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Table of Contents
The Art of War by Sun Tzu
Laying Plans
Waging War
Attack by Stratagem
Tactical Dispositions
Energy
Maneuvering
Variation in Tactics
Terrain
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The Art of War by General Carl Von Clausewitz
Introduction
Notice
What Is War?
Of Danger in War
Information in War
Friction in War
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On the Theory of War
Methodicism
Criticism
On Examples
Strategy
Elements of Strategy
Moral Forces
Boldness
Perseverance
Superiority of Numbers
The Surprise
Stratagem
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Assembly of Forces in Time
Strategic Reserve
Economy of Forces
Geometrical Element
Introductory
The Battle
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Effects of Victory
Night Fighting
First Book
Second Book
Third Book
Fourth Book
Fifth Book
Sixth Book
Seventh Book
Translator’s Preface
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Definitions of the Branches of the Art of War
Military Policy
Conclusion
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The Art of War
By Sun Tzu
Laying Plans
Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the
State.
These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The
Commander; (5) Method and discipline. [It appears from
what follows that Sun Tzu means by “Moral Law” a principle
of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect.
One might be tempted to render it by “morale,” were it not
considered as an attribute of the ruler.]
12
nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute
when the crisis is at hand.” ]
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and
seasons. [The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary
mystery of two words here. Meng Shih refers to “the hard and
the soft, waxing and waning” of Heaven. Wang Hsi, however,
may be right in saying that what is meant is “the general
economy of Heaven,” including the five elements, the four
seasons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.]
13
These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who
knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will
fail.
(c) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and
Earth?
14
(f) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: “Without constant
practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when
mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general
will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand.”]
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will
conquer: —let such a one be retained in command! The
general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will
suffer defeat: —let such a one be dismissed! [The form of this
paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu’s treatise was composed
expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho Lu, king of the Wu
State.]
15
Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of
Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations
were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might
suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be
unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke
listened quietly and then said: “Who will attack the fir st
tomorrow — I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord
Uxbridge. “Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not
given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will
depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what
mine are?”]
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush
him. [All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, “When he is
in disorder, crush him.” It is more natural to suppose that Sun
Tzu is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.]
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If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him.
Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. [Wang Tzu,
quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his
adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness
and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.]
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Waging War
Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the
field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a
hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough
to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at
the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such
as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will
reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is
the cost of raising an army of 100 ,000 men. [The “swift
chariots” were lightly built and, according to Chang Yu, used
for the attack; the “heavy chariots” were heavier, and
designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is true, says
that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. I t is
interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese
warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the
war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the
nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of
foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are
informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75
footmen, and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the
whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions,
each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.] [2.78
modern li go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly
since Sun Tzu’s time.]
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Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State
will not be equal to the strain.
19
measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibals’s
isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was
more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a strange
country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics
would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal
it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a negative
presumption in their favor.]
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are
his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. [Once war is
declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for
reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for fresh
supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This
may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all
great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte,
the value of time — that is, being a little ahead of your
opponent —has counted for more than either numerical
superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to
commissariat.]
20
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the
enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
[The Chinese word translated here as “war material” literally
means “things to be used”, and is meant in the widest sense. It
includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from
provisions.]
21
With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the
homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of
their income will be dissipated; [Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree
that the people are not mulcted not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of
their income. But this is hardly to be extracted from our text.
Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: “The people being regarded
as the essential part of the State, and food as the people’s
heaven, is it not right that those in authority should value and
be careful of both?”] while government expenses for broken
chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows
and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles,
drought-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths
of its total revenue.
22
the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The
captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
Attack by Stratagem
Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all
is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and
destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an
army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regimen t, a
detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. [The
equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa,
consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung,
the equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men, the
equivalent to a detachment consists from any number between
100 and 500, and the equivalent of a company contains from
5 to 100 men. For the last two, however, Chang Yu gives the
exact figures of 100 and 5 respectively.]
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huge French army at Sedan, was won practically without
bloodshed.]
24
were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to
suggest a sort of Roman Testudo, ready made. Tu Mu says
they were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this
is denied by Ch`en Hao. See supra II. 14. The name is also
applied to turrets on city walls. Of the “movable shelters” we
get a fairly clear description from several commentators.
They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels,
propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used
in sieges to convey parties of me n to and from the walls, for
the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu
Mu adds that they are now called “wooden donkeys.”] and the
piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three
months more. [These were great mounds or ramparts of earth
heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to
discover the weak points in the defense, and also to destroy
the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.]
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overthrows the Government, but does no harm to individuals.
The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an
end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed “Father and mother of
the people.”]
26
part may be used in the regular way, and the other for some
special diversion.’ Tu Mu does not understand that dividing
one’s army is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is
the regular, strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling
this a mistake.”]
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a) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being
ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling
the army. [Li Ch`uan adds the comment: “It is like tying
together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to
gallop.” One would naturally think of “the ruler” in this
passage as being at home, and trying to direct the movements
of his army from a distance. But the commentators understand
just the reverse, and quote the saying of T`ai Kung: “A
kingdom should not be governed from without, and army
should not be directed from within.” Of course it is true that,
during an engagement, or when in close touch with the
enemy, the general should not be in the thick of his own
troops, but a little distance apart. Otherwise, he will be liable
to misjudge the position as a whole, and give wrong orders.]
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principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a
position of authority.” Tu Mu quotes: “The skillful employer
of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the
covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights
in establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his
courage in action, the covetous man is quick at seizing
advantages, and the stupid man has no fear of death.”]
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
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d) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the
enemy unprepared.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself,
you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will
also suffer a defeat. [Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien,
prince of Ch`in, who in 383 a.d. marched with a vast army
against the Chin Emperor. When warned not to despise an
enemy who could command the services of such men as
Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully replied: “I have the
population of eight provinces at my back, infantry and
horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam
up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips
into the stream. What danger have I to fear?” Neverthe less,
his forces were soon after disastrously routed at the Fei River,
and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]
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would be hard to find a better epitome of the root-principle of
war.]
Tactical Dispositions
Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves
beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an
opportunity of defeating the enemy.
31
commentators are all against me. The meaning they give, “He
who cannot conquer takes the defensive,” is plausible
enough.]
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Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer
and the whole Empire says, “Well done!” [True excellence
being, as Tu Mu says: “To plan secretly, to move
surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and balk his
schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding
a drop of blood.” Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things
that “the world’s coarse thumb And finger fail to plumb.”]
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only
wins, but excels in winning with ease. [The last half is
literally “one who, conquering, excels in easy conquering.”
Mei Yao-ch`en says: “He who only sees the obvious, wins his
battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of
things, wins with ease.”]
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hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he
receives no credit for courage.”]
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The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly
adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to
control success.
35
24 oz.); a routed army is a shu weighed against an I.” The
point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined
force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized by
defeat.” Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the I
to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi’s statement
that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of the T`ang
dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]
Energy
Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question
of dividing up their numbers. [That is, cutting up the army
into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate officers in
command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous
reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him: “How
large an army do you think I could lead?” “Not more than
100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor.
“Oh!” he answered, “the more the better.”]
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the
enemy’s attack and remain unshaken — this is effected by
maneuvers direct and indirect. [We now come to one of the
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most interesting parts of Sun Tzu’s treatise, the discussion of
the Cheng and the Ch`i.” As it is by no means easy to grasp
the full significance of these two terms, or to render them
consistently by good English equivalents; it may be as well to
tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks on the subject
before proceeding further. Li Ch`uan: “Facing the enemy is
Cheng, making lateral diversion is Ch`i. Chia Lin: “In
presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in
normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal
maneuvers must be employed.” Mei Yao-ch`en: “Ch`i is
active, Cheng is passive; passivity means waiting for an
opportunity, activity beings the victory itself.” Ho Shih: “We
must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as
one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus Cheng may
also be Ch`i, and Ch`i may also be Cheng.”]
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mutually interchangeable and run into each other like the two
sides of a circle ]
38
all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a
clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has
already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably
interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really
be considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in
figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great
leader.]
There are not more than five musical notes, yet the
combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than
can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow,
red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more
hues than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt,
sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors
than can ever be tasted.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack — the
direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise
to an endless series of maneuvers.
39
Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the context it
is used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu defines
this word as “the measurement or estimation of distance.” But
this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative simile.
Applying this definition to the falcon, it seems to me to
denote that instinct of self restraint which keeps the bird from
swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with
the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. Th e
analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of
being able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which
it will be most effective. When the “Victory” went into action
at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for
several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before
replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was
within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear
worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.]
40
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming
disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and
chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be
proof against defeat. [Mei Yao-ch`en says: “The subdivisions
of the army having been previously fixed, and the various
signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing
and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle,
may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is
possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your
dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces
quite out of the question.”]
41
afraid.”] masking strength with weakness is to be effected by
tactical dispositions. [Chang Yu relates the following
anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: “Wishing to
crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their
condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully
concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and
only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen.
The result was that spies one and all recommended the
Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them,
saying: “When two countries go to war, they are naturally
inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet
our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is
surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would be
unwise for us to attack.” The Emperor, however, disregarding
this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at
Po-teng.”]
42
[Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei
territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first
night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000.
P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: “I knew
these men of Ch`I were cowards: their numbers have already
fallen away by more than half.” In his retreat, Sun Pin came
to a narrow defile, with he calculated that his pursuers would
reach after dark.]
43
each men according to his capabilities. He does not demand
perfection from the untalented.”]
Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize
combined energy.
44
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to
approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can
make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. [In the first
case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will
strike at some important point which the enemy will have to
defend.]
You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
positions that cannot be attacked. [i.e., where there are none
of the weak points mentioned above. There is rather a nice
point involved in the interpretation of this later clause. Tu
45
Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch`en assume the meaning to
be: “In order to make your defense quite safe, you must
defend even those places that are not likely to be attacked;”
and Tu Mu adds: “How much more, then, those that will be
attacked.” Taken thus, however, the clause balances less well
with the preceding—always a consideration I n the highly
antithetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yu,
therefore, seems to come nearer the mark in saying: “He who
is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of
heaven, making it impossible for the enemy to guard against
him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are precisely
those that the enemy cannot defend . . . He who is skilled in
defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making
it impossible for the enemy to estimate h is whereabouts. This
being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those that
the enemy cannot attack.”]
46
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high
rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other
place that he will be obliged to relieve. [Tu Mu says: “If the
enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line of
communications and occupy the roads by which he will have
to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack
against the sovereign himself.” It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike
certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in
frontal attacks.]
47
Yao-ch`en) rightly explains it thus: “If the enemy’s
dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body;
whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy
will be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against
attack from every quarter.”]
We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split
up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against
separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many
to the enemy’s few.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his
rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van;
should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should
he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends
reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. [In
Frederick the Great’s instructions to his generals we read: “A
defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment.
Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to
protect every point, while those who are better acquainted
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with their profession, having only the capital object in view,
guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small
misfortunes to avoid greater.”]
Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may
concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
[What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation
of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which
enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long
and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at
precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront
the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such
successful junctions which military history records, one of the
most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Blucher
just at the critical moment on t he field of Waterloo.]
But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will
be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to
succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to
support the van. How much more so if the furthest port ions
of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even
the nearest are separated by several li! [The Chinese of this
last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but the mental
picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army
advancing towards a given rendezvous in separate columns,
each of which has orders to be there on a fixed date . If the
49
general allows the various detachments to proceed at
haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and
place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the
army in detail. Chang Yu’s note may be worth quoting here:
“If we do no t know the place where our opponents mean to
concentrate or the day on which they will join battle, our
unity will be forfeited through our preparations for defense,
and the positions we hold will be insecure. Suddenly
happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle
in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible
between wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any
great distance between the foremost and hindmost divisions
of the army.”]
50
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent
him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the
likelihood of their success. [An alternative reading offered by
Chia Lin is: “Know beforehand all plans conducive to our
success and to the enemy’s failure.”]
51
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none
can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. [i.e.,
everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what
they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations
which has preceded the battle. Do not repeat the tactics which
have gained you one victory, but let your methods be
regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances]
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural
course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
52
The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not
always equally predominant; [That is, as Wang Hsi says:
“they predominate alternately.”] the four seasons make way
for each other in turn. [Literally, “have no invariable seat.”]
There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of
waning and waxing. [The purport of the passage is simply to
illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly
taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happy,
however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun
Tzu mentions is by no means paralleled in war.]
Maneuvering
Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands
from the sovereign.
53
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is
nothing more difficult. [I have departed slightly from the
traditional interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, who says: “From the
time of receiving the sovereign’s instructions until our
encampment over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued
are most difficult.” It seems to me t hat the tactics or
maneuvers can hardly be said to begin until the army has
sallied forth and encamped, and Ch`ien Hao’s note gives
color to this view: “For levying, concentrating, harmonizing
and entrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which
will serve. The real difficulty comes when we engage in
tactical operations.” Tu Yu also observes that “the great
difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in seizing
favorable position.”]
54
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the
enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to
contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of
the artifice of deviation. [Tu Mu cites the famous march of
Chao She in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of O-yu, which was
closely invested by a Ch`in army. The King of Chao first
consulted Lien P`o on the advisability of attempting a relief,
but the latter thought the distance too great, and the
intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then
turned to Chao She, who fully admitted the hazardous nature
of the march, but finally said: “We shall be like two rats
fighting in a whole—and the pluckier one will win!” So he
left the capital with his army, but had only gone a distance of
30 li when he stopped and began throwing up entrenchments.
For 28 days he continued strengthening his fortifications, and
took care that spies should carry the intelligence to the
enemy. The Ch`in general was overjoyed, and attributed his
adversary’s tardiness to the fact that the beleaguered city was
in the Han State, and thus not actually part of Chao territory.
But the spies had no sooner departed than Chao She began a
forced march lasting for two days and one night, and arrive on
the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was
able to occupy a commanding position on the “North hill”
before the enemy had got wind of his movements. A crushing
defeat followed for the Ch`in forces, who were obliged to
raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat across the
border.]
55
this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they
may be dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the
general.]
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall
behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will
reach its destination. [The moral is, as Ts`ao Kung and others
point out: Don’t march a hundred li to gain a tactical
advantage, either with or without impedimenta. Maneuvers of
this description should be confined to short distances.
Stonewall Jackson said: “The hardships of forced marches are
often more painful than the dangers of battle.” He did not
56
often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was
only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was
imperative, that he sacrificed everything for speed.]
57
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be
decided by circumstances.
58
carrying out some of their most memorable and triumphant
expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch`ao who penetrated to the
Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k`ang-an and
Tso Tsung-t`ang.]
59
be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and
flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the
ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular
point. [Chang Yu says: “If sight and hearing converge
simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many
as a million soldiers will be like those of a single man.”!]
60
Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute their
passage.]
61
has a saying: “Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting
walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must
include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium.”]
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait
at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be
well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of
husbanding one’s strength.
62
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack
soldiers whose temper is keen.
63
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. [This does
not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The
object, as Tu Mu puts it, is “to make him believe that there is
a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the
courage of despair.” Tu Mu adds pleasantly: “After that, you
ma y crush him.”]
Do not press a desperate foe too hard. [Ch`en Hao quotes the
saying: “Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their
claws and teeth.” Chang Yu says: “If your adversary has
burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready
to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to
extremities.” Ho Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken
from the life of Yen-ch`ing. That general, together with his
colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded by a vastly superior
army of Khitans in the year 945 a.d. The country was bare
and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire
straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, and
the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking
out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu
Yen -ch`ing exclaimed: “We are desperate men. Far better to
die for our country than to go with fettered hands into
captivity!” A strong gale happened to be blowing from the
northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy
dust. To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated
before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer,
Li Shou-cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity,
and said: “They are many and we are few, but in the midst of
this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory
will go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best
ally.” Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch`ing made a sudden and wholly
unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians
and succeeded in breaking through to safety.]
64
Such is the art of warfare.
Variation in Tactics
Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands
from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his
forces. [It may have been interpolated here merely in order to
supply a beginning to the chapter.]
65
overtaxing your men’s strength.”] towns which must not be
besieged, [Ts`ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from
his own experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou,
he ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path,
and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent
strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer
than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yu says: “No
town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if
left alone, will not cause any trouble.” Hsun Ying, when
urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: “The city is small and
well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, it will be no great
feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a
laughing-stock.” In the seventeenth century, sieges still
formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who
directed attention to the importance of marches,
countermarches and maneuvers. He said: “It is a great mistake
to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of
soldiers will gain a province.”] positions which must not be
contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be
obeyed. [This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their
reverence for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu)
is moved to exclaim: “Weapons are baleful instruments, strife
is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation
of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however, that
even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military
necessity.]
66
not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.
[Literally, “get the advantage of the ground,” which means
not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of
natural advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says:
“Every kind of ground is characterized by certain natural
features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan.
How it is possible to turn these natural features to account
unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by
versatility of mind?”]
67
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we
may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our
schemes. [Tu Mu says: “If we wish to wrest an advantage
from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but
allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing some harm
to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations.”]
68
interpretation of Sun Tzu here: “Get the enemy into a position
where he must suffer injury, an d he will submit of his own
accord.”] and make trouble for them, [Tu Mu, in this phrase,
in his interpretation indicates that trouble should be make for
the enemy affecting their “possessions,” or, as we might say,
“assets,” which he considers to be “a large army, a rich
exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual
fulfillment of commands.” These give us a whip-hand over
the enemy.] and keep them constantly engaged; [Literally,
“make servants of them.” Tu Yu says “prevent the from
having any rest.”] hold out specious allurements, and make
them rush to any given point. [Meng Shih’s note contains an
excellent example of the idiomatic use of: “cause them to
forget pien (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first
impulse), and hasten in our direction.”]
69
is expedient, must be condemned.” Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the
incisive remark: “Simply going to one’s death does not bring
about victory.”]
70
Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others shut himself up behind
his walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch`iang said: “Our
adversary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us
make constant s allies and break down his walls, then he will
grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to
battle, it is doomed to be our prey.” This plan was acted upon,
Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan
by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and
slain.]
71
through the very man who started out with the distinct resolve
no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to
sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one of our
generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried
once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he
was always “so good to his men.” By this plea, had he but
known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu’s
mouth.]
72
that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not know
the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of valleys.”]
After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. [“In
order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,” according to
Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, “in order not to be
impeded in your evolutions.” The T`uang Tien reads, “If the
Enemy crosses a river,” etc. But in view of the next sentence,
this is almost certainly an interpolation.]
73
party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume
of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion
of Lung Chu’s army from getting across. He then turned upon
the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu
himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the
further bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.]
Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.
[The repetition of these words in connection with water is
very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: “Said either of troops
marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the
stream itself; in either case it is essential to be high er than the
enemy and facing the sun.” The other commentators are not at
all explicit.]
74
In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get
over them quickly, without any delay. [Because of the lack of
fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last but not
least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.]
75
Ch`uan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti,
who received it from his Minister Feng Hou.]
If you are careful of your men, [Ts`ao Kung says: “Make for
fresh water and pasture, where you can turn out your animals
to graze.”] and camp on hard ground, the army will be free
from disease of every kind, [Chang Yu says: “The dryness of
the climate will prevent the outbreak of illness.”] and this will
spell victory.
76
[Defined as “low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be
impassable for chariots and horsemen.”] and crevasses,
[Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as “a narrow difficult way
between beetling cliffs.” Tu Mu’s note is “ground covered
with trees and rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and
pitfalls.” This is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly
enough as a defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much
the same view. On the whole, the weight of the commentators
certainly inclines to the rendering “defile.” But the ordinary
meaning of the Chinese in one place is “a crack or fissure”
and the fact that the meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the
sentence indicates something in the nature of a defile, make
me think that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses.] should
be left with all possible speed and not approached.
77
When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is
anxious for the other side to advance. [Probably because we
are in a strong position from which he wishes to dislodge us.
“If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, “and tried to force a
battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less
probability of our responding to the challenge. “]
78
When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of
chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a
wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. [“High and
sharp,” or rising to a peak, is of course somewhat exaggerated
as applied to dust. The commentators explain the
phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier
than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in the
same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching
in ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, “every army
on the march must have scouts some way in advance, who on
sighting dust raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report
it to the commander- in-chief.” Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: “As
you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be
looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust
rising, birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc.”]
79
prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight against us;
that would be the undoing of our city.’ The other side being
informed of this speech, at once acted on the suggestion; but
those within the city were enraged at seeing their
fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they
should fall into the enemy’s hands, were nerved to defend
themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T`ien Tan
sent back converted spies who reported these words to the
enemy: “What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up
the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this
indignity on our forefathers cause us to become
faint-hearted.’]
[Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the
corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo,
witnessing the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately
and were all impatient to go out and fight, their fury being
increased tenfold. T`ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were
ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself
too a mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be
distributed amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were
filled up with their wives an d concubines. He then served out
all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their fill. The
regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls
were manned with the old and weaker men and with women.
This done, envoys were dispatched to the enemy’s camp to
arrange terms of surrender, whereupon the Yen army began
shouting for joy.]
80
their women to be maltreated. Ch`i Chieh, in high good
humor, granted their prayer; but his army now became
increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T`ien Tan got
together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk,
painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and
fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes
on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the
rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which
he had pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of
5000 picked warriors. The animals, maddened with pain,
dashed furiously into the enemy’s camp where they caused
the utmost confusion and dismay; for their tails acted as
torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies, and
the weapons on t heir horns killed or wounded any with
whom they came into contact.]
[In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in
their mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the
same moment a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those
that remained behind making as much noise as possible by
banging drum s and hammering on bronze vessels, until
heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar.
Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued
by the men of Ch`i, who succeeded in slaying their general
Ch`i Chien . . . The result of the battle was the ultimate
recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the
Ch`i State.”]
When the light chariots come out first and take up a position
on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
81
Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate
a plot. [The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch`uan indicates “a
treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages.” Wang Hsi and
Chang Yu, on the other hand, simply say “without reason,”
“on a frivolous pretext.”]
When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint
from want of food.
82
weary. [Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: “If all
the officers of an army are angry with their general, it means
that they are broken with fatigue” owing to the exertions
which he has demanded from them.]
When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle
for food, [In the ordinary course of things, the men would be
fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass.] and when the
men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires,
showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know
that they are determined to fight to the death. [I may quote
here the illustrative passage from the Hou Han Shu, ch. 71,
given in abbreviated form by the P`ei Wen Yun fu: “The rebel
Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch`en-ts`ang,
and Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and
Tung Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed for
hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At
last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw
down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was not
advancing to the attack, but Cho said: ‘It is a principle of war
not to pursue desperate men and not to press a retreating
host.’ Sung answered: ‘That does not apply here. What I am
about to attack is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with
disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganized multitude,
not a band of desperate men.’ Thereupon he advances to the
attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy,
Wang Kuo being slain.”]
83
Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of
his resources; [Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu
Mu says, there is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards
are given to keep the men in good temper.] too many
punishments betray a condition of dire distress. [Because in
such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity
is necessary to keep the men to their duty.]
84
If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is
amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be
made. [Literally, “no martial advance.” That is to say, Cheng
tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem
resorted to instead.]
85
become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they
will still be unless.
86
Terrain
Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit:
87
is doubtlessly, as Tu Yu says, “not to allow the enemy to cut
your communications.” In view of Napoleon’s dictum, “the
secret of war lies in the communications,” we could wish that
Sun Tzu had done more than skirt the edge of this important
subject here and in I. Col. Henderson says: “The line of
supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army
as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist
who finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain
death, and his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to
his adversary’s movements, and to content himself with
warding off his thrusts, so the commander whose
communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a
false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change
all his plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated
detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on ground
which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will
not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or surrender
of his whole army.”]
88
In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer
us an attractive bait, [Tu Yu says, “turning their backs on us
and pretending to flee.” But this is only one of the lures which
might induce us to quit our position.] it will be advisable not
to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in
his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may
deliver our attack with advantage.
89
which flooded their former place of encampment to the depth
of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed at
the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. ‘How
did you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P`ei
Hsing-chien replied: ‘From this time forward be content to
obey orders without asking unnecessary questions.’ From this
it may be seen,” Chang Yu continues, “that high and sunny
places are advantageous not only for fighting, but also
because they are immune from disastrous floods.”]
If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the
strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a
battle, [The point is that we must not think of undertaking a
long and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu
says, “we should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and
keen.”] and fighting will be to your disadvantage.
These six are the principles connected with Earth. The general
who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study
them.
90
Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against
another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the
former.
When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers
too weak, the result is insubordination. [Tu Mu cites the
unhappy case of T`ien Pu, who was sent to Wei in 821 a.d.
with orders to lead an army against Wang T`ing-ts`ou. But the
whole time he was in command, his soldiers treated him with
the utmost contempt, and open ly flouted his authority by
riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at a
time. T`ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct,
and when, after some months had passed, he made an attempt
to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed in
every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed
suicide by cutting his throat.]
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too
weak, the result is collapse. [Ts`ao Kung says: “The officers
are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are
feeble and suddenly collapse.”]
91
commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will
not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without
vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing
their duty.” General Baden-Powell says, italicizing the words:
“The secret of getting successful work out of your trained
men lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions
they receive.” “the most fatal defect in a military leader is
difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from
hesitation.”] when there are no fixes duties assigned to
officers and men, [Tu Mu says: “Neither officers nor men
have any regular routine.”] and the ranks are formed in a
slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter
disorganization.
92
and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and
distances, constitutes the test of a great general.
93
Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow
you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own
beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. [In
this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging picture of
the famous general Wu Ch`i, from whose treatise on war I
have frequently had occasion to quote: “He wore the same
clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldier s,
refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on,
carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and
shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was
suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch`i himself sucked out
the virus. Th e soldier’s mother, hearing this, began wailing
and lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: ‘Why do you
cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and yet the
commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his
sore.’ The woman replied, ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu
performed a similar service for my husband, who never left
him afterwards, and finally met his death at the hands of the
enemy. And now that he has done the same for my son, he too
will fall fighting I know not where.’” Li Ch`uan mentions the
Viscount of Ch`u, who invaded the small state of Hsiao
during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: “Many of
the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold.” So he made
a round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the
men; and straightway they felt as if they were clothed in
garments lined with floss silk.]
94
afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern
military discipline which occurred in 219 a.d., when Lu Meng
was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. He had given
stringent orders to his army not to molest the inhabitants nor
take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a certain
officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a
fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat
belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over his
regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng
considered that the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan
should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline,
and accordingly he order ed his summary execution, the tears
rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of
severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that
time forth even articles dropped in the highway were not
picked up.]
95
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself,
your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and
know Earth, you may make your victory complete. [Li
Ch`uan sums up as follows: “Given a knowledge of three
things—the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the
natural advantages of earth—, victory will invariably crown
your battles.”]
96
can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of
the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men:
this is hemmed in ground; (9) Desperate ground — Ground
on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting
without delay, is desperate ground.
97
greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the
defenders will not prevail against you.
On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may
weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those
lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. But let
98
them once be brought to bay, and they will display the
courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
99
At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one
who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder
behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory
before he shows his hand.
When you leave your own country behind, and take your
army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on
critical ground. When there are means of communication on
all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
100
Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with
unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would see that there is
close connection between all parts of my army.
101
When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his
generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the
enemy’s forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies
are prevented from joining against him.
Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry,
nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his
own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. Thus he is
able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them
know your design. When the outlook is bright, bring it before
their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
102
On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier
passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all
emissaries.
103
readiness. There is a proper season for making attacks with
fire, and special days for starting a conflagration. The proper
season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are
those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the
Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of
rising wind.
A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze
soon falls. In every army, the five developments connected
with fire must be known, the movements of the stars
calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. Hence those
who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those
who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of
strength. By means of water, an opponent may be intercepted,
but not robbed of all his belongings.
Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and
succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of
enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general
stagnation. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his
plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.
104
Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops
unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the
position is critical. If it is to your advantage, make a forward
move; if not, stay where you are. Anger may in time change
to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.
No leader should put troops into the field merely to gratify his
own spleen; no leader should fight a battle simply out of
pique. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never
come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back
to life. Hence the enlightened leader is heedful, and the good
leader full of caution.
Opposing forces may face each other for years, striving for
the victory which may be decided in a single day. This being
so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply
because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver
is the height of stupidity.
105
the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this
foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be
obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive
calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only
be obtained from other men.
Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1)
Local spies — Having local spies means employing the
services of the inhabitants of an enemy territory; (2) Moles —
Having moles means making use of officials of the enemy;
(3) Double agents — Having double agents means getting
hold of the enemy’s spies and using them for our own
purposes; (4) Doomed spies — Having doomed spies means
doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and
allowing our spies to know of them and report them to t he
enemy; (5) Surviving spies — Surviving spies means are
those who bring back news from the enemy’s camp.
When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can
discover the secret system. This is called “divine
manipulation of the threads.” It is the commander’s most
precious faculty. Hence it is that which none in the whole
army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with
spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other
fields should greater secrecy be preserved.
106
divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to
death together with the man to whom the secret was told.
107
On War
by General Carl von Clausewitz
Introduction
The Germans interpret their new national colors— black, red,
and white— by the saying, “Durch Nacht und Blut zur licht.”
(“Through night and blood to light”), and no work yet written
conveys to the thinker a clearer conception of all that the red
streak in their flag stands for than this deep and philosophical
analysis of “War” by Clausewitz.
108
law in each case, viz., “The survival of the fittest”—the
“fittest,” as Huxley long since pointed out, not being
necessarily synonymous with the ethically “best.” Neither of
these thinkers was concerned with the ethics of the struggle
which each studied so exhaustively, but to both men the phase
or condition presented itself neither as moral nor immoral,
any more than are famine, disease, or other natural
phenomena, but as emanating from a force inherent in all
living organisms which can only be mastered by
understanding its nature. It is in that spirit that, one after the
other, all the Nations of the Continent, taught by such drastic
lessons as Koniggrätz and Sedan, have accepted the lesson,
with the result that to-day Europe is an armed camp, and
peace is maintained by the equilibrium of forces, and will
continue just as long as this equilibrium exists, and no longer.
109
are pulling down the dam which may at any moment let in on
us the flood of invasion.
110
“The Statesman who, knowing his instrument to be ready, and
seeing War inevitable, hesitates to strike first is guilty of a
crime against his country.”
111
before (in 1893, in fact) made their arrangements to prevent
the spread of Socialistic propaganda beyond certain useful
limits. As long as the Socialists only threatened capital they
were not seriously interfered with, for the Government knew
quite well that the undisputed sway of the employer was not
for the ultimate good of the State. The standard of comfort
must not be pitched too low if men are to be ready to die for
their country. But the moment the Socialists began to interfere
seriously with the discipline of the Army the word went
round, and the Socialists lost heavily at the polls.
112
training of a whole century, have become instinctive, troops
really are ready to the last button, and might be poured down
upon any one of her neighbours with such rapidity that the
very first collision must suffice to ensure ultimate success—a
success by no means certain if the enemy, whoever he may
be, is allowed breathing-time in which to set his house in
order.
113
War,” to paraphrase Clausewitz. Did they, when in the throes
of such competition, send formal notice to their rivals of their
plans to get the better of them in commerce? Did Mr.
Carnegie, the arch-priest of Peace at any price, when he built
up the Steel Trust, notify his competitors when and how he
proposed to strike the blows which successively made him
master of millions? Surely the Directors of a Great Nation
may consider the interests of their shareholders—i.e., the
people they govern—as sufficiently serious not to be
endangered by the deliberate sacrifice of the preponderant
position of readiness which generations of self-devotion,
patriotism and wise forethought have won for them?
114
Men kill each other at greater distances, it is true—but killing
is a constant factor in all battles. The difference between
“now and then” lies in this, that, thanks to the enormous
increase in range (the essential feature in modern armaments),
it is possible to concentrate by surprise, on any chosen spot, a
man-killing power fully twentyfold greater than was
conceivable in the days of Waterloo; and whereas in
Napoleon’s time this concentration of man-killing power
(which in his hands took the form of the great case-shot
attack) depended almost entirely on the shape and condition
of the ground, which might or might not be favourable,
nowadays such concentration of fire-power is almost
independent of the country altogether.
115
But these alterations in method make no difference in the
truth of the picture of War which Clausewitz presents, with
which every soldier, and above all every Leader, should be
saturated.
116
meet, As things alike to thee, pleasure or pain, Profit or ruin,
victory or defeat. So minded, gird thee to the fight, for so
Thou shalt not sin!
117
meaning to them) make it now, in the opinion of my friends, a
duty incumbent on me to introduce the posthumous works of
my beloved husband, with a few prefatory lines from myself;
and although here may be a difference of opinion on this
point, still I am sure there will be no mistake as to the feeling
which has prompted me to overcome the timidity which
makes any such appearance, even in a subordinate part, so
difficult for a woman.
118
and studies that direction, and to lead him to put down in
writing whatever conclusions he arrived at. A paper with
which he finished the instruction of H.R.H. the Crown Prince
contains the germ of his subsequent works. But it was in the
year 1816, at Coblentz, that he first devoted himself again to
scientific labours, and to collecting the fruits which his rich
experience in those four eventful years had brought to
maturity. He wrote down his views, in the first place, in short
essays, only loosely connected with each other. The
following, without date, which has been found amongst his
papers, seems to belong to those early days.
119
from the essays, which, to attain clearness and conviction in
my own mind, I wrote upon different subjects, to
concentrating in that manner their spirit in a small compass;
but afterwards my peculiarity gained ascendency
completely—I have developed what I could, and thus
naturally have supposed a reader not yet acquainted with the
subject.
“The more I advanced with the work, and the more I yielded
to the spirit of investigation, so much the more I was also led
to system; and thus, then, chapter after chapter has been
inserted.
120
of the course is not under the Director, but conducted by a
Board of Studies. Free as he was from all petty vanity, from
every feeling of restless, egotistical ambition, still he felt a
desire to be really useful, and not to leave inactive the
abilities with which God had endowed him. In active life he
was not in a position in which this longing could be satisfied,
and he had little hope of attaining to any such position: his
whole energies were therefore directed upon the domain of
science, and the benefit which he hoped to lay the foundation
of by his work was the object of his life. That,
notwithstanding this, the resolution not to let the work appear
until after his death became more confirmed is the best proof
that no vain, paltry longing for praise and distinction, no
particle of egotistical views, was mixed up with this noble
aspiration for great and lasting usefulness.
121
more; and the packets sealed by himself were not opened until
after his death.
The papers thus left are those now made public in the
following volumes, exactly in the condition in which they
were found, without a word being added or erased. Still,
however, there was much to do before publication, in the way
of putting them in order and consulting about them; and I am
deeply indebted to several sincere friends for the assistance
they have afforded me, particularly Major O’Etzel, who
kindly undertook the correction of the Press, as well as the
preparation of the maps to accompany the historical parts of
the work. I must also mention my much-loved brother, who
was my support in the hour of my misfortune, and who has
also done much for me in respect of these papers; amongst
other things, by carefully examining and putting them in
order, he found the commencement of the revision which my
dear husband wrote in the year 1827, and mentions in the
Notice hereafter annexed as a work he had in view. This
revision has been inserted in the place intended for it in the
first book (for it does not go any further).
122
hopes, by the rich legacy of sympathy and friendship which I
owe the beloved departed, by the elevating feeling which I
experience at seeing his rare worth so generally and
honourably acknowledged.
Notice
I look upon the first six books, of which a fair copy has now
been made, as only a mass which is still in a manner without
form, and which has yet to be again revised. In this revision
the two kinds of War will be everywhere kept more distinctly
in view, by which all ideas will acquire a clearer meaning, a
more precise direction, and a closer application. The two
kinds of War are, first, those in which the object is the
overthrow of the enemy, whether it be that we aim at his
destruction, politically, or merely at disarming him and
forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and next, those
in which our object is Merely to make some conquests on the
123
frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining
them permanently, or of turning them to account as matter of
exchange in the settlement of a peace. Transition from one
kind to the other must certainly continue to exist, but the
completely different nature of the tendencies of the two must
everywhere appear, and must separate from each other things
which are incompatible.
For the eighth book—on the Plan of a War, that is, of the
organisation of a whole War in general—several chapters are
designed, but they are not at all to be regarded as real
124
materials, they are merely a track, roughly cleared, as it were,
through the mass, in order by that means to ascertain the
points of most importance. They have answered this object,
and I propose, on finishing the seventh book, to proceed at
once to the working out of the eighth, where the two points of
view above mentioned will be chiefly affirmed, by which
everything will be simplified, and at the same time have a
spirit breathed into it. I hope in this book to iron out many
creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen, and at least
to show the object of action, and the real point to be
considered in War.
125
appreciate in the first six books the fruits of several years’
reflection and a diligent study of War, and that, perhaps, he
will find in them some leading ideas which may bring about a
revolution in the theory of War.
The first chapter of the first book is the only one which I
consider as completed; it will at least serve to show the
manner in which I proposed to treat the subject throughout.
126
The theory of the Grande Guerre, or Strategy, as it is called, is
beset with extraordinary difficulties, and we may affirm that
very few men have clear conceptions of the separate subjects,
that is, conceptions carried up to their full logical conclusions.
In real action most men are guided merely by the tact of
judgment which hits the object more or less accurately,
according as they possess more or less genius.
This is the way in which all great Generals have acted, and
therein partly lay their greatness and their genius, that they
always hit upon what was right by this tact. Thus also it will
always be in action, and so far this tact is amply sufficient.
But when it is a question, not of acting oneself, but of
convincing others in a consultation, then all depends on clear
conceptions and demonstration of the inherent relations, and
so little progress has been made in this respect that most
deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no
firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own
opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations of
respect, a middle course really without any value.[Herr
Clausewitz evidently had before his mind the endless
consultations at the Headquarters of the Bohemian Army in
the Leipsic Campaign 1813.]
127
no standing law can embrace. We should also join in this
opinion and give up any attempt at a theory, were it not that a
great number of propositions make themselves evident
without any difficulty, as, for instance, that the defensive
form, with a negative object, is the stronger form, the attack,
with the positive object, the weaker—that great results carry
the little ones with them—that, therefore, strategic effects
may be referred to certain centres of gravity—that a
demonstration is a weaker application of force than a real
attack, that, therefore, there must be some special reason for
resorting to the former—that victory consists not merely in
the conquest on the field of battle, but in the destruction of
armed forces, physically and morally, which can in general
only be effected by a pursuit after the battle is gained—that
successes are always greatest at the point where the victory
has been gained, that, therefore, the change from one line and
object to another can only be regarded as a necessary
evil—that a turning movement is only justified by a
superiority of numbers generally or by the advantage of our
lines of communication and retreat over those of the
enemy—that flank positions are only justifiable on similar
grounds—that every attack becomes weaker as it progresses.
128
The scientific form lies here in the endeavour to explore the
nature of military phenomena to show their affinity with the
nature of the things of which they are composed. Nowhere
has the philosophical argument been evaded, but where it runs
out into too thin a thread the Author has preferred to cut it
short, and fall back upon the corresponding results of
experience; for in the same way as many plants only bear fruit
when they do not shoot too high, so in the practical arts the
theoretical leaves and flowers must not be made to sprout too
far, but kept near to experience, which is their proper soil.
129
twaddle of every kind. If we want a striking picture of them
we have only to read Lichtenberg’s extract from a code of
regulations in case of fire.
130
greater head may appear, and instead of these single grains,
give the whole in a casting of pure metal without dross.
131
which had been carried on with York to a termination in one
way or another, the Author was despatched to York’s
headquarters with two letters, one was from General
d’Auvray, the Chief of the Staff of Wittgenstein’s army, to
General Diebitsch, showing the arrangements made to cut off
York’s corps from Macdonald (this was necessary in order to
give York a plausible excuse for seceding from the French);
the other was an intercepted letter from Macdonald to the
Duke of Bassano. With regard to the former of these, the
Author says, “it would not have had weight with a man like
York, but for a military justification, if the Prussian Court
should require one as against the French, it was important.”
132
ante-chamber. The letters were read. After a pause of an
instant, the General said, “Clausewitz, you are a Prussian, do
you believe that the letter of General d’Auvray is sincere, and
that Wittgenstein’s troops will really be at the points he
mentioned on the 31st?” The Author replied, “I pledge myself
for the sincerity of this letter upon the knowledge I have of
General d’Auvray and the other men of Wittgenstein’s
headquarters; whether the dispositions he announces can be
accomplished as he lays down I certainly cannot pledge
myself; for your Excellency knows that in war we must often
fall short of the line we have drawn for ourselves.” The
General was silent for a few minutes of earnest reflection;
then he held out his hand to the Author, and said, “You have
me. Tell General Diebitsch that we must confer early
to-morrow at the mill of Poschenen, and that I am now firmly
determined to separate myself from the French and their
cause.” The hour was fixed for 8 A.M. After this was settled,
the General added, “But I will not do the thing by halves, I
will get you Massenbach also.” He called in an officer who
was of Massenbach’s cavalry, and who had just left them.
Much like Schiller’s Wallenstein, he asked, walking up and
down the room the while, “What say your regiments?” The
officer broke out with enthusiasm at the idea of a riddance
from the French alliance, and said that every man of the
troops in question felt the same.
133
staff officer to Blucher’s headquarters till the Armistice in
1813.
134
whether the Bishop should not be made responsible for what
the priest had said. This led to the topic of theology in
general, when General Brandt, speaking of himself, says, “I
expressed an opinion that theology is only to be regarded as
an historical process, as a moment in the gradual development
of the human race. This brought upon me an attack from all
quarters, but more especially from Clausewitz, who ought to
have been on my side, he having been an adherent and pupil
of Kiesewetter’s, who had indoctrinated him in the
philosophy of Kant, certainly diluted—I might even say in
homoeopathic doses.” This anecdote is only interesting as the
mention of Kiesewetter points to a circumstance in the life of
Clausewitz that may have had an influence in forming those
habits of thought which distinguish his writings.
135
His writings are contained in nine volumes, published after
his death, but his fame rests most upon the three volumes
forming his treatise on “War.” In the present attempt to render
into English this portion of the works of Clausewitz, the
translator is sensible of many deficiencies, but he hopes at all
events to succeed in making this celebrated treatise better
known in England, believing, as he does, that so far as the
work concerns the interests of this country, it has lost none of
the importance it possessed at the time of its first publication.
J. J. Graham (col.)
1. Introduction
2. Definition
136
duels which make up a War, we shall do so best by supposing
to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to
compel the other to submit to his will: each endeavours to
throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further
resistance.
137
intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly,
without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a
superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application.
The former then dictates the law to the latter, and both
proceed to extremities to which the only limitations are those
imposed by the amount of counter-acting force on each side.
138
arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, etc.,
and, therefore, is not to be found necessarily in all cases,
although it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most
civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each
other.
139
We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of
violence pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the
law to the other, there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which
logically must lead to an extreme. This is the first reciprocal
action, and the first extreme with which we meet (first
reciprocal action).
140
enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me; then I shall be no
longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did
to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a
second extreme (second reciprocal action).
141
we shall propose and for the means which we shall apply, this
constant reciprocal action would involve us in extremes,
which would be nothing but a play of ideas produced by an
almost invisible train of logical subtleties. If, adhering closely
to the absolute, we try to avoid all difficulties by a stroke of
the pen, and insist with logical strictness that in every case the
extreme must be the object, and the utmost effort must be
exerted in that direction, such a stroke of the pen would be a
mere paper law, not by any means adapted to the real world.
142
(3) If it contains within itself the solution perfect and
complete, free from any reaction upon it, through a
calculation beforehand of the political situation which will
follow from it.
143
result is made up from several successive acts, then naturally
that which precedes with all its phases may be taken as a
measure for that which will follow, and in this manner the
world of reality again takes the place of the abstract, and thus
modifies the effort towards the extreme.
But we have already seen that even in the preparation for War
the real world steps into the place of mere abstract
conception—a material standard into the place of the
hypotheses of an extreme: that therefore in that way both
parties, by the influence of the mutual reaction, remain below
the line of extreme effort, and therefore all forces are not at
once brought forward.
In point of fact, the country, with its superficial area and the
population, besides being the source of all military force,
constitutes in itself an integral part of the efficient quantities
in War, providing either the theatre of war or exercising a
considerable influence on the same.
144
Now, it is possible to bring all the movable military forces of
a country into operation at once, but not all fortresses, rivers,
mountains, people, etc.—in short, not the whole country,
unless it is so small that it may be completely embraced by
the first act of the War. Further, the co-operation of allies
does not depend on the Will of the belligerents; and from the
nature of the political relations of states to each other, this
co-operation is frequently not afforded until after the War has
commenced, or it may be increased to restore the balance of
power.
145
the other a real objective ground for limiting his own efforts,
and thus again, through this reciprocal action, extreme
tendencies are brought down to efforts on a limited scale.
146
11. The Political Object Now Reappears
Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again
into consideration, viz., the political object of the War. The
law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to
overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the
place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the
political must again come forward. If the whole consideration
is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and
relations, then the political object, being the original motive,
must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the
sacrifice we demand from ours, the smaller, it may be
expected, will be the means of resistance which he will
employ; but the smaller his preparation, the smaller will ours
require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less
value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be
induced to give it up altogether.
147
exist between two States that a very trifling political motive
for War may produce an effect quite disproportionate—in
fact, a perfect explosion.
This applies to the efforts which the political object will call
forth in the two States, and to the aim which the military
action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that
aim, as, for example, the conquest of a province. At other
times the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of
military action; then such a one must be chosen as will be an
equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the
conclusion of peace. But also, in this, due attention to the
peculiar character of the States concerned is always supposed.
There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be
much greater than the political object, in order to secure the
latter. The political object will be so much the more the
standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself,
the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual
feeling of hostility prevails in the two States from other
causes, and therefore there are cases where the political object
almost alone will be decisive.
148
12. A Suspension in the Action of War Unexplained by
Anything Said as Yet
13. There Is Only One Cause Which Can Suspend the Action,
and this Seems to Be Only Possible on One Side in Any Case
149
If two parties have armed themselves for strife, then a feeling
of animosity must have moved them to it; as long now as they
continue armed, that is, do not come to terms of peace, this
feeling must exist; and it can only be brought to a standstill by
either side by one single motive alone, which is, That he waits
for a more favourable moment for action. Now, at first sight,
it appears that this motive can never exist except on one side,
because it, eo ipso, must be prejudicial to the other. If the one
has an interest in acting, then the other must have an interest
in waiting.
150
peace; if not, he must act. Now, if we suppose that in four
weeks he will be in a better condition to act, then he has
sufficient grounds for putting off the time of action.
But from that moment the logical course for the enemy
appears to be to act that he may not give the conquered party
the desired time. Of course, in this mode of reasoning a
complete insight into the state of circumstances on both sides
is supposed.
151
15. Here, Therefore, the Principle of Polarity Is Brought into
Requisition
If there was only one form of War, to wit, the attack of the
enemy, therefore no defence; or, in other words, if the attack
was distinguished from the defence merely by the positive
motive, which the one has and the other has not, but the
methods of each were precisely one and the same: then in this
sort of fight every advantage gained on the one side would be
a corresponding disadvantage on the other, and true polarity
would exist.
152
particularly, are very different and of unequal strength.
Polarity therefore lies in that to which both bear a relation, in
the decision, but not in the attack or defence itself.
If the one Commander wishes the solution put off, the other
must wish to hasten it, but only by the same form of action. If
it is A’s interest not to attack his enemy at present, but four
weeks hence, then it is B’s interest to be attacked, not four
weeks hence, but at the present moment. This is the direct
antagonism of interests, but it by no means follows that it
would be for B’s interest to attack A at once. That is plainly
something totally different.
153
that the superiority of the defensive [It must be remembered
that all this antedates by some years the introduction of
long-range weapons.] (rightly understood) is very great, and
much greater than may appear at first sight, we conceive that
the greater number of those periods of inaction which occur in
war are thus explained without involving any contradiction.
The weaker the motives to action are, the more will those
motives be absorbed and neutralised by this difference
between attack and defence, the more frequently, therefore,
will action in warfare be stopped, as indeed experience
teaches.
But there is still another cause which may stop action in War,
viz., an incomplete view of the situation. Each Commander
can only fully know his own position; that of his opponent
can only be known to him by reports, which are uncertain; he
may, therefore, form a wrong judgment with respect to it
upon data of this description, and, in consequence of that
error, he may suppose that the power of taking the initiative
rests with his adversary when it lies really with himself. This
want of perfect insight might certainly just as often occasion
an untimely action as untimely inaction, and hence it would in
itself no more contribute to delay than to accelerate action in
War. Still, it must always be regarded as one of the natural
causes which may bring action in War to a standstill without
involving a contradiction. But if we reflect how much more
we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our
opponents too high than too low, because it lies in human
nature to do so, we shall admit that our imperfect insight into
facts in general must contribute very much to delay action in
154
War, and to modify the application of the principles pending
our conduct.
But the slower the action proceeds in War, the more frequent
and longer the periods of inaction, so much the more easily
can an error be repaired; therefore, so much the bolder a
General will be in his calculations, so much the more readily
will he keep them below the line of the absolute, and build
everything upon probabilities and conjecture. Thus, according
as the course of the War is more or less slow, more or less
time will be allowed for that which the nature of a concrete
case particularly requires, calculation of probability based on
given circumstances.
155
We see from the foregoing how much the objective nature of
War makes it a calculation of probabilities; now there is only
one single element still wanting to make it a game, and that
element it certainly is not without: it is chance. There is no
human affair which stands so constantly and so generally in
close connection with chance as War. But together with
chance, the accidental, and along with it good luck, occupy a
great place in War.
22. How this Accords Best with the Human Mind in General
156
Although our intellect always feels itself urged towards
clearness and certainty, still our mind often feels itself
attracted by uncertainty. Instead of threading its way with the
understanding along the narrow path of philosophical
investigations and logical conclusions, in order, almost
unconscious of itself, to arrive in spaces where it feels itself a
stranger, and where it seems to part from all well-known
objects, it prefers to remain with the imagination in the realms
of chance and luck. Instead of living yonder on poor
necessity, it revels here in the wealth of possibilities;
animated thereby, courage then takes wings to itself, and
daring and danger make the element into which it launches
itself as a fearless swimmer plunges into the stream.
157
23. War Is Always a Serious Means for a Serious Object. Its
More Particular Definition
Such is War; such the Commander who conducts it; such the
theory which rules it. But War is no pastime; no mere passion
for venturing and winning; no work of a free enthusiasm: it is
a serious means for a serious object. All that appearance
which it wears from the varying hues of fortune, all that it
assimilates into itself of the oscillations of passion, of
courage, of imagination, of enthusiasm, are only particular
properties of this means.
158
therefore, in a certain measure, a pulsation of violent force
more or less vehement, consequently making its discharges
and exhausting its powers more or less quickly—in other
words, conducting more or less quickly to the aim, but always
lasting long enough to admit of influence being exerted on it
in its course, so as to give it this or that direction, in short, to
be subject to the will of a guiding intelligence., if we reflect
that War has its root in a political object, then naturally this
original motive which called it into existence should also
continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct.
Still, the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that
account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the
means, and though changes in these means may involve
modification in the political objective, the latter always
retains a prior right to consideration. Policy, therefore, is
interwoven with the whole action of War, and must exercise a
continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces
liberated by it will permit.
159
is the object, War is the means, and the means must always
include the object in our conception.
The greater and the more powerful the motives of a War, the
more it affects the whole existence of a people. The more
violent the excitement which precedes the War, by so much
the nearer will the War approach to its abstract form, so much
the more will it be directed to the destruction of the enemy, so
much the nearer will the military and political ends coincide,
so much the more purely military and less political the War
appears to be; but the weaker the motives and the tensions, so
much the less will the natural direction of the military
element—that is, force—be coincident with the direction
which the political element indicates; so much the more must,
therefore, the War become diverted from its natural direction,
the political object diverge from the aim of an ideal War, and
the War appear to become political.
But, that the reader may not form any false conceptions, we
must here observe that by this natural tendency of War we
only mean the philosophical, the strictly logical, and by no
means the tendency of forces actually engaged in conflict, by
which would be supposed to be included all the emotions and
passions of the combatants. No doubt in some cases these also
might be excited to such a degree as to be with difficulty
restrained and confined to the political road; but in most cases
such a contradiction will not arise, because by the existence
of such strenuous exertions a great plan in harmony therewith
would be implied. If the plan is directed only upon a small
object, then the impulses of feeling amongst the masses will
160
be also so weak that these masses will require to be
stimulated rather than repressed.
161
Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of
judgment which the Statesman and General exercises is
rightly to understand in this respect the War in which he
engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to make of it
something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible
for it to be. This is, therefore, the first, the most
comprehensive, of all strategical questions. We shall enter
into this more fully in treating of the plan of a War.
The first of these three phases concerns more the people the
second, more the General and his Army; the third, more the
Government. The passions which break forth in War must
already have a latent existence in the peoples. The range
which the display of courage and talents shall get in the realm
of probabilities and of chance depends on the particular
162
characteristics of the General and his Army, but the political
objects belong to the Government alone.
The problem is, therefore, that theory shall keep itself poised
in a manner between these three tendencies, as between three
points of attraction.
If we ask, first of all, for the object upon which the whole
effort of War is to be directed, in order that it may suffice for
the attainment of the political object, we shall find that it is
163
just as variable as are the political object and the particular
circumstances of the War.
But even when both these things are done, still the War, that
is, the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, cannot be
considered as at an end as long as the will of the enemy is not
subdued also; that is, its Government and its Allies must be
164
forced into signing a peace, or the people into submission; for
whilst we are in full occupation of the country, the War may
break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance
given by Allies. No doubt, this may also take place after a
peace, but that shows nothing more than that every War does
not carry in itself the elements for a complete decision and
final settlement.
But even if this is the case, still with the conclusion of peace a
number of sparks are always extinguished which would have
smouldered on quietly, and the excitement of the passions
abates, because all those whose minds are disposed to peace,
of which in all nations and under all circumstances there is
always a great number, turn themselves away completely
from the road to resistance. Whatever may take place
subsequently, we must always look upon the object as
attained, and the business of War as ended, by a peace.
165
But this object of War in the abstract, this final means of
attaining the political object in which all others are combined,
the disarming the enemy, is rarely attained in practice and is
not a condition necessary to peace. Therefore it can in no wise
be set up in theory as a law. There are innumerable instances
of treaties in which peace has been settled before either party
could be looked upon as disarmed; indeed, even before the
balance of power had undergone any sensible alteration. Nay,
further, if we look at the case in the concrete, then we must
say that in a whole class of cases, the idea of a complete
defeat of the enemy would be a mere imaginative flight,
especially when the enemy is considerably superior.
166
necessity, and seek aid from the calculation of probabilities;
and as this is so much the more the case, the more the War
has a bias that way, from the circumstances out of which it
has arisen—the smaller its motives are, and the excitement it
has raised—so it is also conceivable how out of this
calculation of probabilities even motives to peace may arise.
War does not, therefore, always require to be fought out until
one party is overthrown; and we may suppose that, when the
motives and passions are slight, a weak probability will
suffice to move that side to which it is unfavourable to give
way. Now, were the other side convinced of this beforehand,
it is natural that he would strive for this probability only,
instead of first wasting time and effort in the attempt to
achieve the total destruction of the enemy’s Army.
167
only sufficient, peace will follow, but naturally to the
advantage of that side which has the weakest motive for its
conclusion. We purposely pass over here the difference which
the positive and negative character of the political end must
necessarily produce practically; for although that is, as we
shall hereafter show, of the highest importance, still we are
obliged to keep here to a more general point of view, because
the original political views in the course of the War change
very much, and at last may become totally different, Just
because they are determined by results and probable events.
168
fears to bring matters to a bloody decision, the taking
possession of a weak or defenceless province is an advantage
in itself, and if this advantage is of sufficient importance to
make the enemy apprehensive about the general result, then it
may also be regarded as a shorter road to peace.
The enemy’s outlay in strength lies in the wear and tear of his
forces, consequently in the destruction of them on our part,
and in the loss of provinces, consequently the Conquest of
them by us.
169
of attaining our purpose in different ways is no contradiction,
absurdity, nor even error.
Besides these two means, there are three other peculiar ways
of directly increasing the waste of the enemy’s force. The first
is invasion, that is The occupation of the enemy’s territory,
not with a view to keeping it, but in order to levy
contributions upon it, or to devastate it.
170
as possible, for it is in the nature of the thing that a great end
requires a greater expenditure of force than a small one; but
the smallest object that we can propose to ourselves is simple
passive resistance, that is a combat without any positive view.
In this way, therefore, our means attain their greatest relative
value, and therefore the result is best secured. How far now
can this negative mode of proceeding be carried? Plainly not
to absolute passivity, for mere endurance would not be
fighting; and the defensive is an activity by which so much of
the enemy’s power must be destroyed that he must give up his
object. That alone is what we aim at in each single act, and
therein consists the negative nature of our object.
171
success is realised. We shall resume the consideration of all
this hereafter.
Frederick the Great, during the Seven Years’ War, was never
strong enough to overthrow the Austrian monarchy; and if he
had tried to do so after the fashion of Charles the Twelfth, he
would inevitably have had to succumb himself. But after his
skilful application of the system of husbanding his resources
had shown the powers allied against him, through a seven
years’ struggle, that the actual expenditure of strength far
exceeded what they had at first anticipated, they made peace.
We see then that there are many ways to one’s object in War;
that the complete subjugation of the enemy is not essential in
every case; that the destruction of the enemy’s military force,
the conquest of the enemy’s provinces, the mere occupation
of them, the mere invasion of them—enterprises which are
aimed directly at political objects—lastly, a passive
expectation of the enemy’s blow, are all means which, each in
itself, may be used to force the enemy’s will according as the
peculiar circumstances of the case lead us to expect more
172
from the one or the other. We could still add to these a whole
category of shorter methods of gaining the end, which might
be called arguments ad hominem. What branch of human
affairs is there in which these sparks of individual spirit have
not made their appearance, surmounting all formal
considerations? And least of all can they fail to appear in
War, where the personal character of the combatants plays
such an important part, both in the cabinet and in the field.
We limit ourselves to pointing this out, as it would be
pedantry to attempt to reduce such influences into classes.
Including these, we may say that the number of possible ways
of reaching the object rises to infinity.
173
encounter, whatever number of things may introduce
themselves which are not actual fighting, still it is always
implied in the conception of War that all the effects
manifested have their roots in the combat.
174
If the idea of combat lies at the foundation of every
application of armed power, then also the application of
armed force in general is nothing more than the determining
and arranging a certain number of combats.
175
If we think of the manifold parts of a great armed force, of the
number of circumstances which come into activity when it is
employed, then it is clear that the combat of such a force must
also require a manifold organisation, a subordinating of parts
and formation. There may and must naturally arise for
particular parts a number of objects which are not themselves
the destruction of the enemy’s armed force, and which, while
they certainly contribute to increase that destruction, do so
only in an indirect manner. If a battalion is ordered to drive
the enemy from a rising ground, or a bridge, etc., then
properly the occupation of any such locality is the real object,
the destruction of the enemy’s armed force which takes place
only the means or secondary matter. If the enemy can be
driven away merely by a demonstration, the object is attained
all the same; but this hill or bridge is, in point of fact, only
required as a means of increasing the gross amount of loss
inflicted on the enemy’s armed force. It is the case on the
field of battle, much more must it be so on the whole theatre
of war, where not only one Army is opposed to another, but
one State, one Nation, one whole country to another. Here the
number of possible relations, and consequently possible
combinations, is much greater, the diversity of measures
increased, and by the gradation of objects, each subordinate to
another the first means employed is further apart from the
ultimate object.
176
But a measuring of strength may be effected in cases where
the opposing sides are very unequal by a mere comparative
estimate. In such cases no fighting will take place, and the
weaker will immediately give way.
177
circumstances, and as a general question we have left its
value undetermined. We are once more brought back upon it,
and we shall be able to get an insight into the value which
must necessarily be accorded to it.
178
Thus, the destruction of the enemy’s armed force appears,
therefore, always as the superior and more effectual means, to
which all others must give way.
179
must, ceteris paribus, always be greater the more our aim is
directed upon the destruction of the enemy’s power.
180
enemy’s force, not by any means to the pure defensive, which
may be adopted with a view thereby to exhaust the enemy’s
forces. In the pure defensive the positive object is wanting,
and therefore, while on the defensive, our forces cannot at the
same time be directed on other objects; they can only be
employed to defeat the intentions of the enemy.
The effort with a positive object calls into existence the act of
destruction; the effort with the negative object awaits it.
181
suppose that the consequence of the negative course is that we
are precluded from choosing the destruction of the enemy’s
military force as our object, and must prefer a bloodless
solution. The advantage which the negative effort gives may
certainly lead to that, but only at the risk of its not being the
most advisable method, as that question is dependent on
totally different conditions, resting not with ourselves but
with our opponents. This other bloodless way cannot,
therefore, be looked upon at all as the natural means of
satisfying our great anxiety to spare our forces; on the
contrary, when circumstances are not favourable, it would be
the means of completely ruining them. Very many Generals
have fallen into this error, and been ruined by it. The only
necessary effect resulting from the superiority of the negative
effort is the delay of the decision, so that the party acting
takes refuge in that way, as it were, in the expectation of the
decisive moment. The consequence of that is generally The
postponement of the action as much as possible in time, and
also in space, in so far as space is in connection with it. If the
moment has arrived in which this can no longer be done
without ruinous disadvantage, then the advantage of the
negative must be considered as exhausted, and then comes
forward unchanged the effort for the destruction of the
enemy’s force, which was kept back by a counterpoise, but
never discarded.
182
way must make sure that his opponent will not take this
means of redress, or his cause may be lost in that supreme
court; hence therefore the destruction of the enemy’s armed
force, amongst all the objects which can be pursued in War,
appears always as the one which overrules all others.
183
mind in the consideration of each of the succeeding subjects,
if we would rightly comprehend their true relations and
proper importance, and not become involved incessantly in
the most glaring contradictions with the reality, and at last
with our own selves.
184
consists military genius, that it is not one single quality
bearing upon War, as, for instance, courage, while other
qualities of mind and soul are wanting or have a direction
which is unserviceable for War, but that it is an harmonious
association of powers, in which one or other may
predominate, but none must be in opposition.
185
nations that have been renowned in War belong strictly to
epochs of higher culture.
We may conceive that the two kinds act differently. The first
kind is more certain, because it has become a second nature,
never forsakes the man; the second often leads him farther. In
the first there is more of firmness, in the second, of boldness.
The first leaves the judgment cooler, the second raises its
power at times, but often bewilders it. The two combined
make up the most perfect kind of courage.
186
War is the province of physical exertion and suffering. In
order not to be completely overcome by them, a certain
strength of body and mind is required, which, either natural or
acquired, produces indifference to them. With these
qualifications, under the guidance of simply a sound
understanding, a man is at once a proper instrument for War;
and these are the qualifications so generally to be met with
amongst wild and half-civilised tribes. If we go further in the
demands which War makes on it, then we find the powers of
the understanding predominating. War is the province of
uncertainty: three-fourths of those things upon which action
in War must be calculated, are hidden more or less in the
clouds of great uncertainty. Here, then, above all a fine and
penetrating mind is called for, to search out the truth by the
tact of its judgment.
187
so great as to render the pre-determined plan completely
nugatory, then, as a rule, a new one must be substituted in its
place; but at the moment the necessary data are often wanting
for this, because in the course of action circumstances press
for immediate decision, and allow no time to look about for
fresh data, often not enough for mature consideration.
188
signification as the definition of coup d’oeil. But it is
undeniable that all able decisions formed in the moment of
action soon came to be understood by the expression, as, for
instance, the hitting upon the right point of attack, etc. It is,
therefore, not only the physical, but more frequently the
mental eye which is meant in coup d’oeil. Naturally, the
expression, like the thing, is always more in its place in the
field of tactics: still, it must not be wanting in strategy,
inasmuch as in it rapid decisions are often necessary. If we
strip this conception of that which the expression has given it
of the over-figurative and restricted, then it amounts simply to
the rapid discovery of a truth which to the ordinary mind is
either not visible at all or only becomes so after long
examination and reflection.
189
to the mere propensity to daring, to bravery, boldness, or
temerity. But, when there are sufficient motives in the man, let
them be objective or subjective, true or false, we have no
right to speak of his resolution; for, when we do so, we put
ourselves in his place, and we throw into the scale doubts
which did not exist with him.
