very mam cae witin Bim world made up of al tat be bas lion and loved ad is f0 ts woh that be returns, incesenthy, ‘hough be may ats throngh, and em to inbabir, world gue foreign “eHATEAUBRIAND, Voyage ele 1 Object Relations ‘The dally work of the psychoanalyst is intimately bound up with his patients’ relations with other people. Like everybody pend good deal of thee time talking about people, ‘Ssocatons run toward concerns somewhat divorced from the main- ‘steam of social itercouse—to dteams, fantasies, symptoms, and 50 ‘on —the presence of others can ilays be inferred. Moreover, the patent in analysis talking #0 someone; his communication is shaped by his ‘undetsunding of and relation with the person he is talking to. All theories of psychoanalysis recognize ths. In Freud’ earliest dive theory (19052), che objec ofa dive (in broad terms, the person toward who the drive i directed) was, along with it source and aim, postulated 25 fone of is essential characteristics Alshough the object was seen a the most variable element of drive, one not inherently of originally «on ected with there could be no expression of drive demand without 2 least an implice objet. Drive, insofar as it was psychologically rather than physiologically comprehensible, became known through its derivatives, through it ditection tomatd some objec. Tn this sense, all, peychoanaytc knowledge must begin with the individual's relations vith others Psychoanalytic approaches 10 object relations ate, however, infnicely complicated by the teliztion that the “people” about whom the patient is talking do not necesariy behave in a way that another fobserer of those same people would confirm, This fct appeared10 onicins Aramaialy inthe fist psychoanalytic ereatment ever atempred, that of Anna O (Breuer and Freud, 1995). Anna O's pseudocyesis and her bei chat Breuer was acting like he love aber than lke hee physician, inially led not co increased understanding ofthe dynamics of human interaction bu o the premature termination of he therapy. Ie was left wo Freud, with his courage in the fae of conventionally unacceptable Phenomena o interpret Anna O's reaction ina way that deepened out ‘comprehension of people's interaction with each other. The reeulting theay of uansference made is imposible ever again ro assume thatthe “objets” about whom patients talk necessatily correspond in a one-t0- one fashion with the "el people” of the external wold. The concept of transference suggest thatthe “objec” of te patent’ experience (be it analyst, rend, lover, even parent) sat best an amended version ofthe ‘tual other person involved. People teact to and interact wit not only {an acual other but aio an incernalochet, a paychic representation of & erson which in itself has the power to influence both the individual's fective sates and his overt behavioral reactions, Examples of this ae commonplace in clinical practice outside of the ceansferenc in the mot echnical and limited sense of the erm, Fo it- stance, patient, 2 man of middle age who lives alone and who in teat- ‘ment has been talking about felings of shame at having wasted many years of his life pursuing chimercal goals, reports in session that his iece and her boyfie will be visting him forthe holidays. ln prepara- tion fr this vis he hasbeen polishing his lamp, wiping fingerprints off the walls, and, in general, prepasing forthe onslaught of intensely citi, parental intrudes, His mood as he describes his preparation ‘uatches the story; he is apprehensive, timid, and embarrased by the lining conditions his guests will observe. In the next sesion, following the holiday, he says that the vise wene surprisingly well except cae che “ids” ino stayed with him were "bum" snd “sobs,” wanting only t0 li around in bed all day, reveling inthe freedom todo this away from thet watchful parents His affect once again matches the station a8 he eserves it. He is haughty and contemptuous, condesending and judgmental, ‘What i striking abou this very ordinary example isthe tangential ‘relationship beeween the patient’ description of his cesponses to his ests and any “actual” characteristics of the niece and her boyftend, ‘The only consistency between the two sessions lies in the relationship eseribed, that of an angry, ctvcal, and selfighteour parent and misbehaving, shameful child. Inthe fie sesion the puest ate assigned the role ofthe parental figures in the second che roles asumed bythe patient. We may speculate that it was che vst’ ail to conform to Object Relations and Prychoanaytic Models 11 the patent’ expectations ~ thie failure vo ac paental—that instigated ‘the dramatic shift in his petceprion of them (and of himself). For the ‘Purpote of the preset discussion, however, what matters is chat this ‘mats acount ofan experience with other people is decisively shaped by 4 pater of relationship chat includes a template of the other and, in ‘very language, i Teatied around in his head." The relative impact ofthe characteris of actual people and of hese ineroal images varies ‘widely among diferent individual, but cheir presence and activity sto ome extent demonstable in everyone "The existence of these mental fepesentations of others, sharing as they do some of the characteristics of "real" people aswell as some of thei capacity to trigger behavioral response, yet being demonstrably "diferent" ass erica conceptual problems for any dynamic theory of the mind, Such images go under various names in the psychoanalytic liexatre. In diferen theoretical ystems they ae called variously “in- ternal objects,” “illusory others,” “intojects,” “personifiations,” and the consisuents of a "tepresentational wold.” Their Functions within the psychic economy ate likewise a matter of debate. They may be understood ar serving a a kind of loose anticipatory image of what vo ‘be expected fiom people in che real wodd 2s becoming closely entwined vith the individuals expetience of who be is 2s prsecuos, falling the function ofa kind of eitical internal fth column; of a8 a source of inesnal security and resource, invoked in times of stress and isolation. ‘What is generally agreed upon about these internal images is that they constitute a revdve within the mind of relationships wit impor ‘ant people in the individual's if, In some way cacal exchanges with others leave thei mark; they are “internalized” and so come to shape subsequent attitudes, reactions, perceptions, and so on. This observe ton presents the paychoanalyic theorist with a range of dificult ques tions to which a great deal of contemporary theorizing is directed. How do the characterises of iteral objects relate to those of “real” people pas and secon? Ty the inernal object a representation of the in dividual’ perception ofa tral relationship with another person or af specific aspects and characteristics of the other? What are che cit: ‘Gumstances in which such images become internalized, and what isthe ‘mechanism by which they ae established 2s part ofthe individual's in net world? What isthe connection between these internal representa- tions and subsequent relations with real ethers in the external world? How do internal objects function within mental life? Are there different types of internal objets? Do diferent ctcumstances and mechanisms of internalization lead to different kinds of internal objects? "The tem “object relations theory.” in its broadest sense, refers to t-12 oniGINs ‘tempts within psychoanalysis to answer these questions, that, 0 ean- front the potentially confounding observation that people live ‘simultaneously in an external and an internal word, and thatthe tela- tlonship between the two ranges ffom the most Buid intermingling to ‘he mos rigid separation. The texm thus designates cheosis, or aspects ‘of theories, concerned with expocing the relationship berweea realex ‘eral people and internal images and residues of relations with them, and the significance of these residues for psychic functioning, Ap- ‘roaches to these problems constitute the majo Focus of prychoanalytic ‘theorizing over the past several decades. Discusion of theories of object relation is complicated by the fat ‘hat the term has been used in many different contests and with any ‘number of diferent connotations and denotations, resulting in con siderable ambiguity and confusion. Some authors tke exception to the broad usage just described, arguing that ie vheates to deprive the txm ofall sperfty of mesning and to blur significant areas of theoretical dlsagreement (Lichtenberg, 1979). They prefer to rest the designa- toa “objec elations chery” tothe wos ofa parila cheoris, But in this usage a further problem develops, because the term is applied ‘moe than one, often incompatible, cheoretical stance. It is aten used eaclusively wo desrbe the approach developed by Melanie Klein, and ‘equally often with respect only to the theory of W. R. D. Faitbaica, despite the fact tha che nature, origin, and content of “objets” varies dramatically in these wo approaches, Ia more recent yeats, Otto Ker berg (1976) has applied the term to his own particule blend of che ego perchology of Jacobson and Maller, influenced by terms and emphases derived from the wetngs of Melanie Klin ‘A further difcley with the term i that its use by many authors has tendentious nd polemical overtones. Guntip (1969) opposes the “ob- ject relations theory” of Faisbaira and Winnicott ro what he considers the “mechanistic” psychology of Hartmann and the American ego psychologists, a diction that allows him vo conc thatthe former 1 beter becuse itis “more human.” Theorists operating within the more orthodor psychoanalytic tradition use the term as one of op: probeium. Ics 2 way of acusing snothersuthor of concentating on the psychological superfciltes (behavior with other people) atthe expense Of the mental depths. “Object relations theory" in the view of these authors implies a concession 1 behaviorism; the phenomena to which it refers are more adequately dextibed by the concept of “dive Aerivative,” refering to the manifestations of drive a hey appa in the experience of the individual (Brenner, 1978). Another group of ‘heotss, particularly the followers of Harty Stack Sullivan, view “object Object Relations and Prychosnaytc Models 13 telations” as a weak tetm of compromise (Witenberg, 1979). Object relacions, they argue, ae interpersonal relations, bu the etm allows is ter o proclaim continued allegiance to deve theory. Te might be argued thatthe tem object relations theory is overused, too vatable and hopelessly entangled with theoretical dispute to wat: tant retention, With so unclear a referee, thie argument might 140, 0 ateempe a theoretical approach tothe teatment of object relations isa project based on shifting sands However, because the term isso widely ‘sein psychoanalytic iteratue, the substitution of ase of novel, more ratrowly defined tems would necestate unfeasible tranation of imasive segments of the exiting psychoanalytic literature into 4 new language. Simply dropping the tem would result in more rather than. Jes confusion, particulary ia a project chat cemers around an exposition and compatison of diferent theoretical traditions, Accordingly, we will reain che term object relations in 2 general sense; itis imporanc, however, cha we speci ot definition atthe use, a that we keep in focus the term's specific referents forthe diferent theories we ex: ‘The concept of objec relations originated as an inherent pare of Freud's drive theory. The “object” in Freud's language i the Abidinal object (in the ater theory also the object ofthe aggresive dive) ln this sense the meaning ofthe word “object” parallels its dual usage in evry day English, in which it refers both toa thing and to goal ot target. Freud's object sa ching, but it is not any thing; iste thing whic is the target ofa drive. The “objec” of psychoanalysis is thus not the “ob ject” of aademic psychology, that is, simply an eniy exiting in time And space (se Paget, 1937) lo is orginal usage, the concep of objet ‘was interowined with and contingent upon the concept of deve, Despite this connection, some psychoanalytic theodsts have retained the terms “object” and “abject relations” although they eliminated enticly the concept of drive in the classical Freudian sense (ace Pairbita, 1952; Gunttip, 1965). Ocher theories which stes te rte of the objeut and ‘hich old chat they deal with the problems of object relations are dive theories (See Jacobson, 1964; Keenberg, 1976). Thus, the term, although seemingly theory-bound, docs not adequately discriminate Fherween those approaches which accept Freudian libido theory and thore which do not. ‘Because ofthis ambiguity we reject nattow definitions of object tl tions. Dispute as to whose cheory constitutes 2 “true” objec tlations ap proach ie-a batten enterprise that has caused endless confusion to students of psychoanalysis. ln this book the term refers to individuals’ ineractions with extesnal and intemal (eal and imagined) other14 onicans people, and tothe relationship berneen their intemal and extemal ob ject morlds, We believe thatthe rtm retaine utility only inthis broad ‘sage. All psychoanalytic theories contain theories of object relations: ‘they must if che ae to maintain contact with the day-to-day experience of the individual. Vaious approaches ate dilfeeatiated by thet use of bservations concerning relations with others and by the extent co which these observations are integrated with clasial dive theory. It follows ftom this that our usage expicily dissolves any assumption ofa tie be ‘ween the terms “object” and “object relations” and the concept af underlying drives. Despite its origin in deve theory, we belive thatthe ream “objec,” divorced from that origin, retains its cheorecea uty Within the hisory of peychoanalysi the term has been used to <éescribe both real people inthe extenal wold and the images of them that are established erally. This dual connotation is useful in