Tridentrenewalvote:

separatingfactfromfiction
InterimreportfromLaboursBackbenchDefenceCommiee
June2016

MPs will soon vote to conrm the governments connued commitment to the
maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent. While the result of that vote on
Tridentitselfisnotindoubt,theLabourpartysconnuedcommitmenttothepolicyis
under review. As part of the partys debate on defence,theParliamentaryLabourParty
Defence commiee, chaired by JohnWoodcockMPandBaronessChrisneCrawley,has
run briengs with leading experts on the arguments for and against renewal of the
deterrent.
This interim report explains what Trident renewal means in pracce, summarises the
key arguments advanced in the commiees evidence sessions, and blows apart
common myths about the UKs independent nuclear deterrent. The commiee will
produceanalreportbeforetheCommonsvote.

Contents
Executivesummary
SectionA:Nuclearpracticeandtheory

Chapter1:WhatdoesarenewalofTridentmean?

SectionB:Nucleardeterrenceinthemodernworld

Chapter2:Nucleardeterrence
Deterrencetheory
Threatstonaonalsecurity
Keepingthepeaceandgeopolicalposioning
MullateralismversusUnilateralism
PublicOpinion

Chapter3:Continuousatseadeterrence(CASD)
Vulnerabilityofsubmarines
OtheroponstoCASD
Cost
Jobs

SectionC:Summary

Conclusion
10commonmythsandtheresponse

SectionD:Q&A

SectionE:Briefings

AFirstSeaLordsview
LordBoycebringsreallifeperspecvetotheulityandchallengesofadeterrent.

Lessonsfromthepast
LordPeterHennessyandJamesJinkselaborateonthehistoricalcontextfornuclear
weaponsandsubmarines.

Deterrencetheory
MalcolmChalmersdiscussestheconceptofdeterrenceandhowthisappliestotheUKs
nucleardeterrent

RussiaThreatorrealitycheck?
DavidClarkeandAndrewMonaghandiscussiftheRussianthreatisrealandcanbekept
incheckwithpossessionofanucleardeterrent.

Nonproliferaon
DameMargaretBeckeconsidersthelastLabourgovernmentsrecordonnuclear
nonproliferaon.

DefenceSecretariesdebate
FormerDefenceSecretariesLordRobertsonandLordBrowneholdopposingviews.

Leadingvoicesagainst
CNDsKateHudsonandLord(Nick)HarveywholedtheTridentalternavereviewset
outtheirstalls.

Industriallandscape
ThecontribuonofthenucleardeterrenttotheUKseconomicandskillsbase.

TradeUnions
Skills,jobsandthesupplychain

HMGovernmentsview
DefenceprocurementMinisterPhilipDunneMP,ViceAdmiralListerandIanForberfrom
theMODspeakup.

Thanksandacknowledgements

Specialthankstothewiderangeofexpertswhohavecontributedtothisreport:

Tim Hare, Lord Boyce, David Clark, Andrew Monaghan, Margaret Becke MP, Lord
Browne, Lord Robertson, Lord Hennessy, James Jinks, Steve Carlier, Helen Kenne, BAE
Systems, Malcolm Chalmers,PhilipDunneMP,AdmiralLister,IanForber,SirNickHarvey,
KateHudson,IanWaddell,DaveHulse,AzzaSamms.

Thanks also to UNITE the Union, the GMB and the Confederaon of Engineering and
ShipbuildingUnions(CSEU)fortheirassistance.

Finally thanks to Prema Gurunathan who acted as the secretariat for the report and
contributed a huge amount of experience and her considerable experse andtoEmma
BoothandTomRailtonfortheirassistanceandsupport.

Executivesummary

This evidenceled report aims to inform the Labour Party debate about the renewal of
the UK nuclear deterrent. Based on evidence fromtheleadingexpertsintheeld,from
both sides of the debate, the report examines arguments about boththenecessityofa
nucleardeterrentandthedierentmethodsofdeliveringit.
Secon Agivesashortexplanaonofthecontextoftheupcomingvoteandthedecision
that faces Labour MPs before Secon B examines the issues in more detail. Within
Secon B, Chapter 2 looks at the case for retaining a nuclear deterrent and Chapter 3
exploresdierentoponsfordoingso.
Chapter2concludesthat:

The global security environment is both unstable and unpredictable, with

nonstate actorsbutalsoaggressivestateactorsincludingthoseinpossessionof
orseekingtoacquirenuclearweapons.
There is no legal barrier that prohibits renewal of the deterrent nor is it true
thatthedeterrentisnotenrelyoperaonallyindependent.
Inthiscontextannucleardeterrentprovidestheulmateguaranteeofsecurity.
Britainsroleinglobalsecuritydecisionswouldbeweakenedbydisarmament.
Unilateral disarmament has lile prospect of contribung to wider global
nucleardisarmamenteorts.

Chapter3concludesthat:

Connuousatsea deterrence, delivered by a eet of four ballisc missile

submarines,remainsthemostcosteecveandsecuredeterrentavailable.
New developments in ansubmarine warfaresuchasdronesandcyberwillnot
signicantly compromise the vulnerability of submarines or reduce their
superiorityofothersystems.
Various proposed compromise oponssuchasfewersubmarinesorkeepingthe
missiles separate reduce the credibility of the deterrent without delivering
substanalcostsavings.
Esmatesofcostfromannuclearcampaignersarespeculaveandmisleading.
The renewal programme makes a substanal contribuon to UK advanced
manufacturing and supports thousands of highly skilled jobs. Claims that jobs
could be retained through diversicaon are not credible or supported by
evidence.

The report therefore concludes that there has been no substanal change in the
circumstances surrounding the deterrent since the 2015 Labour elecon manifestoand
its annual conference later that year rearmed the partys commitment to replacethe
UK Vanguard submarine eet. Renewal by compleng the current programme to build
four successor submarines to maintain connuous atsea deterrence connues to oer
the maximum security and value for money. Other opons either compromise UK
security oraddtocost.Manyalternavesdoboth.Therecommendaonofthisreportis
thatLabourmaintainsitexisngpolicyofsupporngrenewalintheupcomingvote.

SectionA:Nuclearpracticeandtheory
Chapter1:WhatdoesarenewalofTridentmean?
1.1. Sincethe1980stheUKsindependentnucleardeterrenthasbeendeliveredbyfour
Vanguardclass submarines. With these now coming to the end of their lives, a new
generaon of submarines known as successor need to be constructed. There has been
much confusion about what has been dubbed the Trident Main Gate vote and what
exactly parliamentarians may be called upon to vote for. While ministers have not yet
revealed the the exact moon to be put before the House of Commons,inpraccethe
decision MPs face is whether or not to commit to the construcon of the successor
boats. The renewal of Trident is therefore less to do with the actual Trident missiles
and more about the principle of a maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent
system.
1.2. Inlightofthelengthyprocurementprocessrequiredforcomplexweaponssystems,
Parliament voted in 2007 to maintain thestrategicnucleardeterrentbeyondthelifeof
the exisng system. The government had, the year before, published a white paper
outlining its intenon to build a new class of submarines. The coalion government in
the 2010 SDSR decided to delay the Main Gate unl 2016. Inial Gate was passed in
2011,releasingfundsforaveyearassessmentphase.
1.3. The SDSR 2015 indicated that the Successor Programme would no longer be
subject to the tradional Main Gate process, but states that the MOD will hold a
debate in ParliamentontheprincipleofConnuousAtSeaDeterrenceandourplansfor
Successor.
1.4. Both theLabourPartyandtheConservavePartyhavecommiedtomaintaininga
1
connuousatseadeterrent.
1.5. The tone of the debate around this issueimpliesthatitisnotalreadydecided,but
this is far from the truth. With a Conservave majority absolutely commied to the
successor programme, and a varietyofotherMPsguaranteedtovoteforrenewal,there
is a castiron majority in the House of Commons. What is up for debate is the exact
posion that the Labour Party willtakeonthisissue.Thisdebateshouldbeinformedby
theundeniablefactofthecertaintyofrenewal.
1.6. The Labour debate on the nuclear deterrent seems to have followed a
countercyclical approach toglobalpolicy,withthepartysupporngdisarmamentatthe
height of the Cold War and jesoningthisjustastheColdWarendedwhenthesewere
perhaps the most benign circumstances for a debate about disarmament.TodayBritain
is facing new global threats, obviously with the rise of internaonal terrorism, but also
from an increasingly belligerent Russiawithaprovocavenuclearposture,yettheparty
haschosenthismomenttoreturntothedebateaboutdisarmament.

HCDeb16July2013andHCDeb17July2013

1.7. It was the famous postwarLabourgovernmentthatrstacquiredBritainsnuclear

deterrent and since then Labour has adopted a mullateralist stance on disarmament,
believing that whilst other countries possess nuclear weapons then Britain should not
disarm unilaterally. Despite this, Labour in government made steps down the nuclear
ladder, such as the eliminaon of taccal nuclearweapons,reduconsinwarheadsand
MargaretBeckescommitmenttoglobalzero.
1.8. In January 2015 the then Shadow Defence Secretary, Vernon Coaker, set out the
LabourPartysposion:
Labour is clear. Let me say thisunequivocally:ourposition,inanincreasinglyuncertain
and unstable world, is that is right for the UK to maintain a credible, minimum
independent nuclear deterrent based on a continuous atsea posture. It isrighttowant
to deliver that deterrent in the most capable and costeffective way, and in a way that
best contributes to global security. It is right, therefore, to wanttoexaminealltheUKs
military capabilities, including nuclear, and to state that we would require a clearbody
of evidence for us to change our view that continuous atsea deterrence provides the
2
mostcredibleandcostefficientformofdeterrent.
1.9. Labours 2015 manifesto commitment on the nuclear deterrent is the following:
Labour remains commied to a minimum, credible, independent nuclear capability,
delivered through a Connuous AtSea Deterrent. We will acvely work to increase
momentum on mullateral disarmament eorts and negoaons, and look at further
reduconsinglobalstockpilesandthenumberofweapons.
1.10. Thepartysposionremainsthesameasthismanifestocommitment,whichevery
Labour MP stood on, and can only be changed by a vote atpartyconference.The2015
party conference in Brighton approved the Britain in the World document rearming
ourcommitmenttothenucleardeterrentandchosenottodebatetheissuespecically.

HCDeb20January2015

SectionB:Nucleardeterrenceinthemodernworld
Chapter2:Nucleardeterrence
Deterrencetheory
2.1.TheUKdefencedoctrinestates:
Deterrence and coercion strategies aim to counter threats to the UKs security by
communicating to potential adversaries the consequences of their anticipatedactionor
inaction. While the threat of a military response can influence our adversaries
calculation of risk during confrontation, they must be convinced that the full potential
costs (the military, economic and diplomatic reaction)oftheiractionswilloutweighany
3
possiblebenefits.
2.2. The government, in the 2015 SDSR, placed deterrence at the heart of the UKs
naonal security policy. The governments most importantdutyistodefendtheUKand
Overseas Territories and protect its people and sovereignty. The 2015 SDSR states that
4
defenceandproteconstartswithdeterrence.
2.3. Deterrence theory has always been prominent in war and conict. It arises from
basic and permanent facts about human behaviour, how people will cognively act to
takeintoaccounttheprobableconsequencesofwhattheydo.
2.4. TheColdWarandthenuclearrevoluonrenewedinterestintheideaofdeterrence
and thusinrecentyearsdeterrencehasbecomesynonymouswiththestrategicnuclear
deterrence. During the Cold War deterrence worked because therewaspolicalwillfor
NATO to act together asone,astrongandcapablemilitarycapacityandaclearmessage
ofcommunicaonthatNATOwerewillingandabletoact.
2.5. This is the purpose of deterrence, to deter aggressors, and in the age of nuclear
weapons,thiswaytodeteraggressorsiswithanuclearposture.
2.6. As KennethWaltzstates:nuclearweaponsdissuadestatesfromgoingtowarmore
5
surelythanconvenonalweaponsdo.
2.7. NATO deputy secretary General Alexander Vershbow at the Berlin Security
Conference in 2015 argued, Deterrence paved the way for dtente and introduced
predictabilityintoasllcompeverelaonship.
2.8. So why a nuclear deterrent and not just any deterrent? Chapter 3 will give more
detail on the importance of CASD but since Clement Alees government acquired a
nucleardeterrent,ithashelpedkeepthepeaceandpreventedthekindofwarsbetween
majorpowersthatravagedtheworldinthersthalfofthelastcentury.

UKDefenceDoctrine,JDP0.01(5thedion),November2014
2015SDSR
5
Waltz,K.NuclearMythsandPolicalRealies,TheAmericanPolicalScienceReview,Vol.84
3
4

ThreatstoOurNationalSecurity
2.9. We live in an unstable and unpredictable world. The threats we currentlyfaceare
mainlyfromnonstateactors,especiallyterrorists.Butoursituaonisrapidlychanging.
2.10. It has only been 25 years since the endoftheColdWar,butRussiasllremainsa
potenal threat to the UK and ourEuropeanallies.ManycommentatorsregardPunas
a ruthless and reckless leader who acts irraonally and is on a naonalist mission to
6
makeRussiaagreatstateagain,evenifthatmeanswithbruteforce .
2.11. The invasion and annexaon of Crimea in Ukraine, a former nuclearstate,shows
justhowfarPunmaygotostrongarmhiswayintothenaonalarena.
2.12. In the 2015 SDSR the Government outlined Russias current threat and nuclear
posture:
Russia is midway through a programme of major investment to modernise and
upgrade its military, including its nuclear forces. It has also increased its nuclear
exercises and rhetoric, with threats to basenuclearforcesinKaliningradandCrimea.Its
military activityaroundtheterritoryofourAllies,andclosetoUKairspaceandterritorial
waters, is designed to test our responses. Russias behaviour willcontinuetobehardto
predict, and, though highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that it may feel
7
temptedtoactaggressivelyagainstNATOAllies.
2.13. EvidencefromleadingexpertsAndrewMonaghanandDavidClarkedemonstrated
that Russia is currently inthemiddleofanextensiveprogrammeofmodernisaonofits
nuclear and ballisc missile capabilies. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has
8
indicated a preference to rely onitsnucleararsenalasameansofpowerprojecon. Its
current modernisaonprogrammeandtheaconsinCrimeahavebeenasignaltoshow
suchpowerprojecon.
2.14. Russiaconnuestohavethelargestnucleararsenalintheworld,capableofbeing
deliveredbyland,seaandair.
2.15. Betweentheyears2012and2015Russiaspentapproximately401milliononthe
9
modernisaon of its nuclear weapons . According to the Russian Defence Minister in
10
2015,55%ofarmamentsacrossthenucleartriadhavebeenmodernised.

Forasimilaranalysis,seeRobertM.Gates,PunsChallengetotheWest,TheWallStreet
Journal,March25,2014.
7
2015SDSR
8
ThishasbeenaregularfeatureofocialRussianpronouncementsinrecentyears.Forarecent
example,seePun:RussiatoBoostNuclearArsenalwith40Missiles,BBCNews,June16,2015,
availableathp://www.bbc.com/news/world3315112518.SeeHansKristensenandRobertS.
Norris,R
9
Nuclearweaponsnancing,andRussiasarmedforcesreform,BASICBlog,17February2015
10
RussiasStateArmamentPlan,December2015
6

2.16. Moreimportantly,in1993,Russiadroppeditsnorstusepolicy.Thismeansthat
Russia would not hesitate to use its nuclear weapons simply based on what they
perceived as a threat from another country. This has been claried further by Alexei
Pushkov, head of Dumas security commiee who has commented that Russia would
deploy nuclear weapons as convenonal weapons, to regional and local wars, not just
naonalones.
2.17. In summer 2014 President Pun said: Russias partners should understand it's
best not to messwithusIwanttoremindyouthatRussiaisoneoftheleadingnuclear
powers. The following spring, Russia threatened to target Denmark with nuclear
weaponsifitparcipatedinNATOsmissiledefencesystem.
2.18. With rising tensions between Russia and Turkey, a NATO state, we must also be
preparedforapossiblenuclearstandobetweentheNATOstatesandRussia.
2.19. A recent RAND Corporaon report has shown just how quickly and eecvely
Russia could invade the Balc States. The recent Russian aggression in the Ukraineand
the history Russia has with the Balc States has renewed potenal instability and a
Russian threat. The RAND report showed that in a series of wargames conducted
between 2014 and 2015 which focused on a Russian invasion of the Balc States, the
longest itwouldtakeRussianforcestoreachtheoutskirtsofTallinnandRigais60hours.
11
SucharapiddefeatwouldleaveNATOwithalimitednumberofopons.
2.20. Furthermore reports of enhanced frequency of Russian military aircraexercises
have piquedaninterestinwhatRussiaisplanningorpreparingfor.Thisisespeciallytrue
for Sweden which in 2014 wasalarmedbyreportsthataRussiansubmarinewaslurking
intheshallowwatersoftheStockholmarchipelago.
2.21. Defence Minister Peter Hultgvist stated that: "What we can see is that there are
moreexercises,moremilitaryacviesintheBalcSea".
2.22. In 2013 when Russian aircra carried out a simulated aack on Stockholm, the
SwedishairforcefailedtoscrambleandhadtorelyonNATOforhelp.

