TITLE

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

People
vs.
Cerilla

The dying
declaration was of
the victim was
applied in this
case as sufficient
to prove the
criminal liability of
the accused
Cerilla.

At around 6:00 pm on 24 April 1998, the victim, Alexander Parreo

(Alexander), his 14-year old daughter, Michelle, and neighbor, Phoebe
Sendin (Sendin), went to the house of Cerilla. They were cordially
welcomed and entertained by Cerilla and his wife. An hour later, a
blackout occurred. At this time, Alexander sought permission from the
couple to leave, which the latter acknowledged. On their way home,
Michelle was walking ahead of Alexander with the latter closely
following his daughter. Suddenly, after walking for about 100 meters
from Cerillas house, Michelle heard an explosion. Michelle immediately
turned her back and saw Cerilla pointing a gun at Alexander who, at that
moment, was staggering towards her. Sendin, who was also with
Alexander and Michelle, did not look back but instead ran away and
proceeded to the house of Mrs. Parreo. Meanwhile, Michelle was
cuddling Alexander beside the road when the latter repeatedly told her
that it was Cerilla who shot him. Twenty minutes later, Alexanders
other daughter arrived. She was also told by Alexander at that moment
that it was Cerilla who shot him.
Police officers rushed to the crime scene and helped carry Alexander
to an ambulance. A police officer was able to ask Alexander who shot
him to which he answered "Pato." "Pato" is an alias by which Cerilla is
known.
Alexanders wife, Susan, who rushed to the hospital was also told by
Alexander that it was appellant who shot him. Alexander died the
following day.

Ariate
vs.
People

The dying
declaration was of
the victim was not
applied in this
case since it
lacked the third
requisite re: that
the declarant
would have been
competent to
testify as the
victim was not
shown to have the
opportunity to see
the assailants.

Petitioners Jesus Geraldo and Amado Ariate were charged with

homicide for the death of Arthur Ronquillo.
At 3:00 a.m. of July 1, 2002, his wife, daughter Mirasol, and son Arnel,
among other persons, on being informed of the shooting of Ronquillo,
repaired to where he was, not far from his residence, and found him
lying on his side and wounded. Although gasping for breath, he was able
to utter to Mirasol, within the hearing distance of Arnel that he was shot
by Badjing and Amado.
Petitioners who were suspected to be the "Badjing" and "Amado"
responsible for the shooting of the victim were subjected to paraffin
tests which yielded negative results.
In a document dated July 1, 2002, the victim's son Arnel gave a
statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners Jesus
Geraldo and Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father.

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material
facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed
belief that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without
an opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a
statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is
certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.
NOTE: Requisites for a dying declaration to be admissible (1) The declaration must concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death. This refers not only to the
facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before and after the assault having a direct
causal connection with it. (2) At the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under
the consciousness of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration
admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is
the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders
the dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of
survival and looked on death as certainly impending. (3) The declarant is competent as a witness.
The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness had he survived,
the proffered declarations will not be admissible. (4) The declaration must be offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. Anent this
requisite, the same deserves no further elaboration as, in fact, the prosecution had caused its
witnesses to take the stand and testify in open court on the substance of Alexanders ante
mortem statement in the present criminal case for murder.
The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with
unanimity that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him.
The statements of victim complied with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First,
Alexanders declaration pertains to the identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal
quality and extent of the injuries he suffered underscore the imminence of his death as his
condition was so serious that his demise occurred the following morning after a thirteen (13)hour operation. Third, he would have been competent to testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying
declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for murder where he was the victim.
The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexanders
and Michelles positive identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this
did not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the shot
was delivered at close range.
The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi. It was not
physically impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is
only 120-150 meters, more or less.
A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: (a) it
concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's death.
There is no dispute that the victim's utterance to his children related to the identities of his
assailants. As for the victim's consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that
he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of
his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may safely be inferred
that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death. The
location of the victim's two gunshot wounds, his gasping for breath, and his eventual death before
arriving at the hospital meet this requirement.
It has not been established, however, that the victim would have been competent to testify
had he survived the attack. There is no showing that he had the opportunity to see his assailant.
Among other things, there is no indication whether he was shot in front, the post-mortem
1

TITLE

People
vs.
De Joya

DOCTRINE

The dying
declaration was of
the victim was not
applied in this
case since the
purported dying
declaration was
incomplete and it
did not
correspond to the
question asked.

FACTS

RULING

In another document dated July 4, 2002, Mirasol also gave a

statement in a question and answer style that her father uttered that
herein petitioners shot him.
At the witness stand, Mirasol echoed her father's declaration that
"Badjing" and "Amado" shot him. Arnel substantially corroborated
Mirasol's statement.

examination report having merely stated that the points of entry of the wounds were at the "right
lumbar area" and the "right iliac area."
At all events, even if the victim's dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify
the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance.
However, it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the burden of proving that
petitioners were, at the material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames
or aliases. This, the prosecution failed to discharge.
When there is doubt on the identity of the malefactors, motive is essential for their conviction.
The Court notes that in their affidavits supporting the criminal complaint, the victim's wife and
children Mirasol and Arnel proffered not knowing any possible motive for petitioners to shoot
the victim. At the trial, no evidence of any motive was presented by the prosecution. Petitioners'
defense of denial and alibi thus assumes importance.
It must be noted that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence.
Those two words could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or
(b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no
predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of a verb,
we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must,
moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's
question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be
complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the
res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a
full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
The statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the
declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial how much of the whole affair of
the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to
include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which
thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary
statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of
a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement
he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been
able to tell.
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified
by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not
therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which
dying declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete.
In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible
communication to Alvin.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature.
When these circumstances are examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly
and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and killed the deceased Eulalia. The
quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks before
Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a
person to slay another in such a violent and gory manner.
The testimony of Herminia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in
the living room where Eulalia was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such
slipper was indeed one of the very same pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife,
who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk slippers are made in such
quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of
slippers of the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife.

Respondent was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide to

which the respondent pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision convicting De Joya of the crime charged.
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together
with their ten year old son Alvin and Herminia 88-year old mother,
Eulalia, are residents of Baliuag, Bulacan.
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia left for school to
teach. Her mother Eulalia was then sitting at their sofa watching the
television set. Her son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And
at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home.
At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses
Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a
friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard,
Gloria looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed
respondent standing and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's.
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia lying
down prostrate and drenched with her own blood. He immediately
threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked
her what happened, to which Eulalia answered Si Paqui. After saying
these words, she let go of Alvin's hand and passed away.
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and
examined the body of Eulalia. The said doctor declared that said Eulalia
had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia
Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by
said doctor. Herminia requested for a death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino
did not issue one and instead immediately left.
Herminia found out that the two gold rings worn by her mother were
missing. The right earring of her mother was likewise missing. All of
these were valued at P300.
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor
ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet were taken out. Its
secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was
destroyed.
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in by the side
of the cabinet near the door of their room downstairs, more or less one
meter from where the victim was lying prostrate.
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color
and size, as the other half of the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo
but which she gave to Socorro De Joya, the wife of the respondent.

TITLE

DOCTRINE

FACTS

Fuentes
vs.
CA

The declaration
made by Zolio was
not given
credence as an
exception to the
hearsay rule under
declaration
against interest
because the socalled declarant
was not shown to
be dead or unable
to testify.

Petitioner Fuentes seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA

affirming his conviction for murder.
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989, Julieto Malaspina
together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was
at a benefit dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur.
Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of
the latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a
short hair." Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with
a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions rushed
to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping
wound on his abdomen he muttered that Fuentes stabbed him.
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim
was killed he was conversing with him; that he was compelled to run
away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill
all those from San Isidro" because "Jonie," the killer, was from that
place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his
brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that "Jonie" admitted
spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match
before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were
many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and escaped
through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the
morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.

People
vs.
Bernal

The deceaseds
declaration to
another person
that he was having
an affair with the
wife of the
accused was
admitted in

Respondent, together with two other persons whose identities and

whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of
kidnapping in Davao city.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his
arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses.
On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.

