Pressure Relief Systems 2014 Rev A

June 2014
PRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEMS

Acknowledgment
DEDICATED TO:
API STD - RP 520/ 521/ 526/ 537

Various Client/ Project Standards/ Specifications
Pictures from many sources, suppliers, internet
My friend Winston Yeo, KBR, Singapore/ Chevron, Thailand
Topics
Introduction
Relief Devices
Codes & Standards
Relieving Scenarios (Demands) & Loads
Sizing
Installation
Isolation
Design Features
PSV
Introduction
PAHH
PIC/PAH
NOP
Control system maintains stable operation

Trip / shutdown system provides primary protection,
when control system fails

Relief system provides secondary protection, when
control and trip systems fail ultimate protection or
last line of defence
PIC
T0 Flare
PAHH
PALL
T0 Compressor
SDV
Well Fluids
SDV
Production
Separator
SDV
SDV
RV lifting: a serious incident
Oil/ Condensate
Produced Water
Code Vs Recommended Practice

Relief devices key part of plant Layer of
Protections to protect plant and personnel. Prevent
production loss
Relief devices are required by national codes and
standards, mandated under law
Community Emergency Response

Emergency, Evacuation
Plant Emergency Response
Containment/ Evacuation Procedure
Mitigation
Mechanical mitigation, Relief System
Operator Action
Prevention
SIS Trips
Operator Response
Controls & Monitoring
Controls, Alarms
Operator Supervision
Process
ASME is a Code. Compliance is mandatory.

API is a recommended practice.
API is also getting adopted as a National /
International Standard
Where Pressure Relief is not possible

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Fast chemical reactions:

Pressure propagation rate is very high and loss of
containment may occurs before RV pops.

hot spots, decompositions & internal detonation/fires
Relieving rate requires large relief areas
Plugging, polymerization or deposition that may
partially or completely block RV

Relieved chemicals may polymerize and plug. PSV useless
Multi-phase relief: where rate is difficult to predict

Relief may create additional hazards due to stack
location or very large vent/ flare system

Use HIPPS
Relief Scenarios
Tank drained. Pulled

vacuum
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Air freshener can in a closed

car - Thermal
Vacuum column fire
Column internals - Pyrophoric fire

Semi sub what was left
RELIEF DEVICES
Relief
Devices
Relief Valves
Rupture Disks
Rupture Pins
Buckling Pins
PVRV
Blow-off Hatches
Explosion Doors
Relief Devices
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Relief Valves
Conventional
Balanced
Pilot
Conventional RV

Set Press
Most common
Simple, cheap and reliable
Backpressure reduces capacity
Variable back pressure limited
to 10% of set pressure
Large spring required limits set
pressure of bigger PSV
Constant or superimposed
backpressure increases set
Why?
point on a 1 for 1 basis
150# RV Set Press, psig at 100F
100
0
Back Press
50
DP
285
165
100
65
Balanced Bellows RV

Not allowed per ASME section I

Back pressure max 30% on all except
smaller sizes. Up to 50% with capacity
correction
Fragile bellows. Mechanical limit imposed
by bellows
Bellows can plug; movement restricted In
plugging and polymerizing service
Bellows sealed in hydrate, solid, foaming
and coking services to keep foreign
matter out of bonnet
Bellows prone to fatigue and pin-hole
leaks. [Leaks take away ability to handle
backpressure; hence bonnet is vented. As
long vent is bigger than holes OK.]
Bonnet vent must be routed to safe
location in toxic service
Why?
Bellows original purpose was to protect the

spindle & guide from corrosive fluids. Beyond 30%
back pressure, lift and hence capacity affected
Balanced Disk RV
Backpressure acting on top and
bottom of disk cancels each other

Backpressure ha no effect on RV
opening or closing pressure
Set Press
100 RV Opening Pressure

RV Reseating Pressure
0
Back Press
50
Pilot RV
Process pressure on a differential area piston keeps the seat closed
Pilot: A small PSV that pops and removes piston top pressure,
allowing the main valve to open
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Pilot
Pilot
Dome
Dome
Piston
Pilot Tube
Pilot Tube
Note: Piston top area > bottom area. For the same pressure, force on top > force on bottom, keeping the seat closed
More on Pilot RV
Process pressure on the larger piston (top) area opposes

pressure on the smaller seat, keeping the valve shut

Higher the process pressure, greater the downward force,
keeping the seat tightly closed. c.f spring loaded RV
A small auxiliary relief valve (pilot) controls the main RV. It
pops open relieving top pressure, opening main RV
Larger RVs can have higher set pressures; no longer limited by
spring force. c.f spring loaded RV
Full lift and capacity achieved near set pressure as there is no
heavy spring load to overcome
With pop action, full lift at set pressure; with modulating pilot,
full lift at relieving pressure; modulating pilot relieves only
what is required
More on Pilot
Pilot is a small RV!

1. As process pressure reaches set pressure, the
spring is compressed; lower feeding seat closes,
isolating process gas
2. Upper seat opens, venting gas and pressure in
dome; and opening RV
Process gas isolated during a relief no flow pilot
Flowing pilot, discharges process gas before,
during and after a relief. Not recommended
2
1
Flowing design may lead to freezing or

particulates into the pilot
Based on one-shot venting or gradual venting
pop or modulating action
Pop or fast action is for rapid relief of gas.
Recommended. Spring loaded RV
Spindle travel - decides

blowdown. 3% blowdown possible
Modulating allows RV opening with a small

pressure rise; fast response. Relieves what is
reqd. Diaphragm RV
More on Pilot RV
Most have soft seats; remote sensing capability pilot

tube intake need not be at RV inlet

Polymerizing, plugging service, sensing line can plug.
Use non-flow type or filtered sensing line in dirty service
Backpressure: Set pressure not affected unless pilot is
vented to header
Caution: Higher backpressure can lead to reverse flow
and product contamination, during start-up and
shutdown. Use check valve
Usual to have no-flow, pop action elastomer seat/ seal
type.
Less commonly used. May require prior approval
Liquid filled systems: Blowdown may change c.f gas service. Operating time too rapid producing water hammer or too slow. Pilot affected by particulate contamination or corrosion
Capacity - Back Pressure Impact

RV: Nozzle or orifice flow decided by:
Transition Point
Sonic to Sun-sonic
upstream pressure, as long
as it is critical or sonic
P, Pressure drop (P1-P2), if
sub-sonic
Back-pressure adds to
spring force, reduces lift
and flow (capacity of RV)
Back Pressure - Conventional RV

Backpressure affects lift;

impacts capacity severely
At 15% valve fully closed
Back Pressure - Balanced Bellows

Bellows nullify backpressure effect to an extent
At 30% capacity reduced

Difficult to have small bellows. Size D & E, may be a modified F !!