11

RANDCorporaonreport2015:hp://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html

2.23. Many academics and policians have since changed their mind about whether
they shouldsupportanucleardeterrentpurelyonthebasisofRussianaggression.David
Clark, former special adviser to Robin Cook and Chair oftheRussiaFoundaon,usedto
be staunchly against our nuclear deterrent but has since been convinced of the
argumentforrenewal,stangthat:
Russia underVladimirPutinhasevolvedintopreciselythesortofaggressive,risktaking
adversary the second centre doctrine was intended to deter. In relative terms, the
Soviet Union was a fairly cautious foreign policy actor. It was willing to use force to
maintain control over its satellite states, but avoided direct conflict with the west and
refrained from crude nuclear blackmail, especially after the Cuban missile crisis.
President Putin has no similar inhibitions. He ispreparedtodismantlethepostcoldwar
security order, rearrange borders by force and threaten nuclear use in ordertoimpose
what heregardsasRussiaslegitimatesphereofinfluenceonthecountriesaroundhim.
12

2.24. The fact is, noone predicted what happened in Ukraine and in reality Pun had
no raonale behind the annexaon of Crimea. We cannot comfortably predict how
Russia will act and why it is onsuchamissionofmodernisaonofitsnuclearcapability.
Ukraine was persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons aerguaranteesofitsterritorial
integrity, guarantees that were not honoured. In pracce it is impossible to imagine
RussiainvadingUkraineiftheyhadretainedtheirnucleararsenal.
2.25. Russia isnt the only threat that the UK faces today: wemustalsoturnourheads
towards rogue states such as North Korea. The regime there has said on several
occasions that it would not hesitate to launch nuclear weapons preempvely if it
believesthatitssurvivalwasunderthreat.
2.26. Much like Russia, North Korea is a ruthless and reckless statethathasnoqualms
with pushing the nuclear buon. Over recent years it has been conducng nuclear
weapons tests with the most recent one only being a few months ago in February.
Media reports in early April 2016 suggested that North Korea was preparing for a h
13
nucleartest.
2.27. North Korea announced in May 2015 that it had successfully ighttested a
submarine launched ballisc missile. If true, it would mean that North Koreas nuclear
capability is modernising ataveryquickpacewhichpotenallyputsthewholeregionat
risk.
2.28. Furthermore, allegaons of collaboraons between North Korea and Syria have
also intrigued the internaonal community. The belief that the two countries were
working together on a secret Syrian nuclear programme isbelievedtohaveledtoIsrael
bombing a suspected nuclear reactor on Syrian territory in September 2007. At the
momentSyriaisunstableanditsfutureisuncertain.
Clark,David.TheLesNuclearChoice.
hp://www.fabians.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/OutwardtotheWorldDec1
5web.pdf
12

SouthKoreabelievesNorthlikelytoconductmorenucleartestsbeforeMay,www.
Globalsecurity.org,17April2016
13

10

2.29. The UK and other Western allies have connued to view Syria as a strong
14
candidate fornuclearproliferaon. WithSyriascurrentallianceswithRussiaandNorth
Korea, the possibility of a nuclearcapableSyriacouldhavedrascconsequencesforthe
internaonalcommunity.
2.30. Many of thosescepcalofournucleardeterrenthavearguedthatwiththeriseof
ISIS and other extremist groups, that not only is a deterrent useless against such
opponents but that the very existence of nuclear weapons is destabilising because of
theriskofcapturebyterrorists.
2.31. Although these risks should not be dismissed, it is unclear what relevance this
argument hastothedebateabouttheUKstrategicdeterrent.AUKnuclearsubmarineis
impossible for terrorists to locate, let alone capture. It is the nuclear stockpiles of
countrieslikePakistanandIsraelaswellasUSbasesintheMiddleEastthatarethemost
vulnerable tocapturebyterroristgroups,apointwhichonlyemphasisestheimportance
ofmullateraliniaves.
2.32. Furthermore, the nuclear deterrent isnt actually intended to deter terrorists. In
fact, the enre Royal Navy could be considered ineecve against terrorist threats, a
point which does not lead to calls for the abolion of thenavy.TheUKhaspoliciesand
capabilies to deal with the wide rangeofthreatswecurrentlyfaceormightfaceinthe
future from extremist groups, SDSR 2015 notedthatwehavealreadypreventedatleast
sevenaackslinkedtoISIL.
2.33. Nuclear weapons are intended to deter nuclear and nonnuclear threats from
state actors, a funcontheyperformmoresurelythanconvenonalforcesevercould.It
isagainstthisyardsckthattheymustbemeasured.
2.34. The consensus amongst the experts we spoke to is that nobody can condently
predict the kind of threats we will face 30, 40 or 50 years from now. With the world
currently in such an unstable and unpredictable state, considering disarmament is a
risky move and one which alarms our allies on the world stage. It would weaken our
standing in the world, remove our capacity to respond to new threats and open us to
thepossibilityofnuclearblackmail.

Keepingthepeaceandgeopoliticalpositioning
2.35. There is a clear geopolical raonale behind maintaining our nuclear deterrent.
The UK has already disarmed substanally, somuchsothatwearecurrentlyatthebare
minimum credible deterrent. But this has not prompted others to follow suit nor hasit
stopped states such as Pakistan or Russia from increasing their nuclear footprint.
Scrapping Trident unilaterally would remove the UKs chance of playing a role in future
mullateraldisarmamentnegoaons.
2.36.Retainingournucleardeterrentisntonlyimportantformaintainingthepeacebut
alsoimportantforourposionintheworld.
IsSyriaacandidatefornuclearproliferation?,MonetaryInstuteforInternaonalStudies,
March2008
14

11

2.37. Admiral Lord Boyce argued that whilst disarming would not cost Britain our P5
status,itwoulddiminishourroleinNATOandontheworldstage.
2.38. Militarily the UK plays a signicant role in NATO. It is one of the largest
contributors of convenonal military forces to NATO operaons and is one of the few
naons able to command a major military operaon, as well asbeingonlyoneofthree
countriestohaveanucleardeterrentwithinNATO.
2.39. A decision to unilaterally disarm could also prompt the US to raise, again, the
longrunning issue of the perceived imbalance of contribuonstoNATObetweenNorth
AmericaandEuropeanallies.ThisargumenthasbeenmadebyBernardJenkin:
Our continuous atseadeterrenceisanimportantcontributiontoNATO.Itisapayback
to the United States for being the ultimate guarantor of European security. We should
not imagine for a minute that if we started downgrading our deterrent, the United
States would remain as interested as itisnowinmaintainingsecurityinEurope,withall
15
thebenefitforthiscountry.
2.40. LordBoycearguedthatifweweretodisarmonthebasisthatwedonotbelievein
the nuclear doctrine, then it is hard to see how the UK could stay in NATO as it is a
nuclearalliance.Asthe2010NATOStrategicConceptsstates:
The supreme guarantee of the security of theAlliesisprovidedbythestrategicnuclear
forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; theindependentstrategic
nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their
16
own,contributetotheoveralldeterrenceandsecurityoftheAllies.
2.41.NATOsDeterrenceandDefencePostureReviewrearmedthisin2012:
Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATOs overall capabilities for deterrence
and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces. The review has shown
that the Alliances nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective
17
deterrenceanddefenceposture.
2.42. Even if we were to unilaterally disarm and remain in NATO, every NATO state is
nuclear capable and allows the deployment and ring of nuclear weapons from its
territory. Thisispartofthe1949alliance.AlthoughtheUnitedStates,FranceandtheUK
are the only members of NATO with an independent nuclear capability, the USstaons
nuclear weapons in ve European countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands
18
andTurkey.

HCDebate17July2013
NATOStrategicConcept,2010
17
DeterrenceandDefencePostureReview,NATO,20May2012
18
Norris,Robert.SandHans.MKristensen,U.S.TacticalNuclearWeaponsinEurope,2011,
BullenoftheAtomicSciensts,January2011
15
16

12

2.43. Some have argued that due to the United States and France having nuclear
weapons, wecanrelyontheirnuclearumbrella.Thisposionisdiculttosquarewitha
moral objecon to nuclear weapons.Secondly,asmenonedabove,wewouldsllhave
facilies to assist with US nuclear launches anditeecvelyoutsourcesourforeignand
defence policy to the Americans which could ulmately mean we could be dependent
on a US republican president foroursecurity.Finally,asarguedbyMalcolmChalmersof
RUSI, should the US not full its NATO obligaons, which could be possible with its
Pacic priority, an aggressor sll has to consider the UK andourabilitytostrike.Having
three nuclear powers in NATO and thus three centres of decision making, in nuclear
theory, is a greater deterrent and enhances security not justintheUKbutintheregion
andacrosstheworld.
2.44. NATO is and has always been commied to arms control, disarmament, and
19
nonproliferaon. NATO states that that nuclear weapons commied to NATO have
been reduced by more than 95% since the height of the Cold War. However as long as
nuclearweaponsexist,itisimperavethatNATOremainsanuclearallianceandthatthe
UKsupportsitsneighboursinsecurityandpeacebyremaininganuclearstate.

2.45.Finallyapopularmythaboutournuclearweaponsshouldbecountered.Itisoen
claimed that our nuclear weapons are not independent, either becausetheyrelyonUS
technology or because of NATO. Mulple experts conrmed in their evidence thatthis
is false. Although we collaborate with our US allies on some technological maers, our
deterrent is completely operaonally independent and the suggeson that it is not
enrelyinUKcontrolissimplyuntrue.

Multilateralismversusunilateralism
2.46. TheNuclearNonproliferaonTreaty(NPT)istheprimaryinternaonalframework
governing the possession of nuclearweaponsandtheproliferaonofnuclearmaterials.
Under its terms the ve designated nuclear weapons states, including the United
Kingdom, undertake to share peaceful nuclear technology. Inexchangethenonnuclear
states undertake never to aempt to acquire nuclear weapons. The treaty came into
force in 1970 and was indenitely extended in 1995. It is important to note that three
nuclearweaponsstatesIndia,PakistanandIsraelarenotsignatoriestothetreaty,and
thatNorthKoreawithdrewin2003.
2.47. For the purposes of this discussion the secon of the NPT which is of interest
concerns the dues placed on nuclear weapons states. There is a common
misconcepon, propagated by opponents of the UKs nuclear deterrent, that the NPT
eecvely obliges nuclear weapons states to disarm unilaterally. The CND website
declares The UK does not have any right topossessnuclearweaponsunderthetreaty;
20
instead it is legally bound to disarm. Thisclaimdoesnotsurviveactualscrunyofthe
termsoftheNPT.

19
20

NATONuclearDeterrencePolicyandForces,December2015
hp://www.cnduk.org/campaigns/globalabolion/nonproliferaontreaty

13

2.48.ThekeyarcleunderdisputeisArcleVIwhichisworthquonginfull:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessationofthenucleararmsraceatanearlydateandto
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strictandeffectiveinternationalcontrol.
2.49. It is abundantly evident that the scenario envisioned under thetermsoftheNPT
is a negoated mullateral treaty, not a duty to unilaterally disarm. There is also
explicitly no expectaon in the NPT that disarmament should occur within a specic
meframe.
2.50. This leads us to a wider discussion of the merits of unilateral and mullateral
approaches to nuclear disarmament. The Labour Party has historically been commied
to a mullateral approach compable with thetermsoftheNPT.Thisprocessisdicult
due to the unwillingness of many nuclear states to enter into negoaons or to
contemplate disarmament. Itwasnotedabovethatatleastthreestatesinpossessionof
nuclear weapons are not signatories to the NPT, with the potenal for the addion of
North Korea to that list. The Labour posion has been that whilst the United Kingdom
should pursue mullateral negoaons in good faith, our own capacity should be
maintainedwhilstotherstatesshowlileinclinaonfordisarmament.
2.51. This is in contrast to the approach of organisaons such as the CND whobelieve
that the United Kingdom should adopt a unilateral stance, giving up our own weapons
without reciprocal agreements from other states. Kate Hudson, the chair of CND,
maintains that she also believes in mullateralism because she desires the total
eliminaon of nuclear weapons, but this is to blur an important disncon. But it is
simply not possible to be both amullateralistandaunilateralist,itisacontradiconin
terms. Of course unilateralists can claim the example of the UK disarming may cause
otherstofollowsuit,butthisremainsahoperatherthanapolicy.
2.52. If it is a hope, it is also a remote hope. Margaret Becke argued that there is
absolutely no evidence that a unilateral move to disarm would evoke a reciprocal
response from any othernuclearpower.TheUKhasmadeanumberofunilateralmoves
down the nuclear ladder in recent decades, such as consolidang to one plaorm and
eliminang taccalnuclearweapons.Noneofthesegesturesofgoodfaithhaveresulted
in similar moves by other states. It would take heroicopmismtobelievethatanything
wouldchangeshouldtheUKdisarmunilaterally.
2.53. What progress has been made on disarmament in recent decades has largely
been a result of bilateralormullateralarrangementsbetweenstates,mostnotablythe
signicant reducon inwarheadstockpilesnegoatedbetweentheUSAandRussia.Any
future path for total nucleardisarmamentislikelytofollowasimilarcourse.Aunilateral
decision by the UK would simply remove a willing parcipantfromthesetalksandmay,
perversely,impedeglobaleorts.

14

2.54. Progress on mullateral disarmament has stalled, and it is important not to

exaggerate the degree to which movement is likely on this front in thenearfuture,but
the work undertaken by Margaret Becke and the last Labour government stands as a
reminder that progress is possible if the polical will exists. Shearguesthatthepriority
now should be work on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which remains unnished
business.

15

Publicopinion
2.55. In her evidence, Kate Hudson of the CND claimed that public opinionisinfavour
scrapping the nuclear deterrent. It is dicult to support this claim with evidence. The
most recent YouGov poll from February 2016 shows that 46% of the populaon are in
favour of renewing our nuclear deterrent and 28% are against, only a quarter of the
21
public. Looking at thehistoryofsuchpollingitappearspublicsupportforunilateralism
has hovered at around this level since the 1980s, although it is possibletogetdierent
resultsbyframingthequesoninadierentway.22

To what extent do you agree or disagree withthefollowingstatements?Therenewal

of the Trident nuclear submarine is estimated to cost up to 100bn over its lifetime
andisanessentialpartofournationaldefencethatshouldberenewed.
Weightedsampleof1217.

YouGovSurvey,February2016
TridentinUkpoliticsandpublicopinionBASIC
hp://www.basicint.org/sites/default/les/tridentpolicspublicopinion_basicjul2013.pdf
21
22

16

Summary
Theconceptofdeterrence

Deterspotenaladversariesbyshowingthepossibleconsequencesoftheir
acons.
Humanbehaviourshowsthatpeoplewillweighuptheprosandconsofa
situaonbeforeacng.Ournucleardeterrentaddsintothisweighingup
equaon.
Thefactis,theonlymenuclearweaponshaveeverbeenusediswhenonly
onesidehadthem.

Threatstoournationalsecurity
RussiaunderPunspresidencyhasbecomeincreasinglyaggressiveandreckless
asshownbytheinvasionandannexaonofCrimea,Ukraine.
NATOdeterrenceiseecveatprotecngNATOstatesfromRussianaggression.
Russiaiscurrentlymodernisingitsnuclearweaponshavingcurrentlyspent403
million.
TensionsbetweenTurkey,aNATOstate,andRussiacouldleadtoaNATORussia
nuclearstando.
NorthKorea,aroguestate,hasrecentlyincreaseditsnuclearweapontesngas
wellastheallegaonsofSyriaworkingwithNorthKoreaonasecretnuclear
programme.
Keepingthepeaceandgeopoliticalpositioning

DroppingournucleardeterrentcoulddiminishUKglobalinuence,especiallyin
regardstomullateraltalks.
AsNATOisanuclearalliance,itwouldseemcontradictorytoremainapartof
NATOifweweretodisarmformoralreasons,especiallyastheUScouldsll
deploynuclearweaponsfromUKterritory.
Threecentresofdecisionmaking,innucleartheory,isagreaterdeterrentwhich
enhancessecurityandkeepsthepeace,notjustintheUKbutintheregionand
acrosstheworld.
Despitemyths,thenucleardeterrentremainstotallyoperaonallyindependent.