190
point; but we say now as before, it is the average result which
indicates the existence of military genius. Should our
assertion appear extraordinary to any one, because he knows
many a resolute hussar officer who is no deep thinker, we
must remind him that the question here is about a peculiar
direction of the mind, and not about great thinking powers.
191
impression. The expression “presence of mind” certainly
denotes very fitly the readiness and rapidity of the help
rendered by the mind.
192
directly in the first place in relation to his person, without
disturbing his action as Commander. If the enemy, instead of
two hours, resists for four, the Commander instead of two
hours is four hours in danger; this is a quantity which plainly
diminishes the higher the rank of the Commander. What is it
for one in the post of Commander-in-Chief? It is nothing.
As long as his men full of good courage fight with zeal and
spirit, it is seldom necessary for the Chief to show great
energy of purpose in the pursuit of his object. But as soon as
difficulties arise—and that must always happen when great
results are at stake—then things no longer move on of
themselves like a well-oiled machine, the machine itself then
begins to offer resistance, and to overcome this the
Commander must have a great force of will. By this
resistance we must not exactly suppose disobedience and
murmurs, although these are frequent enough with particular
individuals; it is the whole feeling of the dissolution of all
physical and moral power, it is the heartrending sight of the
bloody sacrifice which the Commander has to contend with in
himself, and then in all others who directly or indirectly
transfer to him their impressions, feelings, anxieties, and
193
desires. As the forces in one individual after another become
prostrated, and can no longer be excited and supported by an
effort of his own will, the whole inertia of the mass gradually
rests its weight on the Will of the Commander: by the spark in
his breast, by the light of his spirit, the spark of purpose, the
light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others: in so far only
as he is equal to this, he stands above the masses and
continues to be their master; whenever that influence ceases,
and his own spirit is no longer strong enough to revive the
spirit of all others, the masses drawing him down with them
sink into the lower region of animal nature, which shrinks
from danger and knows not shame. These are the weights
which the courage and intelligent faculties of the military
Commander have to overcome if he is to make his name
illustrious. They increase with the masses, and therefore, if
the forces in question are to continue equal to the burden, they
must rise in proportion to the height of the station.
Of all the noble feelings which fill the human heart in the
exciting tumult of battle, none, we must admit, are so
powerful and constant as the soul’s thirst for honour and
renown, which the German language treats so unfairly and
tends to depreciate by the unworthy associations in the words
Ehrgeiz (greed of honour) and Ruhmsucht (hankering after
glory). No doubt it is just in War that the abuse of these proud
aspirations of the soul must bring upon the human race the
most shocking outrages, but by their origin they are certainly
194
to be counted amongst the noblest feelings which belong to
human nature, and in War they are the vivifying principle
which gives the enormous body a spirit. Although other
feelings may be more general in their influence, and many of
them—such as love of country, fanaticism, revenge,
enthusiasm of every kind—may seem to stand higher, the
thirst for honour and renown still remains indispensable.
Those other feelings may rouse the great masses in general,
and excite them more powerfully, but they do not give the
Leader a desire to will more than others, which is an essential
requisite in his position if he is to make himself distinguished
in it. They do not, like a thirst for honour, make the military
act specially the property of the Leader, which he strives to
turn to the best account; where he ploughs with toil, sows
with care, that he may reap plentifully. It is through these
aspirations we have been speaking of in Commanders, from
the highest to the lowest, this sort of energy, this spirit of
emulation, these incentives, that the action of armies is
chiefly animated and made successful. And now as to that
which specially concerns the head of all, we ask, Has there
ever been a great Commander destitute of the love of honour,
or is such a character even conceivable?
195
more systematic deliberation is connected with it, and from
this staunchness partly derives its power.
196
who have very little excitability, who are called phlegmatic or
indolent.
197
equanimity. They often want the positive motive to action,
impulse, and consequently activity, but they are not apt to
throw things into disorder.
198
the mind; therefore they frequently lose head, and that is the
worst phase in their nature as respects the conduct of War.
But it would be contrary to experience to maintain that very
excitable spirits can never preserve a steady
equilibrium—that is to say, that they cannot do so even under
the strongest excitement. Why should they not have the
sentiment of self-respect, for, as a rule, they are men of a
noble nature? This feeling is seldom wanting in them, but it
has not time to produce an effect. After an outburst they
suffer most from a feeling of inward humiliation. If through
education, self-observance, and experience of life, they have
learned, sooner or later, the means of being on their guard, so
that at the moment of powerful excitement they are conscious
betimes of the counteracting force within their own breasts,
then even such men may have great strength of mind.
199
noble minds belonging to savage nations, where the low
degree of mental cultivation favours always the dominance of
the passions. But even amongst the most civilised classes in
civilised States, life is full of examples of this kind—of men
carried away by the violence of their passions, like the
poacher of old chained to the stag in the forest.
200
from an imperative maxim of the understanding, refuses any
change of opinion up to a certain point.
201
Here often nothing else will help us but an imperative maxim
which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that
maxim is, in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion,
and not to give it up until a clear conviction forces us to do
so. We must firmly believe in the superior authority of
well-tried maxims, and under the dazzling influence of
momentary events not forget that their value is of an inferior
stamp. By this preference which in doubtful cases we give to
first convictions, by adherence to the same our actions acquire
that stability and consistency which make up what is called
character.
202
decidedly something better. Vanity is satisfied with mere
show, but obstinacy rests upon the enjoyment of the thing.
203
In this manner a great peculiarity is given to the effect of this
connection of War with country and ground. If we think of
other occupations of man which have a relation to these
objects, on horticulture, agriculture, on building houses and
hydraulic works, on mining, on the chase, and forestry, they
are all confined within very limited spaces which may be
soon explored with sufficient exactness. But the Commander
in War must commit the business he has in hand to a
corresponding space which his eye cannot survey, which the
keenest zeal cannot always explore, and with which, owing to
the constant changes taking place, he can also seldom become
properly acquainted. Certainly the enemy generally is in the
same situation; still, in the first place, the difficulty, although
common to both, is not the less a difficulty, and he who by
talent and practice overcomes it will have a great advantage
on his side; secondly, this equality of the difficulty on both
sides is merely an abstract supposition which is rarely realised
in the particular case, as one of the two opponents (the
defensive) usually knows much more of the locality than his
adversary.
204
drawn map, that this picture should be fixed, that the details
should never again separate themselves—all that can only be
effected by the mental faculty which we call imagination. If
some great poet or painter should feel hurt that we require
from his goddess such an office; if he shrugs his shoulders at
the notion that a sharp gamekeeper must necessarily excel in
imagination, we readily grant that we only speak here of
imagination in a limited sense, of its service in a really menial
capacity. But, however slight this service, still it must be the
work of that natural gift, for if that gift is wanting, it would be
difficult to imagine things plainly in all the completeness of
the visible. That a good memory is a great assistance we
freely allow, but whether memory is to be considered as an
independent faculty of the mind in this case, or whether it is
just that power of imagination which here fixes these things
better on the memory, we leave undecided, as in many
respects it seems difficult upon the whole to conceive these
two mental powers apart from each other.
205
his eyes the direction of the roads, rivers, and hills, without at
the same time being able to dispense with the narrower “sense
of locality” Orisinn. No doubt, information of various kinds
as to objects in general, maps, books, memoirs, and for details
the assistance of his Staff, are a great help to him; but it is
nevertheless certain that if he has himself a talent for forming
an ideal picture of a country quickly and distinctly, it lends to
his action an easier and firmer step, saves him from a certain
mental helplessness, and makes him less dependent on others.
206
is also by no means devoid of truth; but it does not show that
the efficiency of the soldier consists only in his courage, and
that there is no particular energy and capacity of the brain
required in addition to make a man merely what is called a
true soldier. We must again repeat that there is nothing more
common than to hear of men losing their energy on being
raised to a higher position, to which they do not feel
themselves equal; but we must also remind our readers that
we are speaking of pre-eminent services, of such as give
renown in the branch of activity to which they belong. Each
grade of command in War therefore forms its own stratum of
requisite capacity of fame and honour.
207
As we consider distinguished talents requisite for those who
are to attain distinction, even in inferior positions, it naturally
follows that we think highly of those who fill with renown the
place of Second in Command of an Army; and their seeming
simplicity of character as compared with a polyhistor, with
ready men of business, or with councillors of state, must not
lead us astray as to the superior nature of their intellectual
activity. It happens sometimes that men import the fame
gained in an inferior position into a higher one, without in
reality deserving it in the new position; and then if they are
not much employed, and therefore not much exposed to the
risk of showing their weak points, the judgment does not
distinguish very exactly what degree of fame is really due to
them; and thus such men are often the occasion of too low an
estimate being formed of the characteristics required to shine
in certain situations.
208
subservient to a higher judgment and philosophy—could not
attain by it to a glorious object. We do not give that title to
Henry IV. (of France), because he did not live long enough to
set at rest the relations of different States by his military
activity, and to occupy himself in that higher field where
noble feelings and a chivalrous disposition have less to do in
mastering the enemy than in overcoming internal dissension.
209
ordinary understanding could only bring to light with great
effort, and over which it would exhaust itself. But this higher
activity of the mind, this glance of genius, would still not
become matter of history if the qualities of temperament and
character of which we have treated did not give it their
support.
210
as mere scaffolding which had to be removed on the
completion of the building.
Of Danger in War
211
moments, which, however, are not the work of a single
pulse-beat, as is supposed, but rather like doctors’ draughts,
must be taken diluted and spoilt by mixture with time—such
moments, we say, are but few.
212
To add to all this, compassion strikes the beating heart with
pity at the sight of the maimed and fallen. The young soldier
cannot reach any of these different strata of danger without
feeling that the light of reason does not move here in the same
medium, that it is not refracted in the same manner as in
speculative contemplation. Indeed, he must be a very
extraordinary man who, under these impressions for the first
time, does not lose the power of making any instantaneous
decisions. It is true that habit soon blunts such impressions; in
half in hour we begin to be more or less indifferent to all that
is going on around us: but an ordinary character never attains
to complete coolness and the natural elasticity of mind; and so
we perceive that here again ordinary qualities will not
suffice—a thing which gains truth, the wider the sphere of
activity which is to be filled. Enthusiastic, stoical, natural
bravery, great ambition, or also long familiarity with
danger—much of all this there must be if all the effects
produced in this resistant medium are not to fall far short of
that which in the student’s chamber may appear only the
ordinary standard.
213
contain in themselves the exact relation between the person
giving the judgment and the object. We can perceive this by
observing how modestly subdued, even spiritless and
desponding, is the opinion passed upon the results of
untoward events by those who have been eye-witnesses, but
especially if they have been parties concerned. This is,
according to our view, a criterion of the influence which
bodily fatigue exercises, and of the allowance to be made for
it in matters of opinion.
214
Although here the question is strictly only respecting the
extreme effort required by a Commander from his Army, by a
leader from his followers, therefore of the spirit to demand it
and of the art of getting it, still the personal physical exertion
of Generals and of the Chief Commander must not be
overlooked. Having brought the analysis of War
conscientiously up to this point, we could not but take
account also of the weight of this small remaining residue.
Information in War
215
consider the nature of this foundation, its want of
trustworthiness, its changefulness, and we shall soon feel
what a dangerous edifice War is, how easily it may fall to
pieces and bury us in its ruins. For although it is a maxim in
all books that we should trust only certain information, that
we must be always suspicious, that is only a miserable book
comfort, belonging to that description of knowledge in which
writers of systems and compendiums take refuge for want of
anything better to say.
216
which are thus propagated like the waves of the sea subside
into themselves, still, like them, without any apparent cause
they rise again. Firm in reliance on his own better
convictions, the Chief must stand like a rock against which
the sea breaks its fury in vain. The role is not easy; he who is
not by nature of a buoyant disposition, or trained by
experience in War, and matured in judgment, may let it be his
rule to do violence to his own natural conviction by inclining
from the side of fear to that of hope; only by that means will
he be able to preserve his balance. This difficulty of seeing
things correctly, which is one of the greatest sources of
friction in War, makes things appear quite different from what
was expected. The impression of the senses is stronger than
the force of the ideas resulting from methodical reflection,
and this goes so far that no important undertaking was ever
yet carried out without the Commander having to subdue new
doubts in himself at the time of commencing the execution of
his work. Ordinary men who follow the suggestions of others
become, therefore, generally undecided on the spot; they
think that they have found circumstances different from what
they had expected, and this view gains strength by their again
yielding to the suggestions of others. But even the man who
has made his own plans, when he comes to see things with his
own eyes will often think he has done wrong. Firm reliance
on self must make him proof against the seeming pressure of
the moment; his first conviction will in the end prove true,
when the foreground scenery which fate has pushed on to the
stage of War, with its accompaniments of terrific objects, is
drawn aside and the horizon extended. This is one of the great
chasms which separate conception from execution.
217
Friction in War
218
strong will of a proud spirit stands prominent and
commanding in the middle of the Art of War.
219
march perhaps eight hours; the cavalry from charging
effectively because it is stuck fast in heavy ground.
220
proceed with the utmost ease. The knowledge of this friction
is a chief part of that so often talked of, experience in War,
which is required in a good General. Certainly he is not the
best General in whose mind it assumes the greatest
dimensions, who is the most over-awed by it (this includes
that class of over-anxious Generals, of whom there are so
many amongst the experienced); but a General must be aware
of it that he may overcome it, where that is possible, and that
he may not expect a degree of precision in results which is
impossible on account of this very friction. Besides, it can
never be learnt theoretically; and if it could, there would still
be wanting that experience of judgment which is called tact,
and which is always more necessary in a field full of
innumerable small and diversified objects than in great and
decisive cases, when one’s own judgment may be aided by
consultation with others. Just as the man of the world, through
tact of judgment which has become habit, speaks, acts, and
moves only as suits the occasion, so the officer experienced in
War will always, in great and small matters, at every
pulsation of War as we may say, decide and determine
suitably to the occasion. Through this experience and practice
the idea comes to his mind of itself that so and so will not
suit. And thus he will not easily place himself in a position by
which he is compromised, which, if it often occurs in War,
shakes all the foundations of confidence and becomes
extremely dangerous.
221
Concluding Remarks, Book I
222
be brought into exercise, is of much greater consequence than
those believe who do not know the thing by experience. It is
of immense importance that the soldier, high or low, whatever
rank he has, should not have to encounter in War those things
which, when seen for the first time, set him in astonishment
and perplexity; if he has only met with them one single time
before, even by that he is half acquainted with them. This
relates even to bodily fatigues. They should be practised less
to accustom the body to them than the mind. In War the
young soldier is very apt to regard unusual fatigues as the
consequence of faults, mistakes, and embarrassment in the
conduct of the whole, and to become distressed and
despondent as a consequence. This would not happen if he
had been prepared for this beforehand by exercises in peace.
223
besides that, if they cannot be placed in positions of superior
command, they may always be regarded as men acquainted
with the country, who may be questioned on many special
occasions.
224
is only the preparation for the combat, not the conduct of the
same. That arming and equipping are not essential to the
conception of fighting is plain, because mere wrestling is also
fighting.
225
To make a sound theory it is most essential to separate these
two activities, for it is easy to see that if every act of War is to
begin with the preparation of military forces, and to
presuppose forces so organised as a primary condition for
conducting War, that theory will only be applicable in the few
cases to which the force available happens to be exactly
suited. If, on the other hand, we wish to have a theory which
shall suit most cases, and will not be wholly useless in any
case, it must be founded on those means which are in most
general use, and in respect to these only on the actual results
springing from them.
226
be established by some writers as not in accordance with the
general usage of the terms.
227
near in their affinity. All these activities relate to the
maintenance of the military force. In the same way as its
creation and training precede its use, so its maintenance is
always a necessary condition. But, strictly viewed, all
activities thus connected with it are always to be regarded
only as preparations for fighting; they are certainly nothing
more than activities which are very close to the action, so that
they run through the hostile act alternate in importance with
the use of the forces. We have therefore a right to exclude
them as well as the other preparatory activities from the Art
of War in its restricted sense, from the conduct of War
properly so called; and we are obliged to do so if we would
comply with the first principle of all theory, the elimination of
all heterogeneous elements. Who would include in the real
“conduct of War” the whole litany of subsistence and
administration, because it is admitted to stand in constant
reciprocal action with the use of the troops, but is something
essentially different from it?
We have said, in the third chapter of our first book, that as the
fight or combat is the only directly effective activity,
therefore the threads of all others, as they end in it, are
included in it. By this we meant to say that to all others an
object was thereby appointed which, in accordance with the
laws peculiar to themselves, they must seek to attain. Here we
must go a little closer into this subject.
228
purely to the subsistence, and has only, in consequence of the
reciprocal action, a limited influence on the combats by its
results. The subjects which in one respect belong to the
fighting itself are marches, camps, and cantonments, for they
suppose so many different situations of troops, and where
troops are supposed there the idea of the combat must always
be present.
Marches are quite identical with the use of the troops. The act
of marching in the combat, generally called manoeuvring,
certainly does not necessarily include the use of weapons, but
it is so completely and necessarily combined with it that it
forms an integral part of that which we call a combat. But the
march outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a
strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled when,
where, and with what forces a battle is to be delivered—and
to carry that into execution the march is the only means.
229
But if a column, instead of following the road through a
valley, marches along the parallel ridge of heights, or for the
convenience of marching divides itself into several columns,
then these are tactical arrangements, for they relate to the
manner in which we shall use the troops in the anticipated
combat.
230
But although a march can be regarded absolutely as an
integral part of the combat, still there are in it certain relations
which do not belong to the combat, and therefore are neither
tactical nor strategic. To these belong all arrangements which
concern only the accommodation of the troops, the
construction of bridges, roads, etc. These are only conditions;
under many circumstances they are in very close connection,
and may almost identify themselves with the troops, as in
building a bridge in presence of the enemy; but in themselves
they are always activities, the theory of which does not form
part of the theory of the conduct of War.
231
of objects, for everything which appears an advantage may be
the object of a combat, and the preservation of the instrument
with which War is made must necessarily very often become
the object of its partial combinations.
232
is conceivable enough. The care for the subsistence of the
troops comes therefore into reciprocal action chiefly with
strategy, and there is nothing more common than for the
leading strategic features of a campaign and War to be traced
out in connection with a view to this supply. But however
frequent and however important these views of supply may
be, the subsistence of the troops always remains a completely
different activity from the use of the troops, and the former
has only an influence on the latter by its results.
233
of the different ways and systems which the above theories
may furnish, in the same way as is certainly necessary in
regard to victualling troops.
The present theory will therefore treat the combat as the real
contest, marches, camps, and cantonments as circumstances
which are more or less identical with it. The subsistence of
the troops will only come into consideration like other given
circumstances in respect of its results, not as an activity
belonging to the combat.
234
The Art of War thus viewed in its limited sense divides itself
again into tactics and strategy. The former occupies itself with
the form of the separate combat, the latter with its use. Both
connect themselves with the circumstances of marches,
camps, cantonments only through the combat, and these
circumstances are tactical or strategic according as they relate
to the form or to the signification of the battle.
235
vague generalities, which we are often obliged to hear and
read on the conduct of War, owing to the spirit of scientific
investigation having hitherto been little directed to these
subjects.
236
In the art of sieges we first perceive a certain degree of
guidance of the combat, something of the action of the
intellectual faculties upon the material forces placed under
their control, but generally only so far that it very soon
embodied itself again in new material forms, such as
approaches, trenches, counter-approaches, batteries, etc., and
every step which this action of the higher faculties took was
marked by some such result; it was only the thread that was
required on which to string these material inventions in order.
As the intellect can hardly manifest itself in this kind of War,
except in such things, so therefore nearly all that was
necessary was done in that way.
237
on this point also forced themselves into men’s minds, but
they mostly appeared only incidentally in memoirs and
narratives, and in a certain measure incognito.
238
and a one-sided activity. Their aim was to reach results, as in
the science for the preparation for War, entirely certain and
positive, and therefore only to take into consideration that
which could be made matter of calculation.
8. Superiority of Numbers
9. Victualling of Troops
10. Base
239
An ingenious author tried to concentrate in a single
conception, that of a base, a whole host of objects amongst
which sundry relations even with immaterial forces found
their way in as well. The list comprised the subsistence of the
troops, the keeping them complete in numbers and equipment,
the security of communications with the home country, lastly,
the security of retreat in case it became necessary; and, first of
all, he proposed to substitute this conception of a base for all
these things; then for the base itself to substitute its own
length (extent); and, last of all, to substitute the angle formed
by the army with this base: all this was done to obtain a pure
geometrical result utterly useless. This last is, in fact,
unavoidable, if we reflect that none of these substitutions
could be made without violating truth and leaving out some of
the things contained in the original conception. The idea of a
base is a real necessity for strategy, and to have conceived it
is meritorious; but to make such a use of it as we have
depicted is completely inadmissible, and could not but lead to
partial conclusions which have forced these theorists into a
direction opposed to common sense, namely, to a belief in the
decisive effect of the enveloping form of attack.
240
All these attempts at theory are only to be considered in their
analytical part as progress in the province of truth, but in their
synthetical part, in their precepts and rules, they are quite
unserviceable.
They direct the attention only upon material forces, while the
whole military action is penetrated throughout by intelligent
forces and their effects.
241
humbler it is so much the sooner will ridicule and contempt
drive it out of real life.
242
But the intelligent forces are only visible to the inner eye, and
this is different in each person, and often different in the same
person at different times.
243
In order to comprehend clearly the difficulty of the
proposition which is contained in a theory for the conduct of
War, and thence to deduce the necessary characteristics of
such a theory, we must take a closer view of the chief
particulars which make up the nature of activity in War.
(Hostile Feeling)
244
Besides that excitation of feelings naturally arising from the
combat itself, there are others also which do not essentially
belong to it, but which, on account of their relationship, easily
unite with it—ambition, love of power, enthusiasm of every
kind, etc. etc.
245
actually present, but also through the imagination at all other
moments, which have a connection with the present; lastly,
not only directly by itself, but also indirectly by the
responsibility which makes it bear with tenfold weight on the
mind of the chief actor. Who could advise, or resolve upon a
great battle, without feeling his mind more or less wrought
up, or perplexed by, the danger and responsibility which such
a great act of decision carries in itself? We may say that
action in War, in so far as it is real action, not a mere
condition, is never out of the sphere of danger.
246
The peculiar characteristics of mind in the chief actor have, as
well as those of the feelings, a high importance. From an
imaginative, flighty, inexperienced head, and from a calm,
sagacious understanding, different things are to be expected.
247
24. Third Peculiarity.— Uncertainty of All Data
What this feeble light leaves indistinct to the sight talent must
discover, or must be left to chance. It is therefore again talent,
or the favour of fortune, on which reliance must be placed, for
want of objective knowledge.
248
Two means present themselves of getting out of this
difficulty. In the first place, what we have said of the nature
of military action in general does not apply in the same
manner to the action of every one, whatever may be his
standing. In the lower ranks the spirit of self-sacrifice is
called more into request, but the difficulties which the
understanding and judgment meet with are infinitely less. The
field of occurrences is more confined. Ends and means are
fewer in number. Data more distinct; mostly also contained in
the actually visible. But the higher we ascend the more the
difficulties increase, until in the Commander-in-Chief they
reach their climax, so that with him almost everything must
be left to genius.
249
direction for action. As a general rule, whenever an activity is
for the most part occupied with the same objects over and
over again, with the same ends and means, although there
may be trifling alterations and a corresponding number of
varieties of combination, such things are capable of becoming
a subject of study for the reasoning faculties. But such study
is just the most essential part of every theory, and has a
peculiar title to that name. It is an analytical investigation of
the subject that leads to an exact knowledge; and if brought to
bear on the results of experience, which in our case would be
military history, to a thorough familiarity with it. The nearer
theory attains the latter object, so much the more it passes
over from the objective form of knowledge into the subjective
one of skill in action; and so much the more, therefore, it will
prove itself effective when circumstances allow of no other
decision but that of personal talents; it will show its effects in
that talent itself. If theory investigates the subjects which
constitute War; if it separates more distinctly that which at
first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the
properties of the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it
makes evident the nature of objects; if it brings to bear all
over the field of War the light of essentially critical
investigation—then it has fulfilled the chief duties of its
province. It becomes then a guide to him who wishes to make
himself acquainted with War from books; it lights up the
whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his
judgment, and shields him from error.
250
ground and toiling through his subject, but may find the thing
in order, and light admitted on it. It should educate the mind
of the future leader in War, or rather guide him in his
self-instruction, but not accompany him to the field of battle;
just as a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind
of a youth without, therefore, keeping him in leading strings
all through his life.
251
29. Theory Therefore Considers the Nature of Ends and
Means—ends and Means in Tactics
252
31. Locality
33. Weather
Still more rarely has the weather any decisive influence, and
it is mostly only by fogs that it plays a part.
253
Strategy has in the first instance only the victory, that is, the
tactical result, as a means to its object, and ultimately those
things which lead directly to peace. The application of its
means to this object is at the same time attended by
circumstances which have an influence thereon more or less.
254
There remain, therefore, as objects, only those things which
may be supposed as leading directly to peace, Theory
investigates all these ends and means according to the nature
of their effects and their mutual relations.
255
result from it, is a matter of indifference; for the conduct of
War is not making powder and cannon out of a given quantity
of charcoal, sulphur, and saltpetre, of copper and tin: the
given quantities for the conduct of War are arms in a finished
state and their effects. Strategy makes use of maps without
troubling itself about triangulations; it does not inquire how
the country is subdivided into departments and provinces, and
how the people are educated and governed, in order to attain
the best military results; but it takes things as it finds them in
the community of European States, and observes where very
different conditions have a notable influence on War.
256
higher ranks even in supreme Command, whose pursuits had
been previously of a totally different nature; indeed how, as a
rule, the most distinguished Generals have never risen from
the very learned or really erudite class of officers, but have
been mostly men who, from the circumstances of their
position, could not have attained to any great amount of
knowledge. On that account those who have considered it
necessary or even beneficial to commence the education of a
future General by instruction in all details have always been
ridiculed as absurd pedants. It would be easy to show the
injurious tendency of such a course, because the human mind
is trained by the knowledge imparted to it and the direction
given to its ideas. Only what is great can make it great; the
little can only make it little, if the mind itself does not reject it
as something repugnant.
People with whom common sense had the upper hand felt
sensible of the immense distance remaining to be filled up
between a genius of the highest order and a learned pedant;
and they became in a manner free-thinkers, rejected all belief
257
in theory, and affirmed the conduct of War to be a natural
function of man, which he performs more or less well
according as he has brought with him into the world more or
less talent in that direction. It cannot be denied that these were
nearer to the truth than those who placed a value on false
knowledge: at the same time it may easily be seen that such a
view is itself but an exaggeration. No activity of the human
understanding is possible without a certain stock of ideas; but
these are, for the greater part at least, not innate but acquired,
and constitute his knowledge. The only question therefore is,
of what kind should these ideas be; and we think we have
answered it if we say that they should be directed on those
things which man has directly to deal with in War.
258
and maintain also that the activity of mind, is only simple,
and easy in inferior stations, but increases in difficulty with
increase of rank, and in the highest position, in that of
Commander-in-Chief, is to be reckoned among the most
difficult which there is for the human mind.
259
and that it is also to be gained by experience of life as well as
by study and reflection. Life will never bring forth a Newton
or an Euler by its rich teachings, but it may bring forth great
calculators in War, such as Conde’ or Frederick.
260
but which he applies, for the most part, as if by mechanical
dexterity. But it is never so in War. The moral reaction, the
ever-changeful form of things, makes it necessary for the
chief actor to carry in himself the whole mental apparatus of
his knowledge, that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may
be capable of giving the requisite decision from himself.
Knowledge must, by this complete assimilation with his own
mind and life, be converted into real power. This is the reason
why everything seems so easy with men distinguished in War,
and why everything is ascribed to natural talent. We say
natural talent, in order thereby to distinguish it from that
which is formed and matured by observation and study.
261
surer, never forces him into opposition with himself in order
to obey an objective truth.
262
worth observing that there is also no science without a
mixture of Art. In mathematics, for instance, the use of
figures and of algebra is an Art, but that is only one amongst
many instances. The reason is, that however plain and
palpable the difference is between knowledge and power in
the composite results of human knowledge, yet it is difficult
to trace out their line of separation in man himself.
(Art of War)
All thinking is indeed Art. Where the logician draws the line,
where the premises stop which are the result of
cognition—where judgment begins, there Art begins. But
more than this even the perception of the mind is judgment
again, and consequently Art; and at last, even the perception
by the senses as well. In a word, if it is impossible to imagine
a human being possessing merely the faculty of cognition,
devoid of judgment or the reverse, so also Art and Science
can never be completely separated from each other. The more
these subtle elements of light embody themselves in the
outward forms of the world, so much the more separate
appear their domains; and now once more, where the object is
creation and production, there is the province of Art; where
the object is investigation and knowledge Science holds
sway.—After all this it results of itself that it is more fitting to
say Art of War than Science of War.
263
starting-point of ideas which has led to a wrong direction
being taken, which has caused War to be put on a par with
other arts and sciences, and has led to a number of erroneous
analogies.
This has indeed been felt before now, and on that it was
maintained that War is a handicraft; but there was more lost
than gained by that, for a handicraft is only an inferior art, and
as such is also subject to definite and rigid laws. In reality the
Art of War did go on for some time in the spirit of a
handicraft—we allude to the times of the Condottieri—but
then it received that direction, not from intrinsic but from
external causes; and military history shows how little it was at
that time in accordance with the nature of the thing.
264
4. Difference
265
Methodicism
266
relations in it, and if it therefore has a certain value only for
the person himself who makes it.
267
soon acquires something of the nature of a mechanical
appliance, which in the end does that which is right almost
unwittingly.
268
If from the unusual cooking by an enemy’s camp his
movement is inferred, if the intentional exposure of troops in
a combat indicates a false attack, then this way of discerning
the truth is called rule, because from a single visible
circumstance that conclusion is drawn which corresponds
with the same.
269
certainly appear in the theory of the conduct of War, provided
only they are not represented as something different from
what they are, not as the absolute and necessary modes of
action (systems), but as the best of general forms which may
be used as shorter ways in place of a particular disposition for
the occasion, at discretion.
270
are so especially to be dreaded in a sphere where experience
is so costly.
271
the most comprehensive subjects of activity. A constant order
of battle, a constant formation of advance guards and
outposts, are methods by which a General ties not only his
subordinates’ hands, but also his own in certain cases.
Certainly they may have been devised by himself, and may be
applied by him according to circumstances, but they may also
be a subject of theory, in so far as they are based on the
general properties of troops and weapons. On the other hand,
any method by which definite plans for wars or campaigns are
to be given out all ready made as if from a machine are
absolutely worthless.
272
method, and see therefore that method of action can reach up
to regions bordering on the highest. Should an improved
theory facilitate the study of the conduct of War, form the
mind and judgment of men who are rising to the highest
commands, then also method in action will no longer reach so
far, and so much of it as is to be considered indispensable will
then at least be formed from theory itself, and not take place
out of mere imitation. However pre-eminently a great
Commander does things, there is always something subjective
in the way he does them; and if he has a certain manner, a
large share of his individuality is contained in it which does
not always accord with the individuality of the person who
copies his manner.
273
was ever ruined, even on the field of battle, all this was done
through a manner which had outlived its day, together with
the most downright stupidity to which methodicism ever led.
Criticism
274
Thirdly, the testing of the means employed. This is criticism,
properly speaking, in which praise and censure is contained.
This is where theory helps history, or rather, the teaching to
be derived from it.
275
War seldom proceeds from one simple cause, but from
several in common, and that it therefore is not sufficient to
follow up a series of events to their origin in a candid and
impartial spirit, but that it is then also necessary to apportion
to each contributing cause its due weight. This leads,
therefore, to a closer investigation of their nature, and thus a
critical investigation may lead into what is the proper field of
theory.
We have seen that both the search for causes and the
examination of means lead into the field of theory; that is,
into the field of universal truth, which does not proceed solely
from the case immediately under examination. If there is a
theory which can be used, then the critical consideration will
appeal to the proofs there afforded, and the examination may
there stop. But where no such theoretical truth is to be found,
the inquiry must be pushed up to the original elements. If this
necessity occurs often, it must lead the historian (according to
276
a common expression) into a labyrinth of details. He then has
his hands full, and it is impossible for him to stop to give the
requisite attention everywhere; the consequence is, that in
order to set bounds to his investigation, he adopts some
arbitrary assumptions which, if they do not appear so to him,
do so to others, as they are not evident in themselves or
capable of proof.
277
standard, but in the same way as the person acting should use
them, that is, merely as aids to judgment. If it is an
acknowledged principle in tactics that in the usual order of
battle cavalry should be placed behind infantry, not in line
with it, still it would be folly on this account to condemn
every deviation from this principle. Criticism must investigate
the grounds of the deviation, and it is only in case these are
insufficient that it has a right to appeal to principles laid down
in theory. If it is further established in theory that a divided
attack diminishes the probability of success, still it would be
just as unreasonable, whenever there is a divided attack and
an unsuccessful issue, to regard the latter as the result of the
former, without further investigation into the connection
between the two, as where a divided attack is successful to
infer from it the fallacy of that theoretical principle. The spirit
of investigation which belongs to criticism cannot allow
either. Criticism therefore supports itself chiefly on the results
of the analytical investigation of theory; what has been made
out and determined by theory does not require to be
demonstrated over again by criticism, and it is so determined
by theory that criticism may find it ready demonstrated.
278
chiefly that greatness of result as his object; if so, the proper
means were chosen. But if by this form he intended to make
the result more certain, and that expectation was founded not
on some exceptional circumstances (in this case), but on the
general nature of the convergent form, as has happened a
hundred times, then he mistook the nature of the means and
committed an error.
279
It is evident that in thus ascending, at every new station which
we reach a new point of view for the judgment is attained, so
that the same means which appeared advisable at one station,
when looked at from the next above it may have to be
rejected.
280
It is obvious that this may sometimes lead to a wide field of
inquiry, in which it is easy to wander and lose the way, and in
which this difficulty prevails—that a number of assumptions
or suppositions must be made about a variety of things which
do not actually appear, but which in all probability did take
place, and therefore cannot possibly be left out of
consideration.
281
whole campaign lost. This consideration, which attracted the
serious attention of Buonaparte at Villach, no doubt induced
him to sign the armistice of Leoben with so much readiness.
282
satisfied with the conquest of a considerable portion to serve
as a security for peace? The probable result in each case must
be estimated, in order to come to a conclusion as to the
probable determination of the Directory. Supposing the result
of these considerations to be that the French forces were
much too weak for the complete subjugation of the Austrian
monarchy, so that the attempt might completely reverse the
respective positions of the contending Armies, and that even
the conquest and occupation of a considerable district of
country would place the French Army in strategic relations to
which they were not equal, then that result must naturally
influence the estimate of the position of the Army of Italy,
and compel it to lower its expectations. And this, it was no
doubt which influenced Buonaparte, although fully aware of
the helpless condition of the Archduke, still to sign the peace
of Campo Formio, which imposed no greater sacrifices on the
Austrians than the loss of provinces which, even if the
campaign took the most favourable turn for them, they could
not have reconquered. But the French could not have
reckoned on even the moderate treaty of Campo Formio, and
therefore it could not have been their object in making their
bold advance if two considerations had not presented
themselves to their view, the first of which consisted in the
question, what degree of value the Austrians would attach to
each of the above-mentioned results; whether,
notwithstanding the probability of a satisfactory result in
either of these cases, would it be worth while to make the
sacrifices inseparable from a continuance of the War, when
they could be spared those sacrifices by a peace on terms not
too humiliating? The second consideration is the question
whether the Austrian Government, instead of seriously
weighing the possible results of a resistance pushed to
283
extremities, would not prove completely disheartened by the
impression of their present reverses.
284
rests chiefly with the latter to throw the requisite light on the
interrelations of things, and to distinguish from amongst the
endless connections of events those which are really essential.
We are far from seeing a field for great genius in a case which
admits only of the application of a few simple combinations,
and we think it exceedingly ridiculous to hold up, as is often
done, the turning of a position as an invention showing the
highest genius; still nevertheless this creative self-activity on
the part of the critic is necessary, and it is one of the points
which essentially determine the value of critical examination.
285
only one opinion on these achievements, that of unmixed
admiration.
286
his having done so; in no critical works has it been touched
upon, the measure being one which the mind had lost sight of.
The merit of resuscitating the idea of this means is not great,
for it suggests itself at once to any one who breaks loose from
the trammels of fashion. Still it is necessary that it should
suggest itself for us to bring it into consideration and compare
it with the means which Buonaparte employed. Whatever
may be the result of the comparison, it is one which should
not be omitted by criticism.
287
In this case the means of comparison lie much more on the
surface than in the foregoing, but they have been equally
overlooked, because one-sided views have prevailed, and
there has been no freedom of judgment.
Should we, for example, not rest content with assertion in the
case before mentioned, and wish to prove that the persistent
pursuit of Bluecher would have been more advantageous than
the turning on Schwartzenberg, we should support the
arguments on the following simple truths:
288
power is already shaken by considerable losses there is the
more reason to expect fresh successes, therefore in that way
no part of the preponderance already gained is left idle.
289
There are people, no doubt, who will not be convinced on
these arguments, but at all events they cannot retort by saying,
that “whilst Buonaparte threatened Schwartzenberg’s base by
advancing to the Rhine, Schwartzenberg at the same time
threatened Buonaparte’s communications with Paris,”
because we have shown by the reasons above given that
Schwartzenberg would never have thought of marching on
Paris.
290
the Art of War than all philosophical truth. But this
exemplification from history is subject to certain conditions,
of which we shall treat in a special chapter and unfortunately
these conditions are so seldom regarded that reference to
history generally only serves to increase the confusion of
ideas.
The latter can only be learnt from the memoirs of the chief
actor, or from his intimate friends; and in such things of this
kind are often treated of in a very desultory manner, or
purposely misrepresented. Criticism must, therefore, always
291
forego much which was present in the minds of those whose
acts are criticised.
But it is not only in relation to the result, that is, with what
takes place at the last, that this embarrassment arises; the
same occurs in relation to preceding events, therefore with the
data which furnished the motives to action. Criticism has
before it, in most cases, more information on this point than
the principal in the transaction. Now it may seem easy to
dismiss from the consideration everything of this nature, but it
is not so easy as we may think. The knowledge of preceding
and concurrent events is founded not only on certain
information, but on a number of conjectures and suppositions;
292
indeed, there is hardly any of the information respecting
things not purely accidental which has not been preceded by
suppositions or conjectures destined to take the place of
certain information in case such should never be supplied.
Now is it conceivable that criticism in after times, which has
before it as facts all the preceding and concurrent
circumstances, should not allow itself to be thereby
influenced when it asks itself the question, What portion of
the circumstances, which at the moment of action were
unknown, would it have held to be probable? We maintain
that in this case, as in the case of the results, and for the same
reason, it is impossible to disregard all these things
completely.
293
coincidences of events that it can recognise with admiration
how much is due to the exercise of genius, and that it first
learns the essential combination which the glance of that
genius devised.
294
This is, therefore, an opinion formed through the connection
of events, and therefore through the result. But there is
another quite different effect of the result itself upon the
judgment, that is if it is used quite alone as an example for or
against the soundness of a measure. This may be called
judgment according to the result. Such a judgment appears at
first sight inadmissible, and yet it is not.
295
ended in similar catastrophes. Whatever, therefore, of genius,
skill, and energy the Conqueror of the World applied to the
task, this last question addressed to fate [“Frage an der
Schicksal,”a familiar quotation from Schiller.—TR.]
remained always the same. Shall we then discard the
campaigns of 1805, 1807, 1809, and say on account of the
campaign of 1812 that they were acts of imprudence; that the
results were against the nature of things, and that in 1812
strategic justice at last found vent for itself in opposition to
blind chance? That would be an unwarrantable conclusion, a
most arbitrary judgment, a case only half proved, because no
human, eye can trace the thread of the necessary connection
of events up to the determination of the conquered Princes.
Still less can we say the campaign of 1812 merited the same
success as the others, and that the reason why it turned out
otherwise lies in something unnatural, for we cannot regard
the firmness of Alexander as something unpredictable.
What can be more natural than to say that in the years 1805,
1807, 1809, Buonaparte judged his opponents correctly, and
that in 1812 he erred in that point? On the former occasions,
therefore, he was right, in the latter wrong, and in both cases
we judge by the result.
296
all our theoretical views. There are cases in which the greatest
daring is the greatest wisdom.
297
This verdict of the result must therefore always bring forth
that which human sagacity cannot discover; and it will be
chiefly as regards the intellectual powers and operations that
it will be called into requisition, partly because they can be
estimated with the least certainty, partly because their close
connection with the will is favourable to their exercising over
it an important influence. When fear or bravery precipitates
the decision, there is nothing objective intervening between
them for our consideration, and consequently nothing by
which sagacity and calculation might have met the probable
result.
298
perception of the mind, then it must be the same also in a
critical review.
299
the one-sidedness of such systems, and this only requires to
be done once to throw discredit for ever on critical judgments
which are based on them. We have here to deal with a definite
subject, and as the number of possible systems after all can be
but small, therefore also they are themselves the lesser evil.
300
kernel. The author himself has no clear perception of what he
means, contents himself with vague ideas, which if expressed
in plain language would be unsatisfactory even to himself.
301
On Examples
302
experiments are continually in progress in order to investigate
them more fully. That an iron ball to which powder has given
a velocity of 1000 feet in a second, smashes every living thing
which it touches in its course is intelligible in itself;
experience is not required to tell us that; but in producing this
effect how many hundred circumstances are concerned, some
of which can only be learnt by experience! And the physical
is not the only effect which we have to study, it is the moral
which we are in search of, and that can only be ascertained by
experience; and there is no other way of learning and
appreciating it but by experience. In the middle ages, when
firearms were first invented, their effect, owing to their rude
make, was materially but trifling compared to what it now is,
but their effect morally was much greater. One must have
witnessed the firmness of one of those masses taught and led
by Buonaparte, under the heaviest and most unintermittent
cannonade, in order to understand what troops, hardened by
long practice in the field of danger, can do, when by a career
of victory they have reached the noble principle of demanding
from themselves their utmost efforts. In pure conception no
one would believe it. On the other hand, it is well known that
there are troops in the service of European Powers at the
present moment who would easily be dispersed by a few
cannon shots.
303
general in order to show its origin, but not as a verification of
its truth.
304
Lastly, in the fourth place, from the circumstantial detail of a
historical event, and by collecting together several of them,
we may deduce some theory, which therefore has its true
proof in this testimony itself.
305
details which we are unable to give neutralise each other in
their effects in a certain number of cases.
306
of frequent occurrence, and therefore a dozen other cases with
an opposite result might just as easily be brought forward. If
any one will instance a dozen lost battles in which the side
beaten attacked in separate converging columns, we can
instance a dozen that have been gained in which the same
order was adopted. It is evident that in this way no result is to
be obtained.
307
because he was one of the first to bring theoretical, that is,
abstract, ideas into connection with the practical in war, in so
far that the cases brought forward may be regarded as
intended to exemplify and confirm what is theoretically
asserted—yet, in the opinion of an impartial reader, he will
hardly be allowed to have attained the object he proposed to
himself, that of proving theoretical principles by historical
examples. For although he sometimes relates occurrences
with great minuteness, still he falls short very often of
showing that the deductions drawn necessarily proceed from
the inner relations of these events.
308
appearance if the writer had looked upon it as his duty to
deduce from the strict connection of events everything new
which he brought to market, and sought to prove from history.
309
and barren of detail. The most useless of all is that of the old
world.
310
but in general we fail to discover any honest intention and
earnest endeavour to instruct and convince, and we can
therefore only look upon such quotations and references as
embellishments to fill up gaps and hide defects.
311
and moral powers which are the most important in the use of
the same.
That this, however, has not always been the view taken is
evident from the former custom of keeping Strategy in the
cabinet and not with the Army, a thing only allowable if the
cabinet is so near to the Army that it can be taken for the chief
head-quarters of the Army.
312
If we recall to mind from the first chapter how many things of
the highest importance War touches upon, we may conceive
that a consideration of all requires a rare grasp of mind.
313
be concerned with anything but the material forces, so that all
must be confined to a few mathematical relations of
equilibrium and preponderance, of time and space, and a few
lines and angles. If it were nothing more than this, then out of
such a miserable business there would not be a scientific
problem for even a schoolboy.
314
will combine in himself all those qualities which are required
to raise a man above mediocrity in the career of a general.
It may sound strange, but for all who know War in this
respect it is a fact beyond doubt, that much more strength of
will is required to make an important decision in Strategy
than in tactics. In the latter we are hurried on with the
moment; a Commander feels himself borne along in a strong
current, against which he durst not contend without the most
destructive consequences, he suppresses the rising fears, and
boldly ventures further. In Strategy, where all goes on at a
slower rate, there is more room allowed for our own
apprehensions and those of others, for objections and
remonstrances, consequently also for unseasonable regrets;
and as we do not see things in Strategy as we do at least half
of them in tactics, with the living eye, but everything must be
conjectured and assumed, the convictions produced are less
powerful. The consequence is that most Generals, when they
should act, remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts.
315
this campaign, but throughout all the three Wars of the Great
King!
316
Another feature relates to the difficulty of execution. Marches
to turn a flank, right or left, are easily combined; the idea of
keeping a small force always well concentrated to be able to
meet the enemy on equal terms at any point, to multiply a
force by rapid movement, is as easily conceived as expressed;
the mere contrivance in these points, therefore, cannot excite
our admiration, and with respect to such simple things, there
is nothing further than to admit that they are simple.
It was the same with his marches, under the eyes, nay, often
under the cannon of the enemy’s Army; these camps were
taken up, these marches made, not from want of prudence, but
because in Daun’s system, in his mode of drawing up his
Army, in the responsibility which pressed upon him, and in
his character, Frederick found that security which justified his
camps and marches. But it required the King’s boldness,
determination, and strength of will to see things in this light,
and not to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of
which thirty years after people still wrote and spoke. Few
Generals in this situation would have believed these simple
strategic means to be practicable.
317
battle, and its marches had to be organised with a degree of
skill which necessarily called forth a proportionate amount of
exertion. Although attended and delayed by thousands of
waggons, still its subsistence was extremely difficult. In
Silesia, for eight days before the battle of Leignitz, it had
constantly to march, defiling alternately right and left in front
of the enemy:—this costs great fatigue, and entails great
privations.
318
describe those separate subjects which appear to us the most
important, whether of a moral or material nature; then
proceed from the simple to the complex, and conclude with
the inner connection of the whole act of War, in other words,
with the plan for a War or campaign.
Observation
319
the enemy to expect, in case he seeks to recover the lost
province, that we remain in possession of the same.
But these effects are of two kinds, direct and indirect they are
of the latter, if other things intrude themselves and become
the object of the combat—things which cannot be regarded as
the destruction of enemy’s force, but only leading up to it,
certainly by a circuitous road, but with so much the greater
effect. The possession of provinces, towns, fortresses, roads,
bridges, magazines, etc., may be the immediate object of a
battle, but never the ultimate one. Things of this description
can never be, looked upon otherwise than as means of gaining
320
greater superiority, so as at last to offer battle to the enemy in
such a way that it will be impossible for him to accept it.
Therefore all these things must only be regarded as
intermediate links, steps, as it were, leading up to the
effectual principle, but never as that principle itself.
3. Example
321
4. When this View Is Not Taken, Then a False Value Is Given
to Other Things
322
Elements of Strategy
The first class includes all that can be called forth by moral
qualities and effects; to the second belong the whole mass of
the military force, its organisation, the proportion of the three
arms, etc. etc.; to the third, the angle of the lines of operation,
the concentric and eccentric movements in as far as their
geometrical nature has any value in the calculation; to the
fourth, the influences of country, such as commanding points,
hills, rivers, woods, roads, etc. etc.; lastly, to the fifth, all the
means of supply. The separation of these things once for all in
the mind does good in giving clearness and helping us to
estimate at once, at a higher or lower value, the different
classes as we pass onwards. For, in considering them
separately, many lose of themselves their borrowed
importance; one feels, for instance, quite plainly that the
value of a base of operations, even if we look at nothing in it
but its relative position to the line of operations, depends
much less in that simple form on the geometrical element of
the angle which they form with one another, than on the
nature of the roads and the country through which they pass.
323
We should lose ourselves in the most soulless analysis, and as
if in a horrid dream, we should be for ever trying in vain to
build up an arch to connect this base of abstractions with facts
belonging to the real world. Heaven preserve every theorist
from such an undertaking! We shall keep to the world of
things in their totality, and not pursue our analysis further
than is necessary from time to time to give distinctness to the
idea which we wish to impart, and which has come to us, not
by a speculative investigation, but through the impression
made by the realities of War in their entirety.
Moral Forces
324
The spirit and other moral qualities which animate an Army, a
General, or Governments, public opinion in provinces in
which a War is raging, the moral effect of a victory or of a
defeat, are things which in themselves vary very much in their
nature, and which also, according as they stand with regard to
our object and our relations, may have an influence in
different ways.
325
fused, and are not to be decomposed like a metal alloy by a
chemical process. In every rule relating to the physical forces,
theory must present to the mind at the same time the share
which the moral powers will have in it, if it would not be led
to categorical propositions, at one time too timid and
contracted, at another too dogmatical and wide. Even the
most matter-of-fact theories have, without knowing it, strayed
over into this moral kingdom; for, as an example, the effects
of a victory cannot in any way be explained without taking
into consideration the moral impressions. And therefore the
most of the subjects which we shall go through in this book
are composed half of physical, half of moral causes and
effects, and we might say the physical are almost no more
than the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal,
the real bright-polished weapon.
326
drawn attention to the importance of the subject in a general
way, and to have pointed out the spirit in which the views
given in this book have been conceived.
327
where every one down to the common soldier is left to
himself. On this account, a mountainous country is the best
campaigning ground for popular levies.
328
War is a special business, and however general its relations
may be, and even if all the male population of a country,
capable of bearing arms, exercise this calling, still it always
continues to be different and separate from the other pursuits
which occupy the life of man.—To be imbued with a sense of
the spirit and nature of this business, to make use of, to rouse,
to assimilate into the system the powers which should be
active in it, to penetrate completely into the nature of the
business with the understanding, through exercise to gain
confidence and expertness in it, to be completely given up to
it, to pass out of the man into the part which it is assigned to
us to play in War, that is the military virtue of an Army in the
individual.
329
An Army which preserves its usual formations under the
heaviest fire, which is never shaken by imaginary fears, and
in the face of real danger disputes the ground inch by inch,
which, proud in the feeling of its victories, never loses its
sense of obedience, its respect for and confidence in its
leaders, even under the depressing effects of defeat; an Army
with all its physical powers, inured to privations and fatigue
by exercise, like the muscles of an athlete; an Army which
looks upon all its toils as the means to victory, not as a curse
which hovers over its standards, and which is always
reminded of its duties and virtues by the short catechism of
one idea, namely the honour of its arms;—Such an Army is
imbued with the true military spirit.
330
Military virtue is for the parts, what the genius of the
Commander is for the whole. The General can only guide the
whole, not each separate part, and where he cannot guide the
part, there military virtue must be its leader. A General is
chosen by the reputation of his superior talents, the chief
leaders of large masses after careful probation; but this
probation diminishes as we descend the scale of rank, and in
just the same measure we may reckon less and less upon
individual talents; but what is wanting in this respect military
virtue should supply. The natural qualities of a warlike people
play just this part: bravery, aptitude, powers of endurance and
enthusiasm.
331
From these truths the only lesson to be derived is this, that if
an Army is deficient in this quality, every endeavour should
be made to simplify the operations of the War as much as
possible, or to introduce double efficiency in the organisation
of the Army in some other respect, and not to expect from the
mere name of a standing Army, that which only the veritable
thing itself can give.
This spirit can only be generated from two sources, and only
by these two conjointly; the first is a succession of campaigns
and great victories; the other is, an activity of the Army
carried sometimes to the highest pitch. Only by these, does
the soldier learn to know his powers. The more a General is in
the habit of demanding from his troops, the surer he will be
that his demands will be answered. The soldier is as proud of
overcoming toil, as he is of surmounting danger. Therefore it
332
is only in the soil of incessant activity and exertion that the
germ will thrive, but also only in the sunshine of victory.
Once it becomes a strong tree, it will stand against the fiercest
storms of misfortune and defeat, and even against the indolent
inactivity of peace, at least for a time. It can therefore only be
created in War, and under great Generals, but no doubt it may
last at least for several generations, even under Generals of
moderate capacity, and through considerable periods of peace.
333
Boldness
But this noble impulse, with which the human soul raises
itself above the most formidable dangers, is to be regarded as
an active principle peculiarly belonging to War. In fact, in
what branch of human activity should boldness have a right of
citizenship if not in War?
334
Amongst large masses, boldness is a force, the special
cultivation of which can never be to the detriment of other
forces, because the great mass is bound to a higher will by the
frame-work and joints of the order of battle and of the service,
and therefore is guided by an intelligent power which is
extraneous. Boldness is therefore here only like a spring held
down until its action is required.
335
of cases, a thousand times as many of them will end in
disaster through over-anxiety as through boldness.
336
his resolution, which still has also its value. If a young man to
show his skill in horsemanship leaps across a deep cleft, then
he is bold; if he makes the same leap pursued by a troop of
head-chopping Janissaries he is only resolute. But the farther
off the necessity from the point of action, the greater the
number of relations intervening which the mind has to
traverse; in order to realise them, by so much the less does
necessity take from boldness in action. If Frederick the Great,
in the year 1756, saw that War was inevitable, and that he
could only escape destruction by being beforehand with his
enemies, it became necessary for him to commence the War
himself, but at the same time it was certainly very bold: for
few men in his position would have made up their minds to
do so.
337
should it be admired. Boldness, directed by an overruling
intelligence, is the stamp of the hero: this boldness does not
consist in venturing directly against the nature of things, in a
downright contempt of the laws of probability, but, if a choice
is once made, in the rigorous adherence to that higher
calculation which genius, the tact of judgment, has gone over
with the speed of lightning. The more boldness lends wings to
the mind and the discernment, so much the farther they will
reach in their flight, so much the more comprehensive will be
the view, the more exact the result, but certainly always only
in the sense that with greater objects greater dangers are
connected. The ordinary man, not to speak of the weak and
irresolute, arrives at an exact result so far as such is possible
without ocular demonstration, at most after diligent reflection
in his chamber, at a distance from danger and responsibility.
Let danger and responsibility draw close round him in every
direction, then he loses the power of comprehensive vision,
and if he retains this in any measure by the influence of
others, still he will lose his power of decision, because in that
point no one can help him.
338
a building which ambition has planned, whether Frederick or
Alexander acts, is much the same as regards the critical view.
If the one excites the imagination more because it is bolder,
the other pleases the understanding most, because it has in it
more absolute necessity.
Perseverance
339
him to require, and he is not alarmed at the surprise which the
reader may show.
340
Superiority of Numbers
Strategy fixes the point where, the time when, and the
numerical force with which the battle is to be fought. By this
triple determination it has therefore a very essential influence
on the issue of the combat. If tactics has fought the battle, if
the result is over, let it be victory or defeat, Strategy makes
such use of it as can be made in accordance with the great
object of the War. This object is naturally often a very distant
one, seldom does it lie quite close at hand. A series of other
objects subordinate themselves to it as means. These objects,
which are at the same time means to a higher purpose, may be
practically of various kinds; even the ultimate aim of the
whole War may be a different one in every case. We shall
make ourselves acquainted with these things according as we
come to know the separate objects which they come, in
contact with; and it is not our intention here to embrace the
whole subject by a complete enumeration of them, even if
that were possible. We therefore let the employment of the
battle stand over for the present.
341
the combat as well as its consequences. Therefore we shall
only get acquainted with this also by degrees, that is, through
the subjects which more closely determine the application.
342
Whether the troops thus brought are sufficient or not, we have
then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is
the first principle in Strategy, therefore in general as now
stated, it is just as well suited for Greeks and Persians, or for
Englishmen and Mahrattas, as for French and Germans. But
we shall take a glance at our relations in Europe, as respects
War, in order to arrive at some more definite idea on this
subject.
343
double numbers prove such a weight in the scale against the
greatest Generals, we may be sure, that in ordinary cases, in
small as well as great combats, an important superiority of
numbers, but which need not be over two to one, will be
sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous
other circumstances may be. Certainly, we may imagine a
defile which even tenfold would not suffice to force, but in
such a case it can be no question of a battle at all.
344
deal about hills and valleys, roads and footpaths, but does not
say a syllable about mutual strength.
345
absolute strength as a given quantity, whether it be that he has
had no voice in fixing it, or that circumstances prevented a
sufficient expansion being given to it.
346
The right appreciation of their opponents (Daun,
Schwartzenberg), the audacity to leave for a short space of
time a small force only before them, energy in forced
marches, boldness in sudden attacks, the intensified activity
which great souls acquire in the moment of danger, these are
the grounds of such victories; and what have these to do with
the ability to make an exact calculation of two such simple
things as time and space?
347
than the value which should attach to numerical strength in
the combat. If that strength is made as great as possible, then
the maxim is satisfied; a review of the total relations must
then decide whether or not the combat is to be avoided for
want of sufficient force. [Owing to our freedom from
invasion, and to the condition which arise in our Colonial
Wars, we have not yet, in England, arrived at a correct
appreciation of the value of superior numbers in War, and still
adhere to the idea of an Army just “big enough,” which
Clausewitz has so unsparingly ridiculed. (Editor.)]
The Surprise
348
which can be imagined just as well in the defensive, and
which in the tactical defence particularly is a chief point.
Secrecy and rapidity are the two factors in this product and
these suppose in the Government and the
Commander-in-Chief great energy, and on the part of the
Army a high sense of military duty. With effeminacy and
loose principles it is in vain to calculate upon a surprise. But
so general, indeed so indispensable, as is this endeavour, and
true as it is that it is never wholly unproductive of effect, still
it is not the less true that it seldom succeeds to a remarkable
degree, and this follows from the nature of the idea itself. We
should form an erroneous conception if we believed that by
this means chiefly there is much to be attained in War. In idea
it promises a great deal; in the execution it generally sticks
fast by the friction of the whole machine.
349
The preparations for a War usually occupy several months;
the assembly of an Army at its principal positions requires
generally the formation of depôts and magazines, and long
marches, the object of which can be guessed soon enough.
350
their wise dicta and self-complacent terminology, but look at
facts with his own eyes. There is, for instance, a certain day in
the campaign in Silesia, 1761, which, in this respect, has
attained a kind of notoriety. It is the 22nd July, on which
Frederick the Great gained on Laudon the march to Nossen,
near Neisse, by which, as is said, the junction of the Austrian
and Russian armies in Upper Silesia became impossible, and,
therefore, a period of four weeks was gained by the King.
Whoever reads over this occurrence carefully in the principal
histories, [Tempelhof, The Veteran, Frederick the Great.
Compare also (Clausewitz) “Hinterlassene Werke,” vol. x., p.
158.] and considers it impartially, will, in the march of the
22nd July, never find this importance; and generally in the
whole of the fashionable logic on this subject, he will see
nothing but contradictions; but in the proceedings of Laudon,
in this renowned period of manoeuvres, much that is
unaccountable. How could one, with a thirst for truth, and
clear conviction, accept such historical evidence?
351
In 1813, Buonaparte turned suddenly from Dresden twice
against Bluecher, to say nothing of his incursion into
Bohemia from Upper Lusatia, and both times without in the
least attaining his object. They were blows in the air which
only cost him time and force, and might have placed him in a
dangerous position in Dresden.
352
It is the same with the battle of Liegnitz, 1760. Frederick the
Great gained this fine victory through altering during the
night a position which he had just before taken up. Laudon
was through this completely surprised, and lost 70 pieces of
artillery and 10,000 men. Although Frederick the Great had at
this time adopted the principle of moving backwards and
forwards in order to make a battle impossible, or at least to
disconcert the enemy’s plans, still the alteration of position on
the night of the 14-15 was not made exactly with that
intention, but as the King himself says, because the position
of the 14th did not please him. Here, therefore, also chance
was hard at work; without this happy conjunction of the
attack and the change of position in the night, and the difficult
nature of the country, the result would not have been the
same.
353
Now there still remains an observation which concerns the
essence of the thing. A surprise can only be effected by that
party which gives the law to the other; and he who is in the
right gives the law. If we surprise the adversary by a wrong
measure, then instead of reaping good results, we may have to
bear a sound blow in return; in any case the adversary need
not trouble himself much about our surprise, he has in our
mistake the means of turning off the evil. As the offensive
includes in itself much more positive action than the
defensive, so the surprise is certainly more in its place with
the assailant, but by no means invariably, as we shall
hereafter see. Mutual surprises by the offensive and defensive
may therefore meet, and then that one will have the advantage
who has hit the nail on the head the best.
So should it be, but practical life does not keep to this line so
exactly, and that for a very simple reason. The moral effects
which attend a surprise often convert the worst case into a
good one for the side they favour, and do not allow the other
to make any regular determination. We have here in view
more than anywhere else not only the chief Commander, but
each single one, because a surprise has the effect in particular
of greatly loosening unity, so that the individuality of each
separate leader easily comes to light.
354
Stratagem
355
quality so suited to guide and inspire strategic activity as
stratagem. The general tendency to surprise, treated of in the
foregoing chapter, points to this conclusion, for there is a
degree of stratagem, be it ever so small, which lies at the
foundation of every attempt to surprise.
356
greater the impression to be made, the greater the expenditure
in these respects. And as this is usually not given for the
purpose, very few demonstrations, so-called, in Strategy,
effect the object for which they are designed. In fact, it is
dangerous to detach large forces for any length of time merely
for a trick, because there is always the risk of its being done
in vain, and then these forces are wanted at the decisive point.
But the weaker the forces become which are under the
command of Strategy, so much the more they become adapted
for stratagem, so that to the quite feeble and little, for whom
no prudence, no sagacity is any longer sufficient at the point
where all art seems to forsake him, stratagem offers itself as a
last resource. The more helpless his situation, the more
everything presses towards one single, desperate blow, the
more readily stratagem comes to the aid of his boldness. Let
loose from all further calculations, freed from all concern for
the future, boldness and stratagem intensify each other, and
thus collect at one point an infinitesimal glimmering of hope
into a single ray, which may likewise serve to kindle a flame.
357
Assembly of Forces in Space
358
development of the idea is therefore necessary, and we hope
to be allowed a short analysis.
359
as 500 would have lost in their place, is certainly not correct;
therefore the greater loss which the side suffers that has
placed the half of its force in reserve, must be regarded as a
disadvantage in that original formation; further it must be
admitted, that in the generality of cases the 1000 men would
have the advantage at the first commencement of being able
to drive their opponent out of his position and force him to a
retrograde movement; now, whether these two advantages are
a counterpoise to the disadvantage of finding ourselves with
800 men to a certain extent disorganised by the combat,
opposed to an enemy who is not materially weaker in
numbers and who has 500 quite fresh troops, is one that
cannot be decided by pursuing an analysis further, we must
here rely upon experience, and there will scarcely be an
officer experienced in War who will not in the generality of
cases assign the advantage to that side which has the fresh
troops.
But this danger only endures as long as the disorder, the state
of confusion and weakness lasts, in a word, up to the crisis
which every combat brings with it even for the conqueror.
Within the duration of this relaxed state of exhaustion, the
appearance of a proportionate number of fresh troops is
decisive.
360
restore the combat, they would only be carried along in the
general movement; a beaten Army cannot be brought back to
victory a day after by means of a strong reserve. Here we find
ourselves at the source of a highly material difference
between tactics and strategy.
The tactical results, the results within the four corners of the
battle, and before its close, lie for the most part within the
limits of that period of disorder and weakness. But the
strategic result, that is to say, the result of the total combat, of
the victories realised, let them be small or great, lies
completely (beyond) outside of that period. It is only when
the results of partial combats have bound themselves together
into an independent whole, that the strategic result appears,
but then, the state of crisis is over, the forces have resumed
their original form, and are now only weakened to the extent
of those actually destroyed (placed hors de combat).
361
in partial combat, are weakened by it; consequently, only so
much as was unavoidably necessary, but by no means all
which was strategically in conflict with the enemy, unless
tactics has expended them unnecessarily. Corps which, on
account of the general superiority in numbers, have either
been little or not at all engaged, whose presence alone has
assisted in the result, are after the decision the same as they
were before, and for new enterprises as efficient as if they had
been entirely inactive. How greatly such corps which thus
constitute our excess may contribute to the total success is
evident in itself; indeed, it is not difficult to see how they may
even diminish considerably the loss of the forces engaged in
tactical, conflict on our side.