Bellows fixed at at upper end. High back pressure lengthens
the bellows at the lower end, restricting seat lift
Back Pressure - Balanced Disk RV

Disk nullify backpressure effect to an extent

Balanced Spindle type can withstand

higher backpressure; Sizes to 2J3 only
Back Pressure - Pilot RV

Flow
Flow follows closely nozzle flow
For k = 1.3 & BP = 70%. Flow:
Nozzle = 92% Pilot = 78%

Back flow Preventer:
Backpressure may open the

main valve when process
pressure is low as at start-up.
May contaminate products. C3
Refrigeration
Back Pressure Impact - Comparison

Set Pressure Vs Lift
Conventional
Pilot
Backpressure Impact - Tests

University of Milan Test on 5 Balanced RV, 2 J 3
Supposed to be good to 50% BP viz k = 1
Capacity Lost, %
at BP, %
Remarks
10
50
30
50
40
30
20
30
0% at 32%
60
18
bellow ruptured

Terminology - Refresher
Relief Valve: Valve opens in proportion to
overpressure. Liquid (incompressible fluids)

service
Safety Valve: Valve opens rapidly with pop action.
Vapour (compressible fluids) service
Safety Relief Valve: Either a safety or relief valve
Pressure Relief Valve: Generic term for all of
above
MAWP: Max Allowable Working Pressure on top of vessel

based on wall thickness provided at coincident

temperature. > Design Pressure
Design Pressure: Equipment/ system design pressure at
design temperature
Set Pressure: Pressure at which RV is set to open. May be
same or less than Design Pressure
Overpressure: Pressure increase over set pressure
Relieving Pressure: Set pressure + Overpressure
Accumulation: Pressure increase over MAWP
Back pressure: Pressure at the outlet flange/ pressure in
discharge system
Where RV is set below MAWP, overpressure can
be higher to match MAWP + Accumulation
V-002
Superimposed back pressure - Affects set pressure.
Pressure at outlet flange before RV opens
E-001
Constant superimposed BP: Always the same pressure. When RV
discharges to a closed system. Can be high ~ 50% of set pressure.

Variable superimposed BP: Varies based on flow from other
sources. When multiple sources discharge to a common header
Built-up back pressure - Does not affect set pressure but
affects capacity
Pressure that develops in the discharge header as a result of
flow thru RV
Total back-pressure = Superimposed + Built-up BP

Spring differential: Difference between set pressure and
Why?
superimposed constant BP. It is not wise to give a

superimposed constant BP in a data sheet unless one exists.
Back Pressure - Example

Flare Stack
Normal Operating Press = 0.3 U
Flare Header
P = 10 U due to flow from this +

other PSVs
SP = 100 Units
Relief valve

P = 5 U
Care needed while

specifying constant BP
Superimposed Constant Back Press

= 0.3 U
Built-up Back Pressure
= 15 U
Total Back Pressure
= 15.3 U
Spring Differential (Set Pressure Constant BP)
Spring set at:
= 99.7 U
Flare Knockout Drum
Back Pressure - More Info

Backpressure adds to spring load, prevents full
Size
lift

Flow and backpressure reduced; Valve opens again

Close Open. Rapid cycling or chattering
P1, backpressure at valve outlet flange is
known and NOT PB inside the valve at nozzle

outlet
Bigger the RV, smaller is Outlet: PSV area
(Ao/A) ratio; Higher is PB
PB, controls flow in sub-sonic cases
Vendors have come up with a correction factor
to Nozzle Coefft, to account for this based on
valve body / nozzle geometry
Design Tip: Backpressure mechanical limit on RV is

decided by bellows. Bigger the RV lower is
allowable backpressure. Affects non-flowing RVs
too; forgotten by Process Engineers. See RP 526
P2
PB
Outlet: PSV Area Ratio

Area, in2
(Ao/A)
1 D 2
0.110 (31)
1 E 2
0.196 (17)
1 F 2
0.307 (11)
2G3
0.503 (15)
2H3
0.785 (9)
3J4
1.287 (10)
3K4
1.838 (7)
3L4
2.853 (5)
4M6
3.600 (8)
4N6
4.340 (7)
4P6
6.380 (5)
6Q8
11.050 (5)
6R8
16.000 (3)
8 T 10
26.000 (3)
Blowdown: Difference between set pressure and reseating
pressure, % of set pressure. Usually 3%

Cold differential test pressure: Set pressure with correction for
backpressure and/or temperature service condition
Simmer: Audible or visual release of fluid across the RV just prior
to opening at set pressure. Excessive simmering is detrimental
to valve seating surfaces
Chattering: Rapid opening and closing of RV in quick succession.
Wear and tear on seating surfaces leading to leak in normal
operation. Caused by:

Oversized RV
Inlet loss > 3%
Excessive back-pressure
Broken or leaking balanced bellows
Lift: Rise of the disc to open the RV
RV Operation - Refresher
Boiler Board
Formula with Lift
As the seat lifts,

S
Seat Disk
Curtain
Lift, L
flow is thru (i) nozzle at full lift or (ii)

curtain for partial lift
Nozzle Area = D/4
Curtain Area = DL; L = D/4
Usual lift is about 35 to 40%
At PSV opening point,
press * area = spring load
To reach full lift, additional
overpressure required, say 10% to
compress the spring. Not enough.
Solution? Add a skirt to seat, to add
area and redirect flow to add to lift
Blowdown Ring, controls blowdown
Top: Short Simmer; long
blowdown
Skirt
Increases
Decrease
Blowdown
Nozzle Diameter, D
Blowdown
Ring
RV Operation - Refresher
Rupture Disks
Non-reclosing
Non-reclosing: Unlike a PSV that closes once the pressure <

set pressure, RDs remain open and discharge the contents. It
has to be replaced after an event
Good for large relief; instantaneous and unrestricted relief

For valuable/ toxic fluids (no leak) and viscous, high melting
point fluids
For corrosive and slurry (no exposed seat/ spring)
Used upstream and downstream of RV in corrosive services
Upstream of RV
Protects RV internals from corrosion save $$ using standard

MOC; Prevents leakage thru RV; Prevents plugging and gumming
of RV; Allows in-situ calibration testing of RV
Downstream of RV Note: Max distance between RD and PSV = 5D
Protects RV internals from corrosion save $$ using standard
MOC; Check leakage thru RV; Prevents fouling and gumming of
RV; Cushions impact of variable backpressure
In parallel to or in series with RV
Design Tip: RD + RV requires Combined Capacity Factor 0.9 factor on RV area; combined inlet P <3%. RD burst
pressure 90-100% RV set pressure (ASMEVIII Div 1 UG-127 foot note 52 + UG132 (a)(4)(a))
Rupture Disks
Conventional tension loaded type
Op pressure <70% of burst pressure
Fragments and not used under RV
Reverse buckling disk

Op pressure <90% of burst pressure
Can withstand pressures in excess of
burst pressure on the outlet.

Non-fragmenting. Can be used under
RV
PAH set at >10% set point required
between RD & RV.
Liquid service disk

Disk full open without the stored
compressed energy of vapour
Reverse: Snap back action reqd to move

the disc thru knife blade. May not be
reliable in liquid service. Scored design
instead of knife-cut!
Rupture Disks
Why?
2 RDs in series may be required, if

variable backpressure is significant.
What is the gauge pressure?.

What it tells you?
Leakage thru RD can increase the

pressure in the cavity between RD
and RV, reduce dP across RD and
hinder RD opening. Provide a
PG/PAH/vent line d/s of RD
Burst pressure dependency on design Vs

Operating temperature
Rupture Disk Vs Relief Valve

Combining RDs with RVs, Roger

Bours, Chemical Engg, June 2014
Rupture Pins
As a replacement for relief valves. Non reclosing type.
Good for large loads
Usually in alternative paths to staged flares

Buckling Pins
http://www.bsb.ie/Buckling_Pin_Relief_Valves/BPRV_buckling_pin_relief_vent.html
As a replacement for relief valves. Non reclosing type.