Multilateralismversusunilateralism

TheLabourpartyhashistoricallybeencommiedtoamullateralapproachto
disarmament.
Thereisabsolutelynoevidencethataunilateralmovetodisarmwould
encourageotherstodisarm.
ByrenewingthesubmarineswearenotinbreachofNPT.

PublicOpinion

46%oftheBrishpopulaonwouldratherwerenewedournucleardeterrent
thanthe28%whosayweshouldgetridofit.

17

Chapter3:Continuousatseadeterrence(CASD)
Vulnerabilityofsubmarines
3.1. Having established the case for the UK to maintain a nuclear deterrent, the
argument turns to what form this deterrent should take. Currently the strategic
deterrent operates through connuous at sea deterrence (CASD) and is delivered by
four Vanguard class ballisc missile submarines (SSBNs). CASD refers to both a posture
and a plaorm. The posture is connuous, meaning that at least one submarine is at
sea at any one me and its payload is ready to be deployed. The at sea refers to the
plaorm,theSSBNs.
3.2. Dierent postures and plaorms are available and some states have mulple
plaorms. For example it is possible to have a nuclear deterrent comprised of ballisc
missiles based in silos, cruise missiles red from aircra or cruise missiles red from
submarines. It is also theorecally possible to keep the warheads and the missiles
separatetotheplaormortokeepallsubmarinesdockedunlesstheyarerequiredtogo
tosea.
3.3. The UK has decided to pursue a CASD strategy because it oers the minimum
credible deterrent delivered in the most costeecve way. Originally the UK operated
with an airborne deterrent and for a short me operated two systems concurrently
beforeconsolidangtoandSSBNsysteminthe1970s.
3.4. The decision to keep onesubmarineatseaatanyonemeremovesanyambiguity
from the UKs nuclear postureandeliminatestheriskofescalangacrisisbybeingseen
to prepare for a nuclear strike. As it stands all potenal adversaries are aware that the
UK has the capacity to respond to a rststrike, even if the countryisdevastatedbythe
inialaack.
3.5. In the event of such a strike each submarine commander has a leer from the
prime minister of the day detailing what acon to take. All UK prime ministers to date
have been careful to ensure that the contents of thisleerareambiguousasanysignal
that might undermine the deterrent would increase the chances of a nuclear strike
againsttheUK.
3.6. Submarine historians Lord Hennessy and James Jinks argued that ballisc missile
submarines are widely acknowledged as the superior plaorm for a strategic nuclear
deterrent. They oer a mobility and range not possible with silos and a level of
invulnerability far superior to that oered by aircra or baleships. It is this
invulnerability that formsthemainbasisoftheirappealasitispossibletohaveonlyone
SSBN deployed and yet retain condence intheabilitytorespondtoanuclearaackby
delivering unacceptable loss to any aggressor. The invulnerability stems from the
diculty of locang SSBNs once they are deployed. The limitaons of undersea
detecontechnologymeanthatitispossibleevenforlargesubmarinestobeimpossible
to detect for months on end, hiding in the vast expanse of ocean and using the
properesoftheoceanitselftothrowoanyaemptatdetecon.

18

3.7. It has been argued that developments in ansubmarine warfare are now
threatening this invulnerability and may make SSBNs obsoleteasadeliveryplaormfor
anucleardeterrent.
3.8. There are two main contenons. The rst is that a new generaon of underwater
unmanned vehicles (UUVs) commonly referred to as drones will have the same eect
on undersea warfare as they have above water,detecngsubmarinesandmakingthem
vulnerable to aack. The second is that advances in cyber warfare introduce new
vulnerabiliesandcompromisethereliabilityofanSSBNbaseddeterrent.
3.9. The argument that a new generaon of UUVs will make the ocean transparent
and radically change the undersea environmenthasbecomefashionableinrecentyears
and has been used in the context of this debate by the Brish American Security
Informaon Council (BASIC), an organisaon that campaigns against the strategic
deterrent.
3.10. It is undeniablethatUUVtechnologyisadvancingandthatinthefutureUUVswill
be able to operate for longer, cover greater distances and even carry out missions
previously given to manned submarines. What is contenous is the idea that they will
transform undersea warfare and nullify the advantages that SSBNs enjoy over other
plaorms.
3.11. There are two fundamental facts that give underseaplaormsanadvantage.The
rst is thattheoceanisvastandsubmarinesarediculttolocate.AsLordBoyceputsit,
big ocean, small submarine: it makes looking for a needle in a haystack seemsimple.
Secondly theimpenetrabilityoftheoceanmeansthattherangeofdetecontechnology
(sonar) is limited to a few hundred metres.Ofcoursethistechnologymayimprovewith
me,butitisunlikelytodosodramacallyduetothephysicalproperesoftheocean.
3.12. The argument that swarms of UUVs will mean that there is no place le for
submarines to hideintheoceanisdiculttosustain.Achievingevenparalcoverageof
the ocean would require vast numbers of UUVs working in a coordinated fashion at an
expense that is dicult toimagine.UUVswillconnuetobeconstrainedbythephysical
properes oftheoceanandthepraccallimitaonsthatcomewiththeirsize,rangeand
the diculty of transming informaon. A reliance on surface plaorms would mean
thattheseplaormswouldthemselvesbevulnerabletoaack.
3.13. James Jinks argued that proponents of this argument also frequently fail to take
into account that advances in detecon technology are mirrored by similaradvancesin
the stealth of submarines themselves. Expert Bryan Clark notes that The same
improvements that are making submarine detecon easier may also enable a new
23
generaon of sophiscated counterdetecon technologies and taccs. He points to
developments of sonar jamming technology and the potenal to mirror the
noisecancellingtechnologyusedinheadphonesforanunderwaterenvironment.

23

ClarkTheemergingerainunderseawarfarep12

19

3.14. UUVs will undoubtedly transform some aspects of undersea warfare such as
minehunng, but Lord Boyce arguedthattheyareunlikelytoproveasubstanalthreat
the vulnerability of SSBNs in the coming decades and certainly do not represent a
decisive argument against invesng in Successor. It should be noted that the other
nuclear states, such as the United States and Russia, that are supposedly at the
vanguard of advances in UUV technology are themselves connuing to invest in new
submarines. They clearly do not feel thattheoceansareabouttoceasetobethesafest
placetohideanucleardeterrent.
3.15. The other development posited as a potenal future threat to the viability of a
submarinebased nuclear deterrent is the risk of cyber aack. This is an argument that
has been made by BASIC and by former Labour defence secretary Lord Browne in his
evidence. The risk is that if the submarines were compromised as a result of a
sophiscated cyber aack then it would make our deterrent ineecve as aweaponof
lastresort,essenallynullifyingitsmainpurpose.
3.16. In the last decades cyber has been a new froner of warfare and is playing an
increasingly important role inmilitarystrategy.Mainlythishasinvolvedcyberaackson
civilian infrastructure, such as in Estonia in 2007, but there is of course the risk that
cyberaackswillbefocusedonmilitarytargets.
3.17. Lord Hennessy and James Jinks argued that our submarine eet remains more
secure from cyber aack than is oen suggested. The network on which submarines
operate is airgapped meaning that it is not connectedtotheinternet,whichinsulates
the system against outsidepenetraon.Itisalsoincrediblydiculttopenetratethehull
of submarines when they are at sea, not least because they are incredibly dicult to
nd.Noneofthisshouldbreedcomplacency,andtheMODareinvesngheavilyincyber
24
defence with 700m spent recently upgrading their communicaon security , but it
should provide a degree of reassurance thatitwouldbeextremelydiculttomountan
eecvecyberaackagainstasubmarinebasednucleardeterrent.
3.18. It is clear that the advance of new technologies, including cyber and drones, is
changing the undersea warfare environment. These are threats that the UK should be
aware of and there should be adequate provision made to protect against future
advances in these areas. But thesedevelopmentsarenotthegamechangersthatthey
are oen presented as. Submarine historians Lord PeterHennessyandJamesJinksnote
that all the naons in the business are upgrading and acng on a common convicon
that beneath the ocean is by the most secure place to conceal your weapons of last
25
resort. The MOD ocials who gave evidence to the commiee made it clear that
there was a constant process of assessing threats and upgrading submarines to meet
new challenges. The threats are real, but they are neither a decisive argument against
retaining a nuclear deterrent nor a compelling reasontomoveawayfromasubmarines
astheplaormonwhichthatdeterrentisbased.

24
25

hp://www..com/cms/s/0/73ae2cf81c11e596dbfc683b5e52db.html#axzz49YgUXWe3
TheSilentDeepp636

20

OtheroptionstoCASD
3.19. It has been suggested that rather than connuing with connuous at sea
deterrencetheUKshouldadoptadierentpostureordeliverysystem.
3.20. As part of the Conservave/LiberalDemocratCoalionAgreementin2011,itwas
agreed that possible alternaves to the successor programme would be examined.The
review, dubbed the Trident Alternaves review was expected to examine the
possibilies of alternave delivery systems, the feasibility of said systems and cost,
industrialimplicaonsandassociatedrisk.
3.21. It examined severaldierentposturesandsystemsthatcouldbepotenallyused,
butallofthesewerenotaseecveorsafeasCASDdeliveredbysuccessor.Theywere:

Aircraftdeployedwithcruisemissiles
Vulnerabletoaackpriortoalaunchasthelocaoncouldbetargeted.
Vulnerabletoaackaeralaunchasitcanbetargetedandshotdown.
Would require costly procurement of a new aircra that had the
capabilityofanuclearcapacity.
WouldrequirecostlyconversionoftheUKsnuclearwarheads.
Overseas basing and overightrightsformostoperaonswouldhaveto
besecuredwhichposesdiplomacproblemsandraisesquesonsabout
thesovereigntyoftheUKsdeterrent.
Groundbasedcapability
Would require a signicant level of infrastructure investment and
disputesoverthelocaon.
Limitaons on global reach which would require the UK to develop or
procureanInterconnentalBalliscMissile(ICBM)capability.
Vulnerabletopreempvetargetedaacks.
Nucleartippedcruisemissiles
Limited range means there are geographic areas that the UK could not
reach.
Forward basing if required, could require third party agreement which
again places a degree of uncertainty over the UKs sovereign ability to
useitsnucleardeterrent.
Freefallnuclearbombs
Moving to an alternave to the current Trident missile would create a
technical,nancialandschedulerisktotheprogramme.
The delivery of a warhead into a cruise missile cannot be delivered
withoutriskforover20years.
The UK would also have to procure a small capability to bridge the gap
between the soon to be out of service Vanguard class and the
alternavecruisemissilebasedsystemwhichwouldbefurthercosts.

21

ReducednuclearpostureordualuseSSBN
Maintaining a submarinebased deterrent but with reduced posture
would save very lile money as the current eet needs to be replaced
anyway.
Only very minimal savings would be made from a three boat eet
instead of a four boat eet, as a signicant proporon of costs in any
procurements programme are incurred at the beginning of the
manufacturingcycle.
Operang a smaller eet would also come at greater strategic risk as a
connuous at sea deterrencecouldnotbeguaranteed.Thereisalsothe
risk of crisis escalaon if it was necessary to sail a submarine during a
periodofinternaonaltension.

3.22. In sum, the report concluded that our current CASD system oered the UK the
highest level of assurance that canbeaainedwithasingledeterrentsystem,aswellas
beingthecheapestopon.Itstated:
None of these alternative systems and postures could offer the same degree of
resilience as the current posture of continuous at sea deterrence, nor could they
guaranteeapromptresponseinallcircumstances.
3.23. Sir Nick Harvey, the Lib Dem minister whooversawthereviewdescribeditasthe
rst holisc look at the deterrent butstandsbyhisbeliefthatanonconnuousposture
is preferable. Lord Peter Hennessy made the point that the 2006 review was also
comprehensive, with over 400 opons considered. Lord Boyce believes the Trident
AlternavesReviewconclusivelyruledoutotheropons.
3.24. Recently the Labour frontbench has also alluded to the possibility of the UK
having the Japanese Opon. Japan is seen asanuclearthresholdstate,whereithas
a the potenal to acquire nuclear capability independently but has no deployment
method. For the UK this would mean unilaterally disarming but retaining our nuclear
ability (which includes retaining civilian nuclearfacilies,ourstockpileofssilematerial
and our industrial capacity) to reconstute a nuclear capability within a maer of
months.
3.25. Although this opon is presented as a compromise, in reality it is unilateral
disarmament by the back door. Lord Boyce argued that it would be incredibly dicult
and costly to maintain the world class facilies that enable the construcon of nuclear
weaponsandthedeliverysystemstodeploythem,norisitfeasiblethatitcouldbedone
rapidlyweretheneedtoarise.Heclaimedtheskillswouldbelostforever.
3.26. Even if submarines or an alternave delivery plaorm were constructed, itcould
take weeks, even months to aach warheads to missiles, load them and deploy the
submarines, which could be too late. James Jinksmadethepointthatsuchaconcould
riskescalanganuclearcrisis.

22

3.27. More importantly, Arcle VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferaon Treaty, states that
we are allowed to maintain our exisng nuclear capacity, howeverifweweretodisarm
and then aempt to rearm in the future this would be a potenal breach of NPT
according to Lord Boyce. DavidClarkdescribedthisoponasnotserious.Thesocalled
Japanese opon is more an expensive and unrealisc species of disarmament than a
credibleaemptatnucleardeterrenceandiswidelydismissedbynuclearexperts.
3.28.AsformerLabourDefenceSecretaryBobAinsworthstated:
There is no such thingasanoncredibleorlesscredibledeterrent.Therecanbenosuch
thing as a parttime deterrent. To be a deterrent, something has to deter. Doing
anything less that deter stops a nuclear deterrent from being a deterrent atall.Itturns
intowhat?Potentially,attimesofcrisis,itturnsintoaninvitation;itmostcertainlyturns
26
itfromadeterrenttoaweapon.
3.29. The conclusion from the Trident Alternaves review, and the consensusamongst
defence experts, isthatnosystemcanoerthesamelevelofsecurityasfourboatCASD
at a comparable costeecveness. A threeboat system would make minimal savings
but would greatly weaken the posture as connuous deterrence could not be
guaranteed.Anyotherdeliveryplaormwouldbemoreexpensiveandlesssecure.

Cost
3.30. The cost of the successor programme dominates the debate in many ways,
especially as there is disagreement over the method of cosng the programme which
has led to a series of wildly dierent gures beingused.Itisimportanttoscrunizethe
cost and ensure we are geng value for money, especially given the current scal
posionoftheUK.
3.31. The CND have argued that the cost of the programme is out ofcontrolduetoa
recent rise of 6bn in the headline cost of the boats. Originally the successor
programme was esmated at 25bn in 2011, aer an extensive planning exercise, and
aer 5 years of inaon this gure has risen to31bnwitha10bnconngency.Thisis
notunusualindefenceprojectsanddoesnotrepresentaspirallingofcostsashasbeen
argued.