If, therefore, in Strategy the loss does not increase with the
number of the troops employed, but is often diminished by it,
and if, as a natural consequence, the decision in our favor is,
by that means, the more certain, then it follows naturally that
in Strategy we can never employ too many forces, and
consequently also that they must be applied simultaneously to
the immediate purpose.
362
in tactics as well, and perhaps there in the highest degree; but
as the duration of the tactical acts is shorter, therefore the
small effects of exertion and privation on them can come but
little into consideration. But in Strategy on the other hand,
where time and space, are on a larger scale, their influence is
not only always very considerable, but often quite decisive. It
is not at all uncommon for a victorious Army to lose many
more by sickness than on the field of battle.
363
reserve is more to be esteemed than a body of troops which
has been already severely handled in the fight. Just as much
as an unfortunate campaign lowers the courage and moral
powers of an Army, a successful one raises these elements in
their value. In the generality of cases, therefore, these
influences are compensated, and then there remains over and
above as clear gain the habituation to War. We should besides
look more here to successful than to unsuccessful campaigns,
because when the greater probability of the latter may be seen
beforehand, without doubt forces are wanted, and, therefore,
the reserving a portion for future use is out of the question.
This point being settled, then the question is, Do the losses
which a force sustains through fatigues and privations
increase in proportion to the size of the force, as is the case in
a combat? And to that we answer “No.”
364
greater in proportion as the number of men on one spot is
greater. But does not the superiority in force afford also the
best means of spreading out and finding more room, and
therefore more means of subsistence and shelter?
365
strategic result has no such well-defined object and no such
circumscribed limits as the tactical. Thus what can be looked
upon in tactics as an excess of power, must be regarded in
Strategy as a means to give expansion to success, if
opportunity offers for it; with the magnitude of the success
the gain in force increases at the same time, and in this way
the superiority of numbers may soon reach a point which the
most careful economy of forces could never have attained.
366
make time an ally on its own account by bringing troops
successively into action.
The rule which we have been seeking to set forth is, therefore,
that all forces which are available and destined for a strategic
object should be simultaneously applied to it; and this
application will be so much the more complete the more
everything is compressed into one act and into one
movement.
Strategic Reserve
A reserve has two objects which are very distinct from each
other, namely, first, the prolongation and renewal of the
367
combat, and secondly, for use in case of unforeseen events.
The first object implies the utility of a successive application
of forces, and on that account cannot occur in Strategy. Cases
in which a corps is sent to succour a point which is supposed
to be about to fall are plainly to be placed in the category of
the second object, as the resistance which has to be offered
here could not have been sufficiently foreseen. But a corps
which is destined expressly to prolong the combat, and with
that object in view is placed in rear, would be only a corps
placed out of reach of fire, but under the command and at the
disposition of the General Commanding in the action, and
accordingly would be a tactical and not a strategic reserve.
But the necessity for a force ready for unforeseen events may
also take place in Strategy, and consequently there may also
be a strategic reserve, but only where unforeseen events are
imaginable. In tactics, where the enemy’s measures are
generally first ascertained by direct sight, and where they may
be concealed by every wood, every fold of undulating ground,
we must naturally always be alive, more or less, to the
possibility of unforeseen events, in order to strengthen,
subsequently, those points which appear too weak, and, in
fact, to modify generally the disposition of our troops, so as to
make it correspond better to that of the enemy.
368
uncertainty, forces must be kept in reserve against future
contingencies.
369
But even this decision of the total combat has only a relative
meaning of many different gradations, according as the force
over which the victory has been gained forms a more or less
great and important part of the whole. The lost battle of a
corps may be repaired by the victory of the Army. Even the
lost battle of an Army may not only be counterbalanced by
the gain of a more important one, but converted into a
fortunate event (the two days of Kulm, August 29 and 30,
1813 [ Refers to the destruction of Vandamme’s column,
which had been sent unsupported to intercept the retreat of the
Austrians and Prussians from Dresden—but was forgotten by
Napoleon.—Editor.]). No one can doubt this; but it is just as
clear that the weight of each victory (the successful issue of
each total combat) is so much the more substantial the more
important the part conquered, and that therefore the
possibility of repairing the loss by subsequent events
diminishes in the same proportion. In another place we shall
have to examine this more in detail; it suffices for the present
to have drawn attention to the indubitable existence of this
progression.
370
The point where the idea of a strategic reserve begins to
become inconsistent is not difficult to determine: it lies in the
supreme decision. Employment must be given to all the forces
within the space of the supreme decision, and every reserve
(active force available) which is only intended for use after
that decision is opposed to common sense.
If, therefore, tactics has in its reserves the means of not only
meeting unforeseen dispositions on the part of the enemy, but
also of repairing that which never can be foreseen, the result
of the combat, should that be unfortunate; Strategy on the
other hand must, at least as far as relates to the capital result,
renounce the use of these means. As A rule, it can only repair
the losses sustained at one point by advantages gained at
another, in a few cases by moving troops from one point to
another; the idea of preparing for such reverses by placing
forces in reserve beforehand, can never be entertained in
Strategy.
371
belonging to this power remained in East and South Prussia,
destined only to be put on a war-footing afterwards as a
reserve.
Economy of Forces
372
the first point is that all parts act, because the most
purposeless activity still keeps employed and destroys a
portion of the enemy’s force, whilst troops completely
inactive are for the moment quite neutralised. Unmistakably
this idea is bound up with the principles contained in the last
three chapters, it is the same truth, but seen from a somewhat
more comprehensive point of view and condensed into a
single conception.
Geometrical Element
373
not nearly so important as in tactics.—The manner in which
this influence exhibits itself, can only be shown by degrees at
those places where it makes its appearance, and deserves
notice. Here we wish more to direct attention to the difference
which there is between tactics and Strategy in relation to it.
374
established truth, that in Strategy more depends on the
number and the magnitude of the victorious combats, than on
the form of the great lines by which they are connected.
375
principle of general polarity, and therefore is not in opposition
to the argument in the fifth chapter of the second book; it
depends on the fact that here in reality the same thing is at
once an incentive or motive to both commanders, namely the
probability of improving or impairing their position by future
action.
376
weakness, and the contradiction we see here, viz., that man
seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time will
astonish no one.
How could any one in fact justify in the eyes of reason the
expenditure of forces in War, if acting was not the object?
The baker only heats his oven if he has bread to put into it;
the horse is only yoked to the carriage if we mean to drive;
why then make the enormous effort of a War if we look for
nothing else by it but like efforts on the part of the enemy?
377
The first, which produces a constant tendency to delay, and is
thereby a retarding principle, is the natural timidity and want
of resolution in the human mind, a kind of inertia in the moral
world, but which is produced not by attractive, but by
repellent forces, that is to say, by dread of danger and
responsibility.
378
weak to attack B, from which it does not follow that B is
strong enough for an attack on A. The addition of strength,
which the defensive gives is not merely lost by assuming the
offensive, but also passes to the enemy just as, figuratively
expressed, the difference of a + b and a - b is equal to 2b.
Therefore it may so happen that both parties, at one and the
same time, not only feel themselves too weak to attack, but
also are so in reality.
379
In all these cases in which the impulse given by interest is
slight, and the principle of hostility feeble, in which there is
no desire to do much, and also not much to dread from the
enemy; in short, where no powerful motives press and drive,
cabinets will not risk much in the game; hence this tame
mode of carrying on War, in which the hostile spirit of real
War is laid in irons.
380
forces, not in itself a higher exercise of the intelligent
faculties? Is then that kind of conventional sword-exercise not
comprised in and belonging to the other mode of conducting
War? Does it not bear the same relation to it as the motions
upon a ship to the motion of the ship itself? Truly it can take
place only under the tacit condition that the adversary does no
better. And can we tell, how long he may choose to respect
those conditions? Has not then the French Revolution fallen
upon us in the midst of the fancied security of our old system
of War, and driven us from Chalons to Moscow? And did not
Frederick the Great in like manner surprise the Austrians
reposing in their ancient habits of War, and make their
monarchy tremble? Woe to the cabinet which, with a
shilly-shally policy, and a routine-ridden military system,
meets with an adversary who, like the rude element, knows no
other law than that of his intrinsic force. Every deficiency in
energy and exertion is then a weight in the scales in favour of
the enemy; it is not so easy then to change from the fencing
posture into that of an athlete, and a slight blow is often
sufficient to knock down the whole.
The result of all the causes now adduced is, that the hostile
action of a campaign does not progress by a continuous, but
by an intermittent movement, and that, therefore, between the
separate bloody acts, there is a period of watching, during
which both parties fall into the defensive, and also that
usually a higher object causes the principle of aggression to
predominate on one side, and thus leaves it in general in an
advancing position, by which then its proceedings become
modified in some degree.
381
On the Character of Modern War
382
threatens their own existence, or that restless ambition drives
them on.
383
himself a new positive object, and commences active steps
towards it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as
the adversary opposes this, there is a tension of powers; this
lasts until the decision takes place—that is, until one party
either gives up his object or the other has conceded it to him.
384
resembles the effect of a mine well closed and tamped, whilst
an event in itself perhaps just as great, in a state of rest, is
more or less like a mass of powder puffed away in the open
air.
385
equilibrium, or at least in such short tensions with long
intervals between them, and weak in their effects, that the
events to which they gave rise were seldom great successes,
often they were theatrical exhibitions, got up in honour of a
royal birthday (Hochkirch), often a mere satisfying of the
honour of the arms (Kunersdorf), or the personal vanity of the
commander (Freiberg).
386
Book IV: The Combat
Introductory
387
Character of the Modern Battle
388
taken by each side respectively of the masses remaining,
which can be called still effective, that is, which have not yet
quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes; account is taken of the
ground gained or lost, and of how stands the security of the
rear; these results with the special impressions as to bravery
and cowardice, ability and stupidity, which are thought to
have been observed in ourselves and in the enemy are
collected into one single total impression, out of which there
springs the resolution to quit the field or to renew the combat
on the morrow.
389
tactics; we shall, however, have an opportunity hereafter of
making this subject plainer by giving a few particulars.
This is the simple idea; we shall return to it, but before we can
do that we must insert a series of others.
390
of a whole, and has consequently a special object by which it
is bound to this whole.
But this result is true only in its form, and important only on
account of the connection which the ideas have between
themselves, and we have only sought it out to get rid of it at
once.
391
weak modification of that general object, or an ancillary
object bound up with it, important enough to individualise the
battle, but always insignificant in comparison with that
general object; so that if that ancillary object alone should be
obtained, only an unimportant part of the purpose of the
combat is fulfilled. If this assertion is correct, then we see that
the idea, according to which the destruction of the enemy’s
force is only the means, and something else always the object,
can only be true in form, but, that it would lead to false
conclusions if we did not recollect that this destruction of the
enemy’s force is comprised in that object, and that this object
is only a weak modification of it. Forgetfulness of this led to
completely false views before the Wars of the last period, and
created tendencies as well as fragments of systems, in which
theory thought it raised itself so much the more above
handicraft, the less it supposed itself to stand in need of the
use of the real instrument, that is the destruction of the
enemy’s force.
392
through the use of a special artificial form, to effect by a
small direct destruction of the enemy’s forces a much greater
destruction indirectly, or by means of small but extremely
well-directed blows to produce such paralysation of the
enemy’s forces, such a command over the enemy’s will, that
this mode of proceeding is to be viewed as a great shortening
of the road? Undoubtedly a victory at one point may be of
more value than at another. Undoubtedly there is a scientific
arrangement of battles amongst themselves, even in Strategy,
which is in fact nothing but the Art of thus arranging them.
To deny that is not our intention, but we assert that the direct
destruction of the enemy’s forces is everywhere predominant;
we contend here for the overruling importance of this
destructive principle and nothing else.
393
our whole design may be upset. Now if the enemy should
decide upon some simple attack, which can be executed in a
shorter time, then he gains the initiative, and destroys the
effect of the great plan. Therefore, together with the
expediency of a complicated attack we must consider all the
dangers which we run during its preparation, and should only
adopt it if there is no reason to fear that the enemy will
disconcert our scheme. Whenever this is the case we must
ourselves choose the simpler, i.e., quicker way, and lower our
views in this sense as far as the character, the relations of the
enemy, and other circumstances may render necessary. If we
quit the weak impressions of abstract ideas and descend to the
region of practical life, then it is evident that a bold,
courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have time for
wide-reaching skilful combinations, and it is just against such
a one we should require skill the most. By this it appears to us
that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that
are complicated is conclusively shown.
Our opinion is not on that account that the simple blow is the
best, but that we must not lift the arm too far for the time
given to strike, and that this condition will always lead more
to direct conflict the more warlike our opponent is. Therefore,
far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by
complicated plans, we must rather seek to be beforehand with
him by greater simplicity in our designs.
394
disproportionate relation, not logical, we have no right to
assign to ability this advantage over courage in a field which
is called danger, and which must be regarded as the true
domain of courage.
395
may have more or less influence, we shall describe generally
in the next chapter, and become better acquainted with by
degrees afterwards; here we divest the combat of them
entirely, and look upon the destruction of the enemy as the
complete and sufficient object of any combat.
396
him in such a position that he must give up the fight, counts
for nothing in itself, and for that reason cannot come under
the definition of object. There remains, therefore, as we have
said, nothing over except the direct gain which we have made
in the process of destruction; but to this belong not only the
losses which have taken place in the course of the combat, but
also those which, after the withdrawal of the conquered part,
take place as direct consequences of the same.
The loss in physical force is not the only one which the two
sides suffer in the course of the combat; the moral forces also
are shaken, broken, and go to ruin. It is not only the loss in
men, horses and guns, but in order, courage, confidence,
cohesion and plan, which come into consideration when it is a
question whether the fight can be still continued or not. It is
principally the moral forces which decide here, and in all
397
cases in which the conqueror has lost as heavily as the
conquered, it is these alone.
398
whoever at the close has the greatest amount of both left is the
conqueror.
In the combat the loss of moral force is the chief cause of the
decision; after that is given, this loss continues to increase
until it reaches its culminating-point at the close of the whole
act. This then is the opportunity the victor should seize to reap
his harvest by the utmost possible restrictions of his enemy’s
forces, the real object of engaging in the combat. On the
beaten side, the loss of all order and control often makes the
prolongation of resistance by individual units, by the further
punishment they are certain to suffer, more injurious than
useful to the whole. The spirit of the mass is broken; the
original excitement about losing or winning, through which
danger was forgotten, is spent, and to the majority danger
now appears no longer an appeal to their courage, but rather
the endurance of a cruel punishment. Thus the instrument in
the first moment of the enemy’s victory is weakened and
blunted, and therefore no longer fit to repay danger by danger.
399
less, but the second not; and for that reason they usually only
take place on one side of the conflict, at least, they are
considerably in excess on one side.
400
The moral effect of a victory increases, not merely in
proportion to the extent of the forces engaged, but in a
progressive ratio—that is to say, not only in extent, but also in
its intensity. In a beaten detachment order is easily restored.
As a single frozen limb is easily revived by the rest of the
body, so the courage of a defeated detachment is easily raised
again by the courage of the rest of the Army as soon as it
rejoins it. If, therefore, the effects of a small victory are not
completely done away with, still they are partly lost to the
enemy. This is not the case if the Army itself sustains a great
defeat; then one with the other fall together. A great fire
attains quite a different heat from several small ones.
401
If prisoners and captured guns are those things by which the
victory principally gains substance, its true crystallisations,
then the plan of the battle should have those things specially
in view; the destruction of the enemy by death and wounds
appears here merely as a means to an end.
How far this may influence the dispositions in the battle is not
an affair of Strategy, but the decision to fight the battle is in
intimate connection with it, as is shown by the direction given
to our forces, and their general grouping, whether we threaten
the enemy’s flank or rear, or he threatens ours. On this point,
the number of prisoners and captured guns depends very
much, and it is a point which, in many cases, tactics alone
cannot satisfy, particularly if the strategic relations are too
much in opposition to it.
The risk of having to fight on two sides, and the still more
dangerous position of having no line of retreat left open,
paralyse the movements and the power of resistance; further,
in case of defeat, they increase the loss, often raising it to its
extreme point, that is, to destruction. Therefore, the rear being
endangered makes defeat more probable, and, at the same
time, more decisive.
402
form, does not go hand in hand with the plain and simple
stroke of force. Even the smallest troop will not throw itself
upon its enemy without thinking of its line of retreat, and, in
most cases, it will have an eye upon that of the enemy also.
2. In moral power.
403
real evidence of the victory. It is, therefore, to be regarded as
a confession of inferiority—as the lowering of the flag, by
which, in this particular instance, right and superiority are
conceded to the enemy, and this degree of humiliation and
disgrace, which, however, must be distinguished from all the
other moral consequences of the loss of equilibrium, is an
essential part of the victory. It is this part alone which acts
upon the public opinion outside the Army, upon the people
and the Government in both belligerent States, and upon all
others in any way concerned.
404
General by making known his real intentions to prevent the
moral effect spreading to the public and his troops, for to do
that with effect he must disclose his plans completely, which
of course would run counter to his principal interests to too
great a degree.
405
of degrees, yet still the retention of the conception is essential
as a central point to give clearness to our theoretical ideas and
it is a want in our terminology that for a victory over the
enemy tantamount to a rout, and a conquest of the enemy only
tantamount to a simple victory, there is only one and the same
word to use.
406
Destruction of the enemy’s military forces is in reality the
object ofall combats; but other objects may be joined thereto,
and these otherobjects may be at the same time predominant;
we must therefore draw adistinction between those in which
the destruction of the enemy’s forcesis the principal object,
and those in which it is more the means. Thedestruction of the
enemy’s force, the possession of a place or thepossession of
some object may be the general motive for a combat, andit
may be either one of these alone or several together, in which
casehowever usually one is the principal motive. Now the two
principal formsof War, the offensive and defensive, of which
we shall shortly speak, donot modify the first of these
motives, but they certainly do modifythe other two, and
therefore if we arrange them in a scheme they wouldappear
thus:— offensive. Defensive. 1. Destruction of enemy’s force
1. Destruction of enemy’s force. 2. Conquest of a place. 2.
Defence of a place. 3. Conquest of some object. 3. Defence of
some object.
407
reconnoitre must draw up his force as if he really intended to
attack and defeat us, or drive us off, etc. etc. But this
pretended object is not the real one, and our present question
is only as to the latter; therefore, we must to the above three
objects of the offensive further add a fourth, which is to lead
the enemy to make a false conclusion. That offensive means
are conceivable in connection with this object, lies in the
nature of the thing.
408
these objects must always predominate in the great battle;
lastly, that the two last in a defensive battle are in reality such
as yield no fruit, they are, that is to say, purely negative, and
can, therefore, only be serviceable, indirectly, by facilitating
something else which is positive. It is, therefore, a bad sign of
the strategic situation if battles of this kind become too
frequent.
Here the whole success often lies in the mere duration. This is
the reason why we have included it amongst the strategic
elements.
409
themselves out upon one another as quickly as two thousand:
we cannot resist an enemy double or three times our strength
as long as one of the same strength; a cavalry combat is
decided sooner than an infantry combat; and a combat
between infantry only, quicker than if there is artillery [The
increase in the relative range of artillery and the introduction
of shrapnel has altogether modified this conclusion.] as well;
in hills and forests we cannot advance as quickly as on a level
country; all this is clear enough.
410
particularly the moment of the decision, and consequently the
termination.
411
dissolved—General Ruchel undertook to renew the fight with
about 12,000; the consequence was that in a moment his force
was scattered in like manner.
412
1. If the possession of a movable object was the object of the
combat, the loss of the same is always the decision.
413
the moral effect of strong reserves, goes the surest way to
victory. We must allow that the French, in modern times,
especially when led by Buonaparte, have shown a thorough
mastery in this.
414
Marmont gives us an example completely in place here. In the
same way a wooded and broken country will afford protection
against a reaction to those who are engaged in the long crisis
of victory. Both, therefore, the night as well as the wooded
and broken country are obstacles which make the renewal of
the same battle more difficult instead of facilitating it.
415
that a force which comes to re-establish our combat is of less
assistance if it falls upon the enemy in flank and rear,
therefore separated from us, than if it joins itself to us
directly; certainly, cases are not wanting where it is so, but we
must say that the majority are on the other side, and they are
so on account of the second point which is here important to
us.
416
whether or not it is still possible to restore a combat which
has taken an unfavourable turn.
417
easily see that until it is finally concluded all successes in
partial combats are only decisions in suspense, which by the
capital decision may not only be destroyed, but changed into
the opposite. The more our forces have suffered, the more the
enemy will have expended on his side; the greater, therefore,
will be the crisis for the enemy, and the more the superiority
of our fresh troops will tell. If now the total result turns in our
favour, if we wrest from the enemy the field of battle and
recover all the trophies again, then all the forces which he has
sacrificed in obtaining them become sheer gain for us, and
our former defeat becomes a stepping-stone to a greater
triumph. The most brilliant feats which with victory the
enemy would have so highly prized that the loss of forces
which they cost would have been disregarded, leave nothing
now behind but regret at the sacrifice entailed. Such is the
alteration which the magic of victory and the curse of defeat
produces in the specific weight of the same elements.
418
advance guard he held to be necessary always, to fix the
enemy’s attention and “paralyse his independent will-power.”
It was the failure to make this point which, in August 1870,
led von Moltke repeatedly into the very jaws of defeat, from
which only the lethargy of Bazaine on the one hand and the
initiative of his subordinates, notably of von Alvensleben,
rescued him. This is the essence of the new Strategic Doctrine
of the French General Staff. See the works of Bonnal, Foch,
etc.—Editor]
419
great battles have generally too many other determining
causes to be brought on by this weaker motive.
420
supports for more than one strategic point; the concentration
of several Corps from widely extended cantonments, etc. etc.
We can see that the necessity for these arrangements may
constantly arise, and may consider them something like the
small change in the strategic economy, whilst the capital
battles, and all that rank with them are the gold and silver
pieces.
Amongst the ancients, and then again during the early period
of standing Armies, the expression that we had offered battle
421
to the enemy in vain, had more sense in it than it has now. By
the ancients everything was constituted with a view to
measuring each other’s strength in the open field free from
anything in the nature of a hindrance, [Note the custom of
sending formal challenges, fix time and place for action, and
“enhazelug” the battlefield in Anglo-Saxon times.—Ed.] and
the whole Art of War consisted in the organisation, and
formation of the Army, that is in the order of battle.
422
gradually became feasible, and of ordinary occurrence:
ground did not certainly cease to be a principle of strength to
those making use of its aid, but it was no longer a charmed
circle, which shut out the natural forces of War.
During the past thirty years War has perfected itself much
more in this respect, and there is no longer anything which
stands in the way of a General who is in earnest about a
decision by means of battle; he can seek out his enemy, and
attack him: if he does not do so he cannot take credit for
having wished to fight, and the expression he offered a battle
which his opponent did not accept, therefore now means
nothing more than that he did not find circumstances
advantageous enough for a battle, an admission which the
above expression does not suit, but which it only strives to
throw a veil over.
But on the other hand, he who now wishes to, and can retreat
cannot easily be forced to give battle. Now as the advantages
423
to the aggressor from this retreat are often not sufficient, and
a substantial victory is a matter of urgent necessity for him, in
that way the few means which there are to compel such an
opponent also to give battle are often sought for and applied
with particular skill.
424
operation; at the same time the King has also given other
reasons for the battle.
The Battle
Its Decision
425
the essence of War is conflict, and the battle is the conflict of
the main Armies, it is always to be regarded as the real centre
of gravity of the War, and therefore its distinguishing
character is, that unlike all other encounters, it is arranged for,
and undertaken with the sole purpose of obtaining a decisive
victory.
426
consists in an intimate alliance of the Army with the ground
on which it fights and its obstacles, so that Army and position
are only one, then the conquest of an essential point in this
position is the decision. It is said the key of the position is
lost, it cannot therefore be defended any further; the battle
cannot be continued. In both cases the beaten Armies are very
much like the broken strings of an instrument which cannot
do their work.
427
ground as we have elsewhere said, is a standard of lost moral
force; it therefore comes also into account, but more as a sign
of loss suffered than for the loss itself, and the number of
fresh reserves is always the chief point to be looked at by both
Commanders.
But whether it happens that the balance is for a long time little
disturbed, or that even after it has been lost on one side it
rights itself again, and is then lost on the other side, it is
certain at all events that in most instances the defeated
General foresees his fate long before he retreats, and that
cases in which some critical event acts with unexpected force
upon the course of the whole have their existence mostly in
the colouring with which every one depicts his lost battle.
428
this course from the nature of the thing would lead us too far
into the province of tactics, to which this branch of the subject
belongs; we are here only concerned with its results.
The result of the whole combat consists in the sum total of the
results of all partial combats; but these results of separate
combats are settled by different considerations.
429
and his reports, and these again will have an influence on the
measures of the Commander-in-Chief; therefore even those
unsuccessful partial combats which to all appearance are
retrieved, are not lost in their results, and the impressions
from them sum themselves up in the mind of the Commander
without much trouble, and even against his will.
All these things serve for the eye of the General as a compass
to tell the course of the battle in which he is embarked. If
whole batteries have been lost and none of the enemy’s taken;
if battalions have been overthrown by the enemy’s cavalry,
whilst those of the enemy everywhere present impenetrable
masses; if the line of fire from his order of battle wavers
involuntarily from one point to another; if fruitless efforts
have been made to gain certain points, and the assaulting
battalions each, time been scattered by well-directed volleys
of grape and case;—if our artillery begins to reply feebly to
that of the enemy—if the battalions under fire diminish
unusually, fast, because with the wounded crowds of
unwounded men go to the rear;—if single Divisions have
been cut off and made prisoners through the disruption of the
plan of the battle;—if the line of retreat begins to be
endangered: the Commander may tell very well in which
direction he is going with his battle. The longer this direction
continues, the more decided it becomes, so much the more
difficult will be the turning, so much the nearer the moment
430
when he must give up the battle. We shall now make some
observations on this moment.
We have already said more than once that the final decision is
ruled mostly by the relative number of the fresh reserves
remaining at the last; that Commander who sees his adversary
is decidedly superior to him in this respect makes up his mind
to retreat. It is the characteristic of modern battles that all
mischances and losses which take place in the course of the
same can be retrieved by fresh forces, because the
arrangement of the modern order of battle, and the way in
which troops are brought into action, allow of their use almost
generally, and in each position. So long, therefore, as that
Commander against whom the issue seems to declare itself
still retains a superiority in reserve force, he will not give up
the day. But from the moment that his reserves begin to
become weaker than his enemy’s, the decision may be
regarded as settled, and what he now does depends partly on
special circumstances, partly on the degree of courage and
perseverance which he personally possesses, and which may
degenerate into foolish obstinacy. How a Commander can
attain to the power of estimating correctly the still remaining
reserves on both sides is an affair of skilful practical genius,
which does not in any way belong to this place; we keep
ourselves to the result as it forms itself in his mind. But this
conclusion is still not the moment of decision properly, for a
motive which only arises gradually does not answer to that,
but is only a general motive towards resolution, and the
resolution itself requires still some special immediate causes.
Of these there are two chief ones which constantly recur, that
is, the danger of retreat, and the arrival of night.
431
If the retreat with every new step which the battle takes in its
course becomes constantly in greater danger, and if the
reserves are so much diminished that they are no longer
adequate to get breathing room, then there is nothing left but
to submit to fate, and by a well-conducted retreat to save
what, by a longer delay ending in flight and disaster, would
be lost.
That there are, besides the above two usual and chief causes,
yet many others also, which are less or more individual and
not to be overlooked, is a matter of course; for the more a
battle tends towards a complete upset of equilibrium the more
sensible is the influence of each partial result in hastening the
turn. Thus the loss of a battery, a successful charge of a
couple of regiments of cavalry, may call into life the
resolution to retreat already ripening.
432
risk the last upon the game, but to retain as much over as is
necessary for an orderly retreat. However highly we must
esteem courage and firmness in War, and however little
prospect there is of victory to him who cannot resolve to seek
it by the exertion of all his power, still there is a point beyond
which perseverance can only be termed desperate folly, and
therefore can meet with no approbation from any critic. In the
most celebrated of all battles, that of Belle-Alliance,
Buonaparte used his last reserve in an effort to retrieve a
battle which was past being retrieved. He spent his last
farthing, and then, as a beggar, abandoned both the
battle-field and his crown.
Effects of Victory
433
We have already said in the seventh chapter that the
magnitude of a victory increases not merely in the same
measure as the vanquished forces increase in number, but in a
higher ratio. The moral effects resulting from the issue of a
great battle are greater on the side of the conquered than on
that of the conqueror: they lead to greater losses in physical
force, which then in turn react on the moral element, and so
they go on mutually supporting and intensifying each other.
On this moral effect we must therefore lay special weight. It
takes an opposite direction on the one side from that on the
other; as it undermines the energies of the conquered so it
elevates the powers and energy of the conqueror. But its chief
effect is upon the vanquished, because here it is the direct
cause of fresh losses, and besides it is homogeneous in nature
with danger, with the fatigues, the hardships, and generally
with all those embarrassing circumstances by which War is
surrounded, therefore enters into league with them and
increases by their help, whilst with the conqueror all these
things are like weights which give a higher swing to his
courage. It is therefore found, that the vanquished sinks much
further below the original line of equilibrium than the
conqueror raises himself above it; on this account, if we speak
of the effects of victory we allude more particularly to those
which manifest themselves in the army. If this effect is more
powerful in an important combat than in a smaller one, so
again it is much more powerful in a great battle than in a
minor one. The great battle takes place for the sake of itself,
for the sake of the victory which it is to give, and which is
sought for with the utmost effort. Here on this spot, in this
very hour, to conquer the enemy is the purpose in which the
plan of the War with all its threads converges, in which all
distant hopes, all dim glimmerings of the future meet, fate
steps in before us to give an answer to the bold
434
question.—This is the state of mental tension not only of the
Commander but of his whole Army down to the lowest
waggon-driver, no doubt in decreasing strength but also in
decreasing importance.
435
shows also, more or less, to the world at large that the causes
were more of a general than of a particular nature.
He who has not been present at the loss of a great battle will
have difficulty in forming for himself a living or quite true
idea of it, and the abstract notions of this or that small
untoward affair will never come up to the perfect conception
of a lost battle. Let us stop a moment at the picture.
436
that they were not to be discovered, but which, in the issue,
comes out clear and palpable, or which was also, perhaps,
before suspected, but which in the want of any certainty, we
had to oppose by the hope of chance, reliance on good
fortune, Providence or a bold attitude. Now, all this has
proved insufficient, and the bitter truth meets us harsh and
imperious.
437
is requisite to restore it; every new effort without such
external support can only lead to fresh losses.
And now as to the effect of defeat beyond the Army, upon the
Nation and Government! It is the sudden collapse of hopes
stretched to the utmost, the downfall of all self-reliance. In
place of these extinct forces, fear, with its destructive
properties of expansion, rushes into the vacuum left, and
completes the prostration. It is a real shock upon the nerves,
which one of the two athletes receives from the electric spark
of victory. And that effect, however different in its degrees, is
never completely wanting. Instead of every one hastening
with a spirit of determination to aid in repairing the disaster,
every one fears that his efforts will only be in vain, and stops,
hesitating with himself, when he should rush forward; or in
despondency he lets his arm drop, leaving everything to fate.
438
it leads. Without boldness and an enterprising spirit on the
part of the leader, the most brilliant victory will lead to no
great success, and its force exhausts itself all the sooner on
circumstances, if these offer a strong and stubborn opposition
to it. How very differently from Daun, Frederick the Great
would have used the victory at Kollin; and what different
consequences France, in place of Prussia, might have given a
battle of Leuthen!
But then the question may be asked, Can theory accept this
effect of victory as absolutely necessary?—must it not rather
endeavour to find out counteracting means capable of
neutralising these effects? It seems quite natural to answer
this question in the affirmative; but heaven defend us from
taking that wrong course of most theories, out of which is
begotten a mutually devouring Pro et Contra.
439
find means to struggle against it; just as the motion of a
cannon ball is always in the direction of the terrestrial,
although when fired from east to west part of the general
velocity is destroyed by this opposite motion.
440
which one and the same victory may produce according to the
character of the people or state, which has been conquered.
441
No doubt the annihilation-principle is to be found more or
less in other means—granted there are instances in which
through favourable circumstances in a minor combat, the
destruction of the enemy’s forces has been disproportionately
great (Maxen), and on the other hand in a battle, the taking or
holding a single post may be predominant in importance as an
object—but as a general rule it remains a paramount truth,
that battles are only fought with a view to the destruction of
the enemy’s Army, and that this destruction can only be
effected by their means.
442
join deadly contest, and also the more prominent in
importance becomes the battle.
But the soul of the man trembles still more at the thought of
the decision to be given with one single blow. In one point of
space and time all action is here pressed together, and at such
a moment there is stirred up within us a dim feeling as if in
this narrow space all our forces could not develop themselves
and come into activity, as if we had already gained much by
mere time, although this time owes us nothing at all. This is
443
all mere illusion, but even as illusion it is something, and the
same weakness which seizes upon the man in every other
momentous decision may well be felt more powerfully by the
General, when he must stake interests of such enormous
weight upon one venture.
444
these matters, that we may be their guide into this field of
inquiry, and excite them to make a candid examination of the
subject. [On the Continent only, it still preserves full vitality
in the minds of British politicians and pressmen.—Editor.]
[This prayer was abundantly granted—vide the German
victories of 1870.—Editor.]
445
which have decided a whole War, belong to the class of rare
exceptions.
446
The decision which is given by the great battle, depends, we
have said, partly on the battle itself, that is on the number of
troops engaged, and partly on the magnitude of the success.
447
If the cavalry of the vanquished is equal or superior to that of
the victor, then the effects of the pursuit are diminished, and
by that great part of the results of victory are lost.
448
be taught at all, must come to the General through some other
medium than printer’s type.
449
the first steps in pursuit; and in order to avoid the frequent
repetition of this, we shall now dwell for a moment on this
necessary supplement of victory in general.
450
enemy is not to be feared, the conqueror finds in the above
circumstances a powerful check to the vivacity of his pursuit.
There is no reason to fear that the victory will be snatched
away, but adverse combats are still possible, and may
diminish the advantages which up to the present have been
gained. Moreover, at this moment the whole weight of all that
is sensuous in an Army, its wants and weaknesses, are
dependent on the will of the Commander. All the thousands
under his command require rest and refreshment, and long to
see a stop put to toil and danger for the present; only a few,
forming an exception, can see and feel beyond the present
moment, it is only amongst this little number that there is
sufficient mental vigour to think, after what is absolutely
necessary at the moment has been done, upon those results
which at such a moment only appear to the rest as mere
embellishments of victory—as a luxury of triumph. But all
these thousands have a voice in the council of the General, for
through the various steps of the military hierarchy these
interests of the sensuous creature have their sure conductor
into the heart of the Commander. He himself, through mental
and bodily fatigue, is more or less weakened in his natural
activity, and thus it happens then that, mostly from these
causes, purely incidental to human nature, less is done than
might have been done, and that generally what is done is to be
ascribed entirely to the thirst for glory, the energy, indeed
also the hard-heartedness of the General-in-Chief. It is only
thus we can explain the hesitating manner in which many
Generals follow up a victory which superior numbers have
given them. The first pursuit of the enemy we limit in general
to the extent of the first day, including the night following the
victory. At the end of that period the necessity of rest
ourselves prescribes a halt in any case.
451
This first pursuit has different natural degrees.
452
In all three cases the night, if it sets in before the conclusion
of the whole act, usually puts an end to it, and the few
instances in which this has not taken place, and the pursuit
has been continued throughout the night, must be regarded as
pursuits in an exceptionally vigorous form.
453
is immensely increased, of this the battles of Leuthen and La
Belle Alliance [Waterloo.] are examples.
454
obtained readier evidence and greater weight. Certainly the
sparing one’s own instrument of victory is a vital question if
we only possess this one, and foresee that soon the time may
arrive when it will not be sufficient for all that remains to be
done, for every continuation of the offensive must lead
ultimately to complete exhaustion. But this calculation was
still so far false, as the further loss of forces by a continuance
of the pursuit could bear no proportion to that which the
enemy must suffer. That view, therefore, again could only
exist because the military forces were not considered the vital
factor. And so we find that in former Wars real heroes
only—such as Charles XII., Marlborough, Eugene, Frederick
the Great—added a vigorous pursuit to their victories when
they were decisive enough, and that other Generals usually
contented themselves with the possession of the field of
battle. In modern times the greater energy infused into the
conduct of Wars through the greater importance of the
circumstances from which they have proceeded has thrown
down these conventional barriers; the pursuit has become an
all-important business for the conqueror; trophies have on that
account multiplied in extent, and if there are cases also in
modern Warfare in which this has not been the case, still they
belong to the list of exceptions, and are to be accounted for by
peculiar circumstances.
455
the moment confined to a dark room owing to an injury to his
eyes.
456
the Government. The force which he brought with him to
Moscow was no longer sufficient for that, as shown in the
sequel, but it would have been still less so if, in scattering the
Russian Army, he had scattered his own at the same time.
Buonaparte was thoroughly alive to all this, and in our eyes
he stands completely justified. But on that account this case is
still not to be reckoned amongst those in which, through the
general relations, the General is interdicted from following up
his victory, for there never was in his case any question of
mere pursuit. The victory was decided at four o’clock in the
afternoon, but the Russians still occupied the greater part of
the field of battle; they were not yet disposed to give up the
ground, and if the attack had been renewed, they would still
have offered a most determined resistance, which would have
undoubtedly ended in their complete defeat, but would have
cost the conqueror much further bloodshed. We must
therefore reckon the Battle of Borodino as amongst battles,
like Bautzen, left unfinished. At Bautzen the vanquished
preferred to quit the field sooner; at Borodino the conqueror
preferred to content himself with a half victory, not because
the decision appeared doubtful, but because he was not rich
enough to pay for the whole.
457
But further, the effects of victory are very seldom found to
stop with this first pursuit; now first begins the real career to
which victory lent velocity. This course is conditioned as we
have already said, by other relations of which it is not yet
time to speak. But we must here mention, what there is of a
general character in the pursuit in order to avoid repetition
when the subject occurs again.
458
moment when, after a forced march he seeks some rest; if this
excitement is continued from day to day for some time, it may
lead to a complete rout. There lies in it a constant admission
of being obliged to obey the law of the enemy, and of being
unfit for any resistance, and the consciousness of this cannot
do otherwise than weaken the moral of an Army in a high
degree. The effect of pressing the enemy in this way attains a
maximum when it drives the enemy to make night marches. If
the conqueror scares away the discomfited opponent at sunset
from a camp which has just been taken up either for the main
body of the Army, or for the rear-guard, the conquered must
either make a night march, or alter his position in the night,
retiring further away, which is much the same thing; the
victorious party can on the other hand pass the night in quiet.
459
nothing till the last moment, to start on the march, sometimes
in the morning, sometimes in the evening, to be always for
several hours in the presence of the enemy, and exchanging
cannon shots with him, and keeping up skirmishing fire, to
plan manoeuvres to turn him, in short, to make the whole
outlay of tactical means which such a course renders
necessary. All that naturally bears with a heavy weight on the
pursuing Army, and in War, where there are so many burdens
to be borne, men are always inclined to strip off those which
do not seem absolutely necessary. These observations are
true, whether applied to a whole Army or as in the more usual
case, to a strong advance-guard. For the reasons just
mentioned, this second method of pursuit, this continued
pressing of the enemy pursued is rather a rare occurrence;
even Buonaparte in his Russian campaign, 1812, practised it
but little, for the reasons here apparent, that the difficulties
and hardships of this campaign, already threatened his Army
with destruction before it could reach its object; on the other
hand, the French in their other campaigns have distinguished
themselves by their energy in this point also.
Lastly, the third and most effectual form of pursuit is, the
parallel march to the immediate object of the retreat.
460
Now if the conqueror directs his march on this point by a
lateral road, it is evident how that may quicken the retreat of
the beaten Army in a destructive manner, convert it into
hurry, perhaps into flight. [This point is exceptionally well
treated by von Bernhardi in his “Cavalry in Future Wars.”
London: Murray, 1906.] The conquered has only three ways
to counteract this: the first is to throw himself in front of the
enemy, in order by an unexpected attack to gain that
probability of success which is lost to him in general from his
position; this plainly supposes an enterprising bold General,
and an excellent Army, beaten but not utterly defeated;
therefore, it can only be employed by a beaten Army in very
few cases.
The second way is hastening the retreat; but this is just what
the conqueror wants, and it easily leads to immoderate efforts
on the part of the troops, by which enormous losses are
sustained, in stragglers, broken guns, and carriages of all
kinds.
The third way is to make a detour, and get round the nearest
point of interception, to march with more ease at a greater
distance from the enemy, and thus to render the haste required
less damaging. This last way is the worst of all, it generally
turns out like a new debt contracted by an insolvent debtor,
and leads to greater embarrassment. There are cases in which
this course is advisable; others where there is nothing else
left; also instances in which it has been successful; but upon
the whole it is certainly true that its adoption is usually
influenced less by a clear persuasion of its being the surest
way of attaining the aim than by another inadmissible
motive—this motive is the dread of encountering the enemy.
Woe to the Commander who gives in to this! However much
461
the moral of his Army may have deteriorated, and however
well founded may be his apprehensions of being at a
disadvantage in any conflict with the enemy, the evil will
only be made worse by too anxiously avoiding every possible
risk of collision. Buonaparte in 1813 would never have
brought over the Rhine with him the 30,000 or 40,000 men
who remained after the battle of Hanau, [At Hanau (October
30, 1813), the Bavarians some 50,000 strong threw
themselves across the line of Napoleon’s retreat from Leipsic.
By a masterly use of its artillery the French tore the Bavarians
asunder and marched on over their bodies.—Editor.] if he had
avoided that battle and tried to pass the Rhine at Mannheim or
Coblenz. It is just by means of small combats carefully
prepared and executed, and in which the defeated army being
on the defensive, has always the assistance of the ground—it
is just by these that the moral strength of the Army can first
be resuscitated.
462
pick up stragglers, and keep up the impression which the
presence of the enemy never fails to make. Bluecher
neglected this in his, in other respects unexceptionable,
pursuit after La Belle Alliance.
463
Retreat after a Lost Battle
464
It is true that at the moment of quitting a dangerous position
we have often seen trifling formalities observed which caused
a waste of time, and were, therefore, attended with danger,
whilst in such cases everything depends on getting out of the
place speedily. Practised Generals reckon this maxim a very
important one. But such cases must not be confounded with a
general retreat after a lost battle. Whoever then thinks by a
few rapid marches to gain a start, and more easily to recover a
firm standing, commits a great error. The first movements
should be as small as possible, and it is a maxim in general
not to suffer ourselves to be dictated to by the enemy. This
maxim cannot be followed without bloody fighting with the
enemy at our heels, but the gain is worth the sacrifice; without
it we get into an accelerated pace which soon turns into a
headlong rush, and costs merely in stragglers more men than
rear-guard combats, and besides that extinguishes the last
remnants of the spirit of resistance.
465
Now and again it has been suggested [Allusion is here made
to the works of Lloyd Bullow and others.] to divide for the
purpose of retreating, therefore to retreat in separate divisions
or even eccentrically. Such a separation as is made merely for
convenience, and along with which concentrated action
continues possible and is kept in view, is not what we now
refer to; any other kind is extremely dangerous, contrary to
the nature of the thing, and therefore a great error. Every lost
battle is a principle of weakness and disorganisation; and the
first and immediate desideratum is to concentrate, and in
concentration to recover order, courage, and confidence. The
idea of harassing the enemy by separate corps on both flanks
at the moment when he is following up his victory, is a
perfect anomaly; a faint-hearted pedant might be overawed by
his enemy in that manner, and for such a case it may answer;
but where we are not sure of this failing in our opponent it is
better let alone. If the strategic relations after a battle require
that we should cover ourselves right and left by detachments,
so much must be done, as from circumstances is unavoidable,
but this fractioning must always be regarded as an evil, and
we are seldom in a state to commence it the day after the
battle itself.
466
towards the Marne, while with the other (Schwartzenberg),
from fear of being too weak, they advanced with exaggerated
caution.
Night Fighting
These ideal schemes are all based on the hypothesis that the
assailant knows the arrangements of the defender because
they have been made and announced beforehand, and could
not escape notice in his reconnaissances, and inquiries; that
on the other hand, the measures of the assailant, being only
taken at the moment of execution, cannot be known to the
enemy. But the last of these is not always quite the case, and
467
still less is the first. If we are not so near the enemy as to have
him completely under our eye, as the Austrians had Frederick
the Great before the battle of Hochkirch (1758), then all that
we know of his position must always be imperfect, as it is
obtained by reconnaissances, patrols, information from
prisoners, and spies, sources on which no firm reliance can be
placed because intelligence thus obtained is always more or
less of an old date, and the position of the enemy may have
been altered in the meantime. Moreover, with the tactics and
mode of encampment of former times it was much easier than
it is now to examine the position of the enemy. A line of tents
is much easier to distinguish than a line of huts or a bivouac;
and an encampment on a line of front, fully and regularly
drawn out, also easier than one of Divisions formed in
columns, the mode often used at present. We may have the
ground on which a Division bivouacs in that manner
completely under our eye, and yet not be able to arrive at any
accurate idea.
But the position again is not all that we want to know the
measures which the defender may take in the course of the
combat are just as important, and do not by any means consist
in mere random shots. These measures also make night
attacks more difficult in modern Wars than formerly, because
they have in these campaigns an advantage over those already
taken. In our combats the position of the defender is more
temporary than definitive, and on that account the defender is
better able to surprise his adversary with unexpected blows,
than he could formerly. [All these difficulties obviously
become increased as the power of the weapons in use tends to
keep the combatants further Apart.—Editor.]
468
Therefore what the assailant knows of the defensive previous
to a night attack, is seldom or never sufficient to supply the
want of direct observation.
469
then we must make use of the night, at all events, to finish the
preliminary part even if the combat itself should not open till
towards daybreak. This is therefore what takes place in all the
little enterprises by night against outposts, and other small
bodies, the main point being invariably through superior
numbers, and getting round his position, to entangle him
unexpectedly in such a disadvantageous combat, that he
cannot disengage himself without great loss.
470
and however superior the force used may be, still probably it
constitutes only a limited portion of our Army, and we can
sooner stake that than the whole on the risk of a great venture.
Besides, the greater part or perhaps the whole serves as a
support and rallying-point for the portion risked, which again
very much diminishes the danger of the enterprise.
But then at such times the readiness for battle on both sides is
also more perfect; on the other hand, in former Wars it was a
frequent practice for armies to take up camps in sight of each
other, when they had no other object but that of mutually
holding each other in check, consequently for a longer period.
How often Frederick the Great stood for weeks so near to the
471
Austrians, that the two might have exchanged cannon shots
with each other.
But in all these cases there is still the condition that the
enemy’s army is under our eyes, and protected by no
advance-guard.
472
As for the rest, most night combats are so conducted as to end
with daylight, so that only the approach and the first attack
are made under cover of darkness, because the assailant in
that manner can better profit by the consequences of the state
of confusion into which he throws his adversary; and combats
of this description which do not commence until daybreak, in
which the night therefore is only made use of to approach, are
not to be counted as night combats.
473
The Art of War
by Niccolò Machiavelli
Many, Lorenzo, have held and still hold the opinion, that
there is nothing which has less in common with another, and
that is so dissimilar, as civilian life is from the military.
Whence it is often observed, if anyone designs to avail
himself of an enlistment in the army, that he soon changes,
not only his clothes, but also his customs, his habits, his
voice, and in the presence of any civilian custom, he goes to
pieces; for I do not believe that any man can dress in civilian
clothes who wants to be quick and ready for any violence; nor
can that man have civilian customs and habits, who judges
those customs to be effeminate and those habits not
conducive to his actions; nor does it seem right to him to
maintain his ordinary appearance and voice who, with his
beard and cursing, wants to make other men afraid: which
makes such an opinion in these times to be very true. But if
they should consider the ancient institutions, they would not
find matter more united, more in conformity, and which, of
necessity, should be like to each other as much as these
(civilian and military); for in all the arts that are established in
a society for the sake of the common good of men, all those
institutions created to (make people) live in fear of the laws
and of God would be in vain, if their defense had not been
provided for and which, if well arranged, will maintain not
only these, but also those that are not well established. And so
(on the contrary), good institutions without the help of the
military are not much differently disordered than the
474
habitation of a superb and regal palace, which, even though
adorned with jewels and gold, if it is not roofed over will not
have anything to protect it from the rain. And, if in any other
institutions of a City and of a Republic every diligence is
employed in keeping men loyal, peaceful, and full of the fear
of God, it is doubled in the military; for in what man ought
the country look for greater loyalty than in that man who has
to promise to die for her? In whom ought there to be a greater
love of peace, than in him who can only be injured by war? In
whom ought there to be a greater fear of God than in him
who, undergoing infinite dangers every day, has more need
for His aid? If these necessities in forming the life of the
soldier are well considered, they are found to be praised by
those who gave the laws to the Commanders and by those
who were put in charge of military training, and followed and
imitated with all diligence by others.
475
but those which are made with deeds cannot be found out
except by the ruin of the Commanders.
First Book
As I believe that it is possible for one to praise, without
concern, any man after he is dead since every reason and
supervision for adulation is lacking, I am not apprehensive in
praising our own Cosimo Ruccelai, whose name is never
remembered by me without tears, as I have recognized in him
those parts which can be desired in a good friend among
friends and in a citizen of his country. For I do not know what
pertained to him more than to spend himself willingly, not
excepting that courage of his, for his friends, and I do not
know of any enterprise that dismayed him when he knew it
was for the good of his country. And I confess freely not to
have met among so many men whom I have known and
worked with, a man in whom there was a mind more fired
with great and magnificent things. Nor does one grieve with
the friends of another of his death, except for his having been
born to die young unhonored within his own home, without
476
having been able to benefit anyone with that mind of his, for
one would know that no one could speak of him, except (to
say) that a good friend had died. It does not remain for us,
however, or for anyone else who, like us, knew him, to be
able because of this to keep the faith (since deeds do not seem
to) to his laudable qualities. It is true however, that fortune
was not so unfriendly to him that it did not leave some brief
memory of the dexterity of his genius, as was demonstrated
by some of his writings and compositions of amorous verses,
in which (as he was not in love) he (employed as an) exercise
in order not to use his time uselessly in his juvenile years, in
order that fortune might lead him to higher thoughts. Here, it
can be clearly comprehended, that if his objective was
exercise, how very happily he described his ideas, and how
much he was honored in his poetry. Fortune, however, having
deprived us of the use of so great a friend, it appears to me it
is not possible to find any other better remedy than for us to
seek to benefit from his memory, and recover from it any
matter that was either keenly observed or wisely discussed.
And as there is nothing of his more recent than the
discussions which the Lord Fabrizio Colonna had with him in
his gardens, where matters pertaining to war were discussed
at length by that Lord, with (questions) keenly and prudently
asked by Cosimo, it seemed proper to me having been present
with other friends of ours, to recall him to memory, so that
reading it, the friends of Cosimo who met there will renew in
their minds the memory of his virtue, and another part
grieving for not having been there, will learn in part of many
things discussed wisely by a most sagacious man useful not
only to the military way of life, but to the civilian as well. I
will relate, therefore, how Fabrizio Colonna, when he
returned from Lombardy where he had fought a long time
gloriously for the Catholic King, decided to pass through
477
Florence to rest several days in that City in order to visit His
Excellency the Duke, and see again several gentlemen with
whom he had been familiar in the past. Whence it appeared
proper to Cosimo to invite him to a banquet in his gardens,
not so much to show his generosity as to have reason to talk
to him at length, and to learn and understand several things
from him, according as one can hope to from such a man, for
it appeared to him to give him an opportunity to spend a day
discussing such matters as would satisfy his mind.
478
them, because here are some which were more widely known
by the ancients than are those commonly seen today. And
giving him the name of some and telling him that Bernardo,
his grandfather, had worked hard in their culture, Fabrizio
replied: I was thinking that it was what you said I was, and
this place and this study make me remember several Princes
of the Kingdom, who delighted in their ancient culture and
the shadow they cast. And stopping speaking of this, and
somewhat upon himself as though in suspense, he added: If I
did not think I would offend you, I would give you my
opinion: but I do not believe in talking and discussing things
with friends in this manner that I insult them. How much
better would they have done (it is said with peace to
everyone) to seek to imitate the ancients in the strong and
rugged things, not in the soft and delicate, and in the things
they did under the sun, not in the shadows, to adopt the honest
and perfect ways of antiquity, not the false and corrupt; for
while these practices were pleasing to my Romans, my
country (without them) was ruined. To which Cosimo replied
(but to avoid the necessity of having to repeat so many times
who is speaking, and what the other adds, only the names of
those speaking will be noted, without repeating the others).
Cosimo, therefore, said: You have opened the way for a
discussion which I desired, and I pray you to speak without
regard, for I will question you without regard; and if, in
questioning or in replying, I accuse or excuse anyone, it will
not be for accusing or excusing, but to understand the truth
from you.
479
will from me replying to you, because many times a wise
questioner causes one to consider many things and understand
many others which, without having been asked, would never
have been understood.
480
introduce by one who is numbered among the Princes of a
City. I will never forego my examples of my Romans. If their
way of living should be examined, and the institutions in their
Republic, there will be observed in her many things not
impossible to introduce in a Society where there yet might be
something of good.
481
not observed that you have employed any of the ancient
methods, or those which have some similarity.
482
this is ((which appears a paradox)) most difficult and most
easy to do.
483
employ this as a profession, the great as well as the least, be
made otherwise, for this profession does not provide for them
in peace. Whence they are obliged, either to hope that there
will be no peace or to gain so much for themselves in times of
war, that they can provide for themselves in times of peace.
And wherever one of these two thoughts exists, it does not
occur in a good man; for, from the desire to provide for
oneself in every circumstance, robberies, violence and
assassinations result, which such soldiers do to friends as well
as to enemies: and from not desiring peace, there arises those
deceptions which Captains perpetrate upon those whom they
lead, because war hardens them: and even if peace occurs
frequently, it happens that the leaders, being deprived of their
stipends and of their licentious mode of living, raise a flag of
piracy, and without any mercy sack a province.
484
man; and if, through their malignity, they have not become
Dukes of Milan, so much more do they merit to be censured;
for without such a return ((if their lives were to be
examined)), they all have the same cares. Sforza, father of
Francesco, constrained Queen Giovanna to throw herself into
the arms of the King of Aragon, having abandoned her
suddenly, and left her disarmed amid her enemies, only in
order to satisfy his ambition of either levying tribute or taking
the Kingdom. Braccio, with the same industry, sought to
occupy the Kingdom of Naples, and would have succeeded,
had he not been routed and killed at Aquilla. Such evils do
not result from anything else other than the existence of men
who employ the practice of soldiering as their own
profession. Do you not have a proverb which strengthens my
argument, which says: War makes robbers, and peace hangs
them? For those who do not know how to live by another
practice, and not finding any one who will support them in
that, and not having so much virtu that they know how to
come and live together honorably, are forced by necessity to
roam the streets, and justice is forced to extinguish them.
485
Kingdom would never permit its subjects or citizens to
employ it for their profession. Concerning the first, I have
spoken as much as has occurred to me: it remains for me to
talk of the second, where I shall reply to this last question of
yours, and I say that Pompey and Caesar, and almost all those
Captains who were in Rome after the last Carthaginian war,
acquired fame as valiant men, not as good men: but those who
had lived before them acquired glory as valiant and good
men: which results from the fact that these latter did not take
up the practice of war as their profession; and those whom I
named first as those who employed it as their profession. And
while the Republic lived immaculately, no great citizen ever
presumed by means of such a practice to enrich himself
during (periods of) peace by breaking laws, despoiling the
provinces, usurping and tyrannizing the country, and
imposing himself in every way; nor did anyone of the lowest
fortune think of violating the sacred agreement, adhere
himself to any private individual, not fearing the Senate, or to
perform any disgraceful act of tyranny in order to live at all
times by the profession of war. But those who were Captains,
being content with the triumph, returned with a desire for the
private life; and those who were members (of the army)
returned with a desire to lay down the arms they had taken up;
and everyone returned to the art (trade or profession) by
which they ordinarily lived; nor was there ever anyone who
hoped to provide for himself by plunder and by means of
these arts. A clear and evident example of this as it applies to
great citizens can be found in the Regent Attilio, who, when
he was captain of the Roman armies in Africa, and having
almost defeated the Carthaginians, asked the Senate for
permission to return to his house to look after his farms which
were being spoiled by his laborers. Whence it is clearer than
the sun, that if that man had practiced war as his profession,
486
and by means of it thought to obtain some advantage for
himself, having so many provinces which (he could) plunder,
he would not have asked permission to return to take care of
his fields, as each day he could have obtained more than the
value of all his possessions. But as these good men, who do
not practice war as their profession, do not expect to gain
anything from it except hard work, danger, and glory, as soon
as they are sufficiently glorious, desire to return to their
homes and live from the practice of their own profession. As
to men of lower status and gregarious soldiers, it is also true
that every one voluntarily withdrew from such a practice, for
when he was not fighting would have desired to fight, but
when he was fighting wanted to be dismissed. Which
illustrates the many ways, and especially in seeing that it was
among the first privileges, that the Roman people gave to one
of its Citizens, that he should not be constrained unwillingly
to fight. Rome, therefore, while she was well organized
((which it was up to the time of the Gracchi)) did not have
one soldier who had to take up this practice as a profession,
and therefore had few bad ones, and these were severely
punished. A well ordered City, therefore, ought to desire that
this training for war ought to be employed in times of peace
as an exercise, and in times of war as a necessity and for
glory, and allow the public only to use it as a profession, as
Rome did. And any citizen who has other aims in (using) such
exercises is not good, and any City which governs itself
otherwise, is not well ordered.
487
to have around him those who take up such a practice as their
profession.
488
them at all times, for they made war at all times: but in order
to avoid the harm which this continuous practice of theirs
could do to them, since the times did not change, they
changed the men, and kept turning men over in their legions
so that every fifteen years they always completely re-manned
them: and thus they desired men in the flower of their age,
which is from eighteen to thirty five years, during which time
their legs, their hands, and their eyes, worked together, nor
did they expect that their strength should decrease in them, or
that malice should grow in them, as they did in corrupt times.
489
he selects men who know how to live by a profession other
than this. And thus he ought to desire, with the coming of
peace, that his Princes return to governing their people,
gentlemen to the cultivation of their possessions, and the
infantry to their particular arts (trades or professions); and
everyone of these will willingly make war in order to have
peace, and will not seek to disturb the peace to have war.
490
raised under the laws and are chosen by the community in an
honest election; so do not say further that in peace there is a
place for every man. As to the men at arms continued in their
enlistment in peace time, the answer appears more difficult.
None the less, whoever considers everything well, will easily
find the answer, for this thing of keeping on the men at arms
is a corrupt thing and not good. The reason is this; as there are
men who do not have any art (trade or profession), a thousand
evils will arise every day in those States where they exist, and
especially so if they were to be joined by a great number of
companions: but as they are few, and unable by themselves to
constitute an army, they therefore, cannot do any serious
damage. None the less, they have done so many times, as I
said of Francesco and of Sforza, his father, and of Braccio of
Perugia. So I do not approve of this custom of keeping men at
arms, both because it is corrupt and because it can cause great
evils.
491
time of peace desire that they return to their professions. Thus
also, a wise King ought not to give (provisions) to them, or if
he does give them, the reasons ought to be either as a reward
for some excellent act, or in order to avail himself of such a
man in peace as well as in war. And because you have
mentioned me, I want the example to include me, and I say I
have never practiced war as a profession, for my profession is
to govern my subjects, and defend them, and in order to
defend them, I must love peace but know how to make war;
and my King does not reward and esteem me so much for
what I know of war, as because I know also how to counsel
him in peace. Any King ought not, therefore, to want to have
next to him anyone who is not thusly constituted, if he is wise
and wants to govern prudently; for if he has around him either
too many lovers of peace or too many lovers of war, they will
cause him to err. I cannot, in this first discussion of mine and
according to my suggestion, say otherwise, and if this is not
enough for you, you must seek one which satisfies you better.
You can begin to recognize how much difficulty there is in
bringing the ancient methods into modem wars, and what
preparations a wise man must make, and what opportunities
he can hope for to put them into execution. But little by little
you will know these things better if the discussion on bringing
any part of the ancient institutions to the present order of
things does not weary you.
492
to demonstrate it more fully, so that it may be better
understood. The aim of those who want to make war is to be
able to combat in the field with every (kind) of enemy, and to
be able to win the engagement. To want to do this, they must
raise an army. In raising an army, it is necessary to find men,
arm them, organize them, train them in small and large
(battle) orders, lodge them, and expose them to the enemy
afterwards, either at a standstill or while marching. All the
industry of war in the field is placed in these things, which are
the more necessary and honored (in the waging of war). And
if one does well in offering battle to the enemy, all the other
errors he may make in the conduct of the war are supportable:
but if he lacks this organization, even though he be valiant in
other particulars, he will never carry on a war to victory (and
honor). For, as one engagement that you win cancels out
every other bad action of yours, so likewise, when you lose
one, all the things you have done well before become useless.
Since it is necessary, therefore, first to find men, you must
come to the Deletto (Draft) of them, as thus the ancients
called it, and which we call Scelta (Selection): but in order to
call it by a more honored name, I want us to preserve the
name of Deletto. Those who have drawn up regulations for
war want men to be chosen from temperate countries as they
have spirit and are prudent; for warm countries give rise to
men who are prudent but not spirited, and cold (countries) to
men who are spirited but not prudent. This regulation is
drawn up well for one who is the Prince of all the world, and
is therefore permitted to draw men from those places that
appear best to him: but wanting to draw up a regulation that
anyone can use, one must say that every Republic and every
Kingdom ought to take soldiers from their own country,
whether it is hot, cold, or temperate. For, from ancient
examples, it is seen that in every country, good soldiers are
493
made by training; because where nature is lacking, industry
supplies it, which, in this case, is worth more than nature:
And selecting them from another place cannot be called
Deletto, because Deletto means to say to take the best of a
province, and to have the power to select as well those who
do not want to fight as those who do want to. This Deletto
therefore, cannot be made unless the places are subject to
you; for you cannot take whoever you want in the countries
that are not yours, but you need to take those who want to
come.
494
except in Germany, where no one is enlisted by command of
the Prince, but according to the wishes of those who want to
fight. Think, therefore, what methods of those ancients can
now be introduced in an army of men put together by similar
means.
COSIMO: Why?
495
to handle the sword, dig a ditch, carry a load, and are without
cunning or malice. But on this subject, my opinion would be,
that as soldiers are of two kinds, afoot and on horseback, that
those afoot be selected from the Countryside, and those on
horseback from the City.
496
COSIMO: Therefore you praise the ordinance?
FABRIZIO: Watch out that the defect is not yours, but his:
as that which you recognized before this discussion furnishes
proof.
497
FABRIZIO: All the reasons that you mention are from men
who are not far sighted, as I shall clearly show. And first, as
to the uselessness, I say to you that no army is of more use
than your own, nor can an army of your own be organized
except in this way. And as there is no debating over this,
which all the examples of ancient history does for us, I do not
want to lose time over it. And because they cite inexperience
and force, I say ((as it is true)) that inept experience gives rise
to little spirit (enthusiasm) and force makes for discontent:
but experience and enthusiasm gains for themselves the
means for arming, training, and organizing them, as you will
see in the first part of this discussion. But as to force, you
must understand that as men are brought to the army by
commandment of the Prince, they have to come, whether it is
entirely by force or entirely voluntarily: for if it were entirely
from desire, there would not be a Deletto as only a few of
them would go; so also, the (going) entirely by force would
produce bad results; therefore, a middle way ought to be
taken where neither the entirely forced or entirely voluntarily
(means are used), but they should come, drawn by the regard
they have for the Prince, where they are more afraid of of his
anger then the immediate punishment: and it will always
happen that there will be a compulsion mixed with
willingness, from which that discontent cannot arise which
causes bad effects. Yet I do not claim that an army thus
constituted cannot be defeated; for many times the Roman
armies were overcome, and the army of Hannibal was
defeated: so that it can be seen that no army can be so
organized that a promise can be given that it cannot be routed.