Instead of relieving, isolates the high pressure source;
eliminates flaring
Clapper, disk, piston or plunger valve held in place by a pin
When the pin buckles, the valve is instantly closed.
Not Approved by ASME. OK for Pipelines under Dept of
Transportation Code
Open
Closed
Pin
Pressure Vacuum Relief

PVRV/Blow-off Hatches/ Explosion Doors
PVRV
Low set pressure - from few mm of H2O to 1 bar( 15 psig)
Generally for Storage Tank protection
Blow-off Hatches/ Explosion Doors

For infrequent large releases
Used generally for Storage Tank protection
In furnace fire boxes (Explosion Doors)
RELIEF DEVICES SELECTION
Relief Devices - Selection

Type of relief valve
Based on backpressure and service
Steam service: direct spring loaded pop action type.
As back pressure on the valve rises

from conventional to balanced bellows to pilot
Rupture disks: Rapid rise in pressure, corrosive

services or for very large relieving areas
E.g. Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture, Reactor
RD + RV to avoid emissions or in corrosive service
RD + RV: Non fragmenting RD and consider combination
capacity reduction factor
Relief Devices - Comparison

Weighted Pallet
Low Cost
Very Low Set Pressure
Balanced Bellows Metal Seat

Set Press constant with back press
Good Chemical & Temp compatibility

Set Press, not adjustable

High over pressure 100%++
Seat can be frozen

Conventional PSV Metal Seat

Lowest Cost
Good Chemical & Temp compatibility

Seat Leakage = Product Loss

Long simmer or blowdown
Affected by inlet press loss
Affected by back pressure
Difficult to check Set Press in-place
Seat Leakage
Long simmer or blowdown
Limited bellows life
Affected by inlet press loss
Affected by higher back pressure
Difficult to check Set Press in-place
Soft Seat: Good tightness; but elastomer will

limit chemical & temp capability

Pilot - Soft Seat - Piston Type
Smaller & Lighter
Excellent Seat Tightness
Pop or Modulating Action
In-line maintenance of main valve
Set Pressure can be tested in-situ. Only
pilots are tested
Adaptable for remote press sensing
Remote unloading possible
Pilot - Soft Seat - Diaphragm or Bellows

Good for Low Press operation 3 WC
Pop or Modulating Action
In-line maintenance of main valve
Set Pressure can be tested in-situ. Only
pilots are tested
Remote unloading possible
Fully opens at Set Pressure

Not OK in polymerizing or dirty service

Limited Chemical & Temp Compatibility
Limited Low Press Setting >15 psig
Not Allowed under ASME Sec I

Not OK in polymerizing or dirty service

Limited Chemical & Temp Compatibility
Limited High Press Setting <50 psig
Liquid service limitations

Pilot Metal Seat
Set Pressure can be tested in-situ
Excellent Chemical & Temp
Compatibility
Rupture Disks
Good tightness, if disk is intact
Wide choice in material
Minimum space
For high capacity relief as in FCCU
For secondary relief in parallel to a RV

Only pop action available

Pressure limited to 1200 psig
Temperature limited 1000F

Wide tolerance in burst pressure

Non-reclosing
Premature rupture, with pressure
pulsations
Relief Devices - Selection

Type
Conventional
Bellows
Pilot
Default Selection
Back Press
10%
30% (Note 1)
No limit
Max Op Press
90% SP
90% SP
90% SP (Note 2)
ASME Sec I
Remote Pressure Sensing/ Unloading

Plugging, Polymer, Dirty Service
1. Up to 50% with capacity correction 2. Up to 95% of set in revamp or high pressure situation
Rupture Disk
RD/RV Combination
Rapid pressure rise
Prevent atmospheric emissions
Corrosive, fouling polymerization services
Reduce RV cost in corrosive service
Very large relieving area
Not allowed for ASME Sec I

Always use non-fragmenting RD
Derate RV capacity by 10%
CODES & STANDARDS
Codes & Standards

Codes - ASME
Section I for Steam Boilers
Section VIII for Unfired Pressure Vessels
Vessels under 15
psig excluded
Recommended Practices/ Standards - API

RP 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving
Devices in Refineries
Part I Sizing and Selection and

Part II Installation
STD 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems
STD 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves
RP 2000 Relief load calculations for Storage Tanks
ASME is a Code. Compliance is mandatory.
API is a recommended practice.
API is also getting adopted as a National /
International Standard
Operating/ Design/ Set Pressure

Operating Pressure

+ margin
+ margin
+ margin
= PAH or PCV Dump Pressure

= PAHH Pressure
= Design Pressure
RV is usually set at Design Pressure

Code allows a margin over set pressure overpressure for full
capacity to be reached

10% overpressure for all contingencies, except fire

16% with multiple valve
21% overpressure for fire, an infrequent or rare case
Higher overpressure smaller RV, that is all!!
Note:
Why?
1. MAWP, based on installed wall thickness is not considered in RV set point.

Vessels are hydrotested to 130% of MAWP
2. RVs can be set below Design Pressure
3. Considering blowdown, RVs should above set 3-7% above PAHH
ASME/ API Guidelines

Process Engineers go by Design Pressure, rather

than MAWP, as MAWP is usually known much later.
For revamp: MAWP may be OK. Caution: Corroded
walls!
Where RV is set below MAWP, overpressure can

be higher to match MAWP + Accumulation
Single Vs Multiple Devices

Design Note: In high pressure service, large
valves may not be available. Instead of waiting

to find out at AFC stage, it helps if Process
Engineers can do a quick sizing and show
multiple valves, if required
For heat exchangers, one may need a small RV
for thermal and a bigger RD for tube rupture.
Set RV low so that on thermal demand, RD is
not ruptured
RELIEF SCENARIO ANALYSIS
Relief Scenario Analysis

X
Fatal Error
Utility Failures

Power Failed
Power Failure - Total or Partial

Instrument Air Failure
Cooling Medium Failure
Heating Medium or Steam Failure
Restart
Giveup
Controllers Failure
Instrument Air failure to individual control valve
Control Valve Failure - Gas blowby
Blocked Outlet
Inadvertent opening / closing of manual valves
Check Valve Failure
Utility failure may not result in major loads for

individual PSV. But being cumulative load,
they may govern the header and flare sizing
Common Mode / Cascading Failure

One failure results in another
Steam loss to Steam Turbines results in Power failure
Power loss to Air Compressor, leads to Inst Air failure
Power loss to pumps, leads to Cooling Medium failure
Analyzing cascading failures - difficult but

important
READ API RP 521. IT IS PAINFUL. BUT NO OTHER WAY!!
Individual Failure

Exchanger Tube Rupture

Thermal Expansion of blocked in liquid
External Fire
Pressure (Surges) Transients Liquid lines
Ingress of volatile (e.g. water) into hot oil
Fractionators/ Columns:

Reflux Failure
Loss of Cold Feed
Excess Heat to Reboiler
Reboiler Tube Rupture
Absorbent failure
Individual Failure
Abnormal Heat or Vapour Input
Accidental Mixing of Fluids. Remember

Bhopal?
Storage: Liquid Overfill Remember Buncefield
Human Error
Chemical Reactions Column Blows-off Top
Vacuum Relief
Atmospheric Tank Thermal Breathing
Owner may, at his risk, elect to exclude some scenarios,
considering administrative or instrument controls.
How are you going to control Hot Oil Coking?
Power Failure
All Electric Power driven equipment stop
Evaluate

Electrical one-line diagrams

Back-up power sources: in-plant generation / grid power
Single Equipment failure
Localized Power failure
Unit Power failure
Plant-wide or plant section-wide power failure
Consequence:
Vapour release from columns/ vessels
Air Cooler Fans: Natural draft credit: 25% of duty
Instrument Air Failure

All control valves revert to safe position - FC or
FO
Individual control valves: Analyse individually
Consequence:
Blocked outlet etc release
Impact on Flare: Analyse system by system
Simultaneous failure of Inst Air & Inst Electric Power
- unlikely
Steam/ Heating Oil Failure

All Steam Turbine driven equipment stop
Loss of Motive Power to eductors and ejectors
Loss of Heat to reboilers, exchangers

Loss of Stripping Steam to columns
Evaluate single failure, steam line blockage to a
single equipment + to individual unit
Cooling Medium Failure

Evaluate - impact on
Single equipment
Plant wide - Cooling Medium Pumps down
Partial credit, for multiple pumps driven by independent sources
Example - 2 electric motor + 2 steam turbine

No credit, if independent pumps can be on stand-by or taken off
service for maintenance
Cooling Medium Loss to

Exchangers and condensers; Column Condenser - Reflux failure
Refrigeration Condenser - Blocked outlet on Refrigeration
Compressor
Loss of chilled water, refrigerant, etc
Compressor Lube Oil Coolers - Compressor trip
Consequence
Vapour release from columns/ vessels
Blocked Outlet
Causes

Inadvertent valve opening or closing by operator

Instrument / Mechanical / Utility failure
Panic response - Wrong action
Wrong interpretation when multiple alarms are activated
simultaneously. Multiple alarms may result in alarm fatigue, leading
to accidents. Alarm Management Study a MUST.
Source pressure > downstream design pressure.

Sources: Pumps, Compressor, Utility, HP upstream etc
LO or CSO - not a good design; OK if Owner wants

LC valves on a high pressure source may leak
Design Tip: No double jeopardy! Only one valve closed or opened. Safety Engineer can say: Outlet SDVs got
closed but inlet SDV failed to close, asking PSV sized for both gas and liquid. No hard and fast rule.
Blocked Outlet
SDV 2 or PCV-1 fails closed
PSV - 001 Size: Full inflow to V-001
Credit: LCV-1/LCV-2 normal liquid
flow - as only ONE valve is taken

blocked at a time. Caution: instant
flow via LCV < design. Credit?
Safety engineers: Both liquid and
vapor flow as on a trip, SDVs in
liquid and vapor outlets might have
closed with inlet SDV failing to close
Compromise: Check well flow at
relieving pressure; usually less on
high backpressure. (Not true, if
choke takes a high P
PCV-1
PSV - 001
SDV-2
SDV-1
SDV-4
Arguments: On LCV-1 closing, liquid

can go via PCV-1. On LCV-2 closing,
liquid can go via LCV-1 etc.
V-001
SDV-3
LCV-1
LCV-2
Blocked Outlet
LCV - 1 fails closed
PSV - 001
Pump P-001 shut-off
LCV-1
P-001
E-001
Relieving
Operating
Head
pressure > E-001 tube

side design pressure.
Relief rate: Based on
pump head at PSV-001
relieving pressure and
max suction pressure of
pump P- 001
Good design to have
pump outlet designed
for shut-off head
V-001
Capacity
Relief flow is less than Operating flow
Blocked Outlet
To satisfy ASME, a PSV
Relieving
Operating
Head
is required on
equipment at pump
outlet, even if its design
pressure > pump shutoff pressure
Relief rate may be
nominal or Nil.
If a PSV is provided for
some other reason, say
fire, then it will do
Capacity
Pump suction valve & piping downstream of it to suit discharge conditions
Control Valve Failure

Causes

Instrument air failure; Signal (wiring) failure; DCS hardware/software failure

Improper manual operation by operator
Mechanical malfunction of control valve
Hand wheel left engaged on control valve
Plugging
Evaluate both Open and Closed position of control valve

No credit: for interlocks / Emergency Shutdown System in RV size;
Credit may be taken for total load to flare header

Credit may be taken for normally open flow paths and not affected
Simultaneous failure control valve and bypass: Owner preference
Options: No bypass; RO in bypass; bypass valve Cv same as control valve;

parallel but not-connected control valve; parallel control valve on its own
Control Valve Failure

PSV - 002
LCV - 1 fails open
PSV - 001
PSV - 002 Size:
Max flow thru LCV-1

minus V-2 normal flow
Max flow thru LCV-1:
Max Cv + downstream
PSV - 002 relieving
pressure + P between
LCV and PSV
LCV 1 fails closed
SDV-2
V-2
V-001
SDV-1
SDV-3
LCV-1
V-002
L-2
PSV - 001 Size: Blocked
outlet
Note: Several approaches to gas blowby load estimation: All gas; gas volume
equivalent volume of liquid; both gas and liquid limited to max inflow etc.
Dynamic Simulation helps get realistic results
If it overloads or is the largest LP Flare load, consider same design pressure for
the d/s vessel to eliminate gas blowby case
Heat Exchanger Tube Failure
Shell & Tube heat exchangers tubes
may fail due to thermal shock, vibration, corrosion etc

No PSV, if high pressure side design/ operating
pressure is 130% of design (= hydrotest) pressure of
low pressure side * temperature correction
130% or 0.77 rule does not mean tubes dont rupture
a common mistake
Evaluate potential overpressure of connected equipment
Evaluate potential chemical reactions when two sides mix
2 Options - tube failure at mid tube viz 2 orifices and
failure at tube sheet viz 1 nozzle + 1 orifice

For PCHEs, one full channel failure
No PSV for tube failure in double pipe exchangers
Heat Exchanger Tube Failure

Credit: Flow thru normally open path

if LP fluid is gas or vapour
If LP side is liquid, pressure build-up to push and
accelerate large liquid mass. It is as good as blocked
Some consider tube rupture only when HP to LP

differential pressure > 65 bar (1,000 psi)
On tube rupture, pressure spike is rather quick.
Usually rupture disks are provided as spring loaded
RVs take time to react
Opening time: Rupture pin: 2ms; Rupture disk: 5ms; RV
25ms
Recommended to have 2 RDs at either end of LP side
Dynamic Simulation studies help, select location
Check Valve Failure

All valves leak or pass. In early designs check valve leak was
NOT considered
Check valves stop bulk flow but cant avoid leak past them
Some considered check valve leak only in high pressure or dirty or
surging service. Some considered specially designed, power assisted

check valve can stop reverse flow. No longer valid
No credit to single check valve. Reduced flow area for 2
dissimilar check valves
Standard calculation methods available to estimate leak past a
check valve
Note: Along with leak, pressure is transmitted. That is HP side can
pressurize LP side shut-in This point out is missed out by Process Engineers in a
Hazop review
When a compressor trips, discharge from

other running compressors can back flow
into the tripped one, pressurizing its
Suction Drum
Check Valve Failure