26

HCDeb17July2013

23

3.32. The 31bn gureincludesallcostsassociatedwithacquisionincludingfeasibility

studies, design, assessment,demonstraonandmanufacture,aswellasnewfaciliesat
27
BAE Systems in Barrow. This cost alsoaccountsforexpecteddefenceinaonoverthe
28
20 year lifeme of the programme. This is spread over 35 years and equates to 0.2%
peryearofGovernmentspending.29
3.33. There are also inservice costs of the UKs nuclear deterrent once it comes into
service. These are expected to be around 6% of the defence budget, based on the
30
currentdefencebudgetthatgureis2.3bnperyear.
3.34. Recently the CND have said that the Successor eet of submarines will cost
205bn. This number is based on extrapolaons of potenal GDP in the decades to
come and is not based on any hard data. The gure is frequently revised by the CND
(alwaysupward)andisnotrecognisedbytheMOD.
3.35. Not only is the gure fanciful, but it is important to challenge the premise of
including inservice costs in the headline gure. Thisisnotamethodusedforanyother
public procurement project and is used to distort the debate with misleading
informaon.
3.36. As a comparison, the cost for HS2 is esmated at 42.6bn. This does not even
include the cost of the trains, let alone the cost of running trains on the line for the
comingdecades.
3.37.TheinatedguresproducedbyCNDarefrequentlyusedtoassembleashopping
list of alternave public projects. Kate Hudson argued that the money could be spent
on the NHS whilst the CND also listconvenonalmilitaryforces,defencediversicaon,
welfare, internaonal aid and almost anything else they can think of. In reality the
annual savings from nonrenewal would bemodestandwouldbeosetagainsttheloss
of revenue to the economy from the impact on the manufacturing industry as well as
the economic consequences of large scale job losses including increased welfare
payments.
3.38. Lord Boyce said that the idea that savings would be reinvested in convenonal
forceswasmadebypeopleonanotherplanet.
3.39. Finally, it has been argued that there are cheaperalternaves,butasestablished
by the Trident Alternave Review in 2013, no other system is as capable asthecurrent
Tridentbaseddeterrentorascosteecve.

MOD,successorSubmarineProgrammeFactsheet,January2016
Note:Defenceinaonisoenoneofthelargestsourcesofaddionalcostonaprocurement
programme,buttheMoDhaveaccountedforsuchcostsinthere31bnesmate
29
UKNuclearDeerence:Whatyouneedtoknow
hps://www.gov.uk/government/publicaons/uknucleardeterrencefactsheet/uknucleardete
rrencewhatyouneedtoknow
30
PQ17622.Trident,30November2015
27
28

24

Jobs
3.40. Aswiththepreviouseetofsubmarines,thesuccessorprogrammewillbebuiltat
BAE Systems in BarrowInFurness, where therearecurrentlyover6000jobsdependent
onthecompany.
3.41. The MOD has stated that maintaining and sustaining UKs nuclear deterrent
supports over 30,000 UK jobs and makes a signicantcontribuontotheUKeconomy.
31
Approximately 2,200 people across the MOD and the three companies involved are
currently working on the Successor programme with 50% of these beingengineersand
32
designers.
3.42. Professor Keith Hartley in his submission to the BASIC Trident Commission
assessed that the Successor programme will support almost 26,000 jobs over its
33
lifecycle.

BAEatBarrowinFurness:6,045
BAEsuppliers:5,017
AWE:4,500
AWEsuppliers:4,500
Devonport:1,590
Devonportsuppliers:1,590
Operaonsandsupport:2,700
TOTAL25,942

3.43. Thereare293constuenciesacrosstheUKthathavecompaniesintheBAEsupply
34
chainaloneand692companiesintheBAEsupplychainintotal.

MOD,successorSubmarineProgrammeFactsheet,January2016
MinistryofDefence,TheUnitedKingdomsfuturenucleardeterrent:2014updateto
Parliament,16December2014
33
ProfessorKeithHartley,DefenceIndustrialIssues:Employment,Skills,TechnologyandRegional
Impacts,DiscussionPaperNo.2oftheBASICTridentCommission,2012
Number7353,8March2016
34
BAESupplyChainData2015
31
32

25

3.44. Both the Unite and GMB trade unions support the renewal of our submarines,
withLenMcCluskey,GeneralSecretaryofUnitestang:
Building submarines is critical to retain tens of thousands of highly skilled jobs and is
fundamental to the survival of Barrow, which is heavily reliant on the industry for
employment.
The skills of the workforce and the contribution they make to this region and our
country are exceptional so it is important that there is commitment right across the
political parties to retain our worldleading technological advantage in submarine
35
designandbuildbydeliveringthereplacementfortheVanguardtoBarrow.
3.45. Hugh Scullion, General Secretary of the Confederaon of Shipbuilding and
Engineering Unions also reiterated this point: if a decision is taken not to replace
36
Trident,highlyskilledjobswilldisappearandwewillnevergetthembackagain.
3.46. Jeremy Corbyn and the CND have argued that it would be possible forjobstobe
37
keptthroughdefencejobdiversicaon.
3.47. Trade union representaves argued that this approach must be taken with great
cauon, it is not as easy as just stopping thousands of peoples jobs and pung them
elsewhere. We must also be wary of the fact that theseareveryhighlyskilledjobs,and
to get rid ofthemwouldalsoleadtoapermanentlossofsuchskills.Submarinebuilders
and maintenance crews cannot simply be instantly and without cost transferred to
construconorhousebuilding.
3.48. For defence diversicaon to work, there must already be a planinplaceforthis
to happen. Ian Waddell argued that the simple factisthatnosuchplancurrentlyexists,
meaning that vong against renewal of the submarines, without a proper plan inplace
would see 1000s ofworkerslosetheirjobsovernight.Manycountriesthathaveplanned
exhausvely for years to put defence diversicaon in place have all failed to do so
eecvely. The UK has a poor record in this area and Unite have stressed in their
submission to this report that there are no comparave internaonal examples of
diversicaonofprivatesectorworkersprovingeecve.
3.49. Closing exisng submarine facilies would have a signicanteconomicimpacton
local employment as well as having an induced mulplier eect as redundant workers
will reduce their spending in the local economy. There is absolutely no evidence that
shows defence diversicaon could migate the impact of these highly skilled workers
leavingtheareasdependentonSuccessortondworkelsewhere.

Barrowsindustrialfutureisbright,saysUnionsgeneralsecretary,NewsandStar,11March
2013andreiteratedatLabourPartyconference2015.
36
UnionswarnscrappingTridentwillcost13,000jobs,Independent,4April2013
37
DefenceDiversicaon,August2015
35

26

Summary
Vulnerability
The submarine network is airgapped andnotconnectedtotheinternetwhich
makesoutsidecyberpenetraonextremelydicult,ifnotimpossible.
The threat of UUVs is exaggerated, they will notmaketheoceantransparentor
greatlyassistindetecngandtrackingsubmarinesinthedeepocean.
As other technologies progress, so doourswiththeMODinvesng700million
againstcyberthreats.
Otheroptions

The Trident Alternave review in 2013showedthatCASDwasthemostcapable

andcosteecvesystem.
All other delivery methods would be more expensive and would face problems
suchasrangeorvulnerability.
The cost saving of building three boats rather than four is insignicant and
eclipsedbythedangerofrelaxingaCASDposture.

Cost

Theconstruconcostis31bnwitha10bnconngencycost.
Cost increases are due to updated informaon and the impact of inaon on
defenceequipment.
The CND gures are distorted and are not a real representaon of how much
theprogrammewillcostcomparedtosimilarpublicprocurementprojects.

Jobs

Thereareroughly26,00030,000jobsinvolvedwiththeUKsnucleardeterrent.
293 constuencies across the UK have companies in the BAE supply chain that
contributetowardstheUKsnucleardeterrent.
There is no evidence that defence diversicaon could migate the impact of
highlyskilledworkersleavingthesuccessorprogrammetoworkelsewhere.

27

Conclusion
This report has sought to answer two main quesons surrounding the decision to
procure a new generaon of submarines to carry the UK nucleardeterrent.Isanuclear
deterrent sll relevant in a modern security climate? If so, is connuous at sea
deterrence, delivered by four ballisc missile submarines, sll the best method of
providingsuchadeterrent?
In the process of compiling this report we have spoken to awiderangeofexpertsfrom
both sides of the debate and drawn on the extensive body of academic and other
material that has been published on this topic. Whilst there is not a consensus on all
points,thebulkoftheevidencepointstotwobroadconclusions.
Firstly nuclear deterrence remains an important strategic element of UK defencepolicy
and will connue to do so in the decades ahead. Current global instability and the
unpredictable future security landscape, including a belligerent Russia and the rise of
rogue states, reinforce the need for the UK and our allies to maintain robust defences.
Our deterrent is a key component of NATO defences and helps to anchor the UK is a
prominent player in global security decisions. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that
unilateraldisarmamentwillhaveanyposiveimpactonglobaldisarmamenteorts.
In this context, the debate turns to the best method of delivering a nuclear deterrent.
Again the evidence strongly points to one conclusion. A fourboat ballisc missile eet,
providing connuous at sea deterrence connues to be the surest guarantee of UK
security and provides themosteecvevalueformoney.Otherdeliverymechanismsor
stances would either compromise the deterrent eect or cost substanally more to
develop. The evidence of previous ocial reports, that various proposed compromise
opons fail to deliveranysignicantbenetbywayofsecurityorcosteecveness,sll
holds true. The cost is high, but not prohibively so, and the benet to UK
manufacturingandtheindustrialbaseissubstanal.
In the course of compiling this report it has become evident that much of the recent
evidence proposed in opposion to the renewal programme is either inaccurate or
highly misleading. Any ambiguity about the independence of our nuclear weapons and
the legality of renewal has been decisively quashed. Figures for cost are frequently
wildly exaggerated and based on speculaon. Concerns about advances in
ansubmarinewarfareareoverplayedandstrayintotherealmsofsciencecon.
Given this proliferaon of inaccurate informaon, and the prominent posion given to
misleading data in the media, a short list of popular myths and rebuals has been
provided. It is hoped that thiswillassistLabourMPstocometoaconclusionbasedona
solidevidenalbasisratherthanonegroundedinfantasy.

28

10CommonMyths
Cost
Myth:CNDhavestatedthecostofthesuccessorprogrammewillbe205bn
Evidence: The actual cost is 31bn with a 10bn conngency. This takes into account
defenceinaonwhichisthelargestsourceofaddionalcosts.

Japaneseoptionandothercompromises
Myth:Submarineswithnomissiles,threeboatsornuclearthresholdstatus
Evidence: Previous ocial reports that dismiss compromises as ineecve and
expensivesllholdtrue.TheJapaneseoponisnottakenseriouslybyexperts.

PublicOpinion
Myth:PublicopinionshowsthatamajorityoftheUKareagainstournucleardeterrent
Evidence: there has been a long standing paern of unbiased polls public support for
retaininganucleardeterrentaslongasothercountriesdothesame.

Drones
Myth:Droneswillbeabletondoursubmarinesmakingthemredundant
Evidence: The properes of the ocean and issues of scale will connue to limit the
eecvenessofdrones.Droneswillnotcompromisethevulnerabilityofsubmarines.

Cyber
Myth:Ouradversarieswillbeabletohackintooursubmarines
Evidence: The submarine network is not connected to the internet. The MOD is
invesngincountercyberdefences.Cyberisathreat,butnotagamechanger.

Independence
Myth:OurnucleardeterrentiscontrolledbytheU.S.
Evidence: We collaborate with our allies, but our nuclear weapons remain enrely
operaonallyindependentandonlythePrimeMinistercanauthorisealaunch.

NuclearNonProliferationTreaty
Myth:Wewouldbreachofourinternaonalobligaonsbyrenewingoursubmarines
Evidence: The NPT states that as a nuclear state we can maintain our exisng nuclear
capability.Buildingreplacementsubmarinessimplyretainsexisngcapacity.

DefenceDiversification
Myth:Workersonthesuccessorprogrammecouldndnewjobsusingthesameskills
Evidence: Thousands of jobs would be lost overnight and retenon of skills would be
nexttoimpossible.Thereisnoevidenceofprivatesectordiversicaonbeingeecve.

Unilateralism
Myth:Disarmingwouldleadothercountriestofollowsuit
Evidence:Noevidencetosupportthis,otherunilateralmoveshavebeenineecve.

Threats
Myth:TheUKsnucleardeterrentcanttacklethethreatswefacetoday
Evidence:Theworldisunstable,nobodycanpredictthethreatswewillfacein50years.
29

SectionC:Q&A

Whatisthepointofweaponswewillneveruse?
Our deterrent is in use every singleminuteofeverysingleday.Theraonalebehindthe
possession of nuclear weapons is not to use them, and to prevent other states ever
usingthem.
Whataboutthemoralimplicationsofhavingnuclearweapons?
None of us like nuclear weaponsandweallwishtheyhadneverbeeninvented.Butina
world in which some states do have them, it is less likely for them to be used if we
maintain our weapons whilst working for global reducon through negoaons to
disarm. This has been successful in recent years at reducing the numbers of warheads
substanally.Disarmingunilaterallywillhindernothelpglobaldisarmament.
Howdoesrenewaleffectourinternationaltreatyobligations?
The NuclearNonProliferaonTreatysaysthatthe5nuclearstates,includingtheUK,are
allowed to maintain their exisng nuclear capacity. Building replacement submarines
simplyretainsthecapacitywealreadyhave.
Whataboutthecost?
The cost is 31bn with a 10bn conngency, this has taken into account defence
inaon which is the most likely source of cost escalaon. It seems like alot,butthese
submarines will last the best part of 40 years, in the sameperiodwewillspendaround
6,600bnontheNHS.
DonttheAmericanscontrolournuclearweaponsanyway?
No. Our deterrent isenrelyoperaonallyindependentandonlythePrimeMinistercan
authorise the launch of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our Trident missiles do notuse
GPS and cannot be used or hacked by other naon states. Weuseaconstellaonal
navigaonsystemwhichusesthestarstodeterminelocaon,whichthereforecannotbe
hacked.
CouldwenotshelterunderAmericasnuclearumbrella?
First of all, this posion is hard to square with a moral objecon to nuclear weapons.
Our NATO membership would mean we would have to have facilies to assist with US
nuclear launches anyway. It would outsource our foreign and defence policy to the
Americans and would ulmately mean we could be dependent on a US Republican
president for our security. There is also the possibility that disarmamentwouldprompt
the Americans to reconsider their own contribuon to NATO which alreadydwarfsthat
ofotherstates.

30

OthercountriessuchasGermanydonthavethem,whydowe?
Germany shelters under the NATO nuclear umbrella. Germany has nuclearcapable
arllery. Belgium has nuclearcapable aircra. Denmark has runways for such aircra
and has submarine basing for it in Danish waters. Every NATO state is nuclearcapable
and allows the deployment and the ring of nuclear weapons from its territory. Thatis
partofthe1949alliance.
Would our membership to NATO and the UN P5 be affected if we unilaterally
disarmed?
NATO is a nuclear alliance: it is impossible to square membershipofNATOwithamoral
objecon to nuclear weapons. Disarming would reduce our inuence within NATO and
would aect our security relaonships with our NATO partners. Our P5 status would
mostlikelyremainunchanged.
Howwillthistacklethethreatswefacetoday?IsntitanoutdatedColdWarweapon?
The Cold War only ended 25 years ago. Thesesubmarineswilllastfor40years.Nobody
can accurately predict the threats we will facein30,40or50years.Ifwedisarmnow,it
will be incredibly dicult to rearm should we need to. With states like North Korea
aempngtoacquirenuclearweapons,thiswouldbearecklessmove.
Cantourconventionalforcesdeterpotentialadversaries?
Convenonal forces can act as a deterrent, but they do not oer the security of a
nuclear deterrent especially againstnucleararmedstates.Anucleardeterrentoersthe
ulmate guarantee of the security of the United Kingdom against nuclear aack or
nuclearblackmail.
Willitdeterterrorists?
The nuclear deterrent isnt intended to deter terrorists. The UK has an extensive
counterterrorism strategy, which is not an alternave to nuclear deterrence. The two
areintendedtomeetdierentthreats.
Wontdronesmakesubmarinesredundant?
Drone technology is advancing but will remainconstrainedbythephysicalproperesof
the ocean, technological limitaons and the issues of scale. Drones will not transform
the undersea combat environment to the extent of rendering submarines obsolete or
substanallymorevulnerable.
Wontouradversariesandterroristsbeabletohackintooursubmarines?
The submarine network is airgapped basically meaning that it isnotconnectedtothe
internet which makes outside penetraon extremely dicult, if not impossible. The
MOD is invesng heavily in cyber defence, and therefore this threat is not a
gamechanger.

31

Whydoweneedfoursubmarines?
Four submarines are required to maintain one constantly on patrol and retaining this
postureisessenaltoensureaconnuousdeterrent.
Whataboutotheroptions?
The Trident Alternave review 2013 showed that no other alternave to our current
CASD would be more costeecve or secure. No evidence since then haschangedthis
conclusion.
HowwillthiseffectLabourschancesinScotland?
There is lile evidence thatpeopleinScotlandfeelparcularlydierentlyaboutnuclear
weapons than people in England. To beat the SNP we need toholdthemtoaccounton
their abject failures in educaon health and the economy, not try to outSNP them on
defence or foreign policy. Jackie Baillie MSP recently took strongstanceinfavourofthe
UKsnucleardeterrentandsecuredreelecontoHolyroodintheMayelecon.