RULING
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978
around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing
is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show that appellant had perpetrated
the slaying or the robbery.
Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate
family during the four-day wake, does not give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer
of Eulalia. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at work, sewing and carrying on his
trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the
afternoon Eulalia was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with
several other persons. His reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is not
necessarily a sign of guilt.
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made
against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest
and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on
necessity and trustworthiness.
There are three essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a)
the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable
by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify
existed.
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the
extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose.
In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove
their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.
The Court noted, however, that no less than petitioner's own witness, Nerio Biscocho who
claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and "Jonie"
Fuentes are one and the same person.
Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accusedappellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes,
that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking
feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said
of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest
cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no
showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38
obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto
unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece
of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than
the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted
having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to
produce Zoilo as a witness.
In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown
individuals "as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of
purpose." Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances only. The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the participation
of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
3

TITLE

Parel
vs.
Prudencio

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

evidence since it
complied with all
the requisites for
a declaration
against interest to
be considered as
an exception to
the hearsay rule.

On August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto

Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited
Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently
because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived,
approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." When
he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other
handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen"
and because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with them. They then
hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of
Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a
certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit
affair with Bernal's wife and this was the motive behind the former's
kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing. On the other hand, the
defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police
on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped.
A certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified
that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and
Bernal's wife were having an affair. Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity
was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
On February 27, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner with the RTC alleging that he
is the owner of a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes
Park National Reservation near DPS compound in Baguio City. Such
property was constructed solely from his own funds and declared in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 47048. He commenced the
construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later.
When the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he
allowed petitioners parents to move therein and occupy the second
floor while the construction of the ground floor was on-going to
supervise the construction and to safeguard the materials. When the
construction of the second floor was finished in 1975, respondent
allowed petitioners parents and children to transfer and temporarily
reside thereat; it was done out of sheer magnanimity as petitioners
parents have no house of their own and since respondents wife is the
older sister of Florentino, petitioners father.
In November 1985, respondent wrote petitioners father a notice for
them to vacate the said house as the former was due for retirement and
he needed the place to which petitioners parents heeded when they
migrated to U.S. in 1986. However, without respondents knowledge,
petitioner and his family unlawfully entered and took possession of the
ground floor of respondents house. Petitioners refusal to vacate the
house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the
instant action for recovery of possession.
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that his parents
are the co-owners of the said residential house, i.e., the upper story
belongs to respondent while the ground floor pertains to petitioners
parents.
In deciding in favor of the petitioner, RTC did not give credence to the
tax declaration as well as the several documents showing the City
Assessors assessment of the property all in respondents name since tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the

declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is
safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of
interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same
was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a
falsehood to his own detriment.

The declaration
made by the
petitioners father
to the effect that
he is the occupant
of the residential
building and not
the owner of such
building, was
admitted and
considered as a
declaration
against interest
(against the heir,
who is the
petitioner in this
case) as an
exception to the
hearsay rule.

We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint
for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner thereof.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding
they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his
own pecuniary or moral interest.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioners father and had adequate knowledge
with respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the same
as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would
not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as
well as to his childrens interests as his heirs.
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentinos lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said
affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit
even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by respondent against him
(Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject house which the trial court dismissed
due to the absence of evidence showing that petitioner entered the house against the latters will
and held that the remedy of respondent was to file an action for ejectment; and even when a
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was
subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondents action should be an accion publiciana
which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name
of respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioners cross-examination that the
existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan.
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house
declared under his name since 1974. In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted
that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the
house in their name.
In this case, the records show that although petitioners counsel asked that he be allowed to
offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. Thus, the CA did
not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
4

TITLE

DOCTRINE

Tison
vs.
CA

The declaration
made by Teodora
Domingo to the
effect that the
petitioners are her
niece and nephew
was admitted in
evidence despite
the absence of
any independent
evidence of
pedigree or
relationship. This
involves the first
scenario of an act
or declaration
about pedigree
wherein the claim
is directed against
the declarant, in
this case against
her estate.

Mendoza
vs.
CA

The act or
declaration
(about pedigree)
made by the
mother and
brother of the
alleged father of
Teopista Toring to
a certain Isaac
Mendoza, who
was the nephew
of the alleged

FACTS

RULING

affidavit executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by

respondent saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety to
determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed because of
an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the City Treasurer
concerning the propertys tax assessment and Florentino, thought then
that it should be the respondent who should pay the taxes; and that the
affidavit cannot be accepted for being hearsay.

A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and
purchased the materials to be used; and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries upon
order of his father and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not one of
the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not establish that
petitioners father and respondent co-owned the house.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue
as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Teodora Guerreros father cannot be
properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the
further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners
unless and until it is rebutted.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece.
Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception
to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related
to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by
evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam,
that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to
both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the
relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.
There must be some independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there
be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where
it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through
his declarations to the property of some other member of the family.
The declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is rendered
competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance against the private

respondent Teodora Domingo for the parcel of land with a house an
apartment located in Quezon City. The properties were originally owned
by the spouses Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Petitioners claim to be the niece and nephew of Teodora Guerrero
who died leaving only Martin and the petitioners as the heirs. Upon the
death of his wife, Martin Guerrero then executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto him, allegedly as the sole
heir, the land in dispute. Subsequently, a TCT was issued to Martin,
which he used in selling the property to respondent Domingo.
Respondent Domingo thereafter acquired a TCT in her name. The
petitioners claim that they are entitled to inherit of the property by
right of representation.
Petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness,
with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners'
filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal
certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of
destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes
Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton
Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.
Private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the
ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the
deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and
aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls
short of the quantum of proof required.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private
respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida
Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married
at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the
plaintiffs allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees.
Two witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza
and Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro.

An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in
his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may
consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The Court noted that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and
he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father Hipolito,
who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was
Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Nevertheless, there are certain safeguards against its abuse. The following requisites have to be
5

TITLE

Solinap
vs.
Locsin, Jr.

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

father, was
admitted in
evidence as it
complied with the
needed requisites.

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring

because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro
himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a gobetween for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming
pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro frequently
handed him money to be given to Brigida.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista
because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother,
Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and
whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him various
amounts to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro
intended to give certain properties to Teopista.

As a general rule,
entries in official
records made in
the performance
of his duty by a
public officer or by
a person in the
performance of a
duty specially
enjoined by law,
are prima facie
evidence of the
facts therein
stated. However,
in the case at bar,
the certificate,
which issued by
the Local Civil
Registrar,
presented by the
respondent bore
irregularities and
differences from
the certificate,
which was
acquired from the
Civil Registrar
General,
presented by the
petitioners. The
glaring
discrepancies
between the two
Certificates of Live
Birth have
overturned the
genuineness of
the certificated
entered in the

Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on

December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC a
Petition for Letters of Administration praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal
properties which include undetermined savings, current and time
deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of
real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr.,
Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and
(c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
Before the hearing scheduled by the RTC, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr.,
the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to
be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's
petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is
not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,
who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.
Another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir
of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel
Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that
respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the
statute of limitations.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased, respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the
Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. It contains the
information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he
was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his
signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of the document,
respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City, who produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957
records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 is included. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph
showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims,
shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members
of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate

complied with before the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence: (1)
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) the pedigree must be in issue; (3) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue; (4) the declaration must be made
before the controversy arose; and (5) the relationship between the declarant and the person
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations
about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his
brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to
the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the
complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was
filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the
relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than
such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in
which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
The records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and
regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars.
Since the records of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely
access them in the Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from
the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these
employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating
from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier.
Thus, in proving the authenticity of the certificate presented by the respondent, more convincing
evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of certificate presented by
the respondent are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
However, it was shown that Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and
entered in the Local Civil Registry in January 1957 was based merely on her general impressions
of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those
appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law,
the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, the Court
found Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Further, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years
thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to the certificate presented by the
respondent:
The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. The
assailed certificate is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. The assailed certificate is a
carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries
therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten.
Unlike the contents of those other certificates, the assailed certificate does not indicate
important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and
business.
The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back, there
is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other
details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
It bears stressing that Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that: Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippine, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
6