These wise men of yours, therefore, ought not measure this
uselessness from having lost one time, but to believe that just
as they can lose, so too they can win and remedy the cause of
the defeat. And if they should look into this, they will find
498
that it would not have happened because of a defect in the
means, but of the organization which was not sufficiently
perfect. And, as I have said, they ought to provide for you, not
by censuring the organization, but by correcting it: as to how
this ought to be done, you will come to know little by little.
499
but who so much more merit censure, because they had been
the first who were armed by their founders. And not having
dominion on land, they armed themselves on the sea, where
they waged war with virtu, and with arms in hand enlarged
their country. But when the time came when they had to wage
war on land to defend Venice and where they ought to have
sent their own citizens to fight (on land), they enlisted as their
captain (a foreigner), the Marquis of Mantua. This was the
sinister course which prevented them from rising to the skies
and expanding. And they did this in the belief that, as they
knew how to wage war at sea, they should not trust
themselves in waging it on land; which was an unwise belief
(distrust), because a Sea captain, who is accustomed to
combat with winds, water, and men, could more easily
become a Captain on land where the combat is with men only,
than a land Captain become a sea one. And my Romans,
knowing how to combat on land and not on the sea, when the
war broke out with the Carthaginians who were powerful on
the sea, did not enlist Greeks or Spaniards experienced at sea,
but imposed that change on those citizens they sent (to fight)
on land, and they won. If they did this in order that one of
their citizens should not become Tyrant, it was a fear that was
given little consideration; for, in addition to the other reasons
mentioned a short while ago concerning such a proposal, if a
citizen (skilled) in (the use of) arms at sea had never been
made a Tyrant in a City situated in the sea, so much less
would he be able to do this if he were (skilled) in (the use of
arms) on land. And, because of this, they ought to have seen
that arms in the hands of their own citizens could not create
Tyrants, but the evil institutions of a Government are those
which cause a City to be tyrannized; and, as they had a good
Government, did not have to fear arms of their own citizens.
They took an imprudent course, therefore, which was the
500
cause of their being deprived of much glory and happiness.
As to the error which the King of France makes in not having
his people disciplined to war, from what has been cited from
examples previously mentioned, there is no one ((devoid of
some particular passion of theirs)) who does not judge this
defect to be in the Republic, and that this negligence alone is
what makes it weak. But I have made too great a digression
and have gotten away from my subject: yet I have done this to
answer you and to show you, that no reliance can be had on
arms other than ones own, and ones own arms cannot be
established otherwise than by way of an ordinance, nor can
forms of armies be introduced in any place, nor military
discipline instituted. If you have read the arrangements which
the first Kings made in Rome, and most especially of Servius
Tullus, you will find that the institution of classes is none
other than an arrangement to be able quickly to put together
an army for the defense of that City. But turning to our
Deletto, I say again, that having to replenish an established
(old) organization, I would take the seventeen year olds, but
having to create a new one, I would take them of every age
between seventeen and forty in order to avail myself of them
quickly.
501
him with the greatest usefulness. And for this reason, the
peasants, who are accustomed to working the land, are more
useful than anyone else, for of all the professions (arts), this
one is used more than any other in the army: After this, are
the forgers (smiths), carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers; of
whom it is useful to have many, for their skills succeed in
many things, as they are a very good thing for a soldier to
have, from whom you draw double service.
COSIMO: How are those who are or are not suitable to fight
chosen?
502
round hips, sleek legs and feet: which parts usually render a
man strong and agile, which are the two things sought above
everything else in a soldier. He ought, above all, to have
regard for his habits and that there should be in him a (sense
of) honesty and shame, otherwise there will be selected only
an instrument of trouble and a beginning of corruption; for
there is no one who believes that in a dishonest education and
in a brutish mind, there can exist some virtu which in some
part may be praiseworthy. Nor does it appear to me
superfluous, rather I believe it necessary, in order for you to
understand better the importance of this selection, to tell you
the method that the Roman Consuls at the start of their
Magistracy observed in selecting the Roman legions. In
which Deletto, because those who had to be selected were to
be a mixture of new and veteran men ((because of the
continuing wars)), they proceeded from experience with
regard to the old (veteran) men, and from conjecture with
regard to the new. And this ought to be noted, that these
Deletti are made, either for immediate training and use, or for
future employment.
I have talked, and will talk, of those that are made for future
employment, because my intention is to show you how an
army can be organized in countries where there is no military
(organization), in which countries I cannot have Deletti in
order to make use of them. But in countries where it is the
custom to call out armies, and by means of the Prince, these
(Deletti) exist, as was observed at Rome and is today
observed among the Swiss. For in these Deletti, if they are for
the (selection of) new men, there are so many others
accustomed to being under military orders, that the old
(veteran) and new, being mixed together, make a good and
united body. Notwithstanding this, the Emperors, when they
503
began to hold fixed the (term of service of the) soldiers,
placed new men in charge over the soldiers, whom they called
Tironi, as teachers to train them, as is seen in the life of the
Emperor Maximus: which thing, while Rome was free, was
instituted, not in the army, but within the City: and as the
military exercises where the young men were trained were in
the City, there resulted that those then chosen to go to war,
being accustomed in the method of mock warfare, could
easily adapt themselves to real war. But afterwards, when
these Emperors discontinued these exercises, it was necessary
to employ the methods I have described to you. Arriving,
therefore, at the methods of the Roman Selection, I say that,
as soon as the Roman Consuls, on whom was imposed the
carrying on of the war, had assumed the Magistracy, in
wanting to organize their armies ((as it was the custom that
each of them had two legions of Roman men, who were the
nerve (center) of their armies)), created twenty four military
Tribunes, proposing six for each legion, who filled that office
which today is done by those whom we call Constables. After
they had assembled all the Roman men adept at carrying
arms, and placed the Tribunes of each legion apart from each
of the others. Afterwards, by lot they drew the Tribes, from
which the first Selection was to be made, and of that Tribe
they selected four of their best men, from whom one was
selected by the Tribunes of the first legion, and of the other
three, one was selected by the Tribunes of the second legion;
of the other two, one was selected by the Tribunes of the
third, and that last belonged to the fourth legion. After these
four, four others were selected, of whom the first man was
selected by the Tribunes of the second legion, the second by
those of the third, the third by those of the fourth, the fourth
remained to the first. After, another four were chosen: the first
man was selected by the (Tribunes of the) third (legion), the
504
second by the fourth, the third by the first, the fourth
remained to the second. And thus this method of selection
changed successively, so that the selection came to be equal,
and the legions equalized. And as we said above, this was
done where the men were to be used immediately: and as it
was formed of men of whom a good part were experienced in
real warfare, and everyone in mock battles, this Deletto was
able to be based on conjecture and experience. But when a
new army was to be organized and the selection made for
future employment, this Deletto cannot be based except on
conjecture, which is done by age and physical appearance.
505
there are many people, as there are for example in Tuscany,
does not cause you to have better ones, or that the Deletto is
more selective; for desiring in the selection of men to judge
them on the basis of experience, only a very few would
probably be found in that country who would have had this
experience, as much because few have been in a war, as
because of those few who have been, very few have ever been
put to the test, so that because of this they merit to be chosen
before the others: so that whoever is in a similar situation
should select them, must leave experience to one side and
take them by conjecture: and if I were brought to such a
necessity, I would want to see, if twenty young men of good
physical appearance should come before me, with what rule
rule I ought to take some or reject some: so that without doubt
I believe that every man will confess that it is a much smaller
error to take them all in arming and training them, being
unable to know (beforehand) which of them are better, and to
reserve to oneself afterwards to make a more certain Deletto
where, during the exercises with the army, those of greater
courage and vitality may be observed. So that, considering
everything, the selection in this case of a few in order to have
them better, is entirely false. As to causing less hardship to
the country and to the men, I say that the ordinance, whether
it is bad or insufficient, does not cause any hardship: for this
order does not take men away from their business, and does
not bind them so that they cannot go to carry out their
business, because it only obliges them to come together for
training on their free days, which proposition does not do any
harm either to the country or the men; rather, to the young, it
ought to be delightful, for where, on holidays they remain
basely indolent in their hangouts, they would now attend
these exercises with pleasure, for the drawing of arms, as it is
a beautiful spectacle, is thus delightful to the young men. As
506
to being able to pay (more to) the lesser number, and thereby
keeping them more content and obedient, I reply, that no
organization of so few can be made, who are paid so
continually, that their pay satisfies them. For instance, if an
army of five thousand infantry should be organized, in
wanting to pay them so that it should be believed they would
be contented, they must be given at least ten thousand ducats
a month. To begin with, this number of infantry is not enough
to make an army, and the payment is unendurable to a State;
and on the other hand, it is not sufficient to keep the men
content and obligated to respect your position. So that in
doing this although much would be spent, it would provide
little strength, and would not be sufficient to defend you, or
enable you to undertake any enterprise. If you should give
them more, or take on more, so much more impossible would
it be for you to pay them: if you should give them less, or take
on fewer, so much less would be content and so much less
useful would they be to you. Therefore, those who consider
things which are either useless or impossible. But it is indeed
necessary to pay them when they are levied to send to war.
507
you in fact and reputation, for the large number will always
give you reputation. Moreover, in creating the organization,
in order to keep men trained, if you enroll a small number of
men in many countries, and the armies are very distant from
each other, you cannot without the gravest injury to them
assemble them for (joint) exercises, and without this training
the organization is useless, as will be shown in its proper
place.
508
them arms useful for war, and leaders who will extinguish
troubles; for as soon as some one is injured in that country, he
has recourse to his (leader) of the party, who, to maintain his
reputation, advises him to avenge himself, (and) not to remain
in peace. The public leader does the contrary. So that by this
means, the causes for trouble are removed, and replaced by
those for union; and provinces which are united but
effeminate (unwarlike) lose their usefulness but maintain the
union, while those that are disunited and troublesome remain
united; and that disordinate ferocity which they usually
employ, is turned to public usefulness.
509
charge of the care of the armies, from place to place every
year. Nor, for other reasons, (did it result) in the Roman
Empire; once the blood (race) of Caesar was extinguished, so
many civil wars arose among the Captains of the armies, and
so many conspiracies of the above mentioned Captains
against the Emperors, resulting from the continuing of those
Captains in their same Commands. And if any of those
Emperors, and any who later held the Empire by reputation,
such as Hadrian, Marcus, Severus, and others like them,
would have observed such happenings, and would have
introduced this custom of exchanging Captains in that
Empire, without doubt they would have made it more tranquil
and lasting; for the Captains would have had fewer
opportunities for creating tumults, and the Emperors fewer
causes to fear them, and the Senate, when there was a lack in
the succession, would have had more authority in the election
of Emperors, and consequently, better conditions would have
resulted. But the bad customs of men, whether from
ignorance or little diligence, or from examples of good or bad,
are never put aside.
510
both for the age and quality of the men, selecting three
hundred for each legion: so that the Roman cavalry in every
Consular army did not exceed six hundred.
511
ought to be armed, and how they should prepare for an
engagement.
Second Book
I believe that it is necessary, once the men are found, to arm
them; and in wanting to do this, I believe it is necessary to
examine what arms the ancients used, and from them select
the best. The Romans divided their infantry into the heavily
and lightly armed. The light armed they gave the name Veliti.
Under this name they included all those who operated with
the sling, cross-bow, and darts: and the greater part of them
carried a helmet (head covering) and a shield on the arm for
their defense. These men fought outside the regular ranks, and
apart from the heavy armor, which was a Casque that came up
to the shoulders, they also carried a Cuirass which, with the
skirt, came down to the knees, and their arms and legs were
covered by shin-guards and bracelets; they also carried a
shield on the arm, two arms in length and one in width, which
had an iron hoop on it to be able to sustain a blow, and
another underneath, so that in rubbing on the ground, it
should not be worn out. For attacking, they had cinched on
their left side a sword of an arm and a half length, and a
dagger on the right side. They carried a spear, which they
called Pilus, and which they hurled at the enemy at the start of
a battle. These were the important Roman arms, with which
they conquered the world. And although some of the ancient
writers also gave them, in addition to the aforementioned
arms, a shaft in the hand in the manner of a spit, I do not
know how a staff can be used by one who holds a shield, for
in managing it with two hands it is impeded by the shield, and
he cannot do anything worthwhile with one hand because of
512
its heaviness. In addition to this, to combat in the ranks with
the staff (as arms) is useless, except in the front rank where
there is ample space to deploy the entire staff, which cannot
be done in the inner ranks, because the nature of the battalions
((as I will tell you in their organization)) is to press its ranks
continually closer together, as this is feared less, even though
inconvenient, than for the ranks to spread further apart, where
the danger is most apparent. So that all the arms which exceed
two arms in length are useless in tight places; for if you have
a staff and want to use it with both hands, and handled so that
the shield should not annoy you, you cannot attack an enemy
with it who is next to you. If you take it in one hand in order
to serve yourself of the shield, you cannot pick it up except in
the middle, and there remains so much of the staff in the back
part, that those who are behind impede you in using it. And
that this is true, that the Romans did not have the staff, or,
having it, they valued it little, you will read in all the
engagements noted by Titus Livius in his history, where you
will see that only very rarely is mention made of the shaft,
rather he always says that, after hurling the spears, they put
their hands on the sword. Therefore I want to leave this staff,
and relate how much the Romans used the sword for offense,
and for defense, the shield together with the other arms
mentioned above.
The Greeks did not arm so heavily for defense as did the
Romans, but in the offense relied more on this staff than on
the sword, and especially the Phalanxes of Macedonia, who
carried staffs which they called Sarisse, a good ten arms in
length, with which they opened the ranks of the enemy and
maintained order in the Phalanxes. And although other writers
say they also had a shield, I do not know ((for the reasons
given above)) how the Sarisse and the shield could exist
513
together. In addition to this, in the engagement that Paulus
Emilius had with Perseus, King of Macedonia, I do not
remember mention being made of shields, but only of the
Sarisse and the difficulty the Romans had in overcoming
them. So that I conjecture that a Macedonian Phalanx was
nothing else than a battalion of Swiss is today, who have all
their strength and power in their pikes. The Romans ((in
addition to the arms)) ornamented the infantry with plumes;
which things make the sight of an army beautiful to friends,
and terrible to the enemy. The arms for men on horseback in
the original ancient Roman (army) was a round shield, and
they had the head covered, but the rest (of the body) without
armor. They had a sword and a staff with an iron point, long
and thin; whence they were unable to hold the shield firm,
and only make weak movements with the staff, and because
they had no armor, they were exposed to wounds. Afterwards,
with time, they were armed like the infantry, but the shield
was much smaller and square, and the staff more solid and
with two iron tips, so that if the one side was encumbered,
they could avail themselves of the other. With these arms,
both for the infantry and the cavalry, my Romans occupied all
the world, and it must be believed, from the fruits that are
observed, that they were the best armed armies that ever
existed.
514
call a pike, and a sword at their side, rather round in the point
than sharp. This is the ordinary armament of the infantry
today, for few have their arms and shins (protected by) armor,
no one the head; and those few carry a halberd in place of a
pike, the shaft of which ((as you know)) is three armlengths
long, and has the iron attached as an axe. Among them they
have three Scoppettieri (Exploders, i.e., Gunners), who, with
a burst of fire fill that office which anciently was done by
slingers and bow-men. This method of arming was
established by the Germans, and especially by the Swiss,
who, being poor and wanting to live in freedom, were, and
are, obliged to combat with the ambitions of the Princes of
Germany, who were rich and could raise horses, which that
people could not do because of poverty: whence it happened
that being on foot and wanting to defend themselves from
enemies who were on horseback, it behooved them to search
the ancient orders and find arms which should defend them
from the fury of horses. This necessity has caused them to
maintain or rediscover the ancient orders, without which, as
every prudent man affirms, the infantry is entirely useless.
They therefore take up pikes as arms, which are most useful
not only in sustaining (the attacks of) horses, but to overcome
them. And because of the virtu of these arms and ancient
orders, the Germans have assumed so much audacity, that
fifteen or twenty thousand of them would assault any great
number of horse, and there have been many examples of this
seen in the last twenty five years. And this example of their
virtu founded on these arms and these orders have been so
powerful, that after King Charles passed into Italy, every
nation has imitated them: so that the Spanish armies have
come into a very great reputation.
515
COSIMO: What method of arms do you praise more, this
German one or the ancient Roman?
516
with an infantry organized as they are, and armed as the
Roman. So that there will be this advantage of the one over
the other, that the Romans could overcome both the infantry
and the cavalry, and the Germans only the cavalry.
517
those on foot so organized; and regrouping his forces, again
went to meet the Swiss, and as they came near he made his
men-at-arms descend from their horses, and in that manner
fought with them, and killed all but three thousand, who,
seeing themselves consumed without having any remedy,
threw their arms on the ground and surrendered.
FABRIZIO: I have told you a little while ago, but since you
have not understood it, I will repeat it to you. The German
infantry ((as was said a little while ago)) has almost no armor
in defending itself, and use pikes and swords for offense.
They come with these arms and order of battle to meet the
enemy, who ((if he is well equipped with armor to defend
himself, as were the men-at-arms of Carmingnuola who made
them descend to their feet)) comes with his sword and order
of battle to meet him, and he has no other difficulty than to
come near the Swiss until he makes contact with them with
the sword; for as soon as he makes contact with them, he
combats them safely, for the German cannot use the pike
against the enemy who is next to him because of the length of
the staff, so he must use the sword, which is useless to him, as
he has no armor and has to meet an enemy that is (protected)
fully by armor. Whence, whoever considers the advantages
and disadvantages of one and the other, will see that the one
without armor has no remedy, but the one well armored will
have no difficulty in overcoming the first blow and the first
passes of the pike: for in battles, as you will understand better
when I have demonstrated how they are put together, the men
go so that of necessity they accost each other in a way that
they are attacked on the breast, and if one is killed or thrown
to the ground by the pike, those on foot who remain are so
518
numerous that they are sufficient for victory. From this there
resulted that Carmingnuola won with such a massacre of the
Swiss, and with little loss to himself.
519
the German infantry had not been succored by the French
Cavalry: none the less, the Spaniards pressing together made
themselves secure in that place. I conclude, therefore, that a
good infantry not only is able to sustain the (attack) of
cavalry, but does not have fear of infantry, which ((as I have
said many times)) proceeds from its arms (armor) and
organization (discipline).
520
the less, that no more account ought to be taken of the cavalry
than was taken anciently; for ((as has been said above)) they
have often in our times been subjected to disgrace by the
infantry armed (armored) and organized as (described) above.
Tigranus, King of Armenia, came against the Roman army of
which Lucullus was Captain, with (an army) of one hundred
fifty thousand cavalry, among whom were many armed as our
men-at-arms, whom they called Catafratti, while on the other
side the Romans did not total more than six thousand
(cavalry) and fifteen thousand infantry; so that Tigranus,
when he saw the army of the enemy, said: "These are just
about enough horsemen for an embassy". None the less, when
they came to battle, he was routed; and he who writes of that
battle blames those Catafratti, showing them to be useless,
because, he says, that having their faces covered, their vision
was impaired and they were little adept at seeing and
attacking the enemy, and as they were heavily burdened by
the armor, they could not regain their feet when they fell, nor
in any way make use of their persons. I say, therefore, that
those People or Kingdoms which esteem the cavalry more
than the infantry, are always weaker and more exposed to
complete ruin, as has been observed in Italy in our times,
which has been plundered, ruined, and overrun by foreigners,
not for any other fault than because they had paid little
attention to the foot soldiers and had mounted all their
soldiers on horses. Cavalry ought to be used, but as a second
and not the first reliance of an army; for they are necessary
and most useful in undertaking reconnaissance, in
overrunning and despoiling the enemy country, and to keep
harassing and troubling the enemy army so as to keep it
continually under arms, and to impede its provisions; but as to
engagements and battles in the field, which are the important
things in war and the object for which armies are organized,
521
they are more useful in pursuing than in routing the enemy,
and are much more inferior to the foot soldier in
accomplishing the things necessary in accomplishing such
(defeats).
COSIMO: But two doubts occur to me: the one, that I know
that the Parthians did not engage in war except with cavalry,
yet they divided the world with the Romans: the other, that I
would like you to tell me how the (attack of) the cavalry can
be sustained by the infantry, and whence arises the virtu of
the latter and the weakness of the former?
522
today, and tomorrow fifty miles distant. Because of this, the
Parthians were able to prevail with cavalry alone, and thus
resulted the ruin of the army of Crassus, and the dangers to
those of Marcantonio. But ((as I have said)) I did not intend in
this discussion of mine to speak of armies outside of Europe;
and, therefore, I want to continue on those which the Romans
and Greeks had organized in their time, and that the Germans
do today.
523
can be very secure from, and even actually insuperable to, the
cavalry. And if you should argue on this that the Elan with
which he comes makes it more furious in hurling himself
against whoever wants to sustain his attack, and he responds
less to the pike than the spur, I say that, as soon as the horse
so disposed begins to see himself at the point of being struck
by the points of the pikes, either he will by himself check his
gait, so that he will stop as soon as he sees himself about to be
pricked by them, or, being pricked by them, he will turn to the
right or left. If you want to make a test of this, try to run a
horse against a wall, and rarely will you find one that will run
into it, no matter with what Elan you attempt it. Caesar, when
he had to combat the Swiss in Gaul, dismounted and made
everyone dismount to their feet, and had the horses removed
from the ranks, as they were more adept at fleeing than
fighting.
524
esteemed much their own discipline and trusted very much on
their arms (and armor), that if they had to select a place, either
so rough to protect themselves from horses and where they
could not be able to deploy their forces, or one where they
had more to fear from the horses but where they were able to
spread out, they would always take the latter and leave the
former.
525
an enemy, and sustain an attack. And above all, to make the
body more inured to hardships, they accustom it to carry great
weights. This accustoming is necessary, for in difficult
expeditions it often happens that the soldier, in addition to his
arms, must carry provisions for many days, and if he had not
been accustomed to this hard work, he would not be able to
do it, and, hence, he could neither flee from a danger nor
acquire a victory with fame.
526
minute details, for they reasoned that where men had to come
hand to hand (in battle), every little advantage is of the
greatest importance; and I will remind you of that, because
the writers say of this that I have taught it to you. Nor did the
ancients esteem it a more fortunate thing in a Republic than to
have many of its men trained in arms; for it is not the
splendor of jewels and gold that makes the enemy submit
themselves to you, but only the fear of arms. Moreover, errors
made in other things can sometimes be corrected afterwards,
but those that are made in war, as the punishment happens
immediately, cannot be corrected. In addition to this, knowing
how to fight makes men more audacious, as no one fears to
do the things which appear to him he has been taught to do.
The ancients, therefore, wanted their citizens to train in every
warlike activity; and even had them throw darts against the
pole heavier than the actual ones: which exercise, in addition
to making men expert in throwing, also makes the arm more
limber and stronger. They also taught them how to draw the
bow and the sling, and placed teachers in charge of doing all
these things: so that when (men) were selected to go to war,
they were already soldiers in spirit and disposition. Nor did
these remain to teach them anything else than to go by the
orders and maintain themselves in them whether marching or
combatting: which they easily taught by mixing themselves
with them, so that by knowing how to keep (obey) the orders,
they could exist longer in the army.
527
gun, a new instrument ((as you know)), and a necessary one.
And I would accustom all the youth of my State to this
training: but that part of them whom I have enrolled to fight, I
would (especially) train with greater industry and more
solicitude, and I would train them always on their free days. I
would also desire that they be taught to swim, which is a very
useful thing, because there are not always bridges at rivers,
nor ships ready: so that if your army does not know how to
swim, it may be deprived of many advantages, and many
opportunities, to act well are taken away. The Romans,
therefore, arranged that the young men be trained on the field
of Mars, so that having the river Tiber nearby, they would be
able after working hard in exercises on land to refresh
themselves in the water, and also exercise them in their
swimming.
528
They divide all their inhabitants into several parts, and assign
one kind of arms of those they use in war to each part. And as
they used pikes, halberds, bows, and light guns, they called
them pikemen, halberdiers, archers, and gunners. It therefore
behooved all the inhabitants to declare in what order they
wanted to be enrolled. And as all, whether because of age or
other impediment, are not fit for war (combat), they make a
selection from each order and they call them the Giurati
(Sworn Ones), who, on their free days, are obliged to exercise
themselves in those arms in which they are enrolled: and each
one is assigned his place by the public where such exercises
are to be carried on, and those who are of that order but are
not sworn, participate by (contributing) money for those
expenses which are necessary for such exercises. That which
they do, therefore, we can do, but our little prudence does not
allow us to take up any good proceeding.
529
discipline, obey the signs, the sounds (of the bugle), and the
voice of the Captain; to know when to stand, to retire, to go
forward, and when to combat, to march, to maintain ranks; for
without this discipline, despite every careful diligence
observed and practiced, an army is never good. And without
doubt, bold but undisciplined men are more weak than the
timid but disciplined ones; for discipline drives away fear
from men, lack of discipline makes the bold act foolishly.
And so that you may better understand what will be
mentioned below, you have to know that every nation has
made its men train in the discipline of war, or rather its army
as the principal part, which, if they have varied in name, they
have varied little in the numbers of men involved, as all have
comprised six to eight thousand men. This number was called
a Legion by the Romans, a Phalanx by the Greeks, a Caterna
by the Gauls. This same number, by the Swiss, who alone
retain any of that ancient military umbrage, in our times is
called in their language what in ours signifies a Battalion. It is
true that each one is further subdivided into small Battaglia
(Companies), and organized according to its purpose. It
appears to me, therefore, more suitable to base our talk on this
more notable name, and then according to the ancient and
modern systems, arrange them as best as is possible. And as
the Roman Legions were composed of five or six thousand
men, in ten Cohorts, I want to divide our Battalion into ten
Companies, and compose it of six thousand men on foot; and
assign four hundred fifty men to each Company, of whom
four hundred are heavily armed and fifty lightly armed: the
heavily armed include three hundred with shields and swords,
and will be called Scudati (shield bearers), and a hundred
with pikes, and will be called pikemen: the lightly armed are
fifty infantry armed with light guns, cross-bows, halberds,
and bucklers, and these, from an ancient name, are called
530
regular (ordinary) Veliti: the whole ten Companies, therefore,
come to three thousand shield bearers; a thousand ordinary
pikemen, and one hundred fifty ordinary Veliti, all of whom
comprise (a number of) four thousand five hundred infantry.
And we said we wanted to make a Battalion of six thousand
men; therefore it is necessary to add another one thousand
five hundred infantry, of whom I would make a thousand with
pikes, whom I will call extraordinary pikemen, (and five
hundred light armed, whom I will call extraordinary Veliti):
and thus my infantry would come ((according as was said a
little while ago)) to be composed half of shield bearers and
half among pikemen and other arms (carriers). In every
Company, I would put in charge a Constable, four Centurions,
and forty Heads of Ten, and in addition, a Head of the
ordinary Veliti with five Heads of Ten. To the thousand
extraordinary pikemen, I would assign three Constables, ten
Centurions, and a hundred Heads of Ten: to the extraordinary
Veliti, two Constables, five Centurions, and fifty Heads of
Ten. I would also assign a general Head for the whole
Battalion. I would want each Constable to have a distinct flag
and (bugle) sound.
531
methods for organizing the Companies and the armies, you
will not be confounded.
532
esteemed little, all the Battalions can be brought together once
or twice in the years of peace, and give them a form of a
complete army, training it for several days as if it should
engage in battle, placing the front lines, the flanks, and
auxiliaries in their (proper) places.
533
those disciplines. And Joseph in his history says, that the
continual training of the Roman armies resulted in all the
disturbance which usually goes on for gain in a camp, was of
no effect in an engagement, because everyone knew how to
obey orders and to fight by observing them. But in the armies
of new men which you have to put together to combat at the
time, or that you caused to be organized to combat in time,
nothing is done without this training, as the Companies are
different as in a complete army; for as much discipline is
necessary, it must be taught with double the industry and
effort to those who do not have it, and be maintained in those
who have it, as is seen from the fact that many excellent
Captains have tired themselves without any regard to
themselves.
FABRIZIO: You say the truth, and truly the reason is the
affection I have for these orders, and the sorrow that I feel
seeing that they are not put into action: none the less, have no
fear, but I shall return to the subject. As I have told you, of
first importance in the training of the Company is to know
how to maintain ranks. To do this, it is necessary to exercise
them in those orders, which they called Chiocciole
(Spiralling). And as I told you that one of these Companies
ought to consist of four hundred heavily armed infantry, I will
stand on this number. They should, therefore, be arranged into
eighty ranks (files), with five per file. Then continuing on
either strongly or slowly, grouping them and dispersing them;
which, when it is done, can be demonstrated better by deeds
534
than by words: afterwards, it becomes less necessary, for
anyone who is practiced in these exercises knows how this
order proceeds, which is good for nothing else but to
accustom the soldiers to maintain ranks. But let us come and
put together one of those Companies.
I say that these can be formed in three ways: the first and
most useful is to make it completely massive and give it the
form of two squares: the second is to make the square with a
homed front: the third is to make it with a space in the center,
which they call Piazza (plaza). The method of putting
together the first form can be in two steps. The first is to have
the files doubled, that is, that the second file enters the first,
the fourth into the third, and sixth into the fifth, and so on in
succession; so that where there were eighty files and five
(men) per file, they become forty files and ten per file. Then
make them double another time in the same manner, placing
one file within the other, and thus they become twenty files of
twenty men per file. This makes almost a square, for although
there are so many men on one side (of the square) as the
other, none the less, on the side of the front, they come
together so that (the side of) one man touches the next; but on
the other side (of the square) the men are distant at least two
arm lengths from each other, so that the square is longer from
the front to the back (shoulders), then from one side (flank) to
the other. (So that the rectangle thus formed is called two
squares).
535
The fifty ordinary Veliti of the company are not mixed in
with the other files, but when the company is formed, they
extend along its flanks.
536
Heads of Ten are on the Flanks of the first Centurion on the
left hand, and twenty are on the flanks of the last Centurion
on the right hand. And you have to understand, that the Head
of Ten who has to guide (lead) the pikemen ought to have a
pike, and those who guide the shield-bearers ought to have
similar arms.
537
your direction, you cannot make a front of fifteen, or twenty
five or thirty or thirty five, but you must proceed to where the
number is less. And yet, every day, it happens in particular
situations, that you must make a front with six or eight
hundred infantry, so that the doubling by the straight line will
disarrange you: yet this (latter) method pleases me more, and
what difficulty may exist, can be more easily overcome by the
proper exercise and practice of it.
538
great number of countersigns, so that, coming together with
other companies, it may be recognized by its own men.
Secondly, that the Constable and Centurion have tufts of
feathers on their head-dress different and recognizable, and
what is more important, to arrange that the Heads of Ten be
recognized. To which the ancients paid very much attention,
that nothing else would do, but that they wrote numbers on
their bucklers, calling then the first, second, third, fourth, etc.
And they were not above content with this, but each soldier
had to write on his shield the number of his file, and the
number of his place assigned him in that file. The men,
therefore, being thus countersigned (assigned), and
accustomed to stay within these limits, if they should be
disorganized, it is easy to reorganize them all quickly, for the
flag staying fixed, the Centurions and Heads of Ten can judge
their place by eye, and bring the left from the right, or the
right from the left, with the usual distances between; the
infantry guided by their rules and by the difference in
countersigns, can quickly take their proper places, just as, if
you were the staves of a barrel which you had first
countersigned, I would wager you would put it (the barrel)
back together with great ease, but if you had not so
countersigned them (the staves), it is impossible to
reassemble (the barrel). This system, with diligence and
practice, can be taught quickly, and can be quickly learned,
and once learned are forgotten with difficulty; for new men
are guided by the old, and in time, a province which has such
training, would become entirely expert in war. It is also
necessary to teach them to turn in step, and do so when he
should turn from the flanks and by the soldiers in the front, or
from the front to the flanks or shoulders (rear). This is very
easy, for it is sufficient only that each man turns his body
toward the side he is commanded to, and the direction in
539
which they turned becomes the front. It is true that when they
turn by the flank, the ranks which turn go outside their usual
area, because there is a small space between the breast to the
shoulder, while from one flank to the other there is much
space, which is all contrary to the regular formation of the
company. Hence, care should be used in employing it. But
this is more important and where more practice is needed, is
when a company wants to turn entirely, as if it was a solid
body. Here, great care and practice must be employed, for if it
is desired to turn to the left, for instance, it is necessary that
the left wing be halted, and those who are closer to the halted
one, march much slower then those who are in the right wing
and have to run; otherwise everything would be in confusion.
540
the left flank, you have to double them, century by century,
from the right flank: if you want them to be on the right flank,
you have to double them from the left. And thus this company
turns with the pikemen on the flank, with the Heads of Ten on
the front and rear, with the Centurions at the front of them,
and the Constable in the middle. Which formation holds when
going forward; but when the enemy comes and the time for
the (companies) to move from the flanks to the front, it cannot
be done unless all the soldiers face toward the flank where the
pikemen are, and then the company is turned with its files and
heads in that manner that was described above; for the
Centurions being on the outside, and all the men in their
places, the Centurions quickly enter them (the ranks) without
difficulty. But when they are marching frontwards, and have
to combat in the rear, they must arrange the files so that, in
forming the company, the pikes are situated in the rear; and to
do this, no other order has to be maintained except that where,
in the formation of the company ordinarily every Century has
five files of pikemen in front, it now has them behind, but in
all the other parts, observe the order that I have mentioned.
541
less, it is a rule that serves for all those methods, in which it
should happen that you have to manage it. But in showing
you the other two methods for arranging the companies,
proposed by me, I will also better satisfy your question; for
either they are never used, or they are used when the company
is above, and not in the company of others.
542
and turning around toward the right, over by the right flank of
the fifteen files which were moved first, marches so that he
comes to their front, and here he halts. After, move the third
Centurion with the twenty five files and with the fourth
Centurion who is behind them, and turning to the right, march
by the left flank of the last fifteen files of shield-bearers, and
he does not halt until he is at the head of them, but continues
marching up until the last files of twenty five are in line with
the files behind. And, having done this, the Centurion who
was Head of the first fifteen files of shield-bearers leaves the
place where he was, and goes to the rear of the left angle. And
thus he will turn a company of twenty five solid files, of
twenty infantry per file, with two wings, on each side of his
front, and there will remain a space between then, as much as
would (be occupied by) by ten men side by side. The Captain
will be between the two wings, and a Centurion in each
corner of the wing. There will be two files of pikemen and
twenty Heads of Ten on each flank. These two wings (serve
to) hold between them that artillery, whenever the company
has any with it, and the carriages. The Veliti have to stay
along the flanks beneath the pikemen. But, in wanting to
bring this winged (formed) company into the form of the
piazza (plaza), nothing else need be done than to take eight of
the fifteen files of twenty per file and place them between the
points of the two horns (wings), which then from wings
become the rear (shoulder) of the piazza (plaza). The
carriages are kept in this plaza, and the Captain and the flag
there, but not the artillery, which is put either in the front or
along the flanks. These are the methods which can be used by
a company when it has to pass by suspicious places by itself.
None the less, the solid company, without wings and without
the plaza, is best. But in wanting to make safe the disarmed
ones, that winged one is necessary.
543
The Swiss also have many forms of companies, among which
they form one in the manner of a cross, as in the spaces
between the arms, they keep their gunners safe from the
attacks of the enemy. But since such companies are good in
fighting by themselves, and my intention is to show how
several companies united together combat with the enemy, I
do not belabor myself further in describing it.
544
a Prince or a Republic works hard and puts diligence in these
formations and in this training, it will always happen that
there will be good soldiers in that country, and they will be
superior to their neighbors, and will be those who give, and
not receive, laws from other men. But ((as I have told you))
the disorder in which one exists, causes them to disregard and
not to esteem these things, and, therefore, our training is not
good: and even if there should be some heads or members
naturally of virtue, they are unable to demonstrate it.
545
supports, even if they are not so strong, but if few, they must
be strong, for the virtu of only one, despite its spacing, can
remedy any ruin. And so it must be that in the armies and
among every ten men there is one of more life, of more heart,
or at least of more authority, who with his courage, with
words and by example keeps the others firm and disposed to
fight. And these things mentioned by me, as the heads, the
flags, the buglers, are necessary in an army, and it is seen that
we have all these in our (present day) armies, but no one does
his duty. First, the Heads of Ten, in desiring that those things
be done because they are ordered, it is necessary ((as I have
said)) for each of them to have his men separate, lodge with
them, go into action with them, stay in the ranks with them,
for when they are in their places, they are all of mind and
temperament to maintain their ranks straight and firm, and it
is impossible for them to become disrupted, or if they become
disrupted, do not quickly reform their ranks. But today, they
do not serve us for anything other than to give them more pay
than the others, and to have them do some particular thing.
The same happens with the flags, for they are kept rather to
make a beautiful show, than for any military use. But the
ancients served themselves of it as a guide and to reorganize
themselves, for everyone, when the flag was standing firm,
knew the place that he had to be near his flag, and always
returned there. He also knew that if it were moving or
standing still, he had to move or halt. It is necessary in an
army, therefore, that there be many bodies, and that each
body have its own flag and its own guide; for if they have
this, it needs must be they have much courage and
consequently, are livelier. The infantry, therefore, ought to
march according to the flag, and the flag move according to
the bugle (call), which call, if given well, commands the
army, which proceeding in step with those, comes to serve the
546
orders easily. Whence the ancients having whistles (pipes),
fifes, and bugles, controlled (modulated) them perfectly; for,
as he who dances proceeds in time with the music, and
keeping with it does not make a miss-step, so an army
obedient in its movement to that call (sound), will not become
disorganized. And, therefore, they varied the calls according
as they wanted to enkindle or quiet, or firm the spirits of men.
And as the sounds were various, so they named them
variously. The Doric call (sound) brought on constancy,
Frigio, fury (boldness): whence they tell, that Alexander
being at table, and someone sounding the Frigio call, it so
excited his spirit that he took up arms. It would be necessary
to rediscover all these methods, and if this is difficult, it ought
not at least to be (totally) put aside by those who teach the
soldier to obey; which each one can vary and arrange in his
own way, so long as with practice he accustoms the ears of
his soldiers to recognize them. But today, no benefit is gotten
from these sounds in great part, other than to make noise.
547
that where there is much power, many valiant men spring up,
where there is little, few. In Asia, there are found Ninus,
Cyrus, Artafersus, Mithradates, and very few others to
accompany these. In Africa, there are noted ((omitting those
of ancient Egypt)) Maximinius, Jugurtha, and those Captains
who were raised by the Carthaginian Republic, and these are
very few compared to those of Europe; for in Europe there are
excellent men without number, and there would be many
more, if there should be named together with them those
others who have been forgotten by the malignity of the time,
since the world has been more virtuous when there have been
many States which have favored virtu, either from necessity
or from other human passion. Few men, therefore, spring up
in Asia, because, as that province was entirely subject to one
Kingdom, in which because of its greatness there was
indolence for the most part, it could not give rise to excellent
men in business (activity). The same happened in Africa: yet
several, with respect to the Carthaginian Republic, did arise.
More excellent men come out of Republics than from
Kingdoms, because in the former virtu is honored much of the
time, in the Kingdom it is feared; whence it results that in the
former, men of virtu are raised, in the latter they are
extinguished. Whoever, therefore, considers the part of
Europe, will find it to have been full of Republics and
Principalities, which from the fear one had of the other, were
constrained to keep alive their military organizations, and
honor those who greatly prevailed in them. For in Greece, in
addition to the Kingdom of the Macedonians, there were
many Republics, and many most excellent men arose in each
of them. In Italy, there were the Romans, the Samnites, the
Tuscans, the Cisalpine Gauls. France and Germany were full
of Republics and Princes. Spain, the very same. And although
in comparison with the Romans, very few others were noted,
548
it resulted from the malignity of the writers, who pursued
fortune and to whom it was often enough to honor the victors.
For it is not reasonable that among the Samnites and Tuscans,
who fought fifty years with the Roman People before they
were defeated, many excellent men should not have sprung
up. And so likewise in France and Spain. But that virtu which
the writers do not commemorate in particular men, they
commemorate generally in the peoples, in which they exalt to
the stars (skies) the obstinacy which existed in them in
defending their liberty. It is true, therefore, that where there
are many Empires, more valiant men spring up, and it
follows, of necessity, that those being extinguished, little by
little, virtu is extinguished, as there is less reason which
causes men to become virtuous. And as the Roman Empire
afterwards kept growing, and having extinguished all the
Republics and Principalities of Europe and Africa, and in
greater part those of Asis, no other path to virtu was left,
except Rome. Whence it resulted that men of virtu began to
be few in Europe as in Asia, which virtu ultimately came to
decline; for all the virtu being brought to Rome, and as it was
corrupted, so almost the whole world came to be corrupted,
and the Scythian people were able to come to plunder that
Empire, which had extinguished the virtu of others, but did
not know how to maintain its own. And although afterwards
that Empire, because of the inundation of those barbarians,
became divided into several parts, this virtu was not renewed:
first, because a price is paid to recover institutions when they
are spoiled; another, because the mode of living today, with
regard to the Christian religion, does not impose that
necessity to defend it that anciently existed, in which at the
time men, defeated in war, were either put to death or
remained slaves in perpetuity, where they led lives of misery:
the conquered lands were either desolated or the inhabitants
549
driven out, their goods taken away, and they were sent
dispersed throughout the world, so that those overcome in war
suffered every last misery. Men were terrified from the fear of
this, and they kept their military exercises alive, and honored
those who were excellent in them. But today, this fear in large
part is lost, and few of the defeated are put to death, and no
one is kept prisoner long, for they are easily liberated. The
Citizens, although they should rebel a thousand times, are not
destroyed, goods are left to their people, so that the greatest
evil that is feared is a ransom; so that men do not want to
subject themselves to dangers which they little fear.
Afterwards, these provinces of Europe exist under very few
Heads as compared to the past, for all of France obeys a King,
all of Spain another, and Italy exists in a few parts; so that
weak Cities defend themselves by allying themselves with the
victors, and strong States, for the reasons mentioned, do not
fear an ultimate ruin.
550
unnecessary, partly a tangle they do not understand. Those
others who are slave, to whom such examples ought to cause
fear, do not have the power of remedying (their situation), and
those Princes who have lost the State, are no longer in time,
and those who have (the State) do not have (military training)
and those Princes who have lost the State, are no longer in
time, and those who have (the State) do not have (military
training) or want it; for they want without any hardship to
remain (in power) through fortune, not through their own
virtu, and who see that, because there is so little virtu, fortune
governs everything, and they want it to master them, not they
master it. And that that which I have discussed is true,
consider Germany, in which, because there are many
Principalities and Republics, there is much virtu, and all that
is good in our present army, depends on the example of those
people, who, being completely jealous of their State ((as they
fear servitude, which elsewhere is not feared)) maintain and
honor themselves all us Lords. I want this to suffice to have
said in showing the reasons for the present business according
to my opinion. I do not know if it appears the same to you, or
if some other apprehension should have risen from this
discussion.
551
before, the method of training them has been mentioned. And
as to arming them, I would arm them as is presently done,
both as to the light cavalry as to the men-at-arms. But I would
want the light cavalry to be all archers, with some light
gunners among them, who, although of little use in other
actions of war, are most useful in terrifying the peasants, and
place them above a pass that is to be guarded by them, for one
gunner causes more fear to them (the enemy) than twenty
other armed men. And as to numbers, I say that departing
from imitating the Roman army, I would have not less than
three hundred effective cavalry for each battalion, of which I
would want one hundred fifty to be men-at-arms, and a
hundred fifty light cavalry; and I would give a leader to each
of these parts, creating among them fifteen Heads of Ten per
hand, and give each one a flag and a bugler. I would want that
every ten men-at-arms have five carriages and every ten light
cavalrymen two, which, like those of the infantry, should
carry the tents, (cooking) utensils, hitches, poles, and in
addition over the others, their tools. And do not think this is
out of place seeing that men-at-arms have four horses at their
service, and that such a practice is a corrupting one; for in
Germany, it is seen that those men-at-arms are alone with
their horses, and only every twenty have a cart which carries
the necessary things behind them. The horsemen of the
Romans were likewise alone: it is true that the Triari
encamped near the cavalry and were obliged to render aid to it
in the handling of the horses: this can easily be imitated by us,
as will be shown in the distribution of quarters. That,
therefore, which the Romans did, and that which the Germans
do, we also can do; and in not doing it, we make a mistake.
These cavalrymen, enrolled and organized together with a
battalion, can often be assembled when the companies are
assembled, and caused to make some semblance of attack
552
among them, which should be done more so that they may be
recognized among them than for any necessity. But I have
said enough on this subject for now, and let us descend to
forming an army which is able to offer battle to the enemy,
and hope to win it; which is the end for which an army is
organized, and so much study put into it.
Third Book
COSIMO: Since we are changing the discussion, I would
like the questioner to be changed, so that I may not be held to
be presumptuous, which I have always censured in others. I,
therefore, resign the speakership, and I surrender it to any of
these friends of mine who want it.
553
FABRIZIO: I am certain that, in wanting to show how an
army is well organized for undertaking an engagement, it
would be necessary to narrate how the Greeks and the
Romans arranged the ranks in their armies. None the less, as
you yourselves are able to read and consider these things,
through the medium of ancient writers, I shall omit many
particulars, and will cite only those things that appear
necessary for me to imitate, in the desire in our times to give
some (part of) perfection to our army. This will be done, and,
in time, I will show how an army is arranged for an
engagement, how it faces a real battle, and how it can be
trained in mock ones. The greatest mistake that those men
make who arrange an army for an engagement, is to give it
only one front, and commit it to only one onrush and one
attempt (fortune). This results from having lost the method
the ancients employed of receiving one rank into the other;
for without this method, one cannot help the rank in front, or
defend them, or change them by rotation in battle, which was
practiced best by the Romans. In explaining this method,
therefore, I want to tell how the Romans divided each Legion
into three parts, namely, the Astati, the Princeps, and the
Triari; of whom the Astati were placed in the first line of the
army in solid and deep ranks, (and) behind them were the
Princeps, but placed with their ranks more open: and behind
these they placed the Triari, and with ranks so sparse, as to be
able, if necessary, to receive the Princeps and the Astati
between them. In addition to these, they had slingers,
bow-men (archers), and other lightly armed, who were not in
these ranks, but were situated at the head of the army between
the cavalry and the infantry. These light armed men,
therefore, enkindled the battle, and if they won ((which rarely
happened)), they pursued the victory: if they were repulsed,
they retired by way of the flanks of the army, or into the
554
intervals (gaps) provided for such a result, and were led back
among those who were not armed: after this proceeding, the
Astati came hand to hand with the enemy, and who, if they
saw themselves being overcome, retired little by little through
the open spaces in the ranks of the Princeps, and, together
with them, renewed the fight. If these also were forced back,
they all retired into the thin lines of the Triari, and all
together, en masse, recommenced the battle; and if these were
defeated, there was no other remedy, as there was no way left
to reform themselves. The cavalry were on the flanks of the
army, placed like two wings on a body, and they some times
fought on horseback, and sometimes helped the infantry,
according as the need required. This method of reforming
themselves three times is almost impossible to surpass, as it is
necessary that fortune abandon you three times, and that the
enemy has so much virtu that he overcomes you three times.
The Greeks, with their Phalanxes, did not have this method of
reforming themselves, and although these had many ranks
and Leaders within them, none the less, they constituted one
body, or rather, one front. So that in order to help one another,
they did not retire from one rank into the other, as the
Romans, but one man took the place of another, which they
did in this way. Their Phalanxes were (made up) of ranks, and
supposing they had placed fifty men per rank, when their
front came against the enemy, only the first six ranks of all of
them were able to fight, because their lances, which they
called Sarisse, were so long, that the points of the lances of
those in the sixth rank reached past the front rank. When they
fought, therefore, if any of the first rank fell, either killed or
wounded, whoever was behind him in the second rank
immediately entered into his place, and whoever was behind
him in the third rank immediately entered into the place in the
second rank which had become vacant, and thus successively
555
all at once the ranks behind restored the deficiencies of those
in front, so that the ranks were always remained complete,
and no position of the combatants was vacant except in the
last rank, which became depleted because there was no one in
its rear to restore it. So that the injuries which the first rank
suffered, depleted the last, and the first rank always remained
complete; and thus the Phalanxes, because of their
arrangement, were able rather to become depleted than
broken, since the large (size of its) body made it more
immobile. The Romans, in the beginning, also employed
Phalanxes, and instructed their Legions in a way similar to
theirs. Afterwards, they were not satisfied with this
arrangement, and divided the Legion into several bodies; that
is, into Cohorts and Maniples; for they judged ((as was said a
little while ago)) that that body should have more life in it (be
more active) which should have more spirit, and that it should
be composed of several parts, and each regulate itself. The
Battalions of the Swiss, in these times, employed all the
methods of the Phalanxes, as much in the size and entirety of
their organization, as in the method of helping one another,
and when coming to an engagement they place the Battalions
one on the flank of the other, or they place them one behind
the other. They have no way in which the first rank, if it
should retire, to be received by the second, but with this
arrangement, in order to help one another, they place one
Battalion in front and another behind it to the right, so that if
the first has need of aid, the latter can go forward and succor
it. They put a third Battalion behind these, but distant a gun
shot. This they do, because if the other two are repulsed, this
(third) one can make its way forward, and the others have
room in which to retire, and avoid the onrush of the one
which is going forward; for a large multitude cannot be
received (in the same way) as a small body, and, therefore,
556
the small and separate bodies that existed in a Roman Legion
could be so placed together as to be able to receive one
another among themselves, and help each other easily. And
that this arrangement of the Swiss is not as good as that of the
ancient Romans is demonstrated by the many examples of the
Roman Legions when they engaged in battle with the Greek
Phalanxes, and the latter were always destroyed by the
former, because the kinds of arms ((as I mentioned before))
and this method of reforming themselves, was not able to
maintain the solidity of the Phalanx. With these examples,
therefore, if I had to organize an army, I would prefer to
retain the arms and the methods, partly of the Greek
Phalanxes, partly of the Roman Legions; and therefore I have
mentioned wanting in a Battalion two thousand pikes, which
are the arms of the Macedonian Phalanxes, and three
thousand swords and shield, which are the arms of the
Romans. I have divided the Battalion into ten Companies, as
the Romans (divided) the Legion into ten Cohorts. I have
organized the Veliti, that is the light armed, to enkindle the
battle, as they (the Romans did). And thus, as the arms are
mixed, being shared by both nations and as also the
organizations are shared, I have arranged that each company
have five ranks of pikes (pikemen) in front, and the remainder
shields (swordsmen with shields), in order to be able with this
front to resist the cavalry, and easily penetrate the enemy
companies on foot, and the enemy at the first encounter
would meet the pikes, which I would hope would suffice to
resist him, and then the shields (swordsmen) would defeat
him. And if you would note the virtu of this arrangement, you
will see all these arms will execute their office completely.
First, because pikes are useful against cavalry, and when they
come against infantry, they do their duty well before the
battle closes in, for when they are pressed, they become
557
useless. Whence the Swiss, to avoid this disadvantage, after
every three ranks of pikemen place one of halberds, which,
while it is not enough, gives the pikemen room (to maneuver).
Placing, therefore, our pikes in the front and the shields
(swordsmen) behind, they manage to resist the cavalry, and in
enkindling the battle, lay open and attack the infantry: but
when the battle closes in, and they become useless, the shields
and swords take their place, who are able to take care of
themselves in every strait.
558
they wanted that virtu in which they should trust most should
be greater unity, as the discussion of all these three activities
will show you. Those auxiliary infantry, because of the
training they had with the infantry of the Legion, were as
effective as the latter, as they were disciplined as they were,
and therefore they arranged them in a similar way when
organizing (for) and engagement. Whoever, therefore, knows
how they deployed the entire (army). Therefore, having told
you how they divided a Legion into three lines, and how one
line would receive the other, I have come to tell you how the
entire army was organized for an engagement.
559
lengths long, and forty wide. Behind these five Companies I
would place three others, distant in a straight line from the
first ones by forty arm lengths, two of which should come
behind in a straight line at the ends of the five, and the other
should occupy the space in the middle. Thus these three
would come to occupy in length and width the same space as
the five: but where the five would have a distance of four arm
lengths between one another, this one would have thirty three.
Behind these I would place the last two companies, also in a
straight line behind the three, and distant from those three
forty arm lengths, and I would place each of them behind the
ends of the three, so that the space between them would be
ninety one arm lengths. All of these companies arranged
thusly would therefore cover (an area of) one hundred forty
one arm lengths long and two hundred wide. The
extraordinary pikemen I would extend along the flanks of
these companies on the left side, distant twenty arm lengths
from it, creating a hundred forty three files of seven per file,
so that they should cover the entire length of the ten
companies arranged as I have previously described; and there
would remain forty files for protecting the wagons and the
unarmed people in the tail of the army, (and) assigning the
Heads of Ten and the Centurions in their (proper) places: and,
of the three Constables, I would put one at the head, another
in the middle, and the third in the last file, who should fill the
office of Tergiduttore, as the ancients called the one placed in
charge of the rear of the Army. But returning to the head
(van) of the Army I say, that I would place the extraordinary
Veliti alongside the extraordinary pikemen, which, as you
know, are five hundred, and would place them at a distance of
forty arm lengths. On the side of these, also on the left hand; I
would place the men-at-arms, and would assign them a
distance of a hundred fifty arm lengths away. Behind these,
560
the light cavalry, to whom I would assign the same space as
the men-at-arms. The ordinary Veliti I would leave around
their companies, who would occupy those spaces which I
placed between one company and another, who would act to
minister to those (companies) unless I had already placed
them under the extraordinary pikemen; which I would do or
not do according as it should benefit my plans. The general
Head of all the Battalions I would place in that space that
exists between the first and second order of companies, or
rather at the head, and in that space with exists between the
last of the first five companies and the extraordinary pikemen,
according as it should benefit my plans, surrounded by thirty
or sixty picked men, (and) who should know how to execute a
commission prudently, and stalwartly resist an attack, and
should also be in the middle of the buglers and flag carriers.
This is the order in which I would deploy a Battalion on the
left side, which would be the deployment of half the Army,
and would cover an area five hundred and eleven arm lengths
long and as much as mentioned above in width, not including
the space which that part of the extraordinary pikemen should
occupy who act as a shield for the unarmed men, which
would be about one hundred arm lengths. The other
Battalions I would deploy on the right side exactly in the
same way as I deployed those on the left, having a space of
thirty arm lengths between our battalions and the other, in the
head of which space I would place some artillery pieces,
behind which would be the Captain general of the entire
Army, who should have around him in addition to the buglers
and flag carriers at least two hundred picked men, the greater
portion on foot, among whom should be ten or more adept at
executing every command, and should be so provided with
arms and a horse as to be able to go on horseback or afoot as
the needs requires. Ten cannon of the artillery of the Army
561
suffice for the reduction of towns, which should not exceed
fifty pounds per charge, of which in the field I would employ
more in the defense of the encampment than in waging a
battle, and the other artillery should all be rather often than
fifteen pounds per charge. This I would place in front of the
entire army, unless the country should be such that I could
situate it on the flank in a safe place, where it should not be
able to be attacked by the enemy.
562
you, if he weakens himself by assaulting you in several
places, as soon as you defeat one part, all will go badly for
him. If his cavalry should be greater than yours, be most
assured, for the ranks of pikemen that gird you will defend
you from every onrush of theirs, even if your cavalry should
be repulsed. In addition to this, the Heads are placed on the
side so that they are able easily to command and obey. And
the spaces that exist between one company and the next one,
and between one rank and the next, not only serve to enable
one to receive the other, but also to provide a place for the
messengers who go and come by order of the Captain. And as
I told you before, as the Romans had about twenty thousand
men in an Army, so too ought this one have: and as other
soldiers borrowed their mode of fighting and the formation of
their Army from the Legions, so too those soldiers that you
assembled into your two Battalions would have to borrow
their formation and organization. Having given an example of
these things, it is an easy matter to initiate it: for if the army is
increased either by two Battalions, or by as many men as are
contained in them, nothing else has to be done than to double
the arrangements, and where ten companies are placed on the
left side, twenty are now placed, either by increasing or
extending the ranks, according as the place or the enemy
should command you.
563
FABRIZIO: Do not be apprehensive. Do you not hear the
artillery? Ours has already fired, but harmed the enemy little;
and the extraordinary Veliti come forth from their places
together with the light cavalry, and spread out, and with as
much fury and the loudest shouts of which they are capable,
assault the enemy, whose artillery has fired one time, and has
passed over the heads of our infantry without doing them an
injury. And as it is not able to fire a second time, our Veliti
and cavalry have already seized it, and to defend it, the enemy
has moved forward, so that neither that of friend or enemy
can perform its office. You see with what virtu our men fight,
and with what discipline they have become accustomed
because of the training they have had, and from the
confidence they have in the Army, which you see with their
stride, and with the men-at-arms alongside, in marching
order, going to rekindle the battle with the adversary. Your
see our artillery, which to make place for them, and to leave
the space free, has retired to the place from which the Veliti
went forth. You see the Captain who encourages them and
points out to them certain victory. You see the Veliti and light
cavalry have spread out and returned to the flanks of the
Army, in order to see if they can cause any injury to the
enemy from the flanks. Look, the armies are facing each
other: watch with what virtu they have withstood the onrush
of the enemy, and with what silence, and how the Captain
commands the men-at-arms that they should resist and not
attack, and do not detach themselves from the ranks of the
infantry. You see how our light cavalry are gone to attack a
band of enemy gunners who wanted to attach by the flank,
and how the enemy cavalry have succored them, so that,
caught between the cavalry of the one and the other, they
cannot fire, and retire behind their companies. You see with
what fury our pikemen attack them, and how the infantry is
564
already so near each other that they can no longer manage
their pikes: so that, according to the discipline taught by us,
our pikemen retire little by little among the shields
(swordsmen). Watch how in this (encounter), so great an
enemy band of men-at-arms has pushed back our men-at-arms
on the left side and how ours, according to discipline, have
retired under the extraordinary pikemen, and having reformed
the front with their aid, have repulsed the adversary, and
killed a good part of them. In fact all the ordinary pikemen of
the first company have hidden themselves among the ranks of
the shields (swordsmen), and having left the battle to the
swordsmen, who, look with what virtu, security, and leisure,
kill the enemy. Do you not see that, when fighting, the ranks
are so straitened, that they can handle the swords only with
much effort? Look with what hurry the enemy moves; for,
armed with the pike and their swords useless ((the one
because it is too long, the other because of finding the enemy
too greatly armed)), in part they fall dead or wounded, in part
they flee. See them flee on the right side. They also flee on
the left. Look, the victory is ours. Have we not won an
engagement very happily? But it would have been won with
greater felicity if I should have been allowed to put them in
action. And see that it was not necessary to avail ourselves of
either the second or third ranks, that our first line was
sufficient to overcome them. In this part, I have nothing else
to tell you, except to dissolve any doubts that should arise in
you.
565
artillery fire more than one time? and why did you have them
quickly retire within the army, nor afterward make any other
mention of them? It seems to me also that you pointed the
enemy artillery high, and arranged it so that it should be of
much benefit to you. Yet, if it should occur ((and I believe it
happens often)) that the lines are pierced, what remedy do
you provide? And since I have commenced on artillery, I
want to bring up all these questions so as not to have to
discuss it any more. I have heard many disparage the arms
and the organization of the ancient Armies, arguing that today
they could do little, or rather how useless they would be
against the fury of artillery, for these are superior to their
arms and break the ranks, so that it appears to them to be
madness to create an arrangement that cannot be held, and to
endure hardship in carrying a weapon that cannot defend you.
566
can injure only a few of them. A band of organized men
cannot do this, because if they march in a straight line, they
become disorganized, and if they scatter, they do not give the
enemy the hard work to rout them, for they have routed
themselves. And therefore I would organize the Army so that
it should be able to do both; for having placed a thousand
Veliti in its wings, I would arrange, that after our artillery had
fired, they should issue forth together with the light cavalry to
seize the enemy artillery. And therefore I did not have my
artillery fire again so as not to give the enemy time, for you
cannot give me time and take it from others. And for that, the
reason I did not have it fired a second time, was not to allow
it to be fired first; because, to render the enemy artillery
useless, there is no other remedy than to assault it; which, if
the enemy abandons it, you seize it; if they want to defend it,
it is necessary that they leave it behind, so that in the hands of
the enemy or of friends, it cannot be fired. I believe that, even
without examples, this discussion should be enough for you,
yet, being able to give you some from the ancients, I will do
so. Ventidius, coming to battle with the Parthians, the virtu of
whom (the latter) in great part consisted in their bows and
darts, be allowed them to come almost under his
encampments before he led the Army out, which he only did
in order to be able to seize them quickly and not give them
time to fire. Caesar in Gaul tells, that in coming to battle with
the enemy, he was assaulted by them with such fury, that his
men did not have time to draw their darts according to the
Roman custom. It is seen, therefore, that, being in the field, if
you do not want something fired from a distance to injure
you, there is no other remedy than to be able to seize it as
quickly as possible. Another reason also caused me to do
without firing the artillery, at which you may perhaps laugh,
yet I do not judge it is to be disparaged. And there is nothing
567
that causes greater confusion in an Army than to obstruct its
vision, whence most stalwart Armies have been routed for
having their vision obstructed either by dust or by the sun.
There is also nothing that impedes the vision than the smoke
which the artillery makes when fired: I would think,
therefore, that it would be more prudent to let the enemy blind
himself, than for you to go blindly to find him. I would,
therefore, not fire, or ((as this would not be approved because
of the reputation the artillery has)) I would put it in the wings
of the Army, so that firing it, its smoke should not blind the
front of what is most important of our forces. And that
obstructing the vision of the enemy is something useful, can
be adduced from the example of Epaminondas, who, to blind
the enemy Army which was coming to engage him, had his
light cavalry run in front of the enemy so that they raised the
dust high, and which obstructed their vision, and gave him the
victory in the engagement. As to it appearing to you that I
aimed the shots of artillery in my own manner, making it pass
over the heads of the infantry, I reply that there are more
times, and without comparison, that the heavy artillery does
not penetrate the infantry than it does, because the infantry
lies so low, and they (the artillery) are so difficult to fire, that
any little that you raise them, (causes) them to pass over the
heads of the infantry, and if you lower them, they damage the
ground, and the shot does not reach them (the infantry). Also,
the unevenness of the ground saves them, for every little
mound or height which exists between the infantry and it (the
artillery), impedes it. And as to cavalry, and especially
men-at-arms, because they are taller and can more easily be
hit, they can be kept in the rear (tail) of the Army until the
time the artillery has fired. It is true that often they injure the
smaller artillery and the gunners more that the latter (cavalry),
to which the best remedy is to come quickly to grips (hand to
568
hand): and if in the first assault some are killed ((as some
always do die)) a good Captain and a good Army do not have
to fear an injury that is confined, but a general one; and to
imitate the Swiss, who never shun an engagement even if
terrified by artillery, but rather they punish with the capital
penalty those who because of fear of it either break ranks or
by their person give the sign of fear. I made them ((once it
had been fired)) to retire into the Army because it left the
passage free to the companies. No other mention of it was
made, as something useless, once the battle was started.
You have also said in regard to the fury of this instrument that
many judge the arms and the systems of the ancients to be
useless, and it appears from your talk that the modems have
found arms and systems which are useful against the artillery.
If you know this, I would be pleased for you to show it to me,
for up to now I do not know of any that have been observed,
nor do I believe any can be found. So that I would like to
learn from those men for what reasons the soldiers on foot of
our times wear the breastplate or the corselet of iron, and
those on horseback go completely covered with armor, since,
condemning the ancient armor as useless with respect to
artillery, they ought also to shun these. I would also like to
learn for what reason the Swiss, in imitation of the ancient
systems, for a close (pressed) company of six or eight
thousand infantry, and for what reason all the others have
imitated them, bringing the same dangers to this system
because of the artillery as the others brought which had been
imitated from antiquity. I believe that they would not know
what to answer; but if you asked the soldiers who should have
some experience, they would answer, first that they go armed
because, even if that armor does not protect them from the
artillery, it does every other injury inflicted by an enemy, and
569
they would also answer that they go closely together as the
Swiss in order to be better able to attack the infantry, resist
the cavalry, and give the enemy more difficulty in routing
them. So that it is observed that soldiers have to fear many
other things besides the artillery, from which they defend
themselves with armor and organization. From which it
follows that as much as an Army is better armed, and as much
as its ranks are more serrated and more powerful, so much
more is it secure. So that whoever is of the opinion you
mentioned must be either of little prudence, or has thought
very little on this matter; for if we see the least part of the
ancient way of arming in use today, which is the pike, and the
least part of those systems, which are the battalions of the
Swiss, which do us so much good, and lend so much power to
our Armies, why shouldn't we believe that the other arms and
other systems that they left us are also useful? Moreover, if
we do not have any regard for the artillery when we place
ourselves close together, like the Swiss, what other system
than that can make us afraid? inasmuch as there is no other
arrangement that can make us afraid than that of being
pressed together. In addition to this, if the enemy artillery
does not frighten me when I lay siege to a town, where he
may injure me with great safety to himself, and where I am
unable to capture it as it is defended from the walls, but can
stop him only with time with my artillery, so that he is able to
redouble his shots as he wishes, why do I have to be afraid of
him in the field where I am able to seize him quickly? So that
I conclude this, that the artillery, according to my opinion,
does not impede anyone who is able to use the methods of the
ancients, and demonstrate the ancient virtu. And if I had not
talked another time with you concerning this instrument, I
would extend myself further, but I want to return to what I
have now said.