32

SectionD:Briefings
AFirstSeaLordsview
Lord Boyce brings real life perspective to the utility and challenges of a
deterrent.

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians given by Admiral Lord

Boyce, a crossbencher who has commanded three submarinesandisaformerFirstSea
Lord (19982001) and Chief of Defence Staff (200103). Chaired by the chair of the PLP
backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is the first in what is intended to be a
series of briefings on our nuclear deterrent aheadofthemaingatevoteexpectedinthe
spring. Future sessions will consider the industrial, geopolitical and other aspectsofthe
debate.
WhatdoesreplacingTridentmean?Whatisitslifespanandcosts?

WearereplacingthecurrentVanguardsubmarines,nottheirmissilesystem.Sea
salt ages subs, whichwillcometoendoftheirlifeinthelate2020s.Goingmuch
furtherbringsariskofunreliability,parcularlymechanicalfailure.
Submarines made in the UK, rockets in the US (avoiding replicaon costs).
Warheads made and maintained at Aldermaston in the UK. The idea that the
missiles have to be rotated every few weeks making the UK eecvely
dependentontheUSisamyth.
NewSuccessorsubmarinesmaylast3040years,soupto2070
The government has said replacing the submarines will cost around 30bn, so
the capital cost over 40 years equates to around 34% of the annual defence
budget. Cosng debate gets confused because opposion groups like CND add
in esmates for ongoing trainingandmaintenanceovera3040yearperiodand
everythingelsetheycanthinkof.Figureslike167bnfartoocrude.

WhattechnologicalreasonsunderlieTrident?Whatalternativesexist?

Convenonal preempvenuclearstrikesfromanadversarycouldtakeoutmost
convenonal weapons but submarines would remain intact, hence their
ulmatedeterrentstatus.
Because Trident is a connuous atsea deterrent (CASD), the UK will not be
caught out nor is it necessary for the submarines to come into harbour to
become operaonal. During a crisis, they are required at hours noce ordays
at best (three for the Falklands for instance), so a CASD allows a swireacon.
Leaving subsinportonicebringstwinproblemsofmelinesswhentheyneed
to be used; an acon in itself which may be viewed as an escalatory move
duringtensions.
Seldom menoned are the highlytrained, movated and ecient people who
man submarines. Incredibly, there has been no break in CASD in 45 years.
Disarmingriskslosingtheseskillspermanently.ShouldtheUKdecidelaterthata
deterrentisagainnecessaryitwouldbeimpossibletoreestablishit.

33

Despitetechnologicaladvancesinotherareas,theoceansremainsimpermeable
and highly likely to remain so meaning submarines will remain very hard to
detect. There is more chance of a man being able to land on Mars within six
months than technology being created to make the oceans permeable in the
foreseeablefuture
Ballisc missiles are more accurate and have a longerrangecomparedtocruise
missiles.
Further, one should consider the me and cost required to establish a new
delivery system, by which me Vanguardclass submarines may have reached
end of service. Nor should we forget that a new system islikelytoleavetheUK
in breach of theNonProliferaonTreaty.TheBASICcampaigngroupandtheLib
Dems in government both tried to prove that an alternave delivery system
wouldworkbutendedupadmingitwasunrealisc.
If the UK were to step down the nuclear ladder to the extent of scrapping its
warhead but retaining engineering capacity to build them again if needed, any
aempt to begin rebuilding would be at odds with commitments made in the
NPT. Besides retaining the skill base to do so completely unrealisc what
wouldallthepeopleatAldermastondointhemeanme.

Q&A
GeopoliticalrationalebehindmaintainingTrident?
The UK has already disarmed substanally to the bare minimum credible deterrent
butthishasnotpromptedotherstofollowsuitnorhasitstoppedthelikesofPakistanor
Russia from increasing their nuclear footprint.Russiainparcularisseriouslyimproving
itsnuclearandsubmarinecapability.
Scrapping Trident unilaterally would remove the UKs chance of playing a role in future
mullateraldisarmamentnegoaons.
ScrappingTridentwouldmeanmoremoneyforthearmy?
Highly unlikely. HMT wouldnt allow it to be spent on convenonal arms. Those who
claimotherwiseareonanotherplanet
CostofdecommissioningifyoudidscrapTrident?
Upfront decommissioning costs of 34bn, so any decision to scrap going to solve
budgetcrisisinnext5years.
Cyberattackrisks?
Cyber is a threat but subs areautonomousoncetheyleaveandhavecyberproofedway
ofreceivingmessages.Ifcommsaresevered,fallbackmeasuresexists.
Secondcentreofdecision?
Should the US not full its NATO obligaons (unlikely but notimpossiblewithitsPacic
priority), an aggressor has to consider the UK. In nuclear theology, having a second
independentnuclearpowerchainloomingisagreatdeterrent.

34

ImpactonroleinNATOandUNSecurityCouncilifwedisarm?
No impact on P5 role not all countries were nuclear powers when it was founded. If
we disarm on the basis we do not believe in the nuclear doctrine, thenitishardtosee
howtheUKcouldstayinNATO.

35

Lessonsfromthepast
Lord Peter Hennessy and James Jinks elaborate on the historical context for
nuclearweaponsandsubmarines.

This is anoverviewofabriefingforLabourparliamentariansbyLordPeterHennessyand
James Jinks,authorsofTheSilentDeep:TheRoyalNavySubmarineServiceSince1945.
Lord Hennessy, is one of Britain's bestknown historians and Attlee Professor of History
at Queen Mary, University of London. James Jinks completed his PhD under Lord
Hennessy. Chaired by the chair of the PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP,
this is the sixth in a series of briefings on the Successor programme ahead of the
maingate vote. Past sessions haveexaminedRussianforeignpolicyandLaboursrecord
on nonproliferation. Future ones will include the industrial aspects and another with
pollingexperts.
OverviewofcommentsbyPeterHennessy

The Labour Party rowed about the bomb from its incepon in 1946, with Staord
Cripps and Hugh Dalton speaking at a Cabinet commiee meeng against it, cing
the need for resources would distract from the postwar reconstrucon. Ernest
Bevin arrived, late from a conversaon with hisUScounterpart,wherehehadbeen
slighted, announcing that a bomb with the bloody Union Jack on top of it was
required.
Cing defencestrategistandformerMODPermanentSecretaryMichaelQuinlan,PH
says there are eight themes which arise each me we face thequesonofrenewal
or upgrade. These are: 1) the raonale behind it, which range from presge to a
seat at the top table to the need to inuence US and contribute to collecve
security 2) challenge within Government and beyond, the UK has a deep and
recurrent tendency to reconsider its decision, unlike the other nuclear weapons
states 3) cost 4) atude of the US 5)Francealwayslurkingaspowerfulfactor.6)
ethics even before CND, Catholic theologians opposed the bomb 7) instuonal
pressures e.g. from the Armed Forces, 8) secrecy although this is much
diminished.
Each me a decision is required, the same arguments are replayed, albeit in a
dierent form. Former Defence Permanent Secretary Kevin Tebbit also noted that
the UKwasthemostreluctantofallnuclearstates,noonewentthroughthesame
agony, with the French le in parcular demonstrang a wholly dierent psycheto
theBrishle.

OverviewofcommentsbyJamesJinks

JJfocussedonhowwecametoasubmarinebasedsystemanditsadvantages.
An eecve deterrent system possesses several characteriscs including reliability
andinvulnerability.
UKs nuclear weapons were rst carried onbombersbeforethedevelopmentofthe
ballisc missile. With the cancellaon of the Brish Blue Streak and the American
Skybolt,theUKpurchasedthesubmarinebasedPolarisballiscmissilefromtheUS.

36

In the 1960s, the UK built four nuclear submarines,whichremainedinservicefrom

19681996. But from the 1970s, a debate started on how best to replace Polaris.
Again the relavemeritsofland,airandseawerediscussed,alongsidethemeritsof
balliscandcruisemissiles.
JJ comments that during the Cold War, the USSR spent vastsumsinordertodetect
and track submarines, using everything from supercomputers to lasers but got
nowhere. Ansubmarine warfare improvements have been evoluonary not
revoluonary, though therewillbemesoftemporarysuperiority.Inthenext3040
years, we can expect satellites and sonar to improve whilst MarimePatrolAircra
willcovergreaterdistances.Yet,itremainsthecaseofsmallsubmarine,bigocean.
Same technology which maymakesubmarinedeteconeasier,mayalsomakethem
quieter and lead to a new generaon of counterdetecon technologies andtaccs
that wouldenhancetheabilityofasubmarinetoremainundetected.Forexample,a
submarine or unmanned vehicle may emit a sound to drown out its own noise, a
method similar to noise cancelling headphones. The Russians claim their Akula II
class submarines can already do this. Next generaon submarines may also deploy
decoys to create false targets and conduct acousc jamming similar to that
employedbyairborneelectronicwarfaresystemsagainstradar.
In all probability, the Successor class submarines will have new jammers and
decoys, either unmanned undersea vehicles or on the submarine itself, as well as
countermeasures against sonar and other nonacousc detecon techniques such
asmagnecdetecon.
US, Russia and Chinaconnuetoinvestinsubmarines,withIndiaalsodoingsonow,
becausetheybelievetheoceanswillremainopaque.
On vulnerability to cyberaack JJ says it is dicult to gleaninformaonamidstthe
great secrecy surrounding the systems that control UK nuclear weapons. He is
uncertain how anyone could claim the US DoD report claims the UK strategic
weapons system and command and control arrangements were liable to
cyberaack. The authors, and any hacker, would needdetailed knowledge and
understanding of the computer systems on board the Royal Navys submarines, as
well as thecommand,controlsystemsandproceduresthatallowthePrimeMinister
to authorise the releaseofnuclearweapons.Submarinesaredesignedtooperatein
isolaon. The DoD report recommends focusing some of the capabilies into the
submarine force where isolaon is already designed into how they operate and
ght, which would seem to imply that its authors regard submarinebasedsystems
asrelavelysecure.

37

Q&A
A previous speaker (former Lib Dem Defence Minister Nick Harvey) has commented
that instead of changing the delivery method, onemightinsteadconsiderachangein
posturetoasemireadyone.Whatisyourviewonthis?
JJ responded to say that in the 1950s, connual deployment had not beenplannedfor,
instead a eet of seven hybrid Polaris would dipintoanSSBNrole;howevertheUSwas
not supporve of this as a submarine that sought to kill as well as hunt would have a
conicng operang raonale (i.e. seeking both torunawayandchase).Asidefromthe
exisng infrastructure being set up to deliver a connual deterrent, the escalaon
required to turn a semiready deterrent into readiness would only increase tensions.
Indeed during the Cold War,anincreaseinthenumbersofsubmarinesdeployedwasan
instantreadout.
Can you give us a sense, through yourresearch,ofhowWhitehallandtheRoyalNavy
work? Are they competent actors who can come up withthebestsolutionfortheUK
oraretheypartofthemilitaryindustrialcomplexandhencecompromised?
PH replied that along the way, it was clear that Whitehall and the RN hadlearnedhard
lessons, including the need for US help. They had not however found evidence of a
militaryindustrial complex and quong former MOD Permanent Secretary Frank
Cooper, he said thataslongasthememoriesofthe1940sremained,thePrimeMinister
of the day would not like tobetheonetogivetheUKsdeterrentaway;thishefelt,was
farmorepotentthatthesocalledmilitaryindustrialcomplex.
Through your trawl of the records, do you think the 2006 review of Trident was a
thoroughattempttorevisitthematter?
PHsaidhefeltithadbeenathoroughinvesgaon,withover400systemsconsidered.
WhatdoyouthinkoftheexistingRussianthreat?
JJ believes that the Russians have aempted to pick up where they le o in the Cold
War. For most of the ColdWar,whenitcametosubmarinedesignandconstrucon,the
Russians focused on quanty while the West focused on quality. This changed in the
early 1980s, aer the Russians became aware ofhowvulnerabletheirsubmarineswere
to detecon thanks to the US WalkerWhitworth spy ring. The Soviet Union started to
focus on quality as opposed to quanty. By the end of the Cold War,thenewestSoviet
submarines were very quiet and very dicult to detect and track.When the Cold War
ended and the Soviet UnioncollapsedtheRussiansstruggledtooperate,yetalonebuild
new classes of submarines.Between1990and2002theRussianSSBNforceincreasingly
stayed in port. Indeed, in 2002, not asingleRussianSSBNconductedadeterrentpatrol.
SincethentheRussianshavebuiltnewclassesofsubmarinesandtheoperaonaltempo
has increased. There have been reports in the press of submarine acvity in the
NorthAtlanc,oScotlandandundertheArccIceCap.

38

Areweinabetterpositiontohaveasensible,rationaldebateaboutTrident?
PH said Trident should not be a convenient way to do polics as once a decision is
made to forsake the deterrent, it is impossible to go back. JJ said that misinformaon
had gained credibility for instance the fact that Trident would never be usedwhenin
factitwasinuseconnuously,simplybybeingonpatrol.

39

DeterrenceTheory
Malcolm Chalmers discusses the concept of deterrence andhowthisappliesto
theUKsnucleardeterrent

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by Malcolm Chalmers,

Deputy Director and alsoDirectorofProliferationandNuclearPolicyprogrammesatthe
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Chaired by the chair of the PLP backbench
committee John Woodcock MP,thisistheeighthinaseriesofbriefingsontheSuccessor
programme ahead of the maingate vote. Past sessions have examined Russian foreign
policy, Labours record on nonproliferation and the industrial aspect of Trident. Future
ones will include a session examining polling and another with workforce and trade
unionrepresentatives.

OverviewofcommentsbyMalcolmChalmers(MC)

Recent defence reviewshaveexpressedtheUKsrecommitmenttonuclearweapons

but also its commitmenttodisarmamentandreduconinthenumberofwarheads,
yet the 2015 SDSR broke thispaernparallybysignallingnofurtherdisarmament.
In one less analysed sentence, MC believes that there is a clear signalthattheUKs
nuclear posture could be moved up, in view of the broader security environment
and as a response tothegreaterpotenalforconictwithpeer,ornearpeerstates,
in parcular the worryingly asserve posion of Russia over the last few years. At
present the UK has 40 warheadsandeightmissilesoneachboatbutthecapacityto
carry moreofeachshouldtherebetechnologicalchangesinansubmarinewarfare
ormissiledefence.
Whilst previous defence reviews had focused on how best the UK might operatein
places like the Balkans and Iraq, the 2015 SDSR has a greater emphasis on
deterrence more generally, over the full spectrum of defence, beyond nuclear
weapons, and includingdiplomacyandeconomicsancons.Whatunitesallofthese
means of deterrence is that they are about prevenon. MC sees deterrence as a
signal which uses dierent instruments to prevent war. If you are talking about
countries like RussiaandChinawithrangeofcapabilies,deterrenceispreferablyto
war. In the case of Ukraine, economic sancons were an important tool against
furtherRussianinterference.
Nuclear deterrence theory can be as complex as one likes, but at a simple levelfor
the UK, the possession of a nuclear weapon anditsdemonstraonofitsavailability
(throughpatrolling)isadeterrencesignal.
Depending on the scenario, it may be that what a country needs is a large scale
strategic deterrence i.e. a one shot deterrence. On the other hand, it may also
require substrategic systems that act as a nal warning before the large scale
system is used. The UK is the only nuclear weapons state thathasasingledelivery
system; for instance the US and Russia each have three, Chinahastwotothreebut
the UKs submarine system is capable of a range of strategic and prestrategic
opons.

40

MC believes that Russia sees the threat of a small scale nuclear war as a way of
deterring western intervenon in Ukraine but its threatofalloutnuclearwarisjust
not credible. Like North Korea and Pakistan,Russianthreatsofescalaontonuclear
warfare are about deterrence. MC believes that any use of nuclear weaponsinthis
age would be such a massive shi from the norm that polical reputaonal
consequences would be enormous andworsenwhateverspecicgeographicalcrisis
(Crimea etc) which acted as a trigger. Whoever did that would have to reckon with
consequences; nuclear deterrence rests on possibility that the opposing nuclear
weaponstatemightjustretaliate.

Q&A

What can we understand from President Obamas initial support for multilateral
disarmament and subsequently his decision to spend more than USD1 trillion to
updatetheUStriadofnuclearweapons?