At a common manifold, when one of the stream stops
flowing or a pump/ compressor feeding it stops, fluids from

other streams may back flow thru the non-flow pipe
Header A
Xmas Tree
Well
3 Workers Killed
Header B
Test Header
Wellhead inlet manifolds: A common check valve

or one per header
Thermal Expansion
Liquid filled equipment / piping that is blocked-in and heated
Solar radiation; Hot side of exchanger; Heat tracing
Heat Exchangers: Cold side vapor pressure > design pressure

At ambient temperature; At hot side fluid inlet temperature; Heat
tracing
OSBL: Yard piping

10% overpressure for vessels and 33% for piping
CSO or LO valves can eliminate thermal PSV, provided Owner
agrees to administrative control
Air freshener can in a closed

car - Thermal
Thermal Expansion
Thermal Expansion Massive Force
Liquid Ammonia Tank in a closed garage, exploded and
propelled the truck 40m
External Fire
Vacuum column fire
Pool fire under equipment, even if contents are not flammable

Radiant + direct heat boils liquid / expands vapour increasing
pressure
Equipment assumed blocked in and isolated when fire occurs and
inflow stopped
There can be exemptions for this rule, example, heat exchangers
ASME stamped equipment must be protected unless fire can be
ruled out or equipment/ system cannot be blocked-in

Piping and piping components do not require protection.
Interconnecting piping included in adjacent equipment
Equipment grouping: 8.6m (28.2) radius (2,500 sq.ft area) and 7.6m
(25) high from grade are grouped in a single fire zone

Liquid at NLL or HLL
Evaluate: Effects of chemical reaction, fluid decomposition and fluid
behaviour (foaming, frothing, etc.)
Do NOT design for Jet Fire load as some

do. As API RP 521 says, jet fires are
handled by blowdown viz. removing fuel
Design Tip: API indicates max fire zone size. Use it wisely to reduce Blowdown load + Flare size
External Fire
Caution: Corrosion
under insulation can
bring a vessel down
before fire does!. Need
Inspection windows
Fire NOT considered if:

Sloping or proper drainage eliminates pool fire possibility
No flammable hydrocarbon exists in the area
Air Coolers/ equipment located 7.6m (25) above grade OR
over open grating

If fire load is relieved thru any passage that cant be shut
If Owner instructs: Equipment will be vented and drained
when taken out of service. e.g. Pig launcher/ receiver
Credit for fireproof insulation as allowed by API; it
should withstand firewater jet impact

Gas vessel: Fire PSV not effective as vessel metal
temperature > Creep temperature PETRONAS: No fire PSV for gas vessels
Design Tip: If fire relief temperature > equipment design temperature, use design temp
for RV material and flange selection. Say so in data sheet. Vessel metal temperature will be
200-300C > RV relief temperature. Vessel will fail/ rupture/ deform first before RV lifts
External Fire
RP 521 Figures
Heat up rate
Time to Rupture
Vessel under fire
will deform/
rupture before
PSV lifts, as metal
wall rapidly loses
strength as its
temperature rises.
Blowdown Valves
are provided to
depressurize the
vessel within 15
minutes
Against fire:
Blowdown
FW spray
Fireproofing
Temp F
400
100
800
80
1,100
36
RVs do NOT protect against structural failure when the vessel

is exposed to extremely high temperatures during a fire
1/3 Tensile
2/3 Yield
Max Temp
C
F
Pressure Surges
Transient Analysis required for
Water hammer. 24 t piping flew off

800m. Sheared off telephone poles
water, liquid filled or rundown OSBL lines

oil/condensate export pipelines
Transient Analysis is NOT required for

ISBL piping. Short runs and generally do NOT have quick
closing valves
Code allowed - short term - margins may be used

to avoid a PSV
Design Tip: It is common for GRE Fire Water/ Sea Water

piping to burst during start-up, fill the Flare KOD and
bring the plant down. Have a good surge study; leave
design and construction/start-up to a single source. Take
exception from Owner, giving him the risk.
Seawater flooding a column sank semi-sub
Column Cases
Excess heat may not pressurize the

exchanger but will over pressure the column
Reflux failure is usually the controlling case:

Reflux Pump / Power Failure
Reflux Control Valve Fails Closed
Overhead Condenser Failure or Flooded on Draw-off Control Valve
Fails Closed
Non-condensable Accumulates in the Condenser
Operator Error: Block Valves Closed
Loss of Cold Feed

Feed Control Valve Fails Closed or Feed Pump Fails - Transient Surge
in Vapour Rate
Excess Heat to Reboilers

Steam or Heating Control Valve Fails Open
Excessive Fuel to Fired Reboiler Safety Alerts
Column blows off top leakage reacts
Additional Vapours generated
Column overflows 15 killed; 150 injured
Reboiler Tube Rupture
Credit: Reduced vaporization in reboiler at relieving pressure.

Reduced T relieving pressure reduces relief rate
Column Cases
Column load calculations is complicated
3 approaches flash, gross overhead vapour, unbalanced heat; last
one gives the best estimate
Column
Overhead Vapor, kg/h
DC Steam Stripper
Unbalanced Heat, kg/h
60,000
168,000
DC Fractionator
296,000
448,000
HC Debutanizer
69,000
171,000
Dynamic simulation can reduce
Dyn Sim load 60%. Case 2

PSV does not pop
column and reactor loads
DC Fractionator
Conventional, kg/h
Dyn Simulation, kg/h
.. Total power fail
448,000
259,000
.. Single power fail
85,000
258,000
172,000
.. Blocked outlet
From: Optimize relief loads with dynamic simulation, CL Xie, ZG Wang and YF Qin, HP, Dec 2013
Accidental Mixing of Fluids

Runaway reaction - Polymerization:
Some chemicals, when mixed in wrong
ratio or sequence may lead to run-away

reaction
Inadvertent mixing of reactive streams
Decomposition or polymerization due
to abnormal heat input or loss of
cooling
See Safety Alert
Runaway Reaction Relief Rate

Determination is complex. Inputs from
Owner, Catalyst Manufacturer, Process

Licensor.
Owner/ Licensor to provide the relief
load. Pass them the responsibility
Bhopal. 4,000 to 10,000 dead; 500,000 injured
Liquid Overfill of Storage Tanks

Inflow exceeds outflow

Overfilling from an offsite
pump during start-up or

LAH/LAHH failure
Design Tip:
1. Let level transmitters for Control and Trip track each other.
2. While filling large tanks, let DCS put a time lock based on pumping rate and ullage
Vacuum Relief
Equipment may come under vacuum:

Fluid withdrawn without matching inflow
Excessive condensation in Column

Overhead Condenser
Condensation or cooling of vapours upon
atmospheric temperature drop
Compressor suction side blocked
Condensing side of exchanger blocked in
while cooling continues
Draining with vent closed
Cool down and condensing after
steaming a vessel