TITLE

Jison
vs.
CA

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

Local Civil
Registry; thus, the
certificate
presented by the
respondent was
held inadmissible
and insufficient to
prove filiation to
the deceased.

of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila,
indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother,
Amparo Escamilla and that the same does not contain the signature of
the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while
respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded
on January 30, 1957, the certificate presented by the respondent was
recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. On the other hand, the
certificate presented by the petitioners appears on a July, 1956 form,
which was already used before respondent's birth. This scenario dearly
suggests that the certificate presented by the respondent was falsified.
Petitioners presented as witness a handwriting expert who testified that
the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa, then Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City, appearing in the respondents certifcate are
forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious
document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The trial court rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CA on
appeal, holding that the certificate and photograph are sufficient proofs
of respondents illegitimate filiation with the deceased.
In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA
alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison
since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO
impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny
of FRANCISCO's daughter. As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August
1946, in Dingle, Iloilo. MONINA claimed that since childhood, she had
enjoyed the continuous and implied recognition as an illegitimate child
of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged
that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that
she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant
(CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's
refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and
treat her as such.
In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual
relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the
complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and
did not know of her whereabouts since then. Further, he never
recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As
affirmative and special defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA
had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was
barred by estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for
dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the
malicious filing of the complaint.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11)
witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena,
Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy
Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar. These
witnesses explained individual circumstances, which induced them to
believe that MONINA was Franciscos daughter.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. She
affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar and baptismal certificates, she was born on 6 August 1946
to Esperanza Amolar and FRANCISCO. MONINA first studied at Sagrado

In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (the one
presented by the respondent from the Local Civil Registrar and the one presented by the
petitioners from the Civil Registrar General) have overturned the genuineness of the certificated
entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is the certificate recorded in the Civil Registry
General.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation

The letters and

notes written by
the relatives of
the alleged father,
acknowledging
the illegitimate
status of the
respondent, does
not fall under the
second scenario
contemplated
under acts or
declaration about
pedigree as
independent
evidence of
pedigree as to the
relationship
between the
declarant and the
person against
whom the claim is
directed was not
presented.
It also does not
fall within the
purview of the
second type of
family reputation
or tradition
regarding
pedigree as the
letters is not

The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and
events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled
with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts: (1)
FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the
employ of the former; (2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and
conduct; and (3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly, 35spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.
MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth
is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is
devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the inscription
of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the
registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the
latter's part. In like manner, FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal
certificates and school records renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity.
However, despite the inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove the paternity, they may
be admitted as part of MONINA's testimony to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for
her education.
The certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates may not be
taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINA's filiation. Since they are per se inadmissible
in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidence to prove the same.
As to the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCO's relatives, allegedly attesting to
MONINA's filiation, while their due execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA
witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the
contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarantsauthors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and
MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides: The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence
if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
7

TITLE

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

similar to family
possessions such
as family bibles,
family books,
engravings, etc.

where she stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado, from 1952 until 1955
(up to Grade 4), FRANCISCO paid for her tuition fees and other school
expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr.
Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give the money to her mother, or Mr.
Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in
different schools, but FRANCISCO continuously answered for her
schooling. For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University
of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which required a
week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the
hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of them. In 1963,
she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with
Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for
books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by
FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show
FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to canvass
prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two
semesters at University of San Agustin, she transferred to De Paul
College and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at
Western Institute of Technology. During her senior year, she stayed with
Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She
passed the CPA board exams in 1974 and took up an M.B.A. at De La
Salle University as evidenced by her transcript, wherein FRANCISCO was
likewise listed as Guardian.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then
Judge Romeo Callejo of the RTC. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO
presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes
Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal. FRANCISCO declared that
Esperanzas employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while
employed by him, Esperanza would sleep with the other female helpers
on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept
in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household staff was
composed of three female workers and two (2) male workers. After
Esperanza left in October 1944, she never communicated with him
again, neither did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly
denied having had sexual relations with Esperanza and disavowed any
knowledge about MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having
paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted
that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover,
FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these fees
despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He
likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it Danthea Lopez,
Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA
was his daughter.
The trial court ruled against Monina but the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial courts decision.
Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a complaint praying
for a declaration that Rosa Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs
herein, had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel
Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children
of the latter namely, Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. The plaintiffs
allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa Viademonte and
are entitled to receive the latters share, that is, one-fifth of the estate
left by Isabel Gonzales.

affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the
first underscored clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in
question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the
section containing the second underscored phrase. The scope of the enumeration contained in
the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects
which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those articles which represent, in effect,
a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been described
as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if preserved in a
family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Other examples of these objects which are
regarded as reflective of a family's reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on
tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.
Clearly, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, as private documents
not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of
Rule 130, Section 40.
Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common
reputation.
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that Common reputation existing
previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years
old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputations.
The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the
common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a
material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of pedigree may be
proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except
where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the
community.
However, their inadmissibility notwithstanding, such letters and notes, may properly be
admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO
recognized her as his daughter.
As to FRANCISCO's other witnesses, the testimonies of the witnesses are considered
insufficient to overcome MONINA's evidence. It merely consist of denials, which being in the form
of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against positive testimony.
All told, MONINA's evidence hurdled "the high standard of proof" required for the success of
an action to establish one's illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding "open
and continuous possession'' or "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws;"
moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Further, it also
cannot form part
of common
reputation.
Matters of
pedigree may be
proved by
reputation in the
family, and not by
reputation in the
neighborhood or
vicinity, except
where the
pedigree in
question is
marriage which
may be proved by
common
reputation in the
community.

Ferrer vs.
de Inchausti

The testimony of
Joaquin de
Inchausti,
referring to the
statement made
by his half-brother
Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte, to

Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action shows, in a manner
which leaves no room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales and
it follows that her children have no right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales.
On Page 9 of the day-book which Ramon Martinez de Viademonte, Jr., kept during his lifetime,
appears a memorandum which says: On September 1, 1862, seven o'clock in the evening a
children three days old named Rosa Matilde Robles, according to the baptismal certificate issued
by the acting rector Don Ramon Fernandez of the Cathedral Church of Manila, was delivered to
my mother; this child was baptized by the priest Don Remegio Rodriguez with the authority of
8

TITLE

In Re Mallari

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

the effect that

Rosa Matilde
(mother of the
platintiff) is the
same Rosa
Matilde Robles,
thereby rebutting
the contention
that Rosa Matilda
is a legitimate
daughter of Isabel
Gonzales, was
admitted in
evidence as part
of family
reputation or
tradition
regarding
pedigree.

They allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez

Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the fruit of their
relationship. Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father
of defendants herein.
Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde
Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs, has been treated and considered
as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that on one occasion, the said
Gonzales remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez
de Viademonte.
Also, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti, the son of Isabel Gonzales and Jose
Joaquin de Inchausti, dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following
manner: To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa. College records of
the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to establish filiation.
The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon
Viademonte Jr. which showed that true name of Rosa Matilde
Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents in
September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff,
Joaquin de Inchausti testified that one day he was assured by his halfbrother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his
sister but a mere protge and that her true name was Rosa Matilde
Robles and that on occasion the said brother showed him a copy of the
certificate of birth which he took from the parochial church.
The SC ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship of
Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5,
1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should be
stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the
Philippines.
After an investigation, a decision was rendered by this Court holding
that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent
Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his
mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese
national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared
excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked,
and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma
previously issued to him.
On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the
reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly
discovered evidence, the introduction of which could alter the decision
previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented
consisted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate
Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that
Estaben Mallare, respondent's father, is the natural son of Ana Mallare,
a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known
Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
Specifically, the respondent presented the following witnesses:
Damiana Cabangon who declared that she was with her mother,
the "hilot" who attended to Ana Mallare during her delivery, when
Esteban Mallare was born; that she was present when Esteban
was baptized; that Ana Mallare had lived continuously in
Macalelon and was reputed to be unmarried; that she had never
met or seen Esteban's father, a certain Mr. Dy.
Rafael Catarroja, the former mayor of Macalelon, who declared
that he knew Esteban Mallare even as a child; that Esteban was

said rector, and according to the baptismal certificate, it was a child of unknown parents." This
memorandum agrees with the above-mentioned baptismal certificate of Rosa Matilde Robles.
Notwithstanding the argument of counsel for the appellants Joaquin de Inchausti stated that
one day he was assured by his half-brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was
not his sister, but that she was only a mere protegee and that her true name was Rosa Matilde
Robles, and that on that occasion the said brother showed him the certificate of birth, a copy of
which he took from the parochial church.
In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin
Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible, for they are members of the same
family, in accordance with the provisions of section 281 of Act No. 190, and consequently, the
conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles which is mentioned and because
she was born in 1852, in no manner could she be the legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte
and Isabel Gonzalez whose marriage was dissolved in 1836 by the death of the husband.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides: The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence
if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family
portraits and the like may be received as evidence of pedigree.