MC believes that Obama like most US Presidents is commied to mullateral

disarmament and got a new START treaty but in the end, the momentumranintosand
due to domesc polics and lack of Russian interest. MC doesnt think theUSneedsas
large an arsenal as it has, not does it needanexpensivemodernisaonprogrammebut
the polics of an arsenal smaller than that of theRussianstrategic(nottaccal)arsenal
would not be acceptable domescally or internaonally, so it is stuck with broad
numerical parity, however meaningless. MC notes that the UK may be the smallest of
the ve ocial nuclear weapon states but what really maers is the ability to inict
damage.

What is the relationship between NATO countries with no nuclear weapons and the
US?WhatwouldhappentotheUKshoulditgiveupitsnuclearweapons?

If the UK gave up its nuclear weapons, it could join lots of NATO countries with no
weapons that have signed up to NATO deterrence and play their role in a dierent
manner. For instance Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have aircra and crew who
are trained in nuclear missions, trained to drop bombs, but these are American bombs
held in European bases under control of US personnel. If the UK were to deploy US
nuclear bombs with the RAF,abletobeorderedintoaconbythePM,itmightgosome
way to show that it was not rejecng nuclear deterrence for NATOasawhole,andwas
prepared to share the polical burden of nuclear deterrence just as other nonnuclear
NATO members do. Even if the UK weretotakesuchastep,itwouldsllhaveproblems
in explaining to allies why it had chosen this moment in world aairstogiveupitsown
nuclearweapons

41

Isnt the use of nuclear weapons so catastrophic that it is inconceivable they will be
usedandarehenceobsolete?

Deterrence is about changing the behaviour of an adversary and it isnt always easy to
pin down what might lead to a change in their behaviour. MC believes that if Donald
Trump becomes US President, decides that NATO is a waste of money and wont use
nuclear weapons as part of the alliance unless the US is directly threatened, then
deterrence will be undermined;PresidentPuninturnmaybepreparedtodothingshe
currently wouldnt contemplate. For deterrence to work, the aggressor doesnt haveto
believeyouhavetouseit,buttheresachanceyoumightuseit.

42

RussiaThreatorrealitycheck?
David Clarke and Andrew Monaghan discussiftheoffquotedRussianthreatis
realandcanbekeptincheckwithpossessionofanucleardeterrent
This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by David Clark (former
special adviser to the late Robin Cook and chair of the Russia Foundation) and Andrew
Monaghan (Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House). Chaired bythechairof
the PLP backbench committee JohnWoodcockMP,thisisthesecondinwhatisintended
to be a series of briefings on the Successor programme ahead of the maingate vote
expected in the spring. Future sessions will consider theindustrial,diplomaticandother
aspectsofthedebate.
RussianforeignstrategyoverviewofcommentsbyAndrewMonaghan

The Russian state ismovingontoawarfoong,whichgoesbeyonditsaconsin

Ukraine but also public comments by itsleadersandinternalpolicyacvies.In
their view, their policies are a response to an arc of crisis around Russias
borders, a compeon for resources and a 21st century of instabilityduetoa
failure on the internaonal architecture. Russia sees itself operang in a world
thatislesspostUkrainemorepostArabspring.
Aer 2530 years of complete neglect, Russia is modernising its military. Such
rearmament has changed the European security situaon, though
disagreementsarenothingnewandindeedcentraltoRussiaNATOrelaons.
He said to watch for the NATO summit in Warsaw in July, with the possible
announcement of permanent basing of NATO forces in crical NATO states and
bringing former Soviet states like Georgia more into the alliances embrace.
Russian cricism will be forthcoming. Nevertheless, AM said that the trigger
point for NATO Arcle 5 commitments is more likelytoinvolveTurkey(consider
forinstancethedowningofRussianaircra)thanBalcStates.
Watch for further Russian power projecons its sending ofanavalollatoa
G20 summit in Australia is the rst me the Russiannavyhadenteredthisarea
in 100 years. Theres a good chance that the Russian carrier will be deployed
shortly,possiblybeforetheUKs.
Russia views the UK as a so power that has the ability to support colour
revoluonsliketheonesinUkraineandGeorgia.

WhyweneedTridentDavidClark[clickhereforhisarclefortheFabianSociety]

Labour debate on Trident follows a bizarre cycle of policy, with the party
supporng disarmament at the height of the Cold War, dropping the policy
when it ended and the best chancefordisarmamentexistedandisnowlooking
to move back to unilateralism when the threat has in fact increased. Labour
bases its views on Trident in nondefence terms. For the right, it is about
electoral credibility, for the le it is about peace. Both views are valid but
unhelpful and more about how we feel. He doesnt support the status
argument, nong that Germany and Brazil base their arguments for Security
Council membership on their economic strength. In turn, disarmament could
makewarmorelikely,notless.
43

DC has changed his mind and now supports Trident the situaon is arguably
more threatening and in Pun, we have an aggressive risk taker who has
threatened to use nuclear weapons, most worrying is his use of nuclear
blackmail as an ancillary to diplomacy and convenonal military force. In2014
Pun reminded the west that Russia was a leading nuclear power and notto
interfere with it (just as the crisis in Ukraine was deepening); shortly aer it
threatened to target Denmark with nuclear weapons ifitparcipatedinNATOs
missile defence system; whilst at a March 2015 Elbe group meeng, a groupof
rered Russian security ocials wereaskedbyForeignMinisterSergeiLavrovto
warn US ocials privately that Russia would use force, including nuclear
weapons, if the west built up its presenceintheBalcstates,armedUkraineor
aempted to restore Ukrainian control over Crimea. Alexei Pushkov, head of
Dumas security commiee has commented that Russia would deploy nuclear
weapons as convenonal weapons, to regional and local wars,notjustnaonal
ones. Around Crimea, Russia hasdeployedshortrangenuclearcapablemissiles.
Russian defence spending has increased by more than 5 per cent in the past
year but worthconsideringthat21percentofitspublicspendingisclassiedso
wecannotbesureifitisdivertedtodefencetoo.
Tridentisnt only about our ability to deter a nuclear threat from Russia,it also
aects ourabilitytodeteraRussianaackonaNATOcountrywithconvenonal
forces. Should a nonnuclear UK wish to provide military assistance to an ally
being threatened by Russia, our cizens would be highly vulnerable to nuclear
inmidaon. If the UK did not possess a nuclear deterrent, Russia wouldbefar
more likely to respond to any UK involvement in a potenal conict by
threatening to launchanuclearstrikeonBrishciesifitintervenedinanyway.
Russianmilitarydoctrineallowsforthis.
DCs Ukrainian friends regret that the country gave up nuclear weapons for a
promise by Russia that has since been broken. Queson remains how they
might have maintained the weapons but regardless the view remains that
Russian aggression would have been deterred if Ukraine sll was a nuclear
power.

Q&A
IsretainingTridentabinarydecision?
DC believes it is a binary decision as the threshold for a buildup has passed, so one
cant speak seriously of the socalled Japan opon. Indeed a decision by the UK to
disarmismayonlyheightenRussianappeteforaggression.
Should NATO be asked to defend the Baltics following aggression, would Tridentadd
anythingtoassistefforts,giventhatthemightoftheUSnucleararsenal?
DC believes that the UK hasgreatervalueasasecondcentreofnucleardecisionmaking
now than during the Cold War as US now priorises Asia. AM likewise believesthereis
valueinthemaintenanceofthenucleardeterrent.

44

With financial pressures, shouldnt we choose between nuclear and conventional

weapons?
Convenonalweaponsheldbyanonnuclearstatemaycountfornothingwhenfacedby
a Russia that can inict an unacceptableresponsethroughuseoftheirnuclearweapon.
Russianconvenonalforcesthoughimproving,areinfactquiteweak,whichmayexplain
why the Russians lean on their nuclear power. DC noted that we should also consider
that the threshold of use of a nuclear weapon has, under the socalled Patrushev
doctrinebeenloweredtoincluderegionalandlocalconicts.AMbelievesthatwhatDC
actuallycallsthePatrushevdoctrineisRussiasNaonalSecurityStrategy.
WhenmighttheUKusethenuclearoptionagainstRussia?
Possession is implicitofthepotenaltousebutthedeterrentvaluewouldbeweakened
if anyone spelt out the condions under which the country mightusenuclearweapons
and even without concerns arising over Russia, major instability across the world
providesthemeritofpossessingstrategiccapabiliessuchasTrident.
HowisRussiasrelationshipwithChina,particularlydefencerelations?
AM noted that the Russians have sold the Chinese S400, their most advanced
anaircra defence system, and if used in Syria would prevent any western air
intervenon. Poor though SovietSino relaons were, but there are now deliberate
eorts to improve them, including huge delegaons of military personnel and
businessmen.
What is Russian appetiteforbilateraldisarmamentandanewsecuritytreatywiththe
west?
AM said that the Russians are always willing to get a discussion going on quesons of
importance to them. Several crical issues would needtoberesolved,includingRussia
leaving the TreatyonConvenonalArmedForcesinEurope(CFE)andfromtheRussians
perspecve, the USs withdrawal from the AnBallisc Missile Treaty (ABMT) and its
missile defenceprogramme. AMwasconcernedthatalliesareinfactdividedastowhat
a new security selement might look like, whilst DC noted that the pricedemandedby
the Russians for a new selement would be too highandinvolveabandoningafairand
freeEurope,AMconcurredwiththis.

45

Nonproliferation
Dame Margaret Beckett considers the last Labour governments record on
nuclearnonproliferation.

This is an overview of abriefingforLabourparliamentariansbyDameMargaretBeckett

MP who in her role as Foreign Secretary (20067) first committed the UK to the overall
goal of global zero and now convenes the Top Level Group (TLG),acrosspartygroup
including former British Foreign and Defence Secretaries and senior members of the
military whobelieveinmultilateralnucleardisarmament.ChairedbythechairofthePLP
backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is thethirdinaseriesofbriefingsonthe
Successor programme ahead of the maingate vote. Past sessions have provided an
overview of the issues and an examination of Russian foreign policy; future ones will
include a joint panel session with Lord (George) Robertson and Lord (Des) Browne
anotherontheindustrialaspects.
NuclearnonproliferationoverviewofcommentsbyDameMargaret

Disclosure rst that RollsRoyce based in Derby South makes the engines for
Tridentsubmarines!
MB started a review into Trident in 2006, in response to pressure within
Government andtheLabourParty.ShecommissionedtheCabinetSecretaryand
senior ocials to consider, from rst principles, if the UK should sll retain its
nuclear capability, and was adamant that it would not be a paper exercise.The
review recommended renewal of the boats but consideredtheretobepossible
scope forreducingtheirnumbersfromfourtothree.Afullconsultaonwiththe
CabinetwasalsocarriedoutunlikeinthecasePolaris.
In June 2007, MB gave a ground breaking speech at Carnegie Hall where she
announced that the UK would commit to the goal of no nuclearweaponsthe
rst of the P5 countries to commit to doing so. MB set out how this led to an
internaonal network of leaders who are now commied to the Global Zero
movement. As part of this, the UK began to discuss how it would disarm and
steps required to verify this. For the rst me, actual discussions on nuclear
disarmament between P5 members took place and to this day, discussions
amongsttheirscienccommuniesconnue.
Unfortunately the 2010 NPT conference coincided with the General Elecon,
and though there was crossparty consensus, without eecve leadership, the
ocials were treadingwater.Moreposively,thecoaliongovernmentreduced
the UKs stockpile and the UKs approach is now based on a minimumeecve
deterrent.
MB recounted a commentator saying that sing alongside a commitment to
Trident, her comments ondisarmamentappearedtobemademerelytoplacate
awingoftheLabourparty,andhehadnotexpectedhertocarrythemout.

46

Q&A
The moves you made as Foreign Secretary were in a different international context,
beforeRussianaggressionwherearewetodayanddoesprogressstillstand?
Progress is mixed. One of the reasons that made MB decide that the UK ought to
maintain its capacity was becauseasForeignSecretaryshehadheardofRussianacons
that were not yet in the public domain e.g. Litvenko, making her more nervous of the
Russians thanshehadexpectedtobe.ForMB,ithadbeendicultseeingUkrainegiving
up nuclear weapons for a security guarantee of no worth. More posively, MB
commented on how the EU drove talks with Iran, with the US coming in, adding
incenvesthathelped,includingadiplomacdealwiththeUS.
Whatwouldbeyourpriorityifforeignsecretarytoday?
MB said it would be the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which remains
unnished business. Pakistan remains a stumbling block, but MB was condent a way
round it could be found. Dicult though it is, MB felt that the UK has to connue to
work with its partners to push on mullateraldisarmamentasunilateraliniaveshave
notledtootherstatesfollowingintheUKsfootsteps.
WhatlessonscanwelearnfromthedealwithIran?
Negoaons with Iran began under Jack Straw, his German and French counterparts
Joschka Fischer and Lionel Jospin at a me of great concern over Irans moves towards
becoming a nuclear weapons state. The EU troika did not talk about the deal in public
unl Iran had me to assess it and though Ahmadinejad procrasnatedandchangedid
not occur ll his departure, it was crical that the west did not walk away nor publicly
quesonIransintenonstowardsthedeal.
What do you make of comments that the UK and France can share a nuclear
deterrent?
A poll conducted during the Trident review found that the public supported geng rid
of nuclear weapons if others did so to, yet there was lile support for theUKgivingup
itsdeterrentandbeingforcedtorelyonFranceandtheUSA.
Areyouaunilateralist?Ifnot,whynot?
MB responded to say she is not a unilateralist and if she had toputngerononething
that convinced her, it would be Russian aggression towards Ukraine. Whilst she had
been a member of the CND when mullateral negoaons were pieinthesky, her
experienceasForeignSecretaryshowedthattheycouldwork.

47

DefenceSecretariesdebate
Former Defence Secretaries Lord Robertson and Lord Browne hold opposing
views.

This is anoverviewofabriefingforLabourparliamentariansbyLord(George)Robertson
and Lord (Des) Browne. Lord Robertson served as Defence Secretary from 19971999
and was NATO SecGen from 19992004. CurrentlyamemberoftheTopLevelGroupof
UK Parliamentarian for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and NonProliferation, he
remainsasupporterofTrident.LordBrownewasDefenceSecretaryfrom20062008and
Convenor of the Top Level Group from 20092014. He is now Vice Chair to theNuclear
Threat Initiative (NTI). As Defence Secretary, he led the 2007votewhichsawamajority
of MPs vote in support of Trident,buthaschangedhisviews.Chairedbythechairofthe
PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is the fourth in a series of briefings
on the Successor programmeaheadofthemaingatevote.Pastsessionshaveexamined
Russian foreign policy and Labours record onnonproliferation.Futureoneswillinclude
theindustrialaspectsandanotherwithpollingexperts.
OverviewofcommentsbyLordBrowne

The nuclear deterrent is a 20th century weapon and now part of the problem;
theUKshouldworkonmullateralbasistogengridofthem.
As a mullateralist, DB and would like to see a proper debate on the deterrent
aswellasthesecurityofnuclearmaterialandissuesarounditsdisposal.
DB believes we need a new independent assessment; he doesnt think the
submarines should be replaced as their inservice date has already moved a
decade, so running a risk that they will be obsolete by the me they enter
servicein2030.
Speaking about the 2006 white paper which he helped dra,DBtheninformed
parliament that a decision on the replacement of the nuclear warhead would
take place in the next parliament. In the event, President Obama cancelledthe
US warhead programme in 2008andtheUKfollowedsuit.The2015SDSRnotes
that a replacement should be sought in the 2020/2025 parliament, which DB
feelsisinconsistentadvice.
DB expressed concern about vulnerability toacyberaack;forhimcyberrefers
to the relaonship of the weapon system to a computerbased system. In
speaking about vulnerabilies, he referred to the work of Dr Andrew Fuer at
the European Leadership Network (see here) and US Defence Science Board
report from 2013 (see here) which noted that it would cost $450bn to
cyberprooftheUSsdeterrent.
DB also spoke about the possible development of undersea surveillance which
would make boats vulnerable and cing Kevin Lepage (a scienst with NATO),
doesnt feel that the seas will remain impermeable for long, with both NATO
andthelikesofChinaexploringhowtochallengeit.

48

DB believes that if the UK is going to bet that far on a system that wont be
deployed ll2030,andisdesignedtokeepsafeto2070,itmustnowspendme
working on cyber and other challenges, otherwise the deterrent may in fact
becomeadriverofinstability.