Vacuum Relief
Equipment that could come under vacuum is
designed to withstand full vacuum
Note: For large diameter columns and storage tanks,
cost of designing to full vacuum is prohibitive
Check the consequences of air mixing with vessel

inventory before providing vacuum relief. Usual to
provide Nitrogen padding/ blanketing
No RV required if Owner instructs that his
administrative procedures can prevent vacuum
Draining test water; Steam condensing after a steam-out
Atmospheric Tank Protection

Inbreathing (vacuum relief) is required for
Maximum outflow without matching inflow
Vapour shrinkage due to atmosphere cooling
showers etc
Blanket gas supply valve fails/ closed
Out breathing (pressure relief) required for

Maximum inflow without matching outflow

Vapour expansion due to atmosphere warming
Blanket gas supply valve fails open
Vapour outlet valve fails/ closed
Fire relief required unless tank has frangible
roof
Fire generally does not engulf the entire tank
Atmospheric Tank Protection

Refer API 2000, for calculation of relief load
N2/ gas padding for thermal inbreathing/ outbreathing
PVRV for thermal inbreathing/ outbreathing
Gauge hatch / manway vents for fire relief
Tanks have a low design pressure, mmWC. PVRV/
manway are weight loaded; sizing by vendor

PVRVs installed directly on roof nozzle
Blanket Gas Regulators
Emergency Vent
Gauge Hatch
and
Manhole Cover
PVRV
Fired Heater
Blocked outlet and thermal
No PSV required for process coils, unless mandated
or underrated
PSV required for BFW and Steam coils Code/ IBR
Thermal PSV in Hot Oil WHRU

Residual heat in refractory/ insulation. Not effective
against oil coking inside the tube
Pumps & Compressors

Centrifugal Pump
Usually designed for shut-off or highest head at zero flow
Reciprocating/ Positive Displacement Pump/ Compressor

RV for blocked outlet. Due to pulsation in discharge pressure keep good

margin between operating and set pressure
Centrifugal Compressor
Suction side for settle-out pressure. 2-3 stages in a common casing may
settle-out together + Check valve leak
Refrigeration or low temp service ~ vapour pressure at ambient
temperature
Discharge/ Casing: Design for surge pressure at 105% speed with maximum
[suction pressure; molecular weight] and minimum suction temperature [Oil
& Gas Industry practice] or RV provided at 120% of Normal Operating Press
Inter-stage: Usually fire case
When a compressor trips, discharge from

other running compressors can back flow
into the tripped one, pressurizing its
Suction Drum
Typical Relief Cases Oil & Gas

Flowline
- Blocked Outlet/ Thermal
Inlet Sep
- Blocked Outlet
LP Sep
- Blocked Outlet/ Gas Blowby
Compressor
- Fire/ Check Valve Leakage
Compressor Last Stage
- Blocked Outlet ?
Glycol Contactor Fire
Fuel Gas KOD - PCV Failure
Glycol Pump - Blocked Outlet
Filters
- Fire
Air Vessels
- Fire
RVs may not be the right solution

For a few cases, RV is impractical. Instrumented safeguards is needed
Hot Oil WHRU.
Hot Oil Boiling Pt at Relief Press > Incoming Flue Gas Temp
Heat to boiling fluid zero
Hot oil will decompose and coke before it boils
Instrumented protection to remove source of heat + minimum flow at all
times + thermal PSV against residual heat in WHRU
Export pipeline of 1,000 MMSCFD

A huge flare. HIPPS contains the HP fluid avoiding a release
Instrumented Protection to isolate the HP source such as compressor
and/or HIPPS (2 independent SDV) from 2 independent trip systems.
READ ASME CODE CASE 2211-1, now part of RP 521, Annex E
Design Tip: SDVs leak, Ha Ha
Design Tip: HIPPS/ IPF requires Documented User Approval.

Only User may specify pressure protection by system design.
SIZING
Design Tip: Analyzing Relief Scenarios and Estimating Relief

Loads is the important part. Sizing is a matter of routine.
RV Sizing
3 Equations
Vapour - Critical
Steam - Critical (ASME Div VIII)
Liquid
K = Sizing constant
W = Relief flow rate
C = Coefficient
P1 = Upstream relieving pressure
Kd = Coefficient of discharge
Kb /Kw = Back pressure correction factor
Z = Compressibility
M = Molecular weight
T = Upstream relieving temperature
A = Required orifice area
KW
TZ
A=
CP1KdKb M
KW
A=
P1KdKbKnKsh
KQ
G
A=
38KdKwKv P1-P2
Kn = Correction factor for Napier Equation

Ksh = Correction factor for steam superheat
Kv = Correction factor for viscosity
P2 = Total back pressure
SG = Specific gravity of liquid
Liquid sizing: trial & error step required.
Start with an assumed size to determine
Re and hence Kv. Repeat to match
See API for sizing 2 Phase Flow.
Older method of vapor + liquid
area is no longer valid
RV Sizing
Subcritical Flow Vapour, pilot and conventional
Valid for RVs that have their cold spring setting
adjusted to compensate for the constant superimposed

BP
Built-up back pressure <10% or allowable accumulation
K
W
P1
P2
Kd
F2
Z
M
T
A
= Sizing constant
= Relief flow rate
= Upstream relieving pressure
= Downstream or backpressure
= Coefficient of discharge
= Coefficient of sub-critical flow
= Compressibility
= Molecular weight
= Upstream relieving temperature
= Required orifice area
KW
A=
F2Kd
ZT
MP1(P1-P2)
Do NOT interpret this equation

allows >10% back pressure
RV Sizing
Coefficient of Discharge Kd
Depends on relief valve design
National Boiler Board certifies capacities of all RVs
Manufacturer back calculates Kd from certified capacity
and test conditions

If unknown, assume 0.975 for vapour and 0.65 for liquid
RV capacity must be checked based on vendor Kd
For all vapour and liquid RVs, manufacturer should
supply sizing calculation based on his Kd
Design Tip: Kd varies from manufacturer to manufacturer. Our calculations should

not be passed to clients. Final calcs from supplier should be the deliverable.
RV Standard Sizes
Standard RV Sizes
API 526 Orifice Designation
RVs made in standard sizes

Each standard orifice given a
letter designation
Select a standard size larger
than the calculated one
If calculated size, marginally
exceeds a standard size, it may
be OK, as the actual orifice area
for most RVs are higher than the
standard API area. Actual areas
are listed in National Boiler
Board Book
Area, in2
Size
D
0.110
0.196
0.307
0.503
0.785
1.287
1.838
2.853
3.600
4.340
6.380
11.050
16.000
26.000
RV Standard Sizes
Standard RV Sizes
API 526 Orifice Designation
RV Inlet x Outlet Sizes
Area, in2
Size
D
0.110
1 x2
0.196
1 x 2
0.307
1 x 3
0.503
0.785
1.287
1.838
2.853
6 x 10
3.600
8 x 10
4.340
6.380
11.050
16.000
26.000
Size
2 x3
3 x4
3 x6
4 x6
6 x8
Standard RV Sizes
Air/Gas/Steam Service
API area is not actual RV area

Actual area and nozzle coefft vary from

manufacturer to manufacturer
2J3 API Area = 1.287 in2

Actual area = 1.427 to 1.635 in2

Coeffts
= 0.788 to 0.975
National Board certified capacity - based
on nozzle coefft and orifice area - varies