570
LUIGI: We are able to have a very good understanding since
you have so much discoursed about artillery, and in sum, it
seems to me you have shown that the best remedy that one
has against it when he is in the field and having an Army in
an encounter, is to capture it quickly. Upon which, a doubt
rises in me, for it seems to me the enemy can so locate it on a
side of his army from which he can injure you, and would be
so protected by the other sides, that it cannot be captured.
You have ((if you will remember)) in your army's order for
battle, created intervals of four arm lengths between one
company and the next, and placed twenty of the extraordinary
pikemen of the company there. If the enemy should organize
his army similarly to yours, and place his artillery well within
those intervals, I believe that from here he would be able to
injure you with the greatest safety to himself, for it would not
be possible to enter among the enemy forces to capture it.
571
space, that fifty carriages of artillery would disrupt every
Army. It is necessary, therefore, to keep them outside the
ranks where they can be operated in the manner which we
showed you a short time ago. But let us suppose they can be
kept there, and that a middle way can be found, and of a kind
which, when closed together, should not impede the artillery,
yet not be so open as to provide a path for the enemy, I say
that this is easily remedied at the time of the encounter by
creating intervals in your army which give a free path for its
shots, and thus its fury will be useless. Which can be easily
done, because the enemy, if it wants its artillery to be safe,
must place it in the end portions of the intervals, so that its
shots, if they should not harm its own men, must pass in a
straight line, and always in the same line, and, therefore, by
giving them room, can be easily avoided. Because this is a
general rule, that you must give way to those things which
cannot be resisted, as the ancients did to the elephants and
chariots with sickles. I believe, rather I am more than certain,
that it must appear to you that I prepared and won an
engagement in my own manner; none the less, I will repeat
this, if what I have said up to now is now enough, that it
would be impossible for an Army thus organized and armed
not to overcome, at the first encounter, every other Army
organized as modem Armies are organized, which often,
unless they have shields (swordsmen), do not form a front,
and are of an unarmed kind, which cannot defend themselves
from a near-by enemy; and so organized that, that if they
place their companies on the flanks next to each other, not
having a way of receiving one another, they cause it to be
confused, and apt to be easily disturbed. And although they
give their Armies three names, and divide them into three
ranks, the Vanguard, the Company (main body) and the
Rearguard, none the less, they do not serve for anything else
572
than to distinguish them in marching and in their quarters: but
in an engagement, they are all pledged to the first attack and
fortune.
573
the others do? And if the ranks of extraordinary pikemen
which are placed along the flanks seem thin to you, they can
be formed into a square and placed by the flank of the two
companies which I place in the last ranks of the army, from
which place they would all together be able easily to help the
van and the rear of the army, and lend aid to the cavalry
according as their need may require.
LUIGI: And on this part, some doubt has arisen in me. I have
seen that in the disposition of the companies you form the
front with five on each side the center with three, and the rear
with two; and I would believe that it should be better to
arrange them oppositely, because I think that an army can be
routed with more difficulty, for whoever should attack it, the
more he should penetrate into it, so much harder would he
574
find it: but the arrangement made by you appears to me
results, that the more one enters into it, the more he finds it
weak.
575
companies, but with the entire Battalion. And as this last part
has to receive more men, its spaces must be larger, and those
who receive them lesser in number.
LUIGI: And I like what you have said; but also answer me
this. If the five companies retire among the second three, and
afterwards, the eight among the third two, does it not seem
possible that the eight come together then the ten together, are
able to crowd together, whether they are eight or ten, into the
same space which the five occupied.
FABRIZIO: The first thing that I answer is, that it is not the
same space; for the five have four spaces between them,
which they occupy when retiring between one Battalion and
the next, and that which exists between the three or the two:
there also remains that space which exists between the
companies and the extraordinary pikemen, which spaces are
all made large. There is added to this whatever other space the
companies have when they are in the lines without being
changed, for, when they are changed, the ranks are either
compressed or enlarged. They become enlarged when they are
so very much afraid, that they put themselves in flight: they
become compressed when they become so afraid, that they
seek to save themselves, not by flight, but by defense; so that
in this case, they would compress themselves, and not spread
out. There is added to this, that the five ranks of pikemen who
are in front, once they have started the battle, have to retire
among their companies in the rear (tail) of the army to make
place for the shield-bearers (swordsmen) who are able to
fight: and when they go into the tail of the army they can
serve whoever the captain should judge should employ them
well, whereas in the front, once the fight becomes mixed, they
would be completely useless. And therefore, the arranged
576
spaces come to be very capacious for the remaining forces.
But even if these spaces should not suffice, the flanks on the
side consist of men and not walls, who, when they give way
and spread out, are able to create a space of such capacity,
which should be sufficient to receive them.
577
be repeated, (and) I again say that I have so organized this
army, and will (again) explain this engagement to you for two
reasons: one, to show you how it (the army) is organized: the
other, to show you how it is trained. As to the systems, I
believe you all most knowledgeable. As to the army, I tell you
that it may often be put together in this form, for the Heads
are taught to keep their companies in this order: and because
it is the duty of each individual soldier to keep (well) the
arrangement of each company, and it is the duty of each Head
to keep (well) those in each part of the Army, and to know
well how to obey the commands of the general Captain. They
must know, therefore, how to join one company with another,
and how to take their places instantly: and therefore, the
banner of each company must have its number displayed
openly, so that they may be commanded, and the Captain and
the soldiers will more readily recognize that number. The
Battalions ought also to be numbered, and have their number
on their principal banner. One must know, therefore, what the
number is of the Battalion placed on the left or right wing, the
number of those placed in the front and the center, and so on
for the others. I would want also that these numbers reflect
the grades of positions in the Army. For instance, the first
grade is the Head of Ten, the second is the head of fifty
ordinary Veliti, the third the Centurion, the fourth the head of
the first company, the fifth that of the second (company), the
sixth of the third, and so on up to the tenth Company, which
should be in the second place next to the general Captain of
the Battalion; nor should anyone arrive to that Leadership,
unless he had (first) risen through all these grades. And, as in
addition to these Heads, there are the three Constables (in
command) of the extraordinary pikemen, and the two of the
extraordinary Veliti, I would want them to be of the grade of
Constable of the first company, nor would I care if they were
578
men of equal grade, as long as each of them should vie to be
promoted to the second company. Each one of these Captains,
therefore, knowing where his Company should be located, of
necessity it will follow that, at the sound of the trumpet, once
the Captain's flag was raised, all of the Army would be in its
proper places. And this is the first exercise to which an Army
ought to become accustomed, that is, to assemble itself
quickly: and to do this, you must frequently each day arrange
them and disarrange them.
LUIGI: What signs would you want the flags of the Army to
have, in addition to the number?
579
to recognize commands of the Captain by virtue of his (bugle)
calls and flags, as they will understand, without other
command, the pronouncements made by voice. And as the
importance of the commands depends on the (bugle) calls, I
will tell you what sounds (calls) the ancients used. According
as Thucydides affirms, whistles were used in the army of the
Lacedemonians, for they judged that its pitch was more apt to
make their Army proceed with seriousness and not with fury.
Motivated by the same reason, the Carthaginians, in their first
assault, used the zither. Alliatus, King of the Lydians, used
the zither and whistles in war; but Alexander the Great and
the Romans used horns and trumpets, like those who thought
the courage of the soldiers could be increased by virtue of
such instruments, and cause them to combat more bravely.
But just as we have borrowed from the Greek and Roman
methods in equipping our Army, so also in choosing sounds
should we serve ourselves of the customs of both those
nations. I would, therefore, place the trumpets next to the
general Captain, as their sound is apt not only to inflame the
Army, but to be heard over every noise more than any other
sound. I would want that the other sounds existing around the
Constables and Heads of companies to be (made by) small
drums and whistles, sounded not as they are presently, but as
they are customarily sounded at banquets. I would want,
therefore, for the Captain to use the trumpets in indicating
when they should stop or go forward or turn back, when they
should fire the artillery, when to move the extraordinary
Veliti, and by changes in these sounds (calls) point out to the
Army all those moves that generally are pointed out; and
those trumpets afterwards followed by drums. And, as
training in these matters are of great importance, I would
follow them very much in training your Army. As to the
cavalry, I would want to use the same trumpets, but of lower
580
volume and different pitch of sounds from those of the
Captain. This is all that occurs to me concerning the
organization and training of the Army.
581
Fourth Book
LUIGI: Since an engagement has been won so honorably
under my Rule, I think it is well if I do not tempt fortune
further, knowing how changeable and unstable it is. And,
therefore, I desire to resign my speakership, and that, wanting
to follow the order that belongs to the youngest, Zanobi now
assume this office of questioning. And I know he will not
refuse this honor, or we would rather say, this hard work, as
much in order to (give) pleasure, as also because he is
naturally more courageous than I: nor should he be afraid to
enter into these labors, where he can thus be overcome, as he
can overcome.
582
before going to battle, and if some accident should arise
concerning it, what remedies can be made.
583
your Army on a beach and in a place near the adjoining hills,
where the enemy Army can come; because in this case, with
respect to the artillery, the higher place would be
disadvantageous to you, because you could continuously and
conveniently be harmed by the enemy artillery, without being
able to undertake any remedy, and similarly, impeded by your
own men, you cannot conveniently injure him. Whoever
organizes an Army for battle, ought also to have regard for
both the sun and the wind, that the one and the other do not
strike the front, because both impede your vision, the one
with its rays, the other with dust. And in addition, the wind
does not aid the arms that are thrown at the enemy, and makes
their blows more feeble. And as to the sun, it is not enough
that you take care that it is not in your face at the time, but
you must think about it not harming you when it comes up.
And because of this, in arranging the army, I would have it
(the sun) behind them, so that much time should pass before it
should come in front of you. This method was observed by
Hannibal at Cannae and by Marius against the Cimbrians. If
you should be greatly inferior in cavalry, arrange your army
between vines and trees, and such impediments, as the
Spaniards did in our times when they routed the French in the
Kingdom (of Naples) on the Cirignuola. And it has been
frequently seen that the same soldiers, when they changed
only their arrangement and the location, from being overcome
became victorious, as happened to the Carthaginians, who,
after having been often defeated by Marius Regulus, were
afterwards victorious, through the counsel of Xantippe, the
Lacedemonian, who had them descend to the plain, where, by
the virtu of their cavalry and Elephants, they were able to
overcome the Romans. And it appears to me, according to the
examples of the ancients, that almost all the excellent
Captains, when they learned that the enemy had strengthened
584
one side of the company, did not attack the stronger side, but
the weaker, and the other stronger side they oppose to the
weaker: then, when starting a battle, they cornered the
stronger part that it only resist the enemy, and not push it
back, and the weaker part that it allow itself to be overcome,
and retire into the rear ranks of the Army. This causes two
great disorders to the enemy: the first, that he finds his
strongest part surrounded: the second is, that as it appears to
them they will obtain the victory quickly, it rarely happens
that he will not become disorganized, whence his defeat
quickly results. Cornelius Scipio, when he was in Spain,
(fighting) against Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian, and knowing
that Hasdrubal was noted, that in arranging the Army, placed
his legions in the center, which constituted the strongest part
of his Army, and therefore, when Hasdrubal was to proceed in
this manner, afterwards, when he came to the engagement,
changed the arrangement, and put his Legions in the wings of
the Army, and placed his weakest forces in the center. Then
when they came hand to hand, he quickly had those forces in
the center to walk slowly, and the wings to move forward
swiftly: so that only the wings of both armies fought, and the
ranks in the center, being distant from each other, did not join
(in battle), and thus the strongest part of (the army of) Scipio
came to fight the weakest part of (that of) Hasdrubal, and
defeated it. This method at that time was useful, but today,
because of the artillery, could not be employed, because that
space that existed between one and the other army, gives
them time to fire, which is most pernicious, as we said above.
This method, therefore, must be set aside, and be used, as was
said a short time ago, when all the Army is engaged, and the
weaker part made to yield. When a Captain finds himself to
have an army larger than that of the enemy, and not wanting
to be prevented from surrounding him, arranges his Army
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with fronts equal to those of the enemy: then when the battle
is started, has his front retire and the flanks extend little by
little, and it will always happen that the enemy will find
himself surrounded without being aware of it. When a
Captain wants to fight almost secure in not being routed, he
arranges his army in a place where he has a safe refuge
nearby, either amid swamps or mountains or in a powerful
city; for, in this manner, he cannot be pursued by the enemy,
but the enemy cannot be pursued by him. This means was
employed by Hannibal when fortune began to become
adverse for him, and he was apprehensive of the valor of
Marcus Marcellus. Several, in order to disorganize the ranks
of the enemy, have commanded those who are lightly armed,
that they begin the fight, and having begun it, retire among
the ranks; and when the Armies afterwards have joined fronts
together, and each front is occupied in fighting, they have
allowed them to issue forth from the flanks of the companies,
and disorganized and routed them. If anyone finds himself
inferior in cavalry, he can, in addition to the methods
mentioned, place a company of pikemen behind his cavalry,
and in the fighting, arrange for them to give way for the
pikemen, and he will always remain superior. Many have
accustomed some of the lightly armed infantry to get used to
combat amidst the cavalry, and this has been a very great help
to the cavalry. Of all those who have organized Armies for
battle, the most praiseworthy have been Hannibal and Scipio
when they were fighting in Africa: and as Hannibal had his
Army composed of Carthaginians and auxiliaries of various
kinds, he placed eighty Elephants in the first van, then placed
the auxiliaries, after these he placed his Carthaginians, and in
the rear, he placed the Italians, whom he trusted little. He
arranged matters thusly, because the auxiliaries, having the
enemy in front and their rear closed by his men, they could
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not flee: so that being compelled to fight, they should
overcome or tire out the Romans, thinking afterwards with his
forces of virtu, fresh, he could easily overcome the already
tired Romans. In the encounter with this arrangement, Scipio
placed the Astati, the Principi, and the Triari, in the
accustomed fashion for one to be able to receive the other,
and one to help the other. He made the vans of the army full
of intervals; and so that they should not be seen through, but
rather appear united, he filled them with Veliti, whom he
commanded that, as soon as the Elephants arrived, they
should give way, and enter through the regular spaces among
the legions, and leave the way open to the Elephants: and thus
come to render their attack vain, so that coming hand to hand
with them, he was superior.
FABRIZIO: I will tell you. Hannibal had placed all the virtu
of his army in the second line; whence Scipio, in order to
oppose a similar virtu to it, assembled the Principi and the
Triari; so that the intervals of the Principi being occupied by
the Triari, there was no place to receive the Astati, and
therefore, he caused the Astati to be divided and enter the
wings of the army, and did not bring them among the
Principi. But take note that this method of opening up the first
lines to make a place for the second, cannot be employed
except when the other are superior, because then the
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convenience exists to be able to do it, as Scipio was able to.
But being inferior and repulsed, it cannot be done except with
your manifest ruin: and, therefore, you must have ranks in the
rear which will receive you. But let us return to our
discussion. The ancient Asiatics ((among other things thought
up by them to injure the enemy)) used chariots which had
scythes on their sides, so that they not only served to open up
the lines with their attack, but also kill the adversary with the
scythes. Provisions against these attacks were made in three
ways. It was resisted by the density of the ranks, or they were
received within the lines as were the Elephants, or a stalwart
resistance was made with some stratagems, as did Sulla, the
Roman, against Archelaus, who had many of those chariots
which they called Falcati; he (Sulla), in order to resist them,
fixed many poles in the ground behind the first ranks, by
which the chariots, being resisted, lost their impetus. And
note is to be taken of the new method which Sulla used
against this man in arranging the army, since he put the Veliti
and the cavalry in the rear, and all the heavily armed in front,
leaving many intervals in order to be able to send those in the
rear forward if necessity should require it; whence when the
battle was started, with the aid of the cavalry, to whom he
gave the way, he obtained the victory. To want to worry the
enemy during the battle, something must be made to happen
which dismays him, either by announcing new help which is
arriving, or by showing things which look like it, so that the
enemy, being deceived by that sight, becomes frightened; and
when he is frightened, can be easily overcome. These
methods were used by the Roman Consuls Minucius Rufus
and Accilius Glabrius, Caius Sulpicius also placed many
soldier-packs on mules and other animals useless in war, but
in a manner that they looked like men-at-arms, and
commanded that they appear on a hill while they were (in)
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hand to hand (combat) with the Gauls: whence his victory
resulted. Marius did the same when he was fighting against
the Germans. Feigned assaults, therefore, being of great value
while the battle lasts, it happens that many are benefited by
the real (assaults), especially if, improvised in the middle of
the battle, it is able to attack the enemy from behind or on the
sides. Which can be done only with difficulty, unless the
(nature of the) country helps you; for if it is open, part of your
forces cannot be speeded, as must be done in such enterprises:
but in wooded or mountainous places, and hence capable of
ambush, part of your forces can be well hidden, so that the
enemy may be assaulted, suddenly and without his expecting
it, which will always be the cause of giving you the victory.
And sometimes it has been very important, while the battle
goes on, to plant voices which announce the killed of the
enemy Captain, or to have defeated some other part of the
army; and this often has given the victory to whoever used it.
The enemy cavalry may be easily disturbed by unusual forms
(sights) or noises; as did Croesus, who opposed camels to the
cavalry of his adversaries, and Pyrrhus who opposed
elephants to the Roman cavalry, the sight of which disturbed
and disorganized it. In our times, the Turk routed the Shah in
Persia and the Soldan in Syria with nothing else than the
noise of guns, which so affected their cavalry by their
unaccustomed noises, that the Turk was able easily to defeat
it. The Spaniards, to overcome the army of Hamilcar, placed
in their first lines chariots full of tow drawn by oxen, and
when they had come to battle, set fire to them, whence the
oxen, wanting to flee the fire, hurled themselves on the army
of Hamilcar and dispersed it. As we mentioned, where the
country is suitable, it is usual to deceive the enemy when in
combat by drawing him into ambushes: but when it is open
and spacious, many have employed the making (digging) of
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ditches, and then covering them lightly with earth and
branches, but leaving several places (spaces) solid in order to
be able to retire between them; then when the battle is started,
retire through them, and the enemy pursuing, comes to ruin in
them. If, during the battle, some accident befalls you which
dismays your soldiers, it is a most prudent thing to know how
to dissimulate and divert them to (something) good, as did
Lucius Sulla, who, while the fighting was going on, seeing
that a great part of his forces had gone over to the side of the
enemy, and that this had dismayed his men, quickly caused it
to be understood throughout the entire army that everything
was happening by his order, and this not only did not disturb
the army, but so increased its courage that it was victorious. It
also happened to Sulla, that having sent certain soldiers to
undertake certain business, and they having been killed, in
order that his army would not be dismayed said, that because
he had found them unfaithful, he had cunningly sent them
into the hands of the enemy. Sertorious, when undertaking an
engagement in Spain, killed one who had pointed out to him
the slaying of one of his Heads, for fear that by telling the
same to the others, he should dismay them. It is a difficult
matter to stop an army already in flight, and return it to battle.
And you have to make this distinction: either they are entirely
in flight (motion), and here it is impossible to return them: or
only a part are in flight, and here there is some remedy. Many
Roman Captains, by getting in front of those fleeing, have
stopped them, by making them ashamed of their flight, as did
Lucius Sulla, who, when a part of his Legions had already
turned, driven by the forces of Mithradates, with his sword in
hand he got in front of them and shouted, "if anyone asks you
where you have left your Captain, tell them, we have left him
in Boetia fighting." The Consul Attilius opposed those who
fled with those who did not flee, and made them understand
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that if they did not turn about, they would be killed by both
friends and enemies. Phillip of Macedonia, when he learned
that his men were afraid of the Scythian soldiers, put some of
his most trusted cavalry behind his army, and commissioned
them to kill anyone who fled; whence his men, preferring to
die fighting rather than in flight, won. Many Romans, not so
much in order to stop a flight, as to give his men an occasion
to exhibit greater prowess, while they were fighting, have
taken a banner out of their hands, and tossing it amid the
enemy, offered rewards to whoever would recover it.
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more when they are less apprehensive. A Captain ought,
therefore, when he cannot do this, at least endeavor with
industry to restrict the injury caused by the defeat. And to do
this, it is necessary for you to take steps that the enemy is not
able to follow you easily, or give him cause for delay. In the
first case some, after they realize they are losing, order their
Leaders to flee in several parts by different paths, having
(first) given an order where they should afterward reassemble,
so that the enemy, fearing to divide his forces, would leave all
or a greater part of them safe. In the second case, many have
thrown down their most precious possessions in front of the
enemy, so that being retarded by plundering, he gave them
more time for flight. Titus Dimius used not a little astuteness
in hiding the injury received in battle; for, after he had fought
until nightfall with a loss of many of his men, caused a good
many of them to be buried during the night; whence in the
morning, the enemy seeing so many of their dead and so few
Romans, believing they had had the disadvantage, fled. I
believe I have thus confused you, as I said, (but) satisfied
your question in good part: it is true, that concerning the
shape of the army, there remains for me to tell you how
sometimes it is customary for some Captains to make the
front in the form of a wedge, judging in that way to be able
more readily to open (penetrate) the Army of the enemy. In
opposition to this shape they customarily would use a form of
a scissor, so as to be able to receive that wedge into that
space, and surround and fight it from every side. On this, I
would like you to have this general rule, that the greatest
remedy used against the design of the enemy, is to do that
willingly which he designs for you to do by force, because
doing it willingly you do it with order and to your advantage,
but to his disadvantage: if you should do it by force, it would
be to your ruin. As to the fortifying of this, I would not care to
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repeat anything already said. Does the adversary make a
wedge in order to open your ranks? if you proceed with yours
open, you disorganize him, and he does not disorganize you.
Hannibal placed Elephants in front of his Army to open that
of the Army of Scipio; Scipio went with his open and was the
cause of his own victory and the ruin of the former
(Hannibal). Hasdrubal placed his most stalwart forces in the
center of the van of his Army to push back the forces of
Scipio: Scipio commanded in like fashion that they should
retire, and defeated him. So that such plans, when they are put
forward, are the cause for the victory of him against whom
they were organized. It remains for me yet, if I remember
well, to tell you what considerations a Captain ought to take
into account before going into battle: upon which I have to
tell you first that a Captain never has to make an engagement,
if he does not have the advantage, or if he is not compelled to.
Advantages arise from the location, from the organization,
and from having either greater or better forces. Necessity,
(compulsion) arises when you see that, by not fighting, you
must lose in an event; for example, when you see you are
about to lack money, and therefore your Army has to be
dissolved in any case; when hunger is about to assail you, or
when you expect the enemy to be reinforced again by new
forces. In these cases, one ought always to fight, even at your
disadvantage; for it is much better to try your fortune when it
can favor you, than by not trying, see your ruin sure: and in
such a case, it is as serious an error for a Captain not to fight,
as it is to pass up an opportunity to win, either from
ignorance, or from cowardice. The enemy sometimes gives
you the advantage, and sometimes (it derives from) your
prudence. Many have been routed while crossing a river by an
alert enemy of theirs, who waited until they were in the
middle of the stream, and then assaulted them on every side;
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as Caesar did to the Swiss, where he destroyed a fourth part
of them, after they had been split by the river. Some time you
may find your enemy tired from having pursued you too
inconsiderately, so that, finding yourself fresh, and rested,
you ought not to lose such an opportunity. In addition to this,
if an enemy offers you battle at a good hour of the morning,
you can delay going out of your encampment for many hours:
and if he has been under arms for a long time, and has lost
that first ardor with which he started, you can then fight with
him. Scipio and Metellus employed this method in Spain, the
first against Hasdrubal, and the other against Sertorius. If the
enemy has diminished in strength, either from having divided
the Armies, as the Scipios (did) in Spain, or from some other
cause, you ought to try (your) fortune. The greater part of
prudent Captains would rather receive the onrush of the
enemy, who impetuously go to assault them, for their fury is
easily withstood by firm and resolute men, and that fury
which was withstood, easily converts itself into cowardice.
Fabius acted thusly against the Samnites and against the
Gauls, and was victorious, but his colleague, Decius was
killed. Some who feared the virtu of their enemy, have begun
the battle at an hour near nightfall, so that if their men were
defeated, they might be able to be protected by its darkness
and save themselves. Some, having known that the enemy
Army, because of certain superstitions, does not want to
undertake fighting at such a time, selected that time for battle,
and won: which Caesar did in Gaul against Ariovistus, and
Vespatianus in Syria against the Jews. The greater and more
important awareness that a Captain ought to have, is (to see)
that he has about him, men loyal and most expert in war, and
prudent, with whom he counsels continually, and discusses
his forces and those of the enemy with them: which are the
greater in number, which are better armed or better trained,
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which are more apt to suffer deprivation, which to confide in
more, the infantry or the cavalry. Also, they consider the
location in which they are, and if it is more suitable for the
enemy than for themselves; which of them has the better
convenience of supply; whether it is better to delay the
engagement or undertake it, and what benefit the weather
might give you or take away from them; for often when the
soldiers see the war becoming long, they become irritable,
and weary from hard work and tedium, will abandon you.
Above all, it is important for the Captain to know the enemy,
and who he has around him: if he is foolhardy or cautious: if
timid or audacious. See whether you can trust the auxiliary
soldiers. And above all, you ought to guard against leading an
army into battle which is afraid, or distrustful in any way of
victory, for the best indication of defeat is when one believes
he cannot win. And, therefore, in this case, you ought to avoid
an engagement, either by doing as Fabius Maximus did, who,
by encamping in strong places, did not give Hannibal courage
to go and meet him, or by believing that the enemy, also in
strong places, should come to meet you, you should depart
from the field, and divide your forces among your towns, so
that the tedium of capturing them will tire him.
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meet him. And Fabius Maximus never avoided an
engagement with Hannibal, but wanted it at his advantage;
and Hannibal did not presume to be able to overcome him by
going to meet him in the places where he was encamped. But
if he supposed he could defeat him, it was necessary for
Fabius to undertake an engagement with him in any case, or
to flee. Phillip, King of Macedonia, he who was the father of
Perseus, coming to war with the Romans, placed his
encampment on a very high mountain so as not to have an
engagement with them; but the Romans went to meet him on
that mountain, and routed him. Vercingetorix, a Captain of
the Gauls, in order to avoid an engagement with Caesar, who
unexpectedly had crossed the river, placed himself miles
distant with his forces. The Venetians in our times, if they did
not want to come to an engagement with the King of France,
ought not to have waited until the French Army had crossed
the Adda, but should have placed themselves distant from
him, as did Vercingetorix: whence, having waited for him,
they did not know how to take the opportunity of undertaking
an engagement during the crossing, nor how to avoid it; for
the French being near to them, as the Venetians decamped,
assaulted and routed them. And so it is, that an engagement
cannot be avoided if the enemy at all events wants to
undertake it. Nor does anyone cite Fabius, for he avoided an
engagement in cases like that, just as much as did Hannibal. It
often happens that your soldiers are not willing to fight, and
you know that because of their number or the location, or
from some other cause, you have a disadvantage, and would
like them to change their minds. It also happens that necessity
or opportunity constrains you to (come to) an engagement,
and that your soldiers are discontent and little disposed to
fight, whence it is necessary for you in one case to frighten
them, and in the other to excite them. In the first instance, if
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persuasion is not enough, there is no better way to have both
those who fight and those who would not believe you, than to
give some of them over to the enemy as plunder. It may also
be well to do with cunning that which happened to Fabius
Maximus at home. The Army of Fabius desired ((as you
know)) to fight with the Army of Hannibal: his Master of
cavalry had the same desire. It did not seem proper to Fabius
to attempt the battle, so that in order to dispel such (desires),
he had to divide the Army. Fabius kept his men in the
encampments: and the other (the Master of cavalry) going
forth, and coming into great danger, would have been routed,
if Fabius had not succored him. By this example, the Master
of the cavalry, together with the entire army, realized it was a
wise course to obey Fabius. As to exciting them to fight, it is
well to make them angry at the enemy, by pointing out that
(the enemy) say slanderous things of them, and showing them
to have with their intelligence (in the enemy camp) and
having corrupted some part, to encamp on the side where they
see they enemy, and undertake some light skirmishes with
them; because things that are seen daily are more easily
disparaged. By showing yourself indignant, and by making an
oration in which you reproach them for their laziness, you
make them so ashamed by saying you want to fight only if
they do not accompany you. And above every thing, to have
this awareness, if you want to make the soldiers obstinate in
battle, not to permit them to send home any of their
possessions, or settle in any place, until the war ends, so that
they understand that if flight saves them their lives, it will not
save them their possessions, the love of the latter, not less
than the former, renders men obstinate in defense.
597
ZANOBI: You have told how soldiers can be made to turn
and fight, by talking to them. Do you mean by this that he has
to talk to the entire Army, or to its Heads?
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a mistake, they were threatened not only by those evils that
can be feared by men, but also by those that can be expected
from the Deity. This practice, mixed with other religious
means, often made an entire enterprise easy for the ancient
Captains, and would always be so whenever religion was
feared and observed. Sertorius availed himself of this when he
told of talking with a Hind (female stag), which promised him
victory on the part of the Deity. Sulla was said to talk with a
Statue which he had taken from the Temple of Apollo. Many
have told of God appearing to them in their sleep, and
admonishing them to fight. In the times of our fathers,
Charles the seventh, King of France, in the war he waged
against the English, was said to counsel with a young girl sent
by God, who is called the Maid of France, and who was the
cause for victory. You can also take means to make your
(soldiers) value the enemy little, as Agesilaus the Spartan did,
who showed his soldiers some Persians in the nude, so that
seeing their delicate members, they should have no cause for
being afraid of them. Some have constrained them to fight
from necessity, by removing from their paths all hope of
saving themselves, except through victory. This is the
strongest and the best provision that can be made when you
want to make your soldiers obstinate. Which obstinacy is
increased by the confidence and the love either of the Captain
or of the Country. Confidence is instilled by arms
organization, fresh victories, and the knowledge of the
Captain. Love of Country springs from nature: that of the
Captain from (his) virtu more than any other good event.
Necessities can be many, but that is the strongest, which
constrains you either to win or to die.
599
Fifth Book
FABRIZIO: I have shown you how to organize an army to
battle another army which is seen posted against you, and I
have told you how it is overcome, and also of the many
circumstances which can occur because of the various
incidents surrounding it, so that it appears to me now to be the
time to show you how to organize an army against an enemy
which is unseen, but which you are continually afraid will
assault you. This happens when marching through country
which is hostile, or suspected (of being so). And first you
have to understand that a Roman Army ordinarily always sent
ahead some groups of cavalry as observers for the march.
Afterwards the right wing followed. After this came all the
wagons which pertained to it. After those, another Legion,
and next its wagons. After these come the left wing with its
wagon in the rear, and the remainder of the cavalry followed
in the last part. This was in effect the manner in which one
ordinarily marched. And if it happened that the Army should
be assaulted on the march in front or from the rear, they
quickly caused all the wagons to be withdrawn either on the
right, or on the left, according as it happened, or rather as best
they could depending on the location, and all the forces
together, free from their baggage, set up a front on that side
from which the enemy was coming. If they were assaulted on
the flank, they would withdraw the wagons to the side which
was secure, and set up a front on the other. This method being
good, and prudently conducted, appears to me ought to be
imitated, sending cavalry ahead to observe the country, then
having four battalions, having them march in line, and each
with its wagons in the rear. And as the wagons are of two
kinds, that is, those pertaining to individual soldiers, and the
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public ones for use by the whole camp, I would divide the
public wagons into four parts, and assign a part to each
Battalion, also dividing the artillery and all the unarmed men,
so that each one of those armed should have its equal share of
impedimenta. But as it sometimes happens that one marches
in a country not only suspect, but hostile in fact, that you are
afraid of being attacked hourly, in order to go on more
securely, you are compelled to change the formation of the
march, and go on in the regular way, so that in some
unforeseen place, neither the inhabitants nor the Army can
injure you. In such a case, the ancient Captains usually went
on with the Army in squares, for such they called these
formations, not because it was entirely square, but because it
was capable of fighting on four sides, and they said that they
were going prepared either for marching or for battle. I do not
want to stray far from this method, and want to arrange my
two Battalions, which I have taken as a rule for an Army, in
this manner. If you want, therefore, to walk securely through
the enemy country, and be able to respond from every side, if
you had been assaulted by surprise, and wanting, in
accordance with the ancients, to bring it into a square, I would
plan to make a square whose hollow was two hundred arm
lengths on every side in this manner. I would first place the
flanks, each distant from the other by two hundred twelve arm
lengths, and would place five companies in each flank in a
file along its length, and distant from each other three arm
lengths; these would occupy their own space, each company
occupying (a space) forty arm lengths by two hundred twelve
arm lengths. Between the front and rear of these two flanks, I
would place another ten companies, five on each side,
arranging them in such a way that four should be next to the
front of the right flank, and five at the rear of the left flank,
leaving between each one an interval (gap) of four arm
601
lengths: one of which should be next to the front of the left
flank, and one at the rear of the right flank. And as the space
existing between the one flank and the other is two hundred
twelve arm lengths, and these companies placed alongside
each other by their width and not length, they would come to
occupy, with the intervals, one hundred thirty four arm
lengths, (and) there would be between the four companies
placed on the front of the right flank, and one placed on the
left, a remaining space of seventy eight arm lengths, and a
similar space be left among the companies placed in the rear
parts; and there would be no other difference, except that one
space would be on the rear side toward the right wing, the
other would be on the front side toward the left wing. In the
space of seventy eight arm lengths in front, I would place all
the ordinary Veliti, and in that in the rear the extraordinary
Veliti, who would come to be a thousand per space. And if
you want that the space taken up by the Army should be two
hundred twelve arm lengths on every side, I would see that
five companies are placed in front, and those that are placed
in the rear, should not occupy any space already occupied by
the flanks, and therefore I would see that the five companies
in the rear should have their front touch the rear of their
flanks, and those in front should have their rear touch the
front (of their flanks), so that on every side of that army,
space would remain to receive another company. And as there
are four spaces, I would take four banners away from the
extraordinary pikemen and would put one on every corner:
and the two banners of the aforementioned pikemen left to
me, I would place in the middle of the hollow of their army
(formed) in a square of companies, at the heads of which the
general Captain would remain with his men around him. And
as these companies so arranged all march in one direction, but
not all fight in one, in putting them together, one has to
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arrange which sides are not guarded by other companies
during the battle. And, therefore, it ought to be considered
that the five companies in front protect all the other sides,
except the front; and therefore these have to be assembled in
an orderly manner (and) with the pikemen in front. The five
companies behind protect all the sides, except the side in the
back; and therefore ought to be assembled so that the pikemen
are in the rear, as we will demonstrate in its place. The five
companies on the right flank protect all the sides, from the
right flank outward. The five on the left, engird all the sides,
from the left flank outward: and therefore in arranging the
companies, the pikemen ought to be placed so that they turn
by that flank which in uncovered. And as the Heads of Ten
are placed in the front and rear, so that when they have to
fight, all the army and its members are in their proper places,
the manner of accomplishing this was told when we discussed
the methods of arranging the companies. I would divide the
artillery, and one part I would place outside the right flank,
and the other at the left. I would send the light cavalry ahead
to reconnoiter the country. Of the men-at-arms, I would place
part in the rear on the right wing, and part on the left, distant
forty arms lengths from the companies. And no matter how
you arrange your Army, you have to take up ((as the cavalry))
this general (rule), that you have to place them always either
in the rear or on the flanks. Whoever places them ahead in
front of the Army must do one of two things: either he places
them so far ahead, that if they are repulsed they have so much
room to give them time to be able to obtain shelter for
themselves from your infantry and not collide with them; or
to arrange them (the infantry) with so many intervals, that by
means of them the cavalry can enter among them without
disorganizing them. Let not anyone think little of this
instruction, because many, not being aware of this, have been
603
ruined, and have been disorganized and routed by themselves.
The wagons and the unarmed men are placed in the plaza that
exists within the Army, and so compartmented, that they
easily make way for whoever wants to go from one side to the
other, or from one front of the Army to the other. These
companies, without artillery and cavalry, occupy two hundred
eighty two arm lengths of space on the outside in every
direction. And as this square is composed of two Battalions, it
must be devised as to which part one Battalion makes up, and
which part the other. And since the Battalions are called by
number, and each of them has ((as you know)) ten companies
and a general Head, I would have the first Battalion place its
first five companies in the front, the other five on the left
flank, and the Head should be in the left angle of the front.
The first five companies of the second Battalion then should
be placed on the right flank, and the other five in the rear, and
the Head should be in the right angle, who would undertake
the office of the Tergiduttore.
604
When you want to march, you must have levellers and men
with pick axes ahead who clear the road for you, and who are
well protected by that cavalry sent ahead to reconnoiter. An
Army will march in this order ten miles a day, and enough
Sun (light will remain for them to dine and camp, since
ordinarily an Army marches twenty miles. If it happens that it
is assaulted by an organized Army, this assault cannot arise
suddenly, because an organized Army travels at its own rate
(step), so that you are always in time to reorganize for the
engagement, and quickly bring yourself to that formation, or
similar to that formation of the Army, which I showed you
above. For if you are assaulted on the front side, you do
nothing except (to have) the artillery in the flanks and the
cavalry behind come forward and take those places and with
those distances mentioned above. The thousand Veliti who
are forward, come forth from their positions, and dividing
into groups of a hundred, enter into their places between the
cavalry and the wings of the Army. Then, into the voids left
by them, enter the two bands of extraordinary pikemen which
I had placed in the plaza of the Army. The thousand Veliti
that I had placed in the rear depart from there, and distribute
themselves among the flanks of the companies to strengthen
them: and from the open space they leave all the wagons and
unarmed men issue forth and place themselves at the rear of
the companies. The plaza, therefore, remains vacant as
everyone has gone to their places, and the five companies that
I placed in the rear of the Army come forward through the
open void that exists between the one and the other flank, and
march toward the company in the front, and the three
approach them at forty arm lengths with equal intervals
between one another, and two remain behind distant another
forty arm lengths. This formation can be organized quickly,
and comes to be almost the same as the first disposition of the
605
Army which we described before: and if it becomes more
straitened in the front, it becomes larger in the flanks, which
does not weaken it. But as the five companies in the back
have their pikemen in the rear for the reasons mentioned
above, it is necessary to have them come from the forward
part, if you want them to get behind the front of the Army;
and, therefore, one must either make them turn company by
company, as a solid body, or make them enter quickly
between the ranks of the shield-bearers (swordsmen), and
bring them forward; which method is more swift and less
disorderly than to make them turn. And thus you ought to do
with all those who are in the rear in every kind of assault, as I
will show you. If it should happen that the enemy comes from
the rear, the first thing that ought to be done is to have
everyone turn to face the enemy, so that at once the front of
the army becomes the rear, and the rear the front. Then all
those methods of organizing the front should be followed,
which I mentioned above. If the enemy attacks on the right
flank, the entire army ought to be made to face in that
direction, and then those things ought to be done to strengthen
that (new) front which were mentioned above, so that the
cavalry, the Veliti, and the artillery are in the position
assigned in this front. There is only this difference, that in the
changing of fronts, of those who move about, some have to
go further, and some less. It is indeed true that when a front is
made of the right flank, the Veliti would have to enter the
intervals (gaps) that exist between the wings of the Army, and
the cavalry would be those nearer to the left flank, in the
position of those who would have to enter into the two bands
of extraordinary pikemen placed in the center. But before they
enter, the wagons and unarmed men stationed at the openings,
should clear the plaza and retire behind the left flank, which
then becomes the rear of the army. And the other Veliti who
606
should be placed in the rear according to the original
arrangement, in this case should not be changed, as that place
should not remain open, which, from being the rear, would
become a flank. All the other things ought to be done as was
said concerning the first front.
What has been said concerning making a front from the right
flank, is intended also in making one from the left flank, since
the same arrangements ought to be observed. If the enemy
should happen to be large and organized to assault you on two
sides, the two sides on which he assaults you ought to be
strengthened from the two that are not assaulted, doubling the
ranks in each one, and distributing the artillery, Veliti, and
cavalry among each side. If he comes from three or four
sides, it needs must be either you or he lacks prudence, for if
you were wise, you would never put yourself on the side
where the enemy could assault you from three or four sides
with large and organized forces, and if he wanted to attach
you in safety he must be so large and assault you on each side
with a force almost as large as you have in your entire Army.
And if you are so little prudent that you put yourself in the
midst of the territory and forces of an enemy, who has three
times the organized forces that you have, you cannot
complain if evil happens to you, except of yourself. If it
happens, not by your fault, but by some misadventure, the
injury will be without shame, and it will happen to you as it
did to the Scipios in Spain, and the Hasdrubal in Italy. But if
the enemy has a much larger force than you, and in order to
disorganize you wants to assault you on several sides, it will
be his foolishness and his gamble; for to do this, he must go
(spread) himself thin, that you can always attack on one side
and resist on another, and in a brief time ruin him. This
method of organizing an Army which is not seen, but who is
607
feared, is necessary, and it is a most useful thing to accustom
your soldiers to assemble, and march in such order, and in
marching arrange themselves to fight according to the first
front (planned), and then return to marching formation, from
that make a front from the rear, and then from the flank, and
from that return to the original formation. These exercises and
accustomization are necessary matters if you want a
disciplined and trained Army. Captains and Princes have to
work hard at these things: nor is military discipline anything
else, than to know how to command and how to execute these
things, nor is a disciplined Army anything else, than an army
which is well trained in these arrangements; nor would it be
possible for anyone in these times who should well employ
such discipline ever to be routed. And if this square formation
which I have described is somewhat difficult, such difficulty
is necessary, if you take it up as exercise; since knowing how
to organize and maintain oneself well in this, one would
afterwards know how to manage more easily those which not
be as difficult.
608
voices with which they command in (times of) danger, ought
to be loud and clear. And if you command with sounds (bugle
calls), it ought to be done so that they are so different from
each other that one cannot be mistaken for another; and if you
command by voice, you ought to be alert to avoid general
words, and use particular ones, and of the particular ones
avoid those which might be able to be interpreted in an
incorrect manner. Many times saying "go back, go back", has
caused an Army to be ruined: therefore this expression ought
to be avoided, and in its place use "Retreat". If you want them
to turn so as to change the front, either from the rear or from
the flank, never use "Turn around", but say, "To the left", "To
the right", "To the rear", "To the front". So too, all the other
words have to be simple and clear, as "Hurry", "Hold still",
"Forward", "Return". And all those things which can be done
by words are done, the others are done by sounds (calls). As
to the (road) clearers, which is your second question, I would
have this job done by my own soldiers, as much because the
ancient military did so, as also because there would be fewer
unarmed men and less impediments in the army: and I would
draw the number needed from every company, and I would
have them take up the tools suitable for clearing, and leave
their arms in those ranks that are closest to them, which
would carry them so that if the enemy should come, they
would have nothing to do but take them up again and return to
their ranks.
ZANOBI: I'm afraid you have never led these soldiers of ours
to dig.
609
FABRIZIO: Everything will be discussed in its place. For
now I want to leave these parts alone, and discuss the manner
of living of the Army, for it appears to me that having worked
them so hard, it is time to refresh and restore it with food.
You have to understand that a Prince ought to organize his
army as expeditiously as possible, and take away from it all
those things that add burdens to it and make the enterprise
difficult. Among those that cause more difficulty, are to have
to keep the army provided with wine and baked bread. The
ancients did not think of wine, for lacking it, they drank water
tinted with a little vinegar, and not wine. They did not cook
bread in ovens, as is customary throughout the cities; but they
provided flour, and every soldier satisfied himself of that in
his own way, having lard and grease for condiment, which
gave flavor to the bread they made, and which kept them
strong. So that the provisions of living (eating) for the army
were Flour, Vinegar, Lard (Bacon) and Grease (Lard), and
Barley for the horses. Ordinarily, they had herds of large and
small beasts that followed the Army, which ((as they did not
need to be carried)) did not impede them much. This
arrangement permitted an ancient Army to march, sometimes
for many days, through solitary and difficult places without
suffering hardship of (lack of) provisions, for it lived from
things which could be drawn behind. The contrary happens in
modern Armies, which, as they do not want to lack wine and
eat baked bread in the manner that those at home do, and of
which they cannot make provision for long, often are hungry;
or even if they are provided, it is done with hardship and at
very great expense. I would therefore return my Army to this
form of living, and I would not have them eat other bread
than that which they should cook for themselves. As to wine,
I would not prohibit its drinking, or that it should come into
the army, but I would not use either industry or any hard work
610
to obtain it, and as to other provisions, I would govern myself
entirely as the ancients. If you would consider this matter
well, you will see how much difficulty is removed, and how
many troubles and hardships an army and a Captain avoid,
and what great advantage it will give any enterprise which
you may want to undertake.
611
soldiers their regular pay, to help the wounded and infirm,
and to provide for the other needs of the army. The Consul
could indeed, and often did, concede a booty to the soldiers,
but this concession did not cause disorders; for when the
(enemy) army was routed, all the booty was placed in the
middle and was distributed to each person, according to the
merits of each. This method made for the soldiers attending to
winning and not robbing, and the Roman legions defeating
the enemy but not pursuing him: for they never departed from
their orders: only the cavalry and lightly armed men pursued
him, unless there were other soldiers than legionnaires,
which, if the booty would have been kept by whoever
acquired it, it was neither possible nor reasonable to (expect
to) hold the Legion firm, and would bring on many dangers.
From this it resulted, therefore that the public was enriched,
and every Consul brought, with his triumphs, much treasure
into the Treasury, which (consisted) entirely of ransoms and
booty. Another thing well considered by the ancients, was the
pay they gave to each soldier: they wanted a third part to be
placed next to him who carried the flag of the company, who
never was given any except that furnished by the war. They
did this for two reasons: The first so that the soldier would
make capital (save) of his pay: for the greater part of them
being young and irresponsible, the more they had, the more
they spent without need to. The other part because, knowing
that their movable possessions were next to the flag, they
would be forced to have greater care, and defend it with
greater obstinacy: and thus this method made them savers,
and strong. All of these things are necessary to observe if you
want to bring the military up to your standards.
612
incidents, (and) where the industry of the Captain and the
virtu of the soldier is needed if they are to be avoided;
therefore, if you should have something that occurs to you, I
would take care to listen.
613
a few of the enemy assault you: if the enemy takes to sudden
and unreasonable flight: in such cases, you ought always to be
afraid of deceit; and you should never believe that the enemy
does not know his business, rather, if you want to deceive
yourself less and bring on less danger, the more he appears
weak, the more enemy appears more cautious, so much the
more ought you to esteem (be wary) of him. And in this you
have to use two different means, since you have to fear him
with your thoughts and arrangements, but by words and other
external demonstrations show him how much you disparage
him; for this latter method causes your soldiers to have more
hope in obtaining the victory, the former makes you more
cautious and less apt to be deceived. And you have to
understand that when you march through enemy country, you
face more and greater dangers than in undertaking an
engagement. And therefore, when marching, a Captain ought
to double his diligence, and the first thing he ought to do, is to
have all the country through which he marches described and
depicted, so that he will know the places, the numbers, the
distances, the roads, the mountains, the rivers, the marshes,
and all their characteristics. And in getting to know this, in
diverse ways one must have around him different people who
know the places, and question them with diligence, and
contrast their information, and make notes according as it
checks out. He ought to send cavalry ahead, and with them
prudent Heads, not so much to discover the enemy as to
reconnoiter the country, to see whether it checks with the
places and with the information received from them. He ought
also to send out guides, guarded (kept loyal) by hopes of
reward and fear of punishment. And above all, he ought to see
to it that the Army does not know to which sides he guides
them, since there is nothing more useful in war, than to keep
silent (about) the things that have to be done. And so that a
614
sudden assault does not disturb your soldiers, you ought to
advise them to be prepared with their arms, since things that
are foreseen cause less harm. Many have ((in order to avoid
the confusion of the march)) placed the wagons and the
unarmed men under the banners, and commanded them to
follow them, so that having to stop or retire during the march,
they are able to do so more easily: which I approve very much
as something useful. He ought also to have an awareness
during the march, that one part of the Army does not detach
itself from another, or that one (part) going faster and the
other more slowly, the Army does not become compacted
(jumbled), which things cause disorganization. It is necessary,
therefore, to place the Heads along the sides, who should
maintain the steps uniform, restraining those which are too
fast, and hastening the slow; which step cannot be better
regulated than by sound (music). The roads ought to be
widened, so that at least one company can always move in
order. The customs and characteristics of the enemy ought to
be considered, and if he wants to assault you in the morning,
noon, or night, and if he is more powerful in infantry or
cavalry, from what you have learned, you may organize and
prepare yourself. But let us come to some incident in
particular. It sometimes happens that as you are taking
yourself away from in front of the enemy because you judge
yourself to be inferior (to him), and therefore do not want to
come to an engagement with him, he comes upon your rear as
you arrive at the banks of a river, which causes you to lose
times in its crossing, so that the enemy is about to join up and
combat with you. There have been some who have found
themselves in such a peril, their army girded on the rear side
by a ditch, and filling it with tow, have set it afire, then have
passed on with the army without being able to be impeded by
615
the enemy, he being stopped by that fire which was in
between.
FABRIZIO: You say well; but consider what I have said and
what Hanno did: for I said that he dug a ditch and filled it
with tow, so that whoever wanted to pass had to contend with
the ditch and the fire. Hanno made the fire without a ditch,
and as he wanted to pass through it did not make it very large
(strong), since it would have impeded him even without the
ditch. Do you not know that Nabidus, the Spartan, when he
was besieged in Sparta by the Romans, set fire to part of his
own town in order to stop the passage of the Romans, who
had already entered inside? and by those flames not only
stopped their passage, but pushed them out. But let us return
to our subject. Quintus Luttatius, the Roman, having the
Cimbri at his rear, and arriving at a river, so that the enemy
should give him time to cross, made as if to give him time to
combat him, and therefore feigned to make camp there, and
had ditches dug, and some pavilions raised, and sent some
horses to the camps to be shod: so that the Cimbri believing
he was encamping, they also encamped, and divided
themselves into several parts to provide themselves with food:
of which Luttatius becoming aware, he crossed the river
without being able to be impeded by them. Some, in order to
616
cross a river, not having a bridge, have diverted it, and having
drawn a part of it in their rear, the other then became so low
that they crossed it easily. If the rivers are rapid, (and)
desiring that the infantry should cross more safely, the more
capable horses are placed on the side above which holds back
the water, and another part below which succor the infantry if
any, in crossing, should be overcome by the river. Rivers that
are not forded, are crossed by bridges, boats, and rafts: and it
is therefore well to have skills in your Armies capable of
doing all these things. It sometimes happens that in crossing a
river, the enemy on the opposite bank impedes you. If you
want to overcome this difficulty there is no better example
known than that of Caesar, who, having his army on the bank
of a river in Gaul, and his crossing being impeded by
Vercingetorix, the Gaul, who had his forces on the other side
of the river, marched for several days along the river, and the
enemy did the same. And Caesar having made an
encampment in a woody place (and) suitable to conceal his
forces, withdrew three cohorts from every Legion, and had
them stop in that place, commanding then that as soon as he
should depart, they should throw a bridge across and fortify it,
and he with the rest of his forces continued the march:
Whence Vercingetorix seeing the number of Legions, and
believing that no part had remained behind, also continued the
march: but Caesar, as soon as he thought the bridge had been
completed, turned back, and finding everything in order,
crossed the river without difficulty.
617
for fording than elsewhere, for the river always places more
material, and in a pack, which it draws (with it) from the
bottom. Which thing, as it has been experienced many times,
is very true.
618
their guard. As soon as the Numidians saw this, giving spurs
to their horses and attacking them, they passed by without the
enemy being able to take any remedy; and having passed,
they wasted and plundered the country, constraining the
enemy to leave the pass free to the army of Lucius. Some
Captain, who has found himself assaulted by a great multitude
of the enemy, has tightened his ranks, and given the enemy
the faculty of completely surrounding him, and then has
applied force to that part which he has recognized as being
weaker, and has made a path in that way, and saved himself.
Marcantonio, while retiring before the army of the Parthians,
became aware that every day at daybreak as he moved, the
enemy assaulted him, and infested him throughout the march:
so that he took the course of not departing before midday. So
that the Parthians, believing he should not want to decamp
that day returned to their quarters, and Marcantonio was able
then for the remainder of the day to march without being
molested. This same man, to escape the darts of the Parthians,
commanded that, when the Parthians came toward them, they
should kneel, and the second rank of the company should
place their shields on the heads of (those in the) first, the third
on (those of the) second, the fourth on the third, and so on
successively: so that the entire Army came to be as under a
roof, and protected from the darts of the enemy. This is as
much as occurs to me to tell you of what can happen to an
army when marching: therefore, if nothing else occurs to you,
I will pass on to another part.
Sixth Book
ZANOBI: I believe it is well, since the discussion ought to be
changed, that Battista take up his office, and I resign mine;
619
and in this case we would come to imitate the good Captains,
according as I have already learned here from the Lord, who
place the best soldiers in the front and in the rear of the Army,
as it appears necessary to them to have those who bravely
enkindle the battle, and those in the rear who bravely sustain
it. Cosimo, therefore, begun this discussion prudently, and
Battista will prudently finish it. Luigi and I have come in
between these. And as each one of us has taken up his part
willingly, so too I believe Battista is about to close it.
620
neither grottoes (caves), or banks of rivers, or a multitude of
trees, or other natural cover which should protect them. But
the Romans did not encamp safely so much from the location
as by arts, nor ever made an encampment in places where
they should not have been able to spread out all their forces,
according to their discipline. From this resulted that the
Romans were always able to have one form of encampment,
for they wanted the site to obey them, and not they the site.
The Greeks were not able to observe this, for as they obeyed
the site, and the sites changing the formation, it behooved
them that they too should change the mode of encamping and
the form of their encampment. The Romans, therefore, where
the site lacked strength, supplied it with (their) art and
industry. And since in this narration of mine, I have wanted
that the Romans be imitated, I will not depart from their mode
of encamping, not, however, observing all their arrangements:
but taking (only) that part which at the present time seems
appropriate to me. I have often told you that the Romans had
two Legions of Roman men in their consular armies, which
comprised some eleven thousand infantry of forces sent by
friends (allies) to aid them; but they never had more foreign
soldiers in their armies than Romans, except for cavalry,
which they did not care if they exceeded the number in their
Legions; and that in every action of theirs, they place the
Legions in the center, and the Auxiliaries on the sides. Which
method they observed even when they encamped, as you
yourselves have been able to read in those who write of their
affairs; and therefore I am not about to narrate in detail how
they encamped, but will tell you only how I would at present
arrange to encamp my army, and then you will know what
part of the Roman methods I have treated. You know that at
the encounter of two Roman Legions I have taken two
Battalions of six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry
621
effective for each Battalion, and I have divided them by
companies, by arms, and names. You know that in organizing
the army for marching and fighting, I have not made mention
of other forces, but have only shown that in doubling the
forces, nothing else had to be done but to double the orders
(arrangements).
622
distance of six hundred eighty (680) arm lengths. I would also
run two other lines which I would place in the middle of it,
and be of the same length as the former, but distant from each
of them by fifteen arm lengths, at the extremity of which, I
would want the east gate to be (placed): and the space which
exists between the two extreme (end) lines, I would make a
road that would go from the gate to the quarters of the
Captain, which would be thirty arm lengths in width and six
hundred thirty (630) long ((since the Captain's quarters would
occupy fifty arm lengths)) and call this the Captain's Way. I
would then make another road from the south gate up to the
north gate, and cross by the head of the Captain's Way, and
along the east side of the Captain's quarters which would be
one thousand two hundred fifty (1250) arm lengths long
((since it would occupy the entire width of the encampment))
and also be thirty arm lengths wide and be called the Cross
Way. The quarters of the Captain and these two roads having
been designed, therefore the quarters of the two battalions of
your own men should begin to be designed; and I would
quarter one on the right hand (side) of the Captain's Way, and
one on the left. And hence beyond the space which is
occupied by the width of the Cross Way, I would place thirty
two quarters on the left side of the Captain's Way, and thirty
two on the right side, leaving a space of thirty arm lengths
between the sixteenth and seventeenth quarters which should
serve as a transverse road which should cross through all of
the quarters of the battalions, as will be seen in their
partitioning. Of these two arrangements of quarters, in the
first tents that would be adjacent to the Cross Way, I would
quarter the heads of men-at-arms, and since each company
has one hundred and fifty men-at-arms, there would be
assigned ten men-at-arms to each of the quarters. The area
(space) of the quarters of the Heads should be forty arm
623
lengths wide and ten arm lengths long. And it is to be noted
that whenever I say width, I mean from south to north, and
when I say length, that from west to east. Those of the
men-at-arms should be fifteen arm lengths long and thirty
wide. In the next fifteen quarters which in all cases are next
((which should have their beginning across the transverse
road, and which would have the same space as those of the
men-at-arms)) I would quarter the light cavalry, which, since
they are one hundred fifty, ten cavalrymen would be assigned
to each quarter, and in the sixteenth which would be left, I
would quarter their Head, giving him the same space which is
given to the Head of men-at-arms. And thus the quarters of
the cavalry of the two battalions would come to place the
Captain's Way in the center and give a rule for the quarters of
the infantry, as I will narrate. You have noted that I have
quartered the three hundred cavalry of each battalion with
their heads in thirty two quarters situated on the Captain's
Way, and beginning with the Cross Way, and that from the
sixteenth to the seventeenth there is a space of thirty arm
lengths to make a transverse road. If I want, therefore, to
quarter the twenty companies which constitute the two regular
Battalions, I would place the quarters of every two companies
behind the quarters of the cavalry, each of which should be
fifteen arm lengths long and thirty wide, as those of the
cavalry, and should be joined on the rear where they touch
one another. And in every first quarter of each band that
fronts on the Cross Way, I would quarter the Constable of one
company, which would come to correspond with the
quartering of the Head of the men-at-arms: and their quarters
alone would have a space twenty arm lengths in width and ten
in length. And in the other fifteen quarters in each group
which follow after this up the Transverse Way, I would
quarter a company of infantry on each side, which, as they are
624
four hundred fifty, thirty would be assigned to each quarter. I
would place the other fifteen quarters contiguous in each
group to those of the cavalry with the same space, in which I
would quarter a company of infantry from each group. In the
last quarter of each group I would place the Constable of the
company, who would come to be adjacent to the Head of the
light cavalry, with a space of ten arm lengths long and twenty
wide. And thus these first two rows of quarters would be half
of cavalry and half of infantry.
625
infantry) with their Constables. And thus there would come to
be quartered in three rows of quarters per area the cavalry and
the companies (of infantry) of the two regular battalions, in
the center of which I would place the Captain's Way. The two
battalions of auxiliaries ((since I had them composed of the
same men)) I would quarter on each side of these two regular
battalions with the same arrangement of double quarters,
placing first a row of quarters in which I should quarter half
with cavalry and half infantry, distant thirty arm lengths from
each other, to create two roads which I should call, one the
Third Road on the right hand (side), the other the Third on the
left hand. And then I would place on each side two other rows
of quarters, separate but arranged in the same way, which are
those of the regular battalions, which would create two other
roads, and all of these would be called by the number and the
band (side) where they should be situated. So that all this part
of the Army would come to be quartered in twelve rows of
double quarters, and on thirteen roads, counting the Captain's
Way and the Cross Way.
626
and a hundred arm lengths which are left on each side
between the quarters and the ditch, and there remains in each
area a space left for quarters four hundred arm lengths wide
and a hundred long, measuring the length to include the space
occupied by the Captain's quarters. Dividing the said length in
the middle, therefore, there would be on each side of the
Captain forty quarters fifty arm lengths long and twenty wide,
which would total eighty quarters, in which would be
quartered the general Heads of the battalions, the
Chamberlains, the Masters of the camps, and all those who
should have an office (duty) in the army, leaving some vacant
for some foreigners who might arrive, and for those who
should fight through the courtesy of the Captain. On the rear
side of the Captain's quarters, I would create a road thirty arm
lengths wide from north to south, and call it the Front Road,
which would come to be located along the eighty quarters
mentioned, since this road and the Cross Way would have
between them the Captain's quarters and the eighty quarters
on their flanks. From this Front road and opposite to the
Captain's quarters, I would create another road which should
go from there to the west gate, also thirty arm lengths wide,
and corresponding in location and length to the Captain's
Way, and I should call it the Way of the Plaza. These two
roads being located, I would arrange the plaza where the
market should be made, which I would place at the head of
the Way of the Plaza, opposite to the Captain's quarters, and
next to the Front Road, and would want it to be square, and
would allow it a hundred twenty one arm lengths per side.
And from the right hand and left hand of the said plaza, I
would make two rows of quarters, and each row have eight
double quarters, which would take up twelve arm lengths in
length and thirty in width so that they should be on each side
of the plaza, in which there would be sixteen quarters, and
627
total thirty two all together, in which I would quarter that
cavalry left over from the auxiliary battalions, and if this
should not be enough, I would assign them some of the
quarters about the Captain, and especially those which face
the ditch.
628
infantry. Turning then on the left hand side toward the west
gate, I would want in all that tract between them and the said
gate, five other rows of double quarters, in a similar manner
and with the same spaces, ((it is true that from one row to the
other there would not be more than fifteen arm lengths of
space)) in which there would also be quartered a thousand
five hundred infantry: and thus from the north gate to that on
the west, following the ditches, in a hundred quarters, divided
into ten rows of five double quarters per row, the
extraordinary pikemen and Veliti of the regular battalions
would be quartered. And so, too, from the west gate to that on
the south, following the ditches, in exactly the same manner,
in another ten rows of ten quarters per row, the extraordinary
pikemen and Veliti of the auxiliary battalions would be
quartered. Their Heads, or rather their Constables, could take
those quarters on the side toward the ditches which appeared
most convenient for themselves.
629
occupied by them. Then the other spaces remaining between
the roads, which would be four, I would assign in general to
all the impedimenta mentioned, that is, one to the herdsmen,
another to Artificers and workmen, another to the public
wagons for provisions, and the fourth to the armorers. The
roads which I would want left unoccupied would be the Way
of the Plaza, the Front Road, and in addition, a road that
should be called the Center Road, which should take off at the
north and proceed toward the south, and pass through the
center of the Way of the Plaza, which, on the west side,
should have the same effect as has the Transverse Road on
the east side. And in addition to this a Road that should go
around the rear along the quarters of the extraordinary
pikemen and Veliti. And all these roads should be thirty arm
lengths wide. And I would dispose the artillery along the
ditches on the rear of the camp.
FABRIZIO: You know that I made all the roads thirty arm
lengths wide, so that a company of infantry is able to go
through them in order (formation): which, if you remember
well, I told you that each of these (formations) were twenty
five to thirty arm lengths wide. The space between the ditch
and the quarters, which is a hundred arm lengths wide, is
necessary, since the companies and the artillery can be
630
handled here, through which booty is taken, (and) when space
is needed into which to retire, new ditches and embankments
are made. The quarters very distant from the ditches are
better, for they are more distant from the fires and other
things that might be able to draw the enemy to attack them.