LordRobertson

Suggested that the audience read the Guardian arcle (wrien with Lord
Huon)forrebualoftechnicalargumentsthatsuggestTridentisvulnerable.
Disagreeing with DB,GRquesonedifDBsviewmeantthatamaingatedecision
should be postponed and that exisng submarineswere(already)vulnerableor
wasvulnerabilitytheissueonlywithnewsubmarinesastheycomeintoservice.
Referring to President Obamas2008speech,GRsaidthespeechsoundedgood,
which is what the President had wanted, but since then the US has invested
hugeamountsofmoneyrenewingtheirdeterrent.
GR noted that the 1998 SDR commied the biggest act of unilateral
disarmament proporonally, retargeted missiles and changed from minutes to
daysthenocerequiredforthelaunchofamissile.
GR had supported the CND in the 1960s at a me when he felt then that UK
disarmament would lead to a virtuous cycle of disarmament around theworld.
This turned out not to the so, and especially not since 2008 whentheRussians
began invesng inanewclassofnuclearmissilesubmarines,bomberandcruise
missiles. China too hasinvestedheavily,PakistanandIndiahavenothaltedtheir
programmes,norhasNorthKorea.
The events whichhavecaughtthewestbysurpriseinthelast40years,fromthe
Falklands to thefalloftheBerlinWall,9/11toArabspringreectthatwedonot
know what dangers we will faceanditwouldbedisingenuous,indismissingthe
ulityofthedeterrent,tosayotherwise.
GR believes that the nuclear umbrella, comprising the US and UK and outside
NATO, with France,haspreventedanyothercountryinthewestfromseekingto
acquire nuclear weapons. If the UK gives up the deterrent, proliferaon may
possiblyincrease.
Considering cheaper alternaves,GBsaidthattheresultoffourmajorstudies,
including the coalion Trident alternave review and BASIC, agreed at the end
of the day that the dangers a deterrent combats could resurface andreducon
wouldhavealimitedimpactonproliferaonaroundtheworld.

JW principally to Des on age of subs, understand what youre saying but dont get
they can go on for another 1030 years which wouldthenbenddownandmakeservice
date even longer. Second queson, if subs not going to be the spacesowhyarewethe
only sub naon with ballisc capability. WhyisRussianotgoingdownadierentroute?
Theyareinvesnggreatdeal.

49

Q&A[limitedduetovote]
[directed at DB] Would you recommend that MPs vote no when there is a maingate
vote? Why are the Russians invesng in submarines (and not another route) if
submarinesaretoprovevulnerable?
DB Does not believe there will be a main gate decision, instead it will be a modular
posion, which makes him think theTreasurydoesntliketheprojectandshouldevents
be such that they can cancel it, they will do so with minimal costs.DBalsofeltthatthe
Trident alternave review had wrongly assumed that it would take 24 years to build a
warhead from scratch, but he felt it could be done more swily. Not convinced the UK
needs new boats, adding a further 10 years to their lifeme should not be a problem
and they will last ll 2032 if required. Acknowledged that the Russians are invesng
heavily.

50

Leadingvoicesagainst
CNDs Kate Hudson and Lord (Nick) Harvey who led the Trident alternative
reviewsetouttheirstalls
This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by CND General Secretary
KateHudsonandSirNickHarvey,formerLibDemMPforNorthDevonandArmedForces
Minister (201012), during which time he was the LDs lead in the coalitions Trident
alternativereview.ChairedbythechairofthePLPbackbenchcommitteeJohnWoodcock
MP, this is the fifth in a series of briefings on the Successor programme ahead of the
maingate vote. Past sessions haveexaminedRussianforeignpolicyandLaboursrecord
on nonproliferation. Future ones will include the industrial aspects and another with
pollingexperts.
OverviewofcommentsbyKateHudson
KH believes there has been an increase in public opposion of Trident. She
believes there are two reasons for the shi; rstly austerity cuts have made
people more aware of the cost of the deterrent and also its opportunity cost.
Secondly, she cited the Naonal Security Strategy which listed a stateonstate
nuclearaackasaTier2threat,withclimatechangeandcyberetc.listedasTier
1threats.
KH cited 100bn for the lifeme cost of Trident, which shenowthinksisonthe
conservave side, with the actual costs closer to 167183bn; with a further
alternave being oered by Chair of the Foreign Aairs Commiee (Crispin
Blunt)tobe142bn.
KH says CND supporters would like money spent on the NHS (CNDs bestselling
tshirt)
In terms of the arguments jobs and status in favour of the deterrent, KH
believes that that defence diversicaon will divert skilled defence jobs into
other alternaves. As to the status argument, she believes that despite strong
establishmentsupport,itisnotanadequatejuscaon.
CND is in favour of mullateral disarmament too and KH felt that the UK
GovernmentshouldhaveaendedtherecentUNnucleardisarmamenttalks.
SirNickHarvey
When NH took over on the shadow defence brief in 2006, the LDs faced a
similar dilemma to Labour, with substanal poron of the party commied to
unilateral disarmament, a group in favour CASD, and a further in the middle,
holding no strong view. Acoherentpolicywasrequired,aroundwhichtheparty
could coalesce. Didnt think the LDs could embrace unilateralism, but felt it
might be possible to not renew the deterrent on same scale. NH had an
insncve belief in a smaller deterrent but without coming to the view of
geng rid of it altogether. On this basis, they fought the 2010 elecon, with
Menzies Campbell working out six possible alternaves, which they would
reviewingovernment.

51

NH termed the alternave review a Fausan pact that postponed a decision

on the deterrent during the last parliament but allowed preparatory work to
connue. The review wassponsoredbytheCabinetOce(notMOD)andasked
a) what it was we were trying to deter b) what alternave systems could deter
and c) shouldtherebenobeersystems,iftherewerealternaveposturesthat
could oer a way of scaling down. NH believes this was the rst me the
deterrenthadbeenexaminedinaholiscmanner.
If one accepts that the way to deter a demi or semidemocrac Russia is
dierent from deterring the USSR, it is clear that it is me to consider other
alternaves, including for instance single class ofsubmarineoranuclearpped
missile instead of a full ICBM. NHsaidtheyhadbeenledtobelievetherewould
be no technical problem, but then Danny Alexander (who hadnoexperienceof
defence maers) took over NHs role in the review. A dra report said it was
both technically feasible and cost eecve but wouldhitasnagasthewarhead
would take so long to develop that the exisng submarines would be out of
service before it was ready. To then maintain CASD, the only way to get from
the exisng system to a new one (which may have used Astute with a cruise
missile) was to commission the rst two of four submarines andconnuework
on an alternave, but this would be prohibively costly. NH does not believe it
would have taken the 24yearsclaimedtodevelopawarheadasothercountries
have achieved this in a much shorter meframe. However as he wasnt in
government, he couldnt make this argument. The published review declared
there was no alternave realisc system and debate within the LD switched to
alternaveposture,whichNHbelievesthereremainsgroundsforferledebate.
NH thinks that the new submarines do not need to be deployed and armed
24/7, as therealityistherestofthemilitaryisorganisedonaconngencybasis,
moving to a war foong only when required. In his view,onlyTyphoonmustbe
ready to go 24/7 and he thinks it is feasible to maintain a skilled workforce
capable of deploying the deterrent, but it need not be CASD. Aer all, part of
the USs Tomahawk cruisebaseddeterrentwereorganisedinthismannerfor20
years ll 2010. NH suggests this would provide cost savings and contribute to
mullateral disarmament, whilst retaining a capability that can be deployed at
shortnoce,especiallyasanyaackwillnotbeoutoftheblue.

Q&A

[Directed at NH] How long would it take to make the subsdeployableagain?Whatis

yourviewonthefinalnumberofsubmarinesrequired?
Deployment would take weeks, dependingonthewhereaboutsofnearestsubmarine.If
in Faslane, then 24 hours, if out on exercise or undergoing maintenance, then 67
weeks. The numberofsubmarineswoulddependonhowlongtheUKchosetosustaina
future patrol.NearCASD,withoutamidliferefuelcouldrequirethreesubmarines.With
two, CASD could be sustained for 1824 monthsbutnotindenitely.Inhisview,thereis
adecentargumentforthree,butnotfour.

52

Based on a significant sample, ComRes foundthat54%ofthepublicwereinfavourof

renewingthedeterrent.HowcanCNDclaimotherwise?
KH said that there has been a trend of decreasing support since therstparliamentary
votenearlyadecadeagoandthatasatrend,thepublicarebecomingmoreanTrident,
depending how the queson is asked. KH sent the following aer the debate on the
polling:hp://cnduk.org/campaigns/nototrident/opinionpolls
To date, defence diversification has not been donesuccessfully.Inaddition,wouldnt
there be a need for robust timelines attached to the outcome of such ananalysisif
diversificationcannotbeimplementedintime,itisuseless.
KH said that US and German diversicaon/realignment programmes had been
successful.
Even if it were to give up the deterrent, the UK,asamemberofNATOwouldhaveto
permitnuclearweaponsonitssoil.IsthepositionofCNDtoleaveNATO?
[KH did not answer this but CND does in fact oppose UK membership of NATO see
here]
What would CND prioritise spending itshouldthedeterrentbedropped,especiallyas
its cost whatever one believes it to be is over a 3040 year period and CNDs
positionwouldappeartospendthemoneyoverandagain.
KH repeated that there exists an opportunity cost for spending onTrident.Shesaidshe
appreciated that some unions were in support of renewal but others, including Unison
andPCSandwerenot.
HowcanCNDbebothunilateralistandmultilateralist?
KH replied that CNDhadbothunilateralandmullateralrootsinitsfounding;shethinks
it is important to be bothandCNDcampaignsbothforthescrappingofBritainsnuclear
weaponsandglobalabolion.
Do you believe theUKsdisarmament(particularlyunderthelastLabourgovernment)
the single largest act of disarmament proportionally speaking has persuaded any
countriesnottotakeupnuclearweaponsorreducetheirstockpile?
[KH did not answer this owing to me constraints].NHsaidtheUKhascutitswarheads
as far as it can go, if it wishes to retain a deterrent. He thinksthatadopnganon24/7
mayhaveabenigneect.

53

Industriallandscape
ThecontributionofthenucleardeterrenttotheUKseconomicandskillsbase.

This isanoverviewofabriefingforLabourparliamentariansbySteveCarlier,Operations
Director for Submarines at RollsRoyceandapprovedbyBAE.Chairedbythechairofthe
PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP,thisistheseventhinaseriesofbriefings
on the Successor programmeaheadofthemaingatevote.Pastsessionshaveexamined
Russian foreign policy and Labours record onnonproliferation.Futureoneswillinclude
asessiononthepollsandanotherwithworkforceandtradeunionrepresentatives.
OverviewofBAE

BAE at Barrow designs, builds, integrates (components from supply chain into
design), manufactures, tests and commissions the submarines. Submarinesare
incrediblycomplextobuildandtheskillsrequiredrangefromnuclearweldingto
the installaon of the combat system of a warship. Company Engineers who
work on submarines, and move onto other careers, also contribute to other
industries.
BAE have delivered three of the seven Astute class SSNs, most recently HMS
Arul, just before Christmas. The reactor assembly for Boat 4 is largely
complete,allofBoat5isintheconstruconhall,readyforintegraonandBoats
6and7areinfabricaon,soordershavebeenplacedinthesupplychain.
Successor programme is welladvanced too, with design having commenced in
April 2011. It is now on schedule to deliver the mature designrequiredforthe
start of manufacture. BAE have learned from the design of Astute andalsohad
helpfromtheUS.1700peopleareworkingonSuccessoratBAE.
Barrows workforce stands at 7,300 and has risen by 1200 in last year to meet
the ramp up in the Successor programme. The skills required canbebroughtin
from the open market, but BAE also createsitsownskilledworkforce,including
500 apprences and 60 graduate trainees (who come from the open market,
notjustgraduateschemes).OnceemployeescometoBarrow,theytendtostay.
A recent Oxford Economics report highlighted the economic contribuon of
BAE, where for every 100 jobs on site in Barrow, a further 40 are supported in
the wider community, which means more than 10,000 jobs are supported by
submarine construcon in Barrow and South Cumbria alone. Indeed, BAE are
the largest employers in Barrow and also have a relaonship with Furness
Academywhohelpmanagetheirapprenceshipscheme.
85% of BAEs er 2 supply chain is UK based, which is very high in any
programme.Forsecurityreasons,itdoesmostofitssourcingintheUK.
Without even considering RollsRoyce, BAEs submarine supply chain stands at
650 companies in 300 constuencies across the UK, from Aberconwy to York
Outer, from Argyll and Bute to South WestDevonandthisnumberonlyexpects
toincrease.

54

OverviewofcommentsbySteveCarlier(SC)

Nuclear energy is as complex as it gets, and it is even more so in a submarine,

within its hazardous environment. Safety is paramount. Nuclear propulsion
plants enable the submarine to remain undetected and unsupported,
independent of the outside world and have a greater power density compared
to a mini civil nuclear reactor. The nuclear reactor is the principal source of
power for the enre submarine, all systems from the electrical to combat rely
on it.RollsRoycehavebeenassociatedwiththe nuclearpropulsionprogramme
from its outset and it has through life responsibility, which means it designs,
manufactures and provides support 24/7 all year round. It is a longterm
business for the company, with the submarine lifecycle being around70 years
fromconcepttoend.
30 naval reactor plants have been designed and manufactured since 1959. The
third generaon Pressurised Water Reactor(PWR3)whichwillpowerSuccessor,
isasignicantredesign,withRRhavingstartedworkonitsconceptin2008.
3000 are employed on the programme, mainly in Derby but also in Faslane,
Devonport, BristolandBarrow.50apprenceshavejoinedtheprogramme,with
more to come. Three manufacturing sites now exist across Derby, supplying
mechanicalandotheritems. Thestateoftheartprocesshasbeenreengineered
to support Successor. RR also has 600 manufacturing sta and a programmeof
outreach with the Advanced Manufacturing research Centre, to make sure it
getsthebestmanufacturingtechnologyin.Addionally,theyhavenewlystarted
(jointly withtheRoyalNavy),sponsoringnuclearengineeringfor1418yearolds
atDerbyManufacturingUniversityTechnicalCollege.
RR hasworkedverydierentlyincreangthePWR3comparedtothePWR2and
also learned lessons from Astute. Its design is more mature, there is more
tesng and computer analysis to validate designandchanges. Throughlifecost
willalsobelowerdueto30%fewerpartsand30%lessmaintenance.
95% of the 300 company strong supply chain is in the UK, with RR spending
220m each year with them. Its requirements are dicult, with exacng
demands, nuclear quality standard requirements and only small volumes
required. RR is trying to transform its supply chain for PWR3, to ensure it is
sustainable.

55

Q&A
WhatchallengesareBAEfacingontimescaleandcominginonbudget?
Submarines are fundamentally complex, with challenges ranging from the handling of
700 tons of rocket fuel, managing the submarine throughthedesignenvironment,with
the safety regulator and ensuring it comes together in the tesng phase is a challenge.
In addion to this, the customer expects costs to be under control. Having been
through Astute, BAE learned manylessonswhichithasbroughttobearintheSuccessor
programme.Itisinvesngheavilyinthesite,creatednewfaciliesandbroughtinskilled
peoplefromarangeofbackgrounds.
Based onanyconversationswiththeMODandfromyourunderstandingofsubmarine
building,isitpossibletostretchoutthelifeoftheVanguardseries?
MOD is beer placed to answer the queson but it is noted that there are technical
issues around how to prolongasubmarineslife;threecricalfactorstoconsiderarethe
integrityofthepressurehull,thelifeofareactorcoreandhowtojusfytotheregulator
anextensioninareactorslifeme.
Whathavethechallengesbeeninthepast?
Past experience has shown a big problem had been the 810 year gap between the
Vanguard andAstuteclass. WhatBAElearnedthenwastostartdesigning,havingnotso
in a decade was a huge challenge and though it is enrely possible to get people
qualied, they will sll lack the 510 years experience that makes them even beer at
doing their job. The MOD and industry had been opmisc about what could be
achieved but the challenge to his mind, was less about stretching than a gap. Industry
nds it helpful if Government makes up its mind and scks to it, should it then decide
changes are required, clarity and a management arrangement that holds with the
customer has to be put in place. Addionally, the demand for nuclear experience
should and when HinkleyPointcommences,willplaceaddionalpressureonthesupply
ofsuchskilledworkers.
Doescostincreasewithuncertainty?
For many of its suppliers, BAE is an infrequentandrelavelysmallcustomerintermsof
their turnovers. In the instance where BAE is a major customer, it has leverage over
costs, otherwise it is dicult.Sustainingskillsinthemidstofagapisacricalchallenge,
hencetheimportanceplacedonhavingaregulardrumbeatofsubmarineacvity.
Is the Government suggested cost of the deterrent (31bn plus 10bn contingency)
realistic?Doyouhaveaviewontheproposedsubmarinedeliveryauthority?
BAE does not have visibility on the totality of cost, and that both this andquesonson
the delivery authority were quesons for MOD. The Government had made clear,
however, that they believed that there were lessons to be learned from other major
naonal programmes, such as the Olympics, and that certain models work beer in
managinglargeprogrammes.