The testimonies of
the witnesses,
who lived in the
same community
of respondents
paternal
grandmother, to
the effect that his
paternal
grandmother was
unmarried and
was a Filipino
citizen, was
admitted in
evidence as an
exception to the
hearsay rule under
common
reputation. Since
respondents
paternal
grandmother was
a Filipino citizen,
his father was
consequently a
Filipino citizen,
making the
respondent also a
Filipino citizen and
not a Chinese
national.

The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and
residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana
Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was
reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and
illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare (respondents father). Reputation has been held admissible as
evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born
alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from
persons who are not members of the family the reason for the distinction is the public interest
that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
The public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the
witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really
born out of legal union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare"
after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father.
The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a
Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions devoid
of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community
regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain
factual basis. For it must be realized that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain
characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person hails from the same
region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having
known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog should
receive a high degree of credibility.
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship. Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest
him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of
April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
9

TITLE

DOCTRINE

DBP Pool
vs.
RMN

The utterances
made by the
bystanders, made
as basis by the
police
investigators in
their report, was
not considered as
part of res gestae
since spontaneity
was not
sufficiently
proven. At best,
the testimonies
made by the
police
investigators can
be considered as
independently
relevant
statements
gathered in the
course of their
investigation, and
are admissible not
as to the veracity
thereof but to the
fact that they had
been thus uttered.

Talidano
vs.

The copies of the

fax messages were
not considered as
falling within the

FACTS

RULING

then living with his mother, Ana Mallare, a Tagala, who was
cohabiting with a Chinese; that Esteban started voting in 1934, and
became one of his campaign leaders.
Salomon Gimenez, the former mayor of Macalelon, who declared
having known Esteban Mallare; that in the elections of 1925, when
Esteban campaigned for a rival candidate against him, he wanted
to seek for Esteban's disqualification; that he sought the counsel of
Judge Gaudencio Eleazar who advised him that a disqualification
move would not prosper because Esteban's mother was not
married to Esteban's Chinese father.
Joaquin Enobal who declared that he was a classmate and
playmate of Esteban Mallare; that he had not seen the husband of
Ana Mallare; that Ana was a Tagalog who had lived in Macalelon.
This involves a civil case filed by Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RMN)
against DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies and Provident
Insurance Corporation for recovery of insurance benefits.
Respondent owns several broadcasting stations all over the country.
Provident covered respondents transmitter equipment and generating
set for the amount ofP13,550,000.00 under Fire Insurance Policy No.
30354, while petitioner covered respondents transmitter, furniture,
fixture and other transmitter facilities for the amount of P5,883,650.00
under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-66860.
In the evening of July 27, 1988, respondents radio station located in
SSS Building, Bacolod City, was razed by fire causing damage in the
amount of P1,044,040.00. Respondent sought recovery under the two
insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground that the
cause of loss was an excepted risk (i.e., any loss or damage occasioned
by or through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the
following consequences, namely: (c) War, invasion, act of foreign
enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations (whether war be declared or
not), civil war; (d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection,
rebellion, revolution, military or usurped power).
The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that
the fire was caused by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied
the claims.
The RTC rendered a decision, which was subsequently affirmed by the
CA, in favor of respondent RMN. The lower court held that the only
evidence that can be considered to determine if the fire was due to the
intentional act committed by the members of the NPA are the
testimonies of witnesses Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres and SPO3 Leonardo
Rochar who were admittedly not present when the fire occurred. Their
testimonies were limited to the fact that an investigation was conducted
and in the course of the investigation they were informed by bystanders
that heavily armed men entered the transmitter house, poured gasoline
and then lighted it. After that, they went out shouting "Mabuhay ang
NPA". The persons whom they investigated and who actually saw the
burning of the station were not presented as witnesses.

participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to
show his preference for Philippine citizenship.
NB: Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that Common reputation existing
previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years
old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputations.

Petitioner was employed as a second marine officer by Falcon

Maritime and Allied Services, Inc. and was assigned to M/V Phoenix
Seven, a vessel owned and operated by Hansu Corporation which is
based in Korea.

The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it may
concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling occurrence, it
cannot be said however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and
before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres
received the bystanders statements while they were making their investigations during and after
the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down, the bystanders
already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange
information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting
situations where hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these
utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.
At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were made
may be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their
investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been
thus uttered.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and
sufficiency.23 Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.24 Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of
the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such
declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis--vis the other
evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted that there is a need for additional convincing
proof, viz.:
The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of the fire was the
intentional burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or
usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio facilities shouted "Mabuhay ang
NPA" does not furnish logical conclusion that they are members of the NPA or that their act was
an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be submitted. Defendants
failed to discharge their responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk
excluded.25
While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police blotter; (2) the
certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be
considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, as noted
by the CA, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of
the CPP/NPA.
Consequently, the insurance companies are liable to pay the respondent for the damage it
incurred.
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mentions two acts which form part of the res
gestae, namely: spontaneous statements and verbal acts. In spontaneous exclamations, the res
gestae is the startling occurrence, whereas in verbal acts, the res gestae are the statements
10

TITLE

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

Falcon
Maritime

meaning of res
gestae, either as a
spontaneous
statement (as
spontaneity was
not proven) or as
a verbal act (as
there was no
accompanying
statement to the
equivocal act).

Petitioner claimed that his chief officer, a Korean, always

discriminated against and maltreated the vessels Filipino crew. This
prompted him to send a letter-complaint to the officer-in-charge of the
International Transport Federation, a measure that allegedly was
resented by the chief officer. Consequently, petitioner was dismissed on
21 January 1997. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 27 October
1999.
Private respondent countered that petitioner had voluntarily
disembarked the vessel after having been warned several times of
dismissal from service for his incompetence, insubordination, disrespect
and insulting attitude toward his superiors. It cited an incident involving
petitioners incompetence wherein the vessel invaded a different route
at the Osaka Port in Japan due to the absence of petitioner who was
then supposed to be on watch duty. As proof, it presented a copy of a
fax message, sent to it on the date of incident, reporting the vessels
deviation from its course due to petitioners neglect of duty at the
bridge, as well as a copy of the report of crew discharge issued by the
master of M/V Phoenix Seven two days after the incident.
The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing petitioners
complaint, holding that he was validly dismissed for gross neglect of
duties, however, this was subsequently reversed by the NLRC on appeal.
The NLRC held that the fax messages in support of the alleged
misbehavior and neglect of duty by petitioner have no probative value
and are self-serving. It added that the ships logbook should have been
submitted in evidence as it is the repository of all the activities on board
the vessel, especially those affecting the performance or attitude of the
officers and crew members, and, more importantly, the procedures
preparatory to the discharge of a crew member. The NLRC also noted
that private respondent failed to comply with due process in terminating
petitioners employment.