As to the second question, my intention is not that every
space designated by me is covered by only one pavilion, but
is to be used as an all-round convenience for those who are
quartered, with several or few tents, so long as they do not go
outside its limits. And in designing these quarters, the men
must be most experienced and excellent architects, who, as
soon as the Captain has selected the site, know how to give it
form, and divide it, and distinguishing the roads, dividing the
quarters with cords and hatchets in such a practical manner,
that they might be divided and arranged quickly. And if
confusion is not to arise, the camp must always face the same
way, so that everyone will know on which Road and in which
space he has to find his quarters. And this ought to be
observed at all times, in every place, and in a manner that it
appears to be a movable City, which, wherever it goes, brings
with it the same roads, the same houses, and the same
appearance: which cannot be observed by those men who,
seeking strong locations, have to change the form according
to the variations in the sites. But the Romans made the places
strong with ditches, ramparts, and embankments, for they
placed a space around the camp, and in front of it they dug a
ditch and ordinarily six arm lengths wide and three deep,
which spaces they increased according to the (length of) time
they resided in the one place, and according as they feared the
enemy. For myself, I would not at present erect a stockade
(rampart), unless I should want to winter in a place. I would,
however, dig the ditch and embankment, not less than that
mentioned, but greater according to the necessity. With
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respect to the artillery, on every side of the encampment, I
would have a half circle ditch, from which the artillery should
be able to batter on the flanks whoever should come to attack
the moats (ditches). The soldiers ought also to be trained in
this practice of knowing how to arrange an encampment, and
work with them so they may aid him in designing it, and the
soldiers quick in knowing their places. And none of these is
difficult, as will be told in its proper place. For now I want to
pass on to the protection of the camp, which, without the
distribution (assignment) of guards, all the other efforts would
be useless.
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But let us return to the discussion of the guards. I do not seem
to find in connection with the ancients guarding the camp at
night, that they had guards outside, distant from the ditches,
as is the custom today, which they call the watch. I believe I
should do this, when I think how the army could be easily
deceived, because of the difficulty which exists in checking
(reviewing) them, for they may be corrupted or attacked by
the enemy, so that they judged it dangerous to trust them
entirely or in part. And therefore all the power of their
protection was within the ditches, which they dug with very
great diligence and order, punishing capitally anyone who
deviated from such an order. How this was arranged by them,
I will not talk to you further in order not to tire you, since you
are able to see it by yourselves, if you have not seen it up to
now. I will say only briefly what would be done by me. I
would regularly have a third of the army remain armed every
night, and a fourth of them always on foot, who would be
distributed throughout the embankments and all the places of
the army, with double guards posted at each of its squares,
where a part should remain, and a part continually go from
one side of the encampment to the other. And this
arrangement I describe, I would also observe by day if I had
the enemy near. As to giving it a name, and renewing it every
night, and doing the other things that are done in such
guarding, since they are things (already) known, I will not
talk further of them. I would only remind you of a most
important matter, and by observing it do much good, by not
observing it do much evil; which is, that great diligence be
used as to who does not lodge within the camp at night, and
who arrives there anew. And this is an easy matter, to review
who is quartered there, with those arrangements we have
designated, since every quarter having a predetermined
number of men, it is an easy thing to see if there are any men
633
missing or if any are left over; and when they are missing
without permission, to punish them as fugitives, and if they
are left over, to learn who they are, what they know, and what
are their conditions. Such diligence results in the enemy not
being able to have correspondence with your Heads, and not
to have co-knowledge of your counsels. If this had not been
observed with diligence by the Romans, Claudius Nero could
not, when he had Hannibal near to him, have departed from
the encampment he had in Lucania, and go and return from
the Marches, without Hannibal having been aware of it. But it
is not enough to make these good arrangements, unless they
are made to be observed by great security, for there is nothing
that wants so much observance as any required in the army.
Therefore, the laws for their enforcement should be harsh and
hard, and the executor very hard. The Roman punished with
the capital penalty whoever was missing from the guard,
whoever abandoned the place given him in combat, whoever
brought anything concealed from outside the encampment; if
anyone should tell of having performed some great act in
battle, and should not have done it; if anyone should have
fought except at the command of the Captain, if anyone from
fear had thrown aside his arms. And if it occurred that an
entire Cohort or an entire Legion had made a similar error, in
order that they not all be put to death, they put their names in
a purse, and drew the tenth part, and those they put to death.
Which penalty was so carried out, that if everyone did not
hear of it, they at least feared it. And because where there are
severe punishments, there also ought to be rewards, so that
men should fear and hope at the same time, they proposed
rewards for every great deed; such as to him who, during the
fighting, saved the life of one of its citizens, to whoever first
climbed the walls of enemy towns, to whoever first entered
the encampment of the enemy, to whoever in battle wounded
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or killed an enemy, to whoever had thrown him from his
horse. And thus any act of virtu was recognized and rewarded
by the Consuls, and publicly praised by everyone: and those
who received gifts for any of these things, in addition to the
glory and fame they acquired among the soldiers, when they
returned to their country, exhibited them with solemn pomp
and with great demonstrations among their friends and
relatives. It is not to marvel therefore, if that people acquired
so much empire, when they had so great an observance of
punishment and reward toward them, which operated either
for their good or evil, should merit either praise or censure; it
behooves us to observe the greater part of these things. And it
does not appear proper for me to be silent on a method of
punishment observed by them, which was, that as the
miscreant was convicted before the Tribune or the Consul, he
was struck lightly by him with a rod: after which striking of
the criminal, he was allowed to flee, and all the soldiers
allowed to kill him, so that immediately each of them threw
stones or darts, or hit him with other arms, of a kind from
which he went little alive, and rarely returned to camp; and to
such that did return to camp, he was not allowed to return
home except with so much inconvenience and ignominy, that
it was much better for him to die. You see this method almost
observed by the Swiss, who have the condemned publicly put
to death by the other soldiers. Which is well considered and
done for the best, for if it is desired that one be not a defender
of a criminal, the better remedy that is found, is to make him
the punisher of him (the criminal); for in some respects he
favors him while from other desires he longs for his
punishment, if he himself is the executioner, than if the
execution is carried out by another. If you want, therefore,
that one is not to be favored in his mistakes by a people, a
good remedy is to see to it that the public judged him. In
635
support of this, the example of Manlius Capitol that can be
cited, who, when he was accused by the Senate, was defended
so much by the public up to the point where it no longer
became the judge: but having become arbiter of his cause,
condemned him to death. It is, therefore, a method of
punishing this, of doing away with tumults, and of having
justice observed. And since in restraining armed men, the fear
of laws, or of men, is not enough, the ancients added the
authority of God: and, therefore, with very great ceremony,
they made their soldiers swear to observe the military
discipline, so that if they did the contrary, they not only had to
fear the laws and men, but God; and they used every industry
to fill them with Religion.
BATTISTA: I like that. But tell me, when the army had to
take off, what arrangements did they have?
636
impedimenta behind, the armed men on every side, placing
the Legions in the center. And, therefore, you would have to
have a battalion of auxiliaries move, and behind it its
particular impedimenta, and with those the fourth part of the
public impedimenta, which would be all those who should be
quartered in one of those (sections of the camp) which we
showed a short while back. And, therefore, it would be well to
have each one of them assigned to a battalion, so that when
the army moved, everyone would know where his place was
in marching. And every battalion ought to proceed on its way
in this fashion with its own impedimenta, and with a quarter
of the public (impedimenta) at its rear, as we showed the
Roman army marched.
637
besieged. And, therefore, the Captain must be very expert
concerning sites of the countries, and have around him many
others who have the same expertness. They also avoided
sickness and hunger so as not to disorganize the army; for if
you want to keep it healthy, you must see to it that the
soldiers sleep under tents, that they are quartered, where there
are trees to create shade, where there is wood to cook the
food, and not to march in the heat. You need, therefore, to
consider the encampment the day before you arrive there, and
in winter guard against marching in the snow and through ice
without the convenience of making a fire, and not lack
necessary clothing, and not to drink bad water. Those who get
sick in the house, have them taken care of by doctors; for a
captain has no remedy when he has to fight both sickness and
the enemy. But nothing is more useful in maintaining an army
healthy than exercise: and therefore the ancients made them
exercise every day. Whence it is seen how much exercise is of
value, for in the quarters it keeps you healthy, and in battle it
makes you victorious. As to hunger, not only is it necessary to
see that the enemy does not impede your provisions, but to
provide whence you are to obtain them, and to see that those
you have are not lost. And, therefore, you must always have
provisions (on hand) for the army for a month, and beyond
that to tax the neighboring friends that they provide you daily,
keep the provisions in a strong place, and, above all, dispense
it with diligence, giving each one a reasonable measure each
day, and so observe this part that they do not become
disorganized; for every other thing in war can be overcome
with time, this only with time overcomes you. Never make
anyone your enemy, who, while seeking to overcome you
with the sword (iron), can overcome you by hunger, because
if such a victory is not as honorable, it is more secure and
more certain. That army, therefore, cannot escape hunger
638
which does not observe justice, and licentiously consume
whatever it please, for one evil causes the provisions not to
arrive, and the other that when they arrive, they are uselessly
consumed: therefore the ancients arranged that what was
given was eaten, and in the time they assigned, so that no
soldier ate except when the Captain did. Which, as to being
observed by the modern armies, everyone does (the contrary),
and deservedly they cannot be called orderly and sober as the
ancients, but licentious and drunkards.
639
by art; the westerners and easterners had made it with a
multitude: but one of these nations serves itself of natural
fury, as are the westerners; the other of the great obedience
which its men show to their King. But in Greece and Italy, as
there is not this natural fury, nor the natural reverence toward
their King, it has been necessary to turn to discipline; which is
so powerful, that it made the few able to overcome the fury
and natural obstinacy of the many. I tell you, therefore, if you
want to imitate the Romans and Greeks, the number of fifty
thousand soldiers ought not to be exceeded, rather they should
actually be less; for the many cause confusion, and do not
allow discipline to be observed nor the orders learned. And
Pyrrhus used to say that with fifteen thousand men he would
assail the world.
640
way that everyone should believe he is affected, so that one
not helping the other, all find themselves oppressed without a
remedy, or rather, to command everyone what they ought to
do on the same day, so that each one believing himself to be
alone to whom the command is given, thinks of obeying it,
and not of a remedy; and thus, without tumult, your command
is executed by everyone. If you should have suspicion of the
loyalty of any people, and should want to assure yourself and
occupy them without notice, in order to disguise your design
more easily, you cannot do better than to communicate to him
some of your design, requesting his aid, and indicate to him
you want to undertake another enterprise, and to have a mind
alien to every thought of his: which will cause him not to
think of his defense, as he does not believe you are thinking
of attacking him, and he will give you the opportunity which
will enable you to satisfy your desire easily. If you should
have present in your army someone who keeps the enemy
advised of your designs, you cannot do better if you want to
avail yourself of his evil intentions, than to communicate to
him those things you do not want to do, and keep silent those
things you want to do, and tell him you are apprehensive of
the things of which you are not apprehensive, and conceal
those things of which you are apprehensive: which will cause
the enemy to undertake some enterprise, in the belief that he
knows your designs, in which you can deceive him and defeat
him. If you should design ((as did Claudius Nero)) to
decrease your army, sending aid to some friend, and they
should not be aware of it, it is necessary that the encampment
be not decreased, but to maintain entire all the signs and
arrangements, making the same fires and posting the same
guards as for the entire army. Likewise, if you should attach a
new force to your army, and do not want the enemy to know
you have enlarged it, it is necessary that the encampment be
641
not increased, for it is always most useful to keep your
designs secret. Whence Metellus, when he was with the
armies in Spain, to one who asked him what he was going to
do the next day, answered that if his shirt knew it, he would
bum it. Marcus Crassus, to one who asked him when he was
going to move his army, said: "do you believe you are alone
in not hearing the trumpets?" If you should desire to learn the
secrets of your enemy and know his arrangement, some used
to send ambassadors, and with them men expert in war
disguised in the clothing of the family, who, taking the
opportunity to observe the enemy army, and consideration of
his strengths and weaknesses, have given them the occasion
to defeat him. Some have sent a close friend of theirs into
exile, and through him have learned the designs of their
adversary. You may also learn similar secrets from the enemy
if you should take prisoners for this purpose. Marius, in the
war he waged against Cimbri, in order to learn the loyalty of
those Gauls who lived in Lombardy and were leagued with
the Roman people, sent them letters, open and sealed: and in
the open ones he wrote them that they should not open the
sealed ones except at such a time: and before that time, he
called for them to be returned, and finding them opened,
knew their loyalty was not complete. Some Captains, when
they were assaulted have not wanted to go to meet the enemy,
but have gone to assail his country, and constrain him to
return to defend his home. This often has turned out well,
because your soldiers begin to win and fill themselves with
booty and confidence, while those of the enemy become
dismayed, it appearing to them that from being winners, they
have become losers. So that to whoever has made this
diversion, it has turned out well. But this can only be done by
that man who has his country stronger than that of the enemy,
for if it were otherwise, he would go on to lose. It has often
642
been a useful thing for a Captain who finds himself besieged
in the quarters of the enemy, to set in motion proceedings for
an accord, and to make a truce with him for several days;
which only any enemy negligent in every way will do, so that
availing yourself of his negligence, you can easily obtain the
opportunity to get out of his hands. Sulla twice freed himself
from his enemies in this manner, and with this same deceit,
Hannibal in Spain got away from the forces of Claudius Nero,
who had besieged him.
643
of the Nobles, and burned and sacked those of the Plebs.
When Metellus led the army against Jugurtha, all me
ambassadors, sent to him by Jugurtha, were requested by him
to give up Jugurtha as a prisoner; afterwards, writing letters to
these same people on the same subject, wrote in such a way
that in a little while Jugurtha became suspicious of all his
counsellors, and in different ways, dismissed them. Hannibal,
having taken refuge with Antiochus, the Roman ambassadors
frequented him so much at home, that Antiochus becoming
suspicious of him, did not afterwards have any faith in his
counsels. As to dividing the enemy forces, there is no more
certain way than to have one country assaulted by part of
them (your forces), so that being constrained to go to defend
it, they (of that country) abandon the war. This is the method
employed by Fabius when his Army had encountered the
forces of the Gauls, the Tuscans, Umbrians, and Samnites.
Titus Didius, having a small force in comparison with those
of the enemy, and awaiting a Legion from Rome, the enemy
wanted to go out to meet it; so that in order that it should not
do so, he gave out by voice throughout his army that he
wanted to undertake an engagement with the enemy on the
next day; then he took steps that some of the prisoners he had
were given the opportunity to escape, who carried back the
order of the Consul to fight on the next day, (and) caused the
enemy, in order not to diminish his forces, not to go out to
meet that Legion: and in this way, kept himself safe. Which
method did not serve to divide the forces of the enemy, but to
double his own. Some, in order to divide his (the enemy)
forces, have employed allowing him to enter their country,
and (in proof) allowed him to take many towns so that by
placing guards in them, he diminished his forces, and in this
manner having made him weak, assaulted and defeated him.
Some others, when they wanted to go into one province,
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feigned making an assault on another, and used so much
industry, that as soon as they extended toward that one where
there was no fear they would enter, have overcome it before
the enemy had time to succor it. For the enemy, as he is not
certain whether you are to return back to the place first
threatened by you, is constrained not to abandon the one place
and succor the other, and thus often he does not defend either.
In addition to the matters mentioned, it is important to a
Captain when sedition or discord arises among the soldiers, to
know how to extinguish it with art. The better way is to
castigate the heads of this folly (error); but to do it in a way
that you are able to punish them before they are able to
become aware of it. The method is, if they are far from you,
not to call only the guilty ones, but all the others together with
them, so that as they do not believe there is any cause to
punish them, they are not disobedient, but provide the
opportunity for punishment. When they are present, one ought
to strengthen himself with the guiltless, and by their aid,
punish them. If there should be discord among them, the best
way is to expose them to danger, which fear will always make
them united. But, above all, what keeps the Army united, is
the reputation of its Captain, which only results from his
virtu, for neither blood (birth) or authority attain it without
virtu. And the first thing a Captain is expected to do, is to see
to it that the soldiers are paid and punished; for any time
payment is missed, punishment must also be dispensed with,
because you cannot castigate a soldier you rob, unless you
pay him; and as he wants to live, he can abstain from being
robbed. But if you pay him but do not punish him, he
becomes insolent in every way, because you become of little
esteem, and to whomever it happens, he cannot maintain the
dignity of his position; and if he does not maintain it, of
necessity, tumults and discords follow, which are the ruin of
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an Army. The Ancient Captains had a molestation from which
the present ones are almost free, which was the interpretation
of sinister omen to their undertakings; for if an arrow fell in
an army, if the Sun or the Moon was obscured, if an
earthquake occurred, if the Captain fell while either mounting
or dismounting from his horse, it was interpreted in a sinister
fashion by the soldiers, and instilled so much fear in them,
that when they came to an engagement, they were easily
defeated. And, therefore, as soon as such an incident
occurred, the ancient Captains either demonstrated the cause
of it or reduced it to its natural causes, or interpreted it to
(favor) their own purposes. When Caesar went to Africa, and
having fallen while he was putting out to sea, said, "Africa, I
have taken you": and many have profited from an eclipse of
the Moon and from earthquakes: these things cannot happen
in our time, as much because our men are not as superstitious,
as because our Religion, by itself, entirely takes away such
ideas. Yet if it should occur, the orders of the ancients should
be imitated. When, either from hunger, or other natural
necessity, or human passion, your enemy is brought to
extreme desperation, and, driven by it, comes to fight with
you, you ought to remain within your quarters, and avoid
battle as much as you can. Thus the Lacedemonians did
against the Messinians: thus Caesar did against Afranius and
Petreius. When Fulvius was Consul against the Cimbri, he
had the cavalry assault the enemy continually for many days,
and considered how they would issue forth from their quarters
in order to pursue them; whence he placed an ambush behind
the quarters of the Cimbri, and had them assaulted by the
cavalry, and when the Cimbri came out of their quarters to
pursue them, Fulvius seized them and plundered them. It has
been very effective for a Captain, when his army is in the
vicinity of the enemy army, to send his forces with the
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insignia of the enemy, to rob and burn his own country:
whence the enemy, believing they were forces coming to their
aid, also ran out to help them plunder, and, because of this,
have become disorganized and given the adversary the faculty
of overcoming them. Alexander of Epirus used these means
fighting against the Illirici, and Leptenus the Syracusan
against the Carthaginians, and the design succeeded happily
for both. Many have overcome the enemy by giving him the
faculty of eating and drinking beyond his means, feigning
being afraid, and leaving his quarters full of wine and herds,
and when the enemy had filled himself beyond every natural
limit, they assaulted him and overcome him with injury to
him. Thus Tamirus did against Cyrus, and Tiberius Gracchus
against the Spaniards. Some have poisoned the wine and other
things to eat in order to be able to overcome them more
easily. A little while ago, I said I did not find the ancients had
kept a night Watch outside, and I thought they did it to avoid
the evils that could happen, for it has been found that
sometimes, the sentries posted in the daytime to keep watch
for the enemy, have been the ruin of him who posted them;
for it has happened often that when they had been taken, and
by force had been made to give the signal by which they
called their own men, who, coming at the signal, have been
either killed or taken. Sometimes it helps to deceive the
enemy by changing one of your habits, relying on which, he
is ruined: as a Captain had already done, who, when he
wanted to have a signal made to his men indicating the
coming of the enemy, at night with fire and in the daytime
with smoke, commanded that both smoke and flame be made
without any intermission; so that when the enemy came, he
should remain in the belief that he came without being seen,
as he did not see the signals (usually) made to indicate his
discovery, made ((because of his going disorganized)) the
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victory of his adversary easier. Menno Rodius, when he
wanted to draw the enemy from the strong places, sent one in
the disguise of a fugitive, who affirmed that his army was full
of discord, and that the greater part were deserting, and to
give proof of the matter, had certain tumults started among
the quarters: whence to the enemy, thinking he was able to
break him, assaulted him and was routed.
648
Great, when he wanted to go into Asia and secure Thrace for
himself, took with him all the chiefs of this province, giving
them provisions, and placed lowborn men in charge of the
common people of Thrace; and thus he kept the chiefs content
by paying them, and the common people quiet by not having
Heads who should disquiet them. But among all the things by
which Captains gain the people over to themselves, are the
examples of chastity and justice, as was that of Scipio in
Spain when he returned that girl, beautiful in body, to her
husband and father, which did more than arms in gaining over
Spain. Caesar, when he paid for the lumber that he used to
make the stockades around his army in Gaul, gained such a
name for himself of being just, that he facilitated the
acquisition of that province for himself. I do not know what
else remains for me to talk about regarding such events, and
there does not remain any part of this matter that has not been
discussed by us. The only thing lacking is to tell of the
methods of capturing and defending towns, which I am about
to do willingly, if it is not painful for you now.
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been omitted. I tell you again that the ancients did everything
better and with more prudence than we; and if some error is
made in other things, all are made in matters of war. There is
nothing more imprudent or more perilous to a Captain than to
wage war in winter, and more dangerous to him who brings it,
than to him who awaits it. The reason is this: all the industry
used in military discipline, is used in order to be organized to
undertake an engagement with your enemy, as this is the end
toward which a Captain must aim, for the engagement makes
you win or lose a war. Therefore, whoever know how to
organize it better, and who has his army better disciplined,
has the greater advantage in this, and can hope more to win it.
On the other hand, there is nothing more inimical to
organization than the rough sites, or cold and wet seasons; for
the rough side does not allow you to use the plentitude (of
your forces) according to discipline, and the cold and wet
seasons do not allow you to keep your forces together, and
you cannot have them face the enemy united, but of necessity,
you must quarter them separately, and without order, having
to take into account the castles, hamlets, and farm houses that
receive you; so that all the hard work employed by you in
disciplining your army is in vain. And do not marvel if they
war in winter time today, for as the armies are without
discipline, and do not know the harm that is done to them by
not being quartered together, for their annoyance does not
enable those arrangements to be made and to observe that
discipline which they do not have. Yet, the injury caused by
campaigning in the field in the winter ought to be observed,
remembering that the French in the year one thousand five
hundred three (1503) were routed on the Garigliano by the
winter, and not by the Spaniards. For, as I have told you,
whoever assaults has even greater disadvantage, because
weather harms him more when he is in the territory of others,
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and wants to make war. Whence he is compelled either to
withstand the inconveniences of water and cold in order to
keep together, or to divide his forces to escape them. But
whoever waits, can select the place to his liking, and await
him (the enemy) with fresh forces, and can unite them in a
moment, and go out to find the enemy forces who cannot
withstand their fury. Thus were the French routed, and thus
are those always routed who assault an enemy in winter time,
who in itself has prudence. Whoever, therefore, does not want
the forces, organization, discipline, and virtu, in some part, to
be of value, makes war in the field in the winter time. And
because the Romans wanted to avail themselves of all of these
things, into which they put so much industry, avoided not
only the winter time, but rough mountains and difficult
places, and anything else which could impede their ability to
demonstrate their skill and virtu. So this suffices to (answer)
your question; and now let us come to treat of the attacking
and defending of towns, and of the sites, and of their edifices.
Seventh Book
You ought to know that towns and fortresses can be strong
either by nature or industry. Those are strong by nature which
are surrounded by rivers or marshes, as is Mantua or Ferrara,
or those situated on a rock or sloping mountain, as Monaco
and San Leo; for those situated on mountains which are not
difficult to climb, today are ((with respect to caves and
artillery)) very weak. And, therefore, very often today a plain
is sought on which to build (a city) to make it strong by
industry. The first industry is, to make the walls twisted and
full of turned recesses; which pattern results in the enemy not
being able to approach them, as they will be able to be
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attacked easily not only from the front, but on the flanks. If
the walls are made too high, they are excessively exposed to
the blows of the artillery; if they are made too low, they are
very easily scaled. If you dig ditches (moats) in front of them
to make it difficult (to employ) ladders, if it should happen
that the enemy fills them ((which a large army can do easily))
the wall becomes prey to the enemy. I believe, therefore,
((subject to a better judgement)) that if you want to make
provision against both evils the wall ought to be made high,
with the ditches inside and not outside. This is the strongest
way to build that is possible, for it protects you from artillery
and ladders, and does not give the enemy the faculty of filling
the ditches. The wall, therefore, ought to be as high as occurs
to you, and not less than three arm lengths wide, to make it
more difficult to be ruined. It ought to have towers placed at
intervals of two hundred arm lengths. The ditch inside ought
to be at least thirty arm lengths wide and twelve deep, and all
the earth that is excavated in making the ditch is thrown
toward the city, and is sustained by a wall that is part of the
base of the ditch, and extends again as much above the
ground, as that a man may take cover behind it: which has the
effect of making the depth of the ditch greater. In the base of
the ditch, every two hundred arm lengths, there should be a
matted enclosure, which with the artillery, causes injury to
anyone who should descend into it. The heavy artillery which
defends the city, are placed behind the wall enclosing the
ditch; for to defend the wall from the front, as it is high, it is
not possible to use conveniently anything else other than
small or middle sized guns. If the enemy comes to scale your
wall, the height of the first wall easily protects you. If he
comes with artillery, he must first batter down the first wall:
but once it is battered down, because the nature of all
batterings is to cause the wall to fall toward the battered side,
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the ruin of the wall will result ((since it does not find a ditch
which receives and hides it)) in doubling the depth of the
ditch, so that it is not possible for you to pass on further as
you will find a ruin that holds you back and a ditch which will
impede you, and from the wall of the ditch, in safety, the
enemy artillery kills you. The only remedy there exists for
you, is to fill up the ditch: which is very difficult, as much
because its capacity is large, as from the difficulty you have
in approaching it, since the walls being winding and recessed,
you can enter among them only with difficulty, for the
reasons previously mentioned; and then, having to climb over
the ruin with the material in hand, causes you a very great
difficulty: so that I know a city so organized is completely
indestructible.
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And to protect yourself from tunnels, I would dig them so
deep, that whoever should want to go (tunnel) deeper, should
find water. I would also build the fortresses in a way similar
to the walls and ditches, so that similar difficulty would be
encountered in destroying it I want to call to mind one good
thing to anyone who defends a city. This is, that they do not
erect bastions outside, and they be distant from its wall. And
another to anyone who builds the fortresses: And this is, that
he not build any redoubts in them, into which whoever is
inside can retire when the wall is lost. What makes me give
the first counsel is, that no one ought to do anything, through
the medium of which, you begin to lose your reputation
without any remedy, the loss of which makes others esteem
you less, and dismay those who undertake your defense. And
what I say will always happen to you if you erect bastions
outside the town you have to defend, for you will always lose
them, as you are unable to defend small things when they are
placed under the fury of the artillery; so that in losing them,
they become the beginning and the cause of your ruin. Genoa,
when it rebelled from King Louis of France, erected some
bastions on the hills outside the City, which, as soon as they
were lost, and they were lost quickly, also caused the city to
be lost. As to the second counsel, I affirm there is nothing
more dangerous concerning a fortress, than to be able to retire
into it, for the hope that men have (lose) when they abandon a
place, cause it to be lost, and when it is lost, it then causes the
entire fortress to be lost. For an example, there is the recent
loss of the fortress of Forli when the Countess Catherine
defended it against Caesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander
the Sixth, who had led the army of the King of France. That
entire fortress was full of places by both of them: For it was
originally a citadel. There was a moat before coming to the
fortress, so that it was entered by means of a draw bridge. The
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fortress was divided into three parts, and each part separated
by a ditch, and with water between them; and one passed
from one place to another by means of bridges: whence the
Duke battered one of those parts of the fortress with artillery,
and opened up part of a wall; whence Messer Giovanni Da
Casale, who was in charge of the garrison, did not think of
defending that opening, but abandoned to retire into the other
places; so that the forces of the Duke, having entered that part
without opposition, immediately seized all of it, for they
became masters of the bridges that connected the members
(parts) with each other. He lost the fort which was held to be
indestructible because of two mistakes: one, because it had so
many redoubts: the other, because no one was made master of
his bridges (they were unprotected). The poorly built fortress
and the little prudence of the defender, therefore, brought
disgrace to the magnanimous enterprise of the Countess, who
had the courage to face an army which neither the King of
Naples, nor the Duke of Milan, had faced. And although his
(the Duke) efforts did not have a good ending, none the less,
he became noted for those honors which his virtu merited.
Which was testified to by the many epigrams made in those
times praising him. If I should therefore have to build a
fortress, I would make its walls strong, and ditches in the
manner we have discussed, nor would I build anything else to
live in but houses, and they would be weak and low, so that
they would not impede the sight of the walls to anyone who
might be in the plaza, so that the Captain should be able to see
with (his own) eyes where he could be of help, and that
everyone should understand that if the walls and the ditch
were lost, the entire fortress would be lost. And even if I
should build some redoubts, I would have the bridges so
separated, that each part should be master of (protect) the
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bridge in its own area, arranging that it be buttressed on its
pilasters in the middle of the ditch.
BATTISTA: You have said that, today, the little things can
not be defended, and it seems to me I have understood the
opposite, that the smaller the thing was, the better it was
defended.
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would want to know whence this difference arises, and which
is stronger.
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and intervals, to be able to defend it with lances, cross-bows,
and every other kind of arms.
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But let us return to our Cities and Fortresses. The French, for
the greater security of their towns, and to enable them during
sieges to put into and withdraw forces from them more easily,
also employ, in addition to the things mentioned, another
arrangement, of which I have not yet seen any example in
Italy: and it is this, that they erect two pilasters at the outside
point of a draw-bridge, and upon each of them they balance a
beam so that half of it comes over the bridge, and the other
half outside. Then they join small beams to the part outside,
which are woven together from one beam to another in the
shape of a grid, and on the inside they attach a chain to the
end of each beam. When they want to close the bridge from
the outside, therefore, they release the chains and allow all
that gridded part to drop, which closes the bridge when it is
lowered, and when they want to open it, they pull on the
chains, and they (gridded beams) come to be raised; and they
can be raised so that a man can pass under, but not a horse,
and also so much that a horse with the man can pass under,
and also can be closed entirely, for it is lowered and raised
like a lace curtain. This arrangement is more secure than the
shutters: for it can be impeded by the enemy so that it cannot
come down only with difficulty, (and) it does not come down
in a straight line like the shutters which can easily be
penetrated. Those who want to build a City, therefore, ought
to have all the things mentioned installed; and in addition,
they should want at least one mile around the wall where
either farming or building would not be allowed, but should
be open field where no bushes, embankments, trees, or
houses, should exist which would impede the vision, and
which should be in the rear of a besieging enemy. It is to be
noted that a town which has its ditches outside with its
embankments higher than the ground, is very weak; for they
provide a refuge for the enemy who assaults you, but does not
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impede him in attacking you, because they can be easily
forced (opened) and give his artillery an emplacement.
But let us pass into the town. I do not want to waste much
time in showing you that, in addition to the things mentioned
previously, provisions for living and fighting supplies must
also be included, for they are the things which everyone
needs, and without them, every other provision is in vain.
And, generally, two things ought to be done, provision
yourself, and deprive the enemy of the opportunity to avail
himself of the resources of your country. Therefore, any
straw, grain, and cattle, which you cannot receive in your
house, ought to be destroyed. Whoever defends a town ought
to see to it that nothing is done in a tumultuous and
disorganized manner, and have means to let everyone know
what he has to do in any incident. The manner is this, that the
women, children, aged, and the public stay at home, and leave
the town free to the young and the brave: who armed, are
distributed for defense, part being on the walls, part at the
gates, part in the principal places of the City, in order to
remedy those evils which might arise within; another part is
not assigned to any place, but is prepared to help anyone
requesting their help. And when matters are so organized,
only with difficulty can tumults arise which disturb you. I
want you to note also that in attacking and defending Cities,
nothing gives the enemy hope of being able to occupy a town,
than to know the inhabitants are not in the habit of looking for
the enemy; for often Cities are lost entirely from fear, without
any other action. When one assaults such a City, he should
make all his appearances (ostentatious) terrible. On the other
hand, he who is assaulted ought to place brave men, who are
not afraid of thoughts, but by arms, on the side where the
enemy (comes to) fight; for if the attempt proves vain,
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courage grows in the besieged, and then the enemy is forced
to overcome those inside with his virtu and his reputation.
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enemy. Fabius allowed the Campanians to sow so that they
should lack that grain which they were sowing. Dionysius,
when he was besieged at Reggio, feigned wanting to make an
accord with them, and while it was being drawn, had himself
provided with food, and then when, by this method, had
depleted them of grain, pressed them and starved them.
Alexander the Great, when he wanted to capture Leucadia,
captured all the surrounding castles, and allowed the men
from them to take refuge in it (the City), and thus by adding a
great multitude, he starved them. As to assaults, it has been
said that one ought to guard against the first onrush, with
which the Romans often occupied many towns, assaulting
them all at once from every side, and they called it attacking
the city by its crown: as did Scipio when he occupied new
Carthage in Spain. If this onrush is withstood, then only with
difficulty will you be overcome. And even if it should occur
that the enemy had entered inside the city by having forced
the walls, even the small terraces give you some remedy if
they are not abandoned; for many armies have, once they
have entered into a town, been repulsed or slain. The remedy
is, that the towns people keep themselves in high places, and
fight them from their houses and towers. Which thing, those
who have entered in the City, have endeavored to win in two
ways: the one, to open the gates of the City and make a way
for the townspeople by which they can escape in safety: the
other, to send out a (message) by voice signifying that no one
would be harmed unless armed, and whoever would throw his
arms on the ground, they would pardon. Which thing has
made the winning of many Cities easy. In addition to this,
Cities are easy to capture if you fall on them unexpectedly,
which you can do when you find yourself with your army far
away, so that they do not believe that you either want to
assault them, or that you can do it without your presenting
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yourself, because of the distance from the place. Whence, if
you assault them secretly and quickly, it will almost always
happen that you will succeed in reporting the victory. I
unwillingly discuss those things which have happened in our
times, as I would burden you with myself and my (ideas), and
I would not know what to say in discussing other things.
None the less, concerning this matter, I can not but cite the
example of Cesare Borgia, called the Duke Valentine, who,
when he was at Nocera with his forces, under the pretext of
going to harm Camerino, turned toward the State of Urbino,
and occupied a State in one day and without effort, which
some other, with great time and expense, would barely have
occupied. Those who are besieged must also guard
themselves from the deceit and cunning of the enemy, and,
therefore, the besieged should not trust anything which they
see the enemy doing continuously, but always believe they
are being done by deceit, and can change to injure them.
When Domitius Calvinus was besieging a town, he undertook
habitually to circle the walls of the City every day with a
good part of his forces. Whence the townspeople, believing
he was doing this for exercise, lightened the guard: when
Domitius became aware of this, he assaulted them, and
destroyed them. Some Captains, when they heard beforehand
that aid was to come to the besieged, have clothed their
soldiers with the insignia of those who were to come, and
having introduced them inside, have occupied the town.
Chimon, the Athenian, one night set fire to a Temple that was
outside the town, whence, when the townspeople arrived to
succor it, they left the town to the enemy to plunder. Some
have put to death those who left the besieged castle to
blacksmith (shoe horses), and redressing their soldiers with
the clothes of the blacksmiths, who then surrendered the town
to him. The ancient Captains also employed various methods
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to despoil the garrisons of the towns they want to take. Scipio,
when he was in Africa, and desiring to occupy several castles
in which garrisons had been placed by Carthaginians, feigned
several times wanting to assault them, but then from fear not
only abstained, but drew away from them. Which Hannibal
believing to be true, in order to pursue him with a larger force
and be able to attack him more easily, withdrew all the
garrisons from them: (and) Scipio becoming aware of this,
sent Maximus, his Captain, to capture them. Pyrrhus, when he
was waging war in Sclavonia, in one of the Chief Cities of
that country, where a large force had been brought in to
garrison it, feigned to be desperate of being able to capture it,
and turning to other places, caused her, in order to succor
them, to empty herself of the garrison, so that it became easy
to be forced (captured). Many have polluted the water and
diverted rivers to take a town, even though they then did not
succeed. Sieges and surrenders are also easily accomplished,
by dismaying them by pointing out an accomplished victory,
or new help which is come to their disfavor. The ancient
Captains sought to occupy towns by treachery, corrupting
some inside, but have used different methods. Some have sent
one of their men under the disguise of a fugitive, who gained
authority and confidence with the enemy, which he afterward
used for his own benefit. Many by this means have learned
the procedures of the guards, and through this knowledge
have taken the town. Some have blocked the gate so that it
could not be locked with a cart or a beam under some pretext,
and by this means, made the entry easy to the enemy.
Hannibal persuaded one to give him a castle of the Romans,
and that he should feign going on a hunt at night, to show his
inability to go by day for fear of the enemy, and when he
returned with the game, placed his men inside with it, and
killing the guard, captured the gate. You also deceive the
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besieged by drawing them outside the town and distant from
it, by feigning flight when they assault you. And many
((among whom was Hannibal)) have, in addition, allowed
their quarters to be taken in order to have the opportunity of
placing them in their midst, and take the town from them.
They deceive also by feigning departure, as did Forminus, the
Athenian, who having plundered the country of the
Calcidians, afterwards received their ambassadors, and filled
their City with promises of safety and good will, who, as men
of little caution, were shortly after captured by Forminus. The
besieged ought to look out for men whom they have among
them that are suspect, but sometimes they may want to assure
themselves of these by reward, as well as by punishment.
Marcellus, recognizing that Lucius Bancius Nolanus had
turned to favor Hannibal, employed so much humanity and
liberality toward him, that, from an enemy, he made him a
very good friend. The besieged ought to use more diligence in
their guards when the enemy is distant, than when he is near.
And they ought to guard those places better which they think
can be attacked less; for many towns have been lost when the
enemy assaulted them on a side from which they did not
believe they would be assaulted. And this deception occurs
for two reasons: either because the place is strong and they
believe it is inaccessible, or because the enemy cunningly
assaults him on one side with feigned uproars, and on the
other silently with the real assaults. And, therefore, the
besieged ought to have a great awareness of this, and above
all at all times, but especially at night, have good guards at the
walls, and place there not only men, but dogs; and keep them
ferocious and ready, which by smell, detect the presence of
the enemy, and with their baying discover him. And, in
addition to dogs, it has been found that geese have also saved
a City, as happened to the Romans when the Gauls besieged
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the Capitol. When Athens was besieged by the Spartans,
Alcibiades, in order to see if the guards were awake, arranged
that when a light was raised at night, all the guards should
rise, and inflicted a penalty on those who did not observe it.
Hissicratus, the Athenian, slew a guard who was sleeping,
saying he was leaving him as he had found him. Those who
are besieged have had various ways of sending news to their
friends, and in order not to send embassies by voice, wrote
letters in cipher, and concealed them in various ways. The
ciphers are according to the desires of whoever arranges
them, the method of concealment is varied. Some have
written inside the scabbard of a sword. Others have put these
letters inside raw bread, and then baked it, and gave it as food
to him who brought it. Others have placed them in the most
secret places of the body. Others have put them in the collar
of a dog known to him who brings it. Others have written
ordinary things in a letter, and then have written with water
(invisible ink) between one line and another, which
afterwards by wetting or scalding (caused) the letter to
appear. This method has been very astutely observed in our
time, where some wanting to point out a thing which was to
be kept secret to their friends who lived inside a town, and not
wanting to trust it in person, sent communications written in
the customary manner, but interlined as I mentioned above,
and had them hung at the gates of a Temple; which were then
taken and read by those who recognized them from the
countersigns they knew. Which is a very cautious method,
because whoever brings it can be deceived by you, and you
do not run any danger. There are infinite other ways by which
anyone by himself likewise can find and read them. But one
writes with more facility to the besieged than the besieged do
to friends outside, for the latter can not send out such letters
except by one who leaves the town under the guise of a
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fugitive, which is a doubtful and dangerous exploit when the
enemy is cautious to a point. But as to those that are sent
inside, he who is sent can, under many pretexts, go into the
camp that is besieged, and from here await a convenient
opportunity to jump into the town.
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devised a little while ago; for in this case, as the defenses
have been made, the enemy is awaited with leisure and safety.
The ancients often occupied towns with tunnels in two ways:
either they dug a secret tunnel which came out inside the
town, and through which they entered it, in the way in which
the Romans took the City of the Veienti: or, by tunnelling
they undermined a wall, and caused it to be ruined. This last
method is more effective today, and causes Cities located
high up to be weaker, for they can be undermined more
easily, and then when that powder which ignites in an instant
is placed inside those tunnels, it not only ruins the wall, but
the mountains are opened, and the fortresses are entirely
disintegrated into several parts. The remedy for this is to build
on a plain, and make the ditch which girds your City so deep,
that the enemy can not excavate further below it without
finding water, which is the only enemy of these excavations.
And even if you find a knoll within the town that you defend,
you cannot remedy it otherwise than to dig many deep wells
within your walls, which are as outlets to those excavations
which the enemy might be able to arrange against it. Another
remedy is to make an excavation opposite to where you learn
he is excavating: which method readily impedes him, but is
very difficult to foresee, when you are besieged by a cautious
enemy. Whoever is besieged, above all, ought to take care not
to be attacked in times of repose, as after having engaged in
battle, after having stood guard, that is, at dawn, the evening
between night and day, and, above all, at dinner time, in
which times many towns have been captured, and many
armies ruined by those inside. One ought, therefore, to be
always on guard with diligence on every side, and in good
part well armed. I do not want to miss telling you that what
makes defending a City or an encampment difficult, is to have
to keep all the forces you have in them disunited; for the
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enemy being able all together to assault you at his discretion,
you must keep every place guarded on all sides, and thus he
assaults you with his entire force, and you defend it with part
of yours. The besieged can also be completely overcome,
while those outside cannot unless repulsed; whence many
who have been besieged either in their encampment or in a
town, although inferior in strength, have suddenly issued forth
with all their forces, and have overcome the enemy.
Marcellus did this at Nola, and Caesar did this in Gaul, where
his encampment being assaulted by a great number of Gauls,
and seeing he could not defend it without having to divide
this forces into several parts, and unable to stay within the
stockade with the driving attack of the enemy, opened the
encampment on one side, and turning to that side with all his
forces, attacked them with such fury, and with such virtu, that
he overcame and defeated them. The constancy of the
besieged has also often displeased and dismayed the besieger.
And when Pompey was affronting Caesar, and Caesar's army
was suffering greatly from hunger, some of his bread was
brought to Pompey, who, seeing it made of grass, commanded
it not be shown to his army in order not to frighten it, seeing
what kind of enemies he had to encounter. Nothing gave the
Romans more honor in the war against Hannibal, as their
constancy; for, in whatever more inimical and adverse
fortune, they never asked for peace, (and) never gave any sign
of fear: rather, when Hannibal was around Rome, those fields
on which he had situated his quarters were sold at a higher
price than they would ordinarily have been sold in other
times; and they were so obstinate in their enterprises, that to
defend Rome, they did not leave off attacking Capua, which
was being besieged by the Romans at the same time Rome
was being besieged.
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I know that I have spoken to you of many things, which you
have been able to understand and consider by yourselves;
none the less, I have done this ((as I also told you today)) to
be able to show you, through them, the better kind of training,
and also to satisfy those, if there should be any, who had not
had that opportunity to learn, as you have. Nor does it appear
to me there is anything left for me to tell you other than some
general rules, with which you should be very familiar: which
are these. What benefits the enemy, harms you; and what
benefits you, harm the enemy. Whoever is more vigilant in
observing the designs of the enemy in war, and endures much
hardship in training his army, will incur fewer dangers, and
can have greater hope for victory. Never lead your soldiers
into an engagement unless you are assured of their courage,
know they are without fear, and are organized, and never
make an attempt unless you see they hope for victory. It is
better to defeat the enemy by hunger than with steel; in such
victory fortune counts more than virtu. No proceeding is
better than that which you have concealed from the enemy
until the time you have executed it. To know how to
recognize an opportunity in war, and take it, benefits you
more than anything else. Nature creates few men brave,
industry and training makes many. Discipline in war counts
more than fury. If some on the side of the enemy desert to
come to your service, if they be loyal, they will always make
you a great acquisition; for the forces of the adversary
diminish more with the loss of those who flee, than with those
who are killed, even though the name of the fugitives is
suspect to the new friends, and odious to the old. It is better in
organizing an engagement to reserve great aid behind the
front line, than to spread out your soldiers to make a greater
front. He is overcome with difficulty, who knows how to
recognize his forces and those of the enemy. The virtu of the
670
soldiers is worth more than a multitude, and the site is often
of more benefit than virtu. New and speedy things frighten
armies, while the customary and slow things are esteemed
little by them: you will therefore make your army
experienced, and learn (the strength) of a new enemy by
skirmishes, before you come to an engagement with him.
Whoever pursues a routed enemy in a disorganized manner,
does nothing but become vanquished from having been a
victor. Whoever does not make provisions necessary to live
(eat), is overcome without steel. Whoever trusts more in
cavalry than in infantry, or more in infantry than in cavalry,
must settle for the location. If you want to see whether any
spy has come into the camp during the day, have no one go to
his quarters. Change your proceeding when you become
aware that the enemy has foreseen it. Counsel with many on
the things you ought to do, and confer with few on what you
do afterwards. When soldiers are confined to their quarters,
they are kept there by fear or punishment; then when they are
led by war, (they are led) by hope and reward. Good Captains
never come to an engagement unless necessity compels them,
or the opportunity calls them. Act so your enemies do not
know how you want to organize your army for battle, and in
whatever way you organize them, arrange it so that the first
line can be received by the second and by the third. In a
battle, never use a company for some other purpose than what
you have assigned it to, unless you want to cause disorder.
Accidents are remedied with difficulty, unless you quickly
take the facility of thinking. Men, steel, money, and bread, are
the sinews of war; but of these four, the first two are more
necessary, for men and steel find find money and bread, but
money and bread do not find men and steel. The unarmed rich
man is the prize of the poor soldier. Accustom your soldiers
to despise delicate living and luxurious clothing.
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This is as much as occurs to me generally to remind you, and
I know I could have told you of many other things in my
discussion, as for example, how and in how many ways the
ancients organized their ranks, how they dressed, and how
they trained in many other things; and to give you many other
particulars, which I have not judged necessary to narrate, as
much because you are able to see them, as because my
intention has not been to show you in detail how the ancient
army was created, but how an army should be organized in
these times, which should have more virtu than they now
have. Whence it does not please me to discuss the ancient
matters further than those I have judged necessary to such an
introduction. I know I should have enlarged more on the
cavalry, and also on naval warfare; for whoever defines the
military, says, that it is an army on land and on the sea, on
foot and on horseback. Of naval matters, I will not presume to
talk, not because of not being informed, but because I should
leave the talk to the Genoese and Venetians, who have made
much study of it, and have done great things in the past. Of
the cavalry, I also do not want to say anything other than what
I have said above, this part being ((as I said)) less corrupted.
In addition to this, if the infantry, who are the nerve of the
army, are well organized, of necessity it happens that good
cavalry be created. I would only remind you that whoever
organizes the military in his country, so as to fill (the quota)
of cavalry, should make two provisions: the one, that he
should distribute horses of good breed throughout his
countryside, and accustom his men to make a round-up of
fillies, as you do in this country with calves and mules: the
other, ((so that the round-up men find a buyer)) I would
prohibit anyone to keep mules who did not keep a horse; so
that whoever wanted to keep a mount only, would also be
constrained to keep a horse; and, in addition, none should be
672
able to dress in silk, except whoever keeps a horse. I
understand this arrangement has been done by some Princes
of our times, and to have resulted in an excellent cavalry
being produced in their countries in a very brief time. About
other things, how much should be expected from the cavalry,
I will go back to what I said to you today, and to that which is
the custom. Perhaps you will also desire to learn what parts a
Captain ought to have. In this, I will satisfy you in a brief
manner; for I would not knowingly select any other man than
one who should know how to do all those things which we
have discussed today. And these would still not be enough for
him if he did not know how to find them out by himself, for
no one without imagination was ever very great in his
profession; and if imagination makes for honor in other
things, it will, above all, honor you in this one. And it is to be
observed, that every creation (imagination), even though
minor, is celebrated by the writers, as is seen where they
praised Alexander the Great, who, in order to break camp
more secretly, did not give the signal with the trumpet, but
with a hat on the end of a lance. He is also praised for having
ordered his soldiers, when coming to battle with the enemy, to
kneel with the left foot (knee) so that they could more
strongly withstand the attack (of the enemy); which not only
gave him victory, but also so much praise that all the statues
erected in his honor show him in that pose.
673
imitate them, you were unable to discover the reason: to that I
replied, that men who want to do something must first prepare
themselves to know how to do it in order to be able
afterwards to do it when the occasion permits it. whether or
not I would know how to bring the army to the ancient ways,
I would rather you be the judge, who have heard me discuss
on this subject at length; whence you have been able to know
how much time I have consumed on these thoughts, and I also
believe you should be able to imagine how much desire there
is in me to put them into effect. Which you can guess, if I was
ever able to do it, or if ever the opportunity was given to me.
Yet, to make you more certain, and for my greater
justification, I would like also to cite you the reasons, and in
part, will observe what I promised you, to show you the ease
and the difficulty that are present in such imitation. I say to
you, therefore, that no activity among men today is easier to
restore to its ancient ways than the military; but for those only
who are Princes of so large a State, that they are able to
assemble fifteen or twenty thousand young men from among
their own subjects. On the other hand, nothing is more
difficult than this to those who do not have such a
convenience. And, because I want you to understand this part
better, you have to know that Captains who are praised are of
two kinds. The one includes those, who, with an army (well)
ordered through its own natural discipline, have done great
things, such as were the greater part of the Roman Citizens,
and others, who have led armies, who have not had any
hardship in maintaining them good, and to see to it that they
were safely led. The other includes those who not only had to
overcome the enemy, but before they came to this, had been
compelled to make their army good and well ordered, (and)
who, without doubt, deserve greater praise that those others
merited who with a army which was (naturally) good have
674
acted with so much virtu. Such as these were Pelopidas,
Epaminondas, Tullus Hostilius, Phillip of Macedonia father
of Alexander, Cyrus King of the Persians, and Gracchus the
Roman. All these had first to make the army good, and then
fight with it. All of these were able to do so, as much by their
prudence, as by having subjects capable of being directed in
such practices. Nor would it have been possible for any of
them to accomplish any praiseworthy deed, no matter how
good and excellent they might have been, should they have
been in an alien country, full of corrupt men, and not
accustomed to sincere obedience. It is not enough, therefore,
in Italy, to govern an army already trained, but it is necessary
first to know how to do it, and then how to command it. And
of these, there need to be those Princes, who because they
have a large State and many subjects, have the opportunity to
accomplish this. Of whom, I cannot be one, for I have never
commanded, nor can I command except armies of foreigners,
and men obligated to others and not to me. Whether or not it
is possible to introduce into them (those Princes) some of the
things we discussed today, I want to leave to your judgement.
Would I make one of these soldiers who practice today carry
more arms than is customary, and in addition, food for two or
three days, and a shovel? Should I make him dig, or keep him
many hours every day under arms in feigned exercises, so that
in real (battles) afterward he could be of value to me? Would
they abstain from gambling, lasciviousness, swearing, and
insolence, which they do daily? Would they be brought to so
much discipline, obedience, and respect, that a tree full of
apples which should be found in the middle of an
encampment, would be left intact, as is read happened many
times in the ancient armies? What can I promise them, by
which they well respect, love, or fear me, when, with a war
ended, they no longer must come to me for anything? Of what
675
can I make them ashamed, who are born and brought up
without shame? By what Deity or Saints do I make them take
an oath? By those they adore, or by those they curse? I do not
know any whom they adore; but I well know that they curse
them all. How can I believe they will observe the promises to
those men, for whom they show their contempt hourly? How
can those who deprecate God, have reverence for men? What
good customs, therefore, is it possible to instill in such
people? And if you should tell me the Swiss and the
Spaniards are good, I should confess they are far better than
the Italians: but if you will note my discussion, and the ways
in which both proceeded, you will see that there are still many
things missing among them (the Swiss and Spaniards) to
bring them up to the perfection of the ancients. And the Swiss
have been good from their natural customs, for the reasons I
told you today, and the others (Spaniards) from necessity; for
when they fight in a foreign country, it seems to them they are
constrained to win or die, and as no place appeared to them
where they might flee, they became good. But it is a goodness
defective in many parts, for there is nothing good in them
except that they are accustomed to await the enemy up to the
point of the pike and of the sword. Nor would there be anyone
suitable to teach them what they lack, and much less anyone
who does not (speak) their language.
But let us turn to the Italians, who, because they have not
wise Princes, have not produced any good army; and because
they did not have the necessity that the Spaniards had, have
not undertaken it by themselves, so that they remain the
shame of the world. And the people are not to blame, but their
Princes are, who have been castigated, and by their ignorance
have received a just punishment, ignominously losing the
State, (and) without any show of virtu. Do you want to see if
676
what I tell you is true? Consider how many wars have been
waged in Italy, from the passage of King Charles (of France)
until today; and wars usually make men warlike and acquire
reputations; these, as much as they have been great (big) and
cruel, so much more have caused its members and its leaders
to lose reputation. This necessarily points out, that the
customary orders were not, and are not, good, and there is no
one who know how to take up the new orders. Nor do you
ever believe that reputation will be acquired by Italian arms,
except in the manner I have shown, and by those who have
large States in Italy, for this custom can be instilled in men
who are simple, rough, and your own, but not to men who are
malignant, have bad habits, and are foreigners. And a good
sculptor will never be found who believes he can make a
beautiful statue from a piece of marble poorly shaped, even
though it may be a rough one. Our Italian Princes, before they
tasted the blows of the ultramontane wars, believed it was
enough for them to know what was written, think of a
cautious reply, write a beautiful letter, show wit and
promptness in his sayings and in his words, know how to
weave a deception, ornament himself with gems and gold,
sleep and eat with greater splendor than others, keep many
lascivious persons around, conduct himself avariciously and
haughtily toward his subjects, become rotten with idleness,
hand out military ranks at his will, express contempt for
anyone who may have demonstrated any praiseworthy
manner, want their words should be the responses of oracles;
nor were these little men aware that they were preparing
themselves to be the prey of anyone who assaulted them.
From this, then, in the year one thousand four hundred ninety
four (1494), there arose the great frights, the sudden flights,
and the miraculous (stupendous) losses: and those most
powerful States of Italy were several times sacked and
677
despoiled in this manner. But what is worse is, that those who
remained persist in the same error, and exist in the same
disorder: and they do not consider that those who held the
State anciently, had done all those things we discussed, and
that they concentrated on preparing the body for hardships
and the mind not to be afraid of danger. Whence it happened
that Caesar, Alexander, and all those excellent men and
Princes, were the first among the combatants, went around on
foot, and even if they did lose their State, wanted also to lose
their lives; so that they lived and died with virtu. And if they,
or part of them, could be accused of having too much
ambition to rule, there never could be found in them any
softness or anything to condemn, which makes men delicate
and cowardly. If these things were to be read and believed by
these Princes, it would be impossible that they would not
change their way of living, and their countries not change in
fortune. And as, in the beginning of our discussion, you
complained of your organization, I tell you, if you had
organized it as we discussed above, and it did not give a good
account for itself, then you have reason to complain; but if it
is not organized and trained as I have said, (the Army) it can
have reason to complain of you, who have made an abortion,
and not a perfect figure (organization). The Venetians also,
and the Duke of Ferrara, begun it, but did not pursue it; which
was due to their fault, and not of their men. And I affirm to
now, that any of them who have States in Italy today, will
begin in this way, he will be the Lord higher than any other in
this Province; and it will happen to his State as happened to
the Kingdom of the Macedonians, which, coming under
Phillip, who had learned the manner of organizing the armies
from Epaminondas, the Theban, became, with these
arrangements and practices ((while the rest of Greece was in
idleness, and attended to reciting comedies)) so powerful, that
678
in a few years, he was able to occupy it completely, and leave
such a foundation to his son, that he was able to make himself
Prince of the entire world. Whoever disparages these
thoughts, therefore, if he be a Prince, disparages his
Principality, and if he be a Citizen, his City. And I complain
of nature, which either ought to make me a recognizer of this,
or ought to have given me the faculty to be able to pursue it.
Nor, even today when I am old, do I think I can have the
opportunity: and because of this, I have been liberal with you,
who, being young and qualified, when the things I have said
please you, could, at the proper time, in favor of your Princes,
aid and counsel them. I do not want you to be afraid or
mistrustful of this, because this country appears to be born (to
be destined) to resuscitate the things which are dead, as has
been observed with Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture. But as for
waiting for me, because of my years, do not rely on it. And,
truly, if in the past fortune had conceded to me what would
have sufficed for such an enterprise, I believe I would, in a
very brief time, have shown the world how much the ancient
institutions were of value, and, without doubt, I would have
enlarged it with glory, or would have lost it without shame.
679
The Art of War
by Baron De Jomini
Translator’s Preface
In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on
either hand which are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a
special manner in making a translation. There is, on the one
side, the extreme of too rigid adherence, word for word and
line for line, to the original, and on the other is the danger of
using too free a pen. In either case the sense of the author may
not be truly given. It is not always easy to preserve a proper
mean between these extremes. The translators of Jomini’s
Summary of the Principles of the Art of War have endeavored
to render their author into plain English, without mutilating or
adding to his ideas, attempting no display and making no
criticisms.
680
The translation now presented to the people has been made
with the earnest hope and the sincere expectation of its
proving useful. As the existence of a large, well-instructed
standing army is deemed incompatible with our institutions, it
becomes the more important that military information be as
extensively diffused as possible among the people. If by the
present work the translators shall find they have contributed,
even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object,
they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended
upon it.
681
with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be useless
to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general
commanding an army: it enters into all the combinations
which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the
various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this
view, it should have a place in a work like this.
3. Grand Tactics.
6. Minor Tactics.
682
Statesmanship in its Relation to War
Under this head are included those considerations from which
a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or
indispensable, and determines the various operations
necessary to attain the object of the war.
683
It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence
in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and
operations necessary for the proposed end. The party who has
provoked the war may be reduced to the defensive, and the
party assailed may assume the offensive; and there may be
other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct
of a war, as,—
6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon
that of an ally, or upon its own.
684
War is always to be conducted according to the great
principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in
the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should
depend upon the circumstances of the case.
685
advantages commensurate with the sacrifices required and the
hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our times there are so
many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, though
apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession
to the Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since
it was plainly settled by a solemn will, and was supported by
family ties and by the general consent of the Spanish nation;
yet it was stoutly contested by all Europe, and produced a
general coalition against the legitimate legatee.
686
and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving
proper guarantees to other states.
687
enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents
these variations. Plans of operations are made as
circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great
principles of war must be observed.
688
furnishes a contingent of troops, but, in addition, annoys the
enemy to a great degree by threatening portions of his frontier
which otherwise would have been secure. All history teaches
that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and
neglected by any power, however formidable.
689
oppose it when it propagates disorder which may reach the
adjoining states.
690
There are several kinds of war resulting from these two
different interventions:—
691
Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad
illustrations of this, to which we shall again refer in Article
XXIX., in discussing the military character of these
expeditions.
692
military chances in her favor,—a double result, combining the
highest advantages.
Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while
the theater was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the
greatest possible display of force, she at the same time
interfered in a contest already in progress, upon which she
entered with the whole of her resources and at the time most
opportune for her.
693
There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an
adjoining state; the other attacks a distant point, over
intervening territory of great extent whose inhabitants may be
neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
694
country, and was the more readily brought to a successful
termination because its object met with the approval of the
majority of the people whose territory was invaded.
695
the united people would have been stronger, but they would
have lacked the element of religious fanaticism. The war of
1828 proved that Turkey was formidable only upon the
frontiers, where her bravest troops were found, while in the
interior all was weakness.
696
Although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are
sometimes confounded, they differ enough to require separate
notice.
697
than their armies. It may, however, happen, as in the Crusades
and the wars of Islamism, that the dogma for which the war is
waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter enemies in the
country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful.
698
permitted to clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts’
content, it is probable that, instead of giving place to the
terrible Convention, the Assembly would slowly have
returned to the restoration of good, temperate, monarchical
doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and the
immemorial traditions of the French.
699
decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all
would have depended upon the course of the French nation
and the army. The problem thus presents two equally grave
solutions. The campaign of 1793 gave one; whether the other
might have been obtained, it is difficult to say. Experiment
alone could have determined it.
The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for
national wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national
wars the country should be occupied and subjugated, the
fortified places besieged and reduced, and the armies
destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of less importance
to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be made to
gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being
constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the
nation for its independence or the integrity of its territory.
700
enemies,—which they could safely do, since they were
sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. If he had followed
the instructions of the Ministry, to proceed methodically to
the conquest of the country and the reduction of the fortresses
between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, in order to provide a base
of operations, he would perhaps have failed in his mission, or
at least made the war a long and bloody one, by exciting the
national spirit by an occupation of the country similar to that
of 1807.
701
beautiful and unhappy land, although history is not wanting in
examples to prove that violent reactions, any more than
revolutions, are not elements with which to construct and
consolidate. May God grant that from this frightful conflict
may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally
separated from all factions, and based upon a disciplined
army as well as upon the general interests of the country,—a
monarchy capable of rallying to its support this
incomprehensible Spanish nation, which, with merits not less
extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those
who were in the best position to know it.
702
and their masters, affected by a noble love of their sovereign
and country, may set them the example and take the
command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical people may arm
under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic in its
political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its
institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it
holds most dear.
703
Defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this
kind of defense; and the Bocage of La Vendée, so justly
celebrated, proves that any country, even if it be only
traversed by large hedges and ditches or canals, admits of a
formidable defense.
704
friend who aids him; the commanders also know the country,
and, learning immediately the slightest movement on the part
of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat his
projects; while the latter, without information of their
movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to
gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain
safety only in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind
man: his combinations are failures; and when, after the most
carefully-concerted movements and the most rapid and
fatiguing marches, he thinks he is about to accomplish his aim
and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs of the enemy but
his camp-fires: so that while, like Don Quixote, he is
attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of
communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it,
surprises his convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so
disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a
time.
705
Leon by the Oviedo road. A part of the corps of La Romana
which was guarding the Asturias marched behind the very
heights which inclose the valley of the Navia, at most but a
league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a
word of it: when he was entering Gijon, the army of La
Romana attacked the center of the regiments of the division
Marchand, which, being scattered to guard Galicia, barely
escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the marshal to
Lugo. This war presented a thousand incidents as striking as
this. All the gold of Mexico could not have procured reliable
information for the French; what was given was but a lure to
make them fall more readily into snares.
706
Beresford, Blake, La Romana, Cuesta, Castaños, Reding, and
Ballasteros!
707
entered France, originally with the intention of preventing the
conquest of Belgium by France, and without any other
ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole
population—men, women, and children—of Alsace, Lorraine,
Champagne, and Burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a
Saragossa of every walled town, to bring about, by way of
reprisals, murder, pillage, and incendiarism throughout the
country? If all this be not done, and the Germans, in
consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces,
who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate
a part of them, even though at first they had never
contemplated it? The difficulty of answering these two
questions would seem to argue in favor of national wars. But
is there no means of repelling such an invasion without
bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war
of extermination? Is there no mean between these contests
between the people and the old regular method of war
between permanent armies? Will it not be sufficient, for the
efficient defense of the country, to organize a militia, or
landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their governments
into service, would regulate the part the people should take in
the war, and place just limits to its barbarities?
708
the defense of the country in war. This system was used by
France in 1792, imitated by Austria in 1809, and by the whole
of Germany in 1813.
709
conception. Never was a king more to be pitied than Louis
XIV., who persecuted a million of industrious Protestants,
who had put upon the throne his own Protestant ancestor.
Wars of fanaticism are horrible when mingled with exterior
wars, and they are also frightful when they are family
quarrels. The history of France in the times of the League
should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. It is difficult
to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time of
Francis I. should in twenty years have fallen into so
deplorable a state of brutality.
710
appreciated as to spare the necessity of demonstrating its
wisdom.
711
Both these wars, as well as that sustained by Alexander in
1812, it was almost impossible to avoid.
712
suffered from one of them, until a proper opportunity for
redressing them shall arrive. The rule, however, is not without
exception: the respective forces, the localities, the possibility
of finding allies to restore, in a measure, equality of strength
between the parties, are circumstances which will influence a
government so threatened. We now have fulfilled our task, in
noting both the danger and the means of remedying it.
Military Policy
We have already explained what we understand by this title.
It embraces the moral combinations relating to the operations
of armies. If the political considerations which we have just
discussed be also moral, there are others which influence, in a
certain degree, the conduct of a war, which belong neither to
diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. We include these under the
head of Military Policy.
713
or councils of war at the capital upon their operations, the
system of war in favor with their staff, the established force of
the state and its armament, the military geography and
statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the
resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with,
all of which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy.
714
examples of which I was cognizant. In 1796, Moreau’s army,
entering the Black Forest, expected to find terrible mountains,
frightful defiles and forests, and was greatly surprised to
discover, after climbing the declivities of the plateau that
slope to the Rhine, that these, with their spurs, were the only
mountains, and that the country, from the sources of the
Danube to Donauwerth, was a rich and level plain.