Why the difference?
In 1962 ASME Sec VIII derated certified

capacities by 10%. Manufacturers did not
derate their advertised capacity or nozzle
coefft, but increased nozzle area by 10%. But
API orifice areas as advertised remain same.
Board RV Area is based on

Nozzle bore for full lift valves
Lift for restricted lift valve
KA is more comparable.
Explanation AG/Crosby
Advertised KA = 0.975*1.287 = 1.255
National Board = 0.788*1.635 = 1.288
API (K= 0.9) = 0.9*1.287 = 1.158
Actual capacity may be 10-16% more
So dont jump from P to R (73%) when
calculated size marginally exceeds
standard size
Thermal Expansion
Relief Rate, q =
v.
K.d.c
v = cubic expansion coefft of liquid at expected temp
= Heat Transfer Rate
Exchangers: use max Heat Duty
Solar Radiation: use as per Project Design Basis
K = Sizing constant
d = Relative Density
c = Specific heat of trapped liquid
For thermal protection of piping, generally D 1 threaded
or 1 D 2 flanged RVs are provided; No calculations done
Fire Relief
Liquid:

Latent heat for multi-component is tricky, but rules of thumb help. = 50 to 100 units
Assumed that entire heat goes to boil-off.
With large liquid inventory, only a small part goes to vaporization; rest heats the liquid
Gas:
Temperature, T2, calculated under fire may exceed base equipment design temperature.
RV with required inlet flange rating is usually not available. In RV data sheet, specify
design temperature and indicate that T2 is for area calculation only.
Fire Relief - Blowdown

Without BDV, internal pressure (Hoops stress) rises over time;
Stress
metals ability to hold pressure (yield strength) falls with increasing

temperature. The vessel will fail when internal stress exceeds ability
Blowdown brings down internal pressure and stress. As long as
internal stress is below allowable stress, vessel will not rupture
Judiciously use to extend blowdown time when blowdown rate is
higher than design inflow capacity to reduce flare size
Ka
Boom
Time, minutes
API RP 521: Thinner plates (LP service)
heat up faster; higher the temperature,

faster it ruptures
If BDV initial pressure (PAHH/PSV) >>
operating pressure, zoning can cut
peak rate
Flow + Pressure
Fire Relief - Blowdown
RP 521 Figures
Heat up rate
Time to Rupture
Groups 1 +2 + 3
and adjacent equipment within a fire zone

(8.6m radius x 7.6m high) are taken at
BDV initial pressure; rest at operating
pressure
Group 1, then Group 2 and last Group 3

50% reduction
Flow
capacity
Pressure = Poe-t
Time
Take one source at a time. Loads from this
Staggered blowdown can reduce flare
Flow = Foe-t
Time
Staggered Blowdown
Each BDV with secured air vessel,
sized for 3 valve strokes; PAL; 2 check
valves at inlet; no bleeding devices
like regulators
From: Design staggered depressurization sequence for flare systems, R Dole, S Bhatt and S Sridhar, HP, Dec 2013
INSTALLATION & ISOLATION
Design Tip: Improper installation restricts capacity. Next

time you visit a plant, walk around and cringe in horror!!.
Inlet Line
Resonant Chatter in a pilot can self-destruct it
Size on RV rated flow - not on relief load

Inlet loss <3% to avoid chatter, except with
remote sensing pilots

Bleed
If inlet P >3% with pilots, use actual inlet

pressure to size RV
Upstream of demister. from vapour space;
below Normal Liquid Level for PRV

10d min from Control Valve
Free draining to source; Bleed/drain @inlet
Nozzle Entrance Loss

Friction Loss
Entrance Loss
1 Velocity Head
Friction Loss
1 VH if RV is off vessel
VH if RV is off outlet pipe
RV mounted upright
Inlet line/ Vessel Nozzle RV inlet
Bleed
Hard T
Entrance Loss
Velocity Head
Design Tip: Common Error: Ignoring P in common piping,

specially in a group of vessels protected by a single RV.
Inlet 3%
It is difficult to meet <3% criteria when
Inlet pipe area/ RV area < 3. Results in body bowl
choking. Usually in bigger RV

Suggestions:

Have a higher inlet example 4P6; have 6P8

0.7854*4^2/P(6.38) = 1.97
Insert a size 9.5 between P and Q 6.38^11.05 0.7854*6^2/P(6.38) = 4.43
0.7854*6^2/9.5 = 2.973
Reduce RV lift to reduce area viz Q 9.5
Latter 2 reduce RV area to desired to cut rated flow and P
Study of 14,863 RVs indicate 20% fails to meet 3% limit

90 off 4P6 RVs with inlet L= 4 to 116. P = 1.2 to 19.4%.
63% > 3%
From: Address inlet pressure loss concerns with restricted lift relief devices, Smith D, Yoram S, HP, Mar 2014
Outlet
Like high inlet loss, high back-pressure can make

a RV chatter. As soon as RV closes, flow stops,
back-pressure falls, making the RV to open
Atmospheric Discharge
Safe Location
To Safe Location - for steam, air and N2; not HC

Weep or drain hole in outlet low point
To Closed Drain
drain hole
Thermal etc RV
Avoid, if cross contamination is possible
Avoid if water in drain will freeze
To Flare

Line should free drain to flare header; Top entry

No liquid accumulation
Backpressure limitation
Outlet line size RV outlet
< 70% sonic and V criteria
Free Drain
Inlet/ Outlet Isolation

Inlet & outlet Isolation valves

If a spare RV is required by Owner,

install with FB inlet & outlet valves

Inlet valve of one RV is LO and the other LC
Some Owners require interlocked valve to ensure that one RV is
always in service
Why?
Both outlet valves should be LO.
A (globe) vent valve across RV to depressurize before

draining

Not permitted by ASME Section I; not recommended by ASME

Section VIII
If required by Owner, then both should be FB locked open (LO or
CSO)
LO
LO
600 mm gap
LO
LO
LC
A 2nd ball isolation valve located 600mm upstream of vent valve in

HP service, if globe valve is stuck on icing ~ JT cooling
A bleed valve u/s of RV inlet block valve ~ in-situ testing

If Owner agrees, a single common LO outlet valve for all RVs
in a system, say compressor train or Fuel Gas System
LO
Inlet & Outlet Piping

Inlet
Lead
Size, in
Eq L, ft
Fittings No off
10
12
14
16
18
20
open system
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
Closed system
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
75
Eq L, ft each
3
Elbows
12
14
16
18
20
23
Hard T
10
14
19
28
37
47
55
62
72
82
90
Reducer
10
11
13
Gate Valve
10
11
12
14
Eq L, ft - Open system
48
53
62
81
94
115
130
144
161
178
197
Eq L, ft - Closed system
98
103
112
131
144
165
180
194
211
228
247
10
12
14
16
18
20
open system
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
Closed system
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
Outlet
Lead
Size, in
Eq L, ft
Fittings No off
Eq L, ft each
3
Elbows
12
14
16
18
20
23
Hard T
10
14
19
28
37
47
55
62
72
82
90
Reducer
10
11
13
Gate Valve
10
11
12
14
Eq L, ft - Open system
48
53
62
81
94
115
130
144
161
178
197
Eq L, ft - Closed system
73
78
87
106
119
140
155
169
186
203
222
Poor Piping
Design Tip: It is a pain; but MUST review RV inlet and outlet

piping and pump suction piping in 3D model. Easier to do
than wish I could bury myself in sand feeling at site
Pipers locate RVs at convenient locations viz
access, ignoring inlet P. Need to check piping 3D

model
Horizontal dead legs collect trash / liquid in service
RVs in turbulent zone can chatter and get damaged
Downstream of a Pressure Reduction Station Fuel Gas?
Downstream of orifice plates/ flow nozzles
Downstream of pulsating compressor / pump discharge. Pilot
RVs may be better because of high seat loading

