Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
the non-human. Discuss with reference to any ONE or TWO appropriate texts
from the above list.
the Creature as a human creature 5 by virtue of his ability with language alone (By
your language, stranger, I suppose you are my country-man 6), postulates that as the
demarcating boundary of human. In addition, he identifies characteristics he
considers intrinsic to human: self-interest and hearts full of brotherly love and
charity.7
Characters also establish the distinctive features of the sub-human. Robert Walton,
in identifying the Creature through sub-human terminology8 as a savage 9,
postulates his gigantic stature 10 as a distinctive factor of his Category. Similarly,
Frankenstein initially classifies his Creature in sub-human terms, as a wretch and
corpse11 (as entities that echo the human, yet lack a necessary quality) on the basis
of two key assessments (that constitute his views as to the confines of the Category):
first, his view that the Creature has a demi-human appearance, but it is insufficiently
cohesive (his teeth of a pearly whiteness; but these luxuriances only formed a more
horrid contrast with his watery eyes[and]] shrivelled complexion 12) and second,
the Creatures exercise of infantile human behaviours (he grinned and muttered
inarticulate sounds 13).
5 Ibid., 109.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 This terminology is of the sub-human category because it is in reference to
a lower class of humans, which fails to obtain the necessary level (or
morality or intelligence) normally associated with humans: Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, accessed April 23, 2015,
www.merriam-webster.com.
9 Shelley, Frankenstein, 13.
10 Ibid., 12.
11 Ibid., 39-40.
12 Ibid., 39.
13 Ibid., 40.
Similarly, distinctive features of the non-human are alluded to. William Frankenstein
identifies the Creature as non-human through fantastical, mythical language: you are
a monster!... an ogre!14 His sole criterion for justifying such categorisation is
appearance (he identifies the Creature as ugly 15) and he confidently attributes
characteristics to the non-human Category namely violence and bloodlust (you
wish to eat me, and tear me to pieces 16).
However, the focus of the novel quickly shifts as the Creature problematizes these
boundaries, pushing against them in seeking to achieve human classification. The
Creature exemplifies many traits intrinsic to the human category, despite being
rejected from it. As such, he demonstrates that many postulated characteristics of
humanity are non-exclusive to it, and therefore insufficient as distinguishing factors
between human and alternative Categories. Throughout Frankenstein the Creature is
directly paralleled to human characters, and engages in their human behaviours.
For instance, the Creatures expressions of loneliness (but am I not alone, miserably
alone? 17) and a desire for companionship (let me see that I excite the sympathy of
some existing thing18) echo those of Robert Walton, who complains to his sister: I
have no friend there will be none to participate in my joy. 19 Similarly, just as the
broken Frankenstein draws comfort from the remedial force of nature (every
sight seem[s] still to have the power of elevating his soul from earth 20), so too does
14 Ibid., 117.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 78.
18 Ibid., 120.
19 Ibid., 8.
20 Ibid., 16.
the Creature find himself forgetting [his] solitude and deformity when rais[ing]
[his] humid eyes with thankfulness toward the blessed sun. 21 The Creature is even
paralleled to the contemporary human outside the novel his education follows that
Lockean notion of human learning that was popular at the time of publication: he
move[s] from pure unsorted sense perception, to the formation of ideas, to the
eventual attainment of literacy 22 and goes beyond imitating his learning materials, to
imaginatively self-projecting his own attributes onto them: 23 I found myself similar,
yet at the same time strangely unlike the beings concerning whom I read. 24 The effect
of these parallels is to undermine the postulated distinctiveness of certain aspects of
human, shifting the novels attention from distinctions to commonalities and
implicitly postulating that there is less distinction between the Categories than might
be imagined.
21 Ibid., 115.
22 Diana Rees, A Troubled Legacy: Mary Shelleys Frankenstein and the
Inheritance of Human Rights, Representations 96, no. 1 (2006): 49.
23 Caroline Bentley, Family, Humanity, Polity: Theorizing the Basis and
Boundaries of Political Community in Frankenstein, Criticism 47, no. 3
(2005): 330.
24 Shelley, Frankenstein, 156
25 Ibid., 139.
26 Ibid., 95.
between the human and non-human, Frankenstein implicitly moves beyond merely
distinguishing Categories rather, it provides an alternative view where Categories
are situated closely, and overlap in a variety of instances, suggesting their rigid
division is something of an exercise in technicalities.
However, two true distinctions are asserted between Categories. The first is
demonstrated in the Creatures pursuit of language as a means to becoming one
among my fellows.27 Peter Brooks suggests that the Creatures aim in acquiring
language is to enter its network of intersubjective relations 28 between humans and
assert himself as human by participation in that network becoming linked to the
chain of existence.29 While the Creatures narrative account of his experiences
demonstrates he can use language discursively, persuasively and emotively (in other
words, in a human manner), language does not entail his accession to the human
realm.