People
vs.
Esoy

The testimony of
the victim to the
effect that his
cellphone was
snatched by the
respondents, right
after the
commotion, was
considered by the
court as
admissible for
being part of res
gestae (of the first
kind but not
categorically held
by the court in this
case as to what

On January 18, 2001, around 8:00 p.m., the victim Lorenzo Coro and
Andrea Pabalan, rode a jeepney bound for Buendia Avenue at Taft
Avenue in Manila. Upon reaching Taft Avenue corner Pedro Gil Street,
respondents boarded the jeepney. Respondent Bolalacao sat beside the
victim while respondents Esoy and Ciano sat on the opposite side.
Pabalan noticed that Esoy and Ciano were staring at all the passengers
and seemed to be high on drugs. When she again looked at Esoy and
Ciano, the two suddenly drew out their balisongs and swung the same
at them. In the ensuing commotion, the other passengers including
respondents alighted from the jeepney. Then Pabalan saw the victims
bloodied chest. The victim then told her that his cellular phone was
snatched. The victim was immediately brought to the nearby hospital
where he was operated on. Unfortunately, however, the victim died at
11:00 p.m. that same night.
Several days after, Pabalan informed the police investigator that she
saw the three respondents inside the WPD jail and positively identified
them as the assailants. Respondents, for their part, denied any
involvement in the robbery-homicide incident. They claimed that they

accompanying the equivocal act. The Court held that the fax messages cannot be deemed part of
the res gestae.
To be admissible under the first class of res gestae, it is required that: (1) the principal act be
a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Assuming that petitioners negligence, which allegedly caused the ship to deviate from its
course, is the startling occurrence, there is no showing that the statements contained in the fax
messages were made immediately after the alleged incident. In addition, no dates have been
mentioned to determine if these utterances were made spontaneously or with careful
deliberation. Absent the critical element of spontaneity, the fax messages cannot be admitted as
part of the res gestae of the first kind.
The requisites for its admissibility under the second class of res gestae are: (1) the principal
act to be characterized must be equivocal; (2) the equivocal act must be material to the issue;
(3) the statement must accompany the equivocal act; and (4) the statements give a legal
significance to the equivocal act.
Petitioners alleged absence from watch duty is simply a harmless act or at least proved to be
one. Assuming arguendo that such absence was the equivocal act, it is nevertheless not
accompanied by any statement more so by the fax statements adverted to as parts of the res
gestae. No date or time has been mentioned to determine whether the fax messages were made
simultaneously with the purported equivocal act.
Furthermore, the material contents of the fax messages are unclear. The matter of route
encroachment or invasion is questionable. The ship master, who is the author of the fax
messages, did not witness the incident. He obtained such information only from the Japanese
port authorities. Verily, the messages can be characterized as double hearsay.
The ships logbook is the repository of all activities and transactions on board a vessel. Had the
route invasion been so serious as to merit petitioners dismissal, then it would have been
recorded in the logbook. Private respondent would have then had all the more reason to preserve
it considering that vital pieces of information are contained therein.
The vessels logbook is an official record of entries made by a person in the performance of a
duty required by law. It is a respectable record that can be relied upon to authenticate the charges
filed and the procedure taken against the employees prior to their dismissal. It is a vital evidence
as the ship captains are required to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's
head. Therefore, the non-presentation of the logbook raises serious doubts as to whether the
incident did happen at all.
Though Pabalans testimony as to the victims utterance that his cellular phone was taken is
only hearsay, the testimony is considered an exception to the hearsay rule, the victims
spontaneous utterance being part of res gestae.
Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, the
victim or spectator to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after the commission
of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for
the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. In the instant case, all the elements
of res gestae are sufficiently established insofar as the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is
concerned: (1) the principal act (res gestae) the robbery and stabbing of the victim is a
startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise, that is, within minutes after the victim was stabbed and his cellular phone was
snatched; and (3) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances his cellular phone was stolen during the startling occurrence. The
testimony being an exception to the hearsay rule, the trial court did not err in admitting the same.

11

TITLE

DOCTRINE

FACTS

type of res
gestae).

were at their workplace in Sta. Mesa, Manila, when the incident

happened.
The trial court then rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty
of the crime charged, which was affirmed with modification on the
amount of damages by the CA.
However, the respondents argue that (1) no evidence was presented
by the prosecution establishing that personal property was taken from
the victim except for the hearsay allegation of Pabalan; and (2) no
witness testified that the victim or Pabalan actually saw one of the
appellants take something from the victim.
Petitioner Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and
style RDC Construction. She had contracts with the government for the
restoration and asphalting of different roads in Cebu. In connection with
these projects, petitioner entered into two contracts with private
respondent Socor Construction Corporation (SOCOR).
On May 28, 1986, private respondent SOCOR sent petitioner a bill,
containing a revised computation representing the balance of
petitioner's total account for materials delivered and services rendered
by private respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner
refused to pay the amount, claiming that private respondent failed to
submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of
the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government.
Thereafter, the private respondent filed a collection suit with the RTC
against the petitioner. In her answer, the petitioner admitted the
existence of the contracts with private respondent as well as receipt of
the billing, however, she disputed the correctness of the bill. Petitioner
subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into subcontracts with private respondent.
During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vicepresident, Sofia O. Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper. On the
other hand, petitioner's evidence consisted of her lone testimony.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent. It analyze the respondents Book of Collectible Accounts
and found that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded
thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account
of SOCOR's commercial transactions with RDC which were entered
therein in the course of business. This was subsequently affirmed by the
CA.

Canque
vs.
CA

The Book of
Collectible
Accounts
presented by the
private
respondent to
show the
petitioners
indebtedness was
not considered as
within the
purview of entries
in the course of
business as it
lacked the first
and third
requisites. It was
considered as a
mere
memorandum,
used to refresh
the memory of
the witness, and
not an evidence.
Thus, it was used
to corroborate the
witness
testimony.

Wallen
Maritime
vs.
NLRC

The typewritten
excerpts, which
were supposedly
from the ship
captains logbook
and which were
presented in
evidence by the
petitioner, was
not considered as

Private respondent Joselito Macatuno was hired by Wallem

Shipmanagement Limited thru its local manning agent, Wallem
Maritime Services, Inc., as an able-bodied seaman on board the M/T
Fortuna.
On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was berthed at the port of
Kawasaki, Japan, an altercation took place between private respondent
and fellow Filipino crew member, Julius Gurimbao, on the one hand, and
a cadet/apprentice officer of the same nationality as the captain of the
vessel on the other hand.

RULING

Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that: Entries made at, or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable
to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the
following conditions: (1) The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or
unable to testify; (2) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer; (3) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) The
entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and (5) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course
of business or duty.
The business entries in question do not meet the first and third requisites. Dolores Aday, who
made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the account of RDC
Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and marked
in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the
entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of
the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills
were supervised by "an engineer for such functions." The person, therefore, who has personal
knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made in the amounts
and on the dates stated, was the company's project engineer. The entries made by Aday show
only that the billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that she faithfully recorded
the amounts stared therein in the books of account. Whether or not the bills given to Aday
correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates indicated was a fact that
could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not presented during trial.
When the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person who
gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry
which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened, such entry
is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.
As the entries in question were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only
corroborate Dolores Aday's testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.
The ship captain's logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce requires
him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's head. A copy of an official
entry in the logbook is legally binding and serves as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, because no investigation was conducted by the ship captain before repatriating
private respondent, the contents of the logbook have to be duly identified and authenticated lest
an injustice result from a blind adoption of such contents which merely serve as prima facie
evidence of the incident in question.
Moreover, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or even
authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily xeroxed or
photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of documents. What was
12

TITLE

Northwest
Airlines
vs.
Chiong

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

entries in official
records. It does
not have
probative value at
all. The logbook
itself should have
been presented
and duly identified
and authenticated
by the ship
caption
considering that
no investigation
took place before
the repatriation of
the private
respondent.

After being shouted at by the cadet/apprentice for not having initially

followed its orders, Macatuno, together with Gurimbao, went to the
cadet/apprentice and reminded him that as a mere apprentice and not
an officer of the vessel, he had no right whatsoever to order around any
member of the crew. However, the cadet/apprentice reacted violently
by shouting invectives and gesturing as if challenging the two to a fight.
To prevent him from intimidating them, Macatuno pushed twice the
cadet/apprentice's chest while Gurimbao mildly hit his arm. Frantic and
shouting, the cadet/apprentice ran to the captain who happened to
witness the incident from the cabin's window.
Thereafter, the captain summoned private respondent and Gurimbao
and told them to pack up their things as their services were being
terminated. The two attempted to explain their side of the incident but
the captain ignored them and firmly told them to go home.
Upon arrival in the Manila, the private respondent and Gurimbao
reported the matter to the POEA, which rendered a decision finding
their dismissal to be illegal. This was subsequently affirmed by the NLRC.
Petitioner contend that the alleged incident was not the first
infraction of Macatuno and Gurimbao and that, as shown in the logbook,
the two have been given several warnings after they left the vessel
during working hours without permission.

