is more than meets the eye to the countries tense stand-off. (2012, Sept. 13).
The Economist. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com
Johnson, I. and and Shanker, T. (2012, Sept. 16), Beijing Mixes Messages Over Anti-Japan
Protests. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Johnston, A.I. (2013). How New and Assertive is Chinas New Assertiveness? International
Security, 37 (4), 7-48.
Johnston, A.I. (2003). Is China a Status Quo Power? International Security, 27 (4), 5-56.
Li, V. (1975). China and Off-Shore Oil: The Tiao-yu Tai Dispute. Stanford Journal of
International Studies 10, 143-162.

44

Liao, J. (2008). Sino-Japanese Energy Security and Regional Stability: The Case of the East
China Sea Gas Exploration. East Asia, 25, 5778.
McGinley, Mark. (2011, April 14). East China Sea: large marine ecosystem. Encyclopedia of
Earth. Retrieved from http://www.eoearth.org/view/article/151874/
Position Paper: Japan-China Relations Surrounding the Situation of the Senkaku Islands (2012,
Nov. 9). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved from http://www.mofa.go.jp/
Information about the Senkaku Islands. (2015). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved
from http://www.mofa.go.jp/
Mirski, S. (2015) China Releases a Position Paper in the Ongoing Philippines-China
Arbitration. Lawfare. Retrieved from http://www.lawfareblog.com
Neuendorf, K. (2002). The Content Analysis Guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Perlez, J. (2014, Nov. 23). China Said to Turn Reef Into Airstrip in Disputed Water. The New
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Przystup, J. (2013). Japan-China Relations: 40th Anniversary: Fuggetaboutit. Comparative
Connections 14, no. 3. Retrieved from http://www.csis.org.
Ramos-Mrosovosky, C. (2008). International Laws Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands.
Journal of International Law, 29, 903-946.
Reilly, J. (2013). Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in Chinas Japan
Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Regencia, T. (2014, March 30). Philippines sues China over sea claims. Al Jazeera. Retrieved
from http://america.aljazeera.com/
Sanger, D. and Broad, W. (2015, May 16). China Making Some Missiles More Powerful. The

45

New York Times. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/

Sanger, D. and Gladstone, R. (2015, April 8). Piling Sand in a Disputed Sea, China Literally
Gains Ground. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
South China Sea. (2013). U.S. Energy Administration Association. Retrieved from:
http://www.eia.gov
Stockmann, D. (2010). Who Believes Propaganda? Media Effects during the Anti-Japanese
Protests in Beijing. The China Quarterly, 202, 269-289.
Suganuma, U. (2000) Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations:
Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Retrieved from Honolulu, Association for
Asian Studies, Inc.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (1982) United Nations. Montego Bay,
Jamaica. Retrieved from at http://www.un.org
Wang, Z (2008). National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical
Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China. International Studies Quarterly, 52,
783-806.
Wei Su, S. (2005) The Territorial Dispute over the Tiaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update. Ocean
Development & International Law 36.1. Retrieved from Taylor and Francis Online,
//http://tandfonline.com
Weiss, J. (2014). Powerful Patriots. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Whaley, F. (2015, April 13). Chinas Island-Building is Ruining Coral Reefs, Philippines Says.
The New York Times. April 13, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Whiting, A. (1995). Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng. The China Quarterly,
142, 295-316.

46

Wong, E. and Ansfield, J. (2014, June 16). To Bolster Its Claims, China Plants Islands in
Disputed Waters. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Wong, E. (2015, April 9). China Says Construction in Contested Waters is for Maritime
Purposes. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/