56

Doyougooverseasfortheskillsyouneed?Woulddefencediversificationwork?
SC (RR) respondedtosaythatonsecuritygrounds,workershavetobeUKnaonals.The
work done at Barrow was unique, with highly specialised skills which could not be
transferredtoanenrelydierentroleovernight.
[directed at SC (RR)] An FT article has highlighted that the reactor core is potentially
behind schedule. How confident are RR about its ability to deliver their part of the
programmeontimeandtobudget?
SCsaidtheSuccessorprogrammeisforecasttobeonmeandthatitisnotasecretthat
with the Astute class, there were problems sourcing components. As a result, RR
brought its supply chain in house andrecreatedit;sincethenthesupplychainhasbeen
consolidated and is housed in a new factory. RR also learned from Astute to achieve
engineeringmaturitybeforebuild.
Message from MOD to BAE is to be realisc and the company has not been under
pressuretosuppresscostesmates.

57

Jobs,SkillsandtheSupplyChainsTradeUnionsrepresentativesspeakup

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by Ian Waddell National

OfficerforUniteandCSEU(ConfederationofShipbuildingandEngineeringUnions);Dave
Hulse National Officer, GMB and Azza Samms Unite Executive Council member and
works at BAE in Barrow, Aerospace & Shipbuilding whowerealsoaccompaniedbyCath
Speight, Political Officer for the GMB as well as union reps from BAE in Barrow and
RollsRoyce in Derby. Chaired by the chair of the PLP backbench committee John
Woodcock MP, this is the tenth inaseriesofbriefingsonthenucleardeterrentaheadof
the maingate vote. Past sessions have included an examination on Russian foreign
policy,Laboursrecordonnonproliferationanddefenceindustrialpolicy.
IanWaddell(IW)

Need to be clear around the terminology of this debate,itisabouttherenewal

oftheSuccessorprogramme,nottheTridentmissile.
Successor has a huge impact on people and their jobs in places like Barrow,
Derby, Plymouth Devonport and Faslane, where one can see the skills brought
to bear on manufacturing. All these communies, apart from Derby are
isolated.
Uniquely, over 85% of the supply chain for the submarineindustryisUKbased,
in sharp contrast to that for helicoptersandmarimepatrolvessels(MPV).This
is what can be termed the sovereign capability to manufacture, design and
developnuclearpoweredsubmarines.
Thousands of apprences will be onsite by end of year, with the intenon of a
long career in the industry, whilst investment and building works for Successor
havecommencedbothinBarrowandatDerbyworkingonthePWR3.
Those opposed to the concept of deterrence must realise that should it end,
there will be an immediate crisis, with 1,500 out of work overnight in Barrow,
23000 at Derby and tens of thousands in the supply chain. Defence
diversicaon cant save these jobs, which are in economically and
geographically isolated communies, historically chosen in the main for their
proximitytothesea.
As a trade unionist, the ght is oen about jobs andcommunies.Thisme,it
is also about an island naon maintaining its sovereign capability to build
submarines.
At stake are real jobs and people who vote in elecon, such a shi will have a
longlasngimpactontheabilitytoformafutureLabourgovernment.

58

GMBDaveHulse(DH)

DH was a shipyard welder in 1993 in Liverpool when the yard. There was talk
then about diversicaon but of the 1,500 made redundant, very few gained
good employment in Merseyside. With the likes of Barrows, DH saysonemight
as well put a closed sign on it. Government money to upskill people who are
alreadyhighlyskilledisuselesswhentherearenojobsintheseareas.
Cant sit idly by as communies destroyed withthelossof7,000jobsand700
apprenceshipsinBarrow.
DH understands the arguments against the deterrent, but believes it is crical
thatfoursubmarinesarebuilt.

UniteAzzaSamms(AS)
Surprised how many MPs dont know dierence between Trident and
submarines.
If Successor is cancelled, the next boat the UK requires will be a problem, as
previously witnessed by the 90 per cent loss of skills in Barrow which
subsequentlyresultedinproblemswhenarampupwasrequiredforAstute.

Q&A
Whataretheunionsdoingaspartoftheircampaign?
IW said that Unite has sent in a submission to the Shadow defence review, which
includes an examinaon of defence diversicaon in the US and Sweden where there
were base realignment closure acts. Diversicaon was successful if it was an aircra
base closure, with civil servants to be redeployed. No private company was able to
diversify or redeploy in the same manner just speak to the steel industry to
understand how hard this can be. The unions havemetwithCAAT,CNDandacademics
whoarecommiedunilateralists,butthesearenotmindsthatcanbechanged.
MPs made various points about the scale and highlyskilled nature of jobs in the
defence industry and the supply chain, noting thatinplacesinPlymouth,theaverage
salary could fall from 20k to 1516k, with a high social cost to be paid. Concerns
were also voiced around the need to more boldly discuss defence policy at CLP
meetings,asitshouldnotbearightwingmattergiventhejobsinvolved.
DH reiterated the need for a grownup debate that focussed on the people whowould
be aected by the decisions. IW noted the need for a defence industrial policy review
which was allied to a broader manufacturing strategy that sought to buy more
Brishmadeequipment.

59

WhatdounionmembersthinkofLabourrightnow?
Aendingunionrepresentavessaidthattheirmembersareleavingthepartyandwont
vote Labour unl something changes. One said that he would struggle himself to vote
Labour again. In Merseyside, a GMB representave saidheneverthoughthewouldsee
the day that its people move away from Labour as they are now doing. PE added that
Labours 2015 manifesto whichwasinfavourofSuccessorbutwouldreviewareducon
in thenumberofboatshadaectedsupportfortheparty.Incontrast,theConservaves
rmlysetouttheirsupportforfourboats.
IW quesoned why Labour was having this debate now, when it isnt in power andwill
be outvoted inaCommonsvote,asLenMcCluskeyhasalreadysaid.Aenonshouldbe
focussed on the lack of UK content on Boeing P8s and delays in the Type 26 instead of
thisacademicdebate.
Cath Speight added that in her role as the new coconvenor of the internaonal policy
review, jobs will be the focus of the next meeng, with the Shadow defence secretary
andcompaniesinvitedtoaend.

60

HMGovernmentsview
Defence procurement Minister Philip Dunne MP, Vice Admiral Lister and Ian Forber
fromtheMODspeakup.

This is an overview of a briefing for Labour parliamentarians by Philip Dunne MP,

Minister of State for Defence Procurement; Vice Admiral Simon Lister, Chief ofMateriel
Fleet in Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) and Ian Forber, Director Strategic
Programmes at the MOD who is responsible for thenuclearenterprisedelivery.Chaired
by the chair of the PLP backbench committee John Woodcock MP, this is the ninth in a
series of briefings on the Successor programme ahead of the maingate vote. Past
sessions have examined Russian foreignpolicy,Laboursrecordonnonproliferationand
the industrial aspect of Trident. Future oneswillincludeasessionexaminingpollingand
anotherwithworkforceandtradeunionrepresentatives.
OverviewofcommentsbyPhilipDunne(PD)MP

No higher priority for therestof2016thantoseethroughtheSuccessorvotein

parliament and it would be in the best interest of the UK to achievethiswitha
crossparty consensus which has existed in theConservaveandLabourpares
sincethestrategicdeterrentwasestablished50yearsago.
The Tory manifesto commied the government to replacing the Vanguardclass
submarines. PD says the vote on the principle of CASD and plans for the
SuccessorprogrammewilltakeplacethisyearlikelyaertheEUreferendum.
2006 SDSR esmate of replacement submarines was 1114bn, at 2006 prices;
in 2011 in the annual update to parliament, the government inated the top
range, adjusted it by inaon and placed costs at 25bn. In 2015, with work
done through supply chain, the 31bn is an update of the 25bn gure. Taking
into account learning from major construcon programmes that the UK has
engaged with recently, including Olympics and Crossrail, the MOD will set a
10bn.conngencyfortheprogrammewhichtheyhopetheywillnotconsume.
With the replacement programme lasng decades, it should be as nely
managed as possible and a means of changing way the way MOD delivers and
contracts major programmes, changing the behaviour of prime contractors,
aligning them with taxpayer interests and increasing thelevelofrisksharing,as
seenintheAircraCarrierAlliancework.
This is one of largest procurement projects for the government, the economic
impact and skills involved are at top end of engineering endeavours, with
spilloversintothemilitary,civilandnuclearbusinesses.
PD is keen to build a naonal consensus and will share with MPs what the
replacementprogrammemeansfortheirconstuency.

61

OverviewofcommentsbyIanForber(IF)

IF is tasked with creang a long term aordable plan; he holds the budget,
denes requirements and works with Admiral Lister on opons, engaging with
industry and spending the budget. IF previously led the Trident alternave
reviewatCabinetOce.
The Successor programme represents a step change from the delivery of the
Astute class submarines. Aside from eciencies that were set out in the SDSR,
the decision was also made to raonalise and boost programme delivery by
establishing a DG Nuclear and supported organisaon within MOD, bringing
together all sta that work on nuclear issues and doubling the number of
people from 6570 to 140 when fully staed. Anopenadversementforanew
DG Nuclear closed recently, IF hopes to hold interviews before the summer
recess. His roleistosetupandpopulateseniorroleswithinDGNuclearandnd
people who can provide science support and support to the capability teams,
notjustforthedeterrentbutallelementsofit.
Looking at major programmes like Crossrail and Olympics, the common
characterisc of success is a delivery organisaon with a pure focus on what
they have to do. Alongside this is a need tohaveanewapproachwithindustry,
whichDE&Sareworkingon.
The revised cost is based on several factors including a revised schedule, what
industrycando,whatthedesignislikeandhowthebuildwilltakeplace.
IF understands the interest of parliament which is why anannualreportseng
outprogressonSuccessorwillbepublished,withthelatestversionoutshortly.

OverviewofcommentsbyAdmiralSimonLister(SL)

SL works in support of IF and reports to Tony Douglas (CEO of DE&S). He

procures ships, submarines and the weapons systems. Part of his responsibility
is to deliver the Successor programme, with the support of 1,000 civil servants
andmilitarypersonnel.
Programme is now nearing the end ofitsassessmentphaseandtherearethree
main things of focus, rstly the design of the submarine so when a decision is
made, they are ready to start work; secondly, the procurement of long lead
items (for context oak for HMS Victory was purchased15yearsbeforebuilding)
and nally preparing industry and MOD to move from theproduconofAstute
(a 7 tonne submarine) to 17 tonne submarine, with signicantly dierent
systems for ballisc missiles. SL started by taking a long hard look at design
maturity from the go, a key lesson from Astute programme. By September this
year, design maturity will stand at approximately 68% for Successor whereas
Astutesdesignmaturitywasat25%whenitstarted.
SL said where it is right to do so, they have learned lessons from the
management of design maturity and technology from the US nuclear
programme. The Successor design is at the stage where they will be ready to
constructrstelementifthedecisiontodosoismade.

62

SL noted that the capability ofMODandindustryisanotherstrandheislooking

at; he believes that in addion to a newwayofworking,industrycapabilityhas
to change for the actual build. Here, there has been a step change in working
methods and tool sets in factories and also the ship yard, as well as in
arrangements between MOD and its suppliers. Manufacturing capability is
improving in Barrow but is possibly two years away the standards of what is
required, but in sum, the programme is where they expected it to be in the
mediumterm.

Q&A
Is it possible for more British steel to go into the Trident replacement
programme?
Thegovernmentsnewpolicy:

hps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/aachment_data/l
e/473545/PPN_1615_Procuring_steel_in_major_projects.pdf

Is that prime contractors should signal future demand and engage early with a
view to considering if they can use UK steel where possible and encourage UK
steel manufacturers tobidforcontracts.Forfutureplaormswehaveaskedour
Prime Contractors to give steel manufacturers opportunies to bid where they
areabletomeetqualityandmerequirements.

What is being done to ensure that thecurrentVanguardclasssubmarinesare

safetorunontill2032?
The MOD will do what is necessary to ensuretheboatsaresafe.Therewillbea
managed transion and the ambion is to ensure two boat availabilitythrough
the transion period. Planningforretsisalreadywelladvanced.Thehullshave
been monitored to ensure their longevity and MOD has good data on whichto
base its judgements; the real constraints could beinthingslikewiringbutMOD
islookingatthis.

What would you say to MPs inclinedtosupportTridentrenewalbutthinkthe

current vote is more in the party political rather than national interest? By
delayingthevotethisyear,haventwelosttimeontheprogramme?
Polically, the decision has to be taken this year, MOD have progressed the
design and procurement of long lead items and in September, maturity will
stand at 68%. If a decision is taken beyond this year, it may impact the on
programme and the ability todeliverbeforetheexisngboatsgooutofservice.
As this is project will last over two decades and is of an enormous scale, it is
right to create specic milestones for contractors to achieve within each short
period. A tranche system will allow beercontrol,therstoneisfor18months
andechoestheapproachofmanyothermajorinfrastructureprojects.

63

Isthereleaseofinvestmenttiedtoavoteinparliament?
Pledges have been made to hold a vote and it wouldbeappropriateforthisto
happen before the investment decision is formally taken, otherwise one might
say that parliaments will is being ignored. The government wont however go
backtoparliamentateachensuingphaseoftheprogramme.

Whyhaventweusedanolddesignfrom1990s?
The Trident launch system remains the same and the UK receives huge
economic benet from the Common Missile Compartment with the US and
these designs are being updated. Secondly, safety standards and operaonal
requirements have moved on since the 1990s, requiring a new design to meet
needsnow.

What is the MOD doing to mitigate against possible drone technology that
mightthreatenthedeterrent?
MOD is closely examining the emerging technologies that may threaten the
eecveness of the deterrent (and cant say more due to reasons of
classicaon).

Whathappensiftechnologydemandschangesduringthebuildstage?
This is a 17 year long build cycle, so technology will move on, with the rate of
change greatest in the eld of electronics. As a result, the combat system is
designed to be updated on a roune basis. On the other hand, the hull is an
area of stability. Any changes will have to be jused due to their cost
implicaons.

Whatareyoudoingtomitigateanyshortageinskills?
As a bespoke trading enty, DE&S has exibility on pay. Industry itself has a
healthy apprence programme and public commitment to the programme
should aid recruitment. There is also a cross Whitehall ministerial taskforce on
nuclear skills for civil and defence, to combat the problems of an aging
workforce; technical colleges are aiding recruitment and there are also nuclear
degreeapprenceships,soweshouldseeimprovementsinme.

IsthereaFOREXrisk?
FOREX risk is part and parcel of how MOD establishes budgets in any instance.
Thisiskeptunderclosereviewbutitwontdrivetheprogramme.

Howconfidentareyouoncosts?
31bn plus 10bn is our best taut esmate, MOD is at pains to learn best
pracces,hencethenewdeliveryauthorityandincenvisingofindustry.MODis
clearabouttherisksitfacesrightnow.

64

Is the SSRO (Single Source Regulations Office) keeping tabs on the MODs
workonthisprogramme?
The renewal programme will be a qualifyingdefencecontracts,sotheSSROwill
have the ability to review the charging structures and prot rate. The SSROs
role is to check that contractors submit correct costs and also decide on a
baseline prot rate, it is not an allembracing regulatory oversight body that
looks at the terms ofcontracts.Insteadofpouringoverinvoicesaertwoyears,
the SSRO looks at them every quarter. Ulmately it is up to HM Treasury to
determine the year to year budget. The MODs nancial management has
improved, as witnessedbythelanguageusedbytheNAOinexaminingitsmajor
programmes. MOD is not however complacent and connues to nd ways to
hold contractors to account and change behaviours. For instance, risk sharing
arrangements can incenvisethecontractoronscheduleandcosttothebenet
oftheprogramme.

65