The Passenger
Manifest and
Passenger Name
Record were not
admitted as
exceptions to the
hearsay rule,
particularly as
entries in the
course of
business, as the
requisites were
not complied
with. Although
there is no
necessity to bring
into court all the
employees who
individually made
the entries, it is
sufficient that the
person who
supervised them
while they were
making the entries
testify that the
account was
prepared under
his supervision
and that the
entries were

On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime

Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized Philippine agent of
TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as
Third Engineer of TransOceans vessel M/V Elbia, which was set to sail
on April 1, 1989.
Subsequently, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane
ticket for San Diego, California with a departure date of April 1, 1989
from Manila.
On said date, Chiong arrived at the airport three hours before the
scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimares Liaison Officer,
met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiongs seaman
service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiongs passport was
duly stamped, after complying with government requirements for
departing seafarers.
Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue
at the Northwest check-in counter. When it was Chiongs turn, the
Northwest personnel informed him that his name did not appear in the
computers list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then
directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwests
counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass,
however, the man demanded US$100.00 in exchange for the boarding
pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No.
24 bound for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work
at the M/V Elbia by April 1, 1989.
It appears that Chiongs name was crossed out and substituted with
"W. Costine" in Northwests Air Passenger Manifest.
Chiong then filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage
before the RTC. Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its
contract of carriage with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong had no cause of

offered in evidence was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from what could be the
logbook because by their format, they could have been lifted from other records kept in the
vessel.
The entry in the logbook is so sketchy that, unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so many
questions unanswered. Although private respondent candidly admitted in his affidavit having hit
Sason on the chest twice, he did not admit using a spanner. The conflicting versions of the incident
rendered it impossible to determine whether it was private respondent or Gurimbao who wielded
said tool. In the absence of a more detailed narration in the logbook entry of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged assault, the same cannot constitute a valid justification to terminate
private respondent's employment.
Hence, as the typewritten excerpts from the "logbook" were the only pieces of evidence
presented by petitioners to support the dismissal of private respondent, have no probative value
at all, petitioners' cause must fail. Their failure to discharge the onus probandi properly may have
no other result than a finding that the dismissal of private respondent is unjustified.
NB: Under the Table of Offenses and Corresponding Administrative Penalties appended to the
contract of employment entered into by petitioners and private respondent, the offense
described by the logbook entry may well fall under insubordination and may constitute assaulting
a superior officer "with the use of deadly weapon" punishable with dismissal if the victim is indeed
a "superior officer." However, an "apprentice officer" cannot be considered a "superior officer."
An apprentice is a person bound in the form of law to a master, to learn from him his art, trade,
or business, and to serve him during the time of his apprenticeship. In other words, Sason was
merely a learner or a trainee and not a regular officer on board M/T Fortuna.
Chiong was able to prove his case through preponderance of evidence. In addition to his
testimony, Chiongs evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24,
Chiongs passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the
testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez, and POEA personnel who all identified the signature and
stamp of the PCG on Chiongs passport. Chiongs Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1,
1989, coupled with the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence
that he was present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that
flight.
It is of no moment that Chiongs witnesses who all corroborated his testimony on his
presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently
bumped-off are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an interest in the outcome
of this case. A witness relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the veracity of his
or her testimony.
It is true that Chiongs passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had left the
country on April 17, 1989 and come back on October 5 of the same year. However, this evidence
fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April 1, 1989, more particularly,
Chiongs presence at the airport and his subsequent bumping-off by Northwest despite a
confirmed ticket.
Furthermore, Northwest did not present as a witness their check-in agent on that date. This
omission was detrimental to Northwests case considering its claim that Chiong did not check-in
at their counters on said date. It simply insisted that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger and
totally relied on the Flight Manifest, which, curiously, showed a horizontal line drawn across
Chiongs name, and the name W. Costine written above it. The reason for the insertion, or for
Chiongs allegedly being a "no-show" passenger, is not even recorded on the remarks column of
the Flight Manifest beside the Passenger Name column.
It was error for the petitioner to insist that since there is now a pending criminal case for False
Testimony against Chiong, that a falsified part of his testimony would indicate the falsity of his
entire testimony, consistent with the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus doctrine. Before this
maxim can be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or
more material points. The principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a
material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the records show
13

TITLE

Patula
vs.
People

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

regularly entered
in the ordinary
course of
business.
However, the
supervisor-onduty had no
personal
knowledge of the
entries in the
manifest as he did
not supervise its
preparation.

action against it because per its records, Chiong was a "no-show"

passenger.
In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990,
filed a separate criminal complaint for False Testimony14 against Chiong
based on the latters testimony that he did not leave the Philippines
after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his seaman service record
book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on
October 5 of the same year.
The RTC rendered a decision finding preponderance of evidence in
favor of Chiong. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto said ruling.

The ledgers
presented by the
prosecution to
prove the
misappropriation
made by the
petitioner was
deemed
inadmissible since
it did not comply
with the
conditions
required for
entries in the
course of
business, as an
exception to the
hearsay rule.
Further, the
documents being
private
documents,
authentication of
said documents
was necessary
before it can be
admitted in
evidence;
however, this was
also not complied
with by the
prosecution.

Petitioner was charged with estafa. It was established that she was
employed as a saleswoman for Footlucker's Chain of Stores, Inc. and that
being such, she collected and received payments from customers with
the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and
deliver the collection to the company. However, failed to remit the
proceeds but instead misappropriated the amount received to the
prejudice of the company.
During trial, prosecution presented as its first witness, Lamberto Go,
who testified that he was the branch manager of the company and that
petitioner was also an employee of said company. Petitioner became a
sales representative and such, she was authorized to take orders from
wholesale customers coming from different towns and to collect
payments from them. She could also issue and sign official receipts for
the payments, which she would then remit for tallying and
reconciliation. When the accounting clerk told him that erasures were
noted on some collection receipts, he decided to subject her to an audit
by company auditor Karen Guivencan. He then learned from a customer
of petitioner's that the customer's outstanding balance had already
been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid in Footlucker's
records.
The other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, the
company auditor required to check the accounts and ledgers handled by
the petitioner. She discovered in the course of her audit that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession
of various customers differed from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts that petitioner submitted to the office.
Upon completing her audit, she submitted a written report
denominated as "List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA
PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 1620, 1997" which shows that petitioner had misappropriated the total
amount of P131,286.92.
During Guivencan's testimony, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of
petitioner's various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B
to YY and their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first
column that contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified
the invoices by the number, a third that stated the debit, a fourth that

that Chiongs testimony did not contain inconsistencies. As to the criminal case, it is well to note
that there is no final determination yet of Chiongs guilt by the courts.
The RTC and CA correctly excluded the manifest and passenger name record. In order to be
admissible as entries in the course of business, it is necessary that: (a) the person who made the
entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries; (d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a
duty; and (e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Tested by these requirements, the manifest and passenger name record are mere hearsay
evidence. While there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually made
the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them while they were making the
entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that the entries were
regularly entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was
the supervisor on-duty, he has no personal knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did
not supervise the preparation thereof. More importantly, no evidence was presented to prove
that the employee who made the entries was dead nor did the defendant-appellant set forth the
circumstances that would show the employees inability to testify.
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by
petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner as persons other than Guivencan
prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivative. Accordingly, her being the only witness who
testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and
test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or
conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the
entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy
for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character,
or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of
a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication
in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing,
deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. It
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance
as evidence in court.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,
specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the
adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted;
or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because
private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be
presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing
to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
It was error for the RTC to consider the ledgers from the application of the hearsay rule by
stating that the ledgers were prepared in the regular course of business. For a document to be
considered as within the purview of entries in the course of business provided for in Section 43
14

TITLE

DOCTRINE

Africa
vs.
Caltex

The reports from

the police and fire
departments were
not admitted in
evidence as
entries in the
official records, as
an exception to
the hearsay rule,
since the facts
stated therein
were not acquired
by the reporting
officers through
official
information, not
having been given
by the informants
pursuant to any
duty to do so.