The pursuit of language, however, reveals the first of the Creatures features that
distinguishes him from the human. The Creature, while competent with language, is
not fully capable in using it. The Creature recognises that humans use language
relationally, in a way that identifies one another as part of human: brother, sister,
and all the various relationships which bind humans together in mutual bonds. 30 Yet,
he is unable to make such implicit assertions in his own language, by virtue of his
natal alienat[ion].31 Unlike the human (or even sub-human animals) the Creature
27 Ibid., 97.
28 Peter Brooks Body Work: Objects of Desire in Modern Narrative
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 200-201.
29 Shelley, Frankenstein, 121.
30 Ibid., 97.
31 Maureen McLane, Populations, Humanities, and Frankenstein ELH 63,
no. 4 (1996): 966.
However, the more powerful distinction postulated in the text is that which arises by
virtue of the Creatures appearance. Even speaking with the competence of an
educated human, he is expelled from human societies the reason for which
(repeatedly) is his physical representation. William Frankenstein detests the Creature
because he is ugly.36 Victor Frankenstein determines the Creature a monster
(non-human) upon beh[olding] him.37 Villagers recoil from him shriek[ing]
faint[ing] attack[ing] based only on his appearance. 38 In such instances, it is clear
that the Creatures ugliness is a demarcating boundary that prevents his accession to
the human realm. The distinction between human, and sub-human and nonhuman is their manner of physical representation. However, this ugliness is difficult
to quantify. Characters oscillate between identifying the Creatures horrific features
(attempting to objectify his ugliness) and asserting that he is ugly because he is too
unfamiliar. Walton, for instance, describes the Creature gigantic in stature with
long locks of ragged hair39, while, in the same breath, explaining that he cannot
find words to describe 40 his form. In this sense, while a distinction is postulated, it is
scarcely functional.
However, Daniel Cottom and Denise Gigante solve this problem by postulating that
the Creatures ugliness lies in his excessiveness of representation. Cottom asserts the
Creature is ugly because he is a visual breakdown of an irreconcilable diversity of
individuals.41 Gigante, similarly, contends he is an excess of existence chaotic
spillage from his own representational shell.42 On this reading, the demarcating
boundary is between human and other is excessive, chaotic appearance. Yet,
while it is more specific in its terms, the distinction is still one for (generally)
subjective determination. As such, what Frankenstein shows is that the Creatures
problem is one of recognition. The demarcating boundary of the human category
will always be for subjective determination how the appearance is read. Anne
Mellor notes this cruel subjectivity, postulating that it is the human imagination that
ultimately constitutes the distinction; where it adjudicates the appearance as
excessive in this way, it will imag[e], read and writ[e] as malignant. 43 The
boundary of human and other is thus whatever [the imagination] desires. 44
39 Ibid, 79.
40 Ibid., 186.
41 Daniel Cottom, Frankenstein and the Monster of Representation,
SubStance 9, no. 3 (1980): 61.
42 Denise Gigante, Facing the Ugly: The Case of Frankenstein, ELH 67, no.
2 (2000): 566.
43 Anne Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters (New
York: Methuen, 1988), 137.
44 Ibid.
This constructed boundary, interestingly, says something about the nature of the
human category itself. For human is also shown to be irreconcilably variable in its
appearance'. The Creature recognises this in Volneys Ruins of Empires: was man
indeed, at once so powerful, so virtuous, and magnificent, yet so vicious and base? 45
In this sense, while the human and other are demarcated, we might speculate that
Shelley is subtly postulating a final ground of commonality (one which is so powerful,
that it demonstrates the superficiality of the postulated distinctions): both the other
and human are monstrous, disordered and chaotic in their own sense. Each
expressing this disorder in different ways there is little between them. It is a matter
of obvious recognition only yet both are monstrous in their own way.
As such, while Frankenstein can be said in some sense to epitomise the above
quotation, it is a novel that is ultimately more concerned with commonality across
Categories. Throughout the novel, characters speak confidently as to Categories
boundaries and attributes, asserting their differences. Yet, Frankenstein does not take
these distinctions at face value it repeatedly challenges them, fostering the
conclusion that there is (or rather, that there might be, in some circumstances) more in
common to Categories than imagined, While two key grounds of distinction emerge,
these distinctions in light of the commonalities across Categories ultimately
appear insignificant when contextualised in wider unities.
Works Cited
Bentley, Caroline. Family, Humanity, Polity: Theorizing the Basis and
Boundaries of Political Community in Frankenstein. Criticism 47, no. 3
(2005): 325-351.
Brooks, Peter. Body Work: Objects Of Desire In Modern Narrative.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.