715
Let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military
geography and statistics of an empire. These sciences are not
set forth in treatises, and are yet to be developed. Lloyd, who
wrote an essay upon them, in describing the frontiers of the
great states of Europe, was not fortunate in his maxims and
predictions. He saw obstacles everywhere; he represents as
impregnable the Austrian frontier on the Inn, between the
Tyrol and Passau, where Napoleon and Moreau maneuvered
and triumphed with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand
men in 1800, 1805, and 1809.
716
revenue supposed to be possessed by a state,—which is far
from being the knowledge necessary to plan operations. Our
object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important
subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in
military enterprises.
717
maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement
succeeds it, disorder easily results.
718
fortuitous event, may throw into the hands of the enemy all
the chances of success which a skillful general had prepared
for himself by his maneuvers. But these are risks which
cannot be foreseen nor avoided. Would it be fair on that
account to deny the influence of science and principles in
ordinary affairs? This risk even proves the triumph of the
principles, for it happens that they are applied accidentally by
the army against which it was intended to apply them, and are
the cause of its success. But, in admitting this truth, it may be
said that it is an argument against science; this objection is
not well founded, for a general’s science consists in providing
for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of
course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. Even if the
number of battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed
the number due to accident, it would not invalidate my
assertion.
719
do equally well; but an army will certainly do a great deal
more if its own superiority and that of the general be
combined.
2. A good organization;
720
10. A good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of
general administration;
721
from saying that a government should sacrifice every thing to
the army, for this would be absurd; but it ought to make the
army the object of its constant care; and if the prince has not a
military education it will be very difficult for him to fulfill his
duty in this respect. In this case—which is, unfortunately, of
too frequent occurrence—the defect must be supplied by wise
institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good
system of the general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a
good system of national reserves.
722
whether it be immediate and necessary to resist sudden
aggressions.
723
cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed
under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited
by the extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the
country and themselves at the same time by resorting to the
most terrible measures and by calling to its aid an unlimited
dictatorial power, which overthrew both liberty and law under
the pretext of defending them. Here it is the dictatorship, or
the absolute and monstrous usurpation of power, rather than
the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the true cause
of the display of energy. What happened in the Convention
after the fall of Robespierre and the terrible Committee of
Public Safety proves this, as well as the Chambers of 1815.
Now, if the dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few,
has always been a plank of safety in great crises, it seems
natural to draw the conclusion that countries controlled by
elective assemblies must be politically and militarily weaker
than pure monarchies, although in other respects they present
decided advantages.
724
presented as a model in many respects; and if in many points
its customs would be useless and impracticable elsewhere, it
must be admitted that many good institutions might well be
copied from it.
725
infantry and cavalry deserve the attention of a provident
government.
726
machines; and the infantry, even, will be obliged to resume its
armor of the Middle Ages, without which a battalion will be
destroyed before engaging the enemy.
727
well as its organization; its armament should at least be as
good as that of its neighbors, and superior if possible.
728
labors, and should be rewarded when they acquit themselves
with marked ability.
729
power which cannot be adopted as a general base of a system;
but the results of its efforts were none the less striking. Every
year the numerous reports of the cabinet of London, and
particularly of M. d’Yvernois, announced that France was
about to break down for want of money, while Napoleon had
200,000,000 francs [There was a deficit in the finances of
France at the fall of Napoleon. It was the result of his
disasters, and of the stupendous efforts he was obliged to
make. There was no deficit in 1811.] in the vaults of the
Tuileries, all the while meeting the expenses of the
government, including the pay of his armies.
730
projected war; and it will be for the statesman to develop the
modifications which circumstances and localities may make
in these relations.
731
military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily
influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing
good results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues.
Each one will present his projects to him; and, as he will not
have the experience necessary to estimate them according to
their merits, he will submit his judgment to that of his
intimates. His general, interfered with and opposed in all his
enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even if he have
the requisite ability. It may be said that a sovereign might
accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but,
on the contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence.
In this case his presence might be productive of good results,
but it also might lead to great embarrassment. If the army
were turned and cut off from its communications, and obliged
to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad results might not
follow from the presence of the sovereign at head-quarters!
The same system might apply in the case where the sovereign
judges it proper to intrust the command to a prince of his
house, as has frequently happened since the time of Louis
XIV. It has often occurred that the prince possessed only the
titular command, and that an adviser, who in reality
commanded, was imposed upon him. This was the case with
732
the Duke of Orleans and Marsin at the famous battle of Turin,
afterward with the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme at the
battle of Audenarde, and, I think, also at Ulm with the
Archduke Ferdinand and Mack. This system is deplorable,
since no one is responsible for what is done. It is known that
at the battle of Turin the Duke of Orleans exhibited more
sagacity than Marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to
show full secret authority from the king before the prince
would yield his judgment and allow the battle to be lost. So at
Ulm the archduke displayed more skill and courage than
Mack, who was to be his mentor.
733
Between the fashionable selections made in the Saloons of the
Pompadours and Dubarrys, and Napoleon’s preference for
mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is
wide enough to afford the least intelligent government means
of making rational nominations; but, in all ages, human
weaknesses will exercise an influence in one way or another,
and artifice will often carry off the prize from modest or timid
merit, which awaits a call for its services. But, leaving out of
consideration all these influences, it will be profitable to
inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will be
difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to
make it a judicious one. In the first place, to make choice of a
skillful general requires either that the person who makes the
selection shall be a military man, able to form an intelligent
opinion, or that he should be guided by the opinions of others,
which opens the way to the improper influence of cliques.
The embarrassment is certainly less when there is at hand a
general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of
the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has
gained a battle, (for instance, Jourdan, Scherer, and many
others,) it is not always the case that a victorious general is at
the disposition of the government. It may well happen that
after a long period of peace, there may not be a single general
in Europe who has commanded in chief. In this case, it will be
difficult to decide whether one general is better than another.
Those who have served long in peace will be at the head of
their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this
position; but will they always be the most capable of filling
it? Moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government
with their subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that
it is not astonishing they should experience difficulty in
assigning men to their appropriate positions. The judgment of
734
the prince, misled by appearances, may err, and, with the
purest intentions, he may well be deceived in his selections.
It has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but
nothing could be more dangerous. It voted Dumouriez to be a
Cæsar, when he was ignorant of the great operations of war.
Would it have placed Bonaparte at the head of the army of
Italy, when he was known only by two directors? Still, it must
be admitted that, if not infallible, public sentiment is not to be
despised, particularly if it survive great crises and the
experience of events.
735
limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be perfectly
grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. Next
in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A
man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming
merit in others instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in
making this merit conduce to his own glory, will always be a
good general, and may even pass for a great man.
Unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to merit in others
is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are always
jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of
little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not
realizing that the nominal commander of an army always
receives almost all the glory of its success, even when least
entitled to it.
736
depend upon the personal qualities of the individuals; but the
following remarks will be useful in leading to a rational
conclusion:—
737
infallible rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there
is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous!
738
number and the higher the rank of the military officers who
compose the council, the more difficult will it be to
accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be
the amount of dissent.
739
2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of
open and faithful character, between whom and the
commander there may be perfect harmony. The victor will
gain so much glory that he can spare some to the friend who
has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher, aided by
Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he
would not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this
double command is more objectionable than an undivided one
when a state has a Napoleon, a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill
it; but when there is no great general to lead the armies it is
certainly the preferable system.
740
of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether
offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to
these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally
for the levies which may be necessary if the country be
invaded. These points, it is true, should be discussed in a
council of both generals and ministers, and to these points
should the control of the council be limited; for if it should
not only order the general in command to march to Vienna or
to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate the
manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the
unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole
responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of
those who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves
the duty of directing the army,—a duty so difficult for any
one, even upon the scene of operations.
741
empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that whatever
increases the prosperity of the country should be neither
neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the
branches of industry which are the first instruments of this
prosperity; but they should always be secondary to the great
institutions which make up the strength of states in
encouraging the cultivation of the manly and heroic virtues.
Policy and justice both agree on this point; for, whatever
Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront
death in the footsteps of the Cæsars than to fatten upon the
public miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the
national credit. Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land
where the wealth of the tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in
stocks stands, in public estimation, above the uniform of the
brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or fortune to the
defense of his country.
742
The most venal deputies will not be those from military life.]
It is true that many public employments demand a special
course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the abundant leisure
of peace, prepare himself for the career he would prefer after
having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession of
arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon
officers retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of
captain, would it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that
rank, and would it not lead them, when in garrisons, to find
their recreations elsewhere than in the theaters and public
clubs?
743
However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
government, it will be a wise part to honor the military
profession, in order to encourage the love of glory and all the
warlike virtues, under the penalty of receiving the reproaches
of posterity and suffering insult and dependency.
744
success,—since courage alone is necessary to storm a
position, while it requires heroism to make a difficult retreat
before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always opposing
to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet
with a reward equal to that given for a great victory.
745
beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at Kagoul by
Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and
because they fought individually, but not in masses and in
order. An army seized with panic is similarly in a state of
demoralization; because when disorder is once introduced all
concerted action on the part of individuals becomes
impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard,
no maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and
there is no resource but in ignominious flight.
746
In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by
all others. The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats
is due in equal degrees to the national character, the natural
instincts of the soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary
institutions. Indeed, vivacity of imagination is not always the
cause of the introduction of disorder: the want of the habit of
order often causes it, and the lack of precautions on the part
of the generals to maintain this order contributes to it. I have
often been astonished at the indifference of most generals on
this point. Not only did they not deign to take the slightest
precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
rallying in each division of the fractions which may be
scattered in a momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of
the enemy, but they were offended that any one should think
of proposing such precautions. Still, the most undoubted
courage and the most severe discipline will often be
powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a
great degree obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the
different divisions. There are, it is true, cases where all human
resources are insufficient for the maintenance of order, as
when the physical sufferings of the soldiers have been so
great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and when their
officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize
them,—which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out
these exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical
precautions for rallying, and good discipline will most
frequently be successful, if not in preventing disorder, at least
in promptly remedying it.
747
Definition of Strategy and the
Fundamental Principle of War
The art of war, independently of its political and moral
relations, consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand
Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art
of the Engineer. We will treat of the first three branches, and
begin by defining them. In order to do this, we will follow the
order of procedure of a general when war is first declared,
who commences with the points of the highest importance, as
a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the necessary
details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the
formation and handling of a great army.
We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its
commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon
the character of the war: then he must carefully study the
theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations,
taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of
its allies.
748
of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic
positions.
When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet
resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver
to compel him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or
two strategic lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary,
may deviate to a certain degree from the general line of
operations, with which they must not be confounded.
749
If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its
victory, or if it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a
second and more important objective point.
Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base,
in order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops,
or, what is equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation
of fortified posts and camps, thus compelling the enemy to
halt or to divide his forces.
750
Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:—
751
12. Points for intrenched camps, tétes de pont, etc..
752
but this only occurs in the exceptional case of a dispersed
army: for the general case of pitched battles the above
definition holds good.
8. Coups de main.
753
It is proposed to show that there is one great principle
underlying all the operations of war,—a principle which must
be followed in all good combinations. It is embraced in the
following maxims:—
754
there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a
problem without a solution, may well despair of ever
comprehending strategy.
Of Strategic Combinations
755
Article XVI: Of the System of Operations
In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its
bad side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of
operations, which are always dangerous in a hostile country.
All the obstacles in the enemy’s country, the mountains,
rivers, defiles, and forts, are favorable for defense, while the
inhabitants and authorities of the country, so far from being
the instruments of the invading army, are generally hostile.
However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck in a vital
point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek a
speedy termination of the contest.
756
particularly in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in
throwing the masses upon the decisive points, to do this it will
be necessary to take the initiative. The attacking party knows
what he is doing and what he desires to do; he leads his
masses to the point where he desires to strike. He who awaits
the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy fall with large
force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows where his
adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel
him.
757
retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by
multiplying obstacles and difficulties, without, however,
compromising one’s own army. He who invades does so by
reason of some superiority; he will then seek to make the
issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the contrary,
desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off
detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues
incident to his progress.
758
of taking the offensive with success. Wellington’s course was
mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was
the most suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one
of the greatest talents of a general is to know how to use (it
may be alternately) these two systems, and particularly to be
able to take the initiative during the progress of a defensive
war.
759
that no concert of action has been arranged with the armies
operating on the other fields. If, on the contrary, there be
concert of action, the theater of operations of each army taken
singly is but a zone of operations of the general field,
occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common
object.
760
For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading
Austria with two or three armies, to be concentrated under
one commander, and starting from Mayence, from the Upper
Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime Alps, respectively. The
section of country which each of these armies traverses may
be considered as a zone of the general field of operations. But
if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without concerted
action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a
zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.
In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own
objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting
the objective point with the base, either in the offensive or the
defensive.
761
Moreover, was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat
Jourdan in 1796 by the use of converging routes? Besides,
these routes are more favorable for defense than attack, since
two divisions retreating upon these radial lines can effect a
junction more quickly than two armies which are pursuing,
and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses
separately.
762
this chapter, be examined as to their strategic value; but here
it may be proper to remark that this value will depend much
upon the spirit and skill of the general. The great leader who
crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the passage of the
Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of these
chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet
and a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.
763
bases: for instance, a French army in Germany will have the
Rhine for its first base; it may have others beyond this,
wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but if it is
driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the
Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine,
and a fourth upon the Loire.
The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be
in covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army
off from it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier
cannot have so favorable a base in a defensive war as one
whose capital is more retired.
764
All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other
points opinions have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect
base is one parallel to that of the enemy. My opinion is that
bases perpendicular to those of the enemy are more
advantageous, particularly such as have two sides almost
perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle,
thus affording a double base if required, and which, by giving
the control of two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines
of retreat widely apart, and facilitate any change of the line of
operations which an unforeseen turn of affairs may
necessitate.
765
maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
faces, including the base and the communications of the
enemy. The French army, starting from its base C D and
gaining the front of operations F G H, could cut off the allied
army I from its base B D; the latter would be thrown upon the
angle A, formed by the lines of the Rhine, the Ems, and the
sea, while the army E could communicate with its bases on
the Main and Rhine.
“When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is
always bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its
frontiers and closes one side of the square. This may not be an
obstacle insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be
considered as an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous
to retreat after a defeat: hence it would be an advantage to
force the enemy upon it. The soil of a power which can bring
into the field one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand
troops cannot be violated with impunity; and if a defeated
army made the attempt, it would be none the less cut off from
its base. If the boundary of the theater of war should be the
766
territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed in this theater,
and the square would be enlarged till it reached the frontiers
of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the frontiers
may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make it
approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid. In either
case, the advantage of the army which has control of two
faces of the figure, and possesses the power of establishing
upon them a double base, will be still more decided, since it
will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
shortened side,—as was the case with the Prussian army in
1806, with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the
lines of the Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the
mountainous frontier of Franconia.”
767
what is elsewhere said in favor of frontiers which are salient
toward the enemy, and against double lines of operations with
equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The objection is not well
founded; for the greatest advantage of a perpendicular base
consists in the fact that it forms such a salient, which takes in
reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the other
hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both
should be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of
them it will be sufficient to have some fortified points
garrisoned by small bodies, while the great bulk of the force
rests upon the other face,—as was done in the campaigns of
1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety degrees formed by
the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and thence
to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions
by his left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the
attention of the enemy to that point, while he moved with nine
divisions upon the extremity of the perpendicular face toward
Schaffhausen, which carried him in a few days to the gates of
Augsburg, the two detached divisions having already rejoined
him.
In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and
Main, forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier
upon the first and parallel one, while with the mass of his
forces he gained the extremity of the perpendicular base, and
thus intercepted the Prussians at Gera and Naumburg by
reaching their line of retreat.
768
base, its advantages may be partially supplied by a change of
strategic front, as will be seen in Article XX.
769
An insular and naval power acting on the continent would
pursue a diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the
same principle, viz.: to establish the base upon those points
where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country,
and at the same time insure a safe retreat.
Despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide
upon the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well
conducted. The army covered itself by obtaining the
fortresses of Brailoff, Varna, and Silistria, and afterward by
preparing a depot at Sizeboli. As soon as its base was well
established it moved upon Adrianople, which previously
770
would have been madness. Had the season been a couple of
months longer, or had the army not come so great a distance
in 1828, the war would have terminated with the first
campaign.
771
A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not
necessarily be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a
contemplated operation. I think differently; for a strategic
point is such essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far
distant it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it may
be included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events,
and thus acquire its full importance. It would, then, be more
accurate to state that all strategic points are not necessarily
decisive points.
772
first, in order to be more easily guided in our selection of the
second.
773
and Saône, and is at the center of communications between
France and Italy and between the South and East; but it would
not be a decisive point unless well fortified or possessing an
extended camp with têtes de pont. Leipsic is most certainly a
strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the
communications of Northern Germany. Were it fortified and
did it occupy both banks of the river, it would be almost the
key of the country,—if a country has a key, or if this
expression means more than a decisive point.
All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that
they are not only centers of communications, but also the
seats of power and government.
774
opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since this would take in
reverse his front of operations, expose his line of retreat, cut
him off from his supporting army as well as from his base,
and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first
objective point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of
Mélas by the Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of
communications: hence Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza
were decisive points only by reason of the march of Mélas
upon Nice.
775
3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
Objective Points
776
Austria, the first objective point would be the line of the
Ticino and Po; the second, Mantua and the line of the Adige.
In the defensive, the objective point, instead of being that
which it is desirable to gain possession of, is that which is to
be defended. The capital, being considered the seat of power,
becomes the principal objective point of the defense; but there
may be other points, as the defense of a first line and of the
first base of operations. Thus, for a French army reduced to
the defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be to
prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve
the forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a
passage of the river and in besieging them: the second
objective would be to cover the first base of operations upon
the Meuse or Moselle,—which might be attained by a lateral
defense as well as one in front.
777
his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which
he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank
him, to cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and
destroy his forces,—such was the system followed by
Napoleon in his first campaigns. These campaigns proved this
system to be one of the very best.
778
dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army,
as did Napoleon.
779
points should be subordinate to strategy, at least until after a
great success has been attained.
780
strategic front. The portion of the theater of war from which
an enemy can probably reach this front in two or three
marches is called the front of operations.
781
At the resumption of hostilities in 1813, Napoleon’s front of
operations extended at first from Hamburg to Wittenberg;
thence it ran along the line of the allies toward Glogau and
Breslau, (his right being at Löwenberg,) and followed along
the frontier of Bohemia to Dresden. His forces were stationed
on this grand front in four masses, whose strategic positions
were interior and central and presented three different faces.
Subsequently, he retired behind the Elbe. His real line of
defense then extended only from Wittenberg to Dresden, with
a bend to the rear toward Marienberg, for Hamburg and
Magdeburg were beyond the strategic field, and it would have
been fatal for him to have extended his operations to these
points.
782
grand maneuvers, for by this means the control of two faces
of the strategic field may be obtained, thus giving the army a
position almost as favorable as if it possessed a base with two
faces. (See Article XVIII.)
783
order to profit by important advantages afforded by certain
localities, to strike decisive blows, or to procure for the army
a good line of defense and good pivots of operations, which
would be almost equivalent to a real base.
784
occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus, Suchet in
Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front,
while the front of some other corps of the army was not
clearly defined.
Lines of Defense
785
attack in front, the lines present an evident tactical advantage,
since it is always more difficult to drive an army from its
position behind a river, or from a point naturally and
artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the
other hand, this advantage must not be considered
unqualified, lest we should fall into the system of positions
which has been the ruin of so many armies; for, whatever may
be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain
that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the
attacks of his adversary will finally yield. [This does not refer
to intrenched camps, which make a great difference. They are
treated of in Article XXVII.] In addition to this, since a
position naturally very strong [It is a question here of
positions of camps, and not of positions for battle. The latter
will be treated of in the chapter devoted to Grand Tactics,
(Article XXX.)] is difficult of access it will be as difficult of
egress, the enemy may be able with an inferior force to
confine the army by guarding all the outlets. This happened to
the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to Wurmser in Mantua.
Strategic Positions
Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which
are intended to cover a much greater portion of the front of
operations than would be covered in an actual battle. All
positions behind a river or upon a line of defense, the
divisions of the army being separated by considerable
distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at
Rivoli, Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His
786
positions in 1813 in Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line
of defense were strategic. The positions of the Anglo-Prussian
armies on the frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligny,
(1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar in 1799,
were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and
in face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are
strategic positions,—for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge
in 1807. The daily positions taken up by an army beyond the
reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread out either to
deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class.
787
support. The points of support on the strategic front are called
pivots of operations, and are practical temporary bases, but
quite different from pivots of maneuver. For example, in 1796
Verona was an excellent pivot of operations for all
Napoleon’s enterprises about Mantua for eight months. In
1813 Dresden was his pivot.
788
beautiful operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not
have produced the same results upon a theater of the
magnitude of that of the Russian War in 1812, since the
enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could have
found another by adopting a new zone of operations.
789
Every strategic line of defense should always possess a
tactical point upon which to rally for defense should the
enemy cross the strategic front. For instance, an army
guarding a bank of a river, not being able to occupy in force
the whole line, ought always to have a position in rear of the
center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so as
to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in
effecting a passage.
790
It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself
a line of operations,—though doubtless it may happen that
any good road in a certain turn of affairs may become for the
time-being such a line; but as long as it is only traversed by
detachments, and lies beyond the sphere of the principal
enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real line of
operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading
to the same front of operations, and separated by one or two
marches, would not constitute so many lines of operations,
but, being the communications of the different divisions of
the same army, the whole space bounded by them would
constitute but a single line.
791
had three lines of operations leading to Leipsic as an
objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia,
leading from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and
Chemnitz upon Leipsic; the second was the line of the army
of Silesia, going from Breslau by Dresden or by Wittenberg
upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte from Berlin by
Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies
marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it
could not be said that there were as many lines of operations
as roads. The principal line of operations is that followed by
the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions,
munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which,
if compelled, it would retreat.
792
explain it. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is
a question of maneuver-lines, (that is, of strategic
combinations,) and not of great routes. It must also be
admitted that an army marching upon two or three routes,
near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the
different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two
or three lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan
entered Germany with two armies of 70,000 men each, being
independent of each other, there was a double line of
operations; but a French army of which only a detachment
starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the
five or six other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march
on Ulm, would not have a double line of operations in the
sense in which I use the term to designate a maneuver.
Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set them in
motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a
single corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the
principal enterprise, had but a single general line of
operations, with an accessory detachment. The territorial line
was composed of two arms or radii, but the operation was not
double.]
793
better to use the term radii of operations to express the idea of
double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we
conceive the theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every
radius is, after all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.]
Exterior lines lead to the opposite result, and are those formed
by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of
the enemy, or against several of his masses.
There are also deep lines, which are simply long lines.
794
occasions for their use are fully recognized only by a great
and active mind.
795
the Tanaro, and the Po, was unable to recruit for his army,
barely able to maintain a communication by couriers with his
base, and he certainly would have been obliged to cut his way
out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.] had
possessed a year’s supplies in Alessandria, he would none the
less have been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as
the victorious enemy occupied the line of the Po.
796
zones of operations,—the first reaching along the Rhine from
Huningue to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center
consisting of the interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the
third and left was the frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.
The whole force of the French was now about one hundred
and fifteen thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of
one hundred and forty leagues and divided into five corps
d’armée, and could not make a good defense; for to paralyze
them and prevent their concentration it was only necessary to
attack the center. Political reasons were also in favor of this
plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could only
be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between
the Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less
797
fortified than the rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the
allies the advantage of the excellent fortress of Luxembourg
as a base. They wisely adopted this plan of attack; but the
execution was not equal to the conception.
The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for
family reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which
a reverse might subject her provinces. For some reason,
difficult to understand, Austria co-operated only to the extent
of thirty battalions: forty-five thousand men remained as an
army of observation in Brisgau, on the Rhine, and in
Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward
displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been
made of them than to protect the flanks of the invading army?
This remarkable conduct on the part of Austria, which cost
her so much, may account for the resolution of Prussia to
retire at a later period, and quit the field, as she did, at the
very moment when she should have entered it. During the
campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary
for success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons.
If they had anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had
even made a more serious effort to drive him from them, they
would still have had all the advantage of a concentrated force
against several scattered divisions, and could have prevented
their junction and overthrown them separately. Frederick the
Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at
Grandpré,—that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he
(Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Châlons.
798
The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the
Moselle and Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of
losing a village, and how their system led to large
detachments, which are frequently the ruin of armies.
799
the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of the
wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the
parades of the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be
understood?
800
gaining a foot of ground. While they threatened France with
invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies of troops,
defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes
and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their
forces upon the camp at Cambray, they flew off,
excentrically, to Dunkirk on one side and Landau on the
other.
801
Prague. The only difference between the two plans is that the
Austrian troops in Flanders were not so much scattered as
those of Brown in Bohemia; but this difference is certainly
not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position of the North
Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank the
Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the
mass of the enemy,—a direction as dangerous and faulty as
could be given to great operations. This movement was the
same as that of Benningsen on the Lower Vistula which
almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate of the Prussian
army, cut off from its communications and forced upon the
Baltic, is another proof of this truth.
802
concentrate in Belgium and to beat all his large detachments
in detail.
The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the
radical error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The
diversion on Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did
not arrive at Charleroi till the 3d of June,—more than a month
afterward. Here was a splendid opportunity for the Austrians
to profit by their central position. If the Prussian army had
maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by its
left,—that is, both upon the Meuse,—the state of affairs
would have been different. By establishing themselves in the
center of a line of scattered forces they could have prevented
the junction of the different fractions. It may be dangerous in
a battle to attack the center of a close line of troops when it
can be simultaneously sustained by the wings and the
reserves; but it is quite different on a line of three hundred
miles in extent.
In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the
principal theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to
Italy,—which opened a new field of glory for the French
arms. Their lines of operations in this campaign were double;
they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim.
803
Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces
alternately upon these points, and gained victories at
Manheim and in the lines of Mayence so decisive that they
caused the army of the Sambre and Meuse to recross the
Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought Pichegru back to
Landau.
804
keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon
whom these lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of
Roveredo and Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed
and thrown the first back upon the Lavis, changes direction
by the right, debouches by the gorges of the Brenta upon the
left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to take refuge in
Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.
805
from which he derives full profit, marches against this army
and beats it, while some leagues from the other.
806
opposed to this principle. An undue number of lines divides
the forces, and permits fractions to be overwhelmed by the
enemy.
From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well
as from that of many others, the following maxims result:—
807
does not depend exclusively upon the number of soldiers:
their military qualities, their morale, and the ability of their
commander are also very important elements.]
808
The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most
important qualities of a general. The importance of a direction
is illustrated by these examples.
809
even in this case it would be better to have all the forces
under the same commander, who accompanies the principal
army.
810
will be advantageous,—since a single line would crowd the
forces so much as to prevent them all from acting to
advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well
the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the
respective positions of the parties, has the most important
duty to perform.
10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more
advantageous than two divergent. The first conform better to
the principles of strategy, and possess the advantage of
covering the lines of communication and supply; but to be
free from danger they should be so arranged that the armies
which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the
811
combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect
their junction.
812
Marmont could have joined him, and had he possessed fifty
thousand more men, this plan would have produced the most
decisive results and have put the seal on his military career.
813
advantages of the perpendicular base may be lost. The army
E, having the double base A C and C D, if it marched toward
F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all the
strategic advantages of its base C D.
814
Vistula with only a small detachment and after the principal
army had already arrived at Lowicz.
If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more
concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after
the passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be
better to pass it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw
off the enemy from the bridges. This will be referred to in the
article upon the passage of rivers.
815
line at home and one in a hostile country. The nature of the
enemy’s country will also influence these chances. Let us
suppose an army crosses the Alps or the Rhine to carry on
war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of the second
rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always
rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of
that unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state.
On the other hand, a German army invading France would
operate upon a line much more dangerous than that of the
French in Italy, because upon the first could be thrown the
consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and interest.
An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its
own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the
inhabitants, authorities, productions, towns, public depots and
arsenals, and even private stores, are all in its favor. It is not
ordinarily so abroad.
816
important. It is that on each side of the line of operations the
country should be cleared of all enemies for a distance equal
to the depth of this line: otherwise the enemy might threaten
the line of retreat. This rule is everywhere belied by the
events of war. The nature of the country, the rivers and
mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the people,
the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be
estimated by diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable
bodies of the enemy could be permitted on the flanks of the
line of retreat; but a compliance with this demand would
deprive an army of every means of taking a step in a hostile
country; and there is not a campaign in recent wars, or in
those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not contradict
this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna
when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession
of the Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin,
Genoa, and the Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of
Mélas? Did not Eugene march by way of Stradella and Asti to
the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon the Mincio but a
few leagues from his base?
817
single exception cannot disprove a rule based upon the
experience of ages and upon natural principles.
818
and the operation ended by the total defeat of an essential part
of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole army
may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary
armies are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of
the mass of the army, the system is not understood; and this
was what happened in 1813.
819
made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland,
Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a
hostile enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have
threatened him in 1807; but she was then at peace with him
and unarmed. To judge of a system of operations, it must be
supposed that accidents and chances are to be as much in
favor of as against it,—which was by no means the case in
1813, either in the geographic positions or in the state of the
respective forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote
the reverses at Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his
lieutenants, as proof capable of destroying a principle the
simplest application of which required these officers not to
allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement.
Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what
advantage can be expected from the system of central lines, if
the parts of the army which have been weakened in order to
strike decisive blows elsewhere, shall themselves seek a
disastrous contest, instead of being contented with being
bodies of observation? [Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is
not always possible to avoid a combat without running greater
risks than would result from a check; but Macdonald might
have fought Blücher to advantage if he had better understood
Napoleon’s instructions.] In this case it is the enemy who
applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines.
Moreover, in the succeeding campaign, the defense of
Napoleon in Champagne, from the battle of Brienne to that of
Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of these maxims.
820
enterprises fail from the magnitude of the arrangements
necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer in
the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one
hundred thousand men, occupying a central zone against three
isolated armies of thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be
more sure of defeating them successively than if the central
mass were four hundred thousand strong against three armies
of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and for several
good reasons:—
821
I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or
eccentric system. All my works go to show the eternal
influence of principles, and to demonstrate that operations to
be successful must be applications of principles.
822
Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so
advantageous, may be most pernicious,—which should teach
us the necessity of detecting the principles upon which
systems are based, and not to confound principles and
systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant
base to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are
on interior lines and more concentrated, it follows that the
latter could effect a union before the former, and would
inevitably defeat them; as was the case with Moreau and
Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.
In starting from the same points, or from two points much less
separated than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be
exposed to this danger. What was the fate of the concentric
columns of Wurmser and Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach
the Mincio by the two banks of Lake Garda? Can the result of
the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels be
forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march
concentrically on this city,—one by Quatre-Bras, the other by
Wavre. Blücher and Wellington, taking an interior strategic
line, effected a junction before them, and the terrible disaster
of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable principles
of war cannot be violated with impunity.
823
Mention has already been made of strategic lines of
maneuvers, which differ essentially from lines of operations;
and it will be well to define them, for many confound them.
We will not consider those strategic lines which have a great
and permanent importance by reason of their position and
their relation to the features of the country, like the lines of
the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the
Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and
minute examination of the topography of Europe; and an
excellent model for this kind of study is found in the
Archduke Charles’s description of Southern Germany.
824
directions,—while it would have successively perhaps twenty
strategic lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have
at first one for each wing which would join the general line of
operations. If it operated in the zone between the Danube and
the Alps, it might adopt, according to events, the strategic line
leading from Ulm on Donauwerth and Ratisbon, or that from
Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm with
Nuremberg or Mayence.
825
the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done,
to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great
success; but the operation must be of short duration, and care
must have been taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a
sudden change of the line of operations, if necessary, as has
already been referred to.
826
A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz.
Leaving Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he
moved to the right to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in
so doing he left his primitive line of retreat exposed to the
attacks of an enemy superior in force. His object was to gain
communication with Napoleon, whose intention was to join
him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the
beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of
accomplishing this change of strategic line and of informing
his army of it. He did nothing of this kind,—either from
forgetfulness, or on account of the feeling of aversion he had
to any thing like a retreat,—and the severe losses at
Dennewitz were the result.
827
Wavre. However, it was an operation of only three or four
days’ duration, at the end of which time Napoleon would
either beat or be beaten at Bassano: in the first case, he would
open direct communication with Verona and his line of
operations; in the second, he could regain in great haste Trent,
where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back either upon
Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which
made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in
another; for even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano
he could not have interfered with the return to Trent, as there
was no road to enable him to anticipate Napoleon. If
Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois from Trent, he
might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian general,
previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the
French army was doing for several days, and thinking it was
all upon him, would scarcely have thought of resuming the
offensive before Napoleon beaten at Bassano would have
been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had advanced as
far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there
have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have
inflicted upon him the fate of Vandamme at Culm.
828
Article XXIII: Means of protecting a Line of Operations by
Temporary Bases or Strategic Reserves
Strategic Reserves
829
reserve. A wise government always provides good reserves
for its armies, and the general uses them when they come
under his command. The state has its reserves, the army has
its own, and every corps d’armée or division should not fail to
provide one.
830
in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near
Vienna.
831
they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be
dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion,
when new levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an
intrenched camp, under the protection of a fortress which
serves as a great depot, will be indispensable.
832
endeavoring to acquire a small province, the other
counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. Such was
war from the Middle Ages to the era of the French
Revolution. During this revolution great changes transpired,
and many systems of more or less value sprang up. War was
commenced in 1792 as it had been in 1762: the French
encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged
them. It was not till 1793, when assailed from without and
within, that this system was changed. Thoroughly aroused,
France threw one million men in fourteen armies upon her
enemies. These armies had neither tents, provisions, nor
money. On their marches they bivouacked or were quartered
in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of
success. Their tactics changed also: the troops were put in
columns, which were more easily handled than deployed
lines, and, on account of the broken character of the country
of Flanders and the Vosges, they threw out a part of their
force as skirmishers to protect and cover the columns. This
system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at first
met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the
methodical Austrian and Prussian troops as well as their
generals. Mack, to whom was attributed the success of the
Prince of Coburg, increased his reputation by directing the
troops to extend their lines to oppose an open order to the fire
of skirmishers. It had never occurred to the poor man that
while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried the
positions.
833
sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of
Dunkirk, Maubeuge, and Landau, so that this small force,
moving rapidly from point to point, and aided by the troops
already collected at these different points, compelled the
enemy to evacuate France.
834
Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements
from the Rhine.
835
all concurred in urging him to undertakings which no other
person, whether born upon a throne, or a general under the
orders of his government, would ever dare to adopt. This is
probably true; but between the extremes of very distant
invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and,
without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the
line he has marked out. It is probable that the old system of
wars of positions will for a long time be proscribed, or that, if
adopted, it will be much modified and improved.
836
a less extensive scale. Then also we may see armies of from
eighty to one hundred thousand men return to a mixed system
of war,—a mean between the rapid incursions of Napoleon
and the slow system of positions of the last century. Until
then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which
has produced so great results; for the first to renounce it in the
presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a
victim to his indiscretion.
837
same maneuvers; and what was Blücher’s march at Waterloo
but an application of interior strategic lines?
838
Logistics be neglected. In a strategic movement, the two
hostile armies ought to be separated by about two marches,
(counting the distance which separates the advanced guards
from the enemy and from their own columns.) In such a case
there could be no danger in a strategic march from one point
to another.
839
Chiusella, and that of Marshal Paskevitch to cross the Vistula
at Ossiek; and their successful issue is well known.
840
The subject most nearly connected with the system of
marches is the commissariat, for to march quickly and for a
long distance food must be supplied; and the problem of
supporting a numerous army in an enemy’s country is a very
difficult one. It is proposed to discuss the relation between the
commissariat and strategy.
Under Louis XIV. and Frederick II. the armies were larger;
they fought on their own frontiers, and lived from their
storehouses, which were established as they moved. This
interfered greatly with operations, restricting the troops within
841
a distance from the depots dependent upon the means of
transportation, the rations they could carry, and the number of
days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to
camp.
842
charge thus laid upon them. The inhabitants should also be
required to furnish wagons to convey the supplies to the
points occupied by the troops.
843
3. The depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions
should be echeloned as much as possible upon three different
lines of communication, in order to supply with more facility
the wings of the army, and to extend as much as possible the
area from which successive supplies are to be drawn, and,
lastly, in order that the depots should be as well covered as
possible. To this end, it would be well to have the depots on
lines converging toward the principal line of operations,
which will be generally found in the center. This arrangement
has two real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to
the attempts of the enemy, as his distance from them is
thereby increased; secondly, it facilitates the movements of
the army in concentrating upon a single point of the line of
operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the initiative
from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the
offensive and gained some advantage.
844
conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest
difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. To facilitate their
transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable
articles,—as biscuit, rice, etc..: the wagons should be both
light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It will
be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, and to
insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these
vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as
not to take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to
husband the successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he
habituated to carry with him several days’ rations of bread,
rice, or even of flour.
845
the numerous vehicles otherwise necessary. For this reason,
lines of operations thus situated are the most favorable. The
water-communications themselves are not in this case the
lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is
essential that the troops should be able to move at some
distance from the river, in order to prevent the enemy from
throwing back the exterior flank upon the river,—which
might be as dangerous as if it were the sea.
846
explains the success of many a rash enterprise, and proves
how much actual war differs from narrow theory.
847
impracticable. The passage of the Alps by Francis I.,—which
is so well described by Gaillard,—Napoleon’s passage of the
Saint-Bernard, and the Splugen expedition, prove that there is
truth in the remark of Napoleon, that an army can pass
wherever a titan can set his foot,—a maxim not strictly true,
but characteristic of the man, and applied by him with great
success.
848
rivers. He has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of
“impregnable” was decidedly disproved by the bloody events
of 1800, 1805, and 1809.
849
The first point to be considered is their location; the second
lies in the distinction between the cases where an army can
afford to pass the forts without a siege, and those where it will
be necessary to besiege; the third point is in reference to the
relations of an army to a siege which it proposes to cover.
850
line in the center of the country. A Board convened for the
purpose of considering the system of fortresses has decided
quite recently that more were required. This does not prove
that there were not already too many, but that certain points in
addition should be fortified, while those on the first line,
although too much crowded, may be maintained since they
are already in existence. Admitting that France has two fronts
from Dunkirk to Basel, one from Basel to Savoy, one from
Savoy to Nice, in addition to the totally distinct line of the
Pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts, requiring
forty to fifty places. Every military man will admit that this is
enough, since the Swiss and coast fronts require fewer than
the northeast. The system of arrangement of these fortresses is
an important element of their usefulness. Austria has a less
number, because she is bordered by the small German states,
which, instead of being hostile, place their own forts at her
disposal. Moreover, the number above given is what was
considered necessary for a state having four fronts of nearly
equal development. Prussia, being long and narrow, and
extending from Königsberg almost to the gates of Metz,
should not be fortified upon the same system as France,
Spain, or Austria. Thus the geographical position and extent
of states may either diminish or increase the number of
fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included.
851
are certainly those situated on great rivers and commanding
both banks. Mayence, Coblentz, and Strasbourg, including
Kehl, are true illustrations and models of this kind. Places
situated at the confluence of two great rivers command three
different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. Take,
for instance, Modlin. Mayence, when it had on the left bank
of the Main the fort of Gustavusburg, and Cassel on the right,
was the most formidable place in Europe, but it required a
garrison of twenty-five thousand men: so that works of this
extent must be few in number.
852
be unwise to push the invasion too far. Here, also, very much
depends upon the situation and respective strength of the
armies and the spirit of the nations.
853
7. While large places are much the most advantageous among
a friendly people, smaller works are not without importance,
not to arrest an enemy, who might mask them, but as they
may materially aid the operations of an army in the field. The
fort of Königstein in 1813 was as useful to the French as the
fortress of Dresden, because it procured a tête de pont on the
Elbe.
854
Königsberg,—which he did because it was convenient for
supply. If the Russian army in 1812, instead of concentrating
on Smolensk, had supported itself on Dunaburg and Riga, it
would have been in danger of being forced into the sea and of
being cut off from all its bases.
855
by which the siege might be disturbed from without. This was
done by Napoleon at Mantua, and by the Russians at Varna.
Intrenched Lines
856
left, seemed to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they
were forced on every occasion when they were assailed.
857
camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and even
of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they
afford an army.
858
like the camp of Torres-Vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed
by the sea. Whenever it can be passed either by the right or
the left, the army will be compelled to abandon it or run the
risk of being invested in it. The camp of Dresden was an
important support to Napoleon for two months; but as soon as
it was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even
of an ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two
corps within a few days for want of provisions.
859
assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the
enemy in the interior of France and between the relieving
force and the intrenched army would have great difficulty in
recrossing the Rhine.
860
Forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave
the place to its own means of defense. It would only be in the
event of a fortress occupying a point such that it would be
impossible for an army to pass it without taking it, that an
intrenched camp, with the object of preventing an attack upon
it, would be established; and what place in Europe is upon
such a site?
861
Indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the
fortified place upon the other bank too; and a place holding
both banks would fulfill this condition. The fortification of
Coblentz, recently constructed, seems to introduce a new
epoch. This system of the Prussians, combining the
advantages of intrenched camps and permanent works,
deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its
defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense
advantages to an army intended to operate on the Rhine.
Indeed, the inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers
is that they are only very useful when beyond the river; and in
this case they are exposed to the dangers arising from
destruction of bridges (as happened to Napoleon at
Essling,)—to say nothing of the danger of losing their
provisions and munitions, or even of a front attack against
which the works might not avail. The system of detached
permanent works of Coblentz has the advantage of avoiding
these dangers, by protecting the depots on the same bank as
the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from
attack at least until the bridges be re-established. If the city
were upon the right bank of the Rhine, and there were only an
intrenched camp of field-works on the left bank, there would
be no certainty of security either for the depots or the army.
So, if Coblentz were a good ordinary fortress without
detached forts, a large army could not so readily make it a
place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for
debouching from it in the presence of an enemy. The fortress
of Ehrenbreitstein, which is intended to protect Coblentz on
the right bank, is so difficult of access that it would be quite
easy to blockade it, and the egress of a force of any
magnitude might be vigorously disputed.
862
Much has been recently said of a new system used by the
Archduke Maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of
Linz,—by masonry towers. As I only know of it by hearsay
and the description by Captain Allard in the Spectateur
Militaire, I cannot discuss it thoroughly. I only know that the
system of towers used at Genoa by the skillful Colonel
Andreis appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of
improvements,—which the archduke seems to have added.
We are told that the towers of Linz, situated in ditches and
covered by the glacis, have the advantage of giving a
concentrated horizontal fire and of being sheltered from the
direct shot of the enemy. Such towers, if well flanked and
connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous
camp,—always, however, with some of the inconveniences of
closed lines. If the towers are isolated, and the intervals
carefully covered by field-works, (to be thrown up when
required,) they will make a camp preferable to one covered by
ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous as afforded by the
large detached forts of Coblentz. These towers number
thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square
fort commanding the Perlingsberg. Of these twenty-four on
the right bank, some seven or eight are only half-towers. The
circumference of this line is about twelve miles. The towers
are between five hundred and six hundred yards apart, and
will be connected, in case of war, by a palisaded covered way.
They are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with a barbette
battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven
twenty-four pounders. Two howitzers are placed in the upper
tier. Those towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the
déblais of which forms a high glacis which protects the tower
from direct shot; but I should think it would be difficult to
protect the artillery from direct fire.
863
Some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a
complete bastioned enceinte, necessary to make Linz a
fortress of the first rank, would have cost; others maintain that
it has not cost more than a quarter as much as a bastioned
work, and that it subserves, besides, an entirely different
object. If these works are to resist a regular siege, they are
certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp
to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the Danube
for a large army, they are appropriate, and would be of great
importance in a war like that of 1809, and, if existing then,
would probably have saved the capital.
Têtes De Ponts
864
têtes de ponts are doubly advantageous when they are as it
were keeps for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so
if they also cover the bank opposite to the location of the
camp, since then they will mutually support each other. It is
needless to state that these works are particularly important in
an enemy’s country and upon all fronts where there are no
permanent works. It may be observed that the principal
difference between the system of intrenched camps and that
of têtes de ponts is that the best intrenched camps are
composed of detached and closed works, while têtes de ponts
usually consist of contiguous works not closed. An intrenched
line to admit of defense must be occupied in force throughout
its whole extent, which would generally require a large army;
if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are detached closed
works, a comparatively small force can defend them.
865
rather than an objection. In fact, the range once crossed and
the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may be
regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall
back and find a temporary refuge. The only essential
precaution to be observed is, not to allow the enemy to
anticipate the army on this line of retreat. The part of the Alps
between France and Italy, and the Pyrenees, (which are not so
high, though equally broad,) are of this nature. The mountains
of Bohemia and of the Black Forest, and the Vosges, belong
to this class. In Catalonia the mountains cover the whole
country as far as the Ebro: if the war were limited to this
province, the combinations would not be the same as if there
were but a line of mountains. Hungary in this respect differs
little from Lombardy and Castile; for if the Crapacks in the
eastern and northern part are as marked a feature as the
Pyrenees, they are still but a temporary obstacle, and an army
overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of the Waag,
of the Neytra, or of the Theiss, or in the fields of Mongatsch,
would have the vast plains between the Danube and the
Theiss for a field of operations. The only difference would be
in the roads, which in the Alps, though few in number, are
excellent, while in Hungary there are none of much value. In
its northern part, this chain, though not so high, becomes
broader, and would seem to belong to that class of fields of
operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its
evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the
valleys of the Waag or the Theiss, it must be regarded as a
temporary barrier. The attack and defense of this country,
however, would be a strategic study of the most interesting
character.
866
these mountains is secondary, and they must be observed like
a fortress, the armies deciding the great contests in the
valleys. It will, of course, be otherwise if this be the whole
field.
867
historical exposition of the events; and I cannot do better than
refer my readers to it.
868
impracticable for the passage of an army, transversal marches
can only be made by small bodies of light troops.
869
facility than if he had been entrapped in one of the valleys of
Switzerland or of the Tyrol, from which there was but a single
outlet.
870
them the best point for rendezvous when their line of forts is
pierced, or in directing them to continue to act in the
mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the general on the
defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the
many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant.
But, if there be other fronts like this upon the right and left,
all of which are to be defended, the problem is changed: the
difficulties of the defense increase with the extent of the
fronts, and this system of a cordon of forts becomes
dangerous,—while it is not easy to adopt a better one.
871
besides, it is not easy to say where an inferior army could be
concentrated without compromising it.
872
As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be
comprehended by reading the events of Suwaroff’s expedition
by the Saint-Gothard upon the Muttenthal. While we must
approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to capture Lecourbe in
the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the presence of
mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that
general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and
the Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as
Lecourbe had been, and extricated himself with equal ability.
Not less extraordinary was the ten days’ campaign of General
Molitor, who with four thousand men was surrounded in the
canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand allies, and yet
succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after four
admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all
theory in details, and also that in such a country a strong and
heroic will is worth more than all the precepts in the world.
After such lessons, need I say that one of the principal rules
of this kind of war is, not to risk one’s self in the valleys
without securing the heights? Shall I say also that in this kind
of war, more than in any other, operations should be directed
upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally, that
good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of
the great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined
with great mobility and frequent offensive movements, will
be the best means of defending the country?
873
numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes
of Stanz and of the Tyrol.
874
plan ought to have been to throw troops into these valleys to
defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army toward
Turin or Carignano.
875
should not be too widely separated, the marches being so
arranged that the masses may debouch at the junction of the
valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be
driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.
876
includes the great descents, where the distance passed over is
not very great, but where a powerful state is attacked.
877
him. The battle of Austerlitz—due to a fault of
Weyrother—endangered the Russian army anew, since it was
so far from its base. It almost became the victim of a distant
alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the opportunity of
regaining its own country.
878
reciprocally sustaining each other, no such events have taken
place.
879
on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their
success.
880
besides, he neglected to turn to the greatest advantage this
ephemeral enthusiasm.
881
marched to the conquest of Greece, followed by four
thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when Alexander
marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his
fleet coasted the shore.
The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the
line of operations, and the great distance of the principal
objective point, are the only points which require any
deviation from the ordinary operations of war.
882
since, as stated in Article VI., there is no enemy, however
insignificant, whom it would not be useful to convert into an
ally. The influence which the change of policy of the Duke of
Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that day, and the
effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551, and
of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing
the strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war,
when their co-operation cannot be obtained.
Epitome of Strategy
883
1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages
which the reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations
may afford, in accordance with Article XVIII.
884
6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and
activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points
where it may be important to act, to bring superior force to
bear upon fractions of the hostile army.
885
was upon Cologne: hence it was upon the Meuse that a
general effort of the French would have inflicted the most
severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the
most pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the
strategic principle; the other half consists in giving to such
efforts the most decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at
Jena, and at Ratisbon. The whole of strategy is contained in
these four examples.
886
Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations
preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. The
guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of
strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a
part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession
of which promises the most important results.
887
was completely beaten; nor was the maneuver more
successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. As is
evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to
discourage the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a
constant advocate of it; but it is very important to know how
to use it skillfully and opportunely, and I am, moreover, of
opinion that if it be a general’s design to make himself master
of his enemy’s communications while at the same time
holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than
tactical combinations to accomplish it.
888
Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an order of
battle an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to
execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel
order, the oblique order, the perpendicular order.
889
Without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war
of positions, an army may often find it proper to await the
enemy at a favorable point, strong by nature and selected
beforehand for the purpose of there fighting a defensive
battle. Such a position may be taken up when the object is to
cover an important objective point, such as a capital, large
depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls the
surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege.
890
position of the Albis, would have made a great error if his
chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was
exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the
same reason, Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the
fire of his troops, made a good choice of position at Waterloo,
where all the avenues of approach were well swept by his
guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover, rather a
strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a
battle-ground.
891
This is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on a
river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the
smallest reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the
result of the broken line being forced back upon the very
obstacles which seemed to afford perfect protection. This
danger—about which there can be no doubt—gives rise to the
thought that points admitting an easy defense are better on a
battle-field than insurmountable obstacles. [The park of
Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and the rivulet of
Papelotte were for Ney more serious obstacles than the
famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of
the Danube, in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may
perhaps be said that the courage of the defenders in the two
cases was not the same; but, throwing out of consideration
this chance, it must be granted that the difficulties of a
position, when properly taken advantage of, need not be
insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. At
Elchingen the great height and steepness of the banks,
rendering the fire almost ineffectual, were more
disadvantageous than useful in the defense.]
892
8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover
the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on
other points of the front, of such a character as to compel an
attack upon the center. Such a position will always be one of
the most advantageous for defense,—as was shown at
Malplaquet and Waterloo. Great obstacles are not essential
for this purpose, as the smallest accident of the ground is
sometimes sufficient: thus, the insignificant rivulet of
Papelotte forced Ney to attack Wellington’s center, instead of
the left as he had been ordered.
893
plain. There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat
than a forest,—this statement being made upon the
supposition that there are at least two good roads behind the
line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken before
the enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and,
finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank movement
to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest, as
was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more
secure if, as at Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line
behind the center; for this re-entering would become a place
of arms to receive the troops and give them time to pass off in
succession on the main roads.
894
by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy’s
batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails
to a greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a
continued fire either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the
matter in the light of these facts, all must agree that in tactical
operations the advantages resulting from taking the initiative
are balanced by the disadvantages.
895
moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the
advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the
moral effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an
adversary supposed to be beaten is certainly enough to
stagger the boldest troops.
896
preceding article, and the advantages of the defensive been
pointed out, we will now proceed to the consideration of
offensive movements.
897
the left of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of
Bohemia, which province was at that time rather neutral than
hostile: it seemed that, tactically considered, the slope of
these mountains was the decisive point to be held, when it
was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line of
retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz, and the French, by
forcing the right, which was in the plain, would occupy this
line of retreat and throw the allies into the mountains, where
they might have lost all their matériel and a great part of the
personnel of their army. This course was also easier for them
on account of the difference in the features of the ground, led
to more important results, and would have diminished the
obstacles in the future.
898
battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to obtain
the most effective action upon that one of the three points
mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of
success,—a point very easily determined by applying the
analysis just mentioned.
899
column intended to turn the enemy’s line. In order to a proper
appreciation of the merits of each, it becomes necessary to
test each by the application of the general principles which
have been laid down. For example, it is manifest that the
parallel order is worst of all, for it requires no skill to fight
one line against another, battalion against battalion, with
equal chances of success on either side: no tactical skill is
needed in such a battle.
900
The parallel order reinforced upon one wing, or upon the
center, to pierce that of the enemy, is much more favorable
than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in
accordance with the general principles which have been laid
down; although, when the contending forces are about equal,
the part of the line which has been weakened to reinforce the
other may have its own safety compromised if placed in line
parallel to the enemy.
901
C, the result being two oblique lines. The inference is that one
division of the assailing army would take a position
perpendicular to the enemy’s wing, whilst the remainder of
the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying
him; and this would always bring us back to one of the
oblique orders.
The order concave in the center has found advocates since the
day when Hannibal by its use gained the battle of Cannæ.
This order may indeed be very good when the progress of the
battle itself gives rise to it; that is, when the enemy attacks the
center, this retires before him, and he suffers himself to be
enveloped by the wings. But, if this order is adopted before
the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on the center,
has only to attack the wings, which present their extremities
and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they had
been assailed in flank. This order would, therefore, be
scarcely ever used except against an enemy who had taken the
convex order to fight a battle, as will be seen farther on.
902
present the flank to attack, whilst allowing forward movement
by echelon and preserving all the advantages of concentration
of fire. These advantages vanish if the enemy, instead of
foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is content
to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon
one wing. Essling, in 1809, is an example of the advantageous
use of a concave line; but it must not be inferred that
Napoleon committed an error in attacking the center; for an
army fighting with the Danube behind it and with no way of
moving without uncovering its bridges of communication,
must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at
pleasure.
903
both wings at once. Nearly the same convex order was
adopted at Essling, and during the second and third days of
the famous battle of Leipsic. On the last occasion it had just
the result that might have been expected.
904
and might be equally successful against a line unavoidably
immovable; but if the wings of the attacked line are brought
at a proper time against the flanks of the foremost echelons,
disagreeable consequences might result. A parallel order
considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be a
much better arrangement, for the parallel line in this case
would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as
to the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking
the echelons of the center by the flank.
905
attempt at Borodino,—where he obtained only a partial
success, on account of the heroic conduct of the Russian left
and the division of Paskevitch in the famous central redoubt,
and on account of the arrival of Baggavout’s corps on the
wing he hoped to outflank. He used it also at
Bautzen,—where an unprecedented success would have been
the result, but for an accident which interfered with the
maneuver of the left wing intended to cut off the allies from
the road to Wurschen, every arrangement having been made
with that view.
906
If every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit
under the influence of one man’s will and as rapidly as
thought, the art of winning battles would be reduced to
choosing the most favorable order of battle, and a general
could reckon with certainty upon the success of maneuvers
arranged beforehand. But the facts are altogether different; for
the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to
render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the
numerous fractions whose efforts must combine to make such
an attack as will give good ground to hope for victory: in
other words, the chief difficulty is to cause these fractions to
unite in the execution of the decisive maneuver which, in
accordance with the original plan of the battle, is to result in
victory.
907
reached the heights of Frichermont, nothing could have
prevented the loss of the battle by the French, and they could
then only fight to make the defeat less complete. In like
manner, at Bautzen, as soon as Ney had reached Klix, the
retreat of the allies during the night of the 20th of May could
alone have saved them, for on the 21st it was too late; and, if
Ney had executed better what he was advised to do, the
victory would have been a very great one.
908
will occupy lines nearly parallel and more or less
strengthened upon some point; the party acting upon the
defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm will burst
upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to be
used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar
efforts to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the
point of attack shall have been determined, the mass of his
troops will be directed against the center or upon one wing of
the enemy, or upon both at once.
909
retreat. At Marengo, if we may credit Napoleon himself, the
oblique order he assumed, resting his right at Castel Ceriole,
saved him from almost inevitable defeat. Ulm and Jena were
battles won by strategy before they were fought, tactics
having but little to do with them. At Ulm there was not even a
regular battle.
910
The great captain seems to consider the oblique order a
modern invention, a theorist’s fancy,—an opinion I can by no
means share; for the oblique order is as old as Thebes and
Sparta, and I have seen it used with my own eyes. This
assertion of Napoleon’s seems the more remarkable because
Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo, the
very order of which he thus denies the existence.
911
more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than
another.
912
6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular,
or otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform
strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point.
913
History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers,
especially when used against generals of weak character; and,
although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive
and the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete
successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and
a skillful general should know how to employ the means to
gain them when opportunity offers, and especially should he
combine these turning movements with attacks by main force.
914
enemy; and it is always embarrassing to substitute one
division for another in the heat of battle, at the moment when
the enemy is putting forth all his strength in repelling the
attack.
915
The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops
of all arms combined, except a small reserve of each which
should be always held in hand, [The great reserves must, of
course, be also engaged when it is necessary; but it is always
a good plan to keep back, as a final reserve, two or three
battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau decided the
battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what
Kellermann’s cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to
every reader of history.] will, therefore, at the critical moment
of the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will
attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole
attention. This critical moment is usually when the first line
of the parties is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants
are put forth,—on the one side to complete the victory, on the
other to wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to
say that, to make this decisive blow more certain and
effectual, a simultaneous attack upon the enemy’s flank
would be very advantageous.
916
Article XXXII: Turning Maneuvers, and too extended
Movement in Battles
917
skill and seems inclined to indulge in extended movements,
his adversary may be more daring.
918
Adige, and Lusignan with their right was making a wide
détour to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was
speedily surrounded and captured.
919
If Weyrother had been opposed to Jourdan at Rivoli or at
Austerlitz, he might have destroyed the French army, instead
of suffering in each case a total defeat; for the general who at
Stockach attacked a mass of sixty thousand men with four
small bodies of troops so much separated as to be unable to
give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper
advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. In the
same way, Marmont was unfortunate in having at Salamanca
an adversary whose chief merit was a rapid and practiced
tactical coup-d’oeil. With the Duke of York or Moore for an
antagonist, Marmont would probably have been successful.
920
closed and well connected, a general will find himself
prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance;
but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate
of his enemy’s character and his usual style of warfare, to
enable him to regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of
superiority in numbers or discipline, maneuvers may be
attempted which would be imprudent were the forces equal or
the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to
outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other
attacks, and opportunely supported by an attempt of the
remainder of the army on the enemy’s front, either against the
wing turned or against the center. Finally, strategic operations
to cut an enemy’s line of communications before giving
battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its
own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and
effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected
maneuver during the battle.
921
by another which has prepared a surprise for it,—as happened
to the French at Rossbach.
A great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a
skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. It is
always possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where
the commander may not have great capacity; but victories like
those of Lutzen, Luzzara, Eylau, Abensberg, can only be
gained by a brilliant genius endowed with great coolness and
using the wisest combinations.
922
In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved,
marching upon several roads, and divided into masses which
may act independently, these routs are not so much to be
feared; but the principles are unchanged. The advanced guard
must always be halted and formed, and then the mass of the
troops concentrated in that direction which is best suited for
carrying out the object of the march. Whatever maneuvers the
enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to
meet him.
923
their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point
intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack.
924
Article XXXV: Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified
Places, Intrenched Camps or Lines. —Of Coups de Main in
General
This kind of attack will vary with circumstances: 1st, with the
strength of the works; 2d, with the character of the ground on
which they are built; 3d, with the fact of their being isolated
or connected; 4th, with the morale of the respective parties.
History gives us examples of all of these varieties.
925
had as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls,
armed and defended by a number of desperate men.
926
method followed in this case, the following simple and
reasonable directions are laid down:—
927
means for facilitating the passage of the ditches of
field-works and climbing their parapets.
928
easily the victory was bought and how little it should have
been expected. The strategic plan was certainly admirable;
and the march from the Adige through Piacenza to Asti by the
right bank of the Po, leaving the French on the Mincio, was
beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow.
When we examine the operations near Turin, we must confess
that the victors owed more to their good fortune than to their
wisdom. It required no great effort of genius upon the part of
Prince Eugene to prepare the order he issued to his army; and
he must have felt a profound contempt for his opponents to
execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied troops of ten
different nations between eighty thousand Frenchmen on the
one side and the Alps on the other, and to pass around their
camp for forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank
march that was ever attempted. The order for the attack was
so brief and so devoid of instruction that any staff officer of
the present day ought to write a better. Directing the
formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade in two
lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to
make openings through them for the passage of the cavalry
into the camp, make up the sum total of all the science
exhibited by Eugene in order to carry out his rash undertaking
It is true he selected the weak point of the intrenchment; for it
was there so low that it covered only half the bodies of its
defenders.
929
preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one of
the wings, because the center is the point most easily
succored. There have been cases where an attack on the wing
was expected by the defenders, and they have been deceived
by a false attack made at that point, while the real attack took
place at the center, and succeeded simply because
unexpected. In these operations the locality and the character
of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to
be pursued.
930
taking the offensive does not occur to them when their
intrenchments are attacked. Notwithstanding these facts, I
cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run
such a risk and meet the fate of Tallard at Blenheim could
have no just cause of complaint.
Coups De Main
931
seem to be entirely tactical operations, their importance
certainly depends on the relations of the captured posts to the
strategic combinations in hand. It will become necessary,
therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main
in Article XXXVI., when speaking of detachments. However
tiresome these repetitions may seem, I am obliged to state
here the manner of executing such operations, as it is
evidently a part of the subject of the attack of intrenchments.
932
The capture or destruction of a bridge defended by
intrenchments, that of a large convoy, of a small fort closing
important passes, like the two attacks which were made in
1799 upon the fort of Lucisteig in the Grisons; the capture of
Leutasch and Scharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally, the capture of
a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of
provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;—such
are the enterprises which will justify the risks to which a
detachment engaging in them may be exposed.
In reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but
hints; for what has been done once may be done again.
933
occasions for them is one of the greatest and most delicate
responsibilities imposed upon a commander. If nothing is
more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent
out and having a good ensemble of operations with the main
body, it is equally certain that no expedient is more dangerous
when inconsiderately adopted. Frederick the Great regarded it
as one of the essential qualities of a general to know how to
make his adversary send out many detachments, either with
the view of destroying them in detail or of attacking the main
body during their absence.
934
3. There are large detachments made upon the front of
operations, in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the
main body in some combined operation.
935
extremities of Europe, Napoleon ordered the evacuation of
Naples and Hanover, Saint-Cyr hastened to effect a junction
with Massena in the Frioul, and Bernadotte, leaving Hanover,
moved up to take part in the operations of Ulm and Austerlitz.
After these astonishing successes, Napoleon had no difficulty
in retaking Naples and Hanover. This is an example of the
failure of diversions. I will give an instance where such an
operation would have been proper.
936
Among the first should be especially enumerated those
fractions of an army that are detached either to form the
strategic reserve, of which mention has been made, or to
cover lines of operation and retreat when the configuration of
the theater of the war exposes them to attack. For example, a
Russian army that wishes to cross the Balkan is obliged to
leave a portion of its forces to observe Shumla, Routchouk,
and the valley of the Danube, whose direction is
perpendicular to its line of operations. However successful it
may be, a respectable force must always be left toward
Giurgevo or Krajova, and even on the right bank of the river
toward Routchouk.
937
detachments, and to give them as much power of mobility as
possible, in order to enable them by opportune movements to
strike important blows. A most remarkable illustration of this
truth was given by Napoleon in the campaign of 1797.
Obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in
the valley of the Adige to observe the Tyrol while he was
operating toward the Noric Alps, he preferred to draw this
corps to his aid, at the risk of losing temporarily his line of
retreat, rather than leave the parts of his army disconnected
and exposed to defeat in detail. Persuaded that he could be
victorious with his army united, he apprehended no particular
danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon
his communications.
938
5. To make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction
where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution
of an enterprise in another direction.
Peter the Great took the first step toward the destruction of
Charles XII. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment,
of the famous convoy Lowenhaupt was bringing up. Villars
entirely defeated at Denain the large detachment Prince
Eugene sent out in 1709 under D’Albermale.
939
Fouquet at Landshut in 1760, and of Fink at Maxen in 1759,
demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making
detachments, and how dangerous they may be. To come
nearer our own times, the disaster of Vandamme at Culm was
a bloody lesson, teaching that a corps must not be thrust
forward too boldly: however, we must admit that in this case
the operation was well planned, and the fault was not so much
in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it properly,
as might easily have been done. That of Fink was destroyed at
Maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason.