People
vs.
Gabriel

Contrary to
respondents
contention, the
Advance
Information Sheet
does not
constitute as
entries in official
records, an
exception to the
hearsay rule, since
the public officer
who prepared the
document had no
sufficient and
personal
knowledge of the
incident. The

FACTS

RULING

noted the amounts paid, and a fifth that summed the balances. In the
course of Guivencan's direct-examination, petitioner's counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figures
entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay
because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves
presented in court.
On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had
opted not to present evidence for her defense the Prosecution's
evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted, rendered its
decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa.
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex
service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila.
It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where
the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and burned
several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and
effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued
respondents Caltex and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of
the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation.
Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of
the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed
to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the
premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Contrary to the CAs view that the reports presented by the
petitioners are double hearsay and hence inadmissible, petitioners
contend that the reports from the Police Department, Fire Department
and by a certain Captain Tinio of the AFP are admissible as entries in the
official records, which is an exception to the hearsay rule.

of Rule 130, the following requisites must concur: (a) The person who made the entry must be
dead or unable to testify; (b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer; (c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d)
The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral, or religious; (e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
In this line, the Court acquitted the petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

At around 7 o'clock in the evening of 26 November 1989, within the

vicinity of Pier 14 at the North Harbor, a fistfight ensued between Jaime
Tonog on one hand and the accused Gabriel together with "Ramon Doe"
on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers
pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards
Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed weapons. They
approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously
stabbed him in the stomach and at the back, after which the assailants
ran towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was
then brought to Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.
The accused has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog
drunk; Tonog even attempted to box him but he parried his blow; Tonog
continued walking but when he chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and
without provocation boxed and kicked Ramon; Ramon fought back but
was subdued by his bigger assailant so the former ran towards the
highway; when Tonog met a certain Mando he boxed the latter who
however fought back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this

Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that: Entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippine, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry
was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that
it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through official information.
To qualify their statements as "official information" acquired by the officers who prepared the
reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the
facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated
therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been
given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
The respondents are liable for damages pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa
loquitur, which states that where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured
person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care.
The gasoline station was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave
no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily
entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial
suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first
suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is
understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the
matters stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never
formally offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by
the accused on the document must fail since the court cannot consider any evidence which has
not been formally offered.
Parenthetically, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only after
interviewing Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the
attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to present Camba on
the part of the accused should militate against his cause.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three requisites must concur: (a) The entry was
15

TITLE

Barcelon
vs.
CIR

Malayan
Insurance
vs.
Reyes

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

information
contained in the
report cannot be
classified as
official
information since
the informant was
not legally obliged
to give statements
to be made as
basis for the
report.
The BIR record
book (showing the
name of the
taxpayer, the kind
of tax assesses,
the registry
receipt number
and the date of
the mailing) was
not admitted as
entries in official
records as the
entrant was not
shown to have
personal
knowledge of the
facts in the book
nor did she
acquire the facts
from reports
made by persons
under a legal duty
to submit the
same.

moment he saw Ramon return with a bolo on hand; he warned Ramon

not to fight but his advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand
Ramon struck Tonog on the belly; when Mando saw what happened he
(Mando) pulled out his knife and also stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon
and Mando then fled towards the highway.
The trial court convicted the accused as charged and sentenced him
to life imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Jaime Tonog.
In his defense, the accused leans heavily on the Advance Information
Sheet prepared by Pat. Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all
and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect.

The police report

made by the
investigator was
not considered as
entries in the
official records as
it lacked the third
requisite (i.e., that
the public officer
or other person

At around 5 oclock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident

occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving
four vehicles: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit; (2) an Isuzu
Tanker; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant. Based on the
Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, the Isuzu Tanker
was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right
side shortly before the vehicular incident. All three vehicles were at a
halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck
simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and
the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these

made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence,
inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal
knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba
which therefore could not be categorized as official information because in order to be classified
as such the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the
facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. In the case of Camba,
he was not legally so obliged to give such statements.
An assessment is made within the prescriptive period if notice to this effect is released, mailed
or sent by the CIR to the taxpayer within said period. Receipt thereof by the taxpayer within the
prescriptive period is not necessary. However, the rule does not dispense with the requirement
that the taxpayer should actually receive, even beyond the prescriptive period, the assessment
notice which was timely released, mailed and sent.
When a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption that it was received
in the regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a)
that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed. While a
mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still
merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt
thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed
letter was indeed received by the addressee.
The respondent presented the BIR record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of
tax assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR records
custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified that she made the entries therein. Respondent offered
the entry in the BIR record book and the testimony of its record custodian as entries in official
records in accordance with Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states that: Entries
in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or
by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.
An entrant must have personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were
acquired by him from reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal knowledge as
she did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor
was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes 26 how and from whom she obtained the
pertinent information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from
persons under a legal duty to submit the same. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does
not qualify as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence.
Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment notice, or
a certification from the Bureau of Posts, could have easily been obtained. Yet respondent failed
to present such evidence.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
The requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule of entries
in official records, thus: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance
of his or her duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
or her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person personally
or through official information.

Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the trading of securities. It filed

its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1987. Thereafter, the
respondent CIR issued an assessment for deficiency income tax arising
from the disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses and allowances
as part of the deductible business expense since petitioner failed to
subject the salaries, bonuses and allowances to withholding taxes.
The Final Assessment Notice (FAN) was sent to the petitioner through
registered mail on 6 February 1991. However, petitioner denies
receiving the formal assessment notice.
Petitioner was served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to
enforce collection of the deficiency income tax for the year 1987.
Petitioner filed a formal protest, however, the respondent denied the
protest with finality.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA, which ruled in favor
of petitioner. The CTA ruled that while a mailed letter is deemed
received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely a
disputable presumption. It reasoned that the direct denial of the
petitioner shifts the burden of proof to the respondent that the mailed
letter was actually received by the petitioner. The CTA found the BIR
records submitted by the respondent immaterial, self-serving, and
therefore insufficient to prove that the assessment notice was mailed
and duly received by the petitioner.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the CTA and found the
evidence presented by the respondent to be sufficient proof that the tax
assessment notice was mailed to the petitioner, therefore the legal
presumption that it was received should apply.

16

TITLE

PNOC Shipping
vs.
CA

DOCTRINE

FACTS

RULING

had sufficient
knowledge of the
facts by him or her
stated, which
must have been
acquired by the
public officer or
other person
personally or
through official
information).
However, since
the respondents
failed to make a
timely objection
to its presentation
in evidence, it was
still considered as
admissible in
evidence.

two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of the
Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu
Tanker.
Previously, Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy in favor of
First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation, insuring the Mitsubishi
Galant against third party liability, own damage and theft, among
others. Having insured the vehicle against such risks, Malayan Insurance
claimed in its Complaint that it paid the damages sustained by the
assured. It maintained that it has been subrogated to the rights and
interests of the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the
latter. Thus, Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to
respondents Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto Reyes, the registered
owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring
them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. When respondents
refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to
file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against respondents.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and declared the
respondents liable for damages. However, this was reversed by the CA,
on appeal. It held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not
only negligence on the part of respondents, but also compliance with
the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to
subrogation. It noted that the police report, which has been made part
of the records of the trial court, was not properly identified by the police
officer who conducted the on-the-spot investigation of the subject
collision.
In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia
XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation,
was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on
its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel
Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry,
Philippine Coast Guard Commandant rendered a decision finding the
Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the Board and after
unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private respondent sued the LSC
and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, for the value of the
fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of the M/V Maria Efigenia XV,
with interest.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of
LSC as it had already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent and against PNOC, which was later affirmed in toto by the
CA. The lower court cited the evidence presented by private respondent
consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole witness,
Edilberto del Rosario.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, it took into
account the following pieces of documentary evidence that private
respondent proffered during trial, among others:
Exhibit B a document titled "Marine Protest" stating that as a
result of the collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a hole
at its left side that caused it to sink with its cargo valued at
P170,000.00;

Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as the
above requisites could be adequately proved.
Here, there is no dispute that the on-the-spot investigator prepared the report in the
performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is whether such investigator had sufficient
personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third requisite is lacking.
Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police reports presentation in evidence;
thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report is still
admissible in evidence.