Ideal Piping
Difficult to achieve but
recommended by
suppliers
Common Errors
Prod Sep
Ignoring static head
LC
Hydrocyclone
Between upstream & downstream
equipment as in the case of Prod Sep

and d/s vessel or Hydrocyclone
Between PSV and piping at a lower deck
Pump at
Upper Deck
Ignoring P in common piping,

specially in a group of vessels
protected by a single RV
Ignoring mechanical limit on
backpressure. Bigger the RV lower is
backpressure allowed.
Piping at
Lower Deck
Friction Loss
150# RV Outlet Press Limit, psig at 100F
Design Tip: Important to check mechanical limit on

backpressure on flowing and non-flowing RVs.
Forgotten by Process Engineers. See RP 526
Size
DJ
Convn
285
285
60
30
Bellow
230
80
60
30
PSV - 001
HIPPS Errors
HP | LP
PAHH
PALL
Riser SDV
PAHH
PALL
HIPPS used
SDV-3 HP Section
SDV-1 SDV-2
HP | LP
Against PCV / choke failure

Blocked outlet/ stuck pig/ hydrate blockage
Subsea Flowline
In
subsea section to derate flowline/riser,
instead of designing for shut-in pressure

Topside piping
LP Section
Subsea Wells
HP | LP
Fortified Section
Check
Pressure build-up in trapped LP section by
the time PAHHs detect and fully closes SDVs

Provide minimum length of fortified or HP
section d/s of HIPPS SDVs - pig/ hydrate
blockage, SDV leakage
Need to provide a PSV in LP SDVs leak!
RV Discharge Velocity & Noise

Force
Tail pipes may operate at high velocities

Based on Process input, piping to calculate the
reaction forces
RV may need supports to counter momentum and
velocity effects of the flowing fluid
Dual outlet PSV can help mitigate resultant force
Noise levels should be calculated per RP 520

Provide noise insulation or relocate RV away
Flow
Flow Induced Vibration

Flow induced vibrations may result in fatigue
failure.
May require piping supports, increased wall
thickness, etc
Failure to update Relief Studies

Codes and standards; methods/ assumptions
keep changing additional insights,, Flarenet

RVs in old plants should be revisited every 10 years
If control valves/ equipment have been replaced
In Oil & Gas plants, GORs, liquid profiles change
RELIEF SYSTEM DESIGN
Relief System Design

Analyze Relief Scenarios
Analysis
Calculate Relief Loads and RV Size for each
Scenario to get Governing Case
Sizing
Summarize results for each RV for each
contingency to determine Peak Load to Flare
Info Required
1. Heat and Material Balance
2. Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)
3. Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&IDs)
4. Instrument Data (Control Valve, Bypass, RO sizes, etc.)
5. Mechanical and Rotating Equipment Data
Total Load Reduction via Dyn Sim

On total plant failure cases, viz Power, Cooling
Water, Air, it is unlikely all the PSVs will pop at the
same instant + maintain initial rate
Columns may take time build to relief pressure
Dynamic simulation can help find realistic load
Note: Compressor interstage drum pops in total system
study but does not impact total load
Total Power Failure

Fractionator
Conventional, kg/h
Dyn Sim - Individual, kg/h
Dyn Sim System, kg/h
448,000
259,000
140,000
160,000
Stripper Feed Drum
45,000
45,000
50,000
Debutanizer
72,000
72,000
5,000
565,000
376,000
355,000
Comp Interstage Drum
Total
Total Load Reduction via Dyn Sim

Dyn Sim total load is 275,000. But

design taken as 355,000 kg/h
Total Power Failure

Fractionator
Conventional, kg/h
Dyn Sim - Individual, kg/h
Dyn Sim System, kg/h
448,000
259,000
140,000
160,000
Stripper Feed Drum
45,000
45,000
50,000
Debutanizer
72,000
72,000
5,000
565,000
376,000
355,000
Comp Interstage Drum
Total
Still Accidents Happen

Boat hits platform
PSV not bolted right

Boiler started
without purging
Hydrotest done with

cold water
Some of these accidents are not preventable by RVs but by

Common Sense
Good Operating Practice
Good Instrumentation & Controls
CS bend used instead

of AS in H2 plant
Piping Support Not

Fire Proofed
Bend d/s of water

Injection or LCV =
Erosion-corrosion
Missing Check at UC
Internal in Flare KOD

Pig Launched
No gas detectors in
onshore plant
Water Hammer
THANK YOU

Pressure Relief Systems 2014 Rev A

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Pressure Relief Systems 2014 Rev A

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June 2014

PRESSURE RELIEF SYSTEMS

API STD - RP 520/ 521/ 526/ 537

My friend Winston Yeo, KBR, Singapore/ Chevron, Thailand

Control system maintains stable operation

when control system fails

RV lifting: a serious incident

Code Vs Recommended Practice

Community Emergency Response

ASME is a Code. Compliance is mandatory.

Where Pressure Relief is not possible

Fast chemical reactions:

containment may occurs before RV pops.

Plugging, polymerization or deposition that may

partially or completely block RV

Multi-phase relief: where rate is difficult to predict

location or very large vent/ flare system

Tank drained. Pulled

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Air freshener can in a closed

Vacuum column fire

Column internals - Pyrophoric fire

Semi sub what was left

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Not allowed per ASME section I

Bellows original purpose was to protect the

Backpressure acting on top and

bottom of disk cancels each other

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100 RV Opening Pressure

allowing the main valve to open

pressure on the smaller seat, keeping the valve shut

Pilot is a small RV!

Flowing design may lead to freezing or

Spindle travel - decides

Modulating allows RV opening with a small

tube intake need not be at RV inlet

Capacity - Back Pressure Impact

upstream pressure, as long

Back Pressure - Conventional RV

Backpressure affects lift;

Back Pressure - Balanced Bellows

At 30% capacity reduced

Difficult to have small bellows. Size D & E, may be a modified F !!

Back Pressure - Balanced Disk RV

At 20% capacity reduced

Balanced Spindle type can withstand

Back Pressure - Pilot RV

Nozzle = 92% Pilot = 78%

Backpressure may open the

Back Pressure Impact - Comparison

Backpressure Impact - Tests

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overpressure. Liquid (incompressible fluids)

based on wall thickness provided at coincident

Superimposed back pressure - Affects set pressure.

Pressure at outlet flange before RV opens

Constant superimposed BP: Always the same pressure. When RV

discharges to a closed system. Can be high ~ 50% of set pressure.

Built-up back pressure - Does not affect set pressure but

Total back-pressure = Superimposed + Built-up BP