940
issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was
the result of his wise maneuvers. Operations of this kind, so
far from being in opposition to the principles of the art of war,
are necessary to facilitate their application.
941
Since we have included in the number of useful cases of
detachments those intended for coups de main, it is proper to
mention a few examples of this kind to enable the reader to
judge for himself. We may call to mind that one which was
executed by the Russians toward the end of 1828 with the
view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of Bourghas.
The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians
rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an
essential point d’appui beyond the Balkan, where depots
could be established in advance for the army intending to
cross those mountains: in case of failure, no one was
compromised,—not even the small corps which had been
debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the
shipping.
942
For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold
and full of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy
all the injury they can without compromising themselves.
When an opportunity of striking a telling blow presents itself,
they should not think for a moment of any dangers or
difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address and
presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless
danger, are qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool,
calculating boldness. For further information on this subject I
refer my readers to Chapter XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand
Operations, and to Article XLV. of this work, on light
cavalry.
943
remark. Napoleon, a more skillful strategist than Moreau,
desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to take Kray’s
whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him
off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moreau,
who had already a bridge at Basel, preferred passing, with
greater convenience to his army, in front of the enemy, to
turning his extreme left. The tactical advantages seemed to his
mind much more sure than the strategical: he preferred the
certainty of a partial success to the risk attending a victory
which would have been a decisive one. In the same campaign
Napoleon’s passage of the Po is another example of the high
strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing.
The army of the reserve, after the engagement of the
Chiusella, could either march by the left bank of the Po to
Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino and march directly to
Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino, enter Milan,
effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching with
twenty thousand men by the Saint-Gothard pass, then to cross
the Po at Piacenza, expecting to get before Mélas more
certainly in that direction than if he came down too soon upon
his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donauwerth
and Ingolstadt in 1805 was a very similar operation. The
direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of the
destruction of Mack’s army.
944
If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the
tactical, no other point can be better; but if the locality
presents obstacles exceedingly difficult to pass, another must
be chosen, and in making the new selection care should be
taken to have the direction of the movement as nearly as
possible coincident with the true strategic direction.
Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a
great influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still
another consideration, connected with the locality itself. The
best position is that where the army after crossing can take its
front of operations and line of battle perpendicular to the
river, at least for the first marches, without being forced to
separate into several corps moving upon different lines. This
advantage will also save it the danger of fighting a battle with
a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling.
945
thing of the kind previously seen. The two first were executed
by Napoleon at Essling and at Wagram, in presence of an
army of one hundred and twenty thousand men provided with
four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the bed
of the stream is broadest. General Pelet’s interesting account
of them should be carefully read. The third was executed by
the Russian army at Satounovo in 1828, which, although not
to be compared with the two just mentioned, was very
remarkable on account of the great local difficulties and the
vigorous exertions made to surmount them. The passage of
the Beresina was truly wonderful. My object not being to give
historical details on this subject, I direct my readers to the
special narratives of these events. I will give several general
rules to be observed.
946
while building. For this purpose it is convenient to have the
bank from which the passage is made somewhat higher than
the other.
947
being particularly worthy of praise, although the operation
was not so decidedly successful as might have been expected.
948
The fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case
supposed is one in which the general finds his position a most
trying one; for if he divides his army to protect his bridges he
may be obliged to contend with one of his subdivisions
against the whole of the enemy’s force, and have it
overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line,
the enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some
unexpected point, the bridges may be captured or destroyed,
and the general may find himself compromised before he has
had time or opportunity to gain a victory.
949
the army, and remain protected during all the forward
movements. It was in this manner that Jourdan, having passed
the Rhine at Dusseldorf in 1795, on the extreme right of the
Austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the
Main. He was driven away because the French, having a
double and exterior line of operations, left one hundred and
twenty thousand men inactive between Mayence and Basel,
while Clairfayt repulsed Jourdan upon the Lahn. But this
cannot diminish the importance of the advantages gained by
passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy’s strategic
front. A commander-in-chief should either adopt this method,
or that previously explained, of a central mass at the moment
of passage, and the use of eccentric lines afterward, according
to the circumstances of the case, the situation of the frontiers
and bases of operations, as well as the positions of the enemy.
The mention of these combinations, of which something has
already been said in the article on lines of operations, does not
appear out of place here, since their connection with the
location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion.
950
In such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may
be diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of
the points, which then becomes the decisive one, and by
concentrating the two portions by interior lines as rapidly as
possible, to prevent the enemy from destroying them
separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had observed this rule, and
made a junction of their forces in the direction of
Donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would
probably have achieved great successes in Bavaria, instead of
being driven back upon the Rhine.
951
army. If the theory of war leaves any points unprovided for,
that of retreats is certainly one of them.
952
accord before fighting, in order to draw his adversary to a
position which he prefers to his present one. This is rather a
prudent maneuver than a retreat. It was thus that Napoleon
retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw the allies
to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that
Wellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is
what I proposed to do before the attack at Dresden, when the
arrival of Napoleon was known. I represented the necessity of
moving toward Dippoldiswalde to choose a favorable
battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that I was
proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a
retrograde movement without fighting, which would have
been the means of avoiding the catastrophe of the next day,
(August 26, 1813.)
953
the French army in 1812, history does not make mention of
many remarkable retreats. That of Antony, driven out of
Media, was more painful than glorious. That of the Emperor
Julian, harassed by the same Parthians, was a disaster. In
more recent days, the retreat of Charles VIII. to Naples, when
he passed by a corps of the Italian army at Fornovo, was an
admirable one. The retreat of M. de Bellisle from Prague does
not deserve the praises it has received. Those executed by the
King of Prussia after raising the siege of Olmutz and after the
surprise at Hochkirch were very well arranged; but they were
for short distances. That of Moreau in 1796, which was
magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but
not at all extraordinary. The retreat of Lecourbe from Engadin
to Altorf, and that of Macdonald by Pontremoli after the
defeat of the Trebbia, as also that of Suwaroff from the
Muttenthal to Chur, were glorious feats of arms, but partial in
character and of short duration. The retreat of the Russian
army from the Niemen to Moscow—a space of two hundred
and forty leagues,—in presence of such an enemy as
Napoleon and such cavalry as the active and daring Murat
commanded, was certainly admirable. It was undoubtedly
attended by many favorable circumstances, but was highly
deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by the
generals who directed its first stages, but also for the
admirable fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who
performed it. Although the retreat from Moscow was a bloody
catastrophe for Napoleon, it was also glorious for him and the
troops who were at Krasnoi and the Beresina,—because the
skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single man should
have returned. In this ever-memorable event both parties
covered themselves with glory.
954
The magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country
to be traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be
encountered, the attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in
flank, superiority or inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the
troops, are circumstances which have a great effect in
deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out of consideration the
skillful arrangements which the generals may make for their
execution.
A general falling back toward his native land along his line of
magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in
good order, and may effect a retreat with more safety than one
compelled to subsist his army in cantonments, finding it
necessary to occupy an extended position. It would be absurd
to pretend that a French army retiring from Moscow to the
Niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry and
draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good
order and with the same steadiness as a Russian army, well
provided with every thing necessary, marching in its own
country, and covered by an immense number of light cavalry.
955
The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging
roads.
956
of this method being chiefly to avoid incumbering the road,
the interval between the departure of the several corps is
sufficiently great when the artillery may readily file off.
Instead of separating the corps by a whole march, the army
would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a
half-march from each other. These masses, moving off in
succession with an interval of two hours between the
departure of their several army-corps, may file off without
incumbering the road, at least in ordinary countries. In
crossing the Saint-Bernard or the Balkan, other calculations
would doubtless be necessary.
957
marching in battle-order. In long days and in hot countries the
best times for marching are the night and the early part of the
day. It is one of the most difficult problems of logistics to
make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts
for armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats.
958
The fourth method, which consists in following concentric
roads, is undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from
each other when the retreat is ordered. Nothing can be better,
in such a case, than to unite the forces; and the concentric
retreat is the only method of effecting this.
959
that an army, leaving the line which leads from the frontiers
to the center of the state, with a view of moving to the right or
the left, may very well pursue a course nearly parallel to the
line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and its base.
It seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel
retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as
eccentric retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all
leading from the strategic front.
However this dispute about words may result, the sole cause
of which was the obscurity of Bulow’s text, I find fault only
with those retreats made along several diverging roads, under
pretense of covering a greater extent of frontier and of
threatening the enemy on both flanks.
960
I invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. When
the leading divisions of the army of Italy were repulsed by
Wurmser, Bonaparte collected them all together at
Roverbella; and, although he had only forty thousand men, he
fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had only to
contend against isolated columns. If he had made a divergent
retreat, what would have become of his army and his
victories? Wurmser, after his first check, made an eccentric
retreat, directing his two wings toward the extremities of the
line of defense. What was the result? His right, although
supported by the mountains of the Tyrol, was beaten at Trent.
Bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and destroyed
that at Bassano and Mantua.
When the Archduke Charles gave way before the first efforts
of the French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany
by an eccentric movement? Was not the salvation of Germany
due to his concentric retreat? At last Moreau, who had moved
with a very extended line of isolated divisions, perceived that
this was an excellent system for his own destruction, if he
stood his ground and fought or adopted the alternative of
retreating. He concentrated his scattered troops, and all the
efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass
which it was necessary to watch throughout the whole length
of a line of two hundred miles. Such examples must put an
end to further discussion. [Ten years after this first refutation
of Bulow’s idea, the concentric retreat of Barclay and
Bagration saved the Russian army. Although it did not
prevent Napoleon’s first success, it was, in the end, the cause
of his ruin.]
961
army has experienced a great defeat in its own country, and
the scattered fragments seek protection within the walls of
fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the sympathies of
the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the army
thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each
province; but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies,
carried on according to the principles of the art, divergent
retreats are simply absurd.
962
the Asturias; and in either case the French cannot move
directly to Madrid, because their line of operations would be
at the mercy of their adversary.
963
as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial on that
ground, the question is still an open one.
964
When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the
operation, a pursuit always follows.
965
may say; for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy
to leave a country, unless in the case when an unexpected
success shall have been gained over him by an army much
inferior to his in numbers.
966
It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at
the distance of half a day’s march from the main body. The
rear-guard would run great risk of being itself cut off, if
farther distant. When, however, there are defiles in its rear
which are held by friends, it may increase the sphere of its
operations and remain a full day’s march to the rear; for a
defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same degree that
it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy. If the
army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally
large, it may remain a day’s march in rear. This will depend,
however, upon its strength, the nature of the country, and the
character and strength of the pursuing force. If the enemy
presses up closely, it is of importance not to permit him to do
so with impunity, especially if the retreat is made in good
order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time to time
and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy’s advanced guard, as
the Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at
Biberach, and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost
always succeeds, on account of the surprise occasioned by an
unexpected offensive return upon a body of troops which is
thinking of little else than collecting trophies and spoils.
967
respective forces opposed will permit. The army may thus file
across the bridge without being too much hurried. The march
of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall have
reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the
main body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for
relieving the rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The
rear-guard will pass through the intervals of the fresh troops
in position and will cross the river; the enemy, coming up and
finding fresh troops drawn up to give him battle, will make no
attempt to press them too closely. The new rear-guard will
hold its position until night, and will then cross the river,
breaking the bridges after it.
968
one extricated more gloriously and skillfully. Pressed by
famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve hundred miles
from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in front and
in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded
by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for
the honor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff
doubtless helped its escape; but the army performed heroic
deeds, for which due praise should be given. We do not know
whether to admire most the plan of operations which brought
up the Russian armies from the extremities of Moldavia, from
Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to a rendezvous
arranged in peace,—a plan which came near effecting the
capture of their formidable adversary,—or the wonderful
firmness of the lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a
way through his enemies.
The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to
be closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point
of passage, and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the
way before the one which is following the rear of your
column can come up. Never place yourself in a position to be
exposed to such danger; for escape in such a case is rare.
969
bridge over the Danube, and brought Napoleon to the brink of
ruin.
970
The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace
in 1674, by Turenne, is a good example, from which may be
learned the best method of conducting such an enterprise, and
the precautions to be taken on the other side to prevent its
success.
971
increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means
of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same
proportion. The important point is to be able to assemble fifty
thousand or sixty thousand men in twenty-four hours. With
such an army in hand, and with the certainty of having it
rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in check, no matter
how strong he may be, until the whole army is assembled.
972
assemble on the center. The same rules are to be observed in
these cases as were laid down for winter quarters.
973
Africa, that of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,—the
Crusades,—the expeditions of the Northmen to England, to
France, and even to Italy?
The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of
the world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men,
except against second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult
to find transportation for one hundred or one hundred and
fifty thousand men with their immense trains of artillery,
munitions, cavalry, etc..
974
It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in
the Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon
the point of being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a
favorable wind, to pass over the flotilla in two days and effect
a landing. But what would become of the army if a storm
should disperse the fleet of ships of war and the English
should return in force to the Channel and defeat the fleet or
oblige it to regain its ports?
975
immense labor in preparation and vast means of
transportation.
976
I can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his
forces too much by attempting to cover every point. It is an
impossibility to line the entire coast with batteries and
battalions for its defense; but the approaches to those places
where large establishments are to be protected must be closed.
Signals should be arranged for giving prompt notice of the
point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable force
should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a
firm foothold.
977
Logistics; Or, the Practical Art of
Moving Armies
Article XLI: A few Remarks on Logistics in General
978
to be waged without camps, movements became more
complicated, and the staff officers had more extended
functions. The chief of staff began to perform the duty of
transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant
points of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the
necessary documents for arranging plans of operations. The
chief of staff was called to the assistance of the general in
arranging his plans, to give information of them to
subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to
supervise their execution both in their ensemble and in their
minute details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected
with all the operations of a campaign.
It appears from what has been said that the old term logistics
is insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that
the real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be
made to instruct them in a proper manner for their
performance, should be accurately prescribed by special
regulations in accordance with the general principles of the
art. Governments should take the precaution to publish
well-considered regulations, which should define all the
duties of staff officers and should give clear and accurate
instructions as to the best methods of performing these duties.
979
The Austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for
their government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and
was better adapted to the old methods of carrying on war than
the present. This is the only work of the kind I have seen.
There are, no doubt, others, both public and secret; but I have
no knowledge of their existence. Several generals—as, for
instance, Grimoard and Thiebaut—have prepared manuals for
staff officers, and the new royal corps of France has issued
several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be
found a complete manual on the subject.
980
2. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the
general-in-chief for different enterprises, as well as plans of
attack in expected battles.
981
here to general instructions and forms, which are not to be
repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.]
982
14. Keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the
flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and
looking out for their return to the main column as soon as
their service on detachment is no longer necessary; giving
them, when required, some center of action, and forming
strategic reserves.
983
An examination of this long list—which might easily be made
much longer by entering into greater detail—will lead every
reader to remark that these are the duties rather of the
general-in-chief than of staff officers. This truth I announced
some time ago; and it is for the very purpose of permitting the
general-in-chief to give his whole attention to the supreme
direction of the operations that he ought to be provided with
staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution.
Their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately
connected; and woe to an army where these authorities cease
to act in concert! This want of harmony is often seen,—first,
because generals are men and have faults, and secondly,
because in every army there are found individual interests and
pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and
hindering them in performing their duties. [The chiefs of
artillery, of engineers, and of the administrative departments
all claim to have direct connection with the general-in-chief,
and not with the chief of staff. There should, of course, be no
hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high
officers and the commander; but he should work with them in
presence of the chief of staff, and send him all their
correspondence: otherwise, confusion is inevitable.]
984
1. The measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing
the army to enter upon active operations in the field include
all those which are likely to facilitate the success of the first
plan of operations. They should, as a matter of course, make
sure, by frequent inspections, that the matériel of all the arms
of the service is in good order: horses, carriages, caissons,
teams, harness, shoes, etc.. should be carefully examined and
any deficiencies supplied. Bridge-trains, engineer-tool trains,
matériel of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move,
ambulances,—in a word, every thing which conies under the
head of matériel,—should be carefully examined and placed
in good order.
The staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be
necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army
to the proper points of assemblage, making every effort to
give such direction to the marches that the enemy shall be
unable to learn from them any thing relative to the projected
enterprise.
985
these works will be built between the first line of defense and
the second base.
986
1813, Napoleon deviated from his usual custom by issuing a
general order.] I have good reasons for knowing that he did
this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air
of mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall
into the hands of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his
plans.
987
3. The army being assembled, and being in readiness to
undertake some enterprise, the important thing will be to
secure as much concert and precision of action as possible,
whilst taking all the usual precaution’s to gain accurate
information of the route it is to pursue and to cover its
movements thoroughly.
988
Under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method
of arranging the movements of the great corps forming the
wings of an army, or of all those corps not marching with the
column attached to the general head-quarters, will be to trust
the details to the experience of the generals commanding
those corps,—being careful, however, to let them understand
that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. It will
then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and
the object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour
at which they will be expected to be in position. They should
be informed what corps are marching either on the same roads
with them or on side-roads to the right or left in order that
they may govern themselves accordingly; they should receive
whatever news there may be of the enemy, and have a line of
retreat indicated to them. [Napoleon never did this, because
he maintained that no general should ever think seriously of
the possibility of being beaten. In many marches it is certainly
a useless precaution; but it is often indispensable.]
989
precautions: it is convenient also, even when they form part
of a second line, for the head of each column to be preceded
by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools for
removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a
few of these workmen should also accompany each train: in
like manner, a light trestle-bridge train will be found very
useful.
990
small streams. A few good marksmen will not be out of place.
A topographical officer should accompany it, to make a
sketch of the country a mile or two on each side of the road.
A body of irregular cavalry should always be attached, to
spare the regular cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they
are best suited to such service.
991
operations. [It may be objected that in some wars, as where
the population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or
impracticable, to organize lines of depots. In such cases they
will certainly be exposed to great dangers; but these are the
very cases where they are most necessary and should be most
numerous. The line from Bayonne to Madrid was such a line,
which resisted for four years the attacks of the
guerrillas,—although convoys were sometimes seized. At one
time the line extended as far as Cadiz.] These commands may
sometimes become strategic reserves, as was explained in Art.
XXIII.; a few good battalions, with the assistance of movable
detachments passing continually between the army and the
base, will generally be able to keep open the communications.
992
way he insured the successful issue of the campaign. The
choice of the decisive point was the result of a skillful
application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements
for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which
originated in his own closet. It has been long claimed that
Berthier framed those instructions which were conceived with
so much precision and usually transmitted with so much
clearness; but I have had frequent opportunities of knowing
that such was not the truth. The emperor was his own chief
staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to a
distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a
straight line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five
miles, taking into account the windings of the roads,) bending
over and sometimes stretched at full length upon his map,
where the positions of his corps and the supposed positions of
the enemy were marked by pins of different colors, he was
able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty
and precision which were astonishing. Turning his dividers
about from point to point on the map, he decided in a moment
the number of marches necessary for each of his columns to
arrive at the desired point by a certain day; then, placing pins
in the new positions, and bearing in mind the rate of marching
that he must assign to each column, and the hour of its setting
out, he dictated those instructions which are alone enough to
make any man famous.
993
Germany having any conception of the object of these
movements which seemed so very complicated.
994
assemble the army at Ratisbon if the war had not actually
begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it in a more
retired position toward Ulm.
The reason for this alternative order was obvious. If the war
had begun, Ratisbon was too near the Austrian frontier for a
point of assembly, as the corps might thus be thrown
separately into the midst of two hundred thousand enemies;
but by fixing upon Ulm as the point of rendezvous the army
would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy
would have five or six marches more to make before
reaching-it,—which was a highly-important consideration as
the parties were then situated.
995
committed by his chief of staff with his contemptible
logistics.
996
right was assigned to Oudinot, who was in the center. These
two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not been
for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful
scene of confusion might have been the result. Thanks to the
supineness of the enemy, the army escaped all disorder,
except that arising from a few detachments following corps to
which they did not belong. The most remarkable feature of
the whole transaction is found in the fact that after such a
blunder Berthier should have received the title of Prince of
Wagram.
997
campaign, had then never seriously thought what would be
proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the
emperor was present himself no one thought of making any
arrangement for the future unless by his direction.
998
One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war
would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect
information of the enemy’s proceedings. In fact, how can any
man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant what his
adversary is about? As it is unquestionably of the highest
importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the
utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of
the chief causes of the great difference between the theory
and the practice of war.
From this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are
simply learned men without a natural talent for war, and who
have not acquired that practical coup-d’oeil which is imparted
by long experience in the direction of military operations. It is
a very easy matter for a school-man to make a plan for
outflanking a wing or threatening a line of communications
upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of both
parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a
skillful, active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements
are a perfect riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an
exhibition of the incapacity of an ordinary general with none
of the resources of genius.
999
officers and light troops; the third, in questioning prisoners of
war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of probabilities. This
last idea I will enlarge upon farther on. There is also a fifth
method,—that of signals. Although this is used rather for
indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming
conclusions as to his designs, it may be classed with the
others.
The partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy’s lines
of operations may doubtless learn something of his
movements; but it is almost impossible to communicate with
them and receive the information they possess. An extensive
system of espionage will generally be successful: it is,
however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the general’s closet
and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for him,
therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with
his own eyes or hears from reliable persons. Even when the
general receives from his spies information of movements, he
still knows nothing of those which may since have taken
place, nor of what the enemy is going finally to attempt.
1000
Suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed
through Jena toward Weimar, and that another has passed
through Gera toward Naumburg: he must still ask himself the
questions, Where are they going, and what enterprise are they
engaged in? These things the most skillful spy cannot learn.
1001
upon the center or one extremity of its front of operations,
there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that can
possibly be made. A mind fully convinced of these truths and
conversant with the principles of war will always be able to
form a plan which will provide in advance for the probable
contingencies of the future. I will cite a few examples which
have come under my own observation.
1002
the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan they
should adopt.”
Returning to our subject, I must state that the use of spies has
been neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern
armies. In 1813 the staff of Prince Schwarzenberg had not a
single sou for expenditure for such services, and the Emperor
Alexander was obliged to furnish the staff officers with funds
from his own private purse to enable them to send agents into
Lusatia for the purpose of finding out Napoleon’s
1003
whereabouts. General Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of
Brunswick in 1806, were no better informed; and the French
generals in Spain often suffered severely, because it was
impossible to obtain spies and to get information as to what
was going on around them.
1004
capture of a French officer and several soldiers of the guard
from the French bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its
correctness. This warning, which decided the march of
Koutousoff to Maloi-Yaroslavitz, prevented Napoleon from
taking the way by Kalouga, where he would have found
greater facilities for refitting his army and would have
escaped the disastrous days of Krasnoi and the Beresina. The
catastrophe which befell him would thus have been lessened,
though not entirely prevented.
1005
enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principles
of the art.
1006
passing at a distance of seven hundred miles, he threw
himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he had
gained two victories under the walls of Ratisbon. Without the
telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single
fact is sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value.
1007
whilst floating at the mercy of the winds above, has led to the
abandonment of this method of gaining information. By
giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with it an
officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy’s
movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in
connection with the balloon, considerable advantages might
be expected from its use. Sometimes the smoke of the battle,
and the difficulty of distinguishing the columns, that look like
liliputians, so as to know to which party they belong, will
make the reports of the balloonists very unreliable. For
example, a balloonist would have been greatly embarrassed in
deciding, at the battle of Waterloo, whether it was Grouchy or
Blücher who was seen coming up by the Saint-Lambert road;
but this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so
much mixed. I had ocular proof of the advantage to be
derived from such observations when I was stationed in the
spire of Gautsch, at the battle of Leipsic; and Prince
Schwarzenberg’s aid-de-camp, whom I had conducted to the
same point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the
prince was prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between
the Pleisse and the Elster. An observer is doubtless more at
his ease in a clock-tower than in a frail basket floating in
mid-air; but steeples are not always at hand in the vicinity of
battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at pleasure.
1008
arranged so as to indicate to the corps of the army the
direction of the enemy’s threatening movements and the point
where they should concentrate to meet him. These signals
may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of descents.
1009
Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed in
regiments and brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps,
drawn up in two lines, each of which had a right and a left
wing. The cavalry was usually placed upon the wings, and the
artillery—which at this period was very unwieldy—was
distributed along the front of each line. The army camped
together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were
two cavalry wings and two infantry wings, if the march was
by wings four columns were thus formed. When they
marched by lines, (which was specially applicable to flank
movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on account of
local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry had
camped in a third line,—which was rare.
1010
The French Revolution introduced the system of divisions,
which broke up the excessive compactness of the old
formation, and brought upon the field fractions capable of
independent movement on any kind of ground. This change
was a real improvement,—although they went from one
extreme to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary
formation of the Romans. These divisions, composed usually
of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, maneuvered and fought
separately. They were very much extended, either to enable
them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an absurd
expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of
the enemy. The seven or eight divisions of an army were
sometimes seen marching on the same number of roads, ten
or twelve miles distant from each other; the head-quarters was
at the center, with no other support than five or six small
regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four hundred men
each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his forces
against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced,
and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry
reserve, could do nothing but order a retreat to rally his
scattered columns.
1011
command of lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the
wings, the center, and the reserve of his army. [Thus, the
army of the Rhine was composed of a right wing of three
divisions under Lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under
Saint-Cyr, and of a left of two divisions under Saint-Suzanne,
the general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve
under his own immediate orders.]
1012
with safety act independently of each other. Besides this, with
three brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the
third is held in reserve,—a manifest advantage. But, if thirty
brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades are better
than when formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades, it
becomes necessary, in order to obtain this perfect divisional
organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry by
one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from
three to two,—which last would be a serious disadvantage,
because the army-corps is much more frequently called upon
to act independently than a division, and the subdivision into
three parts is specially best for that. [Thirty brigades formed
in fifteen divisions of two brigades each will have only fifteen
brigades in the first line, while the same thirty brigades
formed in ten divisions of three brigades each may have
twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. But it
then becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions
and to have but two in a corps,—which would be a faulty
arrangement, because the corps is much more likely to be
called upon for independent action than the division.]
1013
of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those of the
guard and the grenadiers. Besides these, the corps of
Bernadotte and Marmont detached to the right, and that of
Augereau to the left, were ready for action on the flanks. But
after the passage of the Danube at Donauwerth every thing
was changed. Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was
reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to the right
and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was
destroyed.
With seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the
general line in order to furnish detachments, it may happen
that the extreme corps may be detached, so that each wing
1014
might contain but two divisions, and from these a brigade
might be occasionally detached to flank the march of the
army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. This would be a
weak order of battle.
But, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and
of the units of which it is composed, as well as upon the
character of the operations in which it may be engaged, the
arrangement may be greatly varied. I cannot go into these
details, and shall simply exhibit the principal combinations
that may result from forming the divisions in two or three
brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. I have
indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines,
either one behind the other, or side by side.
1015
better for each corps to have its own second line and its
reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other,
under different commanders. However much one general may
be disposed to support a colleague, he will always object to
dividing up his troops for that purpose; and when in the
general of the first line he sees not a colleague, but a hated
rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable he will be very
slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly
needed. Moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out
in a long line cannot execute his maneuvers with near so
much facility as if his front was only half as great and was
supported by the remainder of his own troops drawn up in
rear.
If nine divisions form the main body,—that is, the wings and
the center,—and six others form the reserve and detachments,
fifteen divisions would be required, or thirty
brigades,—which would make one hundred and eighty
battalions, if each regiment contains three battalions. This
supposition brings our army up to one hundred and forty-five
1016
thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. With
regiments of two battalions there would be required one
hundred and twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand
infantry; but if each regiment contains but two battalions,
each battalion should be one thousand men strong, and this
would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty
thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty
thousand men. These calculations show that the strength of
the minor subdivisions must be carefully considered in
arranging into corps and divisions. If an army does not
contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation
by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. An example of
this was Napoleon’s army of 1800.
1017
But I have dwelt sufficiently on these details. It is probable
that, whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions
of an army, the organization into corps will long be retained
by all the great powers of Europe, and calculations for the
arrangement of the line of battle must be made upon that
basis.
1018
retreat, it seems but fair at the hour of battle to assign it a
position more retired than that in front of the line of battle.]
but, as has been previously stated, this will not often happen
with the present method of forming and moving armies. Each
wing has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced
guard of the main or central portion of the army is naturally
furnished by the leading corps: upon coming into view of the
enemy, these advanced bodies return to their proper positions
in line of battle. Often the cavalry reserve is almost entirely
with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent its taking,
when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle by
the character of the position or by the wishes of the
commanding general.
From what has been stated above, my readers will gather that
very great changes of army organization took place from the
time of the revival of the art of war and the invention of
gunpowder to the French Revolution, and that to have a
proper appreciation of the wars of Louis XIV., of Peter the
Great, and of Frederick II., they should consider them from
the stand-point of those days.
One portion of the old method may still be employed; and if,
by way of example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental
rule to post the cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very
good arrangement for an army of fifty or sixty thousand men,
especially when the ground in the center is not so suitable for
the evolutions of cavalry as that near the extremities. It is
usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry to each
infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference
to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the
flanks. If the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to
permit the organization of three corps of this arm, giving one
1019
as reserve to the center and one to each wing, the arrangement
is certainly a good one. If that is impossible, this reserve may
be formed in two columns, one on the right of the left wing
and the other on the left of the right wing. These columns
may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be
threatened. [ This disposition of the cavalry, of course, is
made upon the supposition that the ground is favorably
situated for it. This is the essential condition of every
well-arranged line of battle.]
The artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may,
as formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each
division remaining near it. It may be observed, moreover,
that, the organization of the artillery having been greatly
improved, an advantageous distribution of it may be more
readily made; but it is a great mistake to scatter it too much.
Few precise rules can be laid down for the proper distribution
of artillery. Who, for example, would dare to advise as a rule
the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one
hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate
support, as Napoleon did successfully at Wagram? I do not
desire to go here into much detail with reference to the use of
this arm, but I will give the following rules:—
1020
artillery its greatest effect. Flat or gently-sloping ground is
better.
1021
turn. I shall at another place have more to say as to the
employment of artillery in battles.
1022
insisted so much upon the material advantage to be gained by
thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for it very rarely
happens that such a collision between opposing troops takes
place that mere weight decides the contest. If three ranks turn
their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. This
increase in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the
number of men firing upon the defensive, whilst in the
offensive there is not near so much mobility as in the ordinary
column of attack. It is much more difficult to move eight
hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three:
although in the former case the extent of front is less, the
ranks cannot be kept properly closed.
But the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of
deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of
columns of attack, each battalion being formed in column on
the central division and depending on its force and
impetuosity?
1023
formed in column on the central divisions; 4, in deep masses;
5, in small squares.
1024
having really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of
one hundred men, and four hundred men who could discharge
their fire-arms, for each battalion. Force and mobility would
both be obtained. [In the Russian army the skirmishers are
taken from the third rank of each division,—which makes the
column eight men in depth, instead of twelve, and gives more
mobility. To facilitate rallying the skirmishers on the
columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the whole fourth
division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three
divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against
cavalry there would be twelve ranks.] A battalion of eight
hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of
four divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which
the first alone—and only two ranks of that—discharge their
pieces. Bach battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred
and twenty shots at a volley, it would deliver four hundred.
1025
To give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers
might, it is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed;
but this would be a two-rank formation, and would offer
much less resistance to a charge than the three-rank
formation,—particularly on the flanks. If to remedy this
inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military
men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist
so well as columns. The English squares at Waterloo were,
however, only in two ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic
efforts of the French cavalry, only one battalion was broken. I
will observe, in conclusion, that, if the two-rank formation be
used for the columns of attack, it will be difficult to preserve
that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is scarcely possible
to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to employ
them alternately in the same engagement. It is not probable
that any European army, except the English, will undertake to
use deployed lines in two ranks. If they do, they should never
move except in columns of attack.
1026
into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns
may debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage
upon him while in disorder. This arrangement would probably
be improved by placing the leading divisions of the two
battalions of the wings upon the same line with the central
deployed battalion. There would thus be a half-battalion more
to each regiment in the first line,—a by no means unimportant
thing for the delivery of fire. There may be reason to fear that,
these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their
battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched
against the enemy may not be easily disengaged for that
purpose. The order may be useful in many cases. I have
therefore indicated it.
1027
expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed to a
powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning,
will be thrown into confusion like the column at Fontenoy, or
broken as was the Macedonian phalanx by Paulus Emilius.
1028
proposed above; but there would be less unsteadiness and
more impulsion than if the battalion marched in a deployed
line. It would have the advantage, also, of being prepared to
resist cavalry.
1029
infantry in those dense masses, it is not at all wonderful that
the deployed and marching battalions of which they were
composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have
been repulsed. Would the same result have been witnessed if
they had used columns of attack formed each of a single
battalion doubled on the center? I think not. Before deciding
finally as to the superiority of the shallow order, with its
facility for firing, over the half-deep order and its momentum,
there should be several trials to see how a deployed line
would stand an assault from a formation. These small
columns have always succeeded wherever I have seen them
tried.
What conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said?
1. If the deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for
the offensive. 2. The column of attack of single battalions is
the best formation for carrying a position by assault; but its
depth should be diminished as much as possible, that it may
when necessary be able to deliver as heavy a column of fire as
possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy’s fire: it
ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported
by cavalry. 3. The formation having the first line deployed
and the second in columns is the best-suited to the defensive.
1030
4. Either of them may be successful in the hands of a general
of talent, who knows how to use his troops properly in the
manner indicated in Articles XVI. and XXX.
1031
might be maneuvered in deployed lines. In others, as Italy,
Switzerland, the valley of the Rhine, half of Hungary, it is
barely possible to deploy a division of ten battalions. The
degree of instruction of the troops, and their national
characteristics, may also have an influence upon the system of
formation.
1032
checkerwise; 6. In changing front while using these different
methods of marching; 7. In changes of front executed by
columns of companies at full distance, without
deployment,—a more expeditious method than the others of
changing front, and the one best suited to all kinds of ground.
1033
easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with
the leading ones before reaching the enemy. Moreover, it is
easy to form line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a
small distance only between the leading and following
battalions; for we must not forget that in the checkered order
there are not two lines, but a single one, which is broken, to
avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the marches of
continuous lines.
1034
deployed line and firing until reaching half musket-range,
then throwing forward the columns of the second line through
the intervals of the first.
1035
I will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to
be attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect
the troops as much as possible from the fire of the enemy’s
artillery, not by withdrawing them at inopportune moments,
but by taking advantage of all inequalities and accidents of
the ground to hide them from the view of the enemy. When
the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range, it is
useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is
then to be made. In such cases covers are only suitable for
skirmishers and troops on the defensive.
1036
The use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of
course, somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared
with that of the whole army, and upon its quality. Even
cavalry of an inferior character may be so handled as to
produce very great results, if set in action at proper moments.
1037
succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered
infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army
deficient in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its
retreats extremely difficult.
1038
A general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery
and enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but
the infantry must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a
charge of this character has only a momentary effect, which
must be taken advantage of before the enemy can return
offensively upon the broken cavalry. The beautiful charge of
the French upon Gosa at the battle of Leipsic, October 16, is a
fine example of this kind. Those executed at Waterloo with
the same object in view were admirable, but failed because
unsupported. The daring charge of Ney’s weak cavalry upon
Prince Hohenlohe’s artillery at Jena is an example of what
may be done under such circumstances.
1039
at Waterloo by the English cavalry. The special cavalry of a
corps d’armée may charge at opportune moments, either to
co-operate in a combined attack, or to take advantage of a
false movement of the enemy, or to finish his defeat by
pressing him while in retreat.
1040
important to get over the ground as rapidly as possible. In like
manner, if the cavalry is armed with sabers, it may take the
gallop at two hundred yards from the enemy’s line if it stands
firmly to receive the attack. But if the cavalry is armed with
the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since the
advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the
preservation of good order: in a mêlée the lance is almost
useless.
1041
should be performed at the very moment when the lines come
in collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be
lost. It is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry
commander should have a quick eye, sound judgment, and a
cool head.
The cuirass is the best defensive armor. The lance and the
cuirass of strong leather doubled seem to me the best
armament for light cavalry, the saber and iron cuirass the best
for heavy cavalry. Some military men of experience are
inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances, believing that
such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of
former days, would bear down every thing before them. A
lance would certainly suit them better than the musketoon;
and I do not see why they should not have lances like those of
the light cavalry.
1042
good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. This might have
been supposed settled by the fate of the French dragoons
when fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the Turkish
cavalry fought quite as well dismounted as mounted. It has
been said that the greatest inconvenience resulting from the
use of dragoons consists in the fact of being obliged at one
moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot resist
their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed
with his musket is superior to any horseman in the world.
This argument has more plausibility than real force; for,
instead of attempting to make men believe such contradictory
statements, it would be much more reasonable to tell them
that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave foot-soldiers
may resist such a charge; that victory does not always depend
upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other
things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of
the commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect
of artillery and musketry fire, rain,—mud, even,—have been
the causes of repulses or of victories; and, finally, that a brave
man, whether on foot or mounted, will always be more than a
match for a coward. By impressing these truths upon
dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their
adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. This
is the case with the Turks and the Circassians, whose cavalry
often dismount to fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover,
musket in hand, like foot-soldiers.
1043
dragoons in a single corps, while he did not consider
Napoleon’s unfortunate experiment with French dragoons,
and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment
of these troops at some particular point. It is probable that this
concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving
uniformity to the instruction of the men in their duties as foot
and mounted soldiers, and that in war they were to be
distributed to the different grand divisions of the army. It
cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might result
to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men
on horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as
infantry. It thus appears that the methods of concentration and
of distribution have their respective advantages and
disadvantages. A judicious mean between the extremes would
be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the army and to
the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and then
to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps.
1044
in the checkered lines the distance may be less than for full
lines. In every case the second line should not be full. It
should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there
should be left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that
may be in column upon the flank of each regiment, to
facilitate the passage through of the troops which have been
brought up.
1045
attacked in front. Irregular cavalry is quite as good as the
regular for this purpose, and it may be better.
1046
supposition of the first charge being entirely successful, it is
always probable that the enemy will bring fresh squadrons to
the contest, and the first line must at length be forced to rally
behind the second. The other point is that, with troops and
commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will
remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in
readiness to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy’s line
while his front is also engaged.
1047
lines; but the real cause of Marlborough’s success was his
seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind
Anderkirch and Gette, and his having the good sense to
withdraw thirty-eight squadrons from this wing to reinforce
his left, which in this way had twice as many cavalry as the
French, and outflanked them. But I cheerfully admit that there
may be many exceptions to a rule which I have not laid down
more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry tactics,—a
tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.]
With cavalry still more than with infantry the morale is very
important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the
commander, and the intelligence and bravery of the soldier,
whether in the mêlée or in the rally, will oftener be the means
of assuring a victory than the adoption of this or that
formation. When, however, a good formation is adopted and
the advantages mentioned above are also present, the victory
is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious
formation.
The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed
the old disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry
will in the end get the better over an irregular cavalry which
will avoid all serious encounters, will retreat with the speed of
the Parthians and return to the combat with the same rapidity,
wearing out the strength of its enemy by continual
skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several
exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent
French cavalry seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of
excellent French cavalry, I refer to its impetuous bravery, and
not to its perfection; for it does not compare with the Russian
or German cavalry either in horsemanship, organization, or in
care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude it
1048
possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to
accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular
cavalry. They acquire a habit of moving in an apparently
disorderly manner, whilst they are all the time directing their
individual efforts toward a common object. The most
practiced hussars can never perform such service as the
Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.
1049
Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one
which provides for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of
war by the incorporation of militia; for they may, with the aid
of a few good regular squadrons, be made excellent partisan
soldiers. These militia would certainly not possess all the
qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on
horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a
measure supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is
much better off than any of her neighbors, both on account of
the number and quality of her horsemen of the Don, and the
character of the irregular militia she can bring into the field at
very short notice.
1050
expected to be undisturbed. Much unusual labor is thus made
necessary upon the part of the opponent’s regular cavalry,
which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue.
1051
upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of
approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It
is no less important in the attack and defense of fortified
places or intrenched camps; for it is one of the main reliances
in modern systems of fortification.
1052
accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes,
it may have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the
front.
1053
7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should
endeavor to cross their fire in order to strike the lines
obliquely. If guns can be so placed as to enfilade a line of
troops, a most powerful effect is produced.
1054
11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should
continue its fire to the last moment, being careful not to
commence firing too soon. The cannoneers can always be
sheltered from an infantry attack if the battery is properly
supported. This is a case for the co-operation of the three
arms; for, if the enemy’s infantry is thrown into confusion by
the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and
infantry will cause its destruction.
1055
13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best
advantage is to place in command of it a general who is at
once a good strategist and tactician. This chief should be
authorized to dispose not only of the reserve artillery, but also
of half the pieces attached to the different corps or divisions
of the army. He should also consult with the commanding
general as to the moment and place of concentration of the
mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful
issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of
thus massing his artillery without previous orders from the
commanding general.
1056
prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in
every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely
varied, would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of
instructions. As the object and limits of this Summary do not
allow me to enter upon the consideration of such details, I can
only refer my readers to the best works which do treat of
them.
I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the
different arms be posted in conformity with the character of
the ground, according to the object in view and the supposed
designs of the enemy, and that they be used simultaneously in
the manner best suited to them, care being taken to enable
them to afford mutual support. A careful study of the events
of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations
of war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and
the ability to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of
the properties of the three arms, either single or combined.
Conclusion
I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may
be regarded as fundamental in war. War in its ensemble is not
a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be
regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive
sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole.
Among other things, combats may be mentioned as often
being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they
may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and
inspirations and a thousand other things frequently being the
controlling elements. The passions which agitate the masses
that are brought into collision, the warlike qualities of these
1057
masses, the energy and talent of their commanders, the spirit,
more or less martial, of nations and epochs, [The well-known
Spanish proverb, He was brave on such a day, may be applied
to nations as to individuals. The French at Rossbach were not
the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians at Prentzlow as
at Dennewitz.]—in a word, every thing that can be called the
poetry and metaphysics of war,—will have a permanent
influence on its results.
1058
produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty
thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point.
1059
will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the
same result of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent
commander.] he will undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade
away, and his admirable combinations can only have the
effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost unavoidable
defeat.
These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be
no sound rules in war, the observance of which, the chances
being equal, will lead to success. It is true that theories cannot
teach men with mathematical precision what they should do
in every possible case; but it is also certain that they will
always point out the errors which should be avoided; and this
is a highly-important consideration, for these rules thus
become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding brave
troops, means of almost certain success.
1060
thing to be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order
of battle for the object in view. When we come to consider
the action of masses on the field, the means to be used may be
an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery put in
position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of
infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division
coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they
may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the
enemy’s flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to
diminish the confidence of the adversary. Each of these things
may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. To define
the cases in which each should be preferred is simply
impossible.
1061
battle until the time when a portion of the enemy’s forces are
either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the purpose of
occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places,
covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, etc..
1062
generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural
masters of the art of war.
1063
operations, and how to carry it to a successful termination.
The first of these talents may be a natural gift, but it may also
be acquired and developed by study. The second depends
more on individual character, is rather a personal attribute,
and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved.
1064
the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in Articles
from XVIII. to XXII.
1065
marches, by interior lines, or by a general movement toward
one extremity of the hostile line. I have indicated the cases in
which one or the other of these means is to be preferred. (See
pages 114 and following.)
The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first
attempts must be selected. This is choosing an objective of
operations. There are two very different kinds: some, that are
called territorial or geographical objectives, refer simply to
an enemy’s line of defense which it is desired to get
possession of, or a fortress or intrenched camp to be captured;
the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in the destruction
or disorganization of the enemy’s forces, without giving
attention to geographical points of any kind. This was the
favorite objective of Napoleon. [The objective may be in
some degree political,—especially in cases of wars of
1066
intervention in the affairs of another country; but it then really
becomes geographical.]
1067
than the enemy’s, you can concentrate more rapidly and more
easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle
will be applied. If your positions are interior and central, the
enemy cannot concentrate except by passing by the mass of
your divisions or by moving in a circle around them: he is
then exactly in a condition not to be able to apply the
fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious measure.
But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central
position, that may be surrounded on all sides by forces
superior at every point, is untenable, unless the enemy’s corps
are very far separated from each other, as was the case with
the allied armies in the Seven Years’ War; or unless the
central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its sides,
like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent
the enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of
great numerical inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to
maneuver upon one of the extremities than upon the center of
the enemy’s line, especially if his masses are sufficiently near
to be dangerous to you.
1068
Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)
1069
This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel
near Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1
and 2, under the Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No.
3,) at Menin; next that of Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge;
finally, joining the army of the Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it
beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges, and, with the
assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser from
the lines of Wissembourg.
1070
It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve
along the whole front was the cause of five victories, neither
of which had decisive results, because the attacks were made
in front, and because, when the cities were relieved, the allied
armies not being cut through, and the French reserve moving
on to the different points in succession, none of the victories
was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the French had
based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse,
had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid
marches, had fallen upon the center of those separated corps,
had crushed Benjouski, assailed the Prince of Coburg in his
rear, beaten him, and pursued him vigorously as Napoleon
pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at Ligny in 1815,
the result would have been very different.
1071
the position of the enemy’s masses. It is of importance in
battles to calculate distances with still greater accuracy; for
the results of movements on the battle-field following them
more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every
precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the
line to a dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is
compactly drawn up. Add to these things calmness during the
action; the ability to choose positions for fighting battles in
the manner styled the defensive with offensive returns, (Art.
XXX.;) the simultaneous employment of the forces in striking
the decisive blow, the faculty of arousing the soldiers and
moving them forward at opportune moments; and we have
mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as the general
is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which will
constitute him a skillful tactician.
1072
to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give them
good instructions for avoiding disasters.
1073
When a military man who is a student of his art has become
fully impressed by the advantages procured by moving a
strong mass against successive fractions of the enemy’s force,
and particularly when he recognizes the importance of
constantly directing the main efforts upon decisive points of
the theater of operations, he will naturally desire to be able to
perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. I have
already, in Chapter III., page 70, of the preceding Summary,
indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be
obtained. There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity
which obtains in all the combinations of a methodical war. It
is this:—in every position a general may occupy, he has only
to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the
front.
1074
to decide upon which of these directions he can injure the
enemy most,—for this will always be the best, especially if he
can move upon it without endangering his own
communications. I have dwelt upon this point also in the
preceding Summary.
1075
might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change
front and fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing
its ruin if seriously defeated.
1076
army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly
continue to operate in the same direction; for if you should
make your greatest effort against the right of the enemy’s
front, while your plan was to gain an advantage over his left,
your operations could not result as you anticipated, no matter
how well they might be executed. If, on the contrary, you had
decided to take the left zone, with the intention of crowding
the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to
maneuver by your right in order to accomplish your object;
for if you maneuvered by the left, yourself and not the enemy
would be the party thrown back upon the sea in case of a
reverse.
1077
I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point.
1078
a case the first consideration is to gain the battle, without
having in view the total destruction of the enemy. That
depends upon the relative numerical strength, the morale of
the two armies, and other circumstances, with reference to
which no fixed rules can be laid down.
1079
battle of Wagram is an excellent example in point,—as good,
indeed, as could be desired. I have treated this subject in
Article XXXVII.
1080
leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability,
have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they
were moved imprudently in one direction when they should
have gone in the other! Numerous examples might be
mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny, Waterloo, Bautzen,
Dennewitz, Leuthen.
I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already
been said. To relieve myself in advance of the blame which
will be ascribed to me for attaching too much importance to
the application of the few maxims laid down in my writings, I
will repeat what I was the first to announce:— “that war is
not an exact science, but a drama full of passion; that the
moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and ability,
the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the impulses,
sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great
influence upon it.” I may be permitted also, after having
written the detailed history of thirty campaigns and assisted in
person in twelve of the most celebrated of them, to declare
that I have not found a single case where these principles,
correctly applied, did not lead to success.
1081
inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended for such
misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to
facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring
minds, by pointing out directing principles. Taking this view,
I claim credit for having rendered valuable service to those
officers who are really desirous of gaining distinction in the
profession of arms.
1082
The heroic events which have recently occurred near
Sebastopol have not produced the slightest change in my
opinion. This gigantic contest between two vast intrenched
camps, occupied by entire armies and mounting two thousand
guns of the largest caliber, is an event without precedent,
which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances
which produced it cannot occur again.
1083
adopt the iron ramrod, and at the date of the battle of
Mollwitz (1741) it had not been introduced into the Austrian
service. Frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till
1777, thirty-six years after the battle of Mollwitz. The
advantage of the cylindrical ramrod consisted in this,—that
the soldier in loading saved the time necessary to turn the
ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time could
never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy
loaded once,—all other things being equal.—Translators.]
The discussion which arose at this epoch between the
partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for
troops is known to all military students.
1084
Vendée—rendered this the only appropriate system. How
would it have been possible to attack the camps of Saorgio,
Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed regiments?
1085
by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of
Chambray.
1086
retreat on Hungary. The prince was satisfied that the firm
bearing of his troops was in part due to this mixture of small
columns with deployed battalions.
1087
To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon
himself, in the campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the
formation of the infantry in columns by divisions of two
companies in two ranks, as the most suitable,—which was
identically what I had proposed in 1807.
1088
1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been
formed in four large masses, each one of eight or twelve
battalions. (according to the strength of the regiments,) [We
suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if there
should be three in each regiment, the deep column would then
consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six
ranks.]
1089
2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to
circumstances, be as good for the offensive as for the
defensive, since it was successfully used by Napoleon at the
passage of the Tagliamento.
1090
Toulouse he gained the victory by maneuvers against the
flanks; and at Toulouse Soult’s right wing was beaten while
descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what fate
would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau
of Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to
attack Napoleon in position on the heights of La Belle
Alliance?
1091
advantages, it deserves a trial; and, indeed, it has already been
practiced in Prussia and Austria.
1092
alike be furnished with them, so that in future the advantage
will not be confined to one side.
Will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the
parties will fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until
one or the other shall retreat or be destroyed?
1093
that their destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth
does not increase in any respect their chances of success.
1094
would be attained by forming the first and fourth companies
behind the second and third respectively; but then the
formation would be in two lines rather than in column; and
this is the reason why I would prefer the organization of the
battalion in six companies or three divisions.
1095
It is time to leave these secondary details and return to the
important question at issue.
1096
numbers of this kind of troops and there was a great deal of
rough ground upon which they could be useful as marksmen,
needed some modifications to make it applicable to Belgium.
At Waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a
gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a
magnificent field of fire, and where it produced a terrible
effect: both flanks of this plateau were well protected.
Wellington, from the crest of the plateau, could discover the
slightest movement in the French army, while his own were
hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have
prevented his losing the battle if a number of other
circumstances had not come to his aid.
1097
4. Finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole
Prussian army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if
not the rear, of the French.
1098
2. That if Wellington’s system of deployed lines and
musketry-fire be excellent for the defense, it would be
difficult ever to employ it in an attack upon an enemy in
position.
1099
general principles, but also dependent for its results upon a
number of moral and physical complications.
1100
their land-forces were not in proportion to their naval
strength. Had Greece been a united government instead of a
confederation of republics, and had the navies of Athens,
Syracuse, Corinth, and Sparta been combined instead of
fighting among each other, it is probable that the Greeks
would have conquered the world before the Romans.
1101
Pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of Tarentum and aided by
their fleet, landed in Italy with twenty-six thousand infantry,
three thousand horses, and the first elephants which had been
seen in Italy. This was two hundred and eighty years before
the Christian era.
1102
The victory of Ecnomos—perhaps more extraordinary than
that of Actium—was the first important step of the Romans
toward universal empire. The subsequent descent in Africa
consisted of forty thousand men; but the greater part of this
force being recalled to Sicily, the remainder was overthrown,
and Regulus, being made prisoner, became as celebrated by
his death as by his famous victory.
1103
hundred of her ships. Subsequently Scipio’s brother crossed
the Hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at
Magnesia gained the celebrated victory which surrendered to
the mercy of the Romans the kingdom of Antiochus and all
Asia. This expedition was aided by a victory gained at
Myonnesus in Ionia, by the combined fleets of Rome and
Rhodes, over the navy of Antiochus.
From this time Rome had no rival, and she continued to add
to her power by using every means to insure to her the empire
of the sea. Paulus Emilius in the year 168 B.C. landed at
Samothrace at the head of twenty-five thousand men,
conquered Perseus, and brought Macedonia to submission.
Twenty years later, the third Punic war decided the fate of
Carthage. The important port of Utica having been given up
to the Romans, an immense fleet was employed in
transporting to this point eighty thousand foot-soldiers and
four thousand horses; Carthage was besieged, and the son of
Paulus Emilius and adopted son of the great Scipio had the
glory of completing the victory which Emilius and Scipio had
begun, by destroying the bitter rival of his country.
1104
Sylla landed in Greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five
thousand Romans, and retook Athens; but Mithridates sent in
succession two large armies by the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles: the first, one hundred thousand strong, was
destroyed at Chæronea, and the second, of eighty thousand
men, met a similar fate at Orchomenus. At the same time,
Lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the
cities of Asia Minor, the islands, and particularly of Rhodes,
was prepared to transport Sylla’s army from Sestos to Asia;
and Mithridates, from fear, made peace.
1105
The greatest armament of the latter days of the Roman
republic was that of Augustus, who transported eighty
thousand men and twelve thousand horses into Greece to
oppose Antony; for, besides the numerous transports required
for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty vessels of
war to protect them. Antony was superior in force on land,
but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had
one hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of
Cleopatra’s galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two
thousand choice troops, besides the necessary rowers.
The first five centuries of the Christian era afford but few
events of interest in maritime warfare. The Vandals, having
acquired Spain, landed in Africa, eighty thousand strong,
1106
under Genseric. They were defeated by Belisarius; but,
holding the Balearic Isles and Sicily, they controlled the
Mediterranean for a time.
1107
Between the years 527 and 584, three new expeditions, under
Ida and Cridda, gained England for the Saxons, who divided
it into seven kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries
had elapsed (833) that they were again united under the
authority of Egbert.
A revolution not less important, and one which has left more
durable traces, marked in the North the establishment of the
vast empire now known as Russia. The Varangian princes,
invited by the Novgorodians, of whom Rurik was the chief,
soon signalized themselves by great expeditions.
1108
Forty years subsequently, Igor took the same route with a
fleet said to have consisted of ten thousand boats. Near
Constantinople his fleet, terrified by the effects of the Greek
fire, was driven on the coast of Asia, where the force was
disembarked. It was defeated, and the expedition returned
home.
1109
About this period the Danes were attracted to England by the
hope of pillage; and we are told that Lothaire called their
king, Ogier, to France to be avenged of his brothers. The first
success of these pirates increased their fondness for this sort
of adventure, and for five or six years their bands swarmed on
the coasts of France and Britain and devastated the country.
Ogier, Hastings, Regner, and Sigefroi conducted them
sometimes to the mouths of the Seine, sometimes to the
mouths of the Loire, and finally to those of the Garonne. It is
even asserted that Hastings entered the Mediterranean and
ascended the Rhone to Avignon; but this is, to say the least,
doubtful. The strength of their fleets is not known: the largest
seems to have been of three hundred sail.
1110
although they were much more assimilated to the Saxons than
to the French in language and customs. Ivar, after pillaging
the kingdom, established his family in Northumberland.
Alfred the Great, at first beaten by Ivar’s successors,
succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the
submission of the Danes.
1111
which country he returned to attack Scotland. When he died,
he divided the kingdom between his three children, according
to the usage of the times.
1112
At the same time, another William, surnamed Bras-de-fer,
Robert Guiscard, and his brother Roger, conquered Calabria
and Sicily with a handful of troops,(1058 to 1070.)
1113
Godfrey afterward led them across Asia and Syria as far as
Jerusalem, where he founded a kingdom.
Conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps
laid for him by the Turks, and was defeated in detachments in
several battles by the Sultan of Iconium. Louis, more
fortunate, defeated the Turks on the banks of the Mender; but,
being deprived of the support of Conrad, and his army being
annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage of
defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to
Attalia, on the coast of Pamphylia, where he endeavored to
embark his army. The means furnished by the Greeks were
insufficient, and not more than fifteen or twenty thousand
men arrived at Antioch with the king: the remainder either
perished or fell into the hands of the Saracens.
1114
This feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks
of the climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although
they were continually aided by small bodies brought over
from Europe by the Italian ships; and they were again about
to yield under the attacks of Saladin, when the court of Rome
succeeded in effecting an alliance between the Emperor
Frederick Barbarossa and the Kings of France and England to
save the Holy Land.
The emperor was the first to set out. At the head of one
hundred thousand Germans, he opened a passage through
Thrace in spite of the formal resistance of the Greeks, now
governed by Isaac Angelus. He marched to Gallipolis, crossed
the Dardanelles, and seized Iconium. He died in consequence
of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been pretended,
was the Cydnus. His son, the Duke of Swabia, annoyed by the
Mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to Ptolemais
scarcely six thousand men.
1115
Twelve years later, a new Crusade was determined upon,
(1203.) Part of the Crusaders embarked from Provence or
Italy; others, led by the Count of Flanders and the Marquis of
Montferrat, proceeded to Venice, with the intention of
embarking there. The party last mentioned were persuaded by
the skillful Dandolo to aid him in an attack upon
Constantinople, upon the pretext of upholding the rights of
Alexis Angelus, the son of Isaac Angelus, who had fought the
Emperor Frederick and was the successor of those
Comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the
armies of Conrad and Louis VII.
1116
The court of Rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal
of Christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all
the fruits, encouraged the German princes to uphold the
tottering realm at Jerusalem. The Emperor Frederick and the
Landgrave of Hesse embarked at Brundusium in 1227, at the
head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. The landgrave, and
afterward Frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put in at
Tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the
presumption of Gregory IX., who excommunicated him
because he was too slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a
later date proceeded with ten thousand men, thus giving way
to the fear inspired by the pontifical thunders.
1117
swept off half his army in a few months, and himself was one
of its victims. The King of Sicily, having arrived with
powerful reinforcements at the time of Louis’s death, and
desiring to carry back the remains of the army to his island of
Sicily, encountered a tempest which caused a loss of four
thousand men and twenty large ships. This prince was not
deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of the
Greek empire and of Constantinople, which seemed a prize of
greater value and more readily obtained. Philip, the son and
successor of Saint Louis, being anxious to return to France,
would have nothing to do with that project. This was the last
effort. The Christians who were abandoned in Syria were
destroyed in the noted attacks of Tripoli and Ptolemais: some
of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at Cyprus
and established themselves at Rhodes.
1118
terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sail to
make a landing upon the island of Negropont, which he
carried by assault. A second attempt upon Rhodes, executed,
it is stated, at the head of a hundred thousand men, by one of
his ablest lieutenants, was a failure, with loss to the assailants.
Mohammed was preparing to go to that point himself with an
immense army assembled on the shores of Ionia, which
Vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death
closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect.
1119
channels and to establish an entirely new system of colonial
dependencies.
1120
and furnished means for obtaining it. At this period the Turks
were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and the
military art in general as the Europeans. They reached the
apex of their greatness under Solyman I., who besieged and
captured Rhodes (1552) with an army stated to have reached
the number of one hundred and forty thousand men,—which
was still formidable even upon the supposition of its strength
being exaggerated by one-half.
The allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, Don John of
Austria, brother of Philip II., and Andrea Doria, attacked the
Turkish fleet at the entrance of the Gulf of Lepanto, near the
promontory of Actium, where Antony and Augustus once
fought for the empire of the world. The Turkish fleet was
almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred vessels and
1121
thirty thousand Turks were captured or perished, (1571.) This
victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the Turks, but
was a great check in their career of greatness. However, they
made such vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former
one was sent to sea during the next year. Peace terminated
this contest, in which such enormous losses were sustained.
Philip II., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of
Lepanto on account of the success he had gained in France by
his diplomacy and by the folly of the adherents of the League,
deemed his arms irresistible. He thought to bring England to
his feet. The invincible Armada intended to produce this
effect, which has been so famous, was composed of an
expeditionary force proceeding from Cadiz, including,
according to Hume’s narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven
vessels, armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty
bronze cannon, and carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in
addition to eleven thousand sailors. To these forces was to be
added an army of twenty-five thousand men which the Duke
of Parma was to bring up from the Netherlands by way of
Ostend. A tempest and the efforts of the English caused the
failure of this expedition, which, although of considerable
magnitude for the period when it appeared, was by no means
entitled to the high-sounding name it received: it lost thirteen
1122
thousand men and half the vessels before it even came near
the English coast.
1123
ascendency under the orders of Grimani, when a third of it
was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral
himself perished.
The siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of
Troy, and each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on
the part of the Turks to carry succor to their army and by
naval victories gained by the Venetians. The latter people had
kept up with the advance of naval tactics in Europe, and thus
were plainly superior to the Mussulmans, who adhered to the
old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every attempt
to issue from the Dardanelles. Three persons of the name of
Morosini, and several Mocenigos, made themselves famous
in this protracted struggle.
1124
thousand men, at whose head he conducted the attack in a
vigorous manner.(1667.)
1125
The struggle between Louis XIV., Holland, and England
gives examples of great maritime operations, but no
remarkable descents. That of James II. in Ireland (1690) was
composed of only six thousand Frenchmen, although De
Tourville’s fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line,
carrying five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine
thousand sailors. A grave fault was committed in not
throwing at least twenty thousand men into Ireland with such
means as were disposable. Two years later, De Tourville had
been conquered in the famous day of La Hogue, and the
remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to
return through the instrumentality of a treaty which required
their evacuation of the island.
1126
This force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five
thousand Cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of
the Caucasus. The czar then seized Derbent, besieged Bakou,
and finally made a treaty with one of the parties whose
dissensions at that time filled with discord the empire of the
Soofees: he procured the cession of Astrabad, the key of the
Caspian Sea and, in some measure, of the whole Persian
empire.
1127
The American war (1779) was the epoch of the greatest
maritime efforts upon the part of the French. Europe was
astonished to see this power send Count d’Estaing to America
with twenty-five ships of the line, while at the same time M.
Orvilliers, with a Franco-Spanish fleet of sixty-five ships of
the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with three
hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at
Havre and St. Malo.
This new armada moved back and forth for several months,
but accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to
port.
1128
At a later date, Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt, consisting of
twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates,
and four hundred transports, obtained great successes at first,
which were followed by sad reverses. The Turks, in hopes of
expelling him, landed fifteen thousand men at Aboukir, but
were all captured or driven into the sea, notwithstanding the
advantages this peninsula gave them of intrenching
themselves and waiting for reinforcements. This is an
excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive
under similar circumstances.
1129
In 1801, Abercrombie, after threatening Ferrol and Cadiz,
effected a descent into Egypt with twenty thousand
Englishmen. The results of this expedition are well known.
1130
all,—forty thousand land-forces and thirty thousand sailors. It
did not succeed, on account of the incapacity of the leader.
1131
Rome, and Switzerland, to defend their homes against still
more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an English
expedition more extensive than the other had not been
entirely defeated by the militia of Louisiana and other states
under the orders of General Jackson.
1132
than five hundred vessels of war and transports were
employed. The fleet sailed from Toulon.
1133
necessary to have land-forces. A French corps of ten thousand
men was at once dispatched to Bomarsund under General
Baraguay-d’Hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced.
Later in the same year, the great expedition to the Crimea was
executed; and with reference to it the following facts are
mentioned, in order to give an idea of its magnitude:—
1134
May 8, 1855, General La Marmora arrived at Balaklava with
fifteen thousand Sardinians.
1135
millions of projectiles, and nine million pounds of powder.
There were sent to the army three thousand tons of powder,
seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and
seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight
thousand war-rockets.
On the day of the final assault there were one hundred and
eighteen batteries, which during the siege had consumed
seven million pounds of powder. They required one million
sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions.
1136
In 1859, the Spaniards made a descent upon Morocco with a
force of forty thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry,
and eighty pieces of artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war
with three hundred and twenty-seven guns, besides
twenty-four gun-boats and numerous transports.
1137
the ultimate result of a struggle (if, indeed, one be attempted
by the Mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three of the most
powerful states of Europe are arrayed against the feeble and
tottering republic of Mexico.]
1138