The price
quotations issued
to the GM of the
private
respondent
corporation was
not considered as
within the
purview of a
commercial list,
which is an
exception to the
hearsay rule. Such
were neither
published in any
list, register,
periodical or other
compilation on
the relevant
subject matter nor
were they
standard
handbooks or
periodicals,
containing data of
everyday
professional need
and relied upon in

The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court
should have been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could
not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.
Del Rosarios his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel
should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto. However, his valuation of such
equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should not be accepted as gospel truth.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses.
Section 45, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that: Evidence of statements of matters
of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other
published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so
stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them there.
Under the said rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters of
interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of
persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in
the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H are not
"commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category of "other published compilations".
The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who
requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two
vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the
relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of
"commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of
everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation." These are simply
letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario.
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the work of the

occupation. The
price quotations
were simply
letters responding
to the queries of
the private
respondent
corporations GM.

Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler

issued to Del Rosario showing that construction of such trawler
would cost P2,250,000.00;
Exhibit D pro forma invoice issued to Del Rosario showing that
two units of CUMMINS Marine Engine would cost P1,160,000.00;
Exhibit E quotation of prices issued to Del Rosario showing that
a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D, would
cost P100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder,
Model FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so that the two units would
cost P145,000.00;
Exhibit F quotation of prices issued to Del Rosario showing that
rolls of nylon rope, a binocular P1,400.00, a compass and floats
would total P197,150.00;
Exhibit H price quotation issued to Del Rosario showing the cost
of poly nettings totalling P414,065.00.
On July 1955, petitioners, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as
guardian ad litem, sued respondent Francisco Tan for acknowledgment
and support.
On March 1956, Celestina Daldo, after petitioners had already
presented oral and documentary evidence and were about to rest their
case, moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the ground that the
parties had come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same
be dismissed with prejudice and without recourse of appeal. On the
same day, Daldo subscribed before the Clerk of Court to an affidavit
categorically stating that Francisco Tan is not the father of her minor
children but rather another person who she cannot divulge. Thereafter,
the case was dismissed by the lower court.
On November 1957, petitioners, this time thru their maternal
grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem, commenced the
present action for acknowledgment and support, involving the same
parties, cause of action and subject matter.
Thereafter, Judge Enriquez, who was detailed to preside over the
assigned court in the absence of the presiding judge, rendered judgment
declaring that "the present case is res judicata by reason of the dismissal
with prejudice of the previous case. However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the presiding judge, Judge Lopez, declared the minors
to be the illegitimate children of Francisco Tan. This decision was
subsequently reversed by the CA, upon appeal.
Petitioners tried to prove that Celestina Daldo and respondent
Francisco Tan lived together as husband and wife for more than eight
years commencing from 1936 to 1944. Petitioners Carmelita Tan and
Rodolfo Tan are allegedly the fruits of such cohabitation. Respondent
denies this claim and avers that he is very much a married man with
children. Celestina Daldo, by her own admission, had been a nursemaid
in respondent's residence but for a period of not less than one year in
1939. Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo, on September
11, 1944.

Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence. Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally
deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in the absence
of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is "entitled to nominal
damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered." However, the amount to be awarded as nominal
damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private respondent
considering the concept and purpose of such damages.

Tan
vs.
CA

The testimonies of
the petitioners
witnesses in the
first case, which
was dismissed
with prejudice,
was not admitted
in evidence as a
testimony or
deposition at a
former
proceeding since
the witnesses
were not shown
to be unable to
testify but rather
were only
unwilling to
testify.

Manliclic

The testimonies of
the respondents

This case involved a vehicular collision between a Philippine Rabbit

Bus, which was owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rule of Court provides that: The testimony of a witness deceased
or out of the Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former case between the same parties,
relating to the same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him,
may be given in evidence.
The testimonies of the petitioners witnesses in the previous case was held to be inadmissible
as it did not fall within the purview of the abovementioned provision. The witnesses at the former
trial were subpoenaed a number of times by the lower court but the witnesses did not appear to
testify. They were neither dead nor outside the Philippines. They cannot be classified as unable
to testify since the Court held that subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat [second trial]
or hostility since testifying at the first trial does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has
lost the power of speech.
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only, they refused to testify. No other person
that prevented them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not come within the legal purview
of those unable to testify.
Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are not at all bereft of remedy. They could
have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt.1 After all, these
remedies are in the statute books to help litigants in the prosecution of their cases. Petitioners
failed to avail of these remedies, went ahead and submitted their case.
Moreover, the validity of the testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the present case was
considerably downgraded by the affidavit of Celestina Daldo which stated that Francisco Tan is
not the father of her minor children. Striking is the fact that this affidavit was executed after
petitioners in the former case had finished with their oral and documentary evidence and were
about to submit their case. By then, their counsel had a grasp of the situation. Petitioners and
their guardian ad litem could have known whether they had reasonably made out a case against
respondent.
The baptismal certificates are also useless to prove the dates of birth of the petitioners,
considering that the period of cohabitation or any intimate relations at all between their mother
and the appellant has been denied and that same has not been satisfactorily proved. Thus, the
date of birth as appearing in the birth certificate would be material only if it coincides with the
period of cohabitation as admitted or sufficiently proved.
The oral evidence for the petitioners, consisting principally of the testimonies of the
grandfather and of the mother of the minors, are unsatisfactory, being inconsistent and
contradictory on material points, and unbelievable. The loose character of the mother of the
minors who admittedly had lived and begotten children with several men of different
nationalities, cannot also be overlooked.
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
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vs.
Calaunan

witnesses in the
criminal case were
admitted in
evidence in the
civil case.
Although these
were not classified
as within the
purview of a
testimony or
deposition at a
former
proceeding,
considering that
petitioner PRBLI
was not a party to
the criminal case
but only to the
civil case and thus
did not have an
opportunity to
cross-examine the
witnesses, the
testimonies were
still admitted in
evidence as such
were not timely
objected to by the
petitioners.
In petitions for
writ of amparo,
considering the
nature of the case,
evidence
otherwise
considered as
inadmissible
under the usual
rules of evidence
may be
considered if it is
consistent with
the admissible
evidence adduced.
Thus, even
hearsay evidence
can be admitted if
it satisfies this
basic minimum
test of reason (i.e.,
to the relevance
of the evidence to
the issue at hand

Mauricio Manliclic and an owner-type jeep, which was owned by

respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988,
respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way
to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The bus was
likewise bound for Manila from Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of
the NLEX in Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the
bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8
meters from point of collision.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently on 2 December
1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI before the. The criminal case was tried ahead of the
civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that
the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these
witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar
Buan testified. The TSN of the testimony of Donato Ganiban,
investigator of the PRBLI in the criminal case was marked and allowed
to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
After trial, the lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the
respondents and against the petitioners, to which the CA affirmed.
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank
and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank
(IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning
of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to
buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.
Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters
Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis
return.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N.
Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student
counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the
respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr.
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred
to as petitioners), with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day,

proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the
same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former
trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness in the former case.
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the
Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in the criminal case, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability
of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed
to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the
right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the
evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of
Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSN of the testimonies of
plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did
it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It cannot argue
that the TSN of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should
not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the
accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSN of the testimonies
of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of
the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

Gen. Avelino
Razon
vs.
Tagitis, et. al.

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers
of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader
must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be
able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to
kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information
may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently
want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court
requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the
petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under
the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to
life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read
in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required
elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner The Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply
with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and
prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence
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and its
consistency with
all other pieces of
adduced
evidence).

the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008,
the petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis
alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were
incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were
baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the
disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance under the
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence
pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the
abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced
disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to
Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis,
with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA.
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben
Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that
was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA
decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9,
2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place
under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.
Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The characteristics of amparo
proceedings namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level
of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt
in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo
situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to
observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the
protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo
petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of
Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a
rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses
based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an
enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating
authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to
arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness As a
rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only
tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material
circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.
NB: The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our
rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand
and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can
be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all
novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows
the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual
abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of
cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the
court in light of specified subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of
reliability of the child witness. These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present
case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of
